Changes in the Policing of Civil Disorders Since the Kerner Report

The P olicing of Ci vil Di sorders

Changes in the Policing of Civil Disorders Since the Kerner Report: The Police Response to Ferguson, August 2014, and Some Implications for the Twenty-First Century P atrick F. Gillham and Gary T. Marx

The Kerner Commission identified factors contributing to police ineffectiveness during the 1960s civil disorders. Since release of the Kerner report, the frequency and intensity of civil disorders has declined and the policing of disorders has changed. Using the report recommendations as a framework, we analyze changes in police disorder management during the 2014 events in Ferguson as these involve operational planning and equipment. Data for the Ferguson case are constructed from media reports, police and activist accounts, after action reports, and field observations. We link changes seen in Ferguson to larger institutional changes in law enforcement over the last fifty years. We conclude with discussions on what did and did not work in the policing of Ferguson and highlight implications for policing of protest and disorder in the twenty-first century.

Keywords: Kerner Commission, National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, democratic policing, protest, riots, Ferguson

Police departments have become more adept It is our hope that the lessons learned in Fer- at handling potential riot situations. While guson will provide guidance to . . . police de- riot potentials were greater in 1968 than in partments around the country and will prepare 1967, the triggering events were rapidly con- these agencies to respond effectively and consti- trolled and large-scale disorders thus were tutionally to the challenges of mass demonstra- avoided. tions in the 21st century. [emphasis added]

—Urban America 1969 —Institute for Intergovernmental Research 2015

Patrick F. Gillham is assistant professor of sociology at Western Washington University. Gary T. Marx is professor emeritus at MIT.

© 2018 Russell Sage Foundation. Gillham, Patrick F., and Gary T. Marx. 2018. “Changes in the Policing of Civil Disorders Since the Kerner Report: The Police Response to Ferguson, August 2014, and Some Implications for the Twenty-First Century.” RSF: The Russell Sage Foundation Journal of the Social Sciences 4(6): 122–43. DOI: 10.7758/RSF.2018.4.6.06. The authors thank Blake Gardner and Hugh Jones for field assistance in Ferguson. In addition, they thank participants in the RSF Conference on the Fiftieth Anniversary of the Kerner Commission Report and anonymous reviewers at RSF for their insightful comments on this manuscript. Direct correspon- dence to: Patrick F. Gillham at [email protected], Department of Sociology, 516 High St., MS-9081, Bell- ingham, WA 98225; and Gary T. Marx at [email protected], http://www.garymarx.net. Open Access Policy: RSF: The Russell Sage Foundation Journal of the Social Sciences is an open access journal. This article is published under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Unported Li- cense. the pol icing o f c ivil d isorders 123

Police were a central factor in the 1967 disor- disorders since the 1960s. Paralleling changes ders studied by the National Advisory Commis- in the forms of disorder, we note a shift by re- sion on Civil Disorders (the Kerner Commis- searchers to study the policing of disorders as sion, thus the Kerner report [1968]). The a factor more broadly tied to efforts to control commission’s “Supplement on Control of Dis- social movements and protest. Then, we review order” considered problems related to opera- several problems with the policing of disorders tional planning, logistical needs, training, con- identified by the Kerner Commission and the trol equipment, coordination, and legal needs. commission’s recommendations to mitigate We use some of their 1968 recommendations them. We use the case of Ferguson in 2014 to as the framework to contrast police behavior illustrate significant changes in the policing of then and now. For the contemporary period, protests since Kerner. We consider three central we consider the policing of protests that questions: What changes in the policing of pro- emerged with a case study of Ferguson, Mis- test and civil disorder are most noticeable since souri, following the police killing of Michael Kerner? What police practices “worked” in Fer- Brown. guson and what practices did not? What are The Ferguson protests and disorder and the implications for the twenty-first century? overwhelming police response to this social unrest provide a reminder that, more than any T he Abeyance of Large- other institution, police symbolize the Ameri- Scale Civil Disorders can racial order. Despite improvement in some We have in general not seen a repeat of the areas, the combustible mix that led to the 1960s massive state violence in response to crowd disorders is still here. Police remain the ful- situations that was responsible for hundreds crum for accumulated grievances. of deaths in the 1960s (Tilly 2003). Even the as- In the 1960s, incidents (and sometimes ru- sassination of Martin Luther King Jr. did not mors) of police violence were most often what lead to extended and continued rioting beyond drew protesters, rioting protesters, and oppor- the initial outbursts, nor was it as heavy handed tunistic rioters to the streets. Once on the a police response as in previous times.1 The de- street, police responses were a central factor in cline in the frequency of civil disorders has whether violence escalated. In 1967 police ac- been documented (Olzak and Shanahan 1996; tion could often be described as too much too Olzak, Shanahan, and McEneaney 1996; Gooden soon or too little too late. Sometimes there were and Myers 2018; Bentley-Edwards et al. 2018), two riots—the police and those they sought to but little research has been undertaken on rea- control. Other factors include instances of fire- sons for the decline and on changes in policing crackers being heard as gunshots, of police of disorders. Since the 1970s, scholars have mistakenly firing at each other, of police cover- shifted their focus away from disorders as such ing their badges; and of leadership, equipment, and toward the policing of social movements strategic, and logistical failures that limited ef- and protest events (see, for example, Marx fectiveness and increased anger on all sides 1970a, 1988; della Porta and Reiter 1998; Earl, (Marx 1971a). This article explores how the po- Soule, and McCarthy 2003; Vitale 2005; della licing of civil disorders in a context of protest Porta, Peterson, and Reiter 2006; Waddington has changed since the 1960s. 2007; Soule and Davenport 2009; Earl 2011; We begin with a consideration of factors rel- Starr, Fernandez, and Scholl 2011; Gillham, Ed- evant to the relative absence of the large-scale wards, and Noakes 2013; Wood 2014). This shift

1. The Kerner report with its call for improved police responses appeared shortly before King’s death. Yet independent of the Kerner report awareness had increased within law enforcement of the need to avoid the kinds of failures seen in Detroit, Newark, and Watts. This statement is of course relative to American history, internation- ally and since the 1960s. Examples of post-1960s failures in policing of civil disorders include the 1979 Greens- boro massacre, the 1980 Miami race–McDuffie riots, and the six-day Rodney King riots in Los Angeles in 1992 (Moore 2012; Webster and William 1992).

rsf: the russell sage foundation journal of the social sciences 124 fiftieth ann iversary of the kerner report away from studying civil disorders is no doubt tinuum moving from communication to coer- related to their relative absence. Relevant fac- cion (Earl and Soule 2006; Wood 2007). tors in the decline likely include improved ways Contemporary research on the U.S. policing for filing grievances against police, the spread of protest and disorderly events has focused of civilian review boards, greater court recep- primarily on national special security events tiveness to police liability cases, and establish- (such as G20 meetings), disruptive protest ment of protest permitting systems (McCarthy events extensively covered by the media (such and McPhail 1998; McPhail, Schweingruber, as Occupy Wall Street), and on policing in large and McCarthy 1998; Schneider 2014).2 Yet, as metro areas like New York City and Washing- many of the articles in this issue suggest, the ton, D.C., where protests are routine (Gillham racial injustices seen by the commission persist and Marx 2000; Vitale 2005, 2007; Fernandez and in some ways have been worsened by the 2008; Starr, Fernandez, and Scholl 2011; Gill- devastating impacts of the war on drugs (Alex- ham, Edwards, and Noakes 2013; Wood 2014; ander 2011; Oliver 2008). King 2017). This research finds that the policing of protest and disorder has changed dramati- V arying Police Responses to cally since the 1960s, although scholars debate Protest and Disorders whether the changes are driven more by inno- Given the contemporary saliency of protests vations in police behavior or by changes in pro- and the fact that disorders often ignite from test tactics (Earl 2011). protest events (such as Ferguson, Baltimore, Police actions can facilitate, channel, or re- Standing Rock, and Charlottesville), for this ar- press protests (Marx 1988; Earl 2003). During ticle we draw on scholarship from the policing the 1950s and 1960s cycles of protest, police ap- of social movements and protest events to the- plied escalating levels of force to prevent or orize the changes in policing of civil disorders. constrain protests and disorders (McCarthy By civil disorders, we mean larger scale, disrup- and McPhail 1998). Such actions could result tive, public events directed at a dominant social in on-the- job troubles such as injuries, deaths, order that can include acts of civil disobedience and property damage, and in-the-job troubles and direct action, confrontations with law en- such as public criticism, commissions, and forcement and counter protesters, and behav- pressure from political elites (Walker 1968; ior such as looting, arson, and physical violence Waddington 1994). (Body- Gendrot 2017). Collective and individual In the aftermath of the Kerner Commission acts that occur during civil disorders involve and others (such as the Violence Commission) violence rituals, coordinated destruction, and researchers noted the development of a less opportunism whether directed at commodities, confrontational approach by leading law en- competing groups, or both (Tilly 2003; Wad- forcement agencies that emphasized negotiat- dington 2007). Our definition recognizes that ing with protesters the time, manner, and place such actions may represent political acts seen of demonstrations. Adopted first in Washing- as being of last resort (Hobsbawm 1964; Piven ton, D.C., in the early 1980s, the negotiated man- and Cloward 1979). Whether police view crowd agement style of protest policing developed behavior as protest or crime has important im- around an event permitting process, which in plications for where responses fall on a con- turn led to increased communication and co-

2. Just how independent, transparent, and effective current methods are is a different question, but the presence of these mechanisms, however imperfect, matters. In addition, when disorders occur they are likely to receive more balanced attention in the mass media and from the Justice Department than fifty years ago. Other possible factors for the abeyance of disorders include the appearance of stronger neighborhood, local community and professionalized national and other nongovernmental organizations (Noakes and Gillham 2006), and moves toward community policing, or at least greater receptiveness to community concerns. Finally, just as the war on drugs has devastated many minority communities by moving many black males younger than thirty into prison or placing them under some type of judicial supervision, this “war” has also removed potential participants from the pool of people who could participate in social movements and other forms of political activity (Oliver 2008).

rsf: the russell sage foundation journal of the social sciences the pol icing o f c ivil d isorders 125 operation between police and protesters and with commanders at headquarters. By the time an extended period of calm (McPhail, Schwe- commanders realized they and additional of- ingruber, and McCarthy 1998; McCarthy, ficers were needed on-site, it was often too late McPhail, and Crist 1999). Yet, since the disrup- as disorder rapidly spread and escalated, as was tive World Trade Organization protests in Se- the case in Detroit, Milwaukee, and Newark attle in 1999 police-pr otester relations have (Kerner Report 1968). been frequently more adversarial. Trust, coop- After a large-scale disorder was under way, eration, and communication have declined on police often had difficulty communicating with both sides as police sought to incapacitate pro- each other because they did not have radios on test and activists resisted such efforts (Noakes, their person and no special radio frequencies Klocke, and Gillham 2005; Vitale 2005, 2007; had been established to handle the additional Gillham and Noakes 2007; Gillham 2011; King radio traffic associated with the disorder re- 2017). sponse. Many departments did not have ade- These changes are noticeable relative to the quate organizational and technical means to 1960s. Drawing on media reports, police and communicate either with police in neighboring activist accounts, official after-action reports, jurisdictions or with state police and sheriff de- and our direct field observations from August partments. When other law enforcement agen- 16 through August 18, we analyze policing of cies were present, their radio frequencies were the 2014 Ferguson Missouri protests and disor- frequently incompatible, making it difficult to der that developed. The Ferguson case is im- respond quickly in an organized way (Kerner portant because it provides an opportunity to Report 1968, 269). study an infrequent occurrence of civil disorder To mitigate these command and control and law enforcement’s response, and illustrates troubles, the commission recommended that, some broader national changes seen in many first, a model operational plan providing guide- law enforcement agencies since the release of lines for responding to incidents and civil dis- the Kerner report. orders developed by the commission be distributed to all police departments;3 second, the Kerner Findings federal government fund the development of Among problems identified by the Kerner Com- miniaturized and portable radios for law en- mission were those involving operational plan- forcement; and, third, the Federal Communi- ning and police control equipment (see table cations Commission make enough frequencies 1). The first set ofoperational planning problems available to police and other first responders involved weaknesses in the dispatch-oriented (Kerner Report 1968, 269–70). command and control structure for policing The second set of operational planning disorders (Kerner Report 1968, 268). In the problems involved the lack of information or 1960s, departments used a dispatch-driven intelligence available to police about the plan- command and control system according to ning of protests and disorder events, and about which orders were delivered from a central lo- disorder events once they started (Kerner Re- cation via car radio to line officers on patrol. port 1968, 172–73, 269). The commission noted Officers responding to the scene of a crowd in- that many departments had little understand- cident radioed back to dispatch for help to dis- ing about the causes of unrest within primarily perse the crowd. Yet, when supporting officers black urban areas, had poor relations with peo- arrived at the scene, their presence and actions ple living in these segregated neighborhoods, could increase tensions among those already and generally lacked reliable means for gather- angry and distrustful of police. Because radios ing information about looming civil unrest. The were anchored to the patrol vehicle, officers at lack of broad understanding, poor relations, the scene were unable to easily communicate and relevant pre-disorder information pre-

3. The plan was integrated into a larger Guidelines for Civil Disorder and Mobilization Planning prepared by the Research, Development and Planning Division of the International Association of Chiefs of Police (Smith and Kobetz 1968). It was released six months after the Kerner report.

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Table 1. Kerner Findings: Mismanagement Factors, Problems, and Recommendations Related to Operational Planning and Police Equipment

Mismanagement Factor Problems Recommendation

Operational Dispatch driven command and control Police need operational plans that planning system provides insufficient structure provide guidelines for responding to for responding to incidents and civil incidents and civil disorders disorders Line officer radios located in patrol Federal government should initiate and vehicle. Thus, cannot communicate fund portable radio development with dispatch unless in vehicle programs No special radio frequency available to FCC should make enough frequencies use for public order emergencies; available to police and related public limited means to communicate with safety services to meet needs for neighboring law enforcement public order emergencies agencies; neighboring agencies used incompatible radio frequencies Limited information gathered before Develop intelligence units to gather, and during civil disorder. Thus, evaluate, analyze, and disseminate unable to make reliable assessment information about potential and and decisions in the field and unable actual civil disorders to counter rumors Police equipment Minimal self-protection equipment Provide proper equipment and clothing available for frontline officers to protect against threat to bodily resulting in officer injury harm Batons and hand guns, the primary Federal government should initiate control tools available for local law program to test and evaluate enforcement, are insufficient for nonlethal weapons for use by police, responding to civil disorders provide support to develop national standards to stimulate the private sector to produce these weapons, and direct funds to develop these weapons for local and state law enforcement agencies

Source: Authors’ tabulations. vented police from preparing adequately. More- police protective and control equipment. Most over, once civil disorders erupted, police had police departments did not provide officers -ad limited skills and methods for gathering infor- equate self-protection equipment against rocks, mation. This made responding to rumors dif- bottles, and other projectiles. Wooden batons ficult. Furthermore, few formal ways to dissem- and service revolvers were the primary methods inate accurate information about an incident of control (Kerner Report 1968, 176). The com- or disorder were in place, leaving rumors and mission questioned the justification for using media to shape the public’s view of events. The deadly force during civil disorders, noting the commission recommended that police develop risk of killing or wounding innocent people, intelligence units to gather, evaluate, analyze, that the property crimes committed during dis- and disseminate information about potential order events did not warrant the use of lethal civil disorders and during civil disorders (269). force, and that excessive force (including the Another set of problems identified involved inappropriate display of weapons) could pro-

rsf: the russell sage foundation journal of the social sciences the pol icing o f c ivil d isorders 127 voke further disorder. The commission saw a death threats to police and shots being fired need for control tools in the “middle range of nearby. In response, the SLCPD deployed their physical force” that could be used “more hu- Tactical Operations Unit, then initiated the manely” and effectively for regular policing and county’s Code 1000 Plan, which mobilized aid during times of unrest (176). from neighboring police departments and ac- The commission recommended that the fed- tivated the Riot A Channel for exclusive com- eral government undertake a program to test munication between responding law enforce- and evaluate “nonlethal” weapons for use by ment agencies (IIR 2015, 5–9). More than fifty police, provide support “to establish criteria officers from multiple agencies quickly arrived and standards specifications to stimulate [pri- and staged at two nearby locations. Crowds vate industry to produce] such items,” and di- continued to grow at the homicide scene and rect funds “to be used to develop appropriate formed at the police staging areas and outside tools . . . for local and state law enforcement the Ferguson PD headquarters. Protests con- agencies (Kerner Report 1968, 272). The com- tinued at these locations until early morning mission further warned against militarizing lo- August 10 (10–11). cal police because doing so risked “destroy[ing] Mid- morning of August 10, crowds reassem- the concept of civilian police as a public service bled around the city. In response, SLCPD and agency dependent for effective operations on Ferguson police chiefs established an “infor- community cooperation and support” (272). mal joint command” within the Ferguson PD We next compare the commission’s recom- headquarters and used the Code 1000 plan to mendations with what we saw in Ferguson to request more officers from surrounding juris- illustrate changes in the policing of disorder. dictions. After an evening candle-light vigil at The contrast between policing of the 1960s and the site of the shooting, angry protesters surged today is clear, just as are commonalities. Al- into streets chanting “no justice, no peace.” though many factors are involved, the changes They were met by police in riot gear holding in law enforcement seen in the illustrative case rifles and shields New( York Times 2014). After study that follows are consistent with the basic this confrontation, the first civil disorder began thrust of the Kerner recommendations and cer- when several protesters vandalized police ve- tainly had an important impact. hicles, damaged property, and looted businesses along West Florissant Avenue (Barker T ransformation in the 2014). Police deployed armored vehicles and Policing of Disorder canine units to protect officers from thrown We next consider key events in Ferguson over projectiles and more reported gun fire. the sixteen days between the killing of Michael The SLCPD chief took charge as incident Brown and his funeral. We then use the Fergu- commander and extended the Code 1000 Plan son case to highlight changes in police opera- by initiating a formal Incident Command Sys- tional planning and equipment since Kerner tem (ICS) framework. The ICS, an organiza- and note some institutional forces contributing tional framework first developed by FEMA and to these changes. adopted nationally by first responders, is “a standardized personnel management tool” that The Ferguson Case (August 9– establishes an integrated organizational com- August 25, 2014) mand and control framework which designates On August 9, shortly after noon, a Ferguson an incident commander to manage all person- police officer shot and killed eighteen-y ear-old nel and make critical decisions (Bigley and Michael Brown, an unarmed African American Roberts 2001; St. Louis County 2013, 6). As part man. Backup officers from the Ferguson Police of the ICS police established an official com- Department (PD) and the St. Louis County Po- mand post in a mall on West Florissant Avenue. lice Department (SLCPD) rushed to the scene After allegedly giving dispersal orders, tactical and pushed back an agitated crowd that had teams fired smoke canisters and tear gas, push- gathered. Officers reported an increasingly cha- ing protesters and looters north into the town otic scene, with some crowd members making of Dellwood. That night, police made thirty-t wo

rsf: the russell sage foundation journal of the social sciences 128 fiftieth ann iversary of the kerner report arrests (Barker 2014; Giegerich, Bogan, and Bell August 16, Governor Nixon declared a state 2014; Institute for Intergovernmental Research of emergency and imposed a midnight to 5:00 2015, 11–15). a.m. curfew. In the streets, officers with hel- Over the next several days, a similar cycle mets, face protectors, gas masks, riot batons, persisted of peaceful protests during the day- shields, and Kevlar vests formed lines separat- time and a mix of peaceful, unruly, and illegal ing people on the streets and sidewalks from actions during the night. According to police local businesses. Tactical teams in full battle reports, at night some citizens looted and gear moved small groups of people around the burned businesses, threw Molotov cocktails streets and sidewalks and stood guard at road- and other projectiles at police lines, fired guns, blocks. That night police again used armored and destroyed civilian and police vehicles. Po- vehicles, lines of officers, less-lethal weapons, lice forcefully responded by driving armored and arrests to disperse crowds (IIR 2015, 24–25). vehicles into the streets, deploying tear gas and On the evening of August 17, police reported other less-lethal weapons, and making arrests that a large crowd attempted to overtake the (IIR 2015, 15–17, 58). command post. It is unclear whether this was As news of the unrest spread through con- the intent of those in the crowd or they had as- ventional media and social media outlets, po- sembled simply to protest police actions or the lice intelligence reports indicated that people curfew order. Police dispatched a helicopter to from across the region and country had begun provide overhead surveillance and a line of of- arriving in Ferguson, some to protest and oth- ficers led by SWAT units used smoke bombs, ers with intent to exploit opportunities for per- tear gas, and other less-lethal weapons to move sonal gain (IIR 2015, 18, 58). Local, county, and the crowd back north on West Florissant Ave- state political leaders, frustrated by the in- nue. Several businesses were looted and a brawl creased disorder and negative media attention between 150 people broke out. As the chaos in- wanted the incident commander replaced. On creased, all police teams were pulled back in August 14, Governor Nixon responded by de- hope to diffuse the anger of people in the claring a state of emergency and making Mis- streets. But the disorder raged on as the most souri State Highway Patrol Captain Johnson, violent night of unrest yet. The next day, Gov- an African American, incident commander. ernor Nixon lifted the curfew and ordered the Protester and police interactions were calmer National Guard to protect the command post, that night, perhaps because of the governor’s freeing up police officers to help with disorder action (20). control (IIR 2015, 26–28). The calm, though, was short lived. On Au- August 19 was a turning point. Hostile inter- gust 15, the Ferguson Police Department iden- actions continued between protesters and po- tified Darren Wilson as the officer who had lice, but less rioting, property damage, and killed Michael Brown and released a surveil- shots fired were reported. Over the next several lance video showing that Brown had allegedly days “a calm began to emerge”—as fewer peo- stolen a package of cigars from a convenience ple protested and less anger was exhibited (IIR store shortly before he was stopped by Wilson. 2015, 28). On August 21, the governor ordered A later unedited version of the video indicated the Missouri National Guard to withdraw from that Brown may not have stolen the cigars Ferguson. By August 24, police report that pro- (Smith 2017). Hundreds of people assembled test had continued to decrease in size and “a outside the Ferguson Police Department head- sense of normalcy was returning.” On August quarters to condemn release of the video, seen 25, Michael Brown was laid to rest. At his fa- by many in the community as a ploy to demon- ther’s request, no protests occurred during the ize Brown and justify the shooting. Like previ- funeral (IIR 2015, 28–29). ous nights, people again engaged in rioting and looting while peaceful protesters looked on. Fifty Years After Kerner This time, police stood by choosing not to act We use the Ferguson case to consider our first out of concern they would only make things major question: What has changed in the po- worse (IIR 2015, 21–23). licing of protest and civil disorder since the

