Court File No. 35613 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA (ON APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF APPEAL OF QUEBEC)
BETWEEN:
REJEAN HINSE APPELLANT
- and -
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA
RESPONDENT
- and -
THE ASSOCIATION IN DEFENCE OF THE WRONGLY CONVICTED, CENTRE PRO BONO QUEBEC and PRO BONO LAW ONTARIO
INTERVENERS
FACTUM OF THE INTERVENER, THE ASSOCIATION IN DEFENCE OF THE WRONGLY CONVICTED
GREENSPAN HUMPHREY LAVINE BORDEN LADNER GERVAIS 15 Bedford Road 100 Queen Street, Suite 1300 Toronto, Ontario M5R 2J7 Ottawa, Ontario KIP 139
Tel: (416) 868-1755 Tel.: (613) 237-5160 Fax: (416) 868-1990 Fax: (613) 230-8842
Brian H. Greenspan /Naomi M. Lutes Nadia Effendi Counsel for the Intervener, Ottawa Agent for the Intervener, The The Association in Defence of the Wrongly Association in Defence of the Wrongly Convicted Convicted 2
BORDEN LADNER GERVAIS BORDEN LADNER GERVAIS Suite 900 - 1000 de La Gauchetiere St. West 100 Queen Street, Suite 1300 Montreal, Quebec H3B 5H4 Ottawa, Ontario KIP 1J9
Tel.: (514) 879-1212 Tel.: (613) 237-5160 Fax: (514) 954-1905 Fax.: (613) 230-8842
Guy J. Pratte Nadia Effendi Counsel for the Appellant, Rejean Hinse Ottawa Agent for the Appellant, Mean Hinse
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA Procureur general du Canada 50 O'Connor Street 284, rue Wellington, T-6060 Suite 500, Room 557 Ottawa, Ontario K1A 0118 Ottawa, Ontario K1A OH8
Tel.: (613) 946-2776 Tel: (613) 670-6290 Fax: (613) 952-6006 Fax: (613) 954-1920
Bernard Letarte Vincent Veilleux Lindy Rouillard-Labbe Christopher M. Rupar
Counsel for the Respondent the Attorney Ottawa Agent for the Respondent the Attorney General of Canada General of Canada
BENNETT JONES LLP BENNETT JONES LLP 3400, One First Canadian Place Bureau 1900, 45, rue O'Connor Toronto, Ontario Ottawa, Ontario M5X 1A4 Ka) 1A4
Tel.: (416) 863-1200 Tel.: (613) 683-2302 Fax: (416) 863-1716 Fax: (613) 683-2323
Counsel for the Intervener Ottawa Agent for the Intervener Pro Bono Law Ontario Pro Bono Law Ontario
LAVERY, De BILLY NOEL et ASSOCIES Bureau 4000 111, rue Champlain 1, Place Ville-Marie Gatineau, Quebec Montreal, Quebec J8X 3R1 H3B 4M4
Tel.: (514) 871-1522 Tel.: (819) 771-7393 Fax: (514) 871-8977 Fax: (819) 771-5397
Counsel for the Intevener Ottawa Agent for the Intevener Centre Pro Bono Quebec Centre Pro Bono Quebec TABLE OF CONTENTS
PART I — OVERVIEW AND STATEMENT OF FACTS 1 A. Overview 1 B. Statement of Facts 2 PART II — QUESTIONS IN ISSUE 3 PART III — STATEMENT OF ARGUMENT 3 A. Overview 3 B. The Liability of the Crown in Conducting Ministerial Reviews — The Duty of Care 4 A Prima Facie Duty of Care is Owed to an Applicant at Common Law 5 Ministerial Reviews are Not Core Policy Decisions 5 C. No Immunity for Negligence: The Royal Prerogative of Mercy Then and Now 6 D. The Standard of Care and Procedural Safeguards 8
PART IV — SUBMISSIONS AS TO COSTS 10
PART V — ORDER SOUGHT 10 PART VI — TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 11 Court File No. 35613 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA (ON APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF APPEAL OF QUEBEC)
BETWEEN:
REJEAN RINSE APPELLANT
- and -
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA
RESPONDENT
- and -
THE ASSOCIATION IN DEFENCE OF THE WRONGLY CONVICTED, CENTRE PRO BONO QUEBEC and PRO BONO LAW ONTARIO
INTERVENERS
FACTUM OF THE INTERVENER, THE ASSOCIATION IN DEFENCE OF THE WRONGLY CONVICTED
PART I — OVERVIEW AND STATEMENT OF FACTS
A. Overview
1. As this Honourable Court stated in Hill v. Hamilton-Wentworth, infra, in addressing the issue of negligent police investigations, "the existing remedies for wrongful prosecution and conviction are incomplete." It is submitted that to deny a remedy in tort to a wrongly convicted 2 person who has suffered negligence at the hands of the Minister of Justice is, quite literally, to deny justice.'
