The Labour Process and the Emergence of Workers' Mobilisation

New Sociological Perspectives 2021, Vol. 1, No. 1, 96–115 https://nsp.lse.ac.uk/

The Labour Process and the Emergence of Workers’ Mobilisation in Delivery Platforms in Argentina: A Mixed Methods Study.

Sofía Daniela Negri*

Abstract

Studies have analysed workers’ mobilisation in the platform economy from a labour process perspective. This paper contributes new empirical and analytical insights to that subfield by analysing both the working conditions and the control mechanisms implemented by management in the labour process to describe and examine the causal mechanisms behind the emergence of delivery platform workers’ mobilisation in companies such as Rappi and Glo- vo in Argentina. Moreover, research with this approach has focused on countries from the Global North, where economic and labour indicators show a better performance in comparison to countries from the Global South, such as Argentina. There, the high unemployment and informal labour rates made workers’ mobilisation unlikely to happen. The paper uses a mixed methods approach, drawing on secondary survey data and primary semi-structured interviews with workers. Conducting bivariate analysis and regression analysis on the survey data and thematic analysis on the interview data, the paper finds that workers’ common experiences create the basis for collective identity and that the support networks they build to compensate for companies’ lack of protection produce solidarity bonds between them. These networks enable the collectivisation of workers’ grievances and the diffusion of mobilisation across platforms. Workers’ grievances are a product of the contradiction between their classification as independent contractors and the control exercised by platforms over them in the labour process. Although delivery platforms do not have a delimited workplace, they operate within a delimited geographical area, which allows workers to meet each other. Future research could study whether the causal mechanisms for mobilisation found here apply to other location-based platforms.

Keywords labour process, mobilisation, delivery platforms, Argentina

* Sofía Daniela Negri is a graduate of the Social Research Methods Masters Programme at the London School of Economics and Political Science and received her BSc in Sociology from the Universidad de Buenos Aires. She is part of the research programme in social class analysis at the Research Institute Gino Germani, UBA. Her research interests encompass the geographies of platform work, the labour process and workers’ political organisation. The Labour Process and the Emergence of Workers’ Mobilisation in Delivery Platforms in Argentina – New Sociological Perspectives 97

Introduction

The Unexpected Breadth of Mobilisation in Delivery Platforms

Since the 2016 first strike in London, delivery platform workers have mobilised continu- ously across the world (Cant 2019; Hidalgo Cordero & Salazar Daza 2021; Tassinari & Mac- carrone 2020; Vandaele 2018; Veen, Barratt & Goods 2020). Mobilisation of delivery platform workers is puzzling given the inexistence of a delimited workplace, the non-standard employment relationship, the individual and competitive character of work and the im- plementation of algorithmic management (Berg et al. 2018; Kellogg, Valentine & Christin, 2020; Woodcock 2017). This paper analyses how the labour process and the working conditions in delivery platforms produce workers mobilisation in Argentina. It offers new empirical data to supplement existing literature on the topic with a mixed methods approach and by analysing a country with a highly informal labour market and a history of precarious workers mobilisation.

Theoretical Framework for Mobilisation

This paper aims at contributing to the growing literature that analyses work and mobilisation in the platform economy from the labour process perspective (Gandini 2019; Tassinari & Maccarrone 2020; Veen, Barratt & Goods 2020). Fantasia (1988) and Atzeni (2010) claim that solidarity bonds emerge in the workplace. Specifically, the Marxist perspective understands that workers’ solidarity develops at the point of production in the labour process (Atzeni 2010). The labour process is the site of capital valorisation achieved by the transformation of labour power into actual labour. To secure this transformation, management implements different control mechanisms (Braverman 1974). However, the labour process is also the space where workers cooperate with each other to produce, developing a sense of mutual dependence and solidarity. This contradiction between subordination and cooperation leads to the recognition that ‘a) the employer has the power to order the forms and times for the execution of the work; b) who gives this order is, by their very nature, on the other side’ (Atzeni 2010,: 28). Collective action is the process through which, under extreme exploitation circumstances, solidarity between workers changes from passive to active.

Labour Process and Casual Work in Platforms

Platforms present themselves as digital infrastructures that enable the meeting between supply and demand of some service (Srnicek 2017). As such, they recognise two types of users: clients and providers. Providers are not conceived as employees but as independent contractors. Moreover, platform work introduces changes within the labour process: 1) platform workers do not share a delimited workplace (Woodcock 2017); 2) the nature of the tasks they perform is individual and competitive (workers compete to get assigned with tasks in the platform), and 3) control is not implemented by managers but by algorithms (Duggan et al. 2019). While the first two represent obstacles for solidarity development between workers, the third deepens control over them. Algorithm technology provides an instantaneous and comprehensive form of control, enabled by processing workers data in the platform. It also generates an asymmetry of information given that workers do not know what data is used by the algorithms and how it affects their work (Gandini 2019; Pas- quale 2015; Scholz 2017). ‘Employers can use algorithms to help direct workers by restricting and recommending, evaluate workers by recording and rating and discipline workers by replacing and rewarding.’ (Kellogg, Valentine & Christin 2020: 368). This produces a contradiction between the level of control exercised by platforms over workers and their classification as independent contractors (De Stefano 2016). In that sense, De Stefano points out that platform work is part of a larger trend towards work casualisation. In this trend, workers are hired for short tasks, paid by task and let go. They are not recognised as employees, meaning they do not fully access the social security rights of a standard employment relationship (Berg et al. 2018). This situation is aggravated by the inexistence of platform work regulations, which generates a high level of job insecurity and income instability for workers. Joyce (2020) also points out that while platform companies present a triangular relation between clients, providers (workers) and the platform, the The Labour Process and the Emergence of Workers’ Mobilisation in Delivery Platforms in Argentina – New Sociological Perspectives 98

