Austr i ns in Crete in or r
Peter Monteath
his er rg es th t the str li n in ol e ent in rti e rete took l e in three in h ses n the first h se str li n for es rti i ted in the defen e of rete g inst Ger n in sion o er t el e d s in ne he se ond h se beg n ith the s rrender of the llied for es nd the str nding on the isl nd of erh s tho s nd llied soldiers, in l ding Australians. These men “on the run” were forced to rely on the assistance of ret ns for their er s r i l, nd the fo nd the lo l o l tion re rk bl re e ti e to their needs he third nd fin l h se gre o t of the re io s t o h ses nd o rised str li n rti i tion in resist n e ti ities in oll bor tion ith lo l resist n e ele ents nd ritish for es he ke fig re in this reg rd s o D nb bin, n str li n ho be e senior offi er ith the ritish e i l er tions e ti e nd ho did much to shape the conduct of “irregular” warfare in Crete.
ntro u tion
he str li n resen e in rete in the e ond orld r is sso i ted ri ril ith the rti i tion of str li n for es in the lti tel fr itless efforts to re ent Ger n in sion of the isl nd in De lo ed to rete in the ke of the f iled defen e of inl nd Gree e in ril, the str li ns nd other e bers of refor e the o bined llied for e t sked ith defending rete ere soon o err n b the Ger n in sion for es s res lt, ost ere e ted to g t t the end of nd the beginning of ne ess ell kno n is the resen e of s bst nti l n bers of str li ns in rete fter the in e tions b the o l e sed o ghl tho s nd e bers of refor e ho h d issed o t on e tion ere ble to e de Ger n t re, or to es e fro s hese en, in l ding s bst nti l n ber of str li ns, ere str nded on the isl nd,
T T AT where they relied almost entirely on the hospitality and goodwill of Cretans with whom lasting onds of friendship were formed. The period of eing “on the run” in Crete lasted weeks or even years, ending only with capture y A is occupying forces or e filtration from the island through ritish operations organised in Cairo. en more o scure in the historical record is the contri ution made y Australians to the Cretan resistance which formed in the immediate wa e of the A is occupation. This resistance comprised the colla orati e efforts of Cretans eager to end the occupation and ritish forces sent to assist the Cretans in that tas . To a large e tent this colla oration flowed naturally from the com ined Cretan ritish efforts to e acuate the Australian and other ritish forces on the run in Crete. A ey figure in these com ined Cretan ritish efforts was Thomas . un a in an Australian archaeologist who ecame the leader of ritish pecial perations ecuti e forces deployed to Crete to support and organise the resistance. This essay traces the course of the Australian presence in Crete in orld ar arguing that there were clear lin s in the three phases of the Australian presence — that is from participation in the defence of Crete to the presence of men on the run and finally to the conduct of “special operations”. While the last stage is distinguished above all by the role of just one man in Tom un a in it was his contri ution which made the most enduring impact on the wartime history of the island. All three stages of the Australian presence contri uted to the foundation of close relations which ha e een maintained into the present.
Austr i ns in the tt e or Crete
The erman in asion of Crete too place o er twel e days at the end of ay and ery eginning of une and thus on the e e of a much larger campaign in the war namely peration ar arossa the erman in asion of the o iet nion. Crete was of limited strategic importance ut the oldness of the erman military operation and the ferocity of the attle ha e drawn a good deal of attention from military historians see especially ee or and tewart . The ermans concei ed and e ecuted an air orne in asion which commenced on ay and had achie ed almost total mastery of the island
C W W by the end of the onth. ustralian forces consisting of so e , en were a ong the roughly , ritish Co onwealth en evacuated fro ainland reece and integrated into Creforce ong, – . laced under the co and of the ew ealander ernard reyberg, the task of the ritish and reek e bers of Creforce was to repel the e pected er an invasion atte pt. ike the other ritish and reek forces evacuated hurriedly fro the ainland, the ustralians were poorly ar ed and supplied. oreover, the losses incurred on the ainland de anded a reorganisation of the available units as they joined the e isting ritish garrison on Crete in preparing a defensive strategy. he largest concentration of ustralians — four infantry battalions and a achine gun battalion — was disposed to the ethy non sector, where the ain priority was to defend the airfield outside the town of ethy non itself. uring this crucial period of several weeks leading to the invasion, the ustralian forces ade their first ac uaintances with the local population, any of who would also beco e involved in the island’s defence (on the ustralian contribution to the defence alongside reek and other llied forces see especially ala o, ong, – wer, – ill, – . n ay, two waves of er an transport planes flying fro ainland bases brought paratroops and glider borne ountain troops to Crete, the dropping zones clustered around the island’s three airfields and the main harbour at uda ay. t ethy non, the ustralians killed large nu bers of en while still in the air and were able to contain those who landed safely, so that the airfield re ained in llied hands. i ilarly, at eraklion, despite bitter fighting, the airfield re ained under llied control. he crucial point at the end of the first day of fighting was the ale e field in western Crete, where the airfield re ained bitterly contested. he turning point in the attle for Crete ca e in the night of – ay with the llied withdrawal fro crucial positions adjacent to the ale e airfield. esperate efforts to retake the airfield over the following hours proved in vain. By the end of 22 May, Crete’s fate was sealed. Although ustralian and other ritish and reek forces, often in co bination with Cretan civilians, fought on over the following days, it was clear by ay that the island could no longer be held, and the order was issued for an evacuation. n that day, reyberg cabled eneral ead uarters in the
