Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan judicature and execution, artificial joints; reward and (1651)1 punishment (by which fastened to the seat of the sovereignty every joint and member is moved to Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) spent most of his life as perform his duty) are the nerves, that do the same in tutor, secretary, and financial manager in the service the body natural; the wealth and riches of all the of the earls of Devonshire and Newcastle. His particular members are the strength; salus populi (the extensive travels in Europe brought him into contact people’s safety) its business; counselors, by whom all with many of the leading thinkers of the time, things needful for it to know are suggested unto it, are including Galileo, whom he visited in 1636, and the memory; equity, and laws, an artificial reason and Mersenne, to whose circle he belonged while in Paris will; concord, health; sedition, sickness; and civil in 1635, and then again when in exile in Paris from war, death. Lastly, the pacts and covenants, by which 1640 to 1651. He had met the elderly Bacon in the the parts of this body politic were at first made, set 1620s. Hobbes contributed the Third Set of Objec- together, and united, resemble that fiat, or the let us tions to Descartes’s Meditations in 1641 and began to make man, pronounced by God in the creation. publish his own philosophical system, Elements of To describe the nature of this artificial man, I will Philosophy, first issuing Section Three, Concerning consider: Government and Society (De Cive) in 1642, then The First Section Concerning Body (De Corpore) in 1655 First, the matter of this, and the artificer—both of and Section Two, Concerning Human Nature (De which is man. Homine) in 1658. The work for which he is best Secondly, how, and by what covenants it is made; known in which he defends his materialist philosophy what are the rights and just power or authority and rejects Anglicanism, is Leviathan, or the Matter, of a sovereign; and what it is that preserves and Forme, and Power of a Commonwealth Ecclesias- dissolves it. ticall and Civill (1651).2 Thirdly, what is a Christian commonwealth. Introduction Lastly, what is the kingdom of darkness. Nature (the art by which God has made and Concerning the first, there is a saying much governs the world) is also so imitated in this by the usurped of late, that wisdom is acquired, not by art of man, as in many other things, that it makes an reading of books, but of men. Consequently, to which artificial animal. For seeing life is but a motion of end, those persons that for the most part can give no limbs, the beginning of which is in some principal other proof of being wise take great delight to show part within, why may we not say that all automata what they think they have read in men, by unchari- (engines that move themselves by springs and wheels table censures of one another behind their backs. But as does a watch) have an artificial life? For what is the there is another saying not of late understood, by heart, but a spring; and the nerves, but so many which they might learn truly to read one another, if strings; and the joints, but so many wheels, giving they would take the pains; and that is, nosce teipsum, mot10n to the whole body, such as was intended by read thyself: which was not meant, as it is now used, the artificer? Art goes yet further, imitating that to countenance, either the barbarous state of men in rational and most excellent work of nature, man. For power towards their inferiors, or to encourage men of by art is created that great LEVIATHAN called a low degree to a saucy behavior towards their betters, COMMONWEALTH, or STATE (in Latin CIVITAS), which but to teach us that for the similitude of the thoughts is but an artificial man, though of greater stature and and passions of one man, to the thoughts and passions strength than the natural, for whose protection and of another, whoever looks into himself, and considers defense it was intended, and in which the sovereignty what he does, when he does think, opine, reason, is an artificial soul, as giving life and motion to the hope, fear, etc., and upon what grounds, he shall as a whole body; the magistrates, and other officers of result read and know what are the thoughts and

1 From The English Works of Thomas Hobbes of Press, 1992); Richard Tuck, Hobbes (Oxford: Oxford Malmesbury, ed. Sir William Molesworth (London, 1839- University Press, 1989); and Tom Sorell, ed., Cambridge 45), 11 vols., modified. Companion to Hobbes (Cambridge: Cambridge University 2 For more on Hobbes, see A. P. Martinich, The Two Press, 1996). Gods of Leviathan (Cambridge: Cambridge University 93 passions of all other men upon the like occasions. I The cause of sense is the external body, or object, say the similitude of passions, which are the same in which presses the organ proper to each sense, either all men, desire, fear, hope, etc., not the similitude of immediately, as in taste and touch, or mediately, as in the objects of the passions, which are the things seeing, hearing, and smelling; this pressure, by the desired, feared, hoped, etc., for these the constitution mediation of nerves and other strings and membranes individual, and particular education, do so vary, and of the body, continued inwards to the brain and heart, they are so easy to be kept from our knowledge, that causes there a resistance, or counterpressure, or the characters of man’s heart, blotted and confounded endeavor of the heart, to deliver itself; this endeavor, as they are with dissembling, lying, counterfeiting, because outward, seems to be some matter without. and erroneous doctrines, are legible only to him who And this seeming, or fancy, is that which men call searches hearts. And though by men’s actions we do sense, and consists, as to the eye, in a light, or color discover their design sometimes, yet to do it without figured; to the ear, in a sound; to the nostril, in an comparing them with our own, and distinguishing all odor; to the tongue and palate, in a savor; and to the circumstances by which the case may come to be rest of the body, in heat, cold, hardness, softness, and altered, is to decipher without a key, and be for the such other qualities as we discern by feeling. All these most part deceived, by too much trust, or by too much qualities called sensible are in the object that causes diffidence, as he who reads is himself a good or evil them but so many several motions of the matter, by man. which it presses our organs diversely. Neither in us that are pressed are they anything else but diverse But let one man read another by his actions ever so motions (for motion produces nothing but motion). perfectly, it serves him only with his acquaintance, But their appearance to us is fancy, the same waking which are but few. He who is to govern a whole nation as dreaming. And as pressing, rubbing, or striking the must read in himself, not this or that particular man, eye makes us fancy a light, and pressing the ear but mankind, which though it is hard to do, harder produces a din, so also do the bodies we see or hear than to learn any language or science, yet when I shall produce the same by their strong, though unobserved have set down my own reading orderly, and perspicu- action. For if those colors and sounds were in the ously, the pains left another, will be only to consider, bodies, or objects that cause them, they could not be if he also does not find the same in himself. For this severed from them, as by glasses, and in echoes by kind of doctrine admits no other demonstration. reflection, we see they are, where we know the thing

we see is in one place, the appearance in another. And Part I. Of Man though at some certain distance, the real and very object seem invested with the fancy it begets in us; yet Chapter 1. Of Sense. still the object is one thing, the image or fancy is Concerning the thoughts of man, I will consider them another, so that sense in all cases is nothing else but first singly, and afterwards in train, or dependence original fancy, caused (as I have said) by the pressure, upon one another. Singly, they are every one a repre- that is, by the motion of external thing upon our eyes, senttation or appearance of some quality or other ears, and other organs ordained to it. accident of a body without us, which is commonly But the philosophy schools through all the univer- called an object—which object works on the eyes, sities of Christendom, grounded upon certain texts of ears, and other parts of a man’s body, and by diversity Aristotle, teach another doctrine, and say, for the of working, produces diversity of appearances. cause of vision, that the thing seen sends forth on The origin of them all is that which we call SENSE. every side a visible species (in English) a visible (For there is no conception in a man’s mind, which show, apparition, or aspect, or a being seen, the has not at first, totally, or by parts, been begotten upon receiving of which into the eye is seeing. And for the the organs of sense.) The rest are derived from that cause of hearing, that the thing heard sends forth an origin. audible species, that is, an audible aspect, or audible being seen, which entering at the ear makes hearing. To know the natural cause of sense is not very For the cause of understanding also, they say the necessary to the business now in hand; and I have thing understood sends forth intelligible species, that elsewhere written of the same at large. Nevertheless, is, an intelligible being seen which coming into the to fill each part of my present method, I will briefly understanding makes us understand. I do not say this deliver the same in this place. 94 as disapproving of the use of universities; but because bodies, only the predominant is sensible; therefore the I am to speak hereafter of their office in a common- light of the sun being predominant, we are not af- wealth, I must let you see on all occasions by the way fected with the action of the stars. And any object what things would be amended in them, among which being removed from our eyes, though the impression the frequency of insignificant speech is one. it made in us remains, yet other objects more present succeeding and working on us, the imagination of the Chapter 2. Of Imagination. past is obscured and made weak, as the voice of a man is in the noise of the day. From this it follows that the That when a thing lies still, unless something else stirs longer the time is, after the sight or sense of any it, it will lie still forever is a truth that no man doubts object, the weaker is the imagination. For the contin- of. But that when a thing is in motion, it will eternally ual change of man’s body destroys in time the parts be in motion, unless something else stops it, though which in sense were moved, so that distance of time the reason is the same (namely, that nothing can and of place has one and the same effect in us. For as change itself), is not so easily assented to. For men at a great distance of place, that which we look at measure, not only other men, but all other things, by appears dim and without distinction of the smaller themselves, and because they find themselves subject parts, and as voices grow weak and inarticulate, so after motion to pain, and lassitude, think everything also, after great distance of time, our imagination of else grows weary of motion, and seeks repose of its the past is weak, and we lose (for example) many own accord, little