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Group Decision and Negotiation (GDN) 2006 International Conference Karlsruhe, Germany, June 25 – 28, 2006 Proceedings

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Group Decision and Negotiation (GDN) 2006 International Conference Karlsruhe, Germany, June 25 – 28, 2006 Proceedings Stefan Seifert / Christof Weinhardt (Eds.) Group Decision and Negotiation (GDN) 2006 International Conference Karlsruhe, Germany, June 25 – 28, 2006 Proceedings Group Decision and Negotiation (GDN) 2006 International Conference Karlsruhe, Germany, June 25 – 28, 2006 Proceedings Editors Stefan Seifert Christof Weinhardt Universität Karlsruhe (TH) Institute of Information Systems and Management (IISM) Englerstraße 14 76131 Karlsruhe Germany Impressum Universitätsverlag Karlsruhe c/o Universitätsbibliothek Straße am Forum 2 D-76131 Karlsruhe www.uvka.de Dieses Werk ist unter folgender Creative Commons-Lizenz lizenziert: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.0/de/ Universitätsverlag Karlsruhe 2006 Print on Demand ISBN 3-86644-044-8 Program Committee Conference Board Melvin F. Shakun (General chair), New York University Rudolf Vetschera (General chair), University of Vienna Christof Weinhardt (Program chair), Universit¨at Karlsruhe (TH) Gregory Kersten, Concordia University, Montreal Marc Kilgour, Wilfrid Laurier University, Waterloo Program Committee Christof Weinhardt (Chair), Universit¨at Karlsruhe (TH) Melvin F. Shakun, New York University Rudolf Vetschera, University of Vienna Gregory Kersten, Concordia University, Montreal Marc Kilgour, Wilfrid Laurier University, Waterloo Fran Ackerman, University of Strathclyde Deepinder Bajwa, Western Washington University Jo˜ao Cl´ımaco, University of Coimbra Joao Paulo Costa, University of Coimbra Colin Eden, University of Strathclyde Paul Gruenbacher, University of Linz Raimo P. Hamalainen, Helsinki University of Technology Keith W. Hipel, University of Waterloo Hsiangchu Lai, Sun Yat-Sen University Floyd Lewis, Western Washington University Hannu Nurmi, University of Turku David Rios-Insua, Universidad Rey Juan Carlos, Madrid Mareike Schoop, University of Hohenheim Gert-Jan de Vreede, University of Nebraska at Omaha Pascale Zarat´e, IRIT Local Organizing Committee Stefan Seifert, Universit¨at Karlsruhe (TH) Carsten Block, Universit¨at Karlsruhe (TH) Anke Plog, Universit¨at Karlsruhe (TH) Christof Weinhardt, Universit¨at Karlsruhe (TH) Contents Preface Melvin F. Shakun and Rudolf Vetschera .................................... XV Foreword Christof Weinhardt and Stefan Seifert .....................................XVI Part I Keynote Presentations E-Negotiations Systems and Processes: Lessons from Invite Design Gregory E. Kersten ................................................... 3 Fallback Bargaining D. Marc Kilgour ................................................... ..... 4 Connectedness, Spirituality, and Rationality in GDN Melvin F. Shakun ................................................... .... 8 New Directions in Automated Negotiation Katia P. Sycara ................................................... ...... 9 Future Opportunities for Group Decision and Negotiations Murray Turoff ................................................... ....... 12 Collaboration Engineering: Current Directions and Future Opportunities Gert-Jan de Vreede ................................................... 15 Part II Invited Multi-Session Track Facilitation and Collaboration Engineering of Group Decision Making & Negotiation Introduction Gert-Jan de Vreede ................................................... 23 Contents VII Supporting Negotiation — A Licence to Move Forward Fran Ackermann, Colin Eden ............................................. 25 Supporting the Collaborative Collection of User’s Requirements Carlos E. Acosta, Luis A. Guerrero ........................................ 27 Collective Causal Mapping Methodology ANCOM2: Aggregating or Filtering? (A synthesis of several case studies in management sciences) Tatiana Bouzdine-Chameeva .............................................. 31 The Value Frequency Model: Toward a Theoretical Understanding of Organizational Change Robert O. Briggs ................................................... ..... 36 Experiences in Attempting to Combine Group Support Methods Colin Eden, Fran Ackermann, John Bryson, Charles Finn, David Andersen, George Richardson ................................................... 40 Participant-Driven Group Support Systems to Support Large, Distributed Group Facilitation Joel H. Helquist, John Kruse, Mark Adkins ................................. 42 Collaboration Process Design Transition to Practitioners: Requirements form a Cognitive Load Perspective Gwendolyn Kolfschoten, Sandra van der Hulst............................... 45 Choice Criteria for Facilitation Techniques: A Preliminary Classification Gwendolyn L. Kolfschoten, Eti¨enne A. J. A. Rouwette ....................... 