Philosophers’ volume 9, no. 9 his paper is about the scientific use of first-person data. Para- october 2009 digmatic examples are data about mental states and events ob- Imprint T tained from first-person reports, such as “I see purple here” and “I’m sad.” Many experimenters ask their subjects about their minds, then use what they hear as a source of data. First-person data are used in many fields, including psychophys- First-Person Data, ics (Snyder, Fast, and Bartoshuk 2004), cognitive psychology (Erics- son and Simon 1993, Schooler and Schreiber 2004), psychiatry and personality psychology (Hurlburt and Heavey 2006), neuropsychol- ogy and clinical psychology (Cytowic 2004, Samsonovich and Nadel Publicity & 2005), cognitive neuroscience (Leopold, Maier, and Logothetis 2003), and consciousness studies (Jack and Shallice 2001, Baars 2003, Ho- hwy and Frith 2004), as well as studies of subjective wellbeing (Alex- androva 2005, Angner 2009) and pain (Aydede 2005). Self-Measurement First-person data are usually drawn from first-person verbal reports. In our everyday life, we ask people how they feel or what they think, then use the answers as evidence of their mental states and events. Many scientists use sophisticated variations of the same method. For instance, psychophysicists may ask subjects, in addition to whether two colors are the same, whether they look the same under certain il- lumination conditions. Answers to the second question, as opposed to the first, are a source of first-person data. Another example is Newell and Simon’s (1972) classic research on problem solving. Newell and Simon investigated the cognitive pro- Gualtiero Piccinini cesses of subjects who were solving a problem, such as an arithmetic calculation. Subjects were asked to verbalize what they were thinking University of Missouri, St. Louis while solving the problem. After subjects were done, they were asked to recall the whole cognitive process they just went through. Both sets of verbalizations — concurrent and retrospective — were used as sources of first-person data. The reliability of such data was later in- vestigated in detail by Ericsson and Simon (1993). Yet a different method was developed by Hurlburt and collabora- tors (Hurlburt 1993, Hurlburt and Heavey 2006). Their main targets © 2009 Gualtiero Piccinini were patterns of thought and emotion, especially in subjects suffering
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at random times. As soon as they heard a beep, subjects wrote down a mental states (perception of a triangle, perception of a circle). But they description of what was on their minds immediately prior to the beep. also discriminate between two physically different stimuli (triangle, Subjects were later interviewed in depth by a trained investigator, circle). Stimulus discrimination is enough to infer that the subject is in who requested more details of the subjects’ experiences at the time different mental states under different conditions. of the beeps. When data about minds are not first-person, they are uncontrover- First-person data need not be based on first-person reports, or even sially public, legitimate scientific data. Are first-person data scientifi- on verbal reports of any kind. For instance, subjects may be asked to cally legitimate? In spite of over a century of debate, the answer re- express their level of happiness (or pain) by pointing at images of mains unsettled. The most fundamental concern is privacy: according smiling vs. frowning faces. In another example, a subject may press to standard scientific methodology, scientific data should be public. one of two buttons depending on which of two ways she perceives a But first-person data appear to contain an element of privacy. Necker cube at a time. Such button-pressing is a source of first-person Critics argue that science must be based on public evidence: since data. Given that first-person data can be generated in the absence of first-person data are private, they should be banned from science. verbal reports, it may be possible to obtain first-person data from non- Apologists reply that first-person data are necessary for understand- verbal animals. In fact, some researchers train monkeys to press one of ing the mind: since first-person data are private, scientists must be two buttons depending on how they see a Necker cube, or something allowed to use private evidence. I will argue that both views rest on closely analogous (Leopold, Maier, and Logothetis 2003). the same false premise. In psychology and neuroscience, the subjects All of the above are methods for generating first-person data. Most issuing first-person reports and other sources of first-person data play of such methods generate first-person data from verbal behaviors, but the epistemic role of (self-)measuring instruments. Data from measur- some don’t. For this reason, the term “first-person report” — which is ing instruments are public and can be validated by public methods. often used in this context — is too restrictive to capture all sources of Therefore, first-person data are as public as other scientific data: their first-person data. Instead, I will use “first-person behavior” to denote use in science is legitimate, in accordance with standard scientific any behavior that is a source of first-person data. methodology. Most behaviors, including most behaviors used by psychologists as Before assessing the validity of first-person data, we can avoid sources of scientific evidence, are not first-person. Most studies in cog- some confusion if we briefly disentangle the present question from nitive psychology and neuroscience are based on data from sources some other, largely orthogonal questions. such as discrimination between stimuli, recall of stimuli, observable manipulation of stimuli, observable preferences between stimuli, dif- What the Problem is Not ferences in performance across trials, eye fixations and gaze shifting, Much of the recent discussion of first-person data has taken place reaction times, involuntary responses, physiological responses (e. g., within consciousness studies. Some authors see the methodology of heart rates and perspiration rates), and last but not least, neural imag- first-person data as a first step towards a science of consciousness (e. g., ing. None of these are sources of first-person data. For instance, if a Dennett 1991, Varela 1996, D. Chalmers 2004). Some also see the use subject presses one of two buttons depending on whether a triangle of first-person data as a way of closing the explanatory gap or solving or a circle is presented to her, there is nothing especially first-personal the “hard problem” (e. g., Varela 1996, Roy 2003, D. Chalmers 2004).1
about her behavior. True, the two possible behaviors (pressing one 1. The explanatory gap is a purported gap in our understanding of conscious- button, pressing the other button) discriminate between two possible ness, such that any explanation of mental phenomena couched in physical
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But we should not assume that first-person data are all and only about Privatism consciousness, or that legitimizing first-person data is enough to con- In recent years, a number of authors have revived a view of first-per- struct a science of consciousness. First-person data are used well be- son data that can be traced to some versions of classical introspection- yond the study of consciousness, and the science of consciousness ist psychology and Husserlian phenomenology. I will call it “privatism”. faces many problems besides first-person data’s legitimacy. Thus, the Privatists maintain that first-person data are private but nevertheless problem of first-person data is not the problem of how to construct a scientifically legitimate. Since first-person data are private, their use science of consciousness, although there is overlap between the two is a break from ordinary science. Accordingly, some privatists call the problems. Furthermore, closing the explanatory gap or solving the use of first-person data “first-person methods”: they contend that first- hard problem requires finding the appropriate explanations. Such ex- person methods are qualitatively different from ordinary, third-person planations