considering whether it is not some particular streets of cities we have seen, and many other motion in which that desire of rest they find in particular circumstances of actions. This decaying themselves consists. From hence it is that the schools sense, when we would express the thing itself (I mean say heavy bodies fall downwards out of an appetite to fancy itself), we call imagination, as I said before, but rest, and to conserve their nature in that place which when we would express the decay, and signify that the is most proper for them, ascribing appetite and know- sense is fading, old, and past, it is called memory. ledge of what is good for their conservation (which is Thus, imagination and memory are but one thing more than man has) to inanimate things, absurdly. which for diverse considerations have diverse names. When a body is once in motion, it moves (unless Much memory, or memory of many things, is something else hinders it) eternally; and whatever called experience. Again, imagination being only of hinders it cannot in an instant, but in time and by those things which have been formerly perceived by degrees, quite extinguish it. And as we see in the sense, either all at once, or by parts at several times, water, though the wind ceases, the waves do not give the former (which is the imagining the whole object, over rolling for a long time after, so also it happens in as it was presented to the sense) is simple imagi- that motion, which is made in the internal parts of a nation—as when one imagines a man, or horse, which man, then, when he sees, dreams, etc. For after the he has seen before. The other is compounded—as object is removed or the eye shut, we still retain an when from the sight of a man at one time, and of a image of the thing seen, though more obscure than horse at another, we conceive in our mind a Centaur. when we see it. And this, the Latins call imagination, So when a man compounds the image of his own from the image made in seeing, and apply the same, person with the image of the actions of another man, though improperly, to all the other senses. But the as when a man imagines himself a Hercules or an Greeks call it fancy, which signifies appearance, and Alexander (which happens often to those who are is as proper to one sense as to another. IMAGINATION much taken with reading of romances), it is a com- therefore is nothing but decaying sense, and is found pound imagination and properly but a fiction of the in men and many other living creatures, as well mind. There are also other imaginations that arise in sleeping, as waking. men (though waking) from the great impression made The decay of sense in men waking is not the decay in sense—as from gazing upon the sun, the impres- of the motion made in sense, but an obscuring of it, in sion leaves an image of the sun before our eyes a long such manner as the light of the sun obscures the light time after, and from being long and vehemently attent of the stars—which stars do no less exercise their upon geometrical figures, a man shall in the dark virtue, by which they are visible, in the day, than in (though awake) have the images of lines and angles the night. But because among many strokes which our before his eyes—which kind of fancy has no parti- eyes, ears, and other organs receive from external

95 cular name, as being a thing that does not commonly The most difficult discerning of a man’s dream, fall into men’s discourse. from his waking thoughts, is then, when by some acci- dent we do not observe that we have slept, which The imaginations of those who sleep are those we easily happens to a man full of fearful thoughts and call dreams. And these also (as all other imaginations) whose conscience is much troubled, and who sleeps, have been before, either totally or by parcels in the without the circumstances of going to bed, or putting sense. And because in sense the brain and nerves, off his clothes, as one who nods in a chair. For he who which are the necessary organs of sense, are so takes pains, and industriously lays himself to sleep, in benumbed in sleep, as not easily be moved by the case any uncouth and exorbitant fancy come unto action of external objects, there can happen in sleep him, cannot easily think it other than a dream. We no imagination, and therefore no dream, but what read of Marcus Brutus (one who had his life given proceeds from the agitation of the inward parts of him by Julius Caesar, and was also his favorite, and man’s body. These inward parts, for the connection notwithstanding murdered him), how at Philippi, the they have with the brain and other organs, when they night before he gave battle to Augustus Caesar, he are distempered, do keep the same in motion—by saw a fearful apparition, which is commonly related which the imaginations there formerly made appear by historians as a vision, but considering the circum- as if a man were waking, saving that the organs of stances, one may easily judge to have been but a short sense being now benumbed, so as there is no new dream. For sitting in his tent, pensive and troubled object, which can master and obscure them with a with the horror of his rash act, it was not hard for him, more vigorous impression, a dream must necessarily slumbering in the cold, to dream of that which most be more clear, in this silence of sense, than are our frightened him—which fear, as by degrees it made waking thoughts. And hence it comes to pass that it is him wake, so also it must necessarily make the appari- a hard matter, and by many thought impossible, to tion vanish by degrees; and having no assurance that distinguish exactly between sense and dreaming. For he slept, he could have no cause to think it a dream or my part, when I consider that in dreams, I do not often anything but a vision. And this is no very rare acci- nor constantly think of the same persons, places, dent; for even those who are perfectly awake, if they objects, and actions that I do waking, nor remember are timorous, and superstitious, possessed with fearful so long a train of coherent thoughts, dreaming, as at tales, and alone in the dark, are subject to the like other times; and because waking I often observe the fancies, and believe they see spirits and dead men’s absurdity of dreams, but never dream of the absurdi- ghosts walking in churchyards; whereas it is either ties of my waking thoughts, I am well satisfied that their fancy only, or else the knavery of such persons, being awake I know I do not dream, though when I as make use of such superstitious fear to pass dis- dream, I think myself awake. guised in the night to places they would not be known And seeing dreams are caused by the distemper of to haunt. some of the inward parts of the body, diverse dis- From this ignorance of how to distinguish dreams tempers must necessarily cause different dreams. And and other strong fancies from vision and sense did hence it is that lying cold breeds dreams of fear and arise the greatest part of the religion of the Gentiles in raises the thought and image of some fearful object time past, who worshipped satyrs, fawns, nymphs, (the motion from the brain to the inner parts, and from and the like, and nowadays the opinion that rude the inner parts to the brain being reciprocal), and that people have of fairies, ghosts, and goblins, and of the as anger causes heat in some parts of the body, when power of witches. For as for witches, I do not think we are awake, so when we sleep the overheating of that their witchcraft is any real power, but yet that the same parts causes anger, and raises up the imagi- they are justly punished for the false belief they have nation of an enemy in the brain. In the same manner that they can do such mischief, joined with their pur- as natural kindness, when we are awake, causes pose to do it if they can, their trade being nearer to a desire, and desire makes heat in certain other parts of new religion than to a craft or science. And for fairies the body, so also, too much heat in those parts, while and walking ghosts, the opinion of them has I think we sleep, raises an imagination of some kindness been on purpose, either taught, or not confuted, to shown in the brain. In sum, our dreams are the reverse keep in credit the use of exorcism, of crosses, of holy of our waking imaginations, the motion when we are water, and other such inventions of ghostly men. awake, beginning at one end, and when we dream, at Nevertheless, there is no doubt but God can make another. 96 unnatural apparitions. But that he does it so often as When a man thinks on anything whatsoever, his men need to fear such things more than they fear the next thought after is not altogether so casual as it stay or change of the course of nature, which he also seems to be. Not every thought to every thought can stay and change, is no point of Christian faith. But succeeds indifferently. But as we have no imagination evil men under the pretext that God can do anything of which we have not formerly had sense, in whole or are so bold as to say anything when it serves their tum, in parts, so we have no transition from one imagina- though they think it untrue; it is the part of a wise man tion to another of which we never had the like before to believe them no further than right reason makes in our senses. The reason of which is this: all fancies that which they say appear credible. If this supersti- are motions within us, relics of those made in the tious fear of spirits were taken away, and with it sense, and those motions that immediately succeeded prognostics from dreams, false prophecies, and many one another in the sense, continue also together after other things depending on it, by which crafty ambi- sense, inasmuch as the former coming again to take tious persons abuse the simple people, men would be place and be predominant, the latter follows, by much more fitted than they are for civil obedience. coherence of the matter moved, in such manner as water upon a plain table is drawn which way any one And this ought to be the work of the schools; but part of it is guided by the finger. But because in sense, they rather nourish such doctrine. For (not knowing sometimes one thing, sometimes another succeeds to what imagination, or the senses are) what they one and the same thing perceived, it comes to pass in receive, they teach, some saying that imaginations time that, in the imagining of anything, there is no arise of themselves and have no cause, others that certainty what we shall imagine next; only this is they arise most commonly from the will, and that certain, it shall be something that succeeded the same good thoughts are blown (inspired) into a man by before, at one time or another. God, and evil thoughts by the Devil, or that good thoughts are poured (infused) into a man by God, and This train of thoughts, or mental discourse, is of evil ones by the Devil. Some say the senses receive two sorts. The first is unguided, without design, and the species of things and deliver them to the common inconstant, in which there is no passionate thought to sense, and the common sense delivers them over to govern and direct those that follow to itself, as the end the fancy, and the fancy to the memory, and the and scope of some desire or other passion; in this case memory to the judgment, like handing of things from the thoughts are said to wander, and seem impertinent one to another, with many words making nothing one to another, as in a dream. Such are commonly the understood. thoughts of men that are not only without company, but also without care of anything, though even then The imagination that is raised in man (or any other their thoughts are as busy as at other times, but creature endowed with the faculty of imagining) by without harmony—as the sound which a lute out of words or other voluntary signs is what we generally tune would yield to any man, or in tune, to one that call understanding, and is common to man and beast. could not play. And yet in this wild ranging of the For a dog by custom will understand the call or the mind, a man may oftentimes perceive the way of it rating of his master, and so will many other beasts. and the dependence of one thought upon another. For That understanding which is peculiar to man is the in a discourse of our present civil war, what could understanding not only his will, but his conceptions seem more impertinent than to ask (as one did) what and thoughts, by the sequel and contexture of the was the value of a Roman penny? Yet the coherence names of things into affirmations, negations, and was manifest enough to me. For the thought of the war other forms of speech; and of this kind of under- introduced the thought of delivering up the king to his standing I shall speak hereafter. enemies; the thought of that brought in the thought of