M A
Middle ast to inform him that his forces had reached the limits of their endurance. t was evident that there was no alternative ut to call upon the oyal avy to repeat the heroics it had achieved in evacuating men from the mainland ust a few wee s earlier (Beevor, 2 . or Australian forces, as for the other Allies and the Cretan civilians, the failed defence of Crete was as demoralising as the rapid defeat on the mainland. n this occasion, the cost for the Australians was nearly eight hundred casualties and over three thousand ta en ( ill, 2 2 . nce more erman airpower had een crucial to turning the tide of attle in the Germans’ favour. If there was a positive outcome, it was that the common participation of Australians with Cretans in the defence of the island, and with it the shared e perience of eing overwhelmed y a technologically superior force, created the foundation of a close relationship which was to offer advantages to Australians and to Cretans over the period of occupation.
n the run
he evacuations too place from two locations, namely the port at era lion on Crete’s north coast and the fishing village of pha ia on the south coast, from where most of the evacuations of Australians were staged. hey reached the village after tre ing across the central spine of the island and then descending the steep and roc y slopes to the coast, in many cases y following the m ros orge to the east of pha ia. he oyal avy e hi ited enormous courage in committing vessels to the evacuation at a time when the uftwaffe ruled the s ies. onetheless, from une it was no longer possi le to perform evacuations. By that time a out half of the British forces had een evacuated — that is, some , men. thers, however, who in many cases had een guided to the areas ad acent to pha ia in anticipation of evacuation, were left ehind. tuc in a hopeless situation etween mountains and sea, the officer appointed to command the stranded men was entrusted with the tas of surrendering to the ermans (Beevor, 22 . he other significant group stranded was the Australian force which had successfully defended the airfield at ethymnon ut ecome isolated from the rest of Creforce and unaware of the order to evacuate. hese men were trapped near ethymnon when erman forces pushed rapidly eastward
I I C I II
from the Canea sector. In these circumstances the ustralian commanding officers reacted in different wa s. he career officer Ian Camp ell, who commanded st attalion, performed a te t oo surrender of his unit to the Germans, so that all of his men entered captivit on a wer, . In contrast, the militia officer in charge of the th attalion, the estern ustralian a andover, gave his men the option of heading south into the hills of central Crete with the hope that at some point the might e a le to find some means of departing the island from the south coast onteath, – . The number of men who were “on the run” is impossible to know exactly ut has een estimated at around one thousand, among whom several hundred were ustralians.1 he were evaders, who managed to avoid capture for var ing lengths of time until the were either captured or the managed to find some means of escape sea. ver time there were also escapers, that is, men who had een ta en into captivit and held in one of the facilities esta lished the Germans in the vicinit of Canea. s these camps were ma eshift affairs, t picall consisting of not much more than a ar ed wire enclosure, escape from them was relativel simple. If the achieved that, the aims of the escapers were identical with those of the evaders, that is, to hide out on the island until an opportunit to depart presented itself. he willingness of ustralian and other soldiers to evade or escape was conditioned in part the fear of captivit , a prospect which ver few had hitherto contemplated. further factor was also the perception that the were li el to e well treated Cretan civilians, who themselves would e opposed to the regime of occupation eing esta lished the Germans over most of the island and Italians in the asithi province in the east. hat perception was ased, in part, on the relations esta lished etween Cretan civilians and llied forces in the wee s leading to the German invasion. verwhelmingl , it appears that the e periences of evaders and escapers proved that perception accurate. irst hand accounts ustralians and other men on the run confirm the e traordinar level of hospitalit accorded
amer and ra er – identif ustralians who were successfull evacuated from Crete. e ond that figure is an un nown num er of men who were not evacuated ut eventuall captured or recaptured is forces, commonl after length periods on the run.
