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Positions of Authority in the Forces Armees Rwandaises (Far)

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Positions of Authority in the Forces Armees Rwandaises (Far) POSITIONS OF AUTHORITY IN THE FORCES ARMEES RWANDAISES (FAR) Power and authority that a civilian could exercise in FAR. Expert report requested by the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda in the case of Prosecutor v. Protais Zigiranyirazo ICTR-200 1-73- 1 Report written by EMMANUEL NERETSE BREVETE D'ETAT - MAJOR Brussels, 1 August 2006. DI1106-0156 (E) rEmT The Prosecutor v. Protuis Zfgiranyirazo. Case No . ICTR-2001-73-1 TABLE OF CONTENTS Introduction .......................................................................................................3 The Forces Armbes Rwandaises ........................................................................4 Maintaining and Restoring Public Order (MROP) ................................... 9 The Parallel Networks ................................................................................. 14 Protecting "VERY IMPORTANT PERSONS" (VIP) ....................................17 Organization and Missions of certain military units referred to as "elite" ...... 20 Movements in military helicopters after April 1994.................................. ..... 23 Difficulties in identifying soldiers by their uniforms ......................................26 Opinion and considerations regarding the statements of certain witnesses ..... 26 Criminal andior disciplinary responsability ....................................................43 Conclusion....................................................................................................... 44 . Bibliography ................................................................................................................45 Annexes .......................................................................................................................45 DIII06-0156 (E) -1 -1 The Prosecutor v. Protais Zigiraqirazo, Case No. ICTR-2001-73-1 1. Introduction From time immemorial, and throughout the world, political power and the military institution have had ambiguous and often conflicting relations. Even if in principle the Army must submit to political power, soldiers quite often interfere in the politics of their countries. In extreme cases, soldiers simply arrogate all political powers to themselves (military regimes born of coups d'etat). However, in all these cases, the functioning of the military institution will always have an abiding feature. In fact, be it in a democracy or under military regimes, soldiers are under the authority of their superiors, i.e., other high-ranking soldiers. Civilians who exercise some amount of authority or effective control over soldiers do so strictly within military laws and regulations in force, often as concerns the supreme command. In the case of Rwanda, how did this happen? Were the Forces Armies Rwandais (FAR) governed by laws and regulations which put them out of the reach of non-hierarchical figures like influential or supposedly influential civil personalities, or were they, on the other hand, used in a manner that smacked of anarchy or chaos? Mr. Protais Zigiranyirazo's defence has requested us to address the military aspects of the case, for instance, "en relation avec le pouvoir supirieur, mais aussi avec d'autres alliguks de connotation militaire" [in relation to the higher authority, but also to other allegations concerning the military]."' In fact, paragraph 3 of the Amended Indictment of 8 March 2005 reads "....Protais ZIGIRANYIRAZO wielded great power and influence. As such, he had de facto control and authority, in the sense of having the material ability to prevent or to punish criminal conduct, over the actions of soldiers, gendarmes, the Interahamwe, administrative officials, and members of the civilian population in ~wanda."~ After reviewing the circumstances and the forms in which a civilian could or not exercise authority over the soldiers, we will analyse the special case of a Prkfet within the context of maintaining and restoring public law and order and that of a relation of the President of the Republic within the context of the Presidential Guard. After giving our opinion on the existence or non-existence of "parallel networks" within FAR, we will dwell on the Presidential Guard Battalion by addressing its organization, its missions and the superior/subordinate relations linking it to other command echelons. Certain Prosecution witnesses also addressed a few military aspects in their testimonies. In the expert's terms of reference, Protais Zigiranyirazo's defence stated that we were going to receive these testimonies so as to comment and give our military expert opinion on them. We also intend to react to its appeal in this report. ' Terms of reference established by Mr. John Philpot, Lead Counsel for Protais ZIGIRANYIRAZO. Case No.lCTR-2001-73-1, Amended Indictment, 7 April 2005. DII106-0 156 (E) 3 The Prosecutor v. Protais Zigiranyirmo, Case No. ICTR-2001-73-1 Lastly, we will speak of the criminal and disciplinary responsibility for acts committed by soldiers, in the light of the statutes as well as the relevant case-law. 2. The Forces Armdes Rwandaises a. Background It will be recalled that FAR, as agreed in 1994, resulted from the merger in 1994 between the former "National Guard" and "National Police" to form the "Rwandan Army." When the Gendarmerie Nationale was formed in 1974, the two forces became the Forces Armies Rwandaises FAR).