the delivering up of Christ; and that again the thought Chapter 3. Of the Consequence or Train of Imagi- of the 30 pence, which was the price of that treason; nations. and in this way easily followed that malicious By Consequence, or TRAIN of thoughts, I understand question, and all this in a moment of time, for thought that succession of one thought to another, which is is quick. called (to distinguish it from discourse in words) The second is more constant, as being regulated mental discourse. by some desire and design. For the impression made by such things as we desire or fear is strong and 97 permanent, or (if it ceases for a time) of quick return; and its events one after another, supposing like events so strong it is sometimes, as to hinder and break our will follow like actions—as he who foresees what will sleep. From desire arises the thought of some means become of a criminal reconsiders what he has seen we have seen produce the like of that which we aim follow on the like crime before, having this order of at; and from the thought of that, the thought of means thoughts: the crime, the officer, the prison, the judge, to that mean; and so continually, until we come to and the gallows. This kind of thought is called some beginning within our own power. And because foresight, and prudence, or providence, and some- the end, by the greatness of the impression, comes times wisdom, though such conjecture, through the often to mind, in case our thoughts begin to wander, difficulty of observing all circumstances, is very they are quickly again reduced into the way; this, fallacious. But this is certain: By how much one man observed by one of the seven wise men, made him has more experience of things past than another, by so give men this precept, which is now worn out, Respice much also he is more prudent, and his expectations finem—that is to say, in all your actions, look often the more seldom fail him. The present only has a upon what you would have, as the thing that directs being in nature; things past have a being in the all your thoughts in the way to attain it. memory only; but things to come have no being at all, the future being but a fiction of the mind, applying the The train of regulated thoughts is of two kinds: sequels of actions past to the actions that are One, when of an effect imagined, we seek the causes present—which with most certainty is done by him or means that produce it; and this is common to man who has most experience, but not with certainty and beast. The other is when, imagining anything enough. And though it is called prudence when the whatsoever, we seek all the possible effects that can event answers our expectation, yet in its own nature, be produced by it—that is to say, we imagine what we it is but presumption. For the foresight of things to can do with it, when we have it. I have not at any time come, which is providence, belongs only to him by seen any sign of this, but in man only; for this is a whose will they are to come. From him only, and curiosity hardly incident to the nature of any living supernaturally, proceeds prophecy. The best prophet creature that has no other passion but sensual, such as naturally is the best guesser, and the best guesser, he are hunger, thirst, lust, and anger. In sum, the dis- who is most versed and studied in the matters he course of the mind, when it is governed by design, is guesses at, for he has most signs to guess by. nothing but seeking, or the faculty of invention, which the Latins called sagacitas and solertia, a hunting out A sign is the event antecedent of the consequent, of the causes, of some effect, present or past, or of the and contrarily, the consequent of the antecedent, effects of some present or past cause. Sometimes a when the like consequences have been observed man seeks what he has lost; and from that place and before; and the more often they have been observed, time in which he misses it, his mind runs back, from the less uncertain is the sign. And therefore he who place to place, and time to time, to find where and has most experience in any kind of business has most when he had it—that is to say, to find some certain signs by which to guess at the future time, and and limited time and place in which to begin a method consequently is the most prudent, and so much more of seeking. Again, from this his thoughts run over the prudent than he who is new in that kind of business, same places and times, to find what action or other as not to be equaled by any advantage of natural and occasion might make him lose it. This we call remem- extemporary wit, though perhaps many young men brance, or calling to mind; the Latins call it remini- think the contrary. scentia, as it were a reconsideration of our former Nevertheless, it is not prudence that distinguishes actions. man from beast. There are beasts that at a year old Sometimes a man knows a determinate place observe more and pursue that which is for their good within the compass of which he is to seek, and then more prudently than a child can do at ten. his thoughts run over all the parts of it, in the same As prudence is a presumption of the future, manner as one would sweep a room to find a jewel, or contracted from the experience of time past, so there as a spaniel ranges the field until he finds a scent, or is a presumption of things past taken from other things as a man should run over the alphabet to start a rhyme. (not future but) past also. For he who has seen by what Sometimes a man desires to know the event of an courses. and degrees a flourishing state has first come action, and then he thinks of some like action past, into civil war and then to ruin, upon the sight of the

98 ruins of any other state will guess the like war and the men say was Cadmus, the son of Agenor, king of like courses have been there also. But this conjecture Phoenicia. A profitable invention for continuing the has the same uncertainty almost with the conjecture memory of time past and the conjunction of mankind, of the future, both being grounded only upon dispersed into so many and distant regions of the experience. earth, and in addition difficult, as proceeding from a watchful observation of the diverse motions of the There is no other act of man’s mind that I can tongue, palate, lips, and other organs of speech by remember, naturally planted in him so as to need no which to make as many differences of characters to other thing to the exercise of it, but to be born a man, remember them. But the most noble and profitable and live with the use of his five senses. Those other invention of all other was that of SPEECH, consisting faculties, of which I shall speak by and by, and which of names or appellations, and their connection by seem proper to man only, are acquired and increased which men register their thoughts, recall them when by study and industry, and of most men learned by they are past, and also declare them one to another for instruction and discipline, and proceed all from the mutual utility and conversation, without which there invention of words and speech. For besides sense, and had been among men, neither commonwealth, nor thoughts, and the train of thoughts, the mind of man society, nor contract, nor peace, no more than among has no other motion, though by the help of speech and lions, bears, and wolves. The first author of speech method, the same faculties may be improved to such was God himself, who instructed Adam how to name a height as to distinguish men from all other living such creatures as he presented to his sight; for the creatures. Scripture goes no further in this matter. But this was Whatever we imagine is finite. Therefore, there is sufficient to direct him to add more names, as the no idea or conception of anything we call infinite. No experience and use of the creatures should give him man can have in his mind an image of infinite magn- occasion, and to join them in such manner by degrees itude, nor conceive infinite swiftness, infinite time, or as to make himself understood, and so by succession infinite force, or infinite power. When we say any- of time, so much language might be gotte11 as he had thing is infinite, we signify only that we are not able found use for, though not so copious as an orator or to conceive the ends and bounds of the things named, philosopher has need of. For I do not find anything in having no conception of the thing, but of our own the Scripture out of which, directly or by conse- inability. And therefore the name of God is used, not quence, can be gathered that Adam was taught the to make us conceive him (for he is incomprehensible, names of all figures, numbers, measures, colors, and his greatness and power are inconceivable), but sounds, fancies, relations, much less the names of that we may honor him. Also, because whatever (as I words and speech, as general, special, affirmative, said before) we conceive has been perceived first by negative, interrogative, optative, infinitive, all which sense, either all at once or by parts; a man can have are useful, and least of all, of entity, intentionality, no thought representing anything not subject to sense. quiddity, and other insignificant words of the Schools. No man therefore can conceive anything, but he must But all this language gotten and augmented by conceive it in some place, and endowed with some Adam and his posterity was again lost at the tower of determinate magnitude, and which may be divided Babel, when by the hand of God every man was stric- into parts; nor that anything is all in this place, and all ken, for his rebellion, with an oblivion of his former in another place at the same time; nor that two, or language. And being as a result forced to disperse more things can be in one and the same place at once; themselves into several parts of the world, it must for none of these things ever have, or can be incident necessarily be that the diversity of tongues that now to sense, but are absurd speeches, taken upon credit is proceeded by degrees from them, in such manner (without any signification at all) from deceived as need (the mother of all inventions) taught them, philosophers, and deceived or deceiving schoolmen. and in tract of time grew everywhere more copious.