cannot be found simply by solving a methodological prob- scientific methods (e. g., D. Chalmers 1999, Varela and Shear 1999). lem. Thus, the problem of first-person data is not the problem of how Privatism may be stated more explicitly as follows: to close the explanatory gap or how to solve the hard problem. (1) Subjects producing first-person behaviors are (scientific) First-person data are sometimes called “introspective data” or “data observers of the mind. from introspective reports”. I used the latter term in a previous paper. I now find this usage misleading, because it invites a conflation be- (2) Their data are their mental states. tween the question of first-person data’s legitimacy and the question (3) Their mental states, and hence their data, are private. of what introspection is and how it works. On the latter question, there is a wide range of opinions (cf. Robbins 2006). In addition, it’s unlikely From these three assumptions, a conclusion follows: that there is a single process responsible for producing all first-person (4) First-person data cannot be validated by public means. behaviors (cf. Prinz 2004). Of course, a complete theory of first-person data must include a theory of how the data are generated, which must The conclusion follows because if first-person data are truly private, say whether there is such a process as introspection and how it works. i. e., directly accessible only to the subjects, then there is no way for But the question of whether first-person data are legitimate is not the anyone else to either validate or invalidate them (more on this below). same as, and may be answered largely independently of, questions Variants of privatism may be found in the writings of several au- about introspection. Because of this, I will avoid appealing to intro- thors. A candid defense is given by Goldman (1997), although later spection or talking about “introspective data” as much as possible. My Goldman moved away from privatism (2004). A more recent example topic is not the process by which subjects generate first-person behav- is by Chalmers: iors, be it introspection or something else. My topic is the legitimacy When a conscious system is observed from the first-person and validity of first-person data. point of view, a range of specific subjective phenomena present themselves. Both sorts of phenomena have the status of data for a science of consciousness. [D. Chalmers terms fails to explain phenomenal consciousness. The hard problem of con- 2004, 1111, emphasis added] sciousness is the problem of explaining why phenomenal consciousness arises in physical systems such as human beings. Chalmers seems to suggest that introspecting subjects observe their
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minds analogously to how experimental scientists observe phenom- theorizing constrained by empirical data. For there to be data to con- ena, and both sets of observations may play a role in science (assump- strain theory, someone must produce them. If the “subject-object du- tion (1)). In the last sentence, he seems to equate first-person data with ality” is not “sustained”, who is producing the data? Some fusion of the subjective experiences themselves (assumption (2)). Later in the subject and object? If so, then the fusion of subject and object counts same paper, he explicitly says that first-person data are private (as- as the scientific observer, and we are back to (1). From now on, I will sumption (3)) and draws the conclusion that the reliability of intro- assume that for present purposes, Varela’s view collapses into (1). And spection is untestable (assumption (4)).2 given the rest of what he says, Varela too belongs in the privatist camp. Some privatists attempt to do without (1). In an article often cited as the founding document of “neurophenomenology” — a label advo- Against Privatism cated by a growing number of authors — Varela argues that the proper Privatism is based on the platitude that mental states and events are source of first-person data is something like Husserl’s “phenomeno- not shared among subjects. I have no quarrel with that: mental states logical reduction”. According to Varela, the phenomenological reduc- and events are private in the sense that we each undergo all and only tion is different from introspection; it is not based on observing one’s our own. As a consequence, we can be aware only of (some of) our mind: own mental states. In this sense, we have a special epistemic access to (some of) our, and only our, mental states. [The phenomenological reduction] is not a ‘seeing inside’, In addition to these truisms, privatism construes mental states as but a tolerance concerning the suspension of conclusions scientific data, directly accessible only to the subject undergoing the that allows a new aspect or insight into the phenomenon mental states. This is where the trouble comes from. If mental states, to unfold. In consequence this move does not sustain the which are private, are scientific data, it follows that the science of mind basic subject-object duality but opens into a field of phe- is grounded (in part) on private data: nomena where it becomes less and less obvious how to distinguish between subject and object (this is what Hus- In most areas of science, data are intersubjectively avail- serl called the ‘fundamental correlation’). [Varela 1996, able: they are equally accessible to a wide range of ob- 339] servers. But in the case of consciousness, first-person data concerning subjective experiences are directly available I find this passage mystifying. At a minimum, science is a form of only to the subject having those experiences. [D. Chalm- 2. Other authors agree to varying degrees. For instance, Hatfield (2005) and ers 2004, 1117; cf. Goldman 1997, 533] Gertler (2009) appear to endorse something very close to (1)-(4), Price and Aydede (2005) appear to endorse (1)-(3), Horst (2005) and Levine (1994) ap- Lack of publicity has two considerable costs. First, private data cannot pear to endorse (2), and Roy (2003) appears to endorse at least (1). A view superficially similar to privatism is defended in a penetrating article by Alston be reproduced by independent observers. Second, private data cannot (1972). But while Alston forcefully defends theses that sound exactly like (1)- be validated (or invalidated) by public means. That both of these are (3), he equally forcefully rejects (4). In fact, he defends the legitimacy of first- person data precisely on the grounds that they can be publicly validated. As consequences of privatism, and how serious they are, is not always the considerations to follow should make clear, (4) follows from (1)-(3), so appreciated. Alston’s rejection of (4) turns out to be inconsistent with privatism as I define it. If first-person data can be validated by public procedures, as Alston main- Privatism runs directly contrary to one of the most basic princi- tains, they can’t be truly private after all (in the relevant sense). ples of scientific methodology: scientific methods must be public. A
