Judicial Usurpation and the Constitution: Historical and Contemporary Issues Robert P
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No. 871 Delivered February 17, 2005 April 11, 2005 Judicial Usurpation and the Constitution: Historical and Contemporary Issues Robert P. George Judicial power can be used, and has been used, for both good and ill. However, in a basically just demo- Talking Points cratic republic, judicial power should never be exer- • Decisions in which the courts usurp the cised lawlessly—even for desirable ends. Judges are authority of the people are not merely incor- not legislators. The legitimacy of their decisions, par- rect; they are themselves unconstitutional. ticularly those decisions that displace legislative judg- ments, depends entirely on the truth of the judicial • Until now, a social consensus regarding the basic definition of marriage meant that claim that the court was authorized by law to settle we did not need to resolve the question at the matter. When this claim is false, a judicial edict is the federal level. not redeemed by its good consequences, for any such edict constitutes a usurpation of the just authority of • The judicial redefinition of marriage is a crime with two victims. The first and obvi- the people to govern themselves through the consti- ous victim is the institution of marriage tutional procedures of deliberative democracy. Deci- itself, and the second is the system of delib- sions in which the courts usurp the authority of the erative democracy. However, there will people are not merely incorrect; they are themselves likely be a third victim—namely, federalism. unconstitutional. And they are unjust. • If we do not have a federal marriage The First Test amendment, then marriage will erode quickly by judicial imposition or by the There were, and are, scholars and statesmen who gradual integration into the formal and believe that courts should not be granted the power informal institutions of society of same-sex to invalidate legislation in the name of the Constitu- couples. tion. In reaction to Chief Justice John Marshall’s opin- ion in the 1803 case of Marbury v. Madison,1 Thomas Jefferson warned that judicial review would lead to a form of despotism.2 It is worth remembering that the power of judicial review is nowhere mentioned in the Constitution. The courts themselves have claimed This paper, in its entirety, can be found at: this power based on inferences drawn from the Con- www.heritage.org/research/legalissues/hl871.cfm stitution’s identification of itself as supreme law, and The Russell Kirk Memorial Lectures 3 the nature of the judicial office. Yet even if we credit Produced by the B. Kenneth Simon Center for these inferences, as I am inclined to do, it must be American Studies Published by The Heritage Foundation said that early supporters of judicial review, including 214 Massachusetts Avenue, NE Washington, DC 20002–4999 (202) 546-4400 • heritage.org Nothing written here is to be construed as necessarily reflect- ing the views of The Heritage Foundation or as an attempt to aid or hinder the passage of any bill before Congress. No. 871 Delivered February 17, 2005 Chief Justice Marshall himself, did not imagine of Dred Scott v. Sandford.5 That opinion, which that the federal and state courts would exercise the among other things declared even free blacks to be sweeping powers they have come to exercise today. non-citizens, and Congress to be powerless to Jefferson and the critics were, it must be conceded, restrict slavery in the federal territories, intensified more prescient.123 the debate about slavery and dramatically As for Marshall’s ruling in Marbury, a good case increased the prospects for civil war. can be made that the power he actually claimed Dred Scott was a classic case of judicial usurpa- for the courts was quite limited. Remember: What tion. Without constitutional warrant, the justices the Supreme Court decided in that case was that manufactured a right to hold property in slaves the Court itself was forbidden by the Constitution that the Constitution nowhere mentioned or could to exercise original jurisdiction putatively con- reasonably be construed as implying. Of course, ferred upon it by the Judiciary Act of 1789. Mar- Taney and those who joined him in the majority shall reasoned that the Constitution, in Article III, depicted their decision as a blow for constitutional fixed the Court’s original jurisdiction, and Con- rights and individual freedoms. They were protect- gress was powerless under the Constitution to ing the minority (slaveholders) against the tyranny expand it. According to the contemporary consti- of a moralistic majority who would deprive them tutional scholar Robert Lowry Clinton, all this of their property rights. The reality was that the meant was that the Court was relying on its own judges were exercising what in a later case would interpretation of the Constitution in deciding what be called “raw judicial power”6 