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Conference Report Südosteuropa Mitteilungen | 01 | 2021 | Supplement Conference Report International Online Conference Young People, Migration and the Demographic Challenge in the Western Balkans Organizers: German Federal Foreign Office / Southeast Europe Association / Aspen Institute Germany Berlin, 28–30 October 2020 Report by Wladimir Dirksen, München, and Friedrich Püttmann, Istanbul Introduction1 The conference brought together scientists, ex- The international conference “Young People, perts and political decision-makers from the Migration and the Demographic Challenge in Western Balkans, EU Member States, and EU in- the Western Balkans” was hosted by the Ger- stitutions to analyse the situation in the region man Federal Foreign Office in cooperation with and to discuss short-term measures and long- the Southeast Europe Association and the As- term strategies. The overall goal was to identify pen Institute Germany. The three-day online joint strategies for countries of origin and des- event took place from 28 to 30 October 2020 tination that are mutually beneficial. The issues and was part of the official programme of the were also discussed with an eye to the addi- German Presidency of the Council of the Euro- tional burden that the COVID-19 pandemic is pean Union. Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the placing on the region. conference was held online in a digital event space that was specifically designed for the Hosted by Federal Foreign Minister Heiko Maas purpose of the conference. and Minister of State Michael Roth in Berlin, the first conference day included Ministers from the The conference aimed to shed light on both the Western Balkans, representatives from the Eu- phenomenon of emigration from the Western ropean Commission, as well as youth represen- Balkans and the challenges and opportunities tatives. The conference was held in English, and this entails. The discussions offered more in- interpretation was available for the Ministers’ sights into reasons why people decide to leave, panel. into the effects the exodus has on the countries of origin and offered recommendations for poli- Throughout the second and third conference cy responses to tackle the issue. day, experts and stakeholders from civil society 1 This is the full version of the conference report. For the short version of the report, only covering the second and part of the third conference day, see SOM 01/2021. For a comprehensive collection of analyses authored by the speakers of the Conference and some additional workshops tackling the issue of emigration from the region, see Southeast Europe in Focus 1/2021, “Emigration from the Western Balkans”, edited by Hansjörg Brey, Christian Hage- mann, Valeska Esch and Viktoria Palm. 2 Südosteuropa Mitteilungen | 01 | 2021 | Supplement Conference Report and international organisations shed light on opportunities – despite all the challenges it en- both the phenomenon of emigration from the tailed. Western Balkans and the challenges and oppor- tunities this entails. Besides the panels, there were short videos providing testimony from Maas stressed that it was not the goal of the young people from the region about their expe- conference to stop migration. 30 years after the riences, hopes and expectations. fall of the iron curtain it was clear that all those who had tried to do so had failed. Mobility was Opening Speech by German Foreign Minister part of the European Union’s DNA and would Heiko Maas prepare young people for a life in a globalised, The Opening Speech of the conference was de- interconnected world. At the same time, one livered by Federal Foreign Minister Heiko Maas could not close one’s eyes to the problems that on 28 October 2020. He pointed out that the a continuous “brain drain” was causing in the COVID-19 pandemic had significantly changed Western Balkans. The numbers were staggering, the agenda of the German Presidency of the as The Economist forecasts that Albania’s, Bos- Council of the European Union. Following the nia and Herzegovina’s and Serbia’s populations outbreak, it quickly became clear that Europe would have dropped by more than a third by would only be able to cope with the crisis in 2050 compared to 1990. As recent surveys by close cooperation with its neighbours. There- the Regional Cooperation Council were show- fore, the German Presidency of the Council of ing, 71 percent of young people in the Western the European Union laid a special focus on Balkan countries were considering moving supporting Southeast Europe in this crisis. As abroad. In particular better salaries were a Germany regarded the Western Balkans as an strong pull factor. But, as Maas underlined, emi- integral part of the “European family”, great im- gration from the Western Balkans was not just portance would be attached not only to sup- about economic opportunities. According to a porting the region in the fight against the pan- recent study by