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method is public just in case by applying it, any competent observer private methods of investigation leads to epistemic divergence (Pic- can generate the same data on the same questions. (For a defense of cinini 2003b). Epistemic divergence occurs when different investiga- method publicity, see Piccinini 2003b.) By following public methods, tors are unable, as a matter of principle, to settle disputes. Consider scientists can ensure two desirable results. First, any competent scien- what happens when two investigators A and B apply private (i. e., non- tist can reproduce other scientists’ data, so as to obtain evidence that public) methods. A’s and B’s methods need not be introspection; they she is in the presence of the same phenomena. Second, scientists can may be the reading of tea leaves or any other private method. Since look for correlations between different types of data, thereby validat- the methods are private, they may generate mutually inconsistent ing them on independent grounds. Data obtained by one method can data as answers to the same question. Let’s suppose that by apply- be correlated with data obtained by other (independently established) ing private methods, A and B deliver answers to the same question. methods, thereby validating the first set of data. Specifically, suppose that A obtains data to the effect that p, while B If privatism is correct, none of this can be done with first-person obtains data to the effect that not-p. A and B disagree: based on their data. They are immune to intersubjective validation: empirical investigations, A maintains that p; B denies it. Due to the pri- vacy of their methods, and absent other methods to answer the same Our access to [first-person data] depends on our mak- question, there is nothing that A and B can do to find out who is right. ing certain assumptions: in particular, the assumption They are both competent investigators who, by the light of privatism, that other subjects really are having conscious experi- applied their methods correctly. And since their methods are private, ences, and that by and large their verbal reports reflect the methods need not yield the same data when applied by different these conscious experiences. We cannot directly test this investigators to answer the same question. assumption: instead, it serves as a sort of background The obvious and sensible solution — the way out of epistemic di- assumption for research in the field. [D. Chalmers 2004, vergence — is to jettison A’s and B’s methods of investigation and find 1117; cf. Goldman 1997, 539] better ones, ones that do not yield contradictory results when applied The important point to notice is that if privatism is correct, the reliabil- by different investigators to answer the same questions. But this is the ity of verbal reports can never be independently established, for prin- same as rejecting private methods of investigation in favor of public cipled reasons. Any attempt to establish it would have to find a cor- ones. That is, the solution to A and B’s impasse is to reject privatism. relation between the private first-person data and some type of public A privatist might reply that at least in the case of first-person data, data, such as the subject’s verbal reports. But the private data are by there is no evidence that we are in a state of epistemic divergence. As definition directly accessible only to the subject, so no one else is in long as our science of mind seems to be doing OK, we should allow a position to establish a correlation between them and anything else. private data. In fact, a common defense of first-person data by priva- The identification of first-person data with (private) mental states en- tists is that although the deliverances of introspection are private, they tails that publicly validating first-person data requires other observers can still be used as scientific evidence because introspection is reli- to undergo the same token mental states. This is impossible, of course. able.3 Or at least, they should be taken to be reliable in the absence At most, the subject herself can swear that her reports are truthful.
That adds no additional warrant to the reports themselves. 3. As I said before, I prefer to discuss the validity of first-person data without There is another way to see the gravity of the situation. Reliance on bringing in the theoretically problematic notion of introspection. Since the
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of evidence to the contrary (Goldman 1997, D. Chalmers 2004). This If privatism is right, our science of mind is even worse off than A response is wrong on three counts. and B. At least A and B can generate data on the same question and see To begin with, the caveat that introspection should be considered if their data agree. But no two subjects can answer the same question reliable unless there is evidence to the contrary is a red herring. If first- by the privatist’s method, because each subject can only introspect her person data are truly private, what evidence could there be that intro- own mind. Thus, if privatism is right, we can never bring any public spection is unreliable? Internal inconsistency, perhaps. In fact, internal evidence (besides consistency) to bear on the reliability of first-person inconsistency is the only suggestion made by Goldman in this context. data. And if so, we are not warranted to rely on them. If a subject delivered contradictory reports as answers to the same A committed privatist might still reply as follows. We must assume question, at least one of the reports must be false. If this internal in- that introspection is reliable, on pain of skepticism about the mind; consistency were noticed systematically across conditions, Goldman the reliability assumption is needed to get our science of mind started. argues (1997, 543), unreliability would be established. But a process This reply assumes that introspection is necessary to study the mind. may be unreliable without producing contradictory data. As Goldman Some would dispute this assumption, but I will grant it for the sake notes, testing the reliability of introspection requires bringing inde- of the argument. The reply also assumes that introspection is a basic pendent evidence to bear. If the deliverances of introspection are pri- source of evidence — a source whose reliability need not be established vate, Goldman continues, no independent evidence can be brought to by means of an independent source (cf. Goldman 2004, 3). Examples bear. Thus, under the assumption of privacy, the degree to which and of putative basic sources include perception, memory, inductive in- the conditions under which introspection is reliable cannot be estab- ference, and deductive inference. Finally, the reply assumes that be- lished by public means. And if they cannot be publicly established, I ing a basic source of evidence is enough for being scientifically legiti- add, nothing warrants the suggestion that introspection is reliable (to mate. On the contrary, being basic is not enough for being a legitimate any degree).4 source of (scientific) evidence. What is also needed is the possibility of establishing reliability on public grounds. Since the reliability of intro- authors I’m discussing address the matter in terms of introspection reliability, spection (as conceived by the privatist) cannot be publicly established, however, I will temporarily go along with them for the sake of the argument. introspection remains illegitimate.5 4. In another paper, Goldman adds another test of reliability, similar to sugges- To illustrate, consider our reliance on perception in physics. David tions made by Alston (1972): We can also demand that introspection should pass the test of not yield- visual observations, this did not occur. So introspection survives a test of ing too many false beliefs ... when combined with other presumptively sorts (Goldman 2000, 19). reliable processes or procedures. Here is an example of how introspec- But the test described here is inconsistent with privatism. If the deliverances tion can pass such a test. I now have an introspectively formed belief that of introspection are truly private, then they can’t be challenged by their in- I currently intend to snap my fingers in the next two minutes. I have a consistency with putative generalizations about the mind (such as the gen- background belief that intentions usually stick around for a while and eralization that people tend to act upon their intentions); at most, the de- get acted upon if they are not overridden. I therefore predict that I shall liverances of introspection can be used to challenge those generalizations. indeed snap my fingers in the next two minutes. If that action is then I take the above test as implying the abandonment of privatism; as such, I observed within the specified time interval, this partly ‘corroborates’ the commend it. reliability of introspection. That is, it corroborates introspection’s reliabil- ity in the weak sense of not defeating or not challenging introspection’s 5. It goes to Goldman’s credit that he changed his mind on this point, from reliability. There was a chance that introspection (together with other maintaining that introspection cannot be independently corroborated by processes) should have yielded a false belief, but, assuming I can trust my other sources of evidence (1997) to maintaining the opposite (2004, 6).