subsumption of labour and the cash nexus between workers and platform point to a binary capital-labour relationship. This allows to analyse the emergence of resistance in platforms as part of broader labour-capital conflicts from a Marxist perspective. Among the different types of platforms, delivery ones are location-based (Graham & Wood- cock 2018). They operate within a delimited area, which makes work in them shaped by the specific context and allows workers to meet each other. This has two main implications for the emergence of solidarity and mobilisation. First, location-based platforms are affected by the characteristics of the labour market where they operate. In the Argentine case in 2018, the labour market was hit by an economic crisis and recession, with increasing rates of informal work and unemployment. Moreover, since 2015, Venezuelan immigration to 1 Available at http://argen- Argentina has grown considerably.1 Most of these migrants have a non-permanent resi- tina.iom.int/co/sites/de- fault/files/publicaciones/ dence status, which affects their chances of participating in the labour market and coerces Informe%20Final%20Ven- them into precarious jobs (Lewis et al. 2015). Work in delivery platforms is physical and ezolanos-as%20en%20Ar- low-skilled, rendering workers vulnerable within the labour market. All of these character- gentina%20-%20Para%20 web.PDF (accessed 28 istics reduce the bargaining power of these workers, restricting their options in the labour June 2021). market and increasing their dependence on platform (Vandaele 2018). However, the fact that delivery platforms are location-based also means that, although workers do not share a space such as a factory, they do work within the same city. In that sense, the importance of urban spaces for delivery platform workers organisation has been examined by the literature (Gregory & Maldonado 2020; Waters & Woodcock 2017). Tassinari & Maccarrone (2020) analysed how workers meeting in urban spaces such as street corners and squares while they are waiting for orders or resting, generate free spaces (Polletta 1999) that are away from algorithmic surveillance and that allow them to build relationships and share grievances, leading to a sense of solidarity. Although they work as individuals, they share a common labour process, leading them to shared experiences and producing a sense of collective identity. Moreover, these workers share a strategic position within this process, meaning that without them the platform cannot operate and supply its clients’ demands. This raises the workplace bargaining power of delivery platform workers (Atzeni 2016; Vandaele 18).

The Argentine Case

Veen, Barratt & Goods (2020) in their comparative study of two delivery platform companies in Australia found signs of resistance among workers but not instances of organised collective actions. The authors observe that the rotational character of work, the vulnerability of precarious and migrant workers and the Australian underemployment rates limited workers’ ability to mobilise. However, in Argentina, where labour market indicators show much worse performance and a high proportion of the workforce are recent Vene- zuelan migrants (see Table 1), mobilisation emerged rapidly.

Indicators % Immigration-related Change in migratory balance from Q1 2017 TO Q1 2018 (1) 208 Proportion of Venezuelan Rappi and Glovo workers (2) 67 Labour market-related Workers aged 18-29 in Rappi and Glovo (2) 68 Male workers in Rappi and Glovo (2) 96 Unemployment rate men 14-29 Q4 2017 (3) 11.4 Unemployment rate men 14-29 Q4 2018 (3) 15.4 Change in the formal employment rate from March 2017 to March 2018 (4) -2.2 Table 1. Information relevant for case selection strategy. Sources in parentheses: 1: Organización Internacional para las Migraciones 2018. 2: Madariaga et al. 2019. 3: Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas y Censos (INDEC), 2019a. 4: Ministerio de Trabajo y Producción 2019. The Labour Process and the Emergence of Workers’ Mobilisation in Delivery Platforms in Argentina – New Sociological Perspectives 99

The indicators in Table 1 explain delivery platforms’ fast growth, given they could access a huge workforce pool that had limited opportunities within the formal labour market. However, in less than a year, delivery platforms workers organised collective actions and created a union. Polletta (2004) argues that culture plays a crucial role in understanding social movements, as it not only comprises subjective aspects of mobilisation, but also shapes the broader context on which structures are built. In the case of workers’ mobilisation, the trade-union tradition of a country is key to understanding political opportunities. In Argentina, trade unions have had a central political role since the industrialisation process in the mid-twentieth century (James 1991). During the neoliberal period, from the 70’s to the 2000’s, Ar- gentina went through a de-industrialisation process that hurt the power of traditional unions (Schorr 2012). In the late 90’s, new workers’ organisations emerged, with unemployed movements acquiring centrality (Schuster et al. 2006; Svampa & Pereyra 2004). Between 2003 and 2014, along with economic growth, Argentina went through what some call a ‘union revitalisation’ (Etchemendy & Collier 2008; Natalucci 2017). Since 2014 Argentina’s economic and labour market indicators have stopped improving, with the economic crisis that started in 2016 leading to their rapid deterioration. This led to a growing importance of precarious workers unions and movements. In this sense, periods of crisis and economic instability enable the emergence of these types of workers organisations. Hence, delivery platform workers mobilisation builds on an existing tradition of informal and geographical- ly dispersed workers’ organisations, that also characterises for the political appropriation of urban spaces and territory (Atzeni 2016). This article analyses the interaction between precarious conditions embedded in work casualisation with the characteristics of the labour process, and how this interaction enables and shapes the causal mechanisms for mobilisation in delivery platforms. The first section of this paper analyses secondary survey data that will allow to characterise these workers and the working conditions they face in order to assess their marketplace bargaining power and to examine in which ways they are different from other cases. The sec- 2 Since then, more delivery platform workers’ or- ond section builds on interview data to describe the labour process through workers’ own ganisations have emerged experiences to examine the control mechanisms implemented by management through and grown in the country, algorithms and the source of workers grievances. Finally, the third section analyses how such as Agrupación de Trabajadores de Reparto solidarity developed among these workers and how it was triggered into collective action. and Glovers Unidos Ar- gentina. The Events 3 The court sentence is available at: public.diario- For this research, a single case design was implemented, with the particularity of analys- judicial.com/documentos ing two instances within the case. This is because workers who were part of the move- /000/085/303/000085303. pdf ment came from two different delivery platforms. Rappi’s workers initiated mobilisation by organising a strike in July 2018 and, in October 2018, workers from both Rappi and Glo- vo created the Asociación de Personal de Plataformas (APP).2 The analysis of this process 4 Since then, the delivery platform sector in Argenti- focuses on how the specific characteristics of the labour process and the implications of na has changed. UberEats work casualisation in each company related to workers’ mobilisation and how mobilisa- came later to the country but left at the end of year tion diffused between platforms. The analysed period starts in January 2018, when com- 2020, as did Glovo. In Jan- pany Glovo arrived in Argentina, followed by Rappi in February and ends in March 2019 uary 2021, the remaining when a court sentence recognised delivery workers as platform’s employees, represent- companies operating in 3 the country are Rappi and ing the union’s first legal win. Glovo and Rappi were the only delivery platforms whose Pedidos Ya. workers were mobilising at that moment.4 The Labour Process and the Emergence of Workers’ Mobilisation in Delivery Platforms in Argentina – New Sociological Perspectives 100

Methodology

Justification for a Mixed Methods Design

The rationale for a mixed methods design arises from the concepts that guided the research’s aims (Coxon 2005; Newman & Benz 1998; Robson & McCartan 2016). These were to analyse the way in which the interaction between working conditions of a casual type of job and the labour process in delivery platforms led and shaped the causal mechanisms behind workers’ mobilisation in Argentina. In a casual type of work, workers are paid by order, are not guaranteed to be assigned with new orders in the future and they are not recognised as formal employees (De Ste- fano 2016). Hence, it can be described by analysing workers’ access to social security, hours of work and income and schedules stability. Whereas the labour process is the process where workers’ labour power acquired by the capitalist in the market is transformed into actual labour (Knights & Willmott 2016). When exploitation is taken to an extreme, the illusion of co-dependence between worker and capitalist is broken, exposing the ex- ploitative character of the platform labour process. This process changes solidarity from passive to active form: collective action (Atzeni 2010). The analysis of secondary survey data makes it possible to describe the variables that represent casual work conditions and compare them across the companies of interest: Rappi and Glovo. It also enables a description of workers’ demographics, which is relevant to understanding their position in the Argentine labour market. However, it is not fit to describe the control mechanisms implemented by platform companies, the cooperation between workers in the labour process or the emergence of collective actions as a product of workers’ solidarity. For these purposes, qualitative data proves effective as it enables us to analyse these aspects from the workers’ perspectives, experiences and motivations. Therefore, using these two types of data allows us to expand the scope of the research (Small 2011) and compensates for the weaknesses of each of them alone (Brewer & Hunt- er 1989; Bryman et al. 2007).

Data Collection

Survey Data The ETP18 is a survey of platform workers performed in 2018 by CIPPEC, an Argentine NGO, with the International Labour Organization (ILO) and the Inter-American Develop- ment Bank (IDB) (Madariaga et al. 2019). They interviewed 600 workers from 11 different platforms, 132 of which were delivery platforms workers: 69 from Glovo and 63 from Rappi. Interviews were performed face to face in workers’ resting places on the streets of Buenos Aires, which was where mobilisation emerged. A non-probability sample was implemented since the universe of platform workers was unknown. Although this type of sample is not representative of the population, it was not a main concern given the research aim was not to make inferences but to explore and describe work conditions in delivery platforms to characterise work casualisation empirically (Small 2009). Convenience samples can also increase bias since participants who share spaces together are likely to have similar characteristics. However, this bias is reduced since the spaces where delivery platform workers rest are determined by the proximity to gastronomical businesses, which is an external factor. See Supplementary file 1 for 5 Supplementary file 1 is avail- details of variables used in the research, their codification and frequencies.5 All analyses able at: https://drive.google. com/file/d/1WLPtL4QGUqb- were done over an extracted subsample which contained the 132 responses from Glovo 4WCBfKSpEQEYkkcEqE2Sk/ and Rappi workers. view Semi-Structured Interviews Twenty semi-structured interviews with delivery platform workers were performed online between April and June 2020. Interviews allow to get a direct measure of causal mechanisms and their time sequence from the people who participated in the events (Beach & Pedersen 2019). For this, it was relevant to assess the level of involvement each interviewee had on the mobilisation process and check their testimonies with the ones from The Labour Process and the Emergence of Workers’ Mobilisation in Delivery Platforms in Argentina – New Sociological Perspectives 101

other participants. Union members and mobilised workers also have political interests, which may affect the way they present the events (Blee 2013). Thus, workers who did not participate in collective actions at the time were also interviewed. Interviews were semi-structured. A topic guide (see Supplementary file 1) was constructed with the objective of covering all the relevant concepts in the research questions (Li- chterman 2002). Nonetheless, this guide was adaptable to any unexpected topics the interviewee brought up. I implemented a snowball sampling which was convenient to locate activists from not highly institutionalised organisations, such as the new union of delivery platform workers (Blee 2013). Because this type of sample increases the risk of bias through homophily, an effort was made to expand the scope of participants by ask- ing each interviewee to refer to another possible one. This process was repeated until theoretical saturation was reached (Small 2009). Due to the coronavirus health crisis, face to face interviews were not possible, so interviews were performed online through WhatsApp. The decision of using WhatsApp was based on workers’ preferences. Online interviews allow to overcome financial and geographical constraints (Janghorban, Latifnejad Roudsari & Taghipour 2014). They also impose less pressure on the interviewees and increase anonymity (Nosek, Banaji & Greenwald 2002). Moreover, the use of a mobile app is easy, convenient, cost effective and has the advantage of not being disruptive of the participant’s life (Garcia, Welford & Smith 2016; Kiukkonen et al. 2010). WhatsApp is generally used in Argentina and it is free, though data privacy is controlled by the company (Kaufmann & Peil 2019). Overall, using WhatsApp to perform interviews proved useful in reaching vulnerable workers with little time and few resources, although it implied a lack of field observations, including non-verbal signals. In addition, workers sometimes did not have good signal, which led to four interviews being done through WhatsApp audios. Although using audios prejudiced the dialogue fluency, it also generated a more reflexive attitude from workers, who gave longer and deeper answers to questions. All interviewees were provided with a digital information sheet and consent was recorded online (See Supplementary file 1).