the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, demic, but also in the topic of youth migration. many young people were also invoking deficits But what really turned this conference into a in the education, health or social systems of key event of the German Council Presidency their countries as well as a lack of merit-based would be the active participation of people recruitment and corruption. Minorities were from the region. Therefore, Maas thanked his facing additional difficulties as many young Ro- colleagues from the Western Balkans and the ma, for example, were suffering from discrimi- members of the European Commission and ex- nation. pressed his gratitude to the co-hosts, the Southeast Europe Association and the Aspen On one of his trips, Maas recounted, he had Institute Germany. talked to a young woman in Skopje who told him: “People in this region are fighting about During the ten days Maas had recently spent in the past, instead of looking to the future. And quarantine, he had read “Where you come those who believe in the future are leaving.” And from,” the German Book Prize winner from 2019 that was exactly what would need to be by German-Bosnian author Saša Stanišić which changed. Maas therefore proposed the three fol- he cited to be saying that “our origins are the lowing steps: the first was that “we must invest bitter-sweet coincidences that carried us here in the future.” Due to the pandemic, more and or there.” As someone who grew up in the Saar- more companies were planning to “near shore” land region which had continuously shifted be- their production. The Western Balkans were in tween France and Germany, this was a stark re- an ideal position for that. Three weeks ago, the minder of how random categories like “home- European Commission had presented the new land” or “nationality” could be, especially if be- Economic and Investment Plan for the Western ing linked to a place of birth. Maas concluded Balkans which would focus on the green and that the book was showing how migration could digital economy and support connectivity. The change perspectives, connect countries and nine billion euros it offered could boost eco- people, and broaden horizons by creating new nomic transformation in the region. But the ba- Südosteuropa Mitteilungen | 01 | 2021 | Supplement Conference Report 3 sis of successful investment were reforms that people in Mostar would be able to participate only the governments of the Western Balkan in local elections for the first time in 12 years. countries could undertake by cutting corruption and red tape. The European Commission’s recent Maas’ third and final point emphasised that it country reports had shown very clearly that the was in the joint strategic interest of both the rule of law and good governance remained top EU and the region that the Western Balkan priorities. Not because the European Union re- countries would join the EU. The EU was where quired them, but because they were in the inter- the Western Balkans belonged and where the est of the people and businesses in the region. young people of the region saw their future. Maas assured the audience that “in all of this, “And if the EU does not come to them, they we stand by your side.” will come to the EU,” Maas warned. As an ex- ample, he mentioned that in 2001, before join- At this year’s summit of the Berlin Process, ing the Union, 75 percent of young Romanians hosted by North Macedonia and Bulgaria, the wanted to leave their country. Today, two Western Balkans hopefully would launch the thirds of them wanted to stay. Maas hoped to next phase of the Regional Economic Area. It see the same development in the Western Bal- would speed up economic growth by bringing kans. With the renewed commitment to Euro- the EU’s four freedoms to the region. The back- pean enlargement and the necessary reforms bone of regional cooperation, however, were at the Zagreb Summit in May 2020, according good-neighbourly relations. Making his second to Maas, both sides had taken important steps point, Maas insisted: “Let us finally put the that year to speed up European integration. ghosts of the past to rest! Because they are Germany was planning to hold the First Acces- blocking your countries’ way into the future.” sion Conference with North Macedonia before This was particularly true with regard to Kosovo the end of the EU Presidency and, if conditions and Serbia where a settlement of the bilateral allowed, would be willing to do the same with conflict was long overdue. On this note, Maas Albania. recognised that Miroslav Lajčak had resumed the EU-facilitated dialogue in July 2020 and un- Concluding his speech, Maas reminded the au- derlined again that there would be “no alterna- dience of the story of the young woman he had tive to a comprehensive, sustainable and bind- met in Skopje and who had told him that all the ing agreement.” Such a step required strong po- young people who believed in a future were litical leadership.
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