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The Role of Existentialism in Ethical Business Decision-Making

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The Role of Existentialism in Ethical Business Decision-Making University of Calgary PRISM: University of Calgary's Digital Repository Haskayne School of Business Haskayne School of Business Research & Publications 2000 The role of existentialism in ethical business decision-making Agarwal, James; Malloy, David C. Wiley Online Library Agarwal, J. and Cruise Malloy, D. (2000), The role of existentialism in ethical business decision-making. Business Ethics: A European Review, 9: 143–154. doi: 10.1111/1467-8608.00185 http://hdl.handle.net/1880/50307 journal article Downloaded from PRISM: https://prism.ucalgary.ca Business Ethics: A European Review The role of existentialism in ethical business decision-making James Agarwal and David Cruise Malloy Introduction tioner and scholar both implicitly and in recent years explicitly (Brady 1985, Hunt and Vitell 1986, Models of ethical decision making in business Beauchamp and Bowie 1997, Kavathatzopoulos have generally been developed from means- or 1993, Hosmer 1996, Weiss 1998). process-oriented and ends-oriented theoretical In this paper we argue for the inclusion of foundations (Dunfee, Smith and Ross 1999, Hunt another theoretical approach to ethical decision- and Vitell 1986, Ferrell, Gresham and Fraedrich making. We do not argue for the exclusion of the 1989, Malhotra and Miller 1998, Murphy 1999). traditional deontological and teleological ap- These two approaches have provided the decision- proaches but for the inclusion and functional maker with ethical perspectives that focus upon awareness of existentialism (i.e. for a three-faced the established principles of ethical conduct and Janus head). The mythical Janus head is the upon the consequences of one's actions. Though Roman god of the city gates with two faces (Brady there exist many variations and attempts at 1985). One face looks inward to protect the hybridisation within these two approaches ± for citizens within the city (or corporate) wall, the example Ross's prima facie theory (Ross 1975), other face looks outward to protect the citizens essentially they lead toward decisions that are from external harm. To continue with this duty-bound (deontological) and/or results-bound metaphor, the third or existential face would (teleological). encourage the decision-maker to look inward The emphasis upon these two approaches in individually, introspectively, and meditatively the business context is not surprising as they (Heidegger 1966) toward authenticity, freedom, methodologically suit the business environment. and accountability. Thus, while deontology and For example, the deontological approach is rule- teleology have the power to influence behaviour based: adherence to the individual firm's code of either through group codes of conduct or by ethics or the profession's code of ethics means that adherence to cost-benefit ratios, existentialism the person is acting deontologically. Similarly, if promotes the organisational member's sense of decisions are grounded in a teleological perspec- individuality, freedom and responsibility. By tive, then the decision-maker is making a rational encouraging each of these three `faces', it may be calculation that factors in the greatest good for the possible for member behaviour to reflect organi- firm (local utilitarianism) and/or for the common- sational principles and organisational goals, as weal (cosmopolitan utilitarianism) (Victor and well as their own genuine sense of ethical conduct. Cullen 1987, 1988). This Janus-headed approach In the proposed model of ethical decision-making, has more or less defined the `theoretical universe' we demonstrate how this comprehensive approach of business and marketing ethics for the practi- can be operationalised. # Blackwell Publishers Ltd. 2000. 108 Cowley Road, Oxford OX4 1JF, UK and 350 Main St, Malden, MA 02148, USA. 143 Volume 9 Number 3 July 2000 The purpose of this paper is to present a the greatest good. Is it profiting? Is it organis- comprehensive approach to business ethics which ational survival? Is it organisational efficiency? Is will enable the decision-maker to appreciate the it clan-like benevolence among employees? Is it inter-relatedness and multidimensionality of ethi- social responsibility? cal behaviour in organisations. We present an Despite the difficulty of establishing appropriate integrated model which enables the decision- goals, this theory does provide an objective maker to incorporate existentialism in the ethical method for choosing among ends. Initially termed decision-making process and to identify the role of the `hedonistic calculus', its contemporary termin- moderating factors as the environment through ology is the rational decision making process. This which s/he gains