Chinese Government Response to the 2019 Hong Kong Protests:
A Corpus-Based Lexical Study
Thesis
Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Master of Arts in the
Graduate School of The Ohio State University
By
Skylor Evan Sergio Gomes, B.S.
Graduate Program in East Asian Studies
The Ohio State University
2020
Thesis Committee
Marjorie K.M. Chan, Advisor
Mineharu Nakayama
Zhiguo Xie
Copyrighted by
Skylor Evan Sergio Gomes
2020
2
Abstract
The 2019 Hong Kong Protests have elicited responses and reactions around the world, with some praising the actions of the protestors while others have condemned them.
However, this is not the first time protests have occurred in Hong Kong. Influences from these past protests can be seen in the 2019 protests, although the presence of the internet and social media has changed not only the methods for protests, but the stage for them as well. The purpose of this study is to analyze the impacts of the Hong Kong protests that began in 2019. This study will be conducted through the analysis of the language used by the Chinese government in response to the ongoing protests. Data for this study was collected from social media posts made to Twitter as well as news articles, from both mainland China and outside sources. With this corpus, I intend to conduct a lexical study in order to characterize attitudes regarding the protests and its participants. The current situation in Hong Kong has had a myriad of effects that can be seen not only within the country of China itself, but also around the world. Understanding the rhetoric and the intentions behind it may help to clarify China’s view on both the 2019 Hong Kong
Protests and the city as a whole.
ii
Acknowledgments
I would first like to thank my advisor, Dr. Marjorie Chan. Taking her undergraduate level history of the Chinese language course is what developed my interest in returning to Ohio State University to study Chinese linguistics. At the time, she invited our class to attend the 2016 Buckeye East Asian Linguistics Forum at Ohio State
University. It was there that she introduced me to the guest speaker, a computational linguist, and sparked my interest in the subject. In addition to this she wrote many recommendation letters for me, from my graduate school application to my applications for the FLAS fellowship. Without her help and patience throughout this whole process, this thesis would not have been possible. I also want to thank Dr. Zhiguo Xie, one of the members of my advising committee. The courses I took from him were challenging, and made me change the way I approached reading scