DOCSLIB.ORG

Opinion for the Court Filed by Circuit Judge GARLAND

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Opinion for the Court Filed by Circuit Judge GARLAND United States Court of Appeals FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT Argued May 13, 2011 Decided September 6, 2011 No. 10-5306 SHAWALI KHAN, APPELLANT v. BARACK OBAMA, ET AL., APPELLEES Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia (No. 1:08-cv-01101) Leonard C. Goodman argued the cause and filed the briefs for appellant. H. Thomas Byron, III, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice, argued the cause for appellees. With him on the brief were Tony West, Assistant Attorney General, Ian Heath Gershengorn, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, and Douglas N. Letter and Robert M. Loeb, Attorneys. Michael P. Abate and Edward Himmelfarb, Attorneys, entered appearances. Before: SENTELLE, Chief Judge, and GINSBURG and GARLAND, Circuit Judges. -2- Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge GARLAND. GARLAND, Circuit Judge: Shawali Khan, a detainee at the United States naval base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, appeals the denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The district court found that Khan was “part of” Hezb-i-Islami Gulbuddin (HIG), an associated force of al Qaeda and the Taliban engaged in hostilities against the United States and its coalition partners. Khan’s primary contention on appeal is that the district court erred in concluding that intelligence reports offered by the government to prove his membership in an HIG cell were reliable. Finding no error in the district court’s careful consideration of the evidence, we affirm its denial of Khan’s petition. I Khan is an Afghan citizen who, at the time of his capture in mid-November 2002, lived in Kandahar, Afghanistan. By the government’s account, Khan’s affiliation with HIG began in the 1980s, when he served as a radio operator for the group under the command of his uncle, Zabit Jalil, during the anti-Soviet jihad. The government alleges that, after September 11, 2001, HIG formed an alliance with al Qaeda and the Taliban to attack U.S. and coalition forces operating in Afghanistan. According to contemporaneous reports by U.S. Army intelligence collectors, three Afghan informants told the collectors about the presence of a small HIG terrorist cell in Kandahar.1 1All descriptions of reports and facts in this opinion are taken from unclassified or declassified documents and briefs that are on the public record in this case. The redactions are for classified information that is contained in a classified appendix to the opinion. -3- One of the informants (hereinafter Informant A), later identified as a disaffected member of the HIG cell, told the intelligence collectors in late October 2002 that Khan was a communicator for the cell, facilitating radio contact among its members. He also reported that the cell was directed from Quetta, Pakistan, by Khan’s uncle. Intelligence Information Report (IIR) 6 044 0266 03 at 1-3 (Oct. 29, 2002) (J.A. 1731- 33). According to Informant A, this cell was responsible for explosions near the Kandahar airfield and was planning additional attacks on U.S. forces using radio-controlled binary explosive devices positioned on roads frequented by U.S. military vehicles. IIR 6 044 0249 03 at 1-4 (Oct. 29, 2002) (J.A. 1726-29). Informant A gave the intelligence collectors specific information about the cell’s method of operation. For example, he described how the cell would detonate two explosions timed to maximize casualties: When the Americans are close enough to the kill zone, the first explosion is detonated . The intent of the first explosion is to cause injury and disable the vehicle. This act will force other Americans to investigate the scene and help evacuate the wounded. When a large enough crowd has gathered around the disabled vehicle and wounded personnel, a second, more powerful explosion is detonated . The purpose of the second explosion is to kill the wounded and those who are trying to help them. Id. at 3 (J.A. 1728); see IIR 6 044 0267 03 at 3 (Oct. 30, 2002) (J.A. 1738). Informant A also identified the precise radio frequencies the cell used in a particular sequence to detonate the two explosions. IIR 6 044 0249 03 at 3 (J.A. 1728); Classified J.A. 1728; see Gov’t Br. 10. And in another meeting, he -4- provided additional specific details about some of the cell’s intended targets and the type of explosive device used -- “a Chinese or Russian antitank mine approximately 12 inches in diameter” connected to an “electric blasting cap” that is in turn “attached to the radio-controlled electronic detonator.” IIR 6 044 0267 03 at 2-3 (J.A. 1737-38). Further details about Khan’s role in the Kandahar HIG cell came from a second Afghan informant (hereinafter Informant B), who “did not personally witness the events he described,” but had “indirect access” to the information. Decl. of Intelligence Collector 1 at ¶ 23 (Mar. 15, 2010) (J.A. 1543); see Decl. of Intelligence Collector 2 at ¶ 20 (Mar. 10, 2010) (J.A. 1572). Informant B reported that Khan was “a go-between and a facilitator” within the cell, that he “use[d] [his] oil shop to conduct meetings and as a contact point with other members within the cell,” and that on November 9, 2002, he “delivered a radio-controlled binary detonation device and two blasting caps to an operative working within his organization.” IIR 6 044 0025 03 at 3 (Nov. 9, 2002) (J.A. 1723). Finally, a third informant, an Afghan government official (hereinafter Informant C), revealed more about the Kandahar HIG cell’s plans to attack U.S. and coalition vehicles at two specific locations. IIR 6 044 0300 03 (Nov. 3, 2002) (J.A. 1744- 45). He told the intelligence collectors that “mines ha[d] already been emplaced” at these locations, but that “they ha[d] not been armed with a remote detonation device.” Id. (J.A. 1745). In mid-November 2002, U.S. military officials decided to neutralize the HIG cell. They planned an operation to capture Khan at his shop, using Informant A’s tip that Khan would be there at a particular time. The operation was a success, and Khan’s home and shop were searched after his arrest. As reflected in several reports and underlying exhibits, the searches -5- uncovered a variety of physical evidence, including a notebook containing Arabic writing about various terrorist activities, a book of poems written in Arabic by a high-level al Qaeda leader, a notebook from the “al-Farouk camp” containing Arabic writing about the use and maintenance of weapons, a notebook with Arabic writing and pictures of Osama bin Laden, Pashtu music praising the Taliban, and a receipt for weapons. See Gov’t Br. 13 n.4 (summarizing material recovered from Khan’s properties). In addition, and more significant, heavily redacted classified intelligence reports state that the search of Khan’s properties yielded further, particularly incriminating evidence that confirmed his role in the Kandahar HIG cell. Gov’t Br. 13, 55. One of those reports states that [Redaction 1]. On November 22, 2002, Informant B told the intelligence collectors that, after Khan’s capture by U.S. forces, Khan’s uncle called a meeting with several HIG operatives in Pakistan to replace the entire Kandahar cell. IIR 6 044 0433 03 at 1-2 (Nov. 22, 2002) (J.A. 1753-54). According to the government, improvised explosive device (IED) attacks stopped in the area for about two months after Khan’s capture. Decl. of Intelligence Collector 2 at ¶ 15 (Mar. 10, 2010) (J.A. 1570). During an interrogation by U.S. personnel on December 17, 2002, Khan admitted to possessing [Redaction 2], but said that [Redaction 3].2 In subsequent interrogations, he at times 2Khan contends there is “grave doubt” about the reliability of this admission to possessing [Redaction 4] because it is possible that the term used for that item was incorrectly translated. Pet’r Br. 20, 29. The district court did not err in finding that other reliable evidence in the record (as discussed in Part II below) corroborated Khan’s admission. -6- admitted to possessing other pieces of physical evidence, and offered exculpatory explanations for some of them.3 In several interrogations, he also admitted that he had been part of the HIG army during the fight against the Soviet Union in the 1980s and that his uncle Jalil had commanded HIG forces against the Soviets; but at other times, he said he had never been an official member of HIG and/or denied any affiliation with HIG. See Pet’r Br. 11-12 (citing interrogation reports). In numerous interrogations, Khan told his questioners that he was just a shopkeeper, not a terrorist, and had been falsely accused by corrupt Afghans who told lies about him for money. Khan has been