POSITIONS OF AUTHORITY IN THE FORCES ARMEES RWANDAISES (FAR)
Power and authority that a civilian could exercise in FAR.
Expert report requested by the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda in the case of Prosecutor v. Protais Zigiranyirazo ICTR-200 1-73- 1
Report written by
EMMANUEL NERETSE BREVETE D'ETAT - MAJOR Brussels, 1 August 2006.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Introduction ...... 3
The Forces Armbes Rwandaises ...... 4
Maintaining and Restoring Public Order (MROP) ...... 9
The Parallel Networks ...... 14
Protecting "VERY IMPORTANT PERSONS" (VIP) ...... 17
Organization and Missions of certain military units referred to as "elite" ...... 20
Movements in military helicopters after April 1994...... 23
Difficulties in identifying soldiers by their uniforms ...... 26
Opinion and considerations regarding the statements of certain witnesses ..... 26
Criminal andior disciplinary responsability ...... 43
Conclusion...... 44 . . Bibliography ...... 45
Annexes ...... 45
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1. Introduction
From time immemorial, and throughout the world, political power and the military institution have had ambiguous and often conflicting relations. Even if in principle the Army must submit to political power, soldiers quite often interfere in the politics of their countries. In extreme cases, soldiers simply arrogate all political powers to themselves (military regimes born of coups d'etat).
However, in all these cases, the functioning of the military institution will always have an abiding feature.
In fact, be it in a democracy or under military regimes, soldiers are under the authority of their superiors, i.e., other high-ranking soldiers. Civilians who exercise some amount of authority or effective control over soldiers do so strictly within military laws and regulations in force, often as concerns the supreme command.
In the case of Rwanda, how did this happen? Were the Forces Armies Rwandais (FAR) governed by laws and regulations which put them out of the reach of non-hierarchical figures like influential or supposedly influential civil personalities, or were they, on the other hand, used in a manner that smacked of anarchy or chaos?
Mr. Protais Zigiranyirazo's defence has requested us to address the military aspects of the case, for instance, "en relation avec le pouvoir supirieur, mais aussi avec d'autres alliguks de connotation militaire" [in relation to the higher authority, but also to other allegations concerning the military]."'
In fact, paragraph 3 of the Amended Indictment of 8 March 2005 reads "....Protais ZIGIRANYIRAZO wielded great power and influence. As such, he had de facto control and authority, in the sense of having the material ability to prevent or to punish criminal conduct, over the actions of soldiers, gendarmes, the Interahamwe, administrative officials, and members of the civilian population in ~wanda."~
After reviewing the circumstances and the forms in which a civilian could or not exercise authority over the soldiers, we will analyse the special case of a Prkfet within the context of maintaining and restoring public law and order and that of a relation of the President of the Republic within the context of the Presidential Guard.
After giving our opinion on the existence or non-existence of "parallel networks" within FAR, we will dwell on the Presidential Guard Battalion by addressing its organization, its missions and the superior/subordinate relations linking it to other command echelons. Certain Prosecution witnesses also addressed a few military aspects in their testimonies. In the expert's terms of reference, Protais Zigiranyirazo's defence stated that we were going to receive these testimonies so as to comment and give our military expert opinion on them. We also intend to react to its appeal in this report.
' Terms of reference established by Mr. John Philpot, Lead Counsel for Protais ZIGIRANYIRAZO. Case No.lCTR-2001-73-1, Amended Indictment, 7 April 2005.
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Lastly, we will speak of the criminal and disciplinary responsibility for acts committed by soldiers, in the light of the statutes as well as the relevant case-law.
2. The Forces Armdes Rwandaises a. Background
It will be recalled that FAR, as agreed in 1994, resulted from the merger in 1994 between the former "National Guard" and "National Police" to form the "Rwandan Army." When the Gendarmerie Nationale was formed in 1974, the two forces became the Forces Armies Rwandaises FAR).^ This term thenceforth referred to an entity formed by the Rwandan Army and the Gendarmerie. The Communal Police, even though it was legally part of the defence and security forces, was not included in FAR.
The National Guard and National Police had taken over from the Force Publique (Police) which was in charge of Defence and security in the Belgian Congo and Ruanda-Urundi.
On 30 June 1960, the Congo obtained independence, while Ruanda-Urundi remained under Belgian trusteeship. At that time, Rwanda did not have, and could not have any soldier because only the Congolese could serve in the "Force Publique."
Independent Congo withdrew its soldiers from Rwanda after 30 June. So Rwanda had to ensure its own security.4 It was under these circumstances that Belgium established as a matter of urgency the "National Guard" which in 1974 became the "Armie Rwandaise" before becoming the Forces Armies Rwandaises (FAR),following the merger with the new "Gendarmerie Nationale. b. FAR Command
Some opinion asserts that senior positions in the FAR Command were occupied by officers from the North West, for instance, the Gisenyi and Ruhengeri Prefectures. This assertion should be qualified.
When Belgium, acting as trustee of Rwanda, took the decision in 1960 to establish a "National Guard," it opened a school to train Rwandan officers. The "Ecole d'oflcier de Kigali" [Kigali Officers' School] was thus opened. One year later, six young Second Lieutenants graduated from this school. The six who graduated included five from the North west.' We do not know the criteria the Belgian authorities used to recruit these officers, but it seems to us inconceivable that they were guided by regionalist motives. But the fact is that the first three batches of the officers' school were admitted by the Belgian authorities. On the eve of the 1 October 1990 RPF attack, these very first officers had, either reached the retirement age, or had been moved to non-active positions (see Annexes F and G).
%egislative Decree (LD) of 23 January 1974 to name the ArmQe Rwandaise and LD of 23 January 2001 to set up the Gendarmerie Nationale. Official Gazette of 1 February 1974. 'Guy, LOGIEST, Mission au Rwanda, Un blanc dnns la bagarre Huh- Tutsi, Brussels, Didier Hatier, 1988. 5 Habyarimana Juv6nal (Gisenyi), Nyatanyi Pierre (Ruhengeri), Nsekalije Aloys (Gisenyi), Benda Sabin (Ruhengeri), Ruhashya Epimaque (Kigali) and Kanyarengwe Alexis (Ruhengeri).
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Furthermore in 1992, with massive retirements dictated by political imperatives, this impression of imbalance seemed no longer tenable.6 It is therefore inaccurate, as Ms Alison Des ~or~es'claims, that after the 1993 Arusha Accords, "[rjhis was particularly true for senior officers, many of them of Habyarimana's age-group, who would be among the first demobilized ... " hence their opposition to those accords. In 1993, there was no officer of Habyarimana's age-group, or from the following batches still in active service in FAR. Moreover, this can easily be determined because junior officers (up to Company Commander) had to retire at 45 years, senior officers (from Major to Colonel) at 50 and Generals at 55. To put it plainly, in 1992, FAR had no junior officer above 45 years, no senior officer above 50, and no General above 55.
c. Situation prior to October 1990
(a) Organization
FAR was composed of Arme'e Rwandaise, Gendarmerie Nationale, Ecole Supe'rieure Militaire, Kigali and Ecole des Sous-officiers, Butare. All of them were placed under the Ministry of National Defence.
The Army and the Gendarmerie were each headed by a general staff headquarters composed of four conventional offices. The Chief-of-Staff was at the same time the Commander-in- Chief of the army and the gendarmerie. The army was made up of battalions or companies comprising units, all placed directly under the general staff headquarters. The Gendarmerie was made up of territorial squads or companies.
The combat units were established mainly in the headquarters of Prefectures. The rest were stationed in Kigali, the country's capital.
(b) The staff
The army had approximately 8,600 troops, all volunteers, including about 300 officers, 1,300 non-commissioned officers, and 7,000 privates. The Gendarmerie had approximately 2,300 troops, all volunteers also, including 100 officers and 450 non-commissioned officers and 2,100 privates. The officers were trained at the Ecole Supe'rieure Militaire, Kigali, for four years, the non-commissioned officers at the Ecole des Sous-officiers, Butare, for two years. On graduation, they served on five-year renewable contracts. Those who completed their military service could apply to be placed on reserve. In 1990, their number increased to about 1,500 troops.8
(c) Military means
We will present the military means available to the Rwandan Army, it being understood that in the event of war, most of the Gendarmerie units would be placed under the authority of the Army.
6 See Annex K: officers retired. 7 Alison Des Forges, Leave None to Tell the Sto~,Paris, L'Harmattan, 1999 p. 125. 8 Sebahire Antoine: Etudz critique de I'Armie Rwandaise, Brussels, lnstitut Royal Supkrieur de Defense, 1991
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(d) The Command
The Command was headed by a general staff headquarters composed of four conventional offices. There were 24 units, all placed under its authority.
The assistance resources available to the Command were the Communication and Intelligence services. The communication service used radios or the telephone. One single radio network transmitted all recorded messages. The telephone was used to transmit only unrecorded messages. In the Amy, these services were used by the communication company. On the ground, the myhad a reconnaissance battalion and an air force squadron. The reconnaissance battalion used jeeps on which weapons were mounted and light Panhard AML60 and AML90 light machine guns. The air force squadron could, with a patrol of two helicopters reconnoitre an area of 50 to 100 km deep on a front (from 0 to 15 km).
(e) Manoeuvre units
The manccuvre units comprised Battalions (Bn) and infantry Companies (Cies). In the Battalion, the antipersonnel weapons were distributed as follows:
The Platoons (PI) had individual weapons with a range of 200m. The Companies had a support PI with three MAG machine guns (Mg) with a range of 8OOm and three 60mm Mortars (Mor) with a range of 1,800m.
The Bn had four 80mm Mor with a range of 3,OOOm and four Mg with a range of 1,500m.
The moured-vehicle weapons were used only by the Bn. It had four non-recoiling 75mm cannons with a range of 800m and a steel perforation capacity of 22mm and four 40mm rocket launchers with a range of 150m
The manoeuvre units had no vehicles to transport troops during war. So they had fight without vehicles.
(f) Support units
The surface-to-surface fire support means comprised a battery of 120mm mortars with a maximum range of 5.6km and some of the means available to the reconnaissance Bn.
The Company was made up of three PI with four guns each. For the support armoured vehicle, the reconnaissance Bn had a light machine gun squad and one PI with six MILAN fire stations.
The air-to-surface support fire means comprised helicopters in which were mounted 68mm rocket launchers and one 20mm cannon. The rocket launchers used two types of ammunition:
The anti-aircraft defence means were grouped within one light anti-aircraft Battalion (LAA Bn). It used batteries of 14.5mm quadruple-fire machine guns and one battery of 37mm Bi- tube fire cannons. Each battery comprised three P1 with three guns each.
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Detection and identification were done visually because the LAA Bn had no radars. The two systems were towed. Regarding support work, the Rwandan Army had only one engineering company the mission of which was: "Participation in national development at the time of peace by executing capital infrastructures (roads, bridges, airstrips, etc. ...)
Its secondary mission is to support the Rwandan army in case of operational crises (creation and removal of obstacles, laying and clearing of mines, support in crossings of waterways, etc.)
To accomplish this mission, it had two equipment platoons and one pioneer platoon, which was composed of two pioneer sections, one bridge-building section and two amphibious sections.
(g) Logistics
Organizationally, at the time of peace, logistical services were grouped into one unit called "Rwandan Army Base" (KA BASE) and a health department (RA HD).
The RA BASE had five sub-units, each responsible for a well-defined area dealing with all related activities. There was thus:
- One Quartermaster company, in charge of foodstuffs, clothing and equipment. - One Order Company, in charge of ammunition. - One Maintenance Company, in charge of vehicle repairs, fuel and lubricant. - One Transport Company which managed the pool of vehicles - One Communication Company to provide the Command with liaison services.
The RA HD was composed of one medico-social centre and one medical company in charge of the collection, triage, evacuation of patients and the injured, and the supply of pharmaceutical products.'0 d. Cases where a civilian could exercise authoritv over the soldiers
The different constitutions under which the Republic of Rwanda had been governed until 1994 established the principle that the President of the Republic, Head of State, is the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Armed ~orces."That was not an exceptional case, for this principle is applied nearly worldwide, irrespective of the regime. What really differs is the manner of exercising this "Supreme Command." In certain cases, the command is symbolic while in others, it is effectively exercised.
Hence, from 1961 to 1973, a civilian, precisely President Grkgoire Kayibanda, exercised the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces. From 1973 to 6 April 1994, the same command
Sebahire Antoine, op cit .pp. 9-10. 10 Sebahire Antoine, op cit, p. 1 I. " - Constitution, 24 November 1963, Article 59 - Constitution, 20 December 1978, Article 45. - Constitution, 10 June 1991, Article 45.
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was exercised by a General, Juvinal HABYARIMANA, who became President of the Republic.
Similarly, during the period of unrest from April to July 1994, the supreme command was exercised by a civilian, Thiodore SINDIKUBWABO, who was interim President.
During their time, these various personalities had the possibility to exercise control over the soldiers, because the laws and practice enabled them to do so. In fact, almost all regimes worldwide, be they democratic or dictatorial, recognize that the "Head of State" is the "Command-in-Chief of the Armed Forces.
At the level of the government, upon the installation in 1960 of the provisional government which resulted from the November 1959 People's Revolution, a ministry, which each time had "Defence and Security" in its portfolio, was formed.
Thus: 1960-1962: Secretariat of State for Defence
1962-1973: Ministry of National Guard and Police
1973-1974: Ministry of National Guard
1974-1994: Ministry of National Defence.
On several occasions, civilians headed these ministries and therefore exercised authority and control over the soldiers:
1960: - Dominique Mbonyumutwa, as Secretary of State for Defence. - Mr. Isidore Sebazungu as Secretary of Stae for Defence. 1962 - 1965: Mr. Calliope Mulindahabi, as Minister of National Guard and Police. 1992 - 1993: Mr. James Gasana, as Minister of National Defence. 1993 - 1994: Mr. Augustin Bizimana as Minister of National Defence.
No other civilian could exercise legal authority over the soldiers, or give them orders within the context of their mission. Furthermore, the regulations clearly indicated the authorities that the soldiers could and must obey and from whom they could receive orders or punishment.
In fact, Article 35 of Regulation 11 on military discipline stipulates: ''
I. Officers:
May inflict all disciplinary punishment on their subordinates: - The minister having National Guard in its portfolio, - Officers of all ranks exercising command during the duration ofan operation.
a) Unit commanders may only issue reprimands to their subordinates and cause their detention with visits up to 15 days.
'"inisterial Order No. 01/02 of 9 July 1969, relating to discipline within the National Guard
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b) The other oflcers may cause only the provisional detention of their subordinates. The same shall apply to any other oficer with regard to soldiers lower in rank who are not subordinate to him.
2" Non-Commission Ofjcers, corporals andprivates:
May inflict all disciplinary punishment on their subordinates:
a) The authorities mentioned under paragraph I. (a) and (b) above b) Area commanders within the jurisdiction of their districts.
It should be emphasized that the regulations were taught to the soldiers upon incorporation so that when performing their functions and accomplishing- their missions. there is no confusion as to the fromwhom they receive orders or the person they must'obey.
e. Special case of Mr. Protais Zigiranyirazo
Mr. Protais Zigiranyirazo was a civilian, outside of any military hierarchy. He has never occupied a position that would have enabled him to exercise legal authority over the soldiers. In fact, he has never been President of the Republic or Minister of Defence. Furthermore, no military regulation put Mr. Protais Zigiranyirazo in a position which required the soldiers to obey him. As a result, he could not exercise any authority or control over soldiers within the context of their mission. Being Prqe6 in Kibuye in 1973 and in Ruhengeri &om 1974 to 1989, conferred no powers on him to command the ~oldiers.'~Consequently, he could not exercise any authority or control over the soldiers or gendarmes as alleged under paragraph 3 of the Indictment.
3. Maintaining and Restoring Public Order (MRPO)
Among the familiar rules within the RAF is the rule on MRPO (Rule 38). Its latest version is published in the Ministerial direction no1102 of 15 September 1978.
In its paragraph 15, the rule designates the authorities who may request or demand assistance from the Armed Forces, namely:
The Prifets and Scus- pryets; - 'The Bourgmestres or their representatives; - The Commanders of units or detachment of the ~atior.al'~eadcz~merie; - The Presidents of the Military Tribunals; The Prosecutors and their Deputies.
l3 Decret-loi no10175du 11 mars 1975 portant Organisation et fonctionnement de la Prefecture. (J.O.,1975. p. 299).
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Article 29 of the Legislative Decree on the establishment of the National Gendarmerie provides that: "The action of the competent administrative authorities shall be applied to the National Gendarmerie by requisition'"4.
Article 34 of the same Legislative Decree provides that "Requisition to receive assistance from the National Gendarmerie in order to maintain and restore public order or to entrust it with a special and speczjk assignment shall be addressed to the Commander of the Unit under whose jurisdiction the requisitioning authority's head office is located'. The same provision provided supra (Art.31) that "Any requisition shall be in writing, referring to the legal provision which it relied on, it shall state the goal to be reached, the part of the territory and when it shall be implemented. The requisition shall moreover, be dated and shall bear the name, position and signatwe of the requisitioning authority". The requisitioned forces shall in any case be under the command of their superiors.
Military operations within the framework of "MRPO" shall be carried out by the Force Commander, that is to say, the subordinates shall always receive orders from their regular superiors and NOT from the authority that requisitioned the forces of law and order.
h. af&r_cnce between "requisition" and "under corn-
Requisition is providing an administrative authority with a military formation with a view to maintaining and restoring public order (MRPO).
U7hereas "under command" is one of the various relations of subordination by which a military formation may be detached or assigned to another military command. It is therefore a matter between military hierarchies contrary to requisition which brings into play a civilian authority. But in any case, this civilian authority cannot give any orders to the soldiers. In terms of command, one differentiates between the levels of subordination under which a military formation (unit) operates:
- Full - Command - Attach Under operational command Under operational control Under tactical control
These levels of relation of subordination and support will be dealt with in the following paragraphs.
c. Relations of subordination and suppo@
The military formations (units, detachments, instittitions, etc.) could be subjected to the different commands in various ways.
14 DL du 23 janvier 1994 portant creation de Is Gendarmerie Nationale.
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The purpose of the relation of subordination is to determine the nature and extent of the powers and responsibilities the commanders have with respect to the formations which are subordinate to them.
Only the terms specified hereinafter may be used.
However, when the kind of relationship has no logistical or administrative responsibility, organizing this support could be subjected to a special directive.
1. FULL COMMAND
FULL COMMAND
Full command is the power and the responsibility to give orders to subordinates. It covers all aspects of military operations and military administration. It only exists in the national armies.
ATTACH
Power given to the authority under whose command the unit is located to exercise over it, within the set limits, f~L1command EXCEPT for transfers and pronlotions of staff. The latter responsibilities shall be actions to be carried out by the authority of origin.
UNDER COMMAND
The term UNDER COMMAND, should not be confujed with FULL COMMAND, il should be followed by a restricrive information specifying the in which the command is transferred. A unit can be UNDER COMMAND.
TERRITOKIAL, TACTICAL AND OPERATIONAL.
OPERATIONAL COMMAND
An authority receiving a lait under operational command bas the power to assign missions or duties to the unit, deploy it, reassign the forces and keep or de!egate the command or the operational and/or tactical control, insozar as it deems it necessary. This does not in itself include administrative powers, or responsibility of a logistical nature.
TACTICAL COMMAND
An authority receiving a unit under tactical command has a commanding power over it which covers solely the tactical operations of this unit. He must use it to accomplish the mission determined by the superior authority.
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TERRITORIAL COMMAND
An authority receiving a unit under territorial command has a commanding power over it which covers EXCLUSIVELY territorial matters. These issues are determined by the directives in force.
2. CONTROL
UNDER CONTROL
The term UNDER CONTROL should be followed by a restricted information specifying the area in which the control is transferred. A unit can be UNDER CONTROL.
TACTICAL, OPERATIONAL, TECHNICALAND ADMINISTRATIVE
The CONTROL is always restricted to activities defined by the competent authority.
OPERATIONAL CONTROL
An authority receiving a unit under operational control has the power which enables him to give orders in order to ensure the smooth running of the activities ordered by the higher authority. Such activities are generally restricted as regards their nature, time and space. This type of subordination does not involve the power to use separately the components of the units concerned. It does not include in itself, administrative control either.
TACTICAL CONTROL
An authority receiving a unit under tactical control has the power, generally limited in time and at the local level, which permits him to give orders on movements and operations which are essential for carrying out the activity ordered by the higher authority.
TECHNICAL CONTROL
A unit receiving a unit under technical control has power solely over technical matters. The competent authority should always explain such matters. Control for movement is also included in this subordination process.
ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROL
An authority receiving a unit under administrative control has power over administrative matters such as staff management, supplies, the services and other matters which do not fall under operational missions and which have to be determined by the competent authority.
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3. DELEGATION AND SUPPORT
Delegation
An authority vested with full command may retain this command or delegate it as attach ; under command or under control.
An authority receiving a unit under attach may hold on to the powers received or delegate them as attach, under command or under control.
An authority receiving a unit under operational, tactical or temtorial command may retain the powers received or delegate them in the same form of or as under control.
An authority receiving a unit under operational control may retain the powers received or delegate them in the various forms of under control.
An authority receiving a unit under tactical, technical or administrative control may delegate the powers received in the same form.
Support
Supporting a unit by another is a MISSION which does NOT in itself involve relations of subordination. If such a relationship is desired, it must be expressed using the terms defined supra (Paras. 109 to 1 12).
The following notions of support are noted:
SUPPORT (Sp)
Action of a unit which helps, covers, increases or supports the operation of another unit. It only consists of the RESULTS of the action and NOT the details of the action carried out.
GENERAL SUPPORT (GS)
Support given to the entire formation considered as a WHOLE and not as one of the components of this formation. DIRECT SUPPORT (DS) Support given to a subordinate formation specifically assigned, which therefore, can send its requests directly to the formation which provides the support.
Even the units under the command of other commanders other than their own, operate within a framework that is very specific and clearly defined by the Staff Headquarters. This is to say that even less a civilian whoever he may be, if he has not lawfully been authorized (President of the Republic, Minister of Defence) could not exercise "an authority or a control over the soldiers". Since Mr. Protais ZIGIRANYIRAZO did not discharge any of these duties, we do not see how and within which context he could "exercise an authority or control over the soldiers" and even less. command them.
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4. The Parallel Networks
In many countries, the official security services could be doubled with other similar services, in such a way that some nonhierarchical dignitaries could exercise an authority over these services. But that was conceivable within the context of the "cold war" or when Governments confronted with mass revolutions, sometimes had to double up with their regular forces of law and order15.
However, this image cannot be applied to Rwanda of the 1990's because of the reasons hereinafter: a. The defence forces in Rwanda in 1990, emerged from the masses and enjoyed massive support from the people. Compared to the situation in Latin American countries, where parallel networks emerged (Death squads, Paramilitary ....) in Rwanda, the regular Army was popular as it was explained by the revolutionaries of all the horizons. On the other hand, the enemy (FPR) had no popular base, just like the puppet armies of Latin American Governments in the 1970's. It was enemy that could have recourse to the parallel networks. It is always the specific characteristic of the unpopular or occupying defence forces to have recourse to the parallel networks. b. The command structure within the RAF as well as organizing all the security services did not allow for parallel networks. It was either totally unnecessary or simply unfeasible.
In fact:
From 1965, the Minister of Defence, the Army Chief of Staff was one and the same person: Juvhal HABYARIMANA.
From 1973, this same man from then on became "President of the Republic" in other words, he also had overall responsibility for the intelligence service which were directly answerable to the Presidency of the Republic. Under these conditions one could not imagine how a parallel network could be set up, first by who, and then for whom?I6 c. Within the Rwandan context the debate as to whether or not the parallel networks existed caught on with the advent of multiparty politics in 1991. All criticisms were permitted provided that one managed to demonize the Coalition Government led by a Prime Minister from the radical opposition. It should be pointed out that this same Government had officially contested the results of the renowned "International Commission of Enquiry on Human Rights Violations" committed in Rwanda since 1 October 1990, which visited Rwanda from 7 to 21 January 1993 and which submitted its final report on 8 March 1993.
In fact, it was in its 5th part that the Commission's report talks about "Death squads" or even a "riseau ziro" [zero network] saying: "All the testimonies affirm that there were a certain number of people around the Head of State who were organizing the massacres or the
IS See the history and the evolution of the "Death squads" or the "Paramilitary" in the Latin American countries like Bolivia, Colombia, ... in the "Monde Diplomatique" of February 1996 and January 2000. "See Annex OB offrs, finalized on 1 October 1990.
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murders of individuals as well as the unrest, the clashes and disruptions in the activities of other parties, in various ways: ideological reflexions, definitions of the means, choice of the targeted regions at such given times. In a communique released on 7/04/93, the Rwandan Government, then led by Mr. Nsengiyaremye of the MDR, who was accused of colluding with President HABYARIMANA's entourage, reacted to the Commission's allegations as follows: '2s regards the "death squads': it is true that many people are still being killed in our country under strange circumstances, which makes one believe in the existence of one or several criminal organizations which are responsible for their death.
However, the report of the International Commission of Enquiry makes an inadmissible confusion by giving the impression that the criminal acts perpetrated by the "death squad" were acts, committed by the Government. This issue needs to be carried by the International Commission of Enquiry which affirmed, on the basis of a single testimony, that the President of the Republic allegedly chaired a meeting of the death squad at which it was allegedly decided to massacre the BAGOGWES. The Government's request to carry out an in depth research into the matter went unheeded but the myth of the death squad continued to spread.
Moreover, some observers pointed out that some investigations were biased and partial. So, Professor Pierre ERNY wrote: "To be fair, the RPF also committed serious acts of violence and massacres. But the RPF (like the Tutsi Governments in Burundi) does not allow the human rights organizations to investigate so freely, which meant that it was hardly talked about whereas the Government in Kigali was not hesitant to feign transparency"" (b).
On the other hand, the world discovered later on that the actual death squads were members of the RPF even before it seized power in 1994. Thanks to Abdul RUZIBIZA's testimony, an RPF dissident and a member of the Commando group responsible for the assassination of the President, the existence and the modus operandi of the death squads are at present well- documented. In fact Abdul RUZIBIZA affirmed in his testimony given in Kinyarwanda, published in all the newspapers in 2004, what all the Rwandans knew but did not dare to say.
In fact he alleged that:
" .... Long before this fateful month of April 1994, the RPF had been indulging in killing opponents with the sole aim of instigating the apocalypse".
".....it brought in stocks of weapons stored in caches in order to cany out the final attack which was programmed for September 1993".
"As regards the Network, the death squad operating in Kigali, it received orders to kill several opposition leaders who were hostile to Habyarimana but refused to collaborate with the RPF compromised by too many dreadful things.. .. ".
"Any Tutsi born in Rwanda could not be trusted by the RPF, if he was killed and we could blame his death on the Government, that was good for us".
"Pierre Erny, Rwanda, 1994, Cldspour comprendre le calvaire d'unpeople, [Hints to understands the ordeal of a nation], Paris I'Harmanan, 1994, p. 89.
DlIIO6-0156 (E) 15 -1 -1 The Prosecutor v. Protais Zigiranyirazo, Case No. ICTR-2001-73-1
It can clearly be noted on both sides, the existence of the death squads was sensed more or less with material proof. But in all that was said on this matter, no reference was made to the military power which Mr. Protais ZIGIRANYIRAZO allegedly had, be it at the national level, or in the Gisenyi prifecture ( his prifecture of origin) or in Ruhengeri where he was prifet for a long time.
Knowing the military structures of the time and the relations of subordination throughout the command chain within the RAF, we noted that there was nothing to show that Protais ZIGIRANYIRAZO had exercised any military powers, be it local or national.
d. In 1992, when he was forced to share his powers, President HABYARIMANA subjected himself to the proposal of this power-sharing with the political parties of the opposition'8. According to the agreement signed for the setting up of the first multiparty Government which was to take office in April 1992, the opposition was supposed to take over all the intelligence services.
This opposition took this offer seriously. It placed at all levels of the services people who were trustworthy and were likely to ensure that the introverted leave the Presidency so that when the time comes nothing would stop them from seizing power when the time comes.
So, the Central Intelligence Service (SCR), which was until then, attached to the Presidency, was split into two departments:
- Internal security was attached to the office of the Prime Minister who according to the agreement, was to come from the opposition. This department was entrusted to Mr. Augustin IYAMUREMYE of the PSD party and a fierce opponent of the HABYARIMANA regime, several times Minister of the RPF.
- External security was entrusted to an official who was very close to a leader of the same PSD party, Filicien GATABAZI. Under these conditions, any attempt to set up a parallel network or simply, to activate any dormant network, would be denounced and those initiators confounded.
Since, admittedly, all the allegations made to that effect proved to be without merit, that is to say, based on the ulterior motives of the politicians.
In her volumious book of almost 1,000 pages, the only time Ms. Alison Des Forges referred to Mr. Protais ZIGIRANYIRAZO, she said: "some people were exercising powers like Protais ZIGIRANYIRAZO, who was first theprkfet of Ruhengeri.. .. n19.
It should be noted that Ms. Alison Des Forges' book has become an essential reference on the subject. With this single quotation, one is far from the openly denounced parallel networks and to which Mr. Protais ZIGIRANYIRAZO was allegedly a member of. No network has
I8 Agreement for the setting up of a Transitional Government (Nsengirayemye) of 16 April 1992 l9 Alison Des Forges, op. cit. p. 58.
DII106-0156 (E) 16 piEr The Prosecutor v. Protais Zigiranyirazo, Case No. ICTR-2001-73-1 been clearly defined and even less the fact that Mr. Protais ZIGIRANYIRAZO is linked with it apart from the fact that he was President HABYARIMANA's brother-in-law. e. Could networks exist within the military structure?
No specific and verifiable evidence can be produced to establish the existence of parallel networks within the RAF and moreover, over which Mr. Protais ZIGIRANYIRAZO allegedly had any influence. The battle order (BO) of the unit commanders in 1990 referred to in the annex as well as that of those in 1994 in the annex, show that the duly appointed officials to whom no act is linked to any parallel network within the RAF.
For this reason he could not exercise any authority or control over the soldiers or the gendarmes within the meaning of 3 of the Indictment.
5. Protecting "VERY IMPORTANT PERSONS" (VIP) a. Specific case of the Head of State's family
According to the law, the Head of State is entitled to have physical protection and as well as his close family2'. The mission of protecting the Head of State, was entrusted to a special unit called the "Presdiential Guard" (Pres G)~'. b. The Presidential Guard
(1) Background
During the 1st Republic (1 96 1-1973) the Head of State's protection was maintained by some soldiers who were provided by the "Military Police" (MP).
The MP was a unit at the level of the company and was based at the MUHIMA Camp in Kigali. From the advent of the 2nd Republic, those soldiers were grouped into an autonomous company which was solely responsible for the protection of the Head of State and his close relatives, and some V.I.Ps. It was called the "Presidential Guard Company" (Pres G Co.) It was stationed at the same Muhima camp, like its parent unit, namely, the MP.
In 1985, the Pres G, which had been elevated to the rank of a battalion, moved out of the MUHIMA camp, to a new camp which had just been built on Kimihurura hill in the northern part of Kigali.
The organizational chart and the structural table had provided that the Pres G Bn was made up of: Three Infantry Companies, an armoured squadron, a support company, and a Staff and Services company. Thus set up, the Bn was supposed to have about 800 troops (officers+non- commissioned officers and corporals and soldiers). In April 1994, only two Companies had
20 Constitution of 24 November 1964, 20 December 1978, 10 June 1991, with the laws fixing the material advantages relating to the presidential office. " Contrary to the impressions given, the abbreviation of Presidential Guard officially according to Rwandan Army regulations is not at all "PG" but rather "Pres G.We would therefore use the ofticial abbreviation throughout this document.
DIII06-0156 (E) 17 The Prosecutor v. Protais Zigiranyirazo, Case No. ICTR-2001-73-1 been set up with a Support Company which had within its set up the nucleus of the future armoured squadron which had been provided for in the Organizational chartz2.This explains the regular recourse to reinforcements which this Bn received in order to be able to carry out its nlissions which were on the increase, whereas its manpower could not be increased at the same pace. So, in 'April 1994, a company of the Para Cdo Bn, was for several days under the command of the Pres G Bn.
(2) Mission From the time it was set up, the Pres G, was entrusted with a double mission:
- To ensure the physical protection of the Head of State and his relatives.
- To participate in the National territorial defence. In fact, in addition to their specific mission, just like the gendarmerie nationale, the special units when they were set up were also assigned to "participate in the internal defence of the territory in wartime or state of siege, within the framework determined by the Ministry of Defence".
(3) Subordination
As regards the mission of protecting the Head of State, the Pres G was directly answerable to the Presidency of the Republic. So, it received orders from the Head of the President's Security. As regards the other defence missions, it was placed under the command of the Army Staff Headquarters.
(4) Protection of VIPs
The protection of VIPs could be entrusted to separate soliders or to structural units of the Pres G. The organizational chart of the Pres G highlights the conventional ranks in force within the Rwandan Army, namely:
- Team (Tm.): 5 troops under the command of a Corporal (cpl)
- Section (Sec): 11 troops under the command of a Sergeant (Sgt)
- Platoon (PI): 39 troops under the command of a Lieutenant (Slt or Lt)
Company (Co.) -+I50 troops under the command of a Lieutenant, a Captain or a Major (Lt, Capt, or Maj.)
- Battalion (Bn): -+ 500 troops under the command of a Major or a Lieutenant Colonel (Maj. or Lt. Col).
22 Annexes I and J: Theoretical Organizational Chart of the Pres G BR Structural table when it was set up, and the actual Organizational Chart in 1994.
D11106-0156 (E) 18 The Prosecutor v. Protais Zigiranyirazo, Case No. ICTR-2001-73-1
Generally, it was within this framework that the missions were assigned, in such a way that every time, the detached Pres G soldiers were structurally controlled by their regular superiors.
We emphasize that the statement that the Pres G Bn were between 1,000 and 1,300 troops is completely wrongz3 theoretically, it was an Infantry Battalion which had a manpower of between 700 and 800 troopsz4.
(5) Relations between the "Guard and the person being guarded"
The protected person was rarely a superior in the hierarchy or rank. For this reason, the person could not give orders to the guard that had been assigned to him. That was also unimaginable when the VIP was a civilian. This person was protected by the President's security, which reported to the commander of the Pres G, who was the only one who could give orders to his soldiersz5.
Therefore, a detached soldier could be assigned to protect a VIP, just as it could be a team, a troop, a platoon, a company or the whole battalion depending on the size of the area and the number of dignitaries to be protected. In any case, Pres G soldiers received orders form their superiors.
The principle of military hierarchy was strictly enforced.
The military hierarchy is based on rank and seniority. A solider is the superior of another soldier, if he has a higher rank than him or if he is more senior than him in the same rank. In some cases, the principle of functional hierarchy could be used. The functional hierarchy is based on the functions carried out within a specific framework (operational, technical, administrative, territorial.. .) permanently or temporarily, in the accomplishment of a mission or a particular service. But for these exceptional circumstances, the functional senior is also the superior.
(6) Case of Mr. Protais ZIGIRANYIRAZO
Mr. Protais ZIGIRANYIRAZO is the brother of Agathe Kanziga, the wife of President Habyarimana and hence, he is his brother-in-law. He was entitled when that was deemed necessary to enjoy the protection of the Presidential Guard. However, being a civilian and neither the superior nor the functional superior of the soldiers assigned to guard him, he could never give them orders.
23 ~lisondes Forges, op. cit. p. 57. 24 See Annex J: Structural table of the Pres G Bn. 25 The author talks about the organization and functioning of the Pres G like an authority. Brevetd d'Etat -major [Passed Staff College], he was teaching "Militaty Organization" at the Military Higher School. One of the important subjects taught in this course was on organizing the RAF units, including the Pres G. Furthermore, from 1988 to 1992, he in charge of the "Military Police" unit which shared the same camp with the Pres G at the Muhimana camp, but also which retained certain missions which the Pres G had not accomplished like the guard of honour around the Presidency or the guard of honour when new Ambassadors presented their credentials. These reinforcement missions at the Pres G required some knowledge and coordination with the Pres G.
DIII06-0156 (E) 19 The Prosecutor v. Protais Zigiranyirazo. Case No. ICTR-2001-73-1
In fact, every soldier who was likely to be assigned to protect Mr. Protais ZIGIRANYIRAZO knew from the disciplinary rules that soldiers should cam out lovallv. and within the set time limits, the orders given by superiors, in the interest of the service.-26 '
Since Mr. Protais ZIGIRANYIRAZO had never been the superior of any soldier, we believe that he could not have given any orders to the soldiers, and should he have done so, they would not have obeyed him. In the exceptional situation which was prevailing in Rwanda between April and July 1994, even the Ministry of Defence as well as the Army Staff Headquarters acknowledged that some soldiers had a tendency to disobey their superiors or to escape their attention in order to commit offences and consequently it demanded that those undisciplined soldiers should be dealt with ruthlessly27.Under these conditions, it would not be surprising that some soldiers duly assigned to protect the members of the President's family, managed to divert from their mission without the knowledge of the people they were protecting, and went to commit offences. In such situations, only those undisciplined soldiers should be answerable for their acts and not the people they were supposed to protect. In the case of Protais Zigiranyirazo, the situation is all the more clear since as a civilian, he had no authority over the soldiers and even less he could not give any orders. All that he could do was to complain to the superior of the soldiers who had been assigned to protect him if he was dissatisfied with their performance. ln any case, the military laws and rules governing the RAF did not give him any authority to control or command the soldiers within the meaning of paragraph 3 of the Amended Indictment of 31 December 2004.
6. Organisation and Missions of certain militarr units referred to as "elite"
First, an elite unit should not be confused with the Army Staff. No unit is created an "elite". However, all units must aspire to become elite units. Therefore, the notion connotes what a unit has become at particular a moment and not really what it was at its creation. Having said that, focus will be on those units called elite units. First, it should be agreed that elite units were well equipped, well trained and always accomplished their missions to the satisfaction of High Command and hence the Nation.
a) Reconnaissance Battalion (Bn Kecce)
The Reconnaissance Battalion was made up of four squadrons. The missions of this unit were as follows:
- Reconnaissance and support operations in the context of the overall mission of the Rwandan Army;
- The first force to engage to the enemy;
- On orders, ensure control of strategic ceIltres and points
26 Disciplinary Rules (Rule 1 I), Article 2. 27 Telegram OPSl941118 of 28 April 1994 from Minadef giving orders to the Commandants deplace to assist the administrative authorities in stopping the plundering and the murders; telegram INTlOPS194 04165 of 10 April 1994 from AR General Staff giving orders to the unit and sector commanders to stop to the massacres.
DIII06-0156 (E) 20 -1 -1 The Prosecutor v. Protais Zigiranyirazo, Case No. ICTR-2001-73-1
When carrying out such missions, several operations could be linked. For example, the battalion may carry our cover operation and immediately after, support defensive units. Several missions had to be carried out simultaneously in very remote places.
Regarding subordination, Bn Recce was directly under the Army Staff. It was therefore excluded that Bn Recce or any of its sub-units received orders from or made to carry out operations by another authority outside the Army Staff. It was only in this manner or by detachment in accordance with to directives from the Army Staff that the command of the unit may fall outside the official organisation chart. b) Para Commando Battalion (Bn Para Cdo)
Bn para was made up of five infantry companies as indicated in its organizational chart.28Its missions were similar to those assigned to any infantry battalion, except that in order to carry out such missions, the para-commando battalion could in its operation, utilize a unique method, that is, its elements could be dropped from the air in order to approach a given target. It is that possibility of dropping by parachute at any part of the battlefront that distinguished it from other infantry battalions. This required high standards as regards the selection of men, means and extra training.
What were therefore the missions of the infantry units?
In general, the mission of the units were to:
Defend the national territory;
Maintain order;
Participate in national development;
Ensure population safety.29
These general missions were often extended by directives which specified the type of mission. However, this was often not the case. For example, there were no directives or instructions specifying how the units were to prepare to rescue the population and under what conditions they had to or could do so.
Bn Para-commando, another so-called "elite" unit, was, like Bn Recce, under the Army Staff. No other authority could give it orders and even deploy para-commandoes on the ground. Even when the Minister of Defence (or his office) wanted Bn Para to be deployed it had to do so through a formal order from the Army Staff. To conclude, claiming that an authority outside the official hierarchy could give orders to soldiers of the two battalions is misunderstanding the procedures then in force.
28 See Annex ... Organisational Chart of Bn Para Commando. 29 Missions of the National Guard. (General missions were adapted to the circumstances of time from National Guard to Rwandan Army in 1973 then to RAF in 1974); Edict No. Rl85125 creating the National Guard, B.O.R.U., p.448.
DIII06-0156 (E) 2 1 The Prosecutor v. Protais Zigiranyirazo, Case No. ICTR-2001-73-1
Bn Para Cdo OMicers' battle order
Comd Bn Aloys Ntabakuze 0232 Maj. CGSC S1-S4 S2-S3 Thiodore Hakizimana 0424 Capt. Cie EM & SP Comd Cie Cie SP-Bn Para Cdo Comd Svlvestre Nzabonaliba 0662 Lt.
d) Battle order for the Presidential Guard in April 1994
Comd Bn / Protais Mpiranya I Maj. Second in Command S1-S4 S2-S3 Evariste Murenzi Capt. Offr ORD Thadie Bagaragaza Maj. Zidechias Kabera Quartermaster-General Gaspard Hategekimana Capt.
Cie EM&SV Comd Cie / Tliadie Bagaragaza - I Maj. PI commander ---
Cie SP Comd Cie P1 commander I Mboneko I Lt.
IS' Cie I Comd Cie I Sebashyitsi / -Lt.
'O Officers situation as at 1 March 1994, Rwandan Army Staff Headquarters, the author's personal archives, ICTR document KO078444
DlIIO6-0156 (E) 22 The Prosecutor v. Protais Zigiranyirazo, Case No. ICTR-2001-73-1
I P1 commander I Nsabimana I Sub-Lt
2"dCie Lt. Comd Cie Muj yambere P1 commander P1 commander P1 commander
,7. Movements in military helicopters after April 1994
Some Prosecution witness including witness AVY (AVY-2) asserted that Protais Zigiranyiranzo travelled by helicopter to Gisenyi in April 1994.~'We will now turn our attention to Rwandan aviation situation in 1994 as regards aircrafts and tactical situation. It will be easier to consider whether a civilian without an official post could easily travel in a military helicopter. Generally, a country's armed forces are made up of: the army, the air force and the navy. These three forces are answerable to their respective Staff Headquarters. Often, for coordination of their operations, a general staff headquarters is in charge. In Rwanda, there was nothing like that. No air force, no navy. Aircrafts (light transport planes or helicopters) belonged to the same entity, namely Flight Squadron which, like other units, was a unit under the Rwandan Army Staff. It is clearer regarding the navy: considering the geographical location of Rwanda, there was no naval force.
It should be underlined that in 1994 there were only military helicopters which belonged either to RAF or UNAMIR.
No private individual or company had its own helicopter. The helicopters that criss-crossed Rwandan sky either belonged to RAF or UNAMIR. Rwandan army aviation was under one squadron. The squadron consisted of three main "WINGS", namely:
- Aircrafts - Ground support - Administrative support
We will focus on the "WING aircraft. Prior to 1 October 1990, the Flight Squadron (ESC Avit) had a "fleet" of transport and combat planes and helicopters. These were:
Airplanes:
- One "NORD ATLAS" for parachutists (+- 30 passengers) - Two "ISLANDERS" for transport (+- 10 passengers)
Helicopters:
- One "Dauphin" for transport of presidential VIPs (serviced in April 1994) - Three "Ecureuil" for transport (6 passengers)
" Witness AVY, Case No. ICTR-2001-73-PT.