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Chalmers suggests that relying on the reliability of introspection in presupposes that first-person data stand or fall as private. But I am not our science of mind is analogous to relying on the reliability of per- arguing against first-person data. I am arguing that they are legitimate ception in physics (cf. D. Chalmers 2004, 1117). Chalmers is right that precisely because, when properly understood, they are as public as the reliability of perception can be established only by some form of other scientific data. The error of privatism is not in defending first- perception — with or without the aid of recording instruments. Thus, person data; the error is in defending first-person data as private. perception is a basic source of evidence. But if privatism is correct, the The third and final mistake in the reliability-based defense of priva- case of introspection is not analogous to that of perception: unlike the tism is to presuppose that data validity is all or nothing. But science is degree of reliability of introspection (according to privatism), the de- rarely as clear-cut as my artificial example of A and B, in which I stipu- gree of reliability of perception can be established by public methods, lated that by answering the same question following private methods, by correlating the reports of perceivers with the objects and events they get different answers. Things are murkier in real life. Yet scien- they perceive. The latter are public objects and events that can be per- tific data are often disputed. In actual science, disputes over data can ceived by other competent observers under similar conditions as well generally be resolved by taking appropriate measures. Such measures as recorded and measured by instruments. In fact, sensory perception include controlling experimental conditions more carefully, making ceased long ago to be the primary means of observation in physics, be- more explicit assumptions, establishing more rigorous procedures, cause (i) it can access less physical information, (ii) it is more subjec- and instituting more precise standards — all of which may be roughly tive (less public), and (iii) it is less reliable than the artificial detectors summarized as striving for a higher degree of publicity in methods physicists employ in most of their observations (cf. Shapere 1982, esp. and data. An especially important way to resolve disputes over data is Section III). for a third party to make a breakthrough — using a new technique or The same point applies to memory, inductive inference, and deduc- instrument — by which new (public) data are obtained.6 The new data tive inference. Basic as they may be, they deliver public conclusions explain why the original parties were getting conflicting results using about public objects and events. Such conclusions can be replicated their original techniques. After the new data and techniques are avail- by others and publicly tested. Thus, their degree of reliability can be able, everyone can obtain mutually consistent results. None of this publicly established. would be possible if the methods being used or data being produced Sometimes we may assume that a method is reliable on the were private. grounds of limited evidence. This is OK so long as we can eventually In practice, publicity comes in degrees. It’s not so much some- find public evidence of such reliability. Even if there are cases where thing to establish (or deny, as the privatist does) by stipulation, but to we simply assume the reliability of a method to start an investigation, achieve by painstaking attention to the details of our scientific meth- it doesn’t follow that we may do so in the case of introspection. We ods, by seeking to avoid the sources of bias and error that can infect may if the reliability of introspection can eventually be established by our data, by comparing data with our colleagues, and by learning public means. If the privatist is right, this cannot be done. By entail- more about the subject matter. By these lights, privatism is an obscu- ing that first-person data cannot publicly validated, privatism poses a rantist methodology. It excuses the many epistemic-divergence–in- principled obstacle to the science of mind. ducing tendencies that are naturally present in science — the tendency This obstacle is due to the alleged privacy of first-person data. This is the second mistake in the reliability-based defense of privatism: it 6. I owe the present point to Heather Tienson.
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to idiosyncratic jargon, to implicit assumptions, to unclear protocols, Biases are bad only if they thwart your epistemic purposes. In many to biased encoding and processing of data — while being a drag on the cases, they don’t. As Bogen and Woodward have argued, observation way forward, which relies on methods (and, consequently, data) that is generally not theory-laden in a harmful way. To serve its epistemic are as public as we can muster. purpose, observation must be reliable, that is, it must produce data So far, I have rejected a defense of privatism based on the alleged, that lead to detecting phenomena and discriminating correctly be- though untestable, reliability of introspection. Another defense of pri- tween the relevant hypotheses about the phenomena (Bogen and vatism may be that (private) first-person data constitute legitimate sci- Woodward 1988, 1992). As long as observation is reliable in this sense, entific evidence insofar as they are purely factual, untainted by theory it doesn’t matter much how biased or theory-laden it is. Of course, or interpretation. The claim that such untainted data are obtainable there are cases in which observation biases do interfere. For instance, may be found in the writings of some classical introspectionists and in the classic case of N-rays, some physicists claimed to observe the phenomenologists.7 In recent years, a similar claim has been resur- effects of N-rays when, in fact, there were no such effects to observe, rected by some neo-introspectionists and neo-phenomenologists (e. g., because N-rays don’t exist (Klotz 1980, Nye 1980). But pernicious bi- Varela 1996, Price and Aydede 2005). But this defense of privatism is ases can eventually be exposed and removed. no better than the previous one. The rub is that establishing the degree to which observation is reli- For starters, even the most “pre-theoretical” of observations are af- able requires public scrutiny. The N-ray affair was resolved by publicly fected by our expectations, interests, and skills. Furthermore, obser- demonstrating that the observations in question could be obtained vations must be described in a language, which comes with its own even under conditions in which N-rays were unquestionably absent set of distinctions, presuppositions, implications, etc. There is no such by the standards of those who purported to observe their effects. Thus, thing as an unbiased observation described in a purely observational