detained at Guantanamo Bay since early 2003. The government contends that Khan’s detention is lawful under the Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) that Congress adopted after the September 11, 2001, al Qaeda 3For example, during one interrogation, Khan admitted to possessing both the notebooks and a spool of wire, which he described to interrogators as “black, approximately 50 meters in length, and the type of wire that ‘You light it on one end and the fire goes down the wire.’” CITF Report of Investigative Activity at 2 (Feb. 7, 2003) (J.A. 1809). He said he took the notebooks and wire “from an abandoned house, previously occupied by Arabs.” Id.; see also Summary Interrogation Report at 3 (Mar. 29, 2007) (J.A. 1865) (stating that he “did some looting” of Arab businesses and houses in which he obtained “some books” in Arabic and “electrical wire”); id.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • The Current Detainee Population of Guantánamo: an Empirical Study
    © Reuters/HO Old – Detainees at XRay Camp in Guantanamo. The Current Detainee Population of Guantánamo: An Empirical Study Benjamin Wittes and Zaahira Wyne with Erin Miller, Julia Pilcer, and Georgina Druce December 16, 2008 The Current Detainee Population of Guantánamo: An Empiricial Study Table of Contents Executive Summary 1 Introduction 3 The Public Record about Guantánamo 4 Demographic Overview 6 Government Allegations 9 Detainee Statements 13 Conclusion 22 Note on Sources and Methods 23 About the Authors 28 Endnotes 29 Appendix I: Detainees at Guantánamo 46 Appendix II: Detainees Not at Guantánamo 66 Appendix III: Sample Habeas Records 89 Sample 1 90 Sample 2 93 Sample 3 96 The Current Detainee Population of Guantánamo: An Empiricial Study EXECUTIVE SUMMARY he following report represents an effort both to document and to describe in as much detail as the public record will permit the current detainee population in American T military custody at the Guantánamo Bay Naval Station in Cuba. Since the military brought the first detainees to Guantánamo in January 2002, the Pentagon has consistently refused to comprehensively identify those it holds. While it has, at various times, released information about individuals who have been detained at Guantánamo, it has always maintained ambiguity about the population of the facility at any given moment, declining even to specify precisely the number of detainees held at the base. We have sought to identify the detainee population using a variety of records, mostly from habeas corpus litigation, and we have sorted the current population into subgroups using both the government’s allegations against detainees and detainee statements about their own affiliations and conduct.
    [Show full text]
  • Military Detentions Through the Habeas Lens
    WHO MAY BE HELD? MILITARY DETENTION THROUGH THE HABEAS LENS Robert M. Chesney* Abstract: We lack consensus regarding who lawfully may be held in mili- tary custody in the contexts that matter most to U.S. national security to- dayi.e., counterterrorism and counterinsurgency. More to the point, federal judges lack consensus on this question. They have grappled with it periodically since 2002, and for the past three years have dealt with it con- tinually in connection with the flood of habeas corpus litigation arising out of Guantanamo in the aftermath of the Supreme Courts 2008 deci- sion in Boumediene v. Bush. Unfortunately, the resulting detention juris- prudence is shot through with disagreement on points large and small, leaving the precise boundaries of the governments detention authority unclear. The aim of this Article is to flesh out and contextualize these dis- agreements, and to locate them in relation to larger trends and debates. Introduction Who lawfully may be held in military custody without criminal charge? It seems a simple question, and in some settings it is.1 But in the settings that matter most at the momentcounterterrorism and counterinsurgencyit is not simple at all. The very metrics of legality are disputed in these contexts, with sharp disagreement regarding which bodies of law are relevant and what, if anything, each actually says about the scope of the governments authority to detain (the de- tention-scope issue).2 This problem has been with us for some time. It has lurked in the background of U.S. detention operations in Afghanistan since 20013 * © 2011, Robert M.