T T T them by locals who pro i e them with foo an shelter at reat risk to themsel es rom the ery earliest ays of the erman occupation it was apparent that any act of resistance inclu in the harbourin of men on the run woul be treate with extraor inary harshness exten in to the loss of life an the ra in of entire illa es on the brutality of the erman occupation re ime in rete see especially ylan er The retan hospitality towar the men on the run was an extension of the lon establishe principle of ilo e ia t was also an acknowle ment that the men ha ma e a sincere effort to pre ent the erman occupation retans were imbue with an historical sense which fore roun e the experience of occupation atin back centuries for many the Turkish occupation was a matter of li in memory mpathy an hospitality in the face of acute an ers were a manifestation of a sense of ratitu e towar those who ha collaborate in efforts to pre ent a renewe in asion an occupation The extent to which retan ilo e ia translate to practical assistance for ustralians an others is e i ent in countless testimonies from sol iers who were i en refu e by retans This occurre typically within illa es or at hi en locations nearby so that the men coul be plie with foo an rink e en in circumstances where the retans themsel es were en urin wartime pri ations ne of the ustralians on the run for example recalle
s lon as the retans ha anythin they woul i e it to us hen we went hun ry we knew that they were oin hun ry too en when they ha no foo to offer someone always in ite us in for a lass of wine or ou o They woul share their last piece of brea with us an we woul all sit aroun the table ippin the har crust into a cup of oli e oil an ine ar an if we were lucky crunchin away on a piece of raw onion ometimes the host with ast ceremony after the repast woul brin out his only ci arette an solemnly cuttin it into three woul pass the pieces aroun with the air of an ambassa or han in out ci ars after a ban uet eck n
mon hun re s of examples of such selfless enerosity towar the ustralians two examples stan out ne is that of e aun ers who was amon those members of attalion who ma e their way eastwar from phakia after they were stran e there ilchrist – s an n i enous man aun ers stoo a hi h chance of bein reco nise as a sol ier on the run yet he was shown hospitality for a perio of almost a year
“a nearly black Australian, a cheerful man who was an obj the natives” (Dunbabin, 2015a consisting in large part of grass and snails caused Scott’s health to – were “on the run”. It was recognised that efforts had to be made to remove , often referred to as “stragglers”. In part, the mounting sense warned, “These [men on the run] are a severe liability to the Cretans and a against the Axis” (“Appreciation”, 1942: undertaken from Cairo to gather together and evacuate the “stragglers” was
T T AT
Crete’s central south coast on 26 July 1941 and performed an evacuation of over two hundred men on 22 August 1941 (“Final Report”, 1945: 2 . After the ool visit, it was confirmed in Cairo that S would take over the organisation of all I9 activity in Crete.2 As further S officers were infiltrated into Crete, they understood the rounding up and evacuation of “stragglers” to be one of their tasks. To perform it, they relied on the cooperation of the men still stranded there, but they also drew on the help of men who reached safety in Cairo and yet were prepared to be infiltrated back into enemy territory with the aim of carrying out this task. Similar arrangements were made for mainland reece, where it was known that men on the run still hoped to find their way to their units, whether by crossing the Aegean or taking a circuitous land route via neutral Turkey. A number of Australians were among those men who, having reached gypt, agreed to be reinfiltrated to mainland reece or Crete to aid their countrymen on the run. A report lists two Australian soldiers employed to carry out escape work: illiam aynard a ely and rancis eil Tudor Brewer (“Summary”, 1945). Records show that both were POWs, and then both were employed on “intelligence duties” from November 1941.3 hat exactly they were asked to do was shrouded in some mystery, though a confidential report divulged that they “had made outstanding escapes, and had volunteered to go back to carry on escape work to rescue those left behind” (“Summary”, 1945). There was also an officer, ieutenant . . reenway of the estern Australian 2 11 attalion who, after finally departing Crete by submarine in late August 1941, did not hesitate to volunteer for special duties despite the extreme hardships he had just endured. e was sent to reece, where he helped establish an evacuation line through the reek islands to neutral
2 This was determined in a discussion in Cairo of the extraction of “stragglers” in Crete and is recorded in the document, “Minutes of a meeting on 6 Nov. 1941, to discuss operation in Crete”, The National Archives (TNA) HS 5/678. The records of a ely and rewer are held in the ational Archives of Australia: AA: A 1 5 500 45, scaped risoner of ar 12521 rivate a ely, 2 5 Australian Infantry attalion and 4 1 unner . rewer, 2 1 Australian ield egiment — employed on intelligence duties, Advanced HQ “A” Force, Cairo. See also the Australian ar emorial record A , fficial istorian 19 9 1945 ar, biographical files — . . aylos, . . ayliss, A. . ayne, A. . a ely, .S. eadman, . . eale and . eale and A 122 500 15 12521 te [ rivate] . . a ely — 2 5 Aust Inf n [Australian Infantry attalion] — [Attachment for special duty].