to settle a morally it could and could not do within its own sphere. charged debate over a divisive social issue in the This was entirely consistent with its recognizing a way they personally favored. like power of the other branches of government to It took a civil war and the constitutional amend- interpret the Constitution for themselves in decid- ments (especially the Fourteenth Amendment) ing what they could and could not do in carrying 4 made possible by the Union victory to reverse out their constitutional functions. Dred Scott v. Sandford. However that may be, the power of the judiciary The Dred Scott decision is a horrible blight on has expanded massively. This expansion began slowly. the judicial record. We should remember, though, Even if we read Marbury more broadly than Professor that while it stands as an example of judicial activ- Clinton reads it, treating it as a case in which the jus- ism in defiance of the Constitution, it is also possi- tices presumed to tell the Congress what it could and ble for judges to dishonor the Constitution by could not do, it would be another fifty-four years refusing to act on its requirements. Judges who are before the Supreme Court would do it again. And it more devoted to a cause than to the Constitution could not have chosen a worse occasion. can—and sometimes have—gone wrong by letting From Dred Scott to Brown stand what should have been struck down. 7 In 1857, Chief Justice Roger Brooke Taney In the 1896 case of Plessy v. Ferguson, for handed down an opinion for the Court in the case example, legally sanctioned racial segregation 1. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 2. See Thomas Jefferson’s criticism of claims by the judiciary of authority to bind the other branches of government in matters of constitutional interpretation (“making the judiciary a despotic branch”) in his letter to Abigail Adams, September 11, 1804, in 11 Writings of Thomas Jefferson (Albert E. Bergh, ed., 1905), pp. 311–313. 3. See Marbury v. Madison. 4. See generally Robert Lowry Clinton, Marbury v. Madison and Judicial Review (University of Kansas Press, 1991). 5. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856). 6. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 222 (1973) (Justice Byron White, dissenting). page 2 No. 871 Delivered February 17, 2005 was upheld by the Supreme Court despite the Citing an individual right to “freedom of con- Fourteenth Amendment’s promise of equality. tract” purportedly implied by the Due Process Plessy was the case in which the justices Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the justices announced their infamous “separate but equal” struck down the law as an unconstitutional interfer- doctrine, a doctrine that was a sham from the ence by the state in private contractual relations start. Separate facilities for blacks in the South between employers and employees. The Court jus- were then, and had always been, inferior in qual- tified its action with a story not dissimilar to the one ity. Indeed, the whole point of segregation was to it told in Dred Scott. Again, it claimed to be protect- embody and reinforce an ideology of white ing the minority (owners) against the tyranny of the supremacy that was utterly incompatible with the democratic majority. It was striking a blow for indi- principles of the Declaration of Independence vidual civil rights and liberties. It was restricting and the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitu- government to the sphere of public business and tion. The maintenance of a regime of systematic getting it out of private relations between compe- inequality was the object, point, and goal of seg- tent adults—namely, owners and workers. regation. As Justice John Harlan wrote in dissent, The truth, of course, is that the Court was sub- segregation should have been declared unlawful stituting its own laissez-faire philosophy of the because the Constitution of the United States is 8 morality of economic relations for the contrary colorblind and recognizes no castes. judgment of the people of New York acting Lochner and Freedom of Contract through their elected representatives in the state legislature. On the controversial moral question of Although more than a half-century would have what constituted authentic freedom and what to pass before the Supreme Court got around to amounted to exploitation, unelected and demo- correcting its error in Plessy in the 1954 case of 9 cratically unaccountable judges, purporting to act Brown v. Board of Education, that did not prevent in the name of the Constitution, simply seized the Court in the meantime from repeating the decision-making power.11 Under the pretext of usurpations that had brought it to shame in the preventing the majority from imposing its morality Dred Scott case. The 1905 case Lochner v. New 10 on the minority, the Court imposed its own moral- York concerned a duly enacted New York statute ity on the people of New York and the nation.