    [Show full text]
  • C:\Documents and Settings\Awarden\Desktop\08
    Case 1:05-cv-02386-UNA Document 516 Filed 07/18/2008 Page 1 of 3 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA ____________________________ ) IN RE: ) ) Misc. No. 08-442 (TFH) GUANTANAMO BAY ) DETAINEE LITIGATION ) Civil Action Nos. ) ) 02-CV-0828, 04-CV-1136, 04-CV-1164, 04-CV-1194, ) 04-CV-1254, 04-CV-1937, 04-CV-2022, 04-CV-2035, ) 04-CV-2046, 04-CV-2215, 05-CV-0023, 05-CV-0247, ) 05-CV-0270, 05-CV-0280, 05-CV-0329, 05-CV-0359, ) 05-CV-0392, 05-CV-0409, 05-CV-0492, 05-CV-0520, ) 05-CV-0526, 05-CV-0569, 05-CV-0634, 05-CV-0748, ) 05-CV-0763, 05-CV-0764, 05-CV-0765, 05-CV-0833, ) 05-CV-0877, 05-CV-0881, 05-CV-0883, 05-CV-0886, ) 05-CV-0889, 05-CV-0892, 05-CV-0993, 05-CV-0994, ) 05-CV-0995, 05-CV-0998, 05-CV-0999, 05-CV-1048, ) 05-CV-1124, 05-CV-1189, 05-CV-1220, 05-CV-1234, ) 05-CV-1236, 05-CV-1244, 05-CV-1347, 05-CV-1353, ) 05-CV-1429, 05-CV-1457, 05-CV-1458, 05-CV-1487, ) 05-CV-1490, 05-CV-1497, 05-CV-1504, 05-CV-1505, ) 05-CV-1506, 05-CV-1509, 05-CV-1555, 05-CV-1590, ) 05-CV-1592, 05-CV-1601, 05-CV-1602, 05-CV-1607, ) 05-CV-1623, 05-CV-1638, 05-CV-1639, 05-CV-1645, ) 05-CV-1646, 05-CV-1649, 05-CV-1678, 05-CV-1704, ) 05-CV-1725, 05-CV-1971, 05-CV-1983, 05-CV-2010, ) 05-CV-2083, 05-CV-2088, 05-CV-2104, 05-CV-2112, ) 05-CV-2185, 05-CV-2186, 05-CV-2199, 05-CV-2200, ) 05-CV-2249, 05-CV-2348, 05-CV-2349, 05-CV-2367, ) 05-CV-2370, 05-CV-2371, 05-CV-2378, 05-CV-2379, ) 05-CV-2380, 05-CV-2381, 05-CV-2384, 05-CV-2385, ) 05-CV-2386, 05-CV-2387, 05-CV-2398, 05-CV-2444, ) 05-CV-2477, 05-CV-2479, 06-CV-0618, 06-CV-1668, ) 06-CV-1674,
    [Show full text]
  • Download the PDF File
    S E C R E T / / NOFORN / / 20331022 DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE HEADQUARTERS, JOINT TASK FORCE GUANTANAMO U.S. NAVAL STATION, GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA APO AE 09360 JTF-GTMO-CDR 22 October 2008 MEMORANDUM FOR Commander, United States Southern Command, 3511 NW 9lst Avenue, Miami, FL 33172 SUBJECT: Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN US9YM-000899DP (S) JTF-GTMO Detainee Assessment 1. (S//NF) Personal Information: JDIMS/NDRC Reference Name: Shawali Khan Current/True Name and Aliases: Shawali Khan, Shawali Mohammad Zey Place of Birth: Arghandab, Kandahar Province, Afghanistan (AF) Date of Birth: 1963 Citizenship: Afghanistan Internment Serial Number (ISN): US9AF-000899DP 2. (U//FOUO) Health: Detainee is in overall good health. 3. (U) JTF-GTMO Assessment: a. (S) Recommendation: JTF-GTMO recommends this detainee for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD). JTF-GTMO previously recommended detainee for CD on 31 March 2007. b. (S//NF) Executive Summary: If released without rehabilitation, close supervision, and means to successfully reintegrate into his society as a law-abiding citizen, it is assessed detainee would probably seek out prior associates and reengage in hostilities and extremist support activities. Since his transfer to JTF-GTMO detainee has largely been compliant with the guard force, but has one incident of threatening to kill a guard’s family. He is non- cooperative with debriefers and withholds information of intelligence value, probably indicating his continued support for anti-Coalition
    [Show full text]
  • April 20, 2015 Monday an Article on Friday About Sony Pictures