once we bring in reliability, the second defense of privatism collapses language. This theory-ladenness of observation has been a traditional into the first. As we saw, we cannot assume that introspection is reli- source of criticism of first-person data.8 Nevertheless, theory-ladenness able in the absence of public evidence to that effect — or at least the is not enough to impugn privatism. possibility of collecting public evidence. And that requires our data to 7. Cf. Titchener: “When we introspect, we must be absolutely impartial and un- be public. prejudiced. We must not let ourselves be biased by any preconceived idea. Until now, I have argued that the proposed justifications for using We are likely to think that, in all probability, a certain thing will happen, or we may actually want to obtain a given result, to confirm some view which private first-person data as evidence are untenable. Privatism leads to we have already formed. In either case, we are in danger of mistaken observa- methodologically unacceptable consequences, forcing the rejection tion. We ought to be ready to take the facts precisely as they are.” [Titchener 1902, 45] of first-person methods. It doesn’t follow that we should reject first- person data. We would have to do so only if the assumptions behind 8. For some criticisms of first-person methods on grounds of theory-ladenness or similar notions, see Bucklew (1955) and Dennett (1991). In spite of these privatism were correct. It’s time to briefly examine their plausibility. critiques, the claim that first-person data can be theory-free continues to be Let’s begin with (1), the premise that subjects producing first-person found in the literature. For some recent discussions of the theory-ladenness of observation, see Dickson (1999), Brewer and Bruce (2001), Estany (2001). behaviors are scientific observers of their mind. Although this is how Among proponents of first-person methods who discuss the theory-laden- some classical introspectionists and phenomenologists saw the matter, ness of observation explicitly, Roy (2003), insofar as I understand him, seems to admit that observation is theory-laden even in the case of self-observation. their approach is now theoretically and methodologically discredited. So does Vermensch (1999, 39). In other scientific psychological and neuroscientific traditions, ranging
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from psychophysics to cognitivism, the subjects are treated as the ob- large literature discussing this and other problems with inner observa- jects of study, not the observers. This is how it should be. Contrary to tion (cf. Hatfield 2005, Gertler 2008). (1), the scientific observers of the mind are the psychologists and neu- One way around such problems is to deny that observation requires roscientists studying the subjects, not the subjects themselves. sensory organs. For example, Armstrong does so on the grounds that This says nothing about whether first-person behaviors, or at least “proprioceptors, stimulation of which gives rise to bodily perception, some of them, are the product of some kind of inner observation. They are not [sensory] organs in the fullest sense because their operation may be. Some people like the idea that first-person behaviors are the is not under the direct control of the will” (1968, 325). Proprioception product of introspection, construed as inner observation. They point is a kind of perception, on which observation is grounded. Armstrong to some positive analogies: like the observation of external events, maintains that proprioception requires no sensory organs, because first-person reports involve detection and discrimination (of internal sensory organs are organs that can be moved voluntarily and proprio- events), are under voluntary control, are subject to epistemic biases ceptive organs cannot be so moved. If Armstrong is right, propriocep- such as distortion by preconception and deliberate deceit, and in some tion shows that observation does not require sensory organs. Arm- cases carry a strong epistemic authority. The inner-observation model strong’s point is persuasive only if you agree that all sensory organs also satisfies the needs of the dualist: if the inner events are non-phys- can be moved voluntarily whereas proprioceptive organs cannot be ical and thus can’t be detected physically, the dualist might yearn for a moved voluntarily. It is more plausible to maintain that proprioceptive way to observe them. Inner observation fits this bill. organs can be moved voluntarily — as we voluntarily move our body, As far as this essay is concerned, I can remain neutral on inner ob- we move our proprioceptive organs with it — or, if that is somehow servation. What I am arguing is simply that with respect to the meth- unacceptable, to use proprioception as a counterexample to the claim odology of science, subjects producing first-person behaviors do not that all perceptual organs can be moved voluntarily. Finally, even play, and should not be seen as playing, the role of scientific observers. granting Armstrong that proprioception requires no sensory organs, it In the next section, I will argue that subjects producing first-person surely requires organs. Comte’s objection can then be reformulated in behaviors play the role of self-measuring instruments. Thus, for the terms of organs simpliciter. purpose of a sound scientific methodology, we do not need to assume Another way around the same problems is to simply weaken the that first-person behaviors involve some kind of inner observation. notion of observation, so that it doesn’t require sensory and perceptual This result will please those who are uneasy about the inner-ob- organs. For instance, Hatfield construes inner observation as “the ap- servation model. The main cluster of objections goes back at least to plication of introspective concepts within everyday perceptual experi- Auguste Comte (Heyd 1989, Wilson 1991): how can the same thing ence” (2005, 292). Since introspection applies to conscious thoughts be the observer as well as the observed? What are the organs of such and intentions as well as perceptions, presumably we can generalize observation? In the case of public events, observation is a relation be- Hatfield’s definition by omitting the term “perceptual”. If all there is to tween an agent, her sensory and perceptual organs, and the observed inner observation is the application of introspective concepts within event: the agent observes the event through her sensory and percep- experience, it’s hard to deny that many first-person behaviors are the tual organs. But in the case of “inner observation”, it’s not clear what product of inner observations. It’s also hard to see why this should be the sensory and perceptual organs are. And if there aren’t any, it’s not called “observation”. At any rate, whether first-person behaviors are the clear what it means to say that something is being observed. There is a product of observation is orthogonal to the validity of first-person data.
