Austrins in Crete in or r Peter Monteath his paer arges that the strlian involveent in artime rete took lae in three main hases n the first hse Astrlian fores participated in the defene of rete ginst German invasion over telve das in ay/Jne 1941. he seond hse began ith the srrender of the Allied fores and the strnding on the island of erhps a thosand llied soldiers, inlding Australians. These men “on the run” were forced to rely on the assistance of retns for their ver srival, nd the fond the local polation remarkably reetive to their needs he third nd final hse gre ot of the reios to hases and omrised strlian articipation in resistane ativities in ollabortion ith local resistane eleents nd ritish fores he ke figre in this regrd s om Dnbabin, n strlian ho became a senior offier ith the British eial erations Eetive and ho did much to shape the conduct of “irregular” warfare in Crete. ntroution The ustralian resence in rete in the eond orld r is ssoited priril ith the artiition of ustrlin forces in the ultimtel fruitless efforts to prevent German insion of the island in 1941. Deploed to Crete in the ke of the filed defene of mainlnd Greece in April, the Austrlins nd other embers of reforce the obined llied force tsked ith defending rete) ere soon oerrun b the German insion forces s reslt, ost ere evacuted to gypt t the end of Ma nd the beginning of June ess well knon is the resence of sbstntil nubers of Austrlians in Crete fter the in eacutions b the ol N esed Roghl thosnd ebers of Creforce ho hd issed out on evacution were ble to evde German tre, or to esape fro PO s hese en, inclding sbstntil nuber of ustralians, were stranded on the islnd, 143 PT ONTATH where they relied almost entirely on the hospitality and goodwill of Cretans with whom lasting onds of friendship were formed. The period of being “on the run” in Crete lasted weeks or even years, ending only with capture y Axis occupying forces or exfiltration from the island through ritish operations organised in Cairo. en more oscure in the historical record is the contriution made y Australians to the Cretan resistance which formed in the immediate wake of the Axis occupation. This resistance comprised the collaoratie efforts of Cretans eager to end the occupation and ritish forces sent to assist the Cretans in that tas. To a large extent this collaoration flowed naturally from the comined Cretan-British efforts to eacuate the Australian and other ritish forces on the run in Crete. A ey figure in these combined Cretan-British efforts was Thomas . unain an Australian archaeologist who ecame the leader of ritish pecial perations ecutie SO forces deployed to Crete to support and organise the resistance. This essay traces the course of the Australian presence in Crete in orld ar arguing that there were clear lins in the three phases of the Australian presence — that is from participation in the defence of Crete to the presence of men on the run and finally to the conduct of “special operations”. While the last stage is distinguished above all by the role of just one man in Tom unbain, it was his contriution which made the most enduring impact on the wartime history of the island. All three stages of the Australian presence contriuted to the foundation of close relations which hae een maintained into the present. Austraians in the atte or Crete The erman inasion of Crete too place oer twele days at the end of ay and very beginning of June 1941, and thus on the eve of a much larger campaign in the war, namely peration ararossa the erman inasion of the oiet Union. Crete was of limited strategic importance, ut the oldness of the erman military operation and the ferocity of the attle hae drawn a good deal of attention from military historians see especially eeor, 1 and tewart ). The Germans conceied and executed an airorne inasion which commenced on ay and had achieved almost total mastery of the island 144 AUSTRALIAN IN CRETE N WORL W II by the end of the onth. ustralian forces consisting of soe , en were aong the roughly 31, ritish Commonwealth en evacuated fro mainland reece and integrated into Creforce (Long, 15–316). laced under the coand of the ew Zealander ernard Freyberg, the task of the ritish and Greek ebers of Creforce was to repel the epected German invasion attept. ike the other ritish and reek forces evacuated hurriedly fro the ainland, the ustralians were poorly armed and supplied. oreover, the losses incurred on the ainland deanded a reorganisation of the available units as they joined the existing ritish garrison on Crete in preparing a defensive strategy. he largest concentration of ustralians — four infantry