    April 20, 2015 Monday the summit in the 1920s went in through An article in the travel pages in the edition of the Washington Ballet says that its casting An article on Friday about Sony Pictures Tibet, as Nepal was closed to westerners at March 28th said that Bethlehem is in Israel. for a full-length “Swan Lake” is a first for Entertainment’s displeasure at the posting the time. It is in Palestine. American ballet, this was not the first time of its internal documents on WikiLeaks mis- two African-Americans were in the lead roles stated, in some copies, when Sony Pictures A Comment article, “It’s not just these new An editorial (17 April, page 36) encouraging in an American production. issued its statement. It was Thursday, not pylons that blight our land” (last week, page readers to register to vote in the general elec- Wednesday. 37), said the pylons are white, the com- tion, before Monday’s deadline, said “With A picture on Monday with the What’s on petition to design them low key and that your national insurance number and access TV highlights in some editions, using infor- A report about art-led regeneration (Digging National Grid chairman, Peter Gershon, to the internet, you can register online at mation from Reuters, was published in error. never stops as town’s gold rush slowly sinks advises the Tory party. National Grid has www.gov.uk/register-to-vote “. To clarify: The picture, with an entry about “Lincoln’s into the sands, 17 April, page 18) quoted JJ asked us to make clear that the pylons are while that page on the UK government Last Day” on the Smithsonian Channel, Charlesworth, associate editor of ArtReview grey, the competition was promoted inter- website says “You’ll need your National shows a fictitious newspaper account of magazine, as saying the Folkestone Triennial nationally by the Royal Institute of British Insurance number (if you have one)”, it is the shooting of Abraham Lincoln that would “possibly … raise shop rents”.
    [Show full text]
  • The “Journey of Death” 1
    THE JOURNEY OF DEATH – OVER 700 PRISONERS ILLEGALLY RENDERED TO GUANTANAMO BAY WITH THE HELP OF PORTUGAL 28 January 2008 THE “JOURNEY OF DEATH” 1 - OVER 700 PRISONERS ILLEGALLY RENDERED TO GUANTANAMO WITH THE HELP OF PORTUGAL - Reprieve can now conclusively show that Portuguese territory and airspace has been used to transfer over 700 prisoners to torture and illegal imprisonment in Guantanamo Bay. Through comparing flight logs obtained from Portuguese authorities, 2 information from the US Department of Defence showing dates of arrival of prisoners at Guantanamo Bay, and unclassified testimony from many of the prisoners themselves, 3 Reprieve is for the first time able to name 728 prisoners rendered to Guantanamo Bay through Portuguese jurisdiction. 1 So said Adil Al-Zamil, prisoner transported on Flight RCH108Y through Portuguese jurisdiction to Guantanamo Bay: “I call the journey to Guantanamo ‘the journey of death.’ I discreetly wished that the plane would fall to end the pain I felt.” Source: Kuwaiti Gitmo Detainees Speak Out about Abuse, By Rania El Gamal, Kuwait Times, December 1, 2006 2 Flight logs obtained by Ana Gomes MEP in 2006 reveal that on at least 94 occasions aircraft crossed Portuguese airspace en route to or from Guantanamo Bay between 2002-2006 . On at least 6 occasions rendition aircraft flew directly from Lajes in the Azores to Guantanamo. See appendix for full copies of the logs. 3 The US Department of Defence has released ‘in-process’ records of Guantanamo inmates, detailing when prisoners were first weighed and measured on entry to the prison. It is possible confirm the identities of prisoners transported to Guantanamo through Portuguese jurisdiction by matching the ‘in- process’ dates of particular prisoners held in Guantanamo with flights contained in the Portuguese flight logs.