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A STRA ANS N CR T N WOR WAR
Turkey, a feat which earned him — on the recommendation of M 9 — a Military Cross ( ilchrist, 2 7 77).4 The logistical difficulties associated with sending vessels from gypt or ibya to Crete, the vagaries of the weather and the dangers of performing evacuations under the noses of the ermans, meant that they were not always successful and sometimes ended in bitter disappointment. Such was the case on one occasion at the tiny southern coastal village of Treis kklesies (Three Churches), where a British SO officer, an Fielding, came across an encampment of men — mainly Australians and New ealanders — dealing with the disappointment of their thwarted departure
The chorus of Walt ing Matilda filled the dusk as loudly as a wireless switched on at full blast against a background of yowling, spluttering atmospherics composed of typically Antipodean sounds of revelry and through the open door of the village coffee shop saw a horde of fren ied giants in tattered khaki and slouch hats. All these men had hoped to be evacuated from Three Churches two days before and were now, understandably enough, drowning their disappointment — an easy feat in Crete, where wine and raki were both more plentiful than food. (Fielding, 1954 4 )
e i er tions
SOE’s role in Crete is known above all for the daring kidnapping of a erman general in April 1944. ed by two British officers — Patrick eigh Fermor and Billy Moss — and with the participation of a number of Cretans, the abduction has been depicted in film and literature. n reality, however, the tasks performed by SO in Crete were wide ranging, and they involved a number of Australians. One of them, Tom unbabin, though not well known in his native Australia and barely mentioned in histories of SO , arguably played the most crucial role for SO in Crete. As indicated above, an important component of SOE’s work in the aftermath of the Axis occupation of Crete was the evacuation of men on the
4 NAA B88 W 976 reenway, eorge James. According to Hugh ilchrist, as part of his rescue operations reenway made at least one visit to Crete, where along with Ba ely and Brewer he evacuated Abbot agouvardas of the Preveli monastery on Crete’s central coast, which had sheltered large numbers of men on the run ( ilchrist, 2 7 77).
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PE E O EA
run Althou h this was nominally the work of , in the early phase the task was dele ated to SOE officers who were infiltrated to the island, sou ht to round up “stragglers”, and guided them to evacuation points n performin that task, the SOE officers came into contact with Cretans who were willin not only to assist evacuations but also to undertake other activities which undermined the erman occupation As the number of stra lers declined, the emphasis of SOE officers shifted more and more to its core tasks of sabota e and subversion ust as a small number of Australians who had mana ed to be evacuated from Crete a reed to be reinfiltrated to assist men on the run in mainland reece and Crete, so there were some Australians who lent assistance to SOE officers on the island he best known of those SOE officers, Patrick ei h ermor, wrote in one of his reports of the assistance iven to him by an Australian soldier by the name of ill ed erwood As he prepared to arrange Ledgerwood’s evacuation in May 1943, Leigh Fermor wrote:
am evacuatin Ser eant ill ed erwood, A , with the ay trip and you may find him useful e is an e cellent chap who was left behind after the fall of Crete, since when he has been to no less than real and rumoured evacuation beaches, ran in from issamo to erapetra e can rub alon in reek, and ets on well with Cretans, who think very hi hly of him e knows certain parts of Crete well, especially ethymnon omos, Apokoronas and Sphakia here is scarcely a villa e in the first two where he has not ot contacts. D’Annunzio [Vlepakes] of Headland [Kephala]5 used him as a messen er for carrying money in D’As philanthropic organisation. He has been on my staff since Tom’s departure,6 and has been most useful runnin my camp, such as it is recommend him to your attention for us in later raids etc in Crete ei h ermor,
ater that year ei h ermor included in the material he sent to Cairo a brief report by another Australian, udley, who wrote of bein a member of the andouvas resistance roup, which numbered some ei hty but had the capacity if re uired to call on another two thousand udley, 1943). After the war, Dudley’s widow wrote of her husband, “After the capitulation of reece he mana ed to et to Crete, was captured but escaped
or security reasons SOE officers commonly used code names for people and places ‘Tom’ here is Tom Dunbabin, an Australian SOE officer discussed below.