Procedure

Survey Data The survey data was analysed by conducting cross-tabulations to compare the two delivery platform companies: Glovo and Rappi. Variables were selected according to the conceptual framework and grouped into three dimensions: demographics, economic dependence and casualisation. Their analysis demonstrated the level of precarity faced by workers in these companies and their opportunities in the Argentine labour market. Cornfield & Kim (1994) found there is an inverse association between high levels of job satisfaction and positive attitudes towards unionism. Hence, a logistic regression was implemented to analyse the relationship between workers’ satisfaction with the platform and variables reflecting work conditions and/or the platform company itself. The goal was not to predict the probability of satisfaction, nor to make inferences about the population (given the small sample size), but to analyse the direction and strength of the associa- tions. The explanatory variables were selected considering their theoretical and statistical correlations, excluding from the models variables that were highly correlated. The regression was an ordered logistic one since the response variable categories have a natural order, relevant for its analysis. This type of model simplifies the interpretation since each explanatory variable has only one regression coefficient for all the response variable categories. To be sure that this feature was not hiding differences in the associ- ations between explanatory and response variable categories, a multinomial regression was performed for each model. It showed no alteration in the coefficients order related to the response categories. See variables’ codification and regression equation in Supple- mentary file 1. The Labour Process and the Emergence of Workers’ Mobilisation in Delivery Platforms in Argentina – New Sociological Perspectives 102

Semi-Structured Interviews Thematic analysis was employed to examine the 20 interview transcripts. This method allows to identify the main topics that emerge from the text and the underlying patterns that connect them. It was used to reconstruct the causal mechanisms that led to mobilisation from the workers’ experiences and perceptions, analysing workers’ trajectories in the Argentine labour market; control mechanisms implemented by platforms; workers’ cooperation and solidarity relationships; the events that triggered mobilisation and what enabled its diffusion between companies. I followed the coding process from Attride-Stirling (2001), beginning by selecting chunks of data into descripting codes and later grouping them into themes according to their affinity and proximity. These basic themes are the main premises of the analysis. By exploring the relationships between them and their underlying patterns, I derived five organising themes. These were grouped into three global themes, which were labelled to represent the main claims and arguments constructed from the data considering the research aims. No pre-codebook was used to maintain an inductive approach and the same coding scheme was used for interviews with Rappi and Glovo workers to enable comparability.

Findings

Platforms Feed on Unemployment and Vulnerability

Figure 1: Findings from Global Theme 1. Own elaboration.

Delivery platforms Glovo and Rappi arrived in Argentina in January and February 2018, respectively. By October 2019, Rappi had 10500 delivery workers and Glovo 8627 (Rodríguez Ansorena 2019). Who were these workers and how did they start working on these platforms?

Dimension Variable - Category Glovo (%) Rappi (%) Age (mean) 27 28 % of men 96 97 6 New surveys conducted % of immigrants**6 65 84 during 2020 in the city of Demographics Buenos Aires indicate a % with up to secondary school incompleted 9 3 higher percentage of Ar- % with secondary school completed 32 27 gentine workers among delivery platform work- % with higher education (completed or incompleted) 59 70 ers (Haidar 2020). This is presumably linked to the Chi square test: **p < 0.5 worsening of the econom- Table 2. Delivery platform workers’ demographics in Glovo and Rappi. Buenos Aires, 2018. Source: own ic crisis, where not only elaboration based on Madariaga et al. 2019. migrants but also Argen- tine people are expelled from the formal labour Delivery platform workers in Argentina are mostly young, male, migrants and highly edu- market. cated. These last two are connected since 67% of workers in Rappi and Glovo are recent The Labour Process and the Emergence of Workers’ Mobilisation in Delivery Platforms in Argentina – New Sociological Perspectives 103

Venezuelan migrants (Madariaga et al. 2019) and the Venezuelan immigration wave to Argentina is characterised by having high levels of education. These migrants pertained to the middle class in their home country and experienced a process of descendant mo- bility in Argentina (Pedone & Mallimaci 2019). Being recent migrants with non-permanent residence status, plus being young and male in a country where the unemployment rate for men between 14 and 29 was 15.3% in 1Q of 2018 (INDEC 2019b), put these workers in a vulnerable position within the local labour market. In that sense, 43% of Rappi workers and 32% of Glovo workers affirmed their main reason to work in the platform was they could not find another job (Table 3). When dividing the sample of delivery workers between migrants and non-migrants, we observed that 40% of migrants said their main reason for working in the platform was that they could not find another job, compared to 27% of non-migrants who said the same.

Categories Glovo (%) Rappi (%) Could not find another job 32 43 Possibility of managing work schedules 30 35 Possibility of an extra income 30 11 Expand the client portfolio 1 0 Easy access to work 0 8 Others 6 3 Total 100 100

Chi square test: **p < 0.5 Table 3. Delivery platform workers’ main reason to work in the platform.** Buenos Aires, 2018. Source: own elaboration based on Madariaga et al. 2019.

Many interviewed workers mentioned they decided to work in delivery platforms because they noticed they could make more money than in their previous jobs (Interview 1, I10, I13, I2, I4, I5, I7, I8). Others said they suffered worse working conditions before (I10, I6, I9, I11, I13, I7, I15). ‘It is better to work with these delivery platforms than to work informally in any other company or other job. Because here, unfortunately, for foreigners it is complicated. Even for the Argentines’. Male, Venezuelan, worker at Glovo.

However, 30% of workers in Glovo and 35% in Rappi claim their main reason to work in the platform was the possibility of managing work schedules (Table 3). This was also mentioned in the interviews, especially for Rappi, where they can decide to connect in the moment, while in Glovo they have to choose their schedules in advance (I1, I2, I3, I4, I5, I6, I7, I8, I9, I10, I11, I12, I15, I19). Cant (2019) in his ethnography study of delivery platform Deliveroo in Brighton, found that workers choose to work there as a combination of nega- tive coercion (relative to their options within the labour market), and positive election (for the flexibility offered by platforms). However, in the Argentine context, this hypothesis must be considered carefully since options are more restricted. In that sense, interviewees claimed that if they could find something better, they would quit the platform (I1, I3, I7, I13, I15, I10). ‘People are always looking to leave Rappi. Looking for something better, obviously. But what happens is that other jobs offer you 12 hours and you will earn in a month what you can earn in Rappi in two weeks’. Male, Venezuelan, worker at Rappi. The Labour Process and the Emergence of Workers’ Mobilisation in Delivery Platforms in Argentina – New Sociological Perspectives 104

Dimension Variable - Category Glovo (%) Rappi (%) Platform income as percentage of total income (mean)* 87 93 Platform’s income is main income 85 95 Economic Work in the other delivery platform 23 8 Dependence Have another job 32 21 Would face difficulties covering living costs without platform work** 33 70

Chi square test: **p < 0.5, *p < 0.10 Table 4. Delivery platform workers’ economic dependence from the platform. Buenos Aires, 2018. Source: own elaboration based on Madariaga et al. 2019.