    [Show full text]
  • Departmentofdefense Officefor the Administrativereview of the Detentionofenemy Combatants at U.S
    UNCLASSIFIED DepartmentofDefense Officefor the AdministrativeReview of the DetentionofEnemy Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba 22 May 2007 TO: SHAWALIKHAN SUBJECT UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD INTHE CASE OF SHAWALI KHAN 1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary . 2. The AdministrativeReviewBoardwillconducta comprehensivereview ofall reasonably availableand relevantinformationregardingyour case. At the conclusionofthis review the Boardwillmake a recommendationto: 1) releaseyou to your homestate; ( ) transferyou to your homestate, withconditionsagreeduponbythe UnitedStates and yourhome state; or (3) continue detentionunderUnitedStates control. 3. The followingprimaryfactors favor continued a 1. The detainee stated he fought in the Mujehedinfor seven years . 2. The detainee claimedhewas involvedinone battleagainstthe NorthernAlliance, but statedhisentire ofapproximately70 individualsretreatedbackto the Talibanfacilities whenthe fightingstarted. 3. The detainee delivered a radio -controlledbinary detonationdeviceand two blasting caps to an operativeworking withinhis organization. The devices were to be usedin conjunctionwith two mines, possiblyChinese-madetype-72 antitankmines. The intendeduse for the devices was to target American civilians or UnitedStates led coalitionmilitarypatrols. 4. The detainee was identifiedtrying to purchase two rockets through an intermediary source for an unknown reason. b . Connections/Associations
    [Show full text]
  • Military Detention Through the Habeas Lens Robert M
    Boston College Law Review Volume 52 | Issue 3 Article 2 5-1-2011 Who May Be Held? Military Detention Through the Habeas Lens Robert M. Chesney University of Texas School of Law, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr Part of the Military, War, and Peace Commons, and the National Security Law Commons Recommended Citation Robert M. Chesney, Who May Be Held? Military Detention Through the Habeas Lens, 52 B.C.L. Rev. 769 (2011), http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr/vol52/iss3/2 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Boston College Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. For more information, please contact [email protected]. WHO MAY BE HELD? MILITARY DETENTION THROUGH THE HABEAS LENS Robert M. Chesney* Abstract: We lack consensus regarding who lawfully may be held in mili- tary custody in the contexts that matter most to U.S. national security to- day—i.e., counterterrorism and counterinsurgency. More to the point, federal judges lack consensus on this question. They have grappled with it periodically since 2002, and for the past three years have dealt with it con- tinually in connection with the flood of habeas corpus litigation arising out of Guantanamo in the aftermath of the Supreme Court’s 2008 deci- sion in Boumediene v. Bush. Unfortunately, the resulting detention juris- prudence is shot through with disagreement on points large and small, leaving the precise boundaries of the government’s detention authority unclear.
    [Show full text]
  • Military Detention Through the Habeas Lens
    Color profile: Disabled Composite Default screen VI Who May Be Held? Military Detention through the Habeas Lens Robert M. Chesney* ho lawfully may be held in military custody without criminal charge? It Wseems a simple question, and in some settings it is. But in the settings that matter most at the moment—counterterrorism and counterinsurgency—it is not simple at all. The very metrics of legality are disputed in those contexts, with sharp disagreement regarding which bodies of law are relevant and what if any- thing each actually says about the detention-scope issue. This problem has been with us for some time. It has lurked in the background of US detention operations in Afghanistan since 20011 and in Iraq since 2003.2 It is central, of course, to the controversies surrounding the use of detention at Guan- tanamo and in the United States itself.3 More than one hundred thousand individ- uals have been detained without criminal charge across these settings,4 giving rise to an immense amount of scholarship, advocacy and litigation along the way. Re- markably, however, the question of who lawfully may be detained remains unsettled in important respects. * Charles I. Francis Professor in Law, University of Texas School of Law. I am grateful to the or- ganizers and participants at the Naval War College’s annual conference for their comments and criticisms, to the Office of the General Counsel of the Department of Defense for the opportunity to present this work in progress, and to Daniel Jackson for outstanding research assistance. A longer version of this article appears in the Boston College Law Review (forthcoming 2011).