Chapter 4. Of Speech. The general use of speech is to transfer our mental discourse into verbal, or the train of our thoughts into The invention of printing, though ingenious, com- a train of words, and that for two commodities, of pared with the invention of letters, is no great matter. which one is the registering of the consequences of But who was the first who found the use of letters is our thoughts, which being apt to slip out of our not known. He who first brought them into Greece, memory and put us to a new labor, may again be 99 recalled by such words as they were marked by. So whereas a proper name brings to mind one thing only, that the first use of names is to serve for marks, or universals recall any one of those many. notes of remembrance. Another is when many use the And of names universal, some are of more, and same words to signify (by their connection and order) some of less extent, the larger comprehending the less one to another, what they conceive or think of each large, and some again of equal extent, comprehending matter, and also what they desire, fear, or have any each other reciprocally—as for example, the name other passion for. And for this use they are called body is of larger signification than the word man, and signs. Special uses of speech are these: first, to comprehends it, and the names man and rational are register what by cogitation we find to be the cause of of equal extent, comprehending mutually one another. anything, present or past, and what we find things But here we must take notice that by a name is not present or past may produce or effect—which in sum always understood, as in grammar, only one word, but is acquiring of arts. Secondly, to show to others that sometimes by circumlocution many words together. knowledge which we have attained, which is to For all these words, he who observes the laws of his counsel and teach one another. Thirdly, to make country in his actions, make but one name, equivalent known to others our wills and purposes that we may to this one word, just. have the mutual help of one another. Fourthly, to please and delight ourselves and others, by playing By this imposition of names, some of larger, some with our words, for pleasure or ornament, innocently. of stricter signification, we turn the reckoning of the To these uses, there are also four correspondent consequences of things imagined in the mind into a abuses: first, when men register their thoughts wrong reckoning of the consequences of appellations. For by the inconstancy of the signification of their words, example, a man who has no use of speech at all (such by which they register for their conceptions that as is born and remains perfectly deaf and dumb), if which they never conceived, and so deceive them- he sets a triangle before his eyes, and by it two right selves. Secondly, when they use words metaphori- angles (such as are the corners of a square figure), cally, that is, in a sense other than that they are he may by meditation compare and find that the ordained for, and by it deceive others. Thirdly, when three angles of that triangle are equal to those two by words they declare that to be their will, which is right angles that stand by it. But if another triangle not. Fourthly, when they use them to grieve one is shown him, different in shape from the former, he another; for seeing nature has armed living creatures, cannot know whether the three angles of that also some with teeth, some with horns, and some with are equal to the same without a new labor. But he hands, to grieve an enemy, it is but an abuse of speech to grieve him with the tongue, unless it is one whom who has the use of words, when he observes that such we are obliged to govern; and then it is not to grieve, equality was ·consequent, not to the length of the but to correct and amend. sides, nor to any other particular thing in his triangle, but only to this, that the sides were straight and the The manner how speech serves to the remem- angles three, and that that was all for which he named brance of the consequence of causes and effects con- it a triangle , will boldly conclude universally that sists in the imposing of names and the connection of them. such equality of angles is in all triangles whatsoever, and register his invention in these general terms, every Of names, some are proper and singular to only triangle has its three angles equal to two right angles. one thing, as Peter, John, this man, this tree, and some And thus, the consequence found in one particular are common to many things, as man, horse, tree— comes to be registered and remembered as a universal every one of which though, but one name, is neverthe- rule, and discharges our mental reckoning of time less the name of diverse particular things, in respect of all which together, it is called a universal, there and place, and delivers us from all labor of the mind, being nothing in the world universal but names; for saving the first, and makes that which was found true the things named are every one of them individual and here and now be true in all times and places. singular. But the use of words in registering our thoughts One universal name is imposed on many things for is in nothing so evident as in numbering. A natural their similitude in some quality or other accident; and fool who could never learn by heart the order of numeral words, as one, two, and three, may observe 100 every stroke of the clock, and nod to it, or say one, ning, in which lies the foundation of their errors. one, one, but can never know what hour it strikes. Thus it happens that they who trust to books do as And it seems there was a time when those names of they who cast up many little sums into a greater, number were not in use; and men were inclined to without considering whether those little sums were apply their fingers of one or both hands to those rightly cast up or not, and at last finding the error things they desired to keep account of, and that as a visible, and not mistrusting their first grounds, do not result it proceeded that now our numeral words are know which way to clear themselves, but spend time but ten, in any nation, and in some but five, and in fluttering over their books—as birds that entering then they begin again. And he who can count to ten, by the chimney, and finding themselves enclosed in if he recites them out of order, will lose himself, and a chamber, flutter at the false light of a glass window, not know when he is done. Much less will he be able for want of wit to consider which way they came in. to add, and subtract, and perform all other operations Thus, in the right definition of names lies the first of arithmetic. Thus, without words there is no possi- use of speech, which is the acquisition of science, bility of reckoning of numbers, much less of magni- and in wrong, or no definitions, lies the first abuse, tudes, of swiftness, of force, and other things, the from which proceed all false and senseless tenets, reckonings of which are necessary to the being, or which make those men who take their instruction well-being, of mankind. from the authority of books and not from their own meditation, to be as much below the condition of When two names are joined together into a conse- quence or affirmation, as thus, a man is a living ignorant men as men endowed with true science are creature, or thus, if he is a man, he is a living creature, if above it. For between true science and erroneous the latter name living creature signifies all that the doctrines, ignorance is in the middle. Natural sense former name man signifies, then the affirmation or and imagination are not subject to absurdity. consequence is true; otherwise false. For true and Nature itself cannot err; and as men abound in false are attributes of speech, not of things. And where copiousness of language, so they become wiser or speech is not, there is neither truth nor falsehood. more mad than ordinary. Nor is it possible without Error there may be, as when we expect that which letters for any man to become either excellently shall not be, or suspect what has not been; but in wise, or (unless his memory is hurt by disease or neither case can a man be charged with untruth. ill constitution of organs) excellently foolish. For Seeing then that truth consists in the right ordering words are wise men’s counters—they do but reckon of names in our affirmations, a man who seeks precise by them—but they are the money of fools who truth has need to remember what every name he uses value them by the authority of an Aristotle, a stands for, and to place it accordingly, or else he will Cicero, or a Thomas, or any other doctor whatso- find himself entangled in words, as a bird in lime ever, if but a man. twigs, the more he struggles the more ensnared. And Subject to names is whatever can enter into or be therefore, in geometry (which is the only science that considered in an account, and be added one to an• it has pleased God to bestow on mankind up to now), other to make a sum, or subtracted one from another men begin at settling the significations of their and leave a remainder. The Latins called accounts of words—which settling of significations they call defi- money rationes, and accounting ratiocinatio; and that nitions, and place them in the beginning of their reckoning. which we call items in bills or books of account, they call nomina, that is names; and from this it seems to By this it appears how necessary it is for any man proceed that they extended the word ratio to the who aspires to true knowledge to examine the define- faculty of reckoning in all other things. The Greeks tions of former authors, and either to correct them, have but one word, logos, for both speech and where they are negligently set down, or to make them reason—but not that they thought there was no himself. For the errors of definitions multiply them• speech without reason, but no reasoning without selves according as the reckoning proceeds, and lead speech and the act of reasoning they called syllogism, men into absurdities, which at last they see, but can• which signifies the summing up of the consequences not avoid, without reckoning anew from the begin- of one saying to another. And because the same things 101 may enter into account for diverse accidents, their because they make us refuse to admit of names not names are (to show that diversity) diversely wrested rightly used. and diversified. This diversity of names may be All other names are but insignificant sounds, and reduced to four general heads. those of two sorts. One when they are new, and yet First, a thing may enter into account for matter or their meaning not explained by definition—of which body—as living, sensible, rational, hot, cold, moved, there have been abundance coined by schoolmen and puzzled philosophers. quiet—with all which names the word matter, or body, is understood, all such being names of matter. Another, when men make a name of two names, whose significations are contradictory and inconsis- Secondly, it may enter into account, or be tent—as this name, an incorporeal body, or (which is considered, for some accident or quality, which we all one) an incorporeal substance, and a great number conceive to be in it, as for being moved, for being so more. For whenever any affirmation is false, the two long, for being