^ This term thenceforth referred to an entity formed by the Rwandan Army and the Gendarmerie. The Communal Police, even though it was legally part of the defence and security forces, was not included in FAR. The National Guard and National Police had taken over from the Force Publique (Police) which was in charge of Defence and security in the Belgian Congo and Ruanda-Urundi. On 30 June 1960, the Congo obtained independence, while Ruanda-Urundi remained under Belgian trusteeship. At that time, Rwanda did not have, and could not have any soldier because only the Congolese could serve in the "Force Publique." Independent Congo withdrew its soldiers from Rwanda after 30 June. So Rwanda had to ensure its own security.4 It was under these circumstances that Belgium established as a matter of urgency the "National Guard" which in 1974 became the "Armie Rwandaise" before becoming the Forces Armies Rwandaises (FAR),following the merger with the new "Gendarmerie Nationale. b. FAR Command Some opinion asserts that senior positions in the FAR Command were occupied by officers from the North West, for instance, the Gisenyi and Ruhengeri Prefectures. This assertion should be qualified. When Belgium, acting as trustee of Rwanda, took the decision in 1960 to establish a "National Guard," it opened a school to train Rwandan officers. The "Ecole d'oflcier de Kigali" [Kigali Officers' School] was thus opened. One year later, six young Second Lieutenants graduated from this school. The six who graduated included five from the North west.' We do not know the criteria the Belgian authorities used to recruit these officers, but it seems to us inconceivable that they were guided by regionalist motives. But the fact is that the first three batches of the officers' school were admitted by the Belgian authorities. On the eve of the 1 October 1990 RPF attack, these very first officers had, either reached the retirement age, or had been moved to non-active positions (see Annexes F and G). %egislative Decree (LD) of 23 January 1974 to name the ArmQe Rwandaise and LD of 23 January 2001 to set up the Gendarmerie Nationale. Official Gazette of 1 February 1974. 'Guy, LOGIEST, Mission au Rwanda, Un blanc dnns la bagarre Huh- Tutsi, Brussels, Didier Hatier, 1988. 5 Habyarimana Juv6nal (Gisenyi), Nyatanyi Pierre (Ruhengeri), Nsekalije Aloys (Gisenyi), Benda Sabin (Ruhengeri), Ruhashya Epimaque (Kigali) and Kanyarengwe Alexis (Ruhengeri). DIII06-0156 (E) 4 The Prosecutor v. Profais Zigiranyirazo, Case No. ICTR-2001-73-1 Furthermore in 1992, with massive retirements dictated by political imperatives, this impression of imbalance seemed no longer tenable.6 It is therefore inaccurate, as Ms Alison Des ~or~es'claims, that after the 1993 Arusha Accords, "[rjhis was particularly true for senior officers, many of them of Habyarimana's age-group, who would be among the first demobilized ... " hence their opposition to those accords. In 1993, there was no officer of Habyarimana's age-group, or from the following batches still in active service in FAR. Moreover, this can easily be determined because junior officers (up to Company Commander) had to retire at 45 years, senior officers (from Major to Colonel) at 50 and Generals at 55. To put it plainly, in 1992, FAR had no junior officer above 45 years, no senior officer above 50, and no General above 55. c. Situation prior to October 1990 (a) Organization FAR was composed of Arme'e Rwandaise, Gendarmerie Nationale, Ecole Supe'rieure Militaire, Kigali and Ecole des Sous-officiers, Butare. All of them were placed under the Ministry of National Defence. The Army and the Gendarmerie were each headed by a general staff headquarters composed of four conventional offices. The Chief-of-Staff was at the same time the Commander-in- Chief of the army and the gendarmerie. The army was made up of battalions or companies comprising units, all placed directly under the general staff headquarters. The Gendarmerie was made up of territorial squads or companies. The combat units were established mainly in the headquarters of Prefectures. The rest were stationed in Kigali, the country's capital. (b) The staff The army had approximately 8,600 troops,
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