2. The Intervener, the Association in Defence of the Wrongly Convicted ("AIDWYC"), is a national public interest organization. It has two broad objectives: first, to propose legislative and other changes to reduce the likelihood of miscarriages of justice; and second, to participate in the review and correction of wrongful convictions. AIDWYC is recognized as an expert in the investigation and remediation of wrongful convictions. It advocates not only for its clients, through mechanisms such as appeals and conviction reviews, but has also been actively engaged in criminal law reform and policy development since its inception. AIDWYC files this factum to address the first question raised on appeal by the Appellant; namely, what standard of liability should apply to the conduct of government officials engaged in the process of ministerial review.
3. AIDWYC respectfully submits that Justice Poulin was correct in determining that the Attorney General of Canada's actions were to be assessed in accordance with the usual rules of civil liability when damages are caused by government servants acting in the operational sphere. It is further AIDWYC' s position that the Quebec Court of Appeal erred in finding that a wrongly convicted person seeking compensation arising from negligent government action must establish that the Minister or his delegate acted with malicious intent.
4. It is the position of AIDWYC that the Minister and his delegates who receive an application for ministerial review of a conviction must undertake a reasonable and prudent review. This process must protect the Applicant's procedural rights and fulfil his or her legitimate expectations. The failure to thoroughly, diligently, and transparently assess and determine the merits of an application amounts to a breach of the standard of care.
B. Statement of Facts
5. AIDWYC takes no position with respect to the facts as advanced by the parties and defers to the parties on the factual record. However, it should be noted that the factual record, in
l Hill v. Hamilton-Wentworth Regional Police Services Board, [2007] 3 S.C.R. 129 at para. 35 [Hill], Appellant's Book of Authorities, Vol. I, Tab 23 ("A.B.A.")
3
relation to the issue of access to justice, reveals a consistent, if not persistent, attempt by the Appellant to vigorously assert his innocence and pursue his remedy.
PART II — QUESTIONS IN ISSUE
6. AIDWYC submits that a failure by the Minister to adequately and diligently review applications submitted pursuant to the ministerial review process is negligent, and attracts liability. Specifically, it is the position of AIDWYC that:
i) The ministerial review process is operational in nature, as it does not engage the exercise of ministerial discretion in making a decision. The Quebec Court of Appeal erred in conflating the exercise of ministerial discretion with the standard of care in undertaking a review of the application;
ii) The historical roots of the review process derived from the royal prerogative of mercy cannot shield the government from liability for failing to comply with the standard of conduct expected of public officials undertaking ministerial reviews; and
iii) The Minister is required to act reasonably and prudently, and as such, an applicant alleging negligence need not demonstrate bad faith or malicious intent. The standard of care owed to ministerial review applicants must include a consideration of procedural fairness. Applicants must be afforded procedural safeguards which accord with their legitimate expectations, and these safeguards should be transparent and open in order to ensure accountability.