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Leaving inner observation aside, aren’t first-person data the men- activity. By the same token, first-person data are records of subjects’ tal states themselves, as (2) declares? This appears to be a category first-person behaviors. Mental states remain private, in the innocuous mistake, perhaps due to confusion between scientific data and sense sense that no one other than the subject undergoes them. But data data. Sense data are a kind of mental entity postulated by a mostly from first-person behaviors are no more private than any other scien- abandoned theory of perception. They were intended to constitute the tific data.10 foundation of empirical knowledge, but they shouldn’t be confused Once we drop the assumption that first-person data are private, we with scientific data.9 By contrast, scientific data are observation state- no longer have reason to accept (4) — the conclusion that the valid- ments, measurement records, and the like. Mental states are none of ity of first-person data is untestable by public means. In fact, there is the above; they are not the right kind of thing to be scientific data. plenty of relevant public evidence.11 Consider an analogy with other experimental sciences. In astron- So far, I have rejected privatism about first-person data. There re- omy, the data are not the distant physical events under investigation. mains to paint a positive picture of what first-person data are and why The data are the photographs and other recordings collected by the they are public. experimenters through their apparatus. Ditto in paleontology. The data are not the evolutionary events under investigation, which for the 10. David Chalmers has replied that the above points about “data” are merely most part are long gone. The data are not even the fossils or geological terminological. But Chalmers’s alternate use of “data” — by “datum”, he does not mean observation record but “directly observable phenomenon or fact” strata. Rather, the data are the drawings, photographs, and other re- (personal communication) — distorts the methodological question under dis- cords of fossils, rocks, and geological strata. By the same token, mental cussion. If we follow Chalmers in using “data” to mean directly observable phenomena or facts and claiming that mental phenomena or facts are pri- states are not psychological data. Psychological data are records col- vate — i. e., directly observable only by the subject — we equivocate between lected by psychologists and neuroscientists about experimental sub- two senses of “directly observable”. In one sense, a mental event is directly observable just in case a subject can be aware of experiencing it. In this sense, jects and their mental states. mental events are surely private. But this is irrelevant to scientific methodol- What about first-person data? Aren’t they at least private, as per (3)? ogy. In the sense that pertains to scientific methodology, a phenomenon or Once we abandon (2), we no longer have reason to believe so. Or- fact is directly observable just in case it can be detected by a reliable (public) procedure (cf. Shapere 1982). In this latter sense, legitimate objects of scien- dinary psychological data are records of subjects’ behavior or neural tific investigation — including mental events — are public, i. e., detectable by all competent investigators using the same reliable procedures. So even if we decide to use ‘data’ to mean directly observable phenomena or facts, first-per- 9. Herbert Feigl used the expression ‘first-person data’ to mean something son data are either public (in the relevant sense) or scientifically illegitimate. like sense data: “[T]he first person data of direct experience are, in the ul- timate epistemological analysis, the confirmation basis of all types of factual 11. There is no room to review the evidence here. For evidence that first-person knowledge claims. This is simply the core of the empiricist thesis over again” data are invalid or questionable under certain conditions, see Nisbett and (Feigl 1958, 437, emphasis original). See also Wood (1940) for a similar no- Wilson (1977), Wilson (1994), Haybron (2007), Hurlburt and Schwitzgebel tion, which he calls “inspective data”. Clearly Feigl was in the grips of a view (2007, 2008). For empirical evidence that first-person data are valid under of evidence according to which all empirical evidence is reducible to some- certain conditions, see Ericsson and Simon (1993), Ericsson (2003), Baars thing like sense data. After we update our philosophy of evidence (following (2003), Leopold, Maier, and Logothetis (2003), Wilson (2003), Cytowic Sellars 1956, Shapere 1982, Bogen and Woodward 1988, and others), we no (2003), Schooler and Schreiber (2004), Hohwy and Frith (2004), Snyder, Fast, longer postulate sense data, let alone follow Feigl in believing that they con- and Bartoshuk (2004), Hurlburt and Heavey (2006). Even Chalmers (2004) stitute the confirmation basis for all factual knowledge claims. In any case, I says that empirical investigations can distinguish reliable from unreliable am not suggesting that Feigl himself confused first-person data in his sense first-person reports, in apparent conflict with his claim (in the same essay) with scientific data (in the present sense), only that some recent supporters that the reliability of introspection is untestable because we don’t have a of privatism appear to. “consciousness meter”. philosophers’ imprint – 10 – vol. 9, no. 9 (october 2009) gualtiero piccinini First-Person Data, Publicity & Self-Measurement
First-Person Data and Self-Measurement psychological studies focus on how subjects generate various kinds In a previous paper (Piccinini 2003a), I compared the process of gen- of first-person behaviors. Theories of the relevant mental processes erating first-person data to ordinary experimental processes in other range from Nisbett and Wilson’s (1977) theory that (at least some) first- sciences, processes from which experimenters collect data. Particle person behaviors are the result of a priori theories that subjects hold physicists set up accelerators to smash particles and then collect data (as opposed to empirical knowledge subjects gain about their mental from them. Biologists set up model organisms to generate biochemical states) to Ericsson and Simon’s (1993) theory that (at least some) first- cascades and then collect data from them. Analogously, psychologists person behaviors are the result of encoding the contents of the sub- instruct subjects to perform certain tasks, which may include generat- jects’ short-term memory into verbal reports. In these and other stud- ing first-person behaviors, and then collect data from them. ies, the production of first-person behaviors is the object of research. This approach shows that (1) the scientific observers are the experi- For the most part, however, first-person behaviors are used to ob- menters, not the subjects, (2) the data are public records of first-person tain data about psychological states and processes other than those behaviors, not mental states, and (3) the empirically intractable ques- responsible for generating first-person behaviors. Such states and tion of the reliability of private data is replaced by the empirically trac- processes include perception, problem solving, and many others. In table question of the validity of public (first-person) data. Like other the general case, it is these other processes that are the object of in- scientific data, first-person data are useful and legitimate as scientific vestigation. In order for first-person data to be relevant to the study of evidence largely to the extent that they have not been empirically in- these other processes, the generation of first-person behaviors must validated, or even better, to the extent that they have been empirically be shown or assumed or at least hoped to satisfy two conditions. First, validated. In sum, the use of first-person data is a form of legitimate, it must not interfere too much with the process under investigation. third-person science.12 This approach goes in the right direction, but Second, it must yield information about the process under investiga- the analogy between the source of first-person data and ordinary ex- tion. In the majority of cases, then, production of first-person behav- perimental processes can use some refinement. iors plays a different epistemic role than that of being the process un- The analogy holds best when the object of investigation is the der investigation. It plays the role of measurement.13 process of generating first-person behaviors. A large number of A subject generating first-person behaviors to fulfill the purposes of a scientific observer is a self-measuring instrument. When a subject 12. In a recent paper, Dennett appears to endorse my proposal while attempt- generates first-person behaviors, she embodies not only (part of) the ing to assimilate it to his “heterophenomenology” (2007, fn. 1). Heterophe- nomenology has virtues, including taking first-person data to be public. But experimental materials but also (part of) the measurement apparatus. I also think heterophenomenology can be improved upon. I disagree with, The psychological or neural system whose activity is under investiga- among other things, Dennett’s claims that (i) scientists should be agnostic tion is (part of) the experimental materials. The process of generating about the truth value of first-person reports and (ii) they should interpret all first-person reports as expressions of beliefs (e. g., Dennett 2003). I also the first-person behaviors is (part of) the measurement process. By disagree that the primary explananda of a science of consciousness are the looking at first-person behaviors in this way, we can shed light on the first-person behaviors; in my view, the primary explananda are the mental phenomena. Unfortunately, I lack the space for the detailed discussion that epistemology and methodology of first-person data by drawing from heterophenomenology deserves. Views that I find more congenial than Den- the literature on measuring instruments (e. g., Hacking 1983, chap. 11; nett’s include Nahmias (2002), Goldman (2004), and Haybron (2007). For an insightful discussion of some problems with heterophenomenology, see also 13. I intend this point and the rest of this paper to supplement (as opposed to Schwitzgebel (2007). repudiate) what I wrote in Piccinini 2003a.