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Table 2. Police Command and Control System, Intelligence Practices, and Protective and Control Equipment During Disorders in the 1960s and in Ferguson in 2014

1960s Ferguson

Command and Dispatch driven Code 1000 Plan and ICS control system No special radio frequency for RIOT A radio frequencies emergencies Radios located in patrol vehicles Vehicle and portable radios, cell incompatible with radios used by phones, and text messaging across neighboring jurisdictions command chain Intelligence No formal intelligence units in Joint intelligence unit formed from practices most PDs SLCPD, SLMPD, SL Fusion Center; assistance from MO Info Analysis Center Limited information gathered before No information gathered before civil civil disorder disorder Limited information gathered during Event data collected by intel unit in civil disorder static and real time via undercover officers, officers in streets, permits, aircraft, police video-streaming, social media monitoring Information about outside protest groups collected by intel unit; relied on cross-national diverse intelligence information systems including fusion centers Self-protection Minimal self-protection available Helmets, gas masks, Kevlar vests, and equipment shields (line officers and tactical units) Military grade body armor, battle dress, and armored vehicles (tactical units) Control Baton and guns Less-lethal weapons to disperse and equipment incapacitate, such as impact, acoustic, and chemical irritants (line officers and tactical units) Armored vehicles and displayed military firepower to deter and intimidate (tactical units)

Source: Authors’ tabulations.

Kerner report? We limit our analysis to changes effectively across the chain of command has in police operational planning related to com- improved significantly since Kerner. For many mand and control and the gathering and anal- years, St. Louis County has had a Code 1000 ysis of intelligence, and police equipment used Plan that aides nearby agencies in planning (see table 2). After highlighting some of these and control for civil disorders and disasters (St. changes, we identify institutional forces that Louis County 2013). When activated on August have contributed to the changes. 9, the nearest twenty-five police cars from various jurisdictions were immediately dispatched Command and Control in Ferguson to the homicide scene along with a crowd- Commanders’ abilities to quickly receive assis- control mobile response team. Other officers tance from other agencies and to communicate self- deployed when they heard the Code 1000

rsf: the russell sage foundation journal of the social sciences 130 fiftieth ann iversary of the kerner report request (Belmar and Kleinknecht 2016; IIR Intelligence in Ferguson 2015). Besides providing a mechanism to Intelligence practices have also radically promptly mobilize mutual aid, the Code 1000 changed. Today, police departments rely on in- Plan also provided a framework for managing house intelligence units, new surveillance tech- personnel during the early hours of the crises. nologies, and cooperation among law enforce- For example, for each five officers that re - ment across a national network of fusion sponded to the Code 1000 request, a command- centers (IIR 2015; Gillham 2011; Narr et al. ing officer was deployed. The commanding of- 2006). Ferguson police did not have an active ficer then made decisions in the field and intelligence unit when the uprising began. communicated with the SLCPD chief who had However, once the ICS protocol was initiated, initiated the Code 1000 (IIR 2015). a joint intelligence unit was established to Once it became clear that the civil disorder monitor the civil disorder and related issues. would not quickly dissipate, law enforcement The unit drew officers and other resources from officials initiated an ICS framework, which for- the separate intelligence units of the SLCPD mally designated the incident commander and and St. Louis Metropolitan Police Department, required establishment of an operations com- the St. Louis Fusion Center, and the Missouri mand post and lines of communication across State Fusion Center (IIR 2015, 82). the ICS chain of command, designated an op- The quickly assembled intelligence unit was erations officer to coordinate tactical opera- able to gather event data as the protests mobi- tions and a public information officer to com- lized and the disorders spread (IIR 2015, 129). municate to the media and community, The intelligence unit relied on various local re- established law enforcement staging areas, and sources including local agency helicopters assigned support staff (St. Louis County 2013, equipped with the latest forward-looking infra- 6; Bigley and Roberts 2001; FEMA 2013). Reli- red (FLIR) night vision and moving map tech- ance on such extensive and versatile opera- nologies, undercover intelligence officers cir- tional guidelines as provided by the Code 1000 culating among the crowds, and officers Plan and ICS framework indicates an organi- tracking social media (St. Louis County Police zational shift in law enforcement’s command Department 2014, 19; IIR 2015, 82, 101). Much and control structure far beyond what the of this locally based intelligence gathering was Kerner Commission envisioned. conducted using “new surveillance technolo- Relatedly, communication technologies gies” (Marx 2002, 2016), such as Geofeedia, a have of course changed dramatically since surveillance platform that links social media Kerner. Police agencies now have access to por- posts with the location of the posting. Geofee- table radios on the same frequencies as vehicle dia showed the intelligence unit the exact loca- radios and as radios in other jurisdictions. In tions of the worst disorder from pictures and Ferguson, the county dispatcher could contact video posted by protesters (Ozer 2016). agencies needed to respond to the initial call The joint intelligence unit also relied on out- for assistance and special RIOT channels were side assistance. FBI aerial surveillance pin- available. Most radios synced well, despite in- pointed the location of fires and where people teroperability issues still common elsewhere were gathered (Tucker 2015). National law en- (IIR 2015; Weiser 2007). When there were fail- forcement and private sector analysts provided ures, a communications officer activated the the intelligence unit “information through di- IP Interoperability and Collaboration System verse intelligence information systems” (IIR and bridged communication networks across 2015, 83), including the hub-and-spoke network all agencies (Kanowitz 2016). Interoperability of seventy-eight fusion centers distributed na- was also provided through officers’ smart tionwide (82). phones which received bulk message texts via Although secrecy surrounding a sensitive a private messaging service (IIR 2015, 106) and topic inhibits a full understanding of where in- likely allowed the sharing of maps, photos, and formation came from and how it was used in- videos among officers in the streets and com- ternally, the public information officer used mand center. some information to counter rumors and pro-