A ST AL A S ETE O LD A
and mas ueraded as a reek after being taught enough of the language to get by. He formed the guerrilla warfare in the hills, was on rete for two and a half years in which time I heard nothing”.7 SOE’s Xan Fielding also received invaluable assistance from Australians in 1943. n the first part of the year M 9 had an agent on the island, the ew Zealander Tom Moir, rounding up “stragglers”. However, Moir was captured by ermans, with the result that the evacuation being organised by Moir had to be completed by Fielding, who drew on the help of a number of men Damer Frazer, : 1). A ritish report noted that great credit for that evacuation was “due to certain of the British and Imperial strays who carried his [i.e. Fielding’s] plans to a successful conclusion and particularly to [the Australian] . 4 te. harles Hunter who assumed full responsibility until XAN’s arrival the day before the evacuation”.8 The “Official Report” on SOE’s activities in Crete indicates that when Xan Fielding was first infiltrated into rete in anuary 194 aboard the vessel edge og he was accompanied by a party whose task it was to carry out sabotage on shipping in the island’s main port, Suda Bay. Listed among the members of the party is a Sergeant . Delaney of the A F (“Final Report”, 194 :3 ). The same report listed a number of other Australians who offered to be sent to rete to carry out duties there. One was John Simcoe, “a brilliant diver and underwater swimmer”, who had helped SOE recover stores lost during a “crash landing” the previous November and had rounded up a “batch of strays” to deliver to the evacuation point. Similarly, the Australian harles Ezzy had carried stores for SOE and had also helped Hunter with the successful May 1943 evacuation, while the Victorian oseph ertie was praised for the helpful knowledge he provided of the Selino district.9
Tom un in
The most influential of the Australians who served for or with SOE in rete was Tom Dunbabin indeed, there is a strong case that Dunbabin was the
This is from a letter by Mercia Dudley to entral Army ecords, dated 3 October 19 , and is held in Dudley’s service records, NAA: B883, NX5173. The report by the ritish officer aptain Arthur eade is held in the SOE file, T A HS 3 . 9 This information is contained in an undated SOE report by Leslie Stevenson, T A HS 3 .
1 3
ETER MONTEATH
most effective of all the SOE officers, even if he is not as well remembered as others. nli e the men mentioned above, Dunbabin played no role in the Battle for Crete, and yet he had a longstanding relationship with the island and with ree culture. Born in rural Tasmania in 1 11, he received much of his education in Melbourne, Sydney and then Corpus Christi College O ford. During his studies in Europe and then in the course of his wor as an archaeologist, be became familiar with many parts of the Mediterranean, including Crete (for biographical information on Dunbabin see especially Dunbabin, 15b ilchrist, 7:88– 3 owell, 1 8 :1 –1 5, 1 1–1 8 . On the outbrea of war in September 1 3 , Dunbabin was employed at the British Legation in Athens. In January 1 he enlisted with the O ford and Buc inghamshire Light Infantry before transferring to the ar Office in London as an intelligence officer ( owell, 1 73:1 1 . In September 1 1 he oined SOE, and after his arrival in Egypt in December he received specialist training for deployment to Crete (Dunbabin, 15b:1 3 . By this time he was 31 years of age, married, and with a young family. Dunbabin’s first mission to Crete commenced in April 1942 and lasted until 15 February 1 3, when he was e filtrated to Cairo — and awarded a DSO. The second tour of duty lasted from 7 September 1 3 to May 1 and the third from 13 July to December 1 . His record shows that he was re infiltrated one last time on February 1 5, before being sent to Cairo for debriefing on April 1 5. Li e other SOE officers, Dunbabin was re uired to submit reports of his wor to SOE’s Cairo office, and these remain an invaluable source for an understanding of his activities in Crete.10 Furthermore, at the end of the war Dunbabin was re uired to submit a final report on SOE activities in Crete, and this too gives a detailed and at times critical assessment of British clandestine warfare (“Final Report”).11 After the war, Dunbabin began wor ing on a longer manuscript recording his impression of his service in Crete, but because of his premature death in 1 55 he completed less than half of it. Nonetheless, it is a document which recalls fran ly both the challenges and the rewards of wor ing with Cretans during the harsh erman occupation (Dunbabin, 15a .