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A. Chalmers 2003; Chang 2004). I will now briefly list some pertinent may be true — they do “need that”. But most of the time, they don’t morals.14 “need that” at all. The grown-ups’ job is to teach them further: they Instrument users, not the instruments themselves, are the observ- just want it; they don’t actually need it. After they master this and other ers. If we look at first-person data as the outcome of self-measurement, distinctions, children’ utterances about themselves begin to acquire we need not assume any notion of “inner observation”. the status of first-person reports. By teaching children to recognize Instruments are limited in what they can measure. Like every mea- and deploy such distinctions, adults train children to express their surement apparatus, the processes responsible for producing first-per- sensations, thoughts, and feelings. Friends, teachers, and counselors son behaviors can measure only some variables and not others. They train people further, to produce more accurate and informative first- can measure some aspects of a subject’s internal states and events but person reports. This is how many adolescents spend their time: debat- not others. Of those they can measure, they may measure some bet- ing how they feel about X, W, and Z, thereby enriching and refining ter than others. And they measure what they measure only to some their first-person reports. As they do this, they often call each other degree of approximation. on their first-person bullshit — for instance, when they deny feelings Like other measurement apparatuses, subjects generating first- that they patently have. Human subjects can self-measure their men- person behaviors need to be prepared carefully before they can yield tal states, to the extent that they can, in large part thanks to years of valid results. This is the role played by the experimental set up and the implicit training by their community. Nevertheless, it may be useful instructions given by the experimenter to her subjects. in some experimental settings to add additional, explicit training to Like other measurement apparatuses, subjects generating first- experimental subjects, making sure they master the relevant concepts person behaviors may need to be calibrated. This is the role of train- and apply them reliably (cf. Nahmias 2002, Schwitzgebel 2004). Train- ing. Contrary to what privatism suggests, we have plentiful public ing the subjects is especially crucial when the subjects are non-verbal ways — independent of first-person reports — to tell when others are animals, such as monkeys (cf. Leopold, Maier, and Logothetis 2003). inaccurate about their mind, and sometimes we correct them.15 This Like other measurements, first-person behaviors need to be pro- is especially obvious with children, when the training begins. After cessed via appropriate procedures and interpreted under appropriate they learn how to point, babies express their desires by whining while theoretical assumptions before they can yield useful data. Different pointing at objects. At a later stage, they may replace some of the assumptions or procedures, applied to the same raw data, may yield pointing and whining with the name of the desired objects — perhaps different final data, which may support different conclusions about the pronounced in a recognizably desirous tone of voice. Finally, they phenomena. may settle on saying something like “I need that”. In some cases, this Measuring instruments produce artifacts and aberrations, which need to be discovered and either prevented or filtered out while pro- 14. Notice that although measurement is mentioned by many scientists while cessing and interpreting the data. There is no failsafe procedure for discussing first-person data, it is usually invoked to characterize the outcome of the process of data collection by scientists, not the role of the subject pro- discovering aberrations and artifacts. Consider microscopes. We can’t ducing the first-person behaviors. The role of the subject is characterized by observe microscopic events without microscopes, and so we have no most commentators — even those who eschew privatism — as that of perform- ing “inner observations”. direct method of validating or invalidating our observations through 15. For more on our independent evidence about people’s mind and how it microscopes. Nevertheless, microscopists found noncircular ways to comes about, see Piccinini (2003a, Section II). discount artifacts and aberrations and validate their data (cf. Hacking
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1983, A. Chalmers 2003). Analogously, subjects engaged in first-per- abandon the notion that first-person reports are observational, or at son behaviors may be prone to illusion, delusion, forgetfulness, con- least that first-person observations play the role of scientific observa- fabulation, wishful thinking, lying, and other confounders. To obtain tions within a science of mind. But it remains difficult to eliminate the valid first-person data, the effects of these factors must be minimized. suspicion that at least some kinds of report, qua reports, are based on Instrument users may obtain valid data without knowing the cor- private evidence inaccessible to anyone other than the subject. rect theory of their instrument’s operation. Users possess practical By renouncing the conception of first-person data as the semantic skills and ingenuity that often allow them to distinguish observations content of first-person reports, the measurement approach sidesteps of artifacts and aberrations from observations of actual facts. Micro- the problem of the reliability of first-person reports. This is because scopes and thermometers are examples of measuring instruments that in the first instance, measurement instruments do not produce reports. were used quite effectively — though not without mistakes — centuries They produce physical outputs. To be sure, the outputs of measure- before good theories of their operation were developed (Hacking 1983, ment instruments need to be interpreted, and when interpreted, they Chang 2004). By the same token, most of us are already quite adept give rise to reports or other forms of representation, such as diagrams at learning from each other’s first-person behaviors without being and equations. But the production of the relevant reports or other rep- misled too much, even though we probably lack the correct theory of resentations is done by the experimenters, not by the measurement the process by which first-person behaviors are generated. With some instruments. specialized training, such as the