rsf: the russell sage foundation journal of the social sciences the pol icing o f c ivil d isorders 131 tester narratives of events, and to portray police up groups, and assess wind direction before in a positive light (IIR 2015). The use of public deploying tear gas (IIR 2015, 46–49). information officers in these ways is a common Police had more than mid-le vel weapons national practice (Gillham, Edwards, and available, however. Tactical units relied heavily Noakes 2013; Narr et al. 2006). The surveillance on military-grade equipment and techniques. and information acquisition and sharing capac- They carried automatic rifles, had strapped to ity has expanded significantly since the 1960s. their vests high-capacity magazines containing one to two hundred rounds of ammunition for Self-protection Equipment in Ferguson their weapons, and used armored vehicles to Police involved in management of the Ferguson disperse crowds (IIR 2015). The Lenco Bearcat, disorder were well equipped in protective gear a close cousin to the U.S. military mine-resist ant, relative to the 1960s (see table 2). Line officers ambush-protected vehicle, was the most prom- in Ferguson wore their regular duty uniforms inent type of armored vehicle deployed. The and Kevlar vests and were issued protective SLCPD’s Bearcat was twenty feet long and ten equipment depending on the officer assign- feet wide, weighed eighteen thousand pounds, ment. Agents policing the most disorderly lo- and had an elevated platform that would allow cations (such as the SLCPD and Missouri State access to the third floor of a building (Lenco Highway Patrol) had helmets, handheld 2014; Belmar and Kleinknecht 2016, 36). Tactical shields, face shields, and gas masks (IIR 2015, officers used the platform to post lookouts and 57). More visually and technically striking was snipers who pointed their rifles at people in the the protective gear worn by tactical officers: crowd while using their high-powered sights to “battle dress uniforms,” some in camouflage, search for people with weapons (IIR 2015). At- military boots, utility belts and web guns, Kev- tached to the Bearcat was a military long-range lar helmets with night vision equipment, gog- acoustical device or “sound cannon,” which gles, gasmasks, “level-three heavy vests,” and would transmit verbal announcements or warn- some body armor. They also had available ar- ings across long distances or high-pitc hed, ear- mored vehicles for safe transit and to extract damaging tones to disperse crowds. officers and injured citizens from volatile settings (IIR 2015; Pickler 2015; Belmar and Klein Institutional Forces of Change knecht 2016). Several institutional forces contributed to these organizational and technological response Control Equipment in Ferguson changes. Closely connected to the Kerner Com- The range of mid-le vel weapons that aug- mission recommendations was creation of the mented officers’ batons and service revolvers National Institute of Justice (NIJ) to research contrasted markedly with the 1960s. Line offi- and standardize police equipment and tech- cers and tactical units had electronic control nologies. Another important set of institutional weapons such as Tasers and an arsenal of vari- forces link to the U.S. Department of Homeland ous projectiles, which had varying levels of im- Security (DHS). These include requirements pact on their human targets. Less painful and that law enforcement agencies receiving federal less likely to cause serious injury were hand- grants must adopt the ICS framework, creation thrown Stingerball devices that released rubber of the fusion center network, and the establish- balls and pyrotechnic fire and sounds. More ment of antiterrorism grant programs.4 painful and likely to injure people were bean bag rounds fired from shotguns, and Pepper- National Institute of Justice and Ball rounds and wooden batons both fired from Development of Police Technologies handheld launchers. Smoke canisters were The various mid-le vel weapons and communi- fired to disorient people in the streets, break cation and surveillance technologies available

4. Space limitations prevent us from elaborating on other similar institutional forces including the rise of paramilitary police units and the Department of Defense 1033 Program that leases military equipment to local law enforcement agencies (see Kraska and Cubellis 1997; Kraska and Kappeler 1997; Balko 2013; Wood 2014).

rsf: the russell sage foundation journal of the social sciences 132 fiftieth ann iversary of the kerner report to law enforcement in Ferguson and nationally tute of Justice 1994, 52). Fourth, the NIJ joined were developed with assistance from the NIJ, with universities and the private sector to dis- the research branch of the U.S. Department of seminate knowledge about these technologies Justice. The NIJ was formed in 1969 following through commercial trade journals, trade recommendations made by President John- shows that coincided with police conventions, son’s 1966 Commission on Law Enforcement and guides for less-lethal weapons (Weapons and Administration of Justice and the Kerner and Protective Systems Technologies Center Commission report. A central purpose of the 2010; Wood 2014). NIJ was to promote the innovation and adop- By the time of the Ferguson protests, a mar- tion of police technologies used to manage pro- ket had been created whereby law enforcement test and disorder (National Institute of Justice agencies across the country could find power- 1994, 10, 44.). ful and affordable middle-range weapons and The NIJ promoted this innovation and adop- other technologies (Wood 2014; Balko 2013). tion through four mechanisms. First, in the early 1970s, the Institute developed the Police Department of Homeland Security and Change Weapons System Program to assess “policies The DHS, created in the aftermath of the ter- and practices in the acquisition and use of of- rorist attacks of September 11, 2001, has been fensive and defensive weapons by law enforce- responsible for three other institutional forces ment” and evaluated existing police weapons that have shaped law enforcement’s adoption systems not yet widely adopted (1994, 45). Sec- of the ICS framework and new technologies ond, simultaneously it launched the Law En- used in response to protest and civil disorder. forcement Standards Laboratory with the dual The first is the requirement that state and local purpose of establishing “scientifically based, agencies who receive federal grants must adopt voluntary commercial manufacturing stan- FEMA ICS protocols. dards” and certifying a nationwide network of The ICS structure was initially developed by “laboratories where equipment items could be the U.S. Forest Service and supporting state and evaluated according to those standards” (45). local agencies in reaction to several organiza- By 1975, the laboratory had developed perfor- tional problems encountered by first respond- mance standards for technologies recom- ers during catastrophic wildfires in California mended by the Kerner report including por- in 1970 (Chase 1980).5 After the Forest Service table radios and defensive gear such as riot and other fire agencies adopted the ICS frame- helmets, light weight body armor, and ballistic work, FEMA adopted ICS as a best practice and shields. Over the years, the NIJ has continued recommended that other first responder agen- to update these standards, including for new cies, including law enforcement, do the same surveillance technologies (National Institute of (Cardwell and Cooney 2000). However, most Justice 1994; Nunn 2001). law enforcement agencies were slow to adopt Third, the NIJ provided research grants to ICS (Cardwell and Cooney 2000; Buck, Trainor, improve existing weapons and develop new and Aguirre 2006). ones. These grants were distributed through After establishing the DHS, President projects such as the Less-Lethal Technologies George W. Bush directed state and local agen- Program started in 1986, and Joint Non-L ethal cies that receive federal grant funds, including Weapons Program started in 1996 (Wood 2014). law enforcement agencies, to adopt FEMA’s ICS Through these grants, less-lethal products such approach for managing emergencies.6 Today, as pepper spray and adjustable-velocity projec- as a consequence of this directive, most law tile launchers were developed (National Insti- enforcement departments have adopted a

5. These problems (similar to the organizational planning problems identified in the Kerner report) included “overloaded spans of control . . . , lack of reliable information, inadequate and incompatible communication, . . . and unclear lines of authority” (Lutz and Lindell 2008, 123).

6. HSPD-5, Directive on Management of Domestic Incidents, February 28, 2003 (accessed May 4, 2018, https:// www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/Homeland%20Security%20Presidential%20Directive%205.pdf).

