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Evidence Determination of Bank Failure Eradication in the 21St ness & Fi si na u n c B Hassan, J Bus Fin Aff 2018, 7:2 i f a o l l A a Journal of f DOI: 10.4172/2167-0234.1000341 f n a r i r u s o J ISSN: 2167-0234 Business & Financial Affairs Research Article Open Access Evidence Determination of Bank Failure Eradication in the 21st Century Nigeria Mohammed Hassan* Department of Business Administration, Gombe State University (GSU), Nigeria Abstract The banking industry has lost its position as the bedrock of Nigerian economy due to abysmal performance of the economy. The industry is known to have contributed in no small measure to the development of the economy. This industry is the enabling hub of national and global payment systems, which facilitate trade transactions within and amongst numerous national, regional and international economic units and by so doing; it enhances commerce, industry and exchange. An effective failure resolution mechanism is critical for sustenance of public confidence. A number of failure resolution options exist, some of which are used for salvaging a distressed institution from total collapse. Notwithstanding the option used, an effective resolution option should among others, focus on: maintaining public confidence and stability in the banking system; ensuring fairness, equity, transparency and accountability; instilling market discipline while discouraging moral hazards; and achieving minimum disruption to the payment system. The research is empirical. The study covers the banking industry with the use of corporate questionnaire to gather data from each of the sample representatives which are One hundred and five (105) bank customers in Gombe metropolis. Pearson product coefficient of correlation was used to compute the collated data. Keywords: Bank failure resolution options in Nigeria; Resolution deposit-taking, maturity transformation and payment system roles. framework; Customer confidence and Stability in the Nigeria Financial One of the key functions of banks in the economy is to facilitate the system maturity transformation of money, that is, to turn short-term savings into long-term credit. Banks fund themselves mainly through deposits Introduction and deposit-like instruments with relatively short maturities. They use this short-term funding to provide longer-term credit, such as Background to the study mortgages. This balance-sheet structure exposes banks to liquidity risk Banking institutions perform essential intermediation functions (i.e., the risk that short-term funding can be withdrawn instantly, while in the economy. They allocate financial resources from savings longer-term loans are only repaid over years). to investments and consumption, provide vehicles for wealth Because of banks’ high liquidity risk, they require a different accumulation, and perform maturity transformation functions that approach to their rescue or resolution than other types of businesses. A facilitate the financing of long-term projects, provide liquidity, and non-bank corporate normally approaches insolvency over an extended facilitate a payment, clearing and settlement function in the economy, period and the deterioration of its financials becomes apparent over including cross-border payments. As these institutions grow in size time. However, even a relatively well-managed and profitable bank can and sophistication, they provide economies of scale, cost-effectiveness, experience liquidity problems, sometimes as a result of external factors. efficiencies and risk-management processes that benefit their customers When the public or financial markets lose confidence in a bank or the and the economy at large. Without a well-developed, safe and efficient banking sector, deposits are withdrawn and sources of short-term financial system, growth in the real economy is constrained. funding dry up. Even a solvent bank can fail if it cannot access funding However, as financial institutions become larger and more with which to service its expenses, repay deposits and other liabilities sophisticated, they also become increasingly complex, interconnected as they become payable, and finance its longer-term loans and other and integrated into the fabric of the real economy. As a result, the failure assets. Resolving a bank in these circumstances requires immediate of a single Banking institution could result in a deadlock in critical intervention, which is not provided for in the normal insolvency financial markets and services, which could quickly spread through processes. the financial system to other markets and institutions, and which could Another reason why banks, in particular, require specific resolution result in economic costs that vastly exceed the costs of the initial single arrangements is because they are closely interconnected with each other, failure. Past experience has shown that normal corporate insolvency the rest of the financial system and the real economy. The failure of a arrangements are inadequate to deal with the potential financial system bank, in particular a large bank, can have catastrophic socioeconomic instability caused by the failure of some banking institutions. Because of the destructive impact that the failure of some Banking institutions could have on the real economy, especially if such institutions are large, *Corresponding author: Mohammed Hassan, Faculty of Art and Social Sciences, complex or very interconnected, they are often regarded as being ‘too Department of Business Administration, Gombe State University (GSU), Nigeria, big to fail’, with a general expectation among depositors and investors Tel: 2348028183554; E-mail: [email protected] that they will always be rescued if they do fail, most likely with taxpayer Received May 08, 2018; Accepted June 01, 2018; Published June 05, 2018 funds. Financial institutions that have the potential to dislocate a whole Citation: Hassan M (2018) Evidence Determination of Bank Failure Eradication financial system and cause severe real economic costs if they fail have in the 21st Century Nigeria. J Bus Fin Aff 7: 341. doi: 10.4172/2167-0234.1000341 come to be referred to as systemically important financial institutions. Copyright: © 2018 Hassan M. This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted Banks are most likely to be designated systemically important use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and financial institutions from a resolution perspective because of their source are credited. J Bus Fin Aff, an open access journal Volume 7 • Issue 2 • 1000341 ISSN: 2167-0234 Citation: Hassan M (2018) Evidence Determination of Bank Failure Eradication in the 21st Century Nigeria. J Bus Fin Aff 7: 341. doi: 10.4172/2167- 0234.1000341 Page 2 of 5 consequences, cause severe hardship among depositors and disrupt ensuring fairness, equity, transparency and accountability; instilling financial stability. Unlike other types of companies, it is not only the market discipline while discouraging moral hazards; and achieving shareholders and creditors that bear the losses of the institution, but minimum disruption to the payment system. also the broader economy and often the taxpayer. Therefore, a special resolution framework should be in place to enable and empower the Objective of the study regulators and authorities to intervene in a distressed bank at an early In the light of the above, the objective of the study include: stage, without necessarily having to wait for the initiative and approval 1. of shareholders or the Board of Directors (Board) or for the point of To identify Bank failure resolution options applicable in the balance-sheet insolvency. Nigeria context. 2. The financial intermediation role of banking institutions exposes To examine how these resolution options create stability and banks to the risk of failure with losses capable of undermining public maintain public confidence in the Nigeria financial system. confidence in the banking system and consequently affecting the other Statement of hypotheses sectors of the economy. This scenario was vividly demonstrated in the global financial crises which originated from United State of America Two hypotheses were formulated to be tested as follows: in 2008 and spread to the rest of the world, in spite of the sophistication Ho: The Bank failure resolution options adopted in Nigeria has and intensity of banking supervision by the United State Regulatory not enhanced public confidence and stability in the Nigeria Financial Agencies. system. In Nigeria jurisdiction, the history of banking business is replete H1: The Bank failure resolution options adopted in Nigeria has with periodic and generalized failures. From the available record, enhanced public confidence and stability in the Nigeria Financial there was rapid growth in the number of indigenous banks within a system. spate of few years between 1947 and 1952 with no supervision. The outcome was that, the collapse of these banks was just as rapid as they Literature Review were established. In all, a total of 25 indigenous banks failed in the early 1950s Adeyemi. Introduction During the reference period, there was no banking regulation The disposition plan by a regulatory authority for a failed or failing framework in place and the period is refer to as the era of free banking. banking institution is refers to as Bank failure resolution. Such a The main causes of bank failure in the free banking era included under- resolution is often operationally designed to protect
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