training scientists go through, we can Typically, at least some aspects of the interpreting and reporting improve. In the long run, we should still aim for a full scientific under- is automated and built into the instruments. Many instruments have standing of the underlying processes. labeled marks that help read their outputs. Some instruments feed into computers that process the information and generate linguistic Self-Measurement and Publicity outputs. But the interpreting and reporting is still done on the basis of One of the greatest benefits of the measurement framework here assumptions built into the measurement process by those who design, proposed is that it allows us to make progress on the validity of first- build, calibrate, and use the instruments. So even in such cases, there person data. Traditionally, both supporters and critics of first-person is no intractable issue of privacy. data focus their attention on first-person verbal reports. They see first- The important point is not that first-person behaviors should nev- person data as the semantic content of verbal reports. If the problem er be construed as reports, or even as observational reports. In fact, of validity is construed as the problem of determining the truth value in many cases, it may be appropriate and helpful to call first-person of first-person reports, it is tempting to conclude that only the subject behaviors “reports”. The important point is that whether first-person (if anyone) is in a position to verify or falsify her reports. behaviors are construed as reports is of little consequence to whether To make matters worse, first-person reports are commonly seen as first-person data are valid. First-person data are scientifically valuable observational. This makes the validity problem especially intractable, insofar as they are indicative of mental states and events. The epis- because no one other than the subject can perform the same puta- temic burden of establishing how accurate, reliable, and precise the tive observations. This is one route towards the conclusion that first- data are falls on the scientists, not the subjects. person data are private data, whose validity cannot be established by Of course, human beings are different from other measurement public means. The problem becomes somewhat more tractable if we instruments in several respects. They have both special capacities,
philosophers’ imprint – 13 – vol. 9, no. 9 (october 2009) gualtiero piccinini First-Person Data, Publicity & Self-Measurement which aid self-measurement, and special sources of interference. On Bibliography one hand, most human beings come already equipped with the ability Alexandrova, Anna (2005). “Subjective Well-Being and Kahneman’s to understand instructions, direct their attention, assess evidence, and ‘Objective Happiness’”. Journal of Happiness Studies 6: 301–324. speak their minds. On the other hand, they may be prone to cognitive Alston, William (1972). “Can Psychology Do Without Private Data?” Be- deficits, self-serving bias, dishonesty, prejudice, and other conditions haviorism 1: 71–102. that confound self-measurement. In short, human beings are epistemic Angner, Erik (2009). “Subjective Measures of Well-Being: Philosophi- agents. This explains why it is so tempting to think of first-person data cal Perspectives”. In Harold Kincaid and Don Ross, eds., The Ox- as the private outcome of introspection. We like to think of ourselves ford Handbook of Philosophy of Economics (Oxford: Oxford University as knowing our minds better than anyone, scientists included. Be that Press), 560–579. as it may, the scientific validity of first-person data has a different basis. Armstrong, David M. (1968). A Materialist Theory of the Mind. London: First-person data are legitimate because they are public recordings of Routledge & Kegan Paul. public behaviors. They are useful insofar as investigators instruct the Aydede, Murat, ed. (2005). Pain: New Essays on Its Nature and the Meth- subjects appropriately, eliminate potential confounders, record behav- odology of Its Study. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. iors carefully, and interpret the results soundly. Baars, Bernard J. (2003). “How Brain Reveals Mind: Neural Studies Support the Fundamental Role of Conscious Experience”. Journal of Conclusion Consciousness Studies 10: 100–114. According to the measurement framework here proposed, first-per- Bogen, James, and James Woodward (1988). “Saving the Phenomena”. son verbal reports are a subclass of first-person behaviors. All such Philosophical Review XCVII: 303–352. behaviors are, in the first instance, physical outputs epistemologically Bogen, James, and James Woodward (1992). “Observations, Theories on a par with the outputs of other measurement instruments. Instru- and the Evolution of the Human Spirit”. Philosophy of Science 59: ment users take their instruments’ outputs and interpret them to yield 590–611. data. Gathering data from first-person reports becomes a special case Brewer, William F., and B. L. Lambert (2001). “The Theory-Ladenness of gathering data from first-person behaviors, which becomes a spe- of Observation and the Theory-Ladenness of the Rest of the Scien- cial case of gathering data from a measuring instrument. The resulting tific Process”. Philosophy of Science 68: 176–186. data are no less public than data obtained from other measurement Bucklew, J. (1955). “The Subjective Tradition in Phenomenological Psy- instruments. chology”. Philosophy of Science 22: 289–299. First-person data can be fruitfully seen as the outcome of a process Chalmers, Alan (2003). “The Theory-Dependence of the Use of Instru- of self-measurement. When seen in this light, the problems of pur- ments in Science”. Philosophy of Science 70: 493–509. ported privacy and lack of public validation of first-person data evapo- Chalmers, David (1999). “First-person Methods in the Science of Con- rate. Data from measuring instruments, including first-person data, are sciousness”. Consciousness Bulletin Fall 1999. public, and the degree to which they are valid can be established by Anna-Mari Rusanen, Eric Schwitzgebel, and two anonymous referees for public methods.16 comments and discussion. Thanks to audiences at University of Missouri, St. Louis; Washington University in St. Louis; the 2006 PSA Meeting; and the 16. Thanks to Anna Alexandrova, Erik Angner, Jim Bogen, David Chalmers, Jor- Consciousness Online conference. The writing of this paper was supported dan Dodd, Robert Gordon, Marcin Miłkowski, Philip Robbins, Martin Roth, in part by two University of Missouri Research Grants.
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