DIII06-0156 (E) 23 The Pros#cutor v. Profais Zigiranyirazo, Case No. ICTR-2001-73-1
- Five "Gazelle" for transport: 4 persons (Pilot, co-pilot, gunner and re-loader)
The Flight Squadron was one of the units of RAF that paid the ultimate price in the war; as early as November 1990, it lost its first Islander plane with two of its best pilots on board. Following the signing of the 1993 Peace Accord, the number of aircrafts, just like the aircrew, was decreased significantly. The unit lost:
- An Islander transport plane in 1990 Two Ecureuil transport helicopters in 1991 and 1992 - Two Gazelles helicopters in 1991 and 1992
The flight squadron lost more than 50% of its aircrafts and best pilots.32
The situation in April 1994 was that with the signing of the Arusha Peace Accord, acquisition of military hardware was no longer possible. What was left of the flight squadron is summarised as follows:
- One Nord Atlas plan for parachutists: capacity: +- 30 passengers - One Islander plan: +- 10 passengers - One Ecureuil transport helicopter - Three Gazelle helicopters - One "Dauphin" VIP helicopter, undergoing servicing.
In addition to the losses as a result of the war, it should be noted that the "Nord Atlas" transport plane transported part of the delegation accompanying President Habyarimana to the fateful summit held in Dar Es Salaam on 6 April 1994. The plane returned to Rwanda only after RPF's victory. This was also the case with the Islander plane which its pilot diverted to Uganda and was later handed over to RPF.
At the time, the number of aircrafts drastically decreased. Consequently, missions also decreased in the same proportions. With just one transport helicopter for the entire army and three combat helicopters (armed), it was very difficult to organise and meet the needs of top officials, namely:
The President of the Republic, the Prime Minister, other members of the Government and Chiefs of Army and Gendarmerie Staff. It should be noted that the "Dauphin" Presidential helicopter was grounded for a while in the hangars of Kanombe requiring service. Another helicopter was placed on permanent stand-by for the Head of State only. As a result, the remaining number of helicopters was not enough so as to make any available to an individual. Combat situation at all the battlefronts as well as the new Kigali front made it increasingly dangerous to fly. "Safe" flight corridors became thinned from day to day with the movements of battle rendering several regions "no flying zones".
Consequently, it is very doubtful that Protais Zigiranyirazo flew in a helicopter in April 1994. There was no tangible reason to justify Protais Zigiranyirazo's request to use an army
32 Cdt Augustin Ruterana, Capt. Javan Tutiringire, Lt. Anatole Havugimana, Capt. Silas Hategekimana Lt. Mazimpaka.
DIII06-0156 (E) 24 The Prosecutor v. Prolais Zigiranyirazo, Case No. ICTR-2001-73-1 helicopter with favourable response. During the rare and perilous movements in helicopter by the interim President of the Republic, the Minister of Defence or the Chief of Staff, it was no known that P. Zigiranyirazo was ever on board. Moreover, the transport helicopter pilots whom I knew - my former students at ESM - told me that they never flew politicians to political meetings after April 1994. Since Zigiranyirazo was no longer a political or an administrative authority, it was unlikely that he boarded a helicopter after 6 April 1994. Even when an air base was created in Mukamira camp after Kanombe airport fell into hands of RPF and that helicopters had to fly over Bushiru, particularly over Zigiranyirazo's residence, nothing shows that he could have boarded any of such helicopters during liaison missions between the Government Headquarters in Murambi (Gitarama), the Army Staff installed in Kibihenkane and their new base in Mukamira camp.
Prosecution witness AVY states that in early April or in April 1994, he saw Protais alight from a helicopter at Umuganda Stadium, Gisenyi. It should be recalled that the helicopters which flew in Rwandan airspace belonged to RAF and UNAMIR only. At the time, the number of RAF flights was cut to the bare minimum. Very few helicopters and pilots remained. Moreover, the Army Staff relocated from Kigali to Kibihekane. Liaison with the battlefronts, political authorities in Gitarama (Murambi): this was the pfiority activity for the few helicopters left. Everyday, a helicopter could make one or more flights between Kibihekane and Murambi. This was in the context of military missions, that is, "contact with High Command". On the other hand, placing these rare helicopters at the disposal of politicians for their political meetings I...].The same witness testifies that the passengers were four in number: two soldiers and two civilians among whom he was able to identify Protais. He further specified that the soldiers were officers, that is, a captain and a lieutenant. It should be noted that he properly distinguish the grades of the RAF officers which were often difficult to do. To our knowledge and according to the battle orders for RAF officers in April, Squadron's transport helicopter had no flight captain. Moreover, the flight Lieutenants were combat pilots piloting the Gazelles with the pilot and co-pilot alone on board.
Below are details of transport and liaison helicopters in action in April-June 1994.~~(d)
Trans~ortand liaison helicopters squadron leader:
Major Aaron Ntizihabose w:Major Celestin P. Haguma Sub-Lieutenant Evariste Hategekimana
There was no pilot with rank of captain or lieutenant at Esc Avi in April 1994. Another witness (ADE) travelled on board a military helicopter from Murambi (Gitarama) up to his home in ~ushiru.'~
The witness testifies that the pilot returned to Mukamira, his new camp after a mission to the seat of the Government in Murambi. In fact, following the fall of Kanombe airport to RPF,
DIlIO6-0156 (E) The Prosecutor v. Protuis Zigirunyirazo, Case No. ICTR-2001-73-1 the Flight Squadron relocated to Mukamira camp. The passenger was able to board only by chance. He testified that:
- He had difficulties returning safely to his home by road - The helicopter was to fly over his home to reach Mukamira - He had met the pilot before3'(f)
In short, it was purely by chance. Should it therefore be concluded that politicians were able to take military helicopters to meetings across the country in April 1994. The material and human resources the Rwandan aviation had, the ever decreasing safe flying zones, transport needs of the Army Staff and the Government which greatly exceeded the available resources, allow to doubt that helicopters flew politicians to political meetings.
8. Difficulties in identifying soldiers bv their uniforms
RAF's (AR and Gd N) uniforms were not very varied as shown in Annex R. It was due to economic considerations and simplicity that different unifornis to distinguish the various components of FAR were reduced to a bare minimum. Therefore, it was not easy for the uninitiated to distinguish on site the type of soldier before him or her. Alison Des Forges admitted this difficulty when she wrote "Witnesses often say that soldiers from the Presidential Guard attacked them, but troops fiom other army units or from the National Police may actually have committed scme of these crimes."j6
9. Opinion and considerations regarding the statements of certain witnesses
The terms of reference of an expert witness require that in the second stage, the expert must be acquainted with the Prosecutor's expert testimony and respond to it in writing. We must also be acquainted with the Prosecution witness statements concerning military facts in order to respond to them in the expert report and testimony. We focused on the following witnesses: Prosecutor's Expert witness, Alison Des Forges, witness AVY, witness ON and witness ADE.
In general, certain witness statements are analysed all along the represent report, while some are specifically focused on. a. Prosecutor's expert witness, Alison Des Forges
Below is our view regarding the military issues she raised in her expert report.
(1) Militarv influence in the State strucI_uTe
During the first two Republics (1960-1994), military involvement in politics was very marginal or occasional. In the 1" Rept~blic(1960-1973), the army, then called the "National Guard" did not exert any political influence. The Ministry of National Guard and Police was under civilian authority until 1965.
35 (0 36 Alison Des Forges, op. cit. p. 223.
DIII06-0156 (E) The Prosecutor v. Profais Zigiranyirazo, Case No. ICTR-2001-73-1
In was that year that a young officer was made the Minister of that Ministry. He was Major Juvenal Habyarimana. He held that post until 1991. It is true that in 1972, President Kayibanda appointed two soldiers for duties in his office.
However, this never amounted to any growing influence on the part of the military in the management of State affairs; but on the contrary.37
Following the coup d'etat of 5 July 1973, the country was governed by a military junta which called itself "Committee for Peace and National Unity". The Committee was composed of 11 members. The first Government of the 2ndRepublic was set up on 1 August 1973 and comprised 5 soldiers only. That figure was attained in subsequent cabinets.
Following the adoption of a new Constitution in 1978, the Committee dissolved itself and the MRND Central Committee became the highest State authority. A few officers were members of the Central Committee; but they represented their regions of origin or other corporate bodies and not so much the military institution. Below is an exhaustive list of soldiers who held Government offices or were members of the Central Committee of the party in power, from 1960 to 1994. The years shown is the year they entered the Government or the Central Committee.
Ministers
- Major Juvenal Habyarimana, Minister of National Guard and Police(l965)
- Captain Andre Bizimana, Minister of Youth (1972)
Captain Jean-Baptiste Seyanga, Minister in the Office of the President (1972)
Lieutenant-Colonel Alexis Kanyarengwe, Minister of Interior and Civil Service (1973)
Lieutenant-Colonel Aloys Nsekalije, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation (1973)
Major Aloys Simba, Minister of Information (1973)
Commander Pierre Celestin Rwagafilita, Minister of Youth and Sport (1973)
Commander Augustin Ndindiliyimana, Minister of Youth and Associations (1982)
Below are the few officers who were members of MRND Central Committee.
Alexis Kanyarengwe
37 Lizinde, Theoneste, "La dicouverte de Kalinga ou lafin d'un mythe. " Contribution to the history of Rwanda, Imprimeire Someca, 1979,289 pages.
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- Aloys Nsekalije - Laurent Serubuga - Pierre Cklestin Rwagafilita - Lkonidas Rusatira.
A brief outline of their career may inform anyone who wished to know the influence soldiers had on politics. In 1980, Col. Kanyarengwa in conflict with his former fellow cadet Habyarimana went into self-exile in Tanzania. He was obscurity for about a decade, and reappeared in 1990 as Chairman of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (WF), which seized power in 1994.
Aloys Nsekalije: after having held several Ministerial portfolios, he swore allegiance to WF and lives in Kigali in a golden retirement.
Lkonard Rusatira was Habyarimana's Chief of Staff at the Ministry of Defence. He now lives in exile, after a brief service under the new regime (RPF). In his recent book:' he explained that Habyarimana retained him in that position for about twenty years just because Habyarimana felt that he was not replaceable. The remaining two officers, namely, Colonel Serugaba and Colonel Rwagafilita, were Chiefs of Army and Gendarmerie Staff respectively. In this regard, it is not too difficulty to understand that they were among the highest authorities of the State governed by a single party to which everyone, including the military belonged. Therefore, in our view, the two officers are not proper example to demonstrate that the military had a grip on the "political process". Their duties were purely military. In 1992, while Rwanda was at war, General Habyarimana, affected by age restriction (55 years), retired from the army. He had previously relinquished his duties of Minister of Defence and Chief of General Staff, so as to comply with the new Constitution promulgated in June 1991. Therefore, like Des Forges, to assert that Habyarimana retained all his military powers even 1993 is far from been credible.39
(2) Definition of enemv bv the Military
Following a meeting held in Kigali on 4 December 1991, which brought together various military officials, a committee composed of 10 officers was set up, whose mandate was to come up with the answer to the following question: "What should be done to defeat the enemy militarily, politically and through the media? A few weeks later, the Committee submitted an in-depth report, in which one of the chapters defined the enemy against whom RAF fought.
In a note classified "SECRET" and dated 21 September 1992, the Chief of Army Staff sent to Unit and Sector Commanders a synoptic report of the document which had been reproduced by the Committee. The synoptic report reproduced in particular the definition and identification of the enemy such as adopted by the ad hoc committee.
Rusatira, Ikonidas, Rwanda x LE droit ci I'espoir )), Paris, L ))harmattan, 2005. p. 23. 39 Alison Des Forges, Expert Report, The Prosecutor v. Zigiranyirazo, p. 5, August 2005.
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The Chief of Army Staffs note was made public for the first time when the "International Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights Violations in Rwanda" was visited Rwanda from 7 to 21 January 1993.
From then onwards, the note became one of the documents with the highest media attention in military history. However, it did not merit such attention, as specialists regarded it as ordinary and trite. Its diffusion amounts to a blatant disclosure of military secrets and should be treated as such. Rather, its content became controversial.
How did soldiers of the Rwandan Armed Forces up against RPF define their enemy? Below is the complete definition.
"The enemy is subdivided into two categories:
The main enemy Supporters ofthe enemv.
I. The main enemy is the extremist Tutsi within or outside the country with nostalgiafor power, who NEVER accepted and DID NOT accept the realities of the 1959 Social Revolution, and who wants to retake power in R WMDA by all means, including by arms.
2. A supporter ofENI (enemy) is anyone who assists the main ENZ."~~
This definition was quite consistent with the principles of strategic and tactical intelligence such as taught in war colleges. In this regard, the doctrine followed by Insitut Royal Supirieur de Defence (IRSD), Brussels, Belgium , is as follows;
"Intelligence deals with real or potential knowledge of the enemy and his surrounding environment. Strategic intelligence is that which is necessary for designing a course of action and military plans nationally and internationally (strategic intelligence). At the government and the armed jbrces high command levels, the aim is to determine the war potential, weaknesses and possibilities of the involvement a foreign power or a group ofjbreign powers. In this regard, it is important not to rely solely on military data, but to also take account of economic, geographical, sociological, political, cultural and scientific data. Strategic intelligence is designed and implemented in times ofpeace and war.
Tactical inteuigence (or combat intelligence) requires the high command to have knowledge of the enemy, atmospheric and geographical conditions, and behaviour of the population in and around the combat zone, in order to prepare and carry out tactical operations (combat intelligence).
Counter intelligence, includes all the activities, both offensive and defensive, the aim of which is to identtfy and neutralises security threats from enemy intelligence services or from individual and/or organisations involved in espionage, sabotage and subver~ion.~'
40 Letter No. 1437lG2.2.4 of the 21 September 1992 of the Chief of Army Staff to List A and all Commanders of Operational Sectors. 41 Instirut Royal Supdrieur de Dqense, Dipartement Forces Tei-restre, Precis G-1NTt2.911, Tactical Intelligence, ~russels,~.Iuly1989.
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Regarding the real enemy, this is what the prestigious institute teaches. "Types of enemies: the following should be distinguished:
(a) The real enemies: these are enemies against whom operations are carried out.
(b) Potential enemies: these are possible enemies who may be a threat to the country or an alliance and against whom intelligence and counter intelligence are particularly designed.
(c) Conventional enemies (Eni Conv); these are imaginary enemies essential for tactical exercises in the context of instruction and training of militavypersonnel.42
Belgium is a democratic state and has been a member of NATO since the creation of this military treaty. In this regard, the country could not be accused of teaching racist or genocide ideologies in its military academy.
RAF's definition of their enemies is consistent mutatis mutandis with the definition that given by the Army of a country at war, regardless of the internal, international or hybrid nature. Of course, in other countries, and in countries where politicians are really patriotic, a document of that nature would never be made public. It assumed high degree of classification of military documents, namely "SECRET". In the case of the Rwanda of 1993, not only was the document disclosed but those responsible for such leakage were never bothered. The fact deduced from this matter is that it confirmed the late stage the "Republic of Rwanda" had reached in 1993 in its gradual decay.
3. Training of militia in military camps or facilities
Statements were made regarding training of militiamen, that is, civilians, in certain military camps or facilities.
Having been uttered by sources referred to as "credible" such statements were gradually taken as the eosoel- truth. However. for anvone who know about the recruitment procedure and how RAF carried out training RAF before and after 1990, such statements are strongly 0 qualified.
(a) Recruitment proce-
Since the National Guard era, recruitment had been carried out based on directives from the Minister of Defence (previously Ministry of National Guard). When there was need for recruitment, the Ministry determined, fbr the Army Staff, not only the total number of men to be enrolled, but also the quota per prdJ%cture. The most populated prdfectures always had the highest number of recruits.
The Army Staff conveyed the directives to the Commanders of the military zones whose jurisdiction corresponded respectfully to each of the prdfectures. They are often wrongly called "Local Commanders", although this term which originated from the Belgian colonial
--
42 Idem. Precis G-INTl2.912, Conventional enemy, Brussels, Sept. 1993
DIII06-0156 (E) 30 The Prosecutor v. Protais Zigirany~razo,Case No. 1CTR-2001-73-1 era was no longer in use. The Commanders of Military zones then conveyed the directives to bourgmesrres through prifets indicating the pre-selection date and venue, the number of candidates *om each commune based on the number of inhabitants. After pre-selection, candidates so retained, whose number had to correspond strictly with the quota fixed by Amy Staff, were taken to the Training Centre. Until 1990, there was one Training Centre only, that is, that of Gako in Bugesera region, Kigaliprifecture.
At the Training Centre, recruits were made to undergo very thorough medical examination and physical tests. When pre-selections in the pr6fectzires had been very thorough, those at the Training Centre only confirmed them. However, sometimes many candidates were declared unfit (physical or medical) following a final selection at the Training Centre.
Final selection was carried out over several days according to the number of recruits. This could take a few days where 500 candidates are tested and a few weeks if the number was more than 2,000 recruits. jb) Development of Training Centres
Following RPF attack on 1 October 1990 which marked the beginning of the war, RAF had to adapt to the new situation in order to train their troops.
Recruitment regulations did not change, but the recruitment rate and number of recruits were no longer as they used to be during peace time. Instead of training new recruits at Gako Training Centre alone, from November 1990, a cohort of three battalions was trained in less than one month at Bigogwe Commando training centre, Gisenyi. That Centre had an advantage due to its large military zone extending to Gishwati natural forest. Thenceforth, recruits were no longer trained at Gako Training Centre. Other recruits were trained at Gabiro in Akagera National Park, which also had large areas and conditions close to real operational situation. Training was carried out in these locations until the signing of the Peace Accords, which restricted recruitment.
(c) Militarv zones
In addition to barracks which sheltered Army or Gendarmerie units across the country, certain regions with varied surface areas were resewed solely for military activities. These areas were called "Military zone". It was there that the units trained with live ammunition or carried out "large-scale" manoeuvres.
(i) Kanombe
Next to Kanombe military camp in Kigali suburbs was a small area of about ten hectares. The area was used for light arms firing range. Due to population increase around Kanombe it became increasingly risky to use the firing range. Stray bullets did sometimes hit riverside residents. However, the area was accessible to many units of Kigali-Kanombe Garrison with barracks for several army and gendarmerie units.
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(ii) Bugesera
The military zone in Bugesera was situated in the southern area of Kigaliprifecture and was called by that name. Gako camp was located in that area and FAR Training Centre was in Gako camp. It was there that new army or gendarmerie recruits were given basic training in time of peace. Bugesera military zone, which covered nearly 500 hectares, was used as training ground for all FAR units. Each unit was required to stay "Outside the Garrison" to participate in military exercises for at least 15 days every year. The military zone provided possibilities for use of heavy weapons like 12.7 mm machine guns or 120 mm mortars.
(iii) Gabiro
Apart from sheltering the military camp, there was a big military zone in Akagera National Park, reserved for military training. The military zone was particularly leveraged following RPF's invasion on 1 October 1990. Since the enemy itself attacked from there, training of recruits in that area placed them in real combat situation. Unlike Bugesera Training Centre which accommodated a maximum of three battalions only, the size of the area allowed to train many recruits at the same time.
(iv) Gishwati
This military zone was created at the time as Bigogwe Commando Training Centre in 1967. It was situated not far from Bigogwe military camp; but in the natural forest of the "Congo-Nile Ridge" on its northern slope stretching the Virunga volcanic chain, on the Rwandan side. Its distinctive geographical location (at an altitude of more than 2,000 metres in jagged relief) allowed to introduce young soldiers to specific "commando" operations. After 1 October 1990, Ce Cdo which ran the Gishwati military zone, used the training centre for accelerated training of new battalions to be sent to battlefront.
(v) Other small militarv zones
This small area is located in Nile commune, Cyangugu pr@cture, along River Ruhwa, which marks the border with Burundi. The military detachment which occupied it was from the Cyangugu Company. This position was mounted following repeated "Inyenzi" incursions (monarchist combatants with desire to retake power following their ousting by the I959 People's Revolution) between 1961 and 1967; the Inyenzi stage incursions from Burundi, and Bweyeye provided them with perfect access route.
Rwempasha, Nvaratare and Kagitumba
In Mutara itself, the unit based in Gabiro camp had to provide detachments the size of a platoon to occupy Rwempahsa, Nyagatare and Kagitumba positions. Since these were not real barracks, such positions were very small military zones solely for military activities.
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- Possible confusion
Until 1993, at every recruitment drive for the army or gendarmerie, young people left their collines for the pvt'fecture; the luckiest got to the Training Centre, while others came back to the colline, sometimes after several days of absence. They had simply been declared unfit for military service.
That certain observers noticed prolonged absence of young people from their native collines and that they later returned, still as civilians, to their collines, made sense. However, to infer from this fact to conclude that it amounted to an unauthorised training of civilians, particularly militiamen, is absurd. For an officer on active service at that time, the argument that those civilians who came back from areas like Gishwati forest or Akagera National Park were unlawfully trained militiamen was untenable. Those were authorised training centres. Their return after several days of absence is easily explained by the duration of the tests they had to undergo and the high number of candidates.
(d) Weapon Secure Areas
General Nsabimana, Chief of Army Staff allegedly requested ADE to authorise that some heavy weapons are kept in the sheds belonging to tea factories. That was likely. However, since the General has died, that statement cannot be confirmed. On the other hand, the established fact was that the Peace Accords prohibited circulation of arms. In August 1993, support units, normally based in Kigali Garrison, still had detachments deployed in operational sectors. No longer able to return to ~i~ali,~~it was quite logical to provide them with shelters located in the area where they were deployed. The secret nature of the measure was also logical because all matters relating to arms and military operations are always treated with secrecy worldwide; a country at war like Rwanda in 1993 was no exception.
One of the implementation provisions the Arusha Accords provided for creation of weapon secure area: Kigali Weapon Secure Area (KWASA)?~that is, places where new weapons were allowed to enter and weapons already in such places must be kept under the control of UNAMIR, or International neutral force in accordance with the relevant text of the Arusha ~ccords.~'Outside the secure area which was restricted to Kigali, weapons found in other places before the signing of the Accords, had to remain where they were. Since units had been deployed within the country prior to the ceasefire, with the official cessation of hostilities, certain materiel hardware had to be stored in adequate places (hangars, shelter from humidity) without breaching the weapon secure measures. That was how some artilleries which had previously been deployed in the North-west (Sect OPS Ruh el Gis) were kept in that region's factory sheds when it was no longer possible to take them to their base in Kigali. There were heavy weapons in certain areas, not because they were hidden. but because they could no longer be moved from the area where they were when the order to
43 Those who lived through that period would celtainly remember unspeakable scenes when RAF officers returning from the warfront were searched up to removing their authorized pistol, the height of dishonour for an officer, before entering Kigali. Report to the Secretary-General of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda, UN DOC.Si26927, 30 ~ecember1993, Nos. l l and 29. 45 The Arusha Peace Accords between the Government of the Republic of Rwanda and the Rwandan Patriotic Front. Official Gazette ofthe Republic ofRwanda, 32"d year, No. 16 of 15 August 1993. The Prosecutor v. Protais Zigiranyirazo, Case No. 1CTP.-2001-73-1
secure weapons took them by surprise. Moving them to their bases in Kigali or Kanombe would have amounted to a blatant violation of the Peace Accords, and LJNAMIR kept its weather eye open. It was therefore not surprising that artilleries belonging to the Artillery Battalion (Bn AC), based in Kanombe or AMLs belonging to Bn Reccee of Kigali were kept in certain areas far from their bases in order not to contravene the provisions of the Peace Accord. Places outside the secure area where such weapons were kept could be Rubaya tea factory or any other place with the required weapon storage condition.
4. The military and the Arusha Peace Accords
The peace accords singed in Arusha, Tanzania, on 4 August 1993 between the Government of Rwanda and the rebellion called "Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) was recorded as "Arusha Peace Accords" (in plural) referring to the multiple protocols which made up the Accords. The accords, which were negotiated for more than two years, official ended the war triggered on 1 October 1990 by the descendants of former Tutsi dignitaries driven from power in 1959. Hopes raised by the accords not because they were "fair", but because they were intended to usher in an era of peace for a population bled to near death by the war which had taken them completely by surprise, having been given fine pacifist speeches. Unfortunately, the accords were never implemented. From August 1993 to April 1994, successive impasses prevented the setting up the Broad-Based Transitional Government which was to manage the transition and implement the accords. Until the 6 April 1994 tragedy, only a few provisions of the accords had been implemented. The resumption of the war ended those feeble efforts to implement the accords. RPF's total military victory in July 1994 rendered the accord null and void and unsuitable, even when for reasons of political propaganda the new regime invoked the accords for legitimacy, which was questionable, as it had taken power by force.
All those concerned at that trouble time wanted to know the source of the impasses which prevented the implementation of the accords. Many pointed to President Habyarirnana in his attempt to retain absolute power, while others noted RPF's hypocrisy as it prepared military conquest of the country. Considering all these scenarios, the history of the "Arusha Accords" has to re-written.
However, more than 12 years after the signing of the Accords, there is need to consider how, on the side of the Government, the Armed Forces received the Accords and the action they took to apply or reject them.
It was in RAF's interest that the war ended. From 1992, demoralised, poorly trained;less motivated than their enemy which had matured through a relentless desire for revenge, everyday the war got them closer to certain defeat than to any chance of victory.
Despite the one-sided nature of the provisions of the Accords which favoured RPF, and regarding which many informed observers had noted they were realistic, FAR considered that it was the price to pay in order to end the war without suffering humiliating defeat. Jean- Claude Williame wrote in this regard: "Arusha was primarily the venue for an "avoidance strategv", one in the minds of those present at the negotiation table, in other words, a strategy that consisted in maintaining the status quo by postponing the main points of contention. The accords signed in Arusha turned out to be a huge white wash considering that the main requirementfor any proper negotiation were non-existent. On the one hand, the
DIII06-0156 (E) piGGF The Prosecutor v. Protais Zigiranyirazo, Case No. ICTR-2001-73-1 negotiators were not the '$roper ones", as those representing the parties were not reflective of the real political balance of power and which were gradually taken over by those who were infavour of war. "46 For instance, one of the government negotiators who had expressed the idea of tackling the issue relating to sharing of power and posts of responsibility on ethnic basis was simply excluded from the delegation and sent back to Kigali at the earliest opportunity. This may seem surrealistic, after the event, especially in neighbouring Burundi where it was on that basis that negotiations were carried out resulting in the Arusha Peace Agreement which turned out to be more realistic and applicable. Following their defeat, it was systematically presented that RAF opposed the Arusha Accords. The reality is more qualified. One of the characteristics of RAF Command was that it was completely under the political authority. Any political decision, even one which was visibility not in the interest of RAF, once taken, must be complied with. Such discipline was present during and after the negotiations of the Arusha Accords. Regarding the application of the Accords, RAF made progress, that is, as far as the military was concerned.
Therefore, it would be interesting to study in detail how RAF received the Accords and their reactions, that is, where they applied or rejected them.
We have reviewed all the actions officially taken by FAR in connection with the Accords, comments from local and foreign observers, as well as certain visible consequences a decade later. The aim of such study would be achieved if opinion could put into perspective the "unequivocal" judgement that FAR fiercely opposed the Arusha Accords.
THE ARUSHA NEGOTIATIONS
Background
The moment the 1 October 1990 war broke out, an intense diplomatic activity was launched. Consequently, by 18 October already, Presidents Habyarimana md Museveni had met in Dar- es-Salaam through Ali Hassan Mwinyi the President of Tanzania at that time. Immediately after that, Belgium mobilized itself in a spectacular manner by literarily "relocating" its government to the Great Lakes region. In that regard, the Prime Minister Wilfred Martens, the Minister of Foreign Affairs Marc Eyskens and his colleague at the Ministry of Defense Guy Coeme, not to mention obscure Secretaries of state, stayed in that region in 1991 and eventually managed to make the Rwandan Government accept the idea to negotiate with the RPF that had just been driven out of the national territory. Therefore, the "rebellion" gained political and diplomatic recognition which it did not deserve. The intense diplomatic activity by Belgium led to the signing of the cease-fire agreement known as "Mwanza." Rather than stop the conflict, the agreement seemed to have created a gaping hole in the Rwandan Government's defense mechanism. The Government had just agreed to negotiate with armed elements it had hitherto presented as belonging to the regular Ugandan army.
Militarv background
After its "withdrawal" into Uganda in late October 1990 in order to reorganize itself and change its strategy, the RPF continued to harass the RAF, either through guerilla warfare and
'' WILLIAME, Jean-Claude, L'ONU au Rwanda, Editions Labor, Brussels 1996, p. 21.
DIII06-0156 (E) 35 The Prosecutor v. Protais Zigiranyirazo, Case No. ICTR-2001-73-1 sabotage or by intimidating members of the population. Every time the RPF tried to get a foothold on Rwandan territory, it was dislodged and repelled to Uganda. For its part, the RPF avoided any negotiation offer or simply broke the cease-fire it has just signed. It was not until it captured a few plots of land by the border with Uganda after 1992 that it agreed to negotiate seriously. This meant that as long as it was not in a position of strength, it deliberately marked time both on the political and military fronts.
Already in November 1990, after its routing in Mutara, the RPF made a foray into the Gatuna border post in Byumba prdfecture and managed to occupy it for some hours and, also, to defeat the reinforcement that came from the town in a murderous ambush bid.