experience. The decision-making process involves the identification of the problem, process and the moderating factors are illustrated the generation of alternatives, the quantitative by examining the ethical implications of a business evaluation of alternatives, the selection and marketing practice, namely, Negative Option implementation of the `best' alternative, and the Marketing (NOM). evaluation of the performance of this decision. While this process has proved to be an efficient method of resolving many organisational dilem- Traditional Theoretical Approaches to mas, it is often found to be lacking when ethical Ethical Decision-Making dilemmas are considered. The impact of utilitarian (i) Teleology decisions upon the individual or minority presents a further problem. If the greatest good for the The teleological approach encompasses a number greatest number results in the obfuscation or of ethical theories all of which converge on a outright denial of individual rights, then the use of similar theme ± what is ethically good is what utilitarianism as an exclusive theoretical outlook achieves the `best' end. The nature of this `best' may not be acceptable to those whose rights are end differs; for example, hedonists argue that the being denied (Racheals 1986). individual's goal ought to be that which involves the least pain and most pleasure (physical and/or (ii) Deontology intellectual). Utilitarians, in contrast, insist that the end to be sought is the greatest pleasure or The deontological approach also subsumes a good and least pain or bad for the greatest number of different perspectives that share a number. Relativism (e.g. cultural relativism) common theme. This theme is the duty to abide suggests that the determination of the best end by principles (Beauchamp and Bowie 1997, depends entirely upon the situation. Raphael 1989, Weiss 1998). For example, the From the perspective of the organisation, the social contract theory argues that members of utilitarian theory is the most frequently advocated. society collectively agree upon certain norms of It is in fact the philosophical basis for our con- behaviour (Dunfee et al. 1999, Rousseau 1762/ temporary notion of democracy as well as the 1979). If someone steps outside the acceptable underpinning for microeconomic theory (Hosmer societal standard, he or she is acting unethically 1996). The utilitarian view can be considered from according to the pre-established agreement. A pro- local and cosmopolitan organisational perspec- fessional code of ethics is an example of a social tives (Gouldner 1957, Victor and Cullen 1988). contract. A second example of deontology is divine The local utilitarian view is oriented toward the deontology (Brody 1983). Here divine authority in greatest good for the firm, whereas the cosmopo- the form of religious texts and its accompanying litan view would encompass a broader perspective doctrine (e.g., the Bible) gives rules, command- that extends beyond the firm (i.e., the greatest ments, or principles for us to abide by. We can good for society-at-large). However, the problem know what is ethical by following the rules of God. with utilitarianism at both local and cosmopolitan A third type of deontology is Kantian deontology levels is that it is often difficult to assess and define (Racheals 1986, Raphael 1989). This perspective 144 # Blackwell Publishers Ltd. 2000 Business Ethics: A European Review views universal ethical principles and duty as that becomes an inauthentic `agent' for an external which any rational person could determine using cause (the firm's internal/local formal and in- his or her intuitive ability to reason ethically formal culture). (Kant's (1788/1977) categorical imperative). The deontological perspective can be observed at both local and cosmopolitan levels. Deontology Existentialism at both levels provides the decision-maker with a consistent and cognitively uncomplicated task: Existentialism is an eclectic school of thought when a dilemma arises, it can be dealt with by (Kaufmann 1975). Though existential writers referring to the appropriate rule. Unfortunately, differ dramatically, two common conceptual organisational life is not that simple; dilemmas threads exist which tie together their ideas which cannot be easily or immediately resolved by regarding the nature of ethical conduct. The first the local or cosmopolitan rulebook occur on a is the belief in the freedom of the individual to daily basis. Jaspers, referring to decision-making create his or her `essence'. Sartre stated that the situations, states that `in vain a way out is sought individual's `existence precedes essence' (Sartre either in obedience to rules and regulations or 1957: 15). This implies that we first exist as humans in thoughtlessness' (Jaspers 1975: 167). In such and we then become whom we decide to be cases
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