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FEMA modeled ICS for responding in emer- Ho w Many Cheers? Some Impacts in gency situations, including situations like the Ferguson and Beyond civil disorder that broke out in Ferguson (IIR Besides organizational and technical changes, 2015). we note changes in police culture, specifically, Another DHS-re lated institutional force was better empirical understanding of crowd be- the establishment of a national fusion center havior and the rights of citizens. In many cases network. Fusion centers, paid for with post-9/11 this has resulted in a softening of, and greater federal grants, are charged with receiving, ana- differentiation in, police responses, even as this lyzing, gathering, and sharing threat-re lated brings risks of under-r eaction. Yet simultane- information across federal, state, local, tribal, ously some law and order responses to crowds territorial, and private-sector partners (DHS have hardened, bringing risks of over-reaction 2017). Analysts in local or state fusion centers (for example, blurring the lines between local send information to other centers and to the police and the military with respect to available central DHS watch center (DHS 2017). As noted tools, tactics, and cooperation). in our case, this network provided vital infor- Given the vast time period and significant mation to the Ferguson intelligence unit as variation across places and types of events any they have to local police agencies responding conclusions about consequences of “what to other recent protests and disorders (Gillham, worked and what has not worked since Kerner?” Edwards, and Noakes 2013; Police Executive Re- must be tentative. Furthermore, any consider- search Forum 2015; Meyer 2017). ation of what works in the context of a semi- A final institutional force is DHS grants pro- secret institution with unique powers of coer- vided to law enforcement agencies for national cion charged with maintaining an unequal security. Since 2003, Urban Areas Security Ini- status quo must be qualified more than for tiative (UASI) grants have provided more than other less adversarial institutions. Yet, some $500 million annually to the largest metropol- broader conclusions can be drawn from the itan areas in the United States, enabling police Ferguson case with respect to current police to acquire military equipment and less-lethal command and control systems, intelligence weapons (Balko 2013; DHS 2014; IIR 2015, 58). practices, and equipment (see table 3). These funds are intended to “address the The organizational and equipment changes unique planning, organization, equipment, seen in Ferguson were not accompanied by ci- training, and exercise needs of high-threat, vilian or police fatalities. As noted in table 3, high-density urban areas, and assists them in policing practices employed during Ferguson building an enhanced and sustainable capacity worked in some ways to deal with issues raised to prevent, protect against, respond to, and re- by the Kerner Commission (such as rapid mo- cover from acts of terrorism” (FEMA 2010, 2). bilization, clearer chain of command, improved But these funds pay for equipment used for communication within and between agencies more than anti-terrorism measures. The SLCPD and officers, dispelling of rumors through pub- used UASI grants to purchase their Bearcat, lic information officers, better intelligence dur- protective gear, and less-lethal weapons used ing events, safety equipment, use of less-lethal during the Ferguson unrest (Belmar and weapons). Kleinknecht 2016; IIR 2015). Yet, paradoxically, these practices can be ac- In sum, the provision of federal resources companied by ironic or unforeseen conse- and funding requirements helped standardize quences. Consider the ways local police have practices, improved communication across become more militarized—a factor the Kerner agencies, and provided support for new prac- report clearly warned against. Although in- tices and technologies unlikely to be locally creasing militarization provides protective funded. Clearly, in important ways the policing equipment for police and superior force to po- of protest has dramatically changed since tentially deter violent assaults against police or Kerner. Next, we consider what worked and others, it can also reinforce feelings of fear and what did not work as a consequence of the de- anger and the view that police are an occupy- scribed changes. ing army rather a public force that protects and

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Table 3. Police Command and Control System, Intelligence Practices, and Protective and Control Equipment Used in Ferguson in 2014

Worked Did Not Work

Command and control system 1000 Plan/ICS Plan Provided efficient mechanism to Drew self-deploying officers rapidly mobilize officers from undertrained in disorder control multiple agencies and without direct supervision Established clear chain of command Incident commander communicated for decision-making, orders inconsistently resulting in communicating orders, and contradictory and under- communicating with public to enforcement that escalated dispel rumors disorder Misinformation provided in cigar video inflamed community members and escalated disorder RIOT radio frequency, Facilitated efficient and closed Closed communications minimized portable radios, cell communication between officers public transparency about police phones, and text Prevented communication system actions messaging overload

Intelligence practices Local intelligence unit Used extensive in-house surveillance Revealed extent of national with extensive and analytic tools to gather and surveillance system with capacity in-house surveillance analyze multiple sources and large to violate privacy rights; created and analytic tools amounts of static and real-time distrust and chilled protest available information; able to quickly assess risk and respond, and to collect evidence for prosecution National fusion center Used extensive national surveillance Revealed extent of national network and analytic tools to gather and surveillance system with capacity analyze multiple sources and large to violate privacy rights; created amounts of static and real-time distrust and chilled protest information; able to inform Ferguson intelligence unit about events there and potential outsider threats Control equipment and techniques Self-protection Minimized individual injury to Distanced officers from community equipment officers in the field members, chilled protest Deployment of mili- Display of firepower may have Frightened and angered community tary grade equip- deterred some disorder; armored members, delegitimized police in ment vehicles provided way to extract local communities and nationally, officers and injured protesters from may have escalated disorder, risk of volatile settings mass fatalities Use of less-lethal Prevented deaths and reduced Frightened and angered community weapons incident of serious injuries members, delegitimized police in local communities and nationally, more people affected by police use of force, may have escalated disorder

Source: Authors’ tabulations.

rsf: the russell sage foundation journal of the social sciences the pol icing o f c ivil d isorders 135 serves its community. First Amendment activ- policing since the late 1960s to draw some em- ities may be chilled, already damaged relations pirical conclusions relevant for today (see ta- may be worsened, and police further delegiti- ble 4). mized. If disorder persists, a militarized force In the decades since Kerner, rather than tak- can attract more people into the streets out of ing an explicitly adversarial and intentionally curiosity, excitement, or anger (Gillham and violent approach specifically against protests, Marx 2000). Another risk is that officers armed police have often sought a more velvet-gloved, with automatic weapons might inadvertently neutral, measured stance, even as the nearby, kill many citizens or other officers. out of sight, iron fist of the National Guard, Less- lethal weapons also raise questions. In military, and hardware with varying degrees of Ferguson, the police use of less-lethal weapons lethality could be quickly mobilized. The polic- might have prevented fatalities. Yet the meth- ing of protest has thus become more accepted ods were controversial. Police claimed they and better understood as a routine part of local used tear gas to disperse crowds. But com- policing. Although the police hardly welcome plaints were lodged that police used it to pun- them, mass demonstrations today in general ish protesters, gave either no or inadequate no longer arouse the hostility or fear they pre- warnings to disperse before using, and gas viously did. Yet large-scale disorders that spill seeped into adjacent homes (IIR 2015, 49–51). out of protests like that in Ferguson still create As is true of military-grade equipment, the use conditions where police may react in ways that of less-lethal weapons worked in some ways, violate civil liberties, have a chilling effect on even as it created problems. The question of nonviolent protest, and escalate disorders, just what worked and what did not is in many ways as they did in the 1960s and historically, a question of the trade-offs,paradoxes, and iro- whether the issue was race or unions. nies inherent in any intervention in complex But today law enforcement is less quick to social environments. automatically categorize all those in the streets as riffraff, criminals, rebellious adolescents, Implications for the Twenty-First Century manipulated students, or agents of a foreign We conclude with two sets of issues—one em- power. Rather, they are often seen as citizens pirical and one evaluative to address a final with rights, though they are expected to keep question: What are the implications of changes their disorder within bounds. More than in the in policing of disorder for a democratic Amer- 1960s, police view their job to be managing ican society in the twenty-fi rst century? rather than repressing protest, protecting the right to demonstrate and guaranteeing due pro- Empirical Issues cess of law and to use a minimum amount of Social scientists generally have a terrible rep- force to restore order (even to those whose utation for predicting the future. Thus, a note views they may find intolerable). The presence of caution is needed regarding sweeping con- of video, cell phone cameras, and body cam- clusions and predictions about the trends we eras, with their potential for accountability can identified. It is too easy to assume that the support this. patterns from the past will be present in the Exceptions to this trend are numerous (see future, or, if they are, that they will be found in note 1). The pattern of police pacification itself the same ratios and be accounted for by the involves a series of interrelated developments same causal factors as previously. In the re- and may not continue in the face of wrench- search presented here, any conclusions must ing social changes or widespread social un- be tempered by the fact that there is an always rest. Nor is it unilateral across dimensions, evolving, dynamic, and fluid conflictual dance groups, or contexts—as any venture into mar- between police and those involved in protest ginalized, ethnically diverse, lower-income ar- and disorder (Gillham and Marx 2000). But, eas or discussions with those who have had holding apart questions about trying to pre- their rights violated and their bodies assaulted dict the future, we build off Marx’s (1998) ear- can attest (Wood 2007). But viewed in com- lier reflections on the developing ethos of U.S. parative and historical terms in which the