Table 4 shows how dependent delivery platform workers in Argentina are on their platform job. For most, this represents their main source of income and occupation, unlike workers in European countries (Tassinari & Maccarrone 2020; Vandaele 2018; Veen, Barratt & Goods 2020). Moreover, we observe that economic dependence is higher for workers in Rappi than for Glovo. This could be explained by the higher proportion of migrants in the former, given that 95% of migrants said the platform provided their main income, compared to 73% of non-migrants. All in all, these workers share a vulnerable position which undermines their marketplace bargaining power (Vandaele 2018).

Casualisation and Control

Figure 2: Findings from Global Theme 2. Own elaboration.

Work Casualisation The character of the employment relationship between platform workers and platform companies constitutes a world-wide debate. Internationally and nationally, governments and institutions are discussing projects around platform work regulations (Cherry 2019; Ottaviano, O’Farrel & Maito 2019). In Argentina, platform workers are classified as independent contractors and are hired through a regime called ‘monotributo’. This scheme allows independent workers to make pension and health payments to the state so that they access social security. Although it is directed to entrepreneurs and freelancers, it is widely used to cover disguised employment relationships (Fernández Massi 2014). Both Rappi and Glovo require that workers be registered in the monotributo scheme to work for the platform. However, once they join, only Glovo obliges them to make the monthly contributions in that regime to get paid. This explains why a lower proportion of workers in Rappi access social security. The Labour Process and the Emergence of Workers’ Mobilisation in Delivery Platforms in Argentina – New Sociological Perspectives 105

Dimension Variable - Category Glovo (%) Rappi (%) Make pension contributions** 90 59

Employment Pension contribution paid by employer 0 0 Relationship Have health insurance 68 54 Have insurance paid by employer 2 0

Chi square test: **p < 0.5 Table 5. Delivery platform workers’ access to social security. Buenos Aires, 2018. Source: own elaboration based on Madariaga et al. 2019.

However, in neither of the platforms these contributions are made by the employer. This is a typical feature of casual work where, as workers are classified as independent contractors, companies are not responsible for paying for their social security (De Stefano 2016). Moreover, the monotributo scheme does not include an insurance for work-related accidents, which is particularly important in delivery platforms given the constant contact with traffic. Also, companies do not provide restroom facilities for workers, despite the fact that they spend many hours working on the streets performing physical work.

Variable Category Glovo (%) Rappi (%) Income stability** With no or low income stability 32 60 Up to 39 hours 27 8 Hours worked in a Between 40 and 45 hours 19 12 week** More than 45 hours 54 80

Chi square test: **p < 0.5 Table 6. Income stability and hours worked in delivery platforms Glovo and Rappi, Buenos Aires, 2018. Source: own elaboration based on Madariaga et al. 2019.

Another consequence of casual work in delivery platforms is low income stability because of the payment by order system. As presented in Table 6, 32% of workers in Glovo and 60% in Rappi claim to have low- or no-income stability. Moreover, 54% of workers in Glovo and 80% of workers in Rappi work more than 45hs a week. This has two implications: 1) unlike what was found in the Global North (Vandaele 2018; Veen et al. 2020), delivery platform workers in Argentina are not part time workers; 2) the flexibility advertised by platform companies does not translate in less hoursof work compared with a full time job (see also Del Bono 2019; Ottaviano et al. 2019). Here also, we observe differences between migrants and non-migrants, for Venezuelans the median of hours worked in a week is 56, while this is 40 for Argentines. Control Mechanisms in the Labour Process So far, the findings have allowed us to analyse the labour relationship between workers and delivery platforms in light of social security access and level of precarity. This section focuses on the control mechanisms implemented by platforms over workers in the labour process. Labour process theorists and scholars have long discussed the issue of control within the capitalist production process (Knights & Willmott 2016). This started in 1974 with the publication of Braverman’s text “Labor and Monopoly Capital.” Braverman claimed that modern management techniques pursue the separation of conception from execution in the labour process to remove from workers any form of control over their job. Burawoy (1982) affirms that workers are presented with activities that give them a sense of choice, which is used to secure their subordination by generating consent. Both strategies are present in delivery platforms. In platforms’ labour processes control is not implemented by managers but by algorithms. Algorithmic management is based on the constant tracking of workers data, which is used to organise work and manage workers (Duggan et al. 2019; Kellogg, Valentine & Christin, 2020). In the interviews, workers expressed being aware that their gps position, ratings, speed, acceptance rate and many other aspects of their jobs were being tracked, stored and used by the platforms algorithms. But they did not know how this data was used exactly (I1, I2, I4, I10). This asymmetry of information is a typical characteristic of platform work and reflects the level of separation between conception and execution (Braverman 1974; Gandini 2019). The Labour Process and the Emergence of Workers’ Mobilisation in Delivery Platforms in Argentina – New Sociological Perspectives 106

Glovo Rappi Workers have to follow specific instructions and mark in the platform every step of their job Job Instructions that they complete. Terms and Workers have to accept terms and conditions in the platform daily. Companies change these Conditions unilaterally without providing training. Schedules Chosen by workers beforehand. Decided by workers in the moment. Algorithm Unknown. Workers can only assume how it works based on their daily experiences. Order Assignment The order is already assigned to the workers. Workers have 30 seconds to accept or decline Mechanism the order before it goes to another worker. Explicit. Declining orders affects workers’ Implicit. Workers with low acceptance rates Acceptance Rate chances of choosing a highly demanded get less and worse orders assigned. schedule. Explicit. Affects workers chances of choosing Implicit. Workers with lower ratings get less Ratings from a highly demanded schedule. and worse orders assigned. Clients/Businesses Workers cannot reply to their ratings and sometimes get bad evaluations because of mistakes made by the business or the platform itself. Because there is a limit of workers per time There is an oversupply of workers, which slot, supply and offer in the platform are bal- forces them to accept worse-paying orders. Supply of Workers anced. Workers are guaranteed to have certain amount of orders in their shifts. Platforms implement especial bonuses for workers when there is a shortness in the supply to Rewards incentivise them to connect. Punishments Platforms block workers in the apps without giving any warning or explanation.

Table 7. Forms of algorithmic control in Rappi and Glovo as perceived by the workers at the time of the field- work. Source: own elaboration based on interviews with delivery platform workers from Rappi and Glovo.