PART III — STATEMENT OF ARGUMENT
A. Overview
7. An application for a ministerial review is the last resort of a wrongly convicted person; his or her last hope. This case is not about the Minister's decision-making authority. It is not about the exercise of discretion, or the roots of that discretion in the royal prerogative of mercy. It is about compensation for a lack of decision making, a lack of review, and a lack of reasonable action. It is about the ability of a wrongly convicted person to sue the federal government for its negligence in handling ministerial reviews. It is respectfully submitted that to require a plaintiff to demonstrate malicious intent on the part of the Minister would not only impose an unfair and 4 possibly insurmountable burden, but would be inconsistent with the function and purpose of ministerial reviews as the last resort of the innocent.
8. It is AIDWYC' s position that, whether exercising his powers under either the former ministerial review provision or pursuant to his powers and duties under the current section 696.1, the Minister owes a duty of care to an applicant to review his or her application diligently and fairly, both in accordance with the civil law of Quebec and at common law.
B. The Liability of the Crown in Conducting Ministerial Reviews — The Duty of Care
9. It is the position of AIDWYC that the Crown is liable in tort for its failure to act reasonably and prudently in conducting ministerial reviews, as the Minister owes the applicant a duty of care. Moreover, the ministerial review process is operational in nature, as it does not engage the exercise of ministerial discretion in reaching a final decision. It is respectfully submitted that the Quebec Court of Appeal erred in conflating the exercise of ministerial discretion with the standard of care in undertaking a review of the application.
10. Because of the importance of ministerial reviews in ameliorating wrongful convictions, it is the submission of AIDWYC that this Court should recognize that such a duty exists in accordance with both the civil code of Quebec and at common law.
11. In Quebec, the Minister's duty is codified in art. 1457 of the Civil Code,2 which does not require that the Court find a specific duty of care. Negligence can arise, and fault may be established, for any failure to meet the ordinary standard of reasonable behaviour in the circumstances.3 Although the Crown is subject to the laws of fault as if it were a person, it can nevertheless invoke its immunity in certain circumstances. As set out in the discussion below, there is no principled rationale to permit the Crown to invoke immunity in this case.
2 Canadian Food Inspection Agency v. PIPSC, [2010] 3 S.C.R. 657 at paras. 25-27, Respondent's Book of Authorities, Vol. I, Tab 21 ("R.B.A."); Civil Code of Quebec, S.Q. 1991, c. 64, art. 1457, Appellant's Factum, p. 45; Vibron Ltd. c. Patrick Garneau & Assad& Inc., 2011 QCCA 1166 at para. 46, Intervener's Book of Authorities, Tab 1 ("Int. B.A.") 3 Videotron Itee v. Bell Expressvu, l.p., [2012] Q.J. No. 7196 at para. 621 (Sup. Ct.), Int. B.A., Tab 2 5
A Prima Facie Duty of Care is Owed to an Applicant at Common Law
12. It is submitted that the Minister owes a ministerial review applicant a duty of care at common law. It is well-settled that the duty of care owed by the Minister to an applicant is determined under the two-step test in Anns and Cooper, infra.4 This test first asks whether there is a sufficiently close relationship between the parties such that the Minister could foresee that his carelessness would cause the applicant damage, and second, whether there are any residual policy considerations which ought to negative or limit the duty.5
13. It is submitted that an applicant and the Minister who is engaged in a ministerial review enjoy a sufficiently close, direct, and proximate relationship.6 Moreover, it would be foreseeable to the Minister that negligent conduct in undertaking a review of an application would occasion the applicant harm, particularly given the issues at stake. The nature of the ministerial review both defines and limits the scope of the relationship. It is a close relationship, as the applicant is easily identifiable, and the potential harm is easily and readily foreseeable. Moreover, as explained by this Court in Hill, "a final consideration bearing on the relationship is the interest it engages."7 It is submitted that the interests engaged — liberty and justice - are of the utmost importance not only to the applicant, but to our criminal justice system.