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Table 4. The Evolving Ethos of the Policing of Protests and Civil Disorders in the United States Since 1967

1. Police are servants of the law rather than the private army of whoever happens to be in power. 2. Law and policy are extended to tactics that had once been ignored and unregulated. 3. The law must be viewed flexibly, and a broad pragmatic view of the likely consequences of police action needs to be taken. 4. The primary goal of police in conventional crowd situations is to manage them to see that they do not get out of hand. 5. Emphasis is on prevention rather than responding after the fact. 6. A coproduction of order should involve a decentralized and delegated reliance on citizens to enforce the law and to control themselves. 7. E mphasis is placed on science and technology involving, first, efforts to engineer physical and social environments while minimizing to the extent possible the militarization of local police or using a technical method simply because it is available, and, second, relatively dispassionate intelligence gathering and analysis. Information technology is central to police managing information about police themselves, events, and protesters. 8. Efforts are made to learn from past events to be better prepared the next time, yet with flexibility, avoiding being rigidly captured by current en vogue doctrines. 9. The federal leadership role is stronger from the start. This involves an effort to develop uniform approaches across soft as well as hard police methods; to increase communication, integration, and cooperation to create more uniform, standardized operations and procedures across local, state, and federal authorities; and to create national standards and best practices. 10. Police are more militarized, particularly with regards to equipment. Logistical, organizational, and communication borders between local, regional, and state control agencies, and between them and the military, are weaker.

Source: Authors’ tabulations (adapted from Marx 1998). Note: Italicized text are additions.

standard police response was, and in many management of disorders? Is law enforce - countries still is, to prohibit demonstrations ment’s ability to avoid killing protesters in or to fire or charge into crowds, the trends the streets or to intervene preventively a sign matter. The ethos of demonstration policing of progress? Is this a cause for some modest Marx saw thirty years after Kerner, holds, if celebration, or at least appreciation? Cer - with some changes in 2018 (Marx 1998; see ta- tainly, the avoidance of provocation, injury ble 4 and appendix). or loss of life, cities on fire, and escalation, as well as decreasing hatred and alienation Moral and Political Issues are positive. Full-scale riots leave deep reser- Apart from what can be seen or empirically voirs of bitterness on all sides and are con - demonstrated are questions of interpretation ducive to backlash and draconian policies. involving moral and political judgments. With We saw that clearly with the backlash and respect to the latter, what can be said about the weakening of the civil rights movement re - impact of more controlled (and what are seen lated to Nixon’s presidency. It is hard to see conventionally to be effective) police re - who really profited from the prolonged 1960s sponses? We need to ask effective for whom disorders. It is much easier to see short-r un and by what standards? costs (Shellow et al. 2018).7 How should we judge developments in the The development of a more pacific, demo-

7. Rob Shellow and his colleagues note how outcomes varied in the short run aftermath by city characteristics and type of event.

rsf: the russell sage foundation journal of the social sciences the pol icing o f c ivil d isorders 137 cratic policing ethos is not without contradic- from it as racial injustice (Marx 1970b, 2018). tions, challenges, risks and trade-offs relative What it takes to prevent or stop a civil disorder to other models (Marx 1988; Gillham and Marx is distinct (other than the issue of police abuse 2000). As noted earlier, we need to ask what that can precipitate and contribute to disorder) does it mean to say that a police response from changes in economic and political op- works? With health care or schools, we seek portunity, education, housing, health, and the maximum effectiveness. But for police in a dem- many other factors related to inequality that ocratic society we need optimal (rather than propel disorders. maximal) effectiveness. Practices must be con- Improved and more effective police re- tinually reexamined given changing conditions, sponses can often stop disorders from escalat- tactics, and actors. In the case of efforts to cre- ing. But to the extent that they are unfairly re- ate more professional police and to regulate pressive and deter legitimate protest, they may discretion in crowd situations, the challenge is deepen racial injustice and the anger and de- in finding the right mix such that honoring dis- spair that help fuel disorders. cretion does not put police beyond the law and Democratic societies experience a continual responsible political control, and that regulat- tension between the desire for order and the ing discretion does not introduce undue rigid- desire for liberty. Although, as the case of the ity. Order needs to be maintained and the law police state suggests, one can have the former (with its vagaries and conflicts) followed, but without the latter, it is not possible to have a not at great cost to citizens’ rights, the elimina- society with liberty that does not also have a tion of protest as a tool for social change, or minimum degree of order. The balance be- the permanent institutionalization of strong tween these will vary depending on the context control responses temporarily created and jus- and time period. Policing in a democracy seeks tified by a major crisis (such as 9/11). In such to avoid the extremes of either anarchy or re- cases, strong oversight and renewal procedures pression. are necessary to keep responses measured and In an open democratic society that respects proportionate. the dignity of the individual and values volun- There is no guarantee that the enhance- tary and consensual behavior and the nonvio- ments of police powers relative to crowds will lent resolution of conflicts, police—with their be used to protect, rather than to undermine power, secrecy, and use of violence and decep- democracy. A democratic society must contin- tion—are an anomaly. They are charged with ually ask the question, “how efficient do we using undemocratic means to help create dem- want police to be?” Democratic societies have ocratic ends. Police offer an ethical and moral traditionally been willing to sacrifice a degree paradox that should forever make democratic of order for increased liberty, but not in times citizens vigilant. of crisis. At such times the danger of a creeping This paradox is evident in the fact that a (or galloping) downhill spiral is ever present. democratic society needs protection both by When liberty is reduced on behalf of order, police and from police. Restrictions on police transparency is particularly important, as is power are not an adequate guarantee of free- avoiding the risk of artificially created or exag- dom. Taken too far, they may even guarantee gerated crises to justify that sacrifice. its opposite, as private interests reign un - We can ask that a bandage or pain reliever checked or citizens take the law into their own do its job and certainly not make an injury hands in the face of increased disorder, or worse, even as it is not a cure. President John- both. Yet a police force with too much power son’s charge to the commission was muddied is also a danger. President Abraham Lincoln regarding the link between his three often- posed the dilemma well when he asked, “must cited questions (“what happened, why did it a government, of necessity, be too strong for happen and what can be done to prevent it the liberties of its’ own people, or too weak to happening again”). The it was taken to mean maintain its’ existence?” This paradox remains riot stoppage. But what was really needed was one of the major challenges of democratic gov- a fourth question separating it as riot control ernance.