The beginning of 1991 was characterized by a spectacular raid on Ruhengeri on 22 February. That day, an RPF commando which came down from the volcano area which was the border with Uganda and, which certainly had reliable information on the target and local forces managed, not only to surround the prifecture office, but also to open the famous "Prison Spiciale." This bold raid, albeit strategically unimportant, as the town was only occupied for a few hours, subsequently proved to have had great media and political impact. The October 1990 RPF that was defeated, disorganized and was on the decline was then presented as great, extraordinary, able to do anything etc ...Having managed to free and take along some political prisoners, sworn enemies of Habyarimana, the RPF had succeeded in dealing with, albeit slightly, a political handicap which had troubled it long, that is, having as part of its "staff' Hutus puppets which it could show off as proof that it is opening
Subsequently, the whole of 1991 was characterized by incursions on the entire length of the border with Uganda. Thejnale was the raid on Byumba town on 2 June 1992 immediately after the signing of the Brussels Covenant which linked the RPF with internal political parties. The offensive allowed the RPF to advance to the entrance into Byumba which, it was unfortunately unable to overrun. However, it succeeded in conquering and consolidating positions further inside Rwanda which were no longer juxtaposed to the Ugandan border. It was then that it conquered the Mulindi tea factory in Mukarange commune which from that moment onwards became its Headquarters. During that second semester of 1992, the military situation was just as favourable to the RPF as was the political situation. Regarding negotiations, it was the time, "its" time.
PROTOCOL ON THE INTEGRATION OF FORCES
The negotiations on the integration of forces were the longest and most difficult. They lasted for more than 6 months and came out with a 40-page or so document. The entire document
47 The people freed and taken to Uganda to swell the RPF ranks included: Major Thboneste LIZINDE, Commander Stanislas BISERUKA, Capitain Stanislas MUVUNANYAMBO. The suffered different experiences: Captain Muvunanyambo was executed (officially killed during the fighting in Mutara in 1992) on the orders of Kagame who failed to admit his "boldness." After the country was captured, Major Lizinde, who was promoted to the rank of a Colonel, was for a while a Deputy at the Transition National Assembly before he went into exile in Kenya. According to witnesses, he was killed there in 1996 by a commando sent by Kigali. As for Commander Biseruka, it was said that he was a regular at the Prison. After the RPF victory which resulted in his appointment as member of the "High Command", he only enjoyed a few years of freedom because, in 2002, he returned to prison and is still languishing there. When one considers that he has just spent 10 years in the Ruhengeri special prison before the RPF freed him, one could indeed talk about a "case".
DllIO6-0156 (E) 36 The Prosecutor v. Protais Zigiranyirazo, Case No. ICTR-2001-73-1 has been reproduced. In spite of all that, on the eve of the official signing of the Accords on 4 August 1993, one of the sections of the protocol had not been signed. It was not until 15 days later that the decision to allow the RF'F to deploy a Battalion within the Parliament in Kigali was endorsed; the decision later turned out to be suicidal for the regime.
The content
The entire content forms part of Protocol No 4 signed on 3 August 93 and is part and parcel of the ~ccords.~*
Concessions
The concessions made by the RAF were enormous. First of all, it was told that the command of the new army to the level of Battalion was to be equally shared with the RPF. And, for no obvious reason, the RPF was to contribute 40% of the forces while the RAF was to contribute 60%. If the RPF was seen as representing the Tutsi community, the ratio of its forces should not exceed 15%. Similarly, if the territory controlled at that time was taken into consideration, its ratio would drop even further because of the 144 communes in the country, the RPF controlled an area covering only about ten of the communes in Ruhengeri and Byumbaprifectures by the border with Uganda. with a total surface area no larger than one commune. The yardstick used by the negotiators to determine the ratio remains unknown.
As for the RF'F, it seemed that the only concession it made was to allow the new army to retain the same structure that RAF had (Rwandan Army-Gendarmerie Nationale), particularly the names of the units and their locations. That did not seem like much.
RECEPTION OF THE ACCORDS BY THE POPULATION
Civilian
The reception of the Accords varied from milieu to milieu. The population in general was worn out by the war but feared a return to feudal regime as the RPF was present. At the height of the negotiations, some Radio Rwanda journalists came up with the idea of traveling the length and breath of the country to sound out people's reaction to the various protocols signed in Arusha. The result was self-evident: yes to ending the war but no to RPF domination, to the expansion of the feudal regime deposed in 1959. Informed, the RPF sensed the dangers contained in the broadcasts for its future and purely and simply insisted that they should not be aired. Once again, through the Brussels Covenant, RF'F needs were met. To the opposition within, it was the power that they had dreamt about for long but which they never believed would one day fall into their hands; their members could not hide their joy. However, since the RPF surprise offensive of February 1993, part of the opposition within had begun to have doubts about RPF's sincerity and did not hesitate to seriously question the Brussels Covenant. For it$ part, the President's camp was visibly worried because it had come to realize that efforts were being made to weaken its camp and that even its most conciliatory suggestions had been bluntly rejected. The President's camp believed
48 Arusha Peace Accord between the government of the republic and the RPF. J.O. 32nd year No 16 of 15 August 1993.
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that the negotiations had merely been used as a pretext to endorse the transfer of power, a decision taken earlier by the RPF-internal Opposition duo. However, under serious diplomatic and economic pressure, the President's camp played the game to the bitter end with a heavy heart. The only Rwandans within who sensed that a ploy existed and who publicly denounced the unfair nature of the Accords were the high-ranking officials of the central administration and the private sector. As they did not have any other forum through which to air their views, they founded a political party which could serve as their voice, that is, the Coalitionpour la Difense de la Ripublique, the CDR. Created in early 1992, the party became the resonating body of all those who feared that power would be seized again by the descendants of the monarchists driven out by the 1959 Revolution. But the CDR was fighting a rearguard war for it made a late appearance on the political scene and, the RPF, who had been carefully monitoring all internal developments which might affect its agenda quickly realized this and formed its opinion the party. Eventually, the CDR was left with no choice but to subscribe to the Accords as well, albeit very late. Quite ironically, it was the RPF that fiercely opposed the CDR's request to participate in transition institutions and neither the government party nor the facilitator Tanzania and, to a lesser extent, the Governments who had sponsored the Accords and were present as observers throughout the negotiations (Belgium. USA, Great Britain and, to a lesser degree, Prance) dared lift its little finger to tell the RPF that it was not its duty to identify in advance with whom it would head the transition. Everything was organized as if the Arusha Accords were an RPF victory and. that as a result of that, it had to dictate the terms thereof.
The military
Unlike in civilian circles where opinions were divid*d, the military welcomed the Arusha Accords with great relief. The commander knew that :hc men were tired, training was inadequate and that political decline had had a serious negative impact on the soldiers. Moreover, the success of all RPF offensives since 1992 pointed to the fact that even a military victory for that atypical rebellion was possible unlike what happened in 1990. However, it seemed that the main reason why senior RAF officials unreservedly supported the Accords was because the disciplined army of any Republic has a natural penchiult to comply with political decisions once they are presented as being in favour of the higher interest of the nation. - The RAF was involved in the negotiations especially when they centered on the famous Protocol on the integration of forces. At the same time, the Headquarters increased its reflection meetings so as to provide negotiators with information which they too could in turn actually faithfully interpret and thereby express national opinion.
When the then Minister of National Defence Mr. James GASANA was appointed to head the Government delegation to the negotiations, the RFP saw red. Caught unawares and well acquainted with this cold agronomist who, like mzny of his senior staff, had studied in Uganda, the RPF reacted immediately. Knowing James GASANA to be a shrewd operator and, moreover, an Anglophone just like all senior civilians and particularly military officials, the RPF was left with no choice but to violate the ceasefire and launch its offensive of 8 February 1993(6).
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Very cleverly as was its wont, the RPF justified its violation of the ceasefire by the alleged massacre of the Tutsis in the country. The explanation advanced quickly became unfounded for even its most ardent sycophants (A. Desforges, G. Prunier, J.P. Chrktien...) subsequently realized that the interethnic disturbances referred to by the RPF to justify its offensive had stopped several weeks before the February 1994 offensive(7). Meanwhile, Minister Gasana was recalled to take charge of the conduct of the war. The RPF was relieved and suggested that talks could resume for it knew then that RAF counsel and the analysis would no longer be taken into consideration and that if the crucial protocol on the integration of forces was adopted in its favour, then it would win everything. The RPF not only won on all fronts but, also got what it never bargained for: the officially positioning, of its commandos in the capital KIGALI.
Publication of the names of officers who were to be part of the integrated High Command and the setting ut, of the committees provided for under the Accords
Before the ink dried on the Arusha document, the Ministry of Defence, under pressure from RPF allies in government, made public the list of officers who were to make up the Army Command High Council of the new army. When the RPF was asked to submit a list, its response was mocking but informative. Paul Kagame replied that it was not yet time to do so and that, at any rate, it was not up to them to suggest how the list was to be made public. Until hostilities resumed in April 1994, it was not known which officers would become members of the Army Command High Council apart from the simpletons from the RAF who eventually never became members. The RAF published a list of its officers and additionally in August 1993, the Military regulation Committee, the Demobilization Committee and the Buffer Zone Committee were set With such concrete actions, the RAF demonstrated its desire to fully implement the Accords in the areas which concerned them. It was often said that the RAF opposed the Accords. The accomplished expert on Rwanda Mrs. Alison Desforges even managed to proffer an explanation thereon. She actually said: "As most of the officers belonged to Habyarimana's generation, they were among the first to be demobilized because of their age."(lO) This seemingly logical statement cannot withstand a simple analysis. Habyarimana graduated from the ~coledes Officievs in Kigali in 1961. In 1993 when the Arusha Accords were signed, he had already retired from the army.50In 1993, of the first six classes of EO graduate who could be considered as belonging to Habyarimana's generation, only TWO were still in the Army and were about to retire as they were approaching the crucial age of 50.~'Therefore, it would be absurd to state that most RAF officers belonged to Habyarimana's generation ... To corroborate our point and prove that RAF officers were not so second-rate, we shall give an example: of the 10 officers set to become member of the future Army Command High Council, the oldest was 44 and the
49 The following officers were appointed to sit on the various committees set up under the Amsha Accords: Commission des Rdglements militaires .I) For the RAF: Col Rutayisire, Lt Col Ndahimana, Muwnyi; Maj Biganiro; Hanyurwiamana; Christophe Bizimungu; Rwagakinga. Technical counselors: Col Gatsinzi, Muberuka,Lt Col Bizumuremyi, Sebahire; Major Ntabakuze.2) For the RPF: Kaka, Mukambage, Lizinde, Ntashamaje, Muzungu, Rwigamba, Nyamurangwa, Cesar Katizari. Demobilization Committee: Col Rusatira, Rutayisire, Lt Col Murasampongo, Sebahire, Nzapfakumunsi, Major Gakara,Ntabakuze, Biganiro, Bizimungu, Rwagakinga, Ndererimana, Hanyurwimfura. Buffer Zone Committee 1.) Ruhengeri and Rulindo Secteurs: Lt Col Muwnyi, Bivugabagaho, Sous Prifet of Kirambo: Semasaka; one sous-prifet from Ruhengeri Prifecture; the bourgmestres of Nyamugali, Cyeru, Nyarutow, Ruhondo, Nkumba, Kinigi, Mukingo communes. See Annex K: List of officers retired in 1992 and 1993. " That was Elie Sagatwa (5th class) and Leonidas Rwatira (6th class).
DIIIO6-0156 (E) 39 The Proscutor v. Protais Zigiranyirazo, Case No. ICTR-2001-73-1 youngest was 35. However, they were all senior officers and even generals. Consequently, the RAF did not have to worry, especially as similar replacements could be guaranteed.
(2) Reassignment of high-ranking officials
Right from the moment negotiations began in June 1993, the RAF Commander eased the measure which involved the recalling of officers attending training courses abroad. From that time onwards, such officers were allowed to return to their training and, additionally, other officers were sent on training which further left units with little or no supervision. Almost all unit commanders (Secteur OPS Commanders, Battalion Commanders ...) who were in charge during the fighting were removed from their command posts after the signing of the Accords in August 1993. They were reassigned to administrative duties (Headquarters, Ministry of Defence, Schools...), so they could rest as the war had ended. Similarly, all the units were reorganized from the top to the bottom to the extent that almost all the soldiers who were considered to he old were retired from the front. In fact, this reorganization began long before the Accords were signed. Minister Gasana who had actually fled when the Accords were signed personally confirmed this. 52 The soldiers really believed that the war was ending. However, some leaders sensed that there was some negligence whenever the Arusha negotiations appeared to be progressing and tried to draw the attention of unit commanders thereto. The warnings were not taken serisusly or were viewed as hostility towards the peace process.
3. Consequence of FAR soldiers' naivety
When the RPF decided to resume hostilities in April 1994, the RAF was helpless. On the one hand, it had been demotivated morally by the political class and, on the other, the Command had done everything in its power to prove that the war had ended. Mobile units in a position to act to stop the advancing RPF were held back in Kigali by the famous "Battalion" which derived pleasure from dispersing the units into rieighbourhoods in the town. Meanwhile, the inexperienced units deployed to the Ugandan border were attacked by elite units from Uganda who knew that they would not have to confront the Para-Commando Battalion or the Reconnaissance Battalion. And for a very good reason: According to information gathered by Karenzi-Karake over a period of two years in Kigali, the Charles Kayonga elements (the famous Battalion) could distract the Ntabakuze and Nzuwonemeye elements We know what happened afterwards.