hot, etc.; and then, of the name of the names of which it is composed, put together and made thing itself, by a little change or wresting, we make a one, signify nothing at all. For example, if it is a false name for that accident, which we consider; and for affirmation to say a quadrangle is round, the word living put into the account life; for moved , motion; round quadrangle signifies nothing, but is a mere for hot, heat; for long, length, and the like; and all sound. So likewise, if it is false to say that virtue can such names are the names of the accidents and proper- be poured, or blown up and down, the words in- ties by which one matter and body is distinguished poured virtue, in-blown virtue, are as absurd and from another. These are called abstract names, be- insignificant as a round quadrangle. And therefore, you shall hardly meet with a senseless and cause severed (not from matter, but) from the account insignificant word that is not made up of some Latin of matter. or Greek names. A Frenchman seldom hears our Thirdly, we bring into account the properties of Savior called by the name of parole, but often by the our own bodies by which we make such distinction; name of verbe; yet verbe and parole differ no more, as when anything is seen by us, we do not reckon the but that one is Latin, the other French. thing itself, but the sight, the color, the idea of it in When a man, upon the hearing of any speech, has the fancy; and when anything is heard, we do not those thoughts which the words of that speech and reckon it, but the hearing or sound only, which is our their connection were ordained and constituted to fancy or conception of it by the ear—and such are signify, then he is said to understand it, understanding names of fancies. being nothing else but conception caused by speech. And therefore, if speech is peculiar to man (as for all Fourthly, we bring into account, consider, and give I know it is), then is understanding peculiar to him names to names themselves, and to speeches. For also. And therefore, of absurd and false affirmations, general, universal, special, equivocal are names of in case they are universal, there can be no under- names. And affirmation, interrogation, command- standing; though many think they understand then, ment, narration, syllogism, sermon, oration, and when they do but repeat the words softly, or examine many other such are names of speeches. And this is them in their mind. all the variety of names positive which are put to mark something which is in nature, or may be feigned by What kinds of speeches signify the appetites, the mind of man, as bodies that are, or may be aversions, and passions of man’s mind, and of their conceived to be; or of bodies, the properties that are, use and abuse, I shall speak when I have spoken of the or may be feigned to be; or words and speech. passions. There are also other names, called negative, which The names of such things as affect us, that is, are notes to signify that a word is not the name of the which please and displease us, because all men are not thing in question—as these words nothing, no man, alike affected with the same thing, nor the same man infinite, unteachable, three want four, and the like— at all times, are in the common discourses of men of which are nevertheless of use in reckoning, or in inconstant signification. For seeing all names are correcting of reckoning, and call to mind our past imposed to signify our conceptions, and all our affec- cogitations, though they are not names of anything, tions are but conceptions, when we conceive the same things differently, we can hardly avoid different 102 naming of them. For though the nature of what we virtues and vices, for one man calls wisdom what conceive is the same, yet the diversity of our reception another calls fear; and one cruelty, what another of it, in respect of different constitutions of body and justice; one prodigality, what another magnanimity; prejudices of opinion, gives everything a tincture of and one gravity, what another stupidity, etc. And our different passions. And therefore, in reasoning a therefore such names can never be true grounds of man must take heed of words, which besides the any ratiocination. No more can metaphors, and tropes signification of what we imagine of their nature, have of speech; but these are less dangerous, because they a signification also of the nature, disposition, and profess their inconstancy, which the others do not. interest of the speaker—such as are the names of

Class 10: Hobbes II: Leviathan Chapter 5: Of Reason and Science When a man reasons, he does nothing else but con- marking them when we reckon by ourselves, and ceive a sum total from addition of parcels, or conceive signifying when we demonstrate or approve our a remainder from subtraction of one sum from reckonings to other men. another, which (if it is done by words) is conceiving And as in arithmetic, unpracticed men must, and of the consequence of the names of all the parts to the professors themselves may, often err and cast up name of the whole, or from the names of the whole false, so also in any other subject of reasoning, the and one part to the name of the other part. And though ablest, most attentive, and most practiced men may in some things (as in numbers), besides adding and deceive themselves and infer false conclusions-not subtracting, men name other operations, as multi- but that reason itself is always right reason, as well as plying and dividing, yet they are the same; for multi- arithmetic is a certain and infallible art, but no one plication is but adding together of things equal, and man's reason, nor the reason of any one number of division, but subtracting of one thing as often as we men, makes the certainty, no more than an account is can. These operations are not incident to numbers therefore well cast up because a great many men have only, but to all manner of things that can be added unanimously approved it. And therefore, as when together and taken one out of another. For as arithme- there is a controversy in an account, the parties must ticians teach to add and subtract in numbers, so the by their own accord set up for right reason the reason geometers teach the same in lines, figures (solid and of some arbitrator, or judge, to whose sentence they superficial), angles, proportions, times, degrees of will both stand, or their controversy must either come swiftness, force, power, and the like. The logicians to blows or be undecided, for want of a right reason teach the same in consequences of words, adding constituted by nature, so is it also in all debates of together two names to make an affirmation and two whatever kind. And when men who think themselves affirmations to make a syllogism, and many syllo- wiser than all others clamor and demand right reason gisms to make a demonstration; and from the sum, or for judge, yet seek no more, but that things should be conclusion, of a syllogism, they subtract one pro determined by no other men’s reason but their own, it position to find the other. Writers of politics add is as intolerable in the society of men as it is in play, together contracts to find men's duties, and lawyers, after trump is turned, to use for trump on every laws and facts, to find what is right and wrong in the occasion that suit which they have most in their hand. actions of private men. In sum, in what• ever matter For they do nothing else, who will have every of their there is place for addition and subtraction, there also passions, as it comes to bear sway in them, be taken is place for reason; and where these have no place, for right reason, and who in their own controversies, there reason has nothing at all to do. exposing their want of right reason by the claim they Out of all this we may define (that is to say lay to it. determine) what that is which is meant by this word The use and end of reason is not the finding of the reason, when we reckon it among the faculties of the sum and truth of one, or a few consequences, remote mind. For REASON, in this sense, is nothing but from the first definitions and settled significations of reckoning (that is, adding and subtracting) of the names, but to begin at these, and proceed from one consequences of general names agreed upon for the consequence to another. For there can be no certainty marking and signifying of our thoughts—I say of the last conclusion without a certainty of all those 103 naming of them. For though the nature of what we virtues and vices, for one man calls wisdom what conceive is the same, yet the diversity of our reception another calls fear; and one cruelty, what another of it, in respect of different constitutions of body and justice; one prodigality, what another magnanimity; prejudices of opinion, gives everything a tincture of and one gravity, what another stupidity, etc. And our different passions. And therefore, in reasoning a therefore such names can never be true grounds of man must take heed of words, which besides the any ratiocination. No more can metaphors, and tropes signification of what we imagine of their nature, have of speech; but these are less dangerous, because they a signification also of the nature, disposition, and profess their inconstancy, which the others do not. interest of the speaker—such as are the names of

Class 10: Hobbes II: Leviathan Chapter 5: Of Reason and Science When a man reasons, he does nothing else but con- marking them when we reckon by ourselves, and ceive a sum total from addition of parcels, or conceive signifying when we demonstrate or approve our a remainder from subtraction of one sum from reckonings to other men. another, which (if it is done by words) is conceiving And as in arithmetic, unpracticed men must, and of the consequence of the names of all the parts to the professors themselves may, often err and cast up name of the whole, or from the names of the whole false, so also in any other subject of reasoning, the and one part to the name of the other part. And though ablest, most attentive, and most practiced men may in some things (as in numbers), besides adding and deceive themselves and infer false conclusions-not subtracting, men name other operations, as multi- but that reason itself is always right reason, as well as plying and dividing, yet they are the same; for multi- arithmetic is a certain and infallible art, but no one plication is but adding together of things equal, and man's reason, nor the reason of any one number of division, but subtracting of one thing as often as we men, makes the certainty, no more than an account is can. These operations are not incident to numbers therefore well cast up because a great many men have only, but to all manner of things that can be added unanimously approved it. And therefore, as when together and taken one out of another. For as arithme- there is a controversy in an account, the parties must ticians teach to add and subtract in numbers, so the by their own accord set up for right reason the reason geometers teach the same in lines, figures (solid and of some arbitrator, or judge, to whose sentence they superficial), angles, proportions, times, degrees of will both stand, or their controversy must either come swiftness, force, power, and the like. The logicians to blows or be undecided, for want of a right reason