There are three main dimensions with major differences between the companies. While in Rappi, workers appreciate the possibility of deciding in the moment to connect to the app or not, this leads to an oversupply of workers at certain times of the day and, therefore, less orders per worker (which means less income, since they are paid by the order). In Glovo, workers must select a schedule in advance since there are a limited number of spots available per slot, which balances supply and demand in the app. However, this also puts more pressure over the worker to take the order. If they decide not to do it, next time they try to choose a schedule, high demand slots will be blocked for them. In Rappi, coercion into accepting orders is not as clear to workers. They suspect that if they have a low acceptance rate, they will be assigned with less orders or orders of longer distances or lower payments but this is not made explicit in the platform. This lack of transparency is what creates a sense of autonomy among many Rappi workers, who claim they prefer this platform because it does not coerce them into taking orders in the same way Glovo does (I2, I5, I7, I8, I9). Workers in Rappi talk about the ‘game’ of deciding which orders to choose or not. They say if many workers decline the same order, it will then re-start the assignment process with a better payment (I6, I9, I10). In that sense, this ‘game’ generates a sense of autonomy among workers, which obscures control and secures profit production (Burawoy 1982). The lack of regulation of platform work enables companies Rappi and Glovo to implement different control strategies at their free will. However, the Argentine national labour law establishes that when a company has this level of control over workers, we are in the presence of an employment relationship where workers are in fact employees (Ottaviano et al. 2019). In that sense, as indicated by De Stefano (2016), there is a contradiction in the legal status in which workers are classified by platform companies and the actual character of the labour relationship, as demonstrated by the analysis of economic dependence, work conditions and control mechanisms. So far we’ve observed that in Rappi the casual character of work reaches its peak, generating greater insecurity and instability for workers, while the level of control over the labour process is similar to that of Glovo, though its obscurity creates a false perception of autonomy and flexibility. The Labour Process and the Emergence of Workers’ Mobilisation in Delivery Platforms in Argentina – New Sociological Perspectives 107

Workers’ Satisfaction Analysing workers’ dissatisfaction with the platforms might tell us something about the causes of their grievances. Cornfield & Kim (1994) show there is an inverse association between workers’ job satisfaction and their attitudes towards unionisation. To start, 9% of workers in Glovo and 37% of workers in Rapi are dissatisfied with the platform (Madariaga et al. 2019). While this was expected given the higher precarity faced by workers in Rappi, ordered logistic regressions were performed on the variable workers’ satisfaction with the platform to analyse this further.

Models 1 2 3 4 5 6 Demographics 0.12 0.39 0.37 0.11 0.07 Age: 30–35 0.15 (0.40) (0.40) (0.43) (0.43) (0.44) (0.44) 0.16 -0.14 -0.14 0.35 0.24 Recent Migrant: Yes 0.16 (0.44) (0.44) (0.40) (0.48) (0.47) (0.47) Company 2.12 2.06 1.63 1.57 Platform: Rappi - - (0.39)*** (0.41)*** (0.41)*** (0.53)*** Economic Dependence Difficulty to pay for -0.16 -0.16 living costs without - - - - (0.39) (0.41) platform work: No Precarity Income Stability: -1.45 -1.45 -1.8 -1.79 Somewhat to very - - (0.4)*** (0.41)*** (0.40)*** (0.40)*** stable

Hours worked per 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 - - week (squared) (0.0001)** (0.0001)** (0.0001)*** (0.0001)***

Shift: Fixed, always 0.77 - - - - - the same schedule (0.45)* Employment Relationship Pension 0.53 - - - - - Contributions: No (0.48)

Health Insurance 1.06 1.23 - - - - Payments: No (0.45)** (0.41)*** Response Variable Categories Satisfied or Very 1. 01 0.72 0.6 0.76 0.78 1.12 (0.42)** Satisfied (0.5)** (0.57) (0.65) (0.57) (0.57)

Neither Satisfied 2.67 2.59 2.47 2.56 2.62 2.78 (048)** nor Unsatisfied (0.55)** (0.61)** (0.69)** (0.62)** (0.62)** N 127 127 124 124 124 124 LR chi2(2) 35.54 35.71 50.86 51.02 45.76 47.5 P-value chi2 0 0 0 0 0 0 Pseudo R 0.1342 0.1348 0.1985 0.1991 0.1786 0.1854 Log likelihood -114 -114 -102 -102 -105 -104 * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 Table 8. Workers’ job satisfaction in relationship with working conditions in the platforms. Ordered logistic regression models: coefficients (log. odds ratios), standard errors, significance levels and model fit. Source: Own elaboration based on data from Madariaga et al. 2019.

As expected, there is a strong and positive association between working in Rappi rather than in Glovo and being unsatisfied rather than satisfied or neither with the platform. In model 1, controlling for age and migrant status, working in the platform Rappi rather than in Glovo multiplies the odds of being unsatisfied rather than satisfied or neither by 8.33 The Labour Process and the Emergence of Workers’ Mobilisation in Delivery Platforms in Argentina – New Sociological Perspectives 108

(increases them by 733%). While the strength of the coefficients for this variable decline in models 2-4, where more explanatory variables are included, it remains positive and statistically significant. In models 2 and 4, controlling for the rest of the variables, workers who claimed would face difficulties to pay for living costs without working in the platform are more likely to be unsatisfied rather than satisfied or neither, in comparison to workers who would not face those difficulties. Even though this association is not significant, it suggests that workers who are more economically dependent on the platform are less satisfied than workers who depend less on it. In addition, controlling for the other variables, workers who do not have income stability are more likely to be unsatisfied than workers who do. Last, in model 6, having a stable shift rather than a rotative one has a positive association with being unsatisfied rather than satisfied or neither. This is coherent with workers’ positive perception of schedule flexibility in platforms. Workers who find they are not experiencing that flexibility feel more unsatisfied than workers who do. Related to the employment relationship, we observe that, controlling for the rest of the variables, not making pension or health contributions is positively associated with being unsatisfied rather than satisfied or neither. Hence, workers who have access to social security rights are happier with their platform jobs than workers who do not. In sum, the characteristic aspects of a casual form of work, i.e. greater precarity and weak- er employment relationship, increase workers’ dissatisfaction with the platform. As these are exacerbated in Rappi in comparison to Glovo, it makes sense that for the explanatory variable “Company”, workers in Rappi are more likely to be unsatisfied – rather than satisfied or neither – than workers in Glovo. The findings presented so far help understandwhy mobilisation started in Rappi. Howev- er, it remains unanswered how these workers mobilised and why Glovo workers, who had high levels of satisfaction, participated in collective actions.