Partial Conclusion
Contrary to the ideas advanced, the soldiers were best placed to implement the Arnsha Accords. In spite of its poor political foresight, the Command even worked zealously but paid dearly for this when the enemy decided to resume hostilities in April 1994. Therefore, it would be inappropriate and even cynical to claim that the RAF opposed the Arusha Accords. Quite the contrary for it was because the RkF believed so much in the Accords that it was caught unawares and defeated by an enemy who was really used to the twist and turns of the revolutionary war and had no respect for diplomacy in the face of military success. Without
'* Gasana James, De I'Etat-Parti d I'Etal-garnison, Paris, L'Harmattan, 2003, p. 123
DIII06-0156 (E) 40 The Prosecutor v. Protais Zigiranyirazo, Case No. ICTR-2001-73-1 trying to make excuses or play down the humiliating military defeat of an army that had enjoyed the support of the entire population, which population had moreover placed its destiny in the hands of these men in uniform, we would like to state that the blame was to be shared. Policy makers should also accept their share of the blame in the military defeat suffered by their army. In other climes, that would be obvious but with respect to the Rwandan tragedy, only the soldiers were held responsible. This seems unfair and that is what we want to express. b. Witness ON
In his testimony Witness ON, mentioned someone named Major Kabera who was allegedly the Gisenyi Operations Commander in 1993. As I knew all RAF Majors at that time and particularly Major Kabera, I can categorically state that the assertion by Witness ON is untrue. The only Major Christophe Kabera who was still serving in the RAF was at that time S4 (logistics) in Byumba Operational Secteur. c. Witness AVY
Witness AVY testified that he underwent six-month training in 1993 at the Bigogwe camp and subsequently at Mukamira camp. He stated that the contingent was made up of about 600 men. Regarding the course content of the military training he allegedly underwent, it mainly consisted of the espionage of Tutsis (g). It should simply be pointed out that at that time, Bigogwe camp housed very few soldiers because, as it was the training center, it received units returning from the front who stayed there for a few weeks trying to get back in shape. Following the signing of the Arusha Accords of August 1993, this camp, like all other camps, were placed under UNAMIR control. Military activities were not allowed without authorization from international observers and, definitely not the housing and training of 600 men for a lengthy six- month period. In that regard, the commanding officer of the UNAMIR detachment in Gisenyi secteur where the Bigogwe camp was located testified before the ICTR in Prosecutor v. Bagosora et a1 that at that time the Bigogwe camp was deserted (h). Moreover, there is no reason why a recruit who had undergone a six-month training at Bigogwe would subsequently move to Mukamira camp. It should be pointed out that both camps were under to two separate operational commands: Gisenyi and Ruhengeri. Unlike the Bigogwe camp which in times of peace served as a commando training centre, Mukamira camp housed only one operational unit: the Ruhengeri Commando Battalion (RUH Bn Cdo). What obtained was the exact opposite of what Witness AVY described: the soldiers in Mukamira camp underwent training or refresher courses at Bigogwe camp but not vice versa,
Lastly, within the RAF at that time, there was no training limited solely to the espionage of Tutsis which lasted for six months. In peace times and under normal circumstances the training of a soldier did indeed last for six months. S~chtraining was carried out mainly at the Gako training centre (Bugesera Kigali).
The time was used to teach the recruits following:
- Combattant's training (Individual tactics) ; - Individual and collective weaponry to the level of sections.
DIII06-0156 (E) 41 The Prosecutor v. Protais Zigiranyirazo, Case No. ICTR-200 1-73-1
- Regulations on the evolution of infantry exercises (Riglement sur l'e'volution des Exercises de 'infanterie -REEI). In short anything related to military drills military: marching in steps, parades, changing of guards, salute.. .. - Physical Education and Sports (Education physique sport EPS). Those were the main subjects taught to recruits. After six months, they were given a roll number and thus became a true RPF soldier.
However, after 01 October 1990, in order to cope with emergencies, there was need to urgently swell the ranks to counter RPF invasion. The training of a soldier was often done over a short period. From 15 days at the height of the crisis in October 1990, it took about 3 months in 1992. But the subjects taught had not really changed. Core subjects (Weaponry, Tactics, .. .) required for a soldier going to the fiont were favoured over subjects relating to protocol and administrations (REEI, some regulations).
But as everyone knows, in 1993, recruitment stopped, particularly at the Bigogwe camp which was not a training centre. Under such conditions:
- Could about 600 men have been trained at Bigogwe camp and then transferred to Mukamira camp, without UNAMIR noticing? - Can one really describe as 'military training' the instructions given to someone to spy on the Tutsi? At any rate, AVY testified that that was all he learnt in six months of military training.
Bearing in mind the prevailing situation at that time, the organization and functioning of the training or military centres, our answer to that question is NO. A contingent of 600 men could not have undergone training at Bigogwe camp in 1994. No, nobody could spend six months learning only to spy on the Tutsis; moreover, that was a strange subject to include in the RAF military training programme.
b. Witness ADE
Witness ADE's testimony on military matters is rather ambiguous. First of all, he makes the dead speak (Gen Nsabimana, Pasteur Musabe ...) and moreover insists that he was secretly informed of some acts. With respect to the arms caches at the Rubaya tea factory, the comments made on Mrs Desforges testimony are also valid for Witness ADE's testimony for, clearly. both witnesses obtained their information from the same source. If the General secretly requested that heavy weapons be stored in the tea factory's shed, it was simply because the Peace Agreements forbade the movement of weapons. However, in August 1993, support units normally based in Kigali Garrison still had detachments deployed to operational secteurs. Unable to return to ~i~ali,"there was understandably a need to find shelter for them in the area where they were deployed. Regarding the secret nature of the act, it was in the nature of things for everything relating to weapons and military operations remained a secret at any time and in any place not only in 1993 in Rwanda which was at war.
53 Those who were around during that period will definitely remember the hitherto unimaginable scenes when RAF officers returning from the front were searched and their service pistol taken from them before they entered into Kigali town; that was the height of disgrace for an officer.
DIII06-0156 (E) 42 ~~~ The Prosecutor v. Protais Zigiranyrrazo, Case No. ICTR-200 1-73-1
One of the provisions to be implemented under the Arusha Accords was the establishment of weapons secure area: Kigali Weapon Secure Area (KWSA): 54 that is, areas where no weapons were stored and where those which already existed were placed under the control of UNAMIR or rather the International Neutral Force as it was known in the Arusha Accords. 55 Weapons at other locations. that is, outside this zone which was restricted to Kigali, before the signing of the Accords, had to remain where they were. Before the cease-fire, units were deployed to the countryside; with the official cessation of hostilities, some materials had to be stored at appropriate locations (sheds, sheltered from humidity...). Without the provisions relating to the weapons secure area being violated. This explains why some artillery parts that had hitherto been deployed to the North West (Ruh OPS and Gis OPS) were stored in the factory sheds in the area for it was no longer possible to take them to their base in Kigali. Consequently, there were indeed heavy weapons at some locations but they had not been hidden there but could not be transferred from the area for they had been caught unawares by the order to create a weapons secure area. As their duty camps were either Kigali or Kanombe, trying to get to them to either location would have been in flagrant violation of the Arusha Agreement and UN.4MIR was keeping an eye open for problems. Claiming victory because you found some artillery parts in Rubaya or armoured vehicles in Mukamira or Gasiza in 1994, was extremely nzive.
10. Criminal andlor disciplinary responsibility
No matter the office issuing it, an order must be legal. The purpose of an order shall not be to aid the perpetration of a crime or an offence. Therefore, a soldier who commits a crime or an offence cannot claim to have received the order to do so fiom anyone for, clearly, an order must not result in the commission of a crime or an offence. Therefore, anyone who commits a crime shall be held individually responsible for the crinle or offence that he commits.
The rules enumerate the offences which a soldier may With respect to ofleer crimes and offences, Article 7 provides that djsciplinary measures shall be distinct frotn legal action. Consequently, for crlminal matters, a soldier is tried like an ordinary citizen. Senior officers may be criminally liable or disciplined if they knew or could have imagined that a subordinate committed or was going to commit an offence and did nothing to prevent, stop or punish the5'.
With respect to the scenarios above, Mr. Protais ZIGIRANYIRAZO was not a supervisor to soldierx We believe he cnnnot he held criminally responsible for the acts allegedly committed b,v soldiers.
54 Report of the Secretq-General on the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda, Un Doc. 5126927, 30 December 1993, nYl1 and 29. 55 Peace ~geementbetween the Government of Rwanda and the Rwandan Patriotic Front, Official Gazette of the Republic ofRwanda, 32"* year, No16 of 15 August 1993. 56 AP no 413102 of 13 December 1978 relating to discipline Within the Rwanda? Armed Forces (Official Gazette, 1978, p. 774, Erratum: Official Gazette, p.1982, p. 467). AI~10-12. 57 Ibidem : Art 60. The Prosecutor v Protais Zigirmyirazo, Case No. 1CTR-2001-73-1
The MF was a regular force governed by transparent, clear and specific rules and regulations. It was an armed force under a clearly identifiable and responsible military hierarchy answerable to the government. The only civilians who had authority over the armed forces were those mentioned in the Constitution or in military regulations. Mr. Protais Zigiranyirazo was not one of them. R4F units in charge of Maintaining and Restoring Public order on the request of the central administration still remained under their supervisors and took orders only from their immediate supervisors.
Soldiers deployed to protect some dignitaries still took orders from their supervisors.
Some RAF units, given their duties, (Presidential Guard), specific training (para commando) or their equipment (reconnaissance: irrmoured vehicle). ..were sometimes presented as being able to avoid the military hierarchical system. That was not the case. In the execution of their special duties, these units still respected hierarchy. A soldier or group of soldiers who carried out an act unauthrized by their superior was held responsible for such an act pursuant to the military rules and regulations in force.
After 6 April 1993, Rwanda was plunged into chaos. Few communicatron routes remained operational. Even the airspace was reduced tremendously. The airline fleet had dwindled and several pilots had been ki!led. I-lelicopter flights were rare and reserved for the most senior State officials (President, Ministers, Chiefs of Army Staff). Other dignitaries, pnrticdarly civilians. had little chance of moving around in a helicopter.
RAF units could not be recognized by their uniform. In fact, on!y the beret distinguished a gendarme from a soldier just as within the same force the beret distinguishes a para commando from an ordinary infanty man. Telling them apart became even more difficult in the wake of the chaos experienced after 6 April 1994. During the events, it waspractically impossible to tell the regular soldisrs From the other armed forces just by their uniforms. It was risky to state that such and such a gendarme [hat one saw was indeed a gendarme simply because he was wearing a red beret or that a soldier belonged to the Presidential Guard or the para commando battalion because he'was wearing a black or camouflage 1.1eret.
Some witnesses testified about militaty matters in Prosecutor V Profais Zigirnnyirazo (ICTR-01-73-1). Prosecution's expcrt witness testified about the great influence the military wielded over political life in Rwanda under the (( Hutu Republic)). We have been able to prove that unlike in other African countries ruled by military juntas, that was never the case. Similarly, we have managed to show that the definilim of the enemy as ploffered by the'P&F Headquarters iil 199'2 was in confonnity iqith tht principle of military intelligence and not based on genocidal ideas. Regarding the training of the militia in military camps and other military installations, once again, we were able to describe the recruitment, training procedure in force within the RAF. In that regard, we have been a.ble to demonstrate that those who state unsubtly that the militia underwent military trainifig in military canlps or instaliations c,an tone dcwn their co!ivictions. Lastly. we were able to cskblish that conuaq to what h4s Des Forges said, the wanda an Armed Forces did not oppdsi the Arush Prace Agreement. The Armed Forces had begun to implement clauses contained in the Accord that The Prosecutor v. Protais Zigiranyirazo, Case No. ICTR-2001-73-1
concerned them to the letter to after the Accords were signed particularly by respecting the weapons secure zone around Kigali in 1993.
Regarding the specific case of Mr. Protais Zigiranyirazo, according to' the rules and regulations governing the RAF which we know inside out and which we examined during the study, it seems he did not have any power over the forces be it of the army or the gendarmerie. Even those who were deployed to guard him remained, as we saw, under their normal military hierarchy. He could not give them any orders or discipline them for dereliction of duty or misconduct. As a military expert and to conclude our research, we do not subscribe to the idea of the Prosecutor that Mr. Protais Zigiranyirazo " ... wielded great power and influence. As such, he had de facto control and authority, in the sense of having the material ability to prevent or to punish criminal conduct, over the actions of soldiers, gendarmes,. .." as mentioned in paragraph 3 of the amended indictment of 7 March 2005.
Castonguav Jacques, Les Cusques bleus a21 Rwanda, Paris, ]'Harmattan 1998.
Des Forges Alison, Leave none to tell the story, Paris, I'Harmattan, 1999.
-,Rwanda 1994, clh pour comprendre le calvaire d'tm pezcpie. Paris. I'Harmattan, 1994.
Logiest Guy, Mission au Rwanda, un blanc dans la bagarre Huw-Tutsi, Bruxelles, Didier Hatier, 1988.
Revntiens F, Rwanda, Troisjours qtli ont fai! basculer 1 'histoire, Paris, l'Harmattan, 1995.
Revntien F, L Xfrique des Grands Lacs en crise, Rwanda el Burundi (1988-1994), Paris, 1'1-Iarmattan, 1994.
Willame Jean Claude, L 'Onu au Rwanda, Bruxelles, ed. Labor, 1995. a Annexes
Annex A: - Military symbo!~.
Annex B: - Rwandan Army Organizational Chart in 1974
Annex C: - RAF Organizational Chart in 1990.
AnnexD: - RAF Detailed Organizational Chart in 1994. Rwandan Army Gendarmerie Narionale
AnnexE: - Battle order "officers" Rwandan Army of 1 October 1990. (Oniy unit commandants are listed). -. l;c, Prosecutor v. Protois Zigiranyirazo, Case No. JCTR-2001-73-1
Annex F: - Battle Order "officers" Rwandan Amy of I April 1994.
Annex G: - Battle order OB "officers" Gendarmerie Nationale of I October 1990. (Limited to Commandants and Service chiefs).
Annex H: - Battle Order "Officers" Gendarmerie .Vationale (Unit Commandants) of 1 April 1594.
Annex 1: - Presidential Guzd Battalion Organizational Chart.
Annex J: Presidential Guard Battalion organizational chart in 1594 (Staff).
Annex K: - Officers retired in 1952 and 1993.
Annex R: - RAF Uniform (Rwandan Army and Gendarmerie).
AR: Rwandan Atmy
DL : Decree
Grades and units within RAF Eq: Team Sec: Section PI: Platoon Cie (Bie): Company (Battery) Bde: Brigade (of the Gendarmerie = One squad) Bn. Battalion Sec OPS: Operational Sectcur EM: Headquarters EM AR : Army Headquarters EM GDN: Gendarmerie Nationale Headquarters FAR: Rwandan Armed Forces Gd N: Gendarmerie Mationale a G Pris: Presidential Guard
Schocls and Centres EO. ~coled 'offjciers [Sraff College] ESM: ~coleSup6rieur~. Mihire [Military Academy] EGEYA: ~colede Gendarmerie Nafronale [Gendarmerie Nationale Academy] CI: C~ntred'lnstrucfion [Training Centre] CE CDO: Cewtre d'EntrafnemenfCommando [Commando Trining Centre]
FAR military ranks MEN Sdt: Soldat [Private] Cpl: Corporal The Prosec~rturv. Prolais Zi@ranyirazo, Case No. 1C'rR-2001-73-i
Non-Commissioned Officers Sgt: Sergeant 1Sgt: Staff Sergeant SM: Sergeant Major ISM: 1st Sergeant Major Adj : Warrant Officer Adj Pr: Warrant Officer Class I1 AC: Warrant Officer Class I
Junior Officers Slt: Sous-lieutenant [Second Lieutenant] Lt: Lieutenant [Lieutenant] Capt: Capitaine [Captain] Cdt: Capitaine-Commandant [Commandant]
Senior oficiers Maj.: Major Lt Col: Lieutenant-colonel Col: Colonel
General Officers Oen 13de: Ge'ne'ral de Brigade [Brigadier] Gen Maj .: Ge'ne'ral Major [Major General] Lt Gen: Lieutenant Ge'niral [Lieutenant General]
Please note:
Cdt: The rank of Captain -Commandant was commonly known as "Commandant" Conld: Refers to the person carrying out the duties of a Commandant irreqpective of his rank Comdt: For the Command.