1 Dunbabin’s SOE reports are held in TNA HS5 7 3 and HS5 7 . 11 Neither in the original report as it was written in 1 5, nor in its published form, as edited by N.A. o onas in , is Dunbabin identified as the author, but his authorship is evident from its presence in Dunbabin’s SOE file TNA HS5/724.
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A STRA ANS N CRETE N OR D AR
hat is stri in in these sources written b Dunbabin himself, but also from the recollections of Cretans and others who new him, is his capacit to adapt to the harsh circumstances which pre ailed in wartime Crete. Dunbabin recalled after the war that he arrived on the island “lamentably ill fitted for life in the Cretan hills. dress su ested a doc labourer, rather than a hillsman” (Dunbabin, 2015a 4). He was pro ided with a new pair of boots — crucial on the unrelentin l roc terrain — a tailored pair of Cretan breeches, an identit as a nati e of the illa e of A ios oannis in the Amari alle , and then he rew a moustache, considered indispensable to pass unnoticed (Dunbabin, 2 15a 4). Dunbabin’s fellow SOE officer Sandy Rendel recalled Dunbabin’s appearance when the two met in the Amari alle in central Crete
There found Tom dressed in a lar e shepherd cloa , lon er and blac er than the usual. From behind he loo ed li e a caricature of a rand n uisitor, and from the front the twirl blac moustache which had made such an unfortunate addition to his uniform in Cairo, loo ed curiousl at home under his shepherd’s cowl. (Rendel, 195 1 2)
hen Dunbabin first arri ed in Crete, most of the e acuations of “stragglers” had already occurred, so that this constituted a small part of his brief. ncreasin l , his attention was de oted to atherin intelli ence about the A is presence on the island and to buildin a coherent resistance mo ement. The latter in particular was no eas tas , because at that time the Cretan resistance was both fra mented and sufferin under a er se ere occupation re ime. A decisive test of Dunbabin’s political and diplomatic skills came in the form of an encounter with the well nown resistance fi ure — a darte — anolis Bandou as. Bandou as was a hi hl re arded fi ure with a stron personal followin in central Crete. One of the SOE officers, an Fieldin , described him as “a dark burly man with sad ox e es and a correspondin l deep throated oice in which he was fond of utterin catacl smic aphorisms such as ‘The struggle needs blood, my lads’”(Fielding, 1954 194). hile both Fielding and Dunbabin appreciated Bandouvas’ courage and commitment to the resistance cause, the also reco nised that Bandou as’ impetuosity ris ed the ind of open militar confrontation with erman forces that could onl end badl for the poorl armed Cretans. This was the dan er which presented itself with the parachuted deli er of British weapons and
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ETER O TEAT
ammunition in October 1942. A confrontation developed between Dunbabin and Bandouvas, with the former insisting that the supplies were for SOE’s use, while Bandouvas took the view that he and his men should be the beneficiaries. George Psychoundakis, the “Cretan Runner” who aided SOE operations, recounted that Bandouvas “retreated before Mr. Tom’s determination” ( sychoundakis, 1954 9).12 Another retan, eorgios T it ikas, recalled the timely intervention of another a darte etrakogeorgis, in the resolution of the dispute
The supplies were dropped by an English plane and Bandouvas immediately said that he would take the lot, because he was the leader, and he would share it out among his a dartes. But Tom told him that the things belong to the English service and that he would give them out as he liked. Bandouvas threatened to kill the Englishman. etrakogeorgis intervened and told him, ‘In God’s name, godbrother! Are we to cut our own throats, instead of joining in the common cause?’