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A ppendix: Working for the could actively help create, rather than under- Kerner Commission and mine, political stability (at least relative to not Related Reflections permitting or responding violently to them). Gary T. Marx had the good fortune to work for The extensive media coverage of Chicago police the commission as part of a research group led attacking protesters was a public relations di- by Rob Shellow and studied police behavior saster and such behavior made the police job and types of disorder. When the Kerner Com- much more difficult. At the time, his views were mission studied questions of the police and heretical and he left the police soon after, but civil disorders, very little social science re- in the decades since they have become more search had been undertaken to inform the anal- widely shared among major police leaders in ysis; the dominant control ethos was a hard- the United States. The management of disor- line, law and order approach in a context of a ders continues to evolve. decentralized federal law enforcement system. How control agents frame events bears di- Marx describes the experience of working rectly on control responses. If they are defined for the commission and on a suppressed report as (or only as) violations of law and order and The Harvest of Racism (2018; Shellow et al. 2018), the criminal code, then hard repression is the published on the fiftieth anniversary of its writ- more likely response. If, in contrast, they are ing. For Marx, the focus on these issues helped also seen as connected to understandable pro- define over five decades of scholarly work. The tests because grievances are present (apart chance to work on these questions at the begin- from whether police are in sympathy with ning of a career with the abundant resources, these) or because citizen’s have the right to ex- legitimation, and access of a national commis- press their concerns, then a soft communica- sion was most fortuitous and sustaining. That tions approach, particularly at the outset, is experience provided data, research questions, more likely (Tilly 2000; Gillham and Noakes and scholarly connections that lasted a lifetime 2007). Adopting either approach to the exclu- on topics such as police behavior in riots and sion of the other brings risks of unwanted un- intelligence gathering, types of riot, counter- der- or overreaction. rioters and community police patrols, the im- Apart from the institutional and cultural fac- plications of the minority or majority group tors discussed in the article, the greater prom- identity of activists and researchers, and, more inence of softer approaches is likely tied to a broadly the study of social movements and shift from the late 1960s to the present in the mass behavior and of the requisites for social ratio of non- or less focused crowd-pr otest order (Marx 1970a, 1970b, 1971a, 1971b, 1974, events to ones where a protest theme is more 1988, 1998, 2002, 2016; Marx and Archer 1971; directly in evidence. A conflict is also possible Marx and Useem 1971; Marx and McAdam 1994; in the communications offered the public by Gillham and Marx 2000, 2003). police and political leaders, versus that coming Working for the Kerner Commission sensi- from protest groups. For the former, the tilt is tized Marx to the importance and neglect of toward a definition of disorder and criminal the softer ethos as applied to crowds. The im- behavior; for the latter, it is toward a protest portance of this was heightened in a candid definition. Within these groups are conflicts as conversation with a high-ra nking member of well, control groups divided over soft and hard the Chicago Police Department shortly after approaches and protest groups divided be- the police violence during the 1968 Democratic tween orderly disorder (to coin a phrase) and Convention. The commander indicated how random destruction and assaults (favored by unprofessional his department had behaved. fringe groups). He said that as a commander in a protest situ- The social and psychological characteristics ation he is willing to listen, to negotiate, to tol- and location of control agents are related to erate minor infractions, and to keep a low pro- such definitions, but more objective character- file. He felt strongly that saving lives should be istics also are likely to be. Thus the presence more important than protecting property or of a widely shared belief among those in the symbols. He believed that demonstrations streets that direct action is needed to call at-

rsf: the russell sage foundation journal of the social sciences the pol icing o f c ivil d isorders 139 tention to a problem, within a context of an Operations (SWAT).” St. Louis County, Missouri ongoing political dispute and a planned event Police Department, February 14. whose organizers go through a permitting pro- Bentley-Edwards, Keisha L., Malik Chaka Ed- cess are likely to be differentiated from spon- wards, Cynthia Neal Spence, William A. Darity taneous, less organized, or unorganized gath- Jr., Darrick Hamilton, and Jasson Perez. 2018. erings that have no clear leader or group to “How Does It Feel to Be a Problem? The Miss- communicate with, nor a specific precipitating ing Kerner Commission Report.” RSF: The Rus- event (Gillham and Noakes 2007). Marx consid- sell Sage Foundation Journal of the Social Sci- ers these and other factors in seeking objective ences 4(6): 20–40. DOI: 10.7758/RSF.2018.4 measures for how events are likely to be labeled .6.02. as either protest or disorder (1970a). However, Bigley, Gregory A., and Karlene H. Roberts. 2001. because events often show much internal vari- “The Incident Command System: High-R eliability ation (by types of participant, activities, places, Organizing for Complex and Volatile Task Envi- and times within the event) rarely will an event ronments.” Academy of Management Journal approach the ideal type at either end of the 44(6): 1281–99. continuum. Body-Gendrot, Sophie. 2017. Public Disorder and The views expressed by the officer men- Globalization. New York: Routledge. tioned contrast markedly with those found in Buck, Dick A., Joseph E. Trainor, and Benigno E. totalitarian regimes, which blur or erase the Aguirre. 2006. “A Critical Evaluation of the Inci- line between politics and crime. Any opposi- dent Command System and NIMS.” Journal of tional politics is defined as crime. But they also Homeland Security and Emergency Management contrast with the creation of the first modern 3(3): 1–27. police department in Paris at the end of the Cardwell, Michael D., and Patrick T. Cooney. 2000. seventeenth century in which the protection of “Nationwide Application of the Incident Com- public order was also equated with the protec- mand System: Standardization Is the Key.” FBI tion of the political order. Indeed, for many ob- Law Enforcement Bulletin 69(10): 10–15. servers the connection has been reversed. That Chase, Richard A. 1980. “FIRESCOPE: A New Con- is, protecting the right to protest against the cept in Multiagency Fire Suppression Coordina- political order is defined as the best way of pro- tion.” General Technical Report PSW-40. Berke- tecting it—at least if the political order is ley, Calif.: Pacific Southwest Forest and Range broadly defined to involve a set of democratic Experiment Station. principles, rather than the particular persons della Porta, Donatella, Abby Peterson, and Herbert or groups in power. The conditions under Reiter, eds. 2006. The Policing of Transnational which democracies can accept nonelectoral po- Protest. Burlington, Vt.: Ashgate. litical challenges and yet remain democracies della Porta, Donatella, and Herbert Reiter, eds. 1998. is an issue of enduring importance. As James Policing of Protest: The Control of Mass Demon- Madison observed, “you must first enable the strations in Western Democracies. Minneapolis: government to control the governed; and in the University of Minnesota Press. next place, oblige it to control itself.” Earl, Jennifer. 2003. “Tanks, Tear Gas, and Taxes: To- ward a Theory of Movement Repression.” Socio- R eferences logical Theory 21(1): 44–68. Alexander, Michelle. 2011. The New Jim Crow: Mass ———. 2011. “Political Repression: Iron Fists, Velvet Incarceration in the Age of Colorblindness. New Gloves, and Diffuse Control.” Annual Review of York: The New Press. Sociology 37(1): 261–84. Balko, Radley. 2013. Rise of the Warrior Cop: The Earl, Jennifer, and Sarah A. Soule. 2006. “Seeing Militarization of America’s Police Forces. New Blue: A Police-Ce ntered Explanation of Protest York: Public Affairs. Policing.” Mobilization 11(2): 145–64. Barker, Tim. 2014. “Ferguson-Area Businesses Cope Earl, Jennifer, Sarah A. Soule, and John D. McCarthy. with Aftermath of Weekend Riot.” St. Louis Post- 2003. “Protest Under Fire? Explaining the Polic- Dispatch, August 12. ing of Protest.” American Sociological Review Belmar, Jon M., and Gil Kleinknecht. 2016. “Tactical 68(4): 581–606.

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