    [Show full text]
  • 1 United States District Court for The
    UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA SHAWALI KHAN, Petitioner, v. Civil Action No. 08-1101 (JDB) BARACK H. OBAMA, et al., Respondents. MEMORANDUM OPINION Petitioner Shawali Khan was in U.S. custody from November 2002 through December 2014. For most of that time, he was detained at the U.S. Naval Base at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba. Since 2008, Khan and the United States have been engaged in lengthy habeas corpus proceedings, through which Khan has attempted to challenge the legality of his detention. In December 2014, the United States relinquished custody of Khan and transferred him to the control of the government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. Because Khan is no longer in U.S. custody, the United States now moves to dismiss Khan’s petition for habeas corpus as moot. Khan opposes that motion, contending that he is still subject to significant collateral consequences due to his former detention at Guantánamo Bay, and thus that this Court retains jurisdiction to consider the merits of his petition. However, following the D.C. Circuit’s opinion in Gul v. Obama, 652 F.3d 12 (D.C. Cir. 2011), this Court concludes that the collateral consequences Khan identifies are not a sufficient injury to confer continuing jurisdiction on this Court. Respondents’ motion will therefore be granted. BACKGROUND 1 Khan is a citizen of Afghanistan who was captured in 2002. Khan v. Obama, 741 F. Supp. 2d 1, 4 (D.D.C. 2010). He was detained at the U.S. Naval Base at Guantánamo Bay from 2003 through December 2014.
    [Show full text]
  • Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law — Volume 17, 2014 Correspondents’ Reports
    YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW — VOLUME 17, 2014 CORRESPONDENTS’ REPORTS 1 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Contents Overview – United States Enforcement of International Humanitarian Law ............................ 1 Cases – United States Courts of Appeal .................................................................................... 3 Cases – United States District Courts ........................................................................................ 4 Cases – United States Military Courts – United States Army ................................................... 5 Cases – United States Military Courts – United States Marine Corps ...................................... 9 Overview – United States Detention Practice .......................................................................... 12 Detainee Challenges – United States Supreme Court .............................................................. 17 Detainee Challenges – United States Courts of Appeals ......................................................... 19 Overview – US Military Commission ..................................................................................... 20 Military Commission Cases US Court of Appeals for the DC Circuit .................................... 21 US Military Commissions Cases – Court of Military Commission Review ........................... 22 US Military Commissions Cases ............................................................................................. 23 Overview – United States Enforcement of International
    [Show full text]
  • The Danger of Executive Overreach in the Global Fight Against Terrorism and Why Congress Must Act
    NOTE Battlefield Earth: The Danger of Executive Overreach in the Global Fight Against Terrorism and Why Congress Must Act Kylie Alexandra* ABSTRACT In the aftermath of 9/11, Congress adopted the Authorization for Use of Military Force ("A UMF") on September 14, 2001, permitting the Presidentto use force against both al Qaeda for committing the attack and the Talibanfor harboringthem. Beyond those two organizations,however, significant debate has arisen concerningthe scope of the A UMF-and whether it includes terror- ist organizationssuch as al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula,whom the United States is fighting in Yemen, not Afghanistan. The 2012 National Defense Au- thorization Act failed to clarify the scope of authority provided by the A UMF and merely codified existing uncertainties in the law. Nonetheless, global ter- rorism will continue to demand military action as new threats emerge in far- flung regions of the world-threatsthat cannot be traced to those directly re- sponsible for 9/11. Congress must therefore pass a new statutory authoriza- tion that clearly identifies the appropriate target(s) in the ongoing armed conflict against terrorist organizations. Congressionalaction will prevent ex- ecutive overreach and ensure that the detention of terrorist combatants in the future remains legal. * J.D. expected May 2014, The George Washington University Law School; B.A. Sociol- ogy, 2010, University of Hawaii-Hilo. I would like to thank Alex Brazier and Christen Gallagher for their thoughtful comments and suggestions on early drafts of this Note, as well as the staff of The George Washington Law Review for their production and editorial assistance.
    [Show full text]