Ministerial Reviews are Not Core Policy Decisions
14. It is submitted that there are no policy considerations which ought to negative or limit the Minister's duty of care owed to a ministerial review applicant in Quebec or at common law. An analysis of the common law rule in Anns both confirms and establishes that a duty exists.8
15. The receipt and review of a ministerial application does not trigger true or core policy decision-making functions which should be exempt from tortious claims.9 The ministerial review
4 Anns v. Merton London Borough Council, [1978] A.C. 728 (H.L.) at pp. 751-752 [Anns], Int. B.A., Tab 3; Cooper v. Hobart, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 537 at paras. 25, 29-39 [Cooper], Int. B.A., Tab 4; see also Kamloops (City Of) v. Neilsen, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 2 [Kamloops], Int. B.A., Tab 5; Just v. British Columbia, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 1228 [Just], A.B.A., Vol. II, Tab 28 5 Cooper, supra note 4 at paras. 25, 29-39, Int. B.A., Tab 4; Kamloops, supra note 4 at pp. 10-11, Int. B.A., Tab 5; Hill, supra note I at para. 20, A.B.A., Vol. I, Tab 23 Hill, supra note I at paras. 23-24, 29, 31, 33-36, A.B.A., Vol. I, Tab 23; R. v. Imperial Tobacco Canada Ltd., [201 I] 3 S.C.R. 45 at paras. 43-46 [Imperial Tobacco], hit. B.A. Tab 6 Hill, supra note I at para. 34, A.B.A., Vol. I, Tab 23 8 Prig/ 'hOMMe v. Prud'homme, [2002] 4 S.C.R. 663 at para. 25, R.B.A., Vol. I, Tab 22 6 process is purely operational in nature, as it does not engage the exercise of ministerial discretion in making a final decision. It is respectfully submitted that, in its analysis of duty of care, the Quebec Court of Appeal erred in conflating the exercise of ministerial discretion with the standard of care in undertaking a review of the application.
16. It is submitted that the discretion inherent in the Minister's review and investigation, as in Hill, fails to provide a convincing reason to negate or limit the duty of care. The closely analogous circumstances of Hill equally dictate in the circumstances of ministerial review that this inherent discretion should be taken into account in formulating the standard of care, and not in determining whether or not a duty of care exists.°
B. No Immunity for Negligence: The Royal Prerogative of Mercy Then and Now
17. The genesis of the review process as expressed in the royal prerogative of mercy should not shield the Minister from liability for failing to meet the standard of conduct expected of public officials undertaking statutory ministerial reviews. The royal prerogative, as the historical root of ministerial review, is merely one factor that assists in determining whether or not the conduct of the Minister is a core policy decision.
18. As true, or core policy decisions are protected from liability, the scope of those decisions should be carefully circumscribed.11 Not all acts of discretion are policy decisions. It is submitted that, having codified the ministerial review process, Parliament did not intend that the receipt and review of applications engage true policy decisions. Core policy decisions are decisions "as to a course or principle of action that are based on public policy considerations, such as economic, social and political factors..."12 The enactment of s. 596 (now expressed in s. 696.1)13 was a policy decision. Its implementation and execution are not.