battalions and a achine-gun battalion — was disposed to the ethynon sector, where the ain priority was to defend the airfield outside the town of ethynon itself. uring this crucial period of several weeks leading to the invasion, the ustralian forces ade their first acuaintances with the local population, any of who would also becoe involved in the island’s defence (on the ustralian contribution to the defence alongside reek and other Allied forces see especially Palao, 200 ong, 86:197–3 wer, 6:299– ill, 2010:195–305). On ay, two waves of eran transport planes flying fro ainland bases brought paratroops and glider-borne ountain troops to Crete, the dropping zones clustered around the island’s three airfields and the main harbour at uda ay. At ethynon, the ustralians killed large nubers of men while still in the air and were able to contain those who landed safely, so that the airfield reained in llied hands. Siilarly, at Heraklion, despite bitter fighting, the airfield reained under llied control. The crucial point at the end of the first day of fighting was the alee field in western Crete, where the airfield reained bitterly contested. The turning point in the attle for Crete cae in the night of – ay with the Allied withdrawal fro crucial positions adjacent to the alee airfield. esperate efforts to retake the airfield over the following hours proved in vain. By the end of 22 May, Crete’s fate was sealed. Although Australian and other ritish and Greek forces, often in cobination with Cretan civilians, fought on over the following days, it was clear by ay that the island could no longer be held, and the order was issued for an evacuation. n that day, reyberg cabled eneral Headquarters in the 145 PETER MONTAH Middle ast to inform him that his forces had reached the limits of their endurance. t was evident that there was no alternative ut to call upon the Royal Navy to repeat the heroics it had achieved in evacuating men from the mainland just a few wees earlier (Beevor, 12. or Australian forces, as for the other Allies and the Cretan civilians, the failed defence of Crete was as demoralising as the rapid defeat on the mainland. n this occasion, the cost for the Australians was nearly eight hundred casualties and over three thousand taen OW (Hill, 20:2). nce more erman airpower had been crucial to turning the tide of attle in the Germans’ favour. If there was a positive outcome, it was that the common participation of Australians with Cretans in the defence of the island, and with it the shared experience of eing overwhelmed y a technologically superior force, created the foundation of a close relationship which was to offer advantages to Australians and to Cretans over the period of occupation. On the run The evacuations too place from two locations, namely the port at Heralion on Crete’s north coast and the fishing village of Sphaia on the south coast, from where most of the evacuations of Australians were staged. They reached the village after trekking across the central spine of the island and then descending the steep and rocy slopes to the coast, in many cases by following the mros orge to the east of Sphaia. The oyal Navy exhiited enormous courage in committing vessels to the evacuation at a time when the uftwaffe ruled the sies. onetheless, from une it was no longer possile to perform evacuations. By that time aout half of the British forces had been evacuated — that is, some 1, men. thers, however, who in many cases had een guided to the areas adacent to Sphaia in anticipation of evacuation, were left behind. Stuc in a hopeless situation etween mountains and sea, the officer appointed to command the stranded men was entrusted with the tas of surrendering to the ermans (Beevor, 1:22). The other significant group stranded was the Australian force which had successfully defended the airfield at ethymnon ut ecome isolated from the rest of Creforce and unaware of the order to evacuate. hese men were trapped near ethymnon when erman forces pushed rapidly eastward 146 AUSTRALIAN IN CRETE IN ORL W II from the Canea sector. In these circumstances the Australian commanding officers reacted in different was. The career officer Ian Campbell, who commanded 1st attalion, performed a textoo surrender of his unit to the Germans, so that all of his men entered captivit on a (Ewer, 016:355). In contrast, the militia officer in charge of the 11th attalion, the estern Australian a Sandover, gave his men the option of heading south into the hills of central Crete with the hope that at some point the might e ale to find some means of departing the island from the south coast (onteath, 2017:59–60).