J.O.: Journal Oficiel [official gazette] OR : Ordre de bataille [battle order] Offr(s): OfJicier(s) Rglt: R?glement [regulations] TEM: Technique d'Etat-mojo? [Headquarters Technique] TPIRIICTR: Tribunal Phal Internatioxal pour le Rwanda/Intem:itional Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda.
RAF units: AC: Artillerie de Cornpapie [Company's artillery] BM: Bitinienls milrtarra [Military installations] Rase AR: Base Logistiqu~de I'Amnze'e Rwandaise [Rwandm Army Logistics base] EM &. Sv: hat-major et services [Headquarteres and services] Cdo: Commando Esc Avi: Escadrille d'aviation
DI1106-0156 (E) 47 The Prosecutor v. Protais Zigiranyirazo, Case WO.'ICTR-2001-73-1
Gn: Ge'nie [Engineering] Maim: Maintenance Mus : Musique [Music] Ord: Ordonnance [Order] Para: Parachutiste brachutist] PM: Police Militaire [Military Police] QG: Quartier Gine'ral [General Headquarters] QM: Quartier-maitre [Quartermaster] Recce: Reconnaissance SS: Sewrce de sante' [Health Service] TR: Transmission Trans: Transport
Gendarmerie Units
BG: Gendarmerie Installations CRDC: Centre de Recherche et de Documentation Criminelle [Criminal Research and Documentation Centre] Gp: Groupe [Group] Cit: Groupement SK: Sicuriti Routitre [Road safety] The Prosecutor v. Protais Zigirnnyirazo. Case No. ICTR-2001-73-1
Curriculum vitae
I. Identification
Name and address: Gaspard Musabyimana 1,ambroeckstraat 61/d 9200 Dendermonde- Belgium
Date and place of birth: Nyamugali-Rwanda, 12 March 1955 Spouse: Thkrkse Mukankuranga Nationality: Rwandan Telephone: 00 32 (0) 477 488 449 e-mail: [email protected] 0 11. Education October 2001- July 2002: INTEC Brussels in Brussels, Belgium Certificate in the maintenance of PCs and data processing networks 1991-1992: Universite' de Paris I, Paris, France, Dipl6me d'e'tudes supirieures specraliskes (DESS) [postgraduate diplon~a] in Public Administration and Management 1976-1981: Institut pe'dagogique national [National Teachers' Training Institute], Butare, Rwanda, Licence [Bachelor's degree] in Education (Qualified to teach at middle secondary school level) 1969-1976: Humanitis pidagogiques [Advanced level studies in teaching] at the Collige ofJiciel de Kigali, Primary School teacher's certificate
111. Placements
July 2002: Training course in data processing at the TECH DATA company in Alost, Belgium September 1991 - June 1992:Institut international d'administratron pziblique (IIAP), [International Public Administration Institute], Pais, France, IIAP dipioma June-August 1985: University of Pittsburg, USA Certificate in Development Management June 1984: Training course at the "Thomas de la Rue" Trust Company in London on the falsification and counterfeiting of travel documents.
DIIIO6-0156 (E) The Prosecutor v. Protais Zigiranyirazo, Case No. ICTR-2001-73-1
IV. Emplovment
2000-2006: Defence investigator at ICTR Case No. ICTR-98-44, The Prosecutor v. Edouard Karemera 1992-1994: Directeur de cabinet at the Ministry of Health, Kigali, Rwanda 1985-1989: Chief of personnel at the Central Inteliigence Department, Kigali, Rwanda 1985-1989: Director of lmmigration and Emigration, Kigali, Rwanda 1981-9185: Civil senwit at the Department of Immigration and Emigration, Kigali, Rwanda
V. Languages spoken
French: Excellent English: Very good Dutch: Good
VI. Publications Gaspard Musabyimlura, Pratiques er rites sexuels azi Rwanda [Sexual practices and rites in Rwanda], Paris; Editions I, 'Harmattan, 2006.
Gaspard Musabyimana, L 'APR et les i-@rgi& mandais azl Zaii.e 19961997. genocide nii. [RPA and the Rwandan rehgees in Zalre. A genocide dznied], Paris, Editions L 'Harmattan, 2004.
Gaspard Musabgimma, La vraie nature clu FPRIAPR, D'Ouganda en Rwanda [The true nature of RPA'RPF. From Uganda to Rwanda], Paris, Editions I, 'Harmattan, 2003.
Gaspard Musabyimana, Sexualitt%, rites et moeurs sexuels de l'ancien Rwanda [Sexual rites and customs and sexuality in Rwanda of old], Brussels, 1999 (at the author's expense).
Gaspard Musabyimana, La coope'ration decentralise'e nu Rwanda [Decentralized cooperation 0 in Rwanda] in La Relive, No. 194, February 1993, Kiga!i- Rwanda. Gaspard ~usabyi~ana,L'administr,ction puhEigue duns un hat democrati.tiq~:e [Pcblic administration in a democratic State], in La Relive, No. 207, May 1992, Kigdi, Rwimda.
. . VLI. Hubhies
Amatcur tennis player Reading Writing
DIIlO6-0156 (E) ~DGT-] The Prosecu!or v. Protais Ligirunyrazo, Case No. ICTR-2001-73-1
Emmanuel NERETSE De Dammenlaan, 174 9200 Dendermonde Belgium Tel. 0032152.20.01.76 E-mail : [email protected]
I J:OKbl13R SENIOR OFFICER OF TIIE 1IWANL)AN AIMED FORCES (RAF) 3 Graduate in military and social sciences, Adviser on Humanitarian International Law (H.1.L) for FUF Breveti d'Etar-major (BEM) [Staff College officer]
a. -Career military officer for 16 years2 from 1978 to 1994
1978-1980 : Instrxtor at the "'Centre rnilitaire J'instruction" [Military Training Centre] at Rugesera, Camp GAKO; 1980-1982 : Contmandant de promotion [Commander of a "promotion" comprising five companies] at the kcole Supirieur hfilituire (ESM) in Kigali; 1982 (January m July): Training course in Belgium; 1982-1985: ~on~panycommander, then deputy operations officer (S3) with the Para Commando battalion of Kanombe-Kigali; 1985-1986 : Training course in Belgium;
Deputy operations officer (S3) with the Para Commando, .. battalion of Kanombe-Kigali; 1987-1988: Training course in Belgi.um; 1988-1992: Commander of Muhima Camp and the Military Police Company, thqn of Camp Kami and the Military Police Battalion; still in Kigali; 1992-1993: Deputy (S3 operat.ions officer) to the Comn~anderof the Byumba operational secteur; 1993- 1994: Commander of the Muvurnba l Battalion. . .
b. Rachinp expee
From 1998 to 1991: Visiting lecturer at the kc ole Stpe'rielcr A4ilitair? in Kigali.
Giving lectures in,
- Military organization (2ndyear); Military history and diplomacy (3Tdyear); - Technique d'~tal-major(TEM) [General staff techniques] as part of the Company Commanders' Course (CCC). The Prosecrrtor v. Protais Zigiranyiraio, Case No. ICTR-2001-73-1
2. Training
a. Education and training courses
1968-1975: Secondsry school: Humaniti pe'dagogique at the ECOEK Normale de BYUA4RA. Primary School teacher's certificate, "DT' with "Grande distinction" [high distinction];
1975-1978: EC& Supdrieure Militaire de Kigali [Kigali Advanced Military Academy]; 16'~batch - Bachelor's degree in Social and Military Sciences with "Distinction";
January 1982-June 1982: Officer certificate from the Signals Corps of the Belgian Amy at the Centre de Transmission et de ~'~lectroni~ue clc Peintre-Vilvolde [**Translator's note: possibly Peulie-Vilvcrde] (Belgium);
1985-1986 : Senior officers' training course at the Institut royal supirieur de difense de Bruxelies and at the kcole d'infunterie de I'armie Belge in Arlon (Belgium);
* 1987-1988: Advanced staff officer's course at :he Institzrt Royal Supirieur de Difense de Brmelles (Belgium). Course leading to the award of the "Brevet d'ktat-major" (REM) [Staff officer's certificzte].
h. Training and/or refresher setginam
- September 1992: .Tartic,ipation in the 2nd Seminu on International Human Rights (IHX) for Senior advisers on [HR of'the member States of the Economic Community of Central Africa (CEAC), or,gan&d in Yaounde, Camercon, by the ICRC of ~eneva,Switzerland; - July 1993: Employers' seminzr organized in Kigali by the ICRC on International Human Kights; - January 1994: Seminar on " Effective Military Judicial System" organized by the "Naval Justice School of Nfivyoft Rhode Island, USA", for RAF and RPF officirs; March 1994: Seminar on the law of armed conflicrs for oficers of the member States of the Ecpnomic Communily of 6entral Africa ir. Yaounde, Cameroon. . .
(a) "La Rigion des Grunds Lacs en Afiique, ... )) [The Great Lzikes Region of Africa], Thesis, Institut t(oj~dSupirieur de Difense, Brussels, 1988;
(b) "i,apolitique de Difense,. . ." [Defence po!icy], ~ditionsde I'Imprinzerze Scolarre, Kigali, 1994;
D11106-0156 (E) The Prosecutor v. Protais Zigiranyirazo, Case No. ICTR-2001-73-1
(c) "Vie et Mort des Forces Armies R~vnndaises(( FAR n ou i'hi~toired'une difaite inconcevabie ...," [Life and death in the Rwandan -4rmed Forces 'RAF' or the history of unimaginable defeat, manuscript, awaiting publication.
4. Languages
w Mother tongue and language of study: Kinyarwanda, French; w Working languages: Kinyanvanda, French, English; w Other languages spoken and read perfectly: Kirundi, Swahili, Lingala; w Solid knowledge (spoken and written): Dutch
5. Personal data
- Rwandan, born on 18 January 1955. - Married, father of four. 0 - Hobbies: Reading, sports.
DlIIO6-0156 (E) ~DRAF~ lnternational Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda Tribunal Penal lnternational pour le Rwanda Arusha International Conference Centre UNITeD NI\TIOKS POBOX6016, Awsha, Tanzania 8.P. 6016, Amsha, Tanzanie NAnONS UNIES - Tel: 255 57 504207-11 504367-72 or 1 212 963 2650 Fax: 255 57 5O4OOOI604373 or 1 212 963 2848149
PROOF. .- - OF SERVICE - ARUSHA PREUVE DE NOTlFlCATlON - ARUSHA late: 27 November 2006 Case Name /Affaire: The Prosecutor vs. Protais ZlGlRANYlRAZO Case No /Affaire No.: ICTR-01-73-T -1 TCI received by / reppar: ALO: received by I recupar Judge E. Mase, President ! .)"doe J R. Reddv j j;die S. A ~gorov Judge F. Lattanzi (Mpambara) 3 Judge F. R. Arrey (Karera) 7 ...... SLO 1 C. Gosnell. Co-ordinator 3 TC2 -1 Judoe W. H. Sekuie (Vacant)...... 7 Judge A. Ramaroson M. Andrianaivo ...... -- ...... 7 Judge K R. Khan (Vacant)...... 3 Judge A. J. N. de Silva I. Endeley ...... -...... I] Judge S. B. Bassa (Nyiramasuhuku et ai.) 7 Judge F. Lattanzi (MuvunYiJ I] Judge L. G. Muthoga (Bizimuogu et ai.) 7 Judge F. R. Arrey (Muvunyil 3 ~udgeE. F. Shon (Bizimungu el al.) Judge T. Hikmet (Ndindliyimana et ai.) 8. Zehnder...... 7 Judoe S. K. Park rNdindiliyimana etai., 8. Zehnder ...... - 3 A. Leroy Co-ordinator 3 A. Marong. Judgement Co-ordinalor 7 s. Mawalla, Judgement Comdinator 3 w. Romans, Judgement Courdinator 9 TC3 Judge A. Vaz (Seromba) P. Mathiam...... Judge I. M. Weinberg de Roca C. RassI...... Judge K. R. Khan (Vacant) ...... Judge D. C. M. Byron J. Greenspoon ...... Judge F. Lattanzi (sihr~d~enukundoj P. Mathiam ...... Judge L. G. Muthoga (zeimnyimm) S. Unnikrishnan...... Judge F. R. Arrey (Rukundoj K. Ardault ...... Judge E. F. Short (~~nrmemeta).) C. Dufty ...... Judge K. Hokborg (Serom~sB RwamakuDsl (Vacant) ...... n- Judge- G. G. Kam (Seromba. Ksrsmera et el. 8 M. I. Mbadinga...... Rwsmakubal rn 31, O'Donnell, SLO C. Denis, Co-ordinator (Ksremsm elsf B Rwamekubal 17 H. Gaao. CO-ordinator (~wam~ei (XI OTP~IBUREAU DU PROCUREUR 17 Senior Trial Att received by ...... DEFENSE ' complete I rimplw " CMS4 FORM 17 Accused / Acc 0 Lead Counsel 1 Conseil Principat .... J. Philpot In /a Arusha Arusha ...... 17 by fax comas 1 ~-fv"CMS~ FORM" 17 Co-Counsel1 Conseil Adjoint ... P. Zaduk In /a Arusha Arusha ...... (,,anture) by faxcow- I rampfir "cMs~~. All Decisions: Appeals Chamber Unit, The Hague S. Chenault, Jurist Linguist All Decisions & Important Public Documents: Press & Public Affairs Legal Library - r,r PAM-C, LUCK. From: F. A. Talon J:P Fan616 (Chief, CMS) N. Diallo (TCI) R. Kouambo (TC2) C. Hometowu Rc3) De: (Appealsnearn IV) Deputy Registrar S. Menon M. Niang S. van Driessche cc: 0. A. Dieng A. Mlller, OLA, NY - 0 WVSS 17 ICTR Spokesperson E. O'Donnell DCDMS P. Enow Subjecl Kindly find attached the following document@)I Veuillez trouver en annexe I@)document(s) suivant(s): Objet: Date Filed 1 Date enregisfrie Pages Documents Ilame / titre du documenl PDSITIC)NS OR AUTHORITY IN THE FORCES AWESRWANDAISES (FAR) : POWER AND 27 November 2006 53 AUTHOIRIT Y THAT CIVILIAN COULD EXERCISE IN FAR : EXPERT REPOT REUESTED BY ICTR INTHECAS E OF PROSECUTORV. ZIGIRANYIRAZO