19. It is submitted that, although the former s. 596 employed the language of mercy, such mercy was primarily granted in the context of miscarriages of justice. As a result, although the
9 Just, supra note 4 at p. 1240, A.B.A., Vol. II, Tab 28; Imperial Tobacco, supra note 6 at paras. 61-64, 72, 84, 85, 90, 95, R.B.A., Vol. I, Tab 33 10 MI, supra note I at para. 51, A.B.A., Vol. I, Tab 23 " Imperial Tobacco, supra note 6 at paras. 85, 86, R.B.A., Vol. I, Tab 33 12 Imperial Tobacco, ibid. at para. 90, R.B.A., Vol. I, Tab 33 13 Criminal Code, S.C. 1953-1954, c. 51, s. 596, Appellant's Factum, p. 46; Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 696.1, Appellant's Factum, p. 52 7
language and procedure was reformed and enacted in the current s. 696.1, the purpose of the section remains substantively the same.14
20. There are good policy reasons not to negative the duty of care. Victims of a miscarriage of justice whose continued conviction and consequent stigmatization has been the result of negligence on the part of the Minister should not be denied redress through civil compensation. AIDWYC submits that, whether then or now, the Minster was required to act prudently and fairly when reviewing applications for two critical reasons. First, the application for a ministerial review engages a statutory power under the Criminal Code, not the historical royal prerogative of mercy. Second, even if the ministerial review is an exercise of mercy, it is nevertheless subject to judicial review.15
21. Even if the ministerial review power embraces the exercise of the royal prerogative, it is submitted that the conduct of the Minister is not immune from review. The exercise of a prerogative power that affects the rights or legitimate expectations of an individual is reviewable.16 The conduct of the Minister has the potential to affect the liberty of the applicant and clearly presents "real adverse consequences for the person affected."17 The liberty of a wrongly convicted individual is one of the most important rights in our judicial system. An applicant for mercy has a reasonable and legitimate expectation that his or her application will be seriously reviewed and assessed. It is submitted that as the ultimate decision is reviewable, so too is the process.18
22. Judicial review is both moot and practically unavailable in the case of an exonerated wrongly convicted person, or for a person who has had his or her charges stayed or withdrawn
14 See, e.g. comments on this point in Timm v. Canada (Attorney General), [2012] F.C.J. No. 556 at paras. 6-16 (F.C.); Int. B.A., Tab 7 15 Thatcher v. Canada (Minister of Justice), [1996] F.C.J. No. 1261 (F.C.) [decided under s.690] [Thatcher], A.B.A., Vol. II, Tab 50 16 Black v. Canada (Prime Minister) (2001), 54 O.R. (3d) 215 at paras. 51, 56 (C.A.) [Black], A.B.A., Vol. I, Tab 10; See also Canada (Prime Minister) v. Khadr, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 44 at para. 36, A.B.A., Vol. I, Tab 12 17 Black, ibid. at para. 60, A.B.A., Vol. I, Tab 10 18 This case represents the reverse of the situation in Black, ibid, There, the Court found that, since the exercise of the honours prerogative exercised personally by the Queen was not reviewable, the Prime Minister's actions relating to the exercise of that privilege were likewise not reviewable. 8 after having applied for a ministerial review.19 This individual would have already obtained through the courts what he or she did not obtain through the Minister. Therefore, the only remedy available for the mistakes of the government in reviewing his or her application is through a negligence claim. Indeed, as this Court has held, the ability to sue and to seek judicial review in this context are not mutually exclusive.20
23. It is AIDWYC's respectful submission that there are no overarching principles of public law or reasons of policy that ought to negate or limit the Minister's liability for negligence in considering and reviewing ministerial reviews. In the alternative, it is AIDWYC' s .respectful submission that if this Court finds that, prior to the enactment of the current ministerial review scheme in s. 696.1 of the Criminal Code, the Crown's negligence was immune from liability, this Court should nevertheless clarify the current duty and standard of care owed by the Minister to prospective applicants to guard against future wrongful convictions.
C. The Standard of Care and Procedural Safeguards
24. It is AIDWYC's position that the Minister is required to act reasonably and prudently in assessing ministerial reviews. As such, it is submitted that an applicant alleging negligence need not demonstrate malice or bad faith on the part of the Minister. Rather, the standard of care owed to ministerial review applicants must include a consideration of procedural fairness. Applicants must be afforded procedural safeguards which accord with their legitimate expectations, and the failure to comply with these safeguards should expose the Minister to liability, in order to ensure accountability, accessibility, and transparency and to guard against wrongful convictions.