Of course other people intervened too, including ostis aradisanos, and Bandouvas was forced to back down and that was when they split up. etrakogiorgis and Bandouvas split up and never oined forces again. (T it ikas, 2012 0– 1)
ith his authority and respect established, Dunbabin went on to building links among various resistance figures and political organisations, and in particular between the conservative t i e rga osis retes ( ational Organisation of rete, EO ) — which he helped to found — and the more progressive t i o ele t eroti o eto o ( ational iberation Front, EA ), which also contained a number of communist elements. So high was the regard with which he was held by the retans and by SOE in airo, that from September 1944 Dunbabin became the overall field commander of SOE in rete. n that capacity he applied his skills to ensuring a peaceful transition to a post war order, as the erman presence retreated to the area in and around anea. nlike the mainland, rete indeed managed a post war transition free of bloodshed.
12 The retan eorge sychoundakis rendered invaluable assistance to “stragglers” and to SOE officers, above all by running messages from one district to another, and recorded his recollections of his role in his popular book e reta er, translated into English by atrick eigh Fermor.
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A STRA IA S I CRETE I OR AR II
Many were fulsome in their praise of unbabin and his role in bringing about that outcome, not least his fellow SOE officers. Patrick eigh ermor, for example, said of him that his “judgement of men was deep and sound, with the single e ception that he always placed himself humbly in the background” eigh ermor, . Billy Moss, who participated in the successful SOE abduction of General Kreipe, claimed, “It was mostly thanks to Tom’s wisdom and far sightedness in helping to found the E.O. . Resistance organisation that Crete was spared the hostilities and post war strife in mainland Greece” (Moss, 1950:210). In a similar vein SOE’s Sandy Rendel, who had known unbabin at O ford before the war, reminisced
Tom unbabin had so many ualities … that he really was an awfully good choice as our main man. e had a very good background knowledge and you wouldn’t have believed it, but the time he had been all over Crete, how many thousands of Cretans loved the man and very greatly respected him, including some of the toughest characters you could ever meet. Rendel et al.,
Meeting with fellow SOE veterans long after the war, Rendel offered the opinion, “with all respect to everybody and I’m sure you’ll agree, he was streets better than any of us” Rendel et al., . Cretan opinion was e ually generous. hen an SOE officer toured through Crete in the company of unbabin in the final part of the war, he observed
He is known as Mr ‘Tom’ from one end of the Island to the other, even in parts which he has never visited. uring our tour with the Brigadier13 in ecember we passed through villages some that were new to him, but the welcome was always the same. I feel he might well be called the Pimpernel of Crete although I know he would hate such a suggestion. O land,
The most widely known of the Cretan helpers to the SOE missions, George Psychoundakis, recalled a high spirited encounter in the Amari alley which displays as much as any other episode the e tent to which unbabin was able to establish a rapport with Cretans from many backgrounds. Psychoundakis had guided a resistance figure to the Amari