Collective Identity, Solidarity and Collective Action

Figure 3: Findings from Global Theme 3. Own elaboration.

In July 2018, workers from Rappi organised a strike. This was the first collective action of delivery platform workers in the country. The organisation of the strike was a spontane- ous response to a change in the app’s order assignment mechanism. Before, orders were sent to all the workers close to the business and the one who accepted it faster was the one assigned with it. After, each order was assigned first to a unique worker and if they did not accept it, it was directed to someone else. This directed assignment mechanism exposed the control exercised by the companies over the labour process and constrained workers’ autonomy by establishing a reward mechanism for those with better performance indicators in the platforms (Kellogg, Valentine & Christin 2020). The Labour Process and the Emergence of Workers’ Mobilisation in Delivery Platforms in Argentina – New Sociological Perspectives 109

On the day of the strike, workers connected to the app, accepted the terms and conditions and immediately noticed the change in the order assignment mechanism. In a few hours, Rappi workers from all over the city were striking and the platform had to launch a bonus due to shortness of workers. The strike was organised through delivery platform workers’ WhatsApp groups, where workers had shared their experiences with the new functioning and expressed how it was affecting their earnings. The pre-existence of these WhatsApp groups was key for mobilisation. ‘Because they from one day to the next put an update, they forced us all to update the application and (...) when we began to see the differences, the most noticeable at that time was the money that we made before to what we were making at that time’. Union member, APP.

Because of the lack of a delimited workplace, delivery platform workers usually wait for orders in spaces of the city nearby shops. Workers recognise each other from their brand- ed work elements and so it is common to see them waiting in groups on squares or corners. ‘When I was starting out, people spoke to me just because I had a Rappi backpack, I didn’t know them. And then there comes a time when you walk down the street, you already know almost everyone, you recognize them and if you are talking, you let others know what is happening’. Male, Venezuelan, worker at Rappi.

These groups integrate workers from both Rappi and Glovo, since the similarity of their job creates a sense of a shared experience. Moreover, the majority of Venezuelan workers on these platforms, together with their extremely similar and recent immigration experiences, generates a feeling of community and collective identity between them. In addition, since platforms do not aid workers in case of traffic accidents, health problems, or police abuse, workers create their own support networks. These networks exist across platforms and consist of workers cooperating and helping each other in their daily work routines (see also Tassinari & Maccarrone 2020). ‘We have our emergency chat, about anything that may happen on the streets: someone who has been injured, someone who has a problem with a client, or sometimes even someone who has problems with other colleagues. We take care of each other’. Male, Venezuelan, worker at Glovo.

The combination of workers’ collective identity given by their trajectories and national- ities and their support and cooperation within the labour process produces solidarity bonds among them. At the same time, the existence of free spaces was what allowed for the material development of those relationships (see also Tassinari & Maccarrone 2020 and Polletta 1999). While algorithmic management provides an instantaneous and precise form of control over workers, it has blind spots that traditional managers do not (Woodcock 2017). Algorithms cannot monitor workers’ interactions outside the platform so easily, whether they are on city squares and corners (offline free spaces), or WhatsApp groups (online free spaces) (Tassinari & Maccarone 2020). These free hybrid spaces are what enable the construction of support networks and allow the collectivisation of grievances between delivery platform workers. Because, as mentioned, these spaces and networks do not distinguish Rappi workers from Glovo ones, when the strike in Rappi emerged, Glovo workers became indirectly involved in the events. What workers started with the strike in Rappi triggered a process which enabled the transformation of passive solidarity into active solidarity: collective action (Atzeni 2010). While the original claim was about the order assignment mechanism in Rappi, the action mobilised Glovo workers as well. Mobilisation diffused through the support networks between workers from different platforms and generated the conditions for workers to express their grievances and transform them into claims. Therefore, mobilisation here is not presented through the comparison between Rappi and Glovo since the workers who participated in its emergence did not make that distinction in the The Labour Process and the Emergence of Workers’ Mobilisation in Delivery Platforms in Argentina – New Sociological Perspectives 110

interviews. That lack of separation between workers from different platforms is what allowed for diffusion. Workers claims were based on the contradiction between their independent contractors’ status and control in the platforms. ‘Because they make you look like micro-entrepreneurs. I do not believe that a micro-en- trepreneur rides a bicycle ten hours a day, seven days a week, sometimes earning less than a minimum salary, working twice as much. We are workers and we want that myth of independent workers to end. This is not a freelance, it is not for students, it is not for you to increase your income. If platforms work, it is because most of us are dedicated full time and because they exert control mechanisms. They sanction you, block you, control you and you have no right to defense. These applications tell you that it is a meeting point, you put your price and another person will tell you if they agree or if they want a discount and you will give it to them because you are independent. That’s a lie. They impose the prices on us. What independence are we talking about? There is control’. Union member, APP.

Following the strike, the company Rappi started blocking the workers who participated in it, which meant they could not continue working in the platform. The lack of regulation of work in the platform sector enabled this type of anti-mobilisation strategy, which was used repeatedly during the next months. This led workers to create their own union. In October of 2018, only four months after the first strike, delivery workers from Rappi and Glovo presented the Asociación de Personal de Plataformas. ‘We didn’t think at first about creating a union. But we realized that because the first thing they did was block me and I think it was like a message for the rest. And then we said “well, we have to have some protection.” Something, because otherwise is like going to war and being killed directly and well, that is why we created the union’. Union member, APP.