teach the same in consequences of words, adding constituted by nature, so is it also in all debates of together two names to make an affirmation and two whatever kind. And when men who think themselves affirmations to make a syllogism, and many syllo- wiser than all others clamor and demand right reason gisms to make a demonstration; and from the sum, or for judge, yet seek no more, but that things should be conclusion, of a syllogism, they subtract one pro determined by no other men’s reason but their own, it position to find the other. Writers of politics add is as intolerable in the society of men as it is in play, together contracts to find men's duties, and lawyers, after trump is turned, to use for trump on every laws and facts, to find what is right and wrong in the occasion that suit which they have most in their hand. actions of private men. In sum, in what• ever matter For they do nothing else, who will have every of their there is place for addition and subtraction, there also passions, as it comes to bear sway in them, be taken is place for reason; and where these have no place, for right reason, and who in their own controversies, there reason has nothing at all to do. exposing their want of right reason by the claim they Out of all this we may define (that is to say lay to it. determine) what that is which is meant by this word The use and end of reason is not the finding of the reason, when we reckon it among the faculties of the sum and truth of one, or a few consequences, remote mind. For REASON, in this sense, is nothing but from the first definitions and settled significations of reckoning (that is, adding and subtracting) of the names, but to begin at these, and proceed from one consequences of general names agreed upon for the consequence to another. For there can be no certainty marking and signifying of our thoughts—I say of the last conclusion without a certainty of all those 103 affirmations and negations, on which it was grounded But this privilege is allayed by another, and that is and inferred. As when a master of a family, in taking by the privilege of absurdity, to which no living crea- an account, casts up the sums of all the bills of ture is subject, but man only. And of men, those are expense into one sum, and not regarding how each bill of all most subject to it who profess philosophy. For is summed up by those that give them in account, nor it is most true that Cicero said of them somewhere: what it is he pays for, he advantages himself no more that there can be nothing so absurd, but may be found than if he allowed the account in gross, trusting to all in the books of philosophers. And the reason is mani- of the accountants’ skill and honesty, so also in fest. For there is not one of them who begins his ratio- reasoning of all other things, he that takes up cination from the definitions, or explications of the conclusions on the trust of authors, and does not fetch names they are to use, which is a method that has been them from the first items in every reckoning (which used only in geometry, whose conclusions have in this are the significations of names settled by definitions), way been made indisputable. loses his labor, and does not know anything, but only I. The first cause of absurd conclusions I ascribe to believes. the want of method, in that they do not begin their When a man reckons without the use of words, ratiocination from definitions, that is, from settled which may be done in particular things (as when upon significations of their words, as if they could cast the sight of any one thing, we conjecture what was accounts without knowing the value of the numeral likely to have preceded, or is likely to follow upon it), words, one, two, and three. if that which he thought likely to follow, does not And whereas all bodies enter into account upon follow, or that which he thought likely to have diverse considerations (which I have mentioned in the preceded it, has not preceded it, this is called Error, to preceding chapter), these considerations being which even the most prudent men are subject. But diversely named, diverse absurdities proceed from the when we reason in words of general signification, and confusion and unfit connection of their names into fall upon a general inference which is false, though it assertions. And therefore, is commonly called error, it is indeed an ABSURDITY, or senseless speech. For error is but a deception in II. The second cause of absurd assertions I ascribe presuming that something is past, or to come, of to the giving of names of bodies to accidents; or of which, though it were not past, or not to come, yet accidents to bodies; as they do who say faith is there was no impossibility discoverable. But when we infused, or inspired; when nothing can be poured or make a general assertion, unless it is a true one, the breathed into anything but body; and that extension is possibility of it is inconceivable. And words by which body; that phantasms are spirits, etc. we conceive nothing but the sound are those we call III. The third I ascribe to the giving of the names absurd, insignificant, and nonsense. And therefore, if of the accidents of bodies without us to the accidents a man should talk to me of a round quadrangle, or of our own bodies; as they do who say the color is in accidents of bread in cheese; or immaterial sub- the body; the sound is in the air, etc. stances; or of a free subject; a free will; or any free, but free from being hindered by opposition, I should IV. The fourth, to the giving of the names of bodies not say he was in an error, but that his words were to names, or speeches; as they do who say that there without meaning, that is to say, absurd. are universal things, that a living creature is genus or a general thing, etc. I have said before (in the second chapter) that a man did excel all other animals in this faculty, that V. The fifth, to the giving of the names of when he conceived anything whatsoever, he was apt accidents to names and speeches; as they do who say to inquire the consequences of it, and what effects he the nature of a thing is its definition; a man’s could do with it. And now I add this other degree of command is his will, and the like. the same excellence, that he can by words reduce the VI. The sixth, to the use of metaphors, tropes, and consequences he finds to general rules called theo- other rhetorical figures, instead of proper words. For rems, or aphorisms—that is, he can reason, or reckon, though it is lawful to say (for example) in common not only in number, but in all other things, of which speech, the way goes, or leads here, or there; the one may be added unto or subtracted from another. proverb says this or that (whereas ways cannot go, nor proverbs speak), yet in reckoning and seeking of truth such speeches are not to be admitted. 104

VII. The seventh, to names that signify nothing, children who, having no thought of generation, are but are taken up and learned by rote from the schools, made believe by the women that their brothers and as hypostatical, transubstantiate, consubstantiate, sisters are not born, but found in the garden. eternal-now, and the like canting of schoolmen. But yet they who have no science are in better and To him who can avoid these things, it is not nobler condition with their natural prudence than men easy to fall into any absurdity, unless it is by the who by misreasoning, or by trusting them who reason length of an account, where he may perhaps forget wrong, fall upon false and absurd general rules. For what went before. For all men by nature reason ignorance of causes and of rules does not set men so alike, and well, when they have good principles. far out of their way as relying on false rules, and For who is so stupid as both to make a mistake in taking for causes of what they aspire to, those that are geometry and also to persist in it, when another not so, but rather causes of the contrary. detects his error to him? By this it appears that To conclude, the light of human minds is reason is not, as sense and memory, born with us, perspicuous words, but by exact definitions first made nor gotten by experience only, as prudence is, but clearer and purged from ambiguity; reason is the attained by industry, first in apt imposing of pace; increase of science, the way; and the benefit of names, and secondly by getting a good and orderly mankind, the end. And on the contrary, metaphors, method in proceeding from the elements, which are and senseless and ambiguous words, are like ignes names, to assertions made by connection of one of fatui, a fool’s fire, and reasoning upon them is them to another, and so to syllogisms, which are the wandering among innumerable absurdities—and their connections of one assertion to another, until we end, contention and sedition, or contempt. come to a knowledge of all the consequences of names appertaining to the subject in hand; and that As much experience is prudence, so is much is what men call SCIENCE. And whereas sense and science sapience. For though we usually have one memory are but knowledge of fact, which is a thing name of wisdom for them both, yet the Latins did past and irrevocable, science is the knowledge of always distinguish between prudentia and sapientia, consequences and dependence of one fact upon ascribing the former to experience, the latter to another, by which, out of what we can presently do, science. But to make their difference appear more we know how to do something else when we will, clearly, let us suppose one man endowed with an or the like, another time, because when we see how excellent natural use and dexterity in handling his anything comes about, upon what causes, and by arms, and another to have added to that dexterity an what manner, when the like causes come into our acquired science of where he can offend or be power, we see how to make it produce the like offended by his adversary, in every possible posture effects. or guard; the ability of the former would be to the ability of the latter as prudence to sapience, both Children therefore are not endowed with reason at useful, but the latter infallible. But they who trusting all until they have attained the use of speech, but are only to the authority of books follow the blind blindly called reasonable creatures, for the possibility appa- are like him who, trusting to the false rules of a master rent of having the use of reason in time to come. And of fencing, ventures presumptuously upon an the most part of men, though they have the use of adversary who either kills or disgraces him. reasoning a little way, as in numbering to some degree, yet it serves them to little use in common The signs of science are some, certain and infalli• life, in which they govern themselves, some better, ble, some, uncertain. Certain, when he who pretends some worse, according to their differences of experi- the science of anything can teach the same, that is to ence, quickness of memory, and inclinations to sev• say, demonstrate the truth of this perspicuously to eral ends, but specially according to good or evil another; uncertain, when only some particular events fortune and the errors of one another. For as for answer to his pretense, and upon many occasions science, or certain rules of their actions, they are so prove so as he says they must. Signs of prudence are far from it that they do not know what it is. Geometry all uncertain, because to observe by experience and they have thought conjuring; but for other sciences, remember all circumstances that may alter the suc• they who have not been taught the beginnings and cess is impossible. But in any business, of which a some progress in them, that they may see how they man does not have infallible science to proceed by, to are acquired and generated, are in this point like forsake his own natural judgment and be guided by 105 general sentences read in authors, and subject to many are joined together, destroy one another, as if a man exceptions, is a sign of folly, and generally scorned should say an incorporeal body. by the name of pedantry. And even of those men But in the sense of common people, not all the themselves who in councils of the commonwealth universe is called body, but only such parts of it as love to show their reading of politics and history, very they can discern by the sense of feeling to resist their few do it in their domestic affairs, where their parti- force, or by the sense of their eyes to hinder them from cular interest is concerned, having prudence enough a farther prospect. Therefore, in the common lan- for their private affairs; but in public they study more guage of men, air and aerial substances are not the reputation of their own wit than the success of typically to be taken for bodies, but (as often as men another’s business. are sensible of their effects) are called wind, or breath,