25. It is submitted that, in receiving and processing s. 696.1 applications, the Minister or his delegate must act reasonably and with prudence.21 The statutory obligations and the Regulations
19 Although now s.696. I requires that a conviction review applicant first exhaust his or her right of appeal to an appellate court, this was not always the case. Moreover, an appeal to the Supreme Court is not always required prior to making such an application: McArthur v. Ontario (Attorney General), 2012 ONSC 5773, R.13.A, Vol. II, Tab 43 20 Canada (Attorney General) v. TeleZone Inc., [2010] 3 S.C.R. 585 at paras. 27, 30, 42, 78, 81 [TeleZone], Int. B.A., Tab 8 21 St. Lawrence Cement Inc. v. Barrette, [2008] 3 S.C.R. 392 at paras. 21, 71, Int. B.A., Tab 10; Ryan v. Victoria (City), [1999] 1 S.C.R. 201 at para. 28, Int. B.A., Tab 9 9 support this position.22 Section 696.2 provides that, upon receipt of an application, the Minister of Justice "shall review it in accordance with the regulations."23 It is submitted that the obligation to review in accordance with the Regulations includes, and indeed presupposes, accessibility to the decision-maker and a thorough, meaningful review. This codified process neither imposes nor creates new obligations. It merely reflects the basic procedure the Minister ought to have followed to ensure a fair assessment of the application.24
26. Procedural fairness principles are of assistance in determining the appropriate standard of care, as the standard of care analysis should look not to any reasonable and prudent person, but measures the actions of the governmental entity against a reasonable entity similarly placed.25 This does not mean that every breach of an administrative law duty would be a breach of the standard of care. A determination as to whether the Minister breached the standard of care will depend on whether his actions were reasonable and prudent in all the circumstances.
27. It is submitted that, at a minimum, the Minister is required to act in good faith and to conduct a meaningful review.26 It is submitted that this does not mean that, in order to establish a breach of the standard of care, a plaintiff must prove bad faith or malicious intent. Rather, the plaintiff must prove that the Minister acted unreasonably. Bad faith is, of course, unreasonable, but other actions or inactions may, depending on the specific facts of each case, prove also to be unreasonable.
28. When an individual has exhausted all rights of appeal, the ministerial review process is the last safeguard against wrongful convictions. Indeed, AIDWYC has assisted a number of individuals in pursuing successful ministerial reviews. James Driskell, Steven Truscott, William Mullins-Johnson, Erin Walsh, Kyle Unger, Romeo Phillion, all wrongly convicted persons,27
22 TeleZone, supra note 20 at para. 28, Int. B.A., Tab 8. However, mere compliance with this statutory duty will not be determinative, and will not necessarily militate in favour of the Minister: See Ryan v. Victoria (City), supra note 21 at para. 28, Int. B.A, Tab 9 23 Criminal Code, supra note 13, s. 696.2(1), Appellant's Factum, p. 52 24 Regulations Respecting Applications for Ministerial Review — Miscarriages of Justice, SOR/2002-416, R.B.A., Vol. I, Tab 7 25 See, for example, the standard of care analysis undertaken by this Court in Hill, supra at para. 73, A.B.A., Vol. I, Tab 23 and in Just v. British Columbia, supra note 4 at pp. 1244-1246, A.B.A., Vol. II, Tab 28 26 Thatcher, supra note 15 at para. 13, A.B.A., Vol. II, Tab 50 27 See "Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Certain Aspects of the Trial and Conviction of James Driskell", the Honourable Patrick J. LeSage, Q.C., Commissioner, January 2007, Int. B.A., Tab 14; Truscott (Re), 2007 10 relied upon the Minister to prudently and thoroughly review their applications. Had these applications been reviewed negligently, their exoneration would have been in jeopardy. The integrity of the process of ministerial review requires accessibility, the obligation to thoroughly and diligently review, and a transparent process which provides an opportunity to ensure a fair and balanced evaluation of an application. When these features are absent, or negligently addressed, access to justice requires access to compensation.
PART IV — SUBMISSIONS AS TO COSTS
29. AIDWYC makes no submissions as to costs.
PART V — ORDER SOUGHT
30. AIDWYC respectfully requests an opportunity to present ten minutes of oral argument, or as long as this Honourable Court sees fit.