13 Brigadier Barker Benfield, ead of SOE in Cairo.
ETE MO TE TH for discussions with unbabin, who at that time had a lair near Khardaki on the slopes of Mt Kedros:
He had a fine hut there with a sheet of corrugated iron on the roof, probably used by the shepherds who pastured their flocks there in winter time. hen they had had their talk, we all sat down and began singing. Mr. Tom’s hideout, unlike ours, was very handy for food and drink, and the wine in those parts is like the wine at the marriage of Cana in Galilee. lso, they had such a large supply of oranges that some of them had gone bad. Everyone began to drink deeply, and by and by, we were all very merry and this soon turned into a rag. e started with the oranges, picking out the rotten ones and throwing them at each other. Mr. Pavlo [i.e. Pavlos Vernadakis] didn’t like this at all, and said it wasn’t right. But before he could finish, he caught several on the head at the same moment, the attack being led by Mr. Tom. hen the oranges were finished, it was the turn of sticks and stones. Mr. Tom had got hold of a long stick, with which he charged down on the others pretending it was a rifle with a fixed bayonet. I had never seen him in such high spirits before. Then it was the turn for water — whole bucketfuls were thrown about, until we were all drenched to the skin. There was shouting and horseplay until nightfall. ( sychoundakis, 195 :210)
Cretans’ fondness of unbabin continued beyond the war, so that a popular song, simply titled “Tom”, was sung by Cretans for many years, and he was made an honorary citi en of Heraklion (Gilchrist, 200 :91). It was there that a memorial service was held soon after his tragic death in 1955, and his old friend atrick eigh ermor delivered a eulogy which heaped praise on his former comrade in arms:
uring all those years he shared all the hardships and ordeals of guerrilla life with the Cretans: the snow and the cold, the hunger and the thirst, the sleeping on branches and stones, the exhaustion and the ever present danger. nd he shared, too, the rewards of that life: the company of men whom he loved and respected and who loved and respected him. Kind and just to all, he was stern and merciless to himself he never shrank from a task, however hard a battle it was, mental or physical. On those endless marches through the mountains from cave to cave, or in flight from the German raids, he would carry the same load on his back as the hardiest mountaineer bred among the goat rocks. ( eigh ermor, 2015:1 )
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T C T
Con usions
The three stages of the ustralian presence in Crete during orld ar proceeded almost seamlessly one from the other. Though ustralians generally fought well in the Battle of Crete, errors in the preparation of the island’s defence, followed by tactical flaws from the beginning of the campaign, brought a rapid defeat, a failure to evacuate large numbers of men, and the commencement of a new phase of the ustralian presence on the island. Though their contact with the local population before the erman invasion had been brief, those ustralians stranded on Crete encountered a remarkable willingness among locals to feed and accommodate them. The third and final phase of the ustralian presence in Crete began when the efforts to evacuate “stragglers” evolved into a series of activities organised by in support of Cretan resistance. The ustralian participation in E’s work was remarkable for the willingness of evacuees to return to the island in support of those stranded there. Most remarkable, however, is the ma or role of Tom unbabin, who displayed e ceptional political and diplomatic talent in bringing together diverse resistance elements and made a vital contribution to the peaceful transition to a post war order. Through those three phases the ustralians e hibited a level of adaptability which facilitated their survival. Confronted with harsh and unfamiliar circumstances, they were able to pursue a number of survival strategies which protected them from the challenges posed by both the natural environment and a vindictive is occupation regime. This adaptability is best e emplified by Tom unbabin. Though a man of great sophistication and erudition, he accepted the rigours of wartime life in rural Crete perhaps his own early life in rural Tasmania had e uipped him with the ability to return to the rhythms of the most rudimentary country life. or their part, the Cretans who looked after the ustralians developed an e traordinary level of empathy with them. rom the beginning they understood that the ustralians and the other llied forces were there not to occupy Crete but to defend it against an imminent threat. Their treatment of the ustralians was on the one hand an e tension of the longstanding tradition of ilo e ia, but it was also a recognition of a unity of purpose in the face of a common enemy.
E E E
i io r hy
“Appreciation”, 1942 “Appreciation of para military activities to su ort o erations for the recapture of Crete”, February 42. TNA (The National Archives) HS 5/682. eevor, eevor, rete: e attle a d t e esista e ondon ohn urray, amer and ra er, amer and ra er, t e : a s a e a d asio i e o ied rete orthshore enguin udley, udley, “Report by an Australian Private on Bo Peep’s Band 15.8.43”, unbabin, a unbabin, “Reminiscences from the mountains of Crete 1942 1944)” n r aeologist at ar, ed om unbabin – eraklion ociety of retan istorical tudies unbabin, b unbabin, “Tom Dunbabin of Crete” n r aeologist at ar, ed om unbabin – eraklion ociety of retan istorical tudies Ewer, Ewer, orgotte a s: e a aig i ree e evised edition elbourne cribe ielding, ielding, ide a d See ondon ecker “Final Report”, 2004 “Final Report on SOE Missions in Crete 1941 1945.” n e reta esista e – : e i ial ritis e ort o oget er it o e ts ritis i ers o oo art i t e esista e, ed okonas – eraklion ystis ilchrist, ilchrist, stralia s a d ree s ol e e ater ears ydney alstead ress ill, ill, iggers a d ree s: t e stralia a aig s i ree e a d rete ydney niversity of ew outh ales ress eigh ermor, P. Leigh Fermor “Report No. 2”, 27 April 1943, TNA HS5/728.
A STRAL ANS N CRETE N ORLD AR
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