or (because the same are called in the Latin spiritus) Part III. Of a Christian Commonwealth spirits—as when they call that aerial substance, which, in the body of any living creature, gives it life Chapter 34. Of the Significance of Spirit, Angel, and motion, vital and animal spirits. But for those and Inspiration in the Books of Holy Scripture idols of the brain, which represent bodies to us where they are not, as in a looking-glass, in a dream, or to a Seeing the foundation of all true ratiocination is the distempered brain waking, they are (as the apostle constant signification of words, which in the doctrine said generally of all idols) nothing—nothing at all, I following does not depend (as in natural science) on say, there where they seem to be; and in the brain the will of the writer, nor (as in common conver- itself, nothing but tumult, proceeding either from the sation) on vulgar use, but on the sense they carry in action of the objects, or from the disorderly agitation the Scripture, it is necessary, before I proceed any of the organs of our sense. And men, who are other• further, to determine, out of the Bible, the meaning of wise employed than to search into their causes, do not such words, as by their ambiguity may render what I know of themselves what to call them, and may am to infer upon them, obscure, or disputable . I will therefore easily be persuaded by those whose know- begin with the words Body and Spirit, which in the ledge they much revere, some to call them bodies, and language of the Schools are termed corporeal and think them made of air compacted by a power super- incorporeal substances. natural, because the sight judges them corporeal, and The word body, in the most general meaning, some to call them spirits, because the sense of touch signifies that which fills or occupies some certain discerns nothing in the place where they appear to room or imagined place, and does not depend on the resist their fingers. So that the proper signification of imagination, but is a real part of what we call the spirit in common speech is either a subtle, fluid, and universe. For the universe, being the aggregate of all invisible body, or a ghost, or other idol or phantasm bodies, there is no real part of it that is not also body, of the imagination. But for metaphorical significa- nor anything properly a body that this not also part of tions, there are many; for sometimes it is taken for (that aggregate of all bodies) the universe. The same disposition or inclination of the mind, as when for the also, because bodies are subject to change, that is to disposition to control the sayings of other men, we say, to variety of appearance to the sense of living say, a spirit of contradiction; for a disposition to creatures is called substance—that is to say, subject uncleanness, an unclean spirit; for perverseness, an to various accidents, as sometimes to be moved, obstinate spirit; for sullenness , a dumb spirit, and for sometimes to stand still—and to seem to our senses inclination to godliness, and God’s service, the Spirit sometimes hot, sometimes cold, sometimes of one of God—sometimes for any eminent ability, or extra- color, smell, taste, or sound, sometimes of another. ordinary passion, or disease of the mind, as when And we attribute this diversity of seeming (produced great wisdom is called the spirit of wisdom; and mad- by the diversity of the operation of bodies on the men are said to be possessed with a spirit. organs of our sense) to alterations of the bodies that I do not find anywhere any other signification of operate and call them accidents of those bodies. And spirit , and where none of these can satisfy the sense according to this meaning of the word substance and of that word in Scripture, the place does not fall under body signify the same thing; and therefore, human understanding, and our faith in this does not incorporeal substance are words which, when they consist in our opinion, but in our submission, as in all places where God is said to be a Spirit; or where by 106 the Spirit of God, God himself is meant. For the nature of the year, by which he keeps an account of time— of God is incomprehensible; that is to say, we under- and the like of other sciences. stand nothing of what he is, but only that he is; and By this definition it is evident that we are not to therefore the attributes we give him are not to tell one account as any part of it that original knowledge another what he is, nor to signify our opinion of his called experience, in which consists prudence, nature, but our desire to honor him with such names because it is not attained by reasoning, but found as as we conceive most honorable among ourselves [....] well in brute beasts as in man, and is but a memory of To men who understand the signification of these successions of events in times past, in which the words, substance and incorporeal, as incorporeal is omission of every little circumstance altering the not taken for subtle body but for not body, they imply effect frustrates the;: expectation of the most prudent; a contradiction, inasmuch as to say, an angel or spirit whereas nothing is produced by reasoning correctly, is (in that sense) an incorporeal substance is to say in but general, eternal, and immutable truth. effect there is no angel nor spirit at all. Considering Nor are we therefore to give that name to any false therefore the signification of the word angel in the conclusions, for he who reasons correctly in words he Old Testament, and the nature of dreams and visions understands can never conclude an error. that happen to men by the ordinary way of nature, I was inclined to this opinion, that angels were nothing Nor to that which any man knows by supernatural but supernatural apparitions of the fancy raised by the revelation, because it is not acquired by reasoning. special and extraordinary operation of God, by that Nor that which is gotten by reasoning from the means to make his presence and commandments authority of books, because it is not by reasoning from known to mankind, and chiefly to his own people. But the cause to the effect, nor from the effect to the cause, the many places of the New Testament, and our and is not knowledge, but faith. Savior’s own words, and in such texts where there is no suspicion of corruption of the Scripture, have The faculty of reasoning being consequent to the extorted from my feeble reason an acknowledgment use of speech, it was not possible but that there should and belief that there are also substantial and perma- have been some general truths found out by nent angels. But to believe they are in no place, that is reasoning, as ancient almost as language itself.… to say, nowhere, that is to say, nothing, as they Now to descend to the particular tenets of vain (though indirectly) say that will have them incur- philosophy derived to the Universities and as a result poreal, cannot be evinced by Scripture…. into the Church, partly from Aristotle, partly from blindness of understanding, I shall first consider their principles. There is a certain philosophia prima, on Part IV. Of the Kingdom of Darkness which all other philosophy ought to depend; it consists principally in right limiting of the Chapter 46. Of Darkness from Vain Philosophy significations of such appellations or names as are of and Fabulous Traditions all others the most universal—which limitations serve to avoid ambiguity and equivocation in reasoning, By PHILOSOPHY is understood the knowledge and are commonly called definitions, such as are the acquired by reasoning from the manner of the definitions of body, time, place, matter, form, generation of anything to the properties, or from the essence, subject, substance, accident, power, act, properties to some possible way of generation of the finite, infinite, quantity, quality, motion, action, same, to the end to be able to produce, as far as matter passion, and diverse others, necessary to the and human force permit, such effects as human life explaining of a man's conceptions concerning the requires. So the geometer, from the construction of nature and generation of bodies. The explication (that figures, finds out many properties of them, and from is, the settling of the meaning) of these and the like the properties, new ways of their construction by terms is commonly called metaphysics in the Schools, reasoning, to the end to be able to measure land and as being a part of the philosophy of Aristotle which water, and for infinite other uses. So the astronomer, has that for a title. But it is in another sense, for there from the rising, setting, and moving of the sun and it signifies as much as books written or placed after stars in diverse parts of the heavens, finds out the his natural philosophy; but the schools take them for causes of day and night and of the different seasons books of supernatural philosophy, for the word 107 metaphysics will bear both these senses. And indeed speech. Others serve to show the consequence or that which is there written is for the most part so far repugnance of one name to another, as when one says from the possibility of being understood, and so a man is a body, he intends that the name of body is repugnant to natural reason, that whoever thinks there necessarily consequent to the name of man, as being is anything to be understood by it must necessarily but several names of the same thing, man, which think it supernatural. consequence is signified by coupling them together with the word is. And as we use the verb is, so the From these metaphysics, which are mingled with Latins use their verb est, and the Greeks their esti the Scripture to make school divinity, we are told through all its declinations. Whether all other nations there are in the world certain essences separated from of