In November, the union APP mobilised to the platform companies’ offices. Consequently, members of the APP committee were blocked on the platform by Rappi. They initiated legal actions for unfair dismissal and, in March 2019, a first instance court sentence con- firmed that Rappi’s actions violated workers’ right to collective organisation recognised by the national labour law. Additionally, the judge in charge specified that given the way in which work is organised by the platforms, workers should be classified as employees, in- stead of independent contractors. Similar court sentences have been sanctioned in other countries and while this is a victory of platform workers’ mobilisation, there still is a lack of involvement from governments that commit to regulating platform work (I15, I16, I18, I20). Finally, despite this victory, workers’ organisation in delivery platforms in Argentina faces several obstacles. These are similar to those Veen, Barratt & Goods (2020) found in their study of delivery platforms in Australia: • The rotative character of work and the lack of a delimited workplace makes it difficult for the union to reach most platform workers (Ottaviano et al. 2019). • The persistent economic crisis and increase of unemployment rates leads to a growth in the platforms’ workforce. These new workers are not aware of the union or cannot afford participating in their actions and losing income or risk being blocked. • Platforms employ a series of strategies to disincentivize mobilisation: launching bonuses during strikes, blocking workers on the apps and stop assigning orders to mobilised workers. To conclude, mobilisation in delivery platforms is a process resulting from workers’ common trajectories, which enables the construction of a collective identity; workers’ cooperation through support networks that produce solidarity bonds; and the contradiction between casual work and the controlled labour process, which generates the grievances that triggered collective action. The Labour Process and the Emergence of Workers’ Mobilisation in Delivery Platforms in Argentina – New Sociological Perspectives 111

Conclusion

Globally, workers’ vulnerable position within the labour market forced them to work in platforms. Specifically, delivery platforms where, as independent contractors, they experience high insecurity and instability, particularly in Rappi. However, their employment status as independent contractors does not fit with the high level of control implemented by platforms in the labour process. Workers are tracked, punished, rewarded and blocked by platforms. This contradiction produces grievances, which are collectivised through workers’ support networks. These include workers from the two platforms, which is how once mobilisation emerged in Rappi, it diffused to Glovo.

Discussions

The case of delivery platform workers’ mobilisation in Argentina illustrates how, in an adverse context, the same aspects of platform work that deepen precarity, enable the mechanisms for mobilisation. Migrants’ vulnerability constrains their possibilities in the labour market (prejudicing their marketplace bargaining power) but also enables the construction of a collective identity. The lack of a specified workplace aggravates their work conditions and disperses their interactions, but provides them with a free space where they can share their grievances, and which they can appropriate for their political organisation (Gregory & Maldonado 2020; Tassinari & Maccarrone 2020; Waters & Woodcock 2017). The lack of support provided by platforms to workers because of their independent contractor status generated the emergence of support networks between them, which enabled mobilisation diffusion. In that sense, when analysing the causal mechanisms behind mobilisation, it emerges that they are similar to what Tassinari & Maccarrone (2020) found in Italy and UK in two aspects. First, workers’ grievances are a product of the lack of regulation of platform work. Second, free spaces are key for the development of relationships and collective identity. Finally, mobilisation is based on the solidarity bonds between workers. Furthermore, the analysis provided here contributes empirical data for the labour process literature since it shows not only how workers shared experiences in the labour process generate their grievances but also allow for the emergence of solidarity. In addition, it contributes to Vandaele’s (2018) analysis in the sense that, although workers in delivery platforms have a low marketplace bargaining power, they have a higher workplace bargaining power, meaning they are able of disrupting the production process by striking to demand for better working conditions. Moreover, delivery platform workers’ mobilisation is a case of precarious workers agency (Alberti et al. 2018) in a country from the Global South. The survey data analysis showed how, unlike platform workers in countries from the Global North, delivery platform workers in Argentina work full time and have their only or main income come from the platform. Moreover, the interview data highlights how many of them have experienced worse working conditions in previous jobs in Argentina. In that sense, the country’s economic and labour context benefits platforms, generating a pool of workers whose situation forces them to work in these companies. While these factors represent an obstacle for workers’ mobilisation, the shared trajectories and identities among workers have also facilitated the construction of a collective identity. In that sense, it is possible to establish a connection between delivery workers’ mobilisation and mobilisation in location-based platforms more broadly. The geographical limitation of these types of platforms is fun- damental for workers to share identities and experiences, such as being migrants in a country going through an economic recession. Moreover, by being in the same city, it is possible for them to meet physically and hence, cooperate with each other despite the individual character of their jobs (Woodcock & Graham 2020). The Argentine context also provides a fertile ground for precarious and informal workers organisations, given their development since the late 90’s. Argentina is a country with an extended labour rights system (initiated by the labour movement with the Peronist government in mid twentieth century), that exists parallel to an increase of informal labour. This has given birth to strong organisations that nucleate informal workers, such as Confederación de Trabajadores de la Economía Popular (CTEP), which has shown support The Labour Process and the Emergence of Workers’ Mobilisation in Delivery Platforms in Argentina – New Sociological Perspectives 112

to the APP union. In that sense, the existence of a strong union tradition in the country, which contemplates not only formal but also informal work has provided APP with a political structure for their organisation.

Supplementary File 1

Appendix. Collection instruments, ethics and codifications of quantitative and qualitative data used in the research, available here: https://drive.google.com/file/d/1WLPtL4QGUqb4WCBfKSpEQEYkkcEqE2Sk/view

Data Accessibility Statement

The original dataset from the secondary survey data used in this research can be accessed here: https://publications.iadb.org/es/base-de-datos-de-la-encuesta-trabajadores-de- plataformas-en-argentina-2018-etp18-de-la-publicacion, under reference: Madariaga, J., Buenadicha, C., Molina, E. y Ernst, C. (2019). Economía de plataformas y empleo ¿Cómo es trabajar para una app en Argentina? Buenos Aires, Argentina. CIPPEC-BID - OIT. http:// dx.doi.org/10.18235/0001768 Interview audios and transcripts are not available to safeguard the identity of the participants. However, the thematic analysis codification scheme and quotes can be found in ‘Supplementary file 1’, along with the interview guide, information sheet and consent form used in the research.

Ethics and Consent

This research has been performed in accordance with the LSE’s Code of Research Con- duct. The project was submitted for evaluation and approved by the Research Ethics Com- mittee at LSE under reference 1083. The information sheet and consent form recorded by participants can be found in Supplementary file 1.

Competing interests

The author has no competing interests to declare. The Labour Process and the Emergence of Workers’ Mobilisation in Delivery Platforms in Argentina – New Sociological Perspectives 113

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