31. AIDWYC does not seek costs, and asks that no costs be awarded against it.
ALL OF WHICH IS RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED THIS 20th DAY of OCTOBER, 2014.
/ (16----. .-c..-o------ict GREENSPAN HUIVITHREY LAVINE BORDEN LADNER GERVAIS 15 Bedford Road 100 Queen Street, Suite 1300 Toronto, Ontario M5R 2J7 Ottawa, Ontario KIP 1J9
Tel: (416) 868-1755 Tel.: (613) 237-5160 Fax: (416) 868-1990 Fax: (613) 230-8842 Brian H. Greenspan /Naomi M. Lutes Nadia Effendi Counsel for the Applicant/ Proposed Intervener, Ottawa Agent for the Applicant/Proposed The Association in Defence of the Wrongly Intervener, The Association in Defence of the Convicted Wrongly Convicted
ONCA 575, A.B.A., Vol. II, Tab 52; Regina v. Mullins-Johnson, 2007 ONCA 720, 87 O.R. (3d) 425; Int. B.A., Tab 11; Walsh (Re), 2008 NBCA 33, Int. B.A., Tab 13; Regina v. Phillion, 2009 ONCA 202, Int. B.A., Tab 12 11
PART VI – ALPHABETICAL TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Legislation Paragraphs)
Civil Code of Quebec, S.Q. 1991, c. 64, art. 1457 11
Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c. C-46, ss. 690, 696.1 to 696.6 13
Criminal Code, S.C. 1953-54, c. 51, s. 596 13
Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34, s. 617 13
Regulations Respecting Applications for Ministerial Review — Miscarriages of Justice, SOR/2002-416 25
Jurisprudence Paragraph(s)
Anns v. Merton London Borough Council, [1978] A.C. 728 (H.L.) 12
Black v. Canada (Prime Minister) (2001), 54 O.R. (3d) 215 (C.A.) 21
Canada (Attorney General) v. TeleZone Inc., [2010] 3 S.C.R. 585 22, 25
Canada (Prime Minister) v. Khadr, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 44 21
Canadian Food Inspection Agency v. PIPSC, [2010] 3 S.C.R. 657 11
Cooper v. Hobart, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 537 12
Hill v. Hamilton-Wentworth Regional Police Services Board, [2007] 3 S.C.R. 129 1, 12, 13, 16, 26
Just v. British Columbia, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 1228 12, 15, 26
Kamloops (City Of) v. Neilsen, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 2 12
McArthur v. Ontario (Attorney General), 2012 ONSC 5773 22
Prud'homme v. Prud'homme, [2002] 4 S.C.R. 663 14
Regina v. Imperial Tobacco Canada Ltd., [2011] 3 S.C.R. 45 13, 15, 18
Regina v. Mullins-Johnson, 2007 ONCA 720, 87 O.R. (3d) 425 28
Regina v. Phillion, 2009 ONCA 202 28 12
Ryan v. Victoria (City), [1999] 1 S.C.R. 201 25
St. Lawrence Cement Inc. v. Barrette, [2008] 3 S.C.R. 392 25
Thatcher v. Canada (Minister of Justice), [1996] F.C.J. No. 1261 (F.C.) 20, 27
Timm v. Canada (Attorney General), [2012] F.C.J. No. 556 (F.C.) 19
Truscott (Re), 2007 ONCA 575 28
Vibron Ltd. c. Patrick Garneau & Associes Inc., 2011 QCCA 1166 11
Videotron ltee v. Bell Expressvu, 1.p., [2012] Q.J. No. 7196 (Sup. Ct.) 11
Walsh (Re), 2008 NBCA 33 28
Other References Paragraphs)
"Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Certain Aspects of the Trial and Conviction of James Driskell", the Honourable Patrick J. LeSage, Q.C., Commissioner, January 2007 .... 28