the world have a word that answers to it or not in bodies, which they call abstract essences and their several languages, I cannot tell, but I am sure substantial forms. There is need of somewhat more they do not have need of it. For the placing of two than ordinary attention in this place for the inter- names in order may serve to signify their preting of this jargon. Also I ask pardon of those who consequence, if it were the custom (for custom is it, are not used to this kind of discourse, for applying that give words their force), as well as the words is, or myself to those who are. The world (I do not mean the be, or are, and the like. earth only, that denominates the lovers of it worldly men, but the universe, that is, the whole mass of all And if it were so, that there was a language without things that are) is corporeal, that is to say, body, and any verb answerable to est, or is, or be; yet the men has the dimensions of magnitude, namely, length, who used it would not be a jot the less capable of breadth, and depth. Also, every part of body is like- inferring, concluding, and of all kind of reasoning wise body, and has the like dimensions, and conse- than were the Greeks and Latins. But what then would quently every part of the universe is body; and that become of these terms of entity, essence, essential, which is not body is not part of the universe. And essentiality that are derived from it, and of many more because the universe is all, that which is no part of it that depend on these, applied as most commonly they is nothing, and consequently nowhere. Nor does it are? They are therefore not names of things, but signs follow from this that spirits are nothing, for they have by which we make known that we conceive the dimensions and are therefore really bodies, though consequence of one name or attribute to another, as that name in common speech is given to such bodies when we say a man is a living body, we do not mean only as are visible or palpable, that is, that have some that the man is one thing, the living body another, and degree of opacity. But for spirits, they call them the is, or being a third, but that the man and the living incorporeal, which is a name of more honor, and may body are the same thing, because the consequence, if therefore with more piety be attributed to God he is a man, he is a living body, is a true consequence, himself, in whom we consider not what attribute signified by that word is. Therefore, to be a body, to expresses best his nature, which is incomprehensible, walk, to be speaking, to live, to see, and the like but what best expresses our desire to honor him. infinitives, also corporeity, walking, speaking, life, sight, and the like, that signify just the same, are the To know now upon what grounds they say there names of nothing—as I have elsewhere more amply are abstract essences or substantial forms, we are to expressed. consider what those words do properly signify. The use of words is to register to ourselves and make But to what purpose (someone may say) is such manifest to others the thoughts and conceptions of our subtlety in a work of this nature, where I pretend to minds. Of which words, some are the names of the nothing but what is necessary to the doctrine of things conceived, as the names of all sorts of bodies, government and obedience? It is to this purpose that that work upon the senses and leave an impression in men may no longer suffer themselves to be abused by the imagination. Others are the names of the imagina- them, that by this doctrine of separated essences, built tions themselves, that is to say, of those ideas or on the vain philosophy of Aristotle, would fright them mental images we have of all things we see or remem- from obeying the laws of their country with empty ber. And others again are names of names, or of names, as men frighten birds from the com with an different sorts of speech, as universal, plural, singular empty doublet, a hat, and a crooked stick. For it is are the names of names, and definition, affirmation, upon this ground that when a man is dead and buried, negation, true, false, syllogism, interrogation, pro- they say his soul (that is his life) can walk separated mise, covenant are the names of certain forms of from his body and is seen by night among the graves. 108

Upon the same ground they say that the figure, and Again, whereas motion is change of place, and color, and taste of a piece of bread has a being there, incorporeal substances are not capable of place, they where they say there is no bread. And upon the same are troubled to make it seem possible how a soul can ground they say that faith, and wisdom, and other go forward, without the body, to heaven, hell, or virtues are sometimes poured into a man, sometimes purgatory, and how the ghosts of men (and I may add blown into him from heaven, as if the virtuous and of their clothes which they appear in) can walk by their virtues could be asunder, and a great many other night in churches, churchyards, and other places of things that serve to lessen the dependence of subjects sepulture. To which I do not know what they can on the sovereign power of their country. For who will answer, unless they will say they walk definitive, not endeavor to obey the laws, if he expects obedience to circumscriptive, or spiritually, not temporally, for be poured or blown into him? Or who will not obey a such egregious distinctions are equally applicable to priest, who can make God, rather than his sovereign, any difficulty whatsoever. rather than God himself? Or who that is in fear of For the meaning of eternity, they will not have it ghosts will not bear great respect to those who can be an endless succession of time; for then they should make the holy water that drives them from him? And not be able to render a reason how God’s will and this shall suffice for an example of the errors which preordaining of things to come should not be before are brought into the Church from the entities and his prescience of the same, as the efficient cause essences of Aristotle, which it maybe he knew to be before the effect or agent before the action, nor of false philosophy, but wrote it as a thing consonant to many other of their bold opinions concerning the and corroborative of their religion, and fearing the incomprehensible nature of God. But they will teach fate of Socrates. us that eternity is the standing still of the present time, Being once fallen into this error of separated a nunc-stans (as the Schools call it), which neither essences, they are as a result necessarily involved in they nor anyone else understands, no more than they many other absurdities that follow it. For seeing they would a hic-stans for an infinite greatness of place. will have these forms be real, they are obliged to And whereas men divide a body in their thought assign them some place. But because they hold them by numbering parts of it, and in numbering those parts incorporeal, without all dimension of quantity, and number also the parts of the place it filled, it cannot all men know that place is dimension and not to be be but in making many parts, we make also many filled but by that which is corporeal, they are driven places of those parts—by which there cannot be to uphold their credit with a distinction, that they are conceived in the mind of any man, more or fewer not indeed anywhere circumscriptive, but definitive— parts than there are places for. Yet they will have us which term, being mere words, and in this occasion believe that by the almighty power of God one body insignificant, pass only in Latin , that the vanity of may be at one and the same time in many places; and them may be concealed. For the circumscription of a many bodies at one and the same time in one place, as thing is nothing else but the determination or defining if it were an acknowledgment of the Divine Power to of its place; and so, both the terms of the distinction say: that which is, is not; or that which has been, has are the same. And in particular, of the essence of a not been. And these are but a small part of the man, which (they say) is his soul, they affirm it to be incongruities they are forced to from their disputing all of it in his little finger, and all of it in every other philosophically, instead of admiring and adoring of part (however small) of his body; and yet no more the divine and incomprehensible nature, whose soul in the whole body than in any one of those parts. attributes cannot signify what he is, but ought to Can any man think that God is served with such signify our desire to honor him with the best absurdities? And yet all this is necessary to believe, to appellations we can think of. But they who venture to those who will believe the existence of an incorporeal reason of his nature from these attributes of honor, soul, separated from the body. losing their understanding in the very first attempt, And when they come to give account, how an fall from one inconvenience into another, without end incorporeal substance can be capable of pain and be and without number, in the same manner as when a tormented in the fire of hell or purgatory, they have man ignorant of the ceremonies of court, coming into nothing at all to answer but that it cannot be known the presence of a greater person than he is used to how fire can burn souls. speak to, and stumbling at his entrance, to save himself from falling, lets slip his cloak; to recover his 109 cloak, lets fall his hat; and with one disorder after another, discovers his astonishment and rusticity…. Then for physics, that is, the knowledge of the subordinate and secondary causes of natural events, they [the Schoolmen] render none at all but empty words. If you desire to know why some kinds of bodies sink naturally downwards toward the earth and others go naturally from it, the Schools will tell you out of Aristotle that the bodies that sink downwards are heavy; and that this heaviness is what causes them to descend. But if you ask what they mean by heaviness, they will define it to be an endeavor to go to the center of the earth, so that the cause why things sink downward is an endeavor to be below, which is as much as to say that bodies descend or ascend because they do. Or they will telI you the center of the earth is the place of rest and conservation for heavy things; and therefore they endeavor to be there, as if stones and metals had a desire or could discern the place they would be at, as man does; or loved rest, as man does not; or that a piece of glass were less safe in the window than falling into the street…. And in many occasions they put for the cause of natural events their own ignorance, but disguised in other words, as when they say, fortune is the cause of things contingent—that is, of things of which they know no cause—and as when they attribute many effects to occult qualities—that is, qualities not known to them and therefore also (as they think) to no one else—and to sympathy, antipathy, antiperistasis, specifical qualities, and other like terms, which signify neither the agent that produces them, not the operation by which they are produced. If such metaphysics and physics as this are not vain philosophy, there was never any, nor was St. Paul needed to give us warning to avoid it.

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