49 A Training Approach for the Transition of Repeatable Collaboration Processes to Practitioners Gwendolyn Kolfschoten, Gert-Jan de Vreede, Leah R. Pietron ................. 53 A Favourable Knowledge Management Context: Application of the Causal Mapping Technique Rania Labaki, Val´erie Pallas, Tatiana Bouzdine-Chameeva .................... 57 Towards a Group Decision Support Framework for Complex Issues Paulo Melo, Francisco Antunes, Jo˜ao Paulo Costa ........................... 61 An Exploration of How Men and Women Differ in Using Contextual Cues to Make Attributions during Virtual Collaboration Ruth Ter Bush, Daniel Mittleman ......................................... 63 VIII Contents Part III Invited Session GSS Assimilation: Issues and Impacts Introduction Deepinder S. Bajwa, L. Floyd Lewis ....................................... 69 Post Adoption Impacts of Collaborative Information Technologies: Research Model and Case Evidence Deepinder S. Bajwa, L. Floyd Lewis ....................................... 70 A Team Decision Framework for Quality Decision Outcomes Des Klass, Olive Schmidenberg, John de Reuck .............................. 74 Key Issues for GSS Research Graham Pervan, David Arnott ............................................ 78 Part IV Perspectives of Supply Strategies: Theoretical and Experimental Considerations Introduction Karl-Martin Ehrhart................................................... 85 An Experiment on Auction Fever Susanne Abele, Karl-Martin Ehrhart, Marion Ott ........................... 86 Collaborative Software Networks Competition in the Presence of Sponsored User Orientation: A Game Theoretic Analysis Christian Hoppe ................................................... ..... 89 Experimental Investigation of Supplier-Retailer Contracts Claudia Keser, Giuseppe Paleologo ........................................ 92 Part V Invited Session Advances in Graph Model and Negotiation Technologies Introduction D. Marc Kilgour, Keith W. Hipel .......................................... 97 Bilateral Negotiation Using Case-based Distance Methods Ye Chen, D. Marc Kilgour, Keith W. Hipel ................................. 98 Perceptual Graph Models Amer Obeidi, D. Marc Kilgour, Keith W. Hipel ............................. 99 Contents IX Negotiations over the Caspian Sea: A Preliminary Graph Model Analysis Majid Sheikhmohammady, D. Marc Kilgour, Keith W. Hipel .................. 100 Part VI Invited Session Empirical Research on Electronic Negotiations Introduction Sabine K¨oszegi, Stefan Strecker ........................................... 105 Assessment of an Electronic Auction System: Beliefs about Usage, System and Institution on Intention to Use Eva Chen, Ilka Weber ................................................... 106 Phase Analysis of Behavior in E-Negotiations Emphasizing the Effect of Negotiator Relationship Eva-Maria Pesendorfer, Andrea Graf, Sabine T. Koeszegi ..................... 108 An Empirical Study on the Use of Communication Media in Electronic Negotiations Mareike Schoop, Frank K¨ohne, Dirk Staskiewicz ............................. 111 Part VII Invited Session Invite Negotiation Platform and Experiments Introduction Simone A. Ludwig, Eva H. Chen .......................................... 117 Negotiation Agreement Modeling Using SEM R´eal Carbonneau, Jamshid Etezadi-Amoli, Gregory E. Kersten ................ 118 An E-negotiation Experiment on the Effects of Integrativeness on the Negotiation Process and Outcome Eva H. Chen, Simone A. Ludwig .......................................... 120 A General Parametric Function for Utility Assessment Jamshid Etezadi-Amoli, Tak Mak .......................................... 123 The Effectiveness of Complex Bargaining Styles in Dyadic Negotiations Xianhua Huang, Gregory E. Kersten, Simone A. Ludwig ..................... 125 Issues in Developing ENS for Negotiations and Auctions JinBaek Kim ................................................... ........ 127 X Contents Part VIII Invited Session Group Decisions, Negotiation and Emotion Introduction Bilyana Martinovsky ................................................... 131 Investigating Mind Markers in Design Meetings Dirk Heylen ................................................... ......... 132 Emotion, Language and Negotiation Bilyana Martinovsky ................................................... 135 Part IX Invited Session Electronic Participation Introduction Jesus Rios ................................................... .......... 143 Participation and Food Chain Risks Simon French, Clare Bayley, Nan Zhang ................................... 144 Supporting the Elaboration of a Participatory Budget Over the Internet Jesus Rios, David Rios Insua ............................................ 147 Graphical Visualization Tools in AHP-Group Decision Making Alberto Tur´on, Jos´eMar´ıa Moreno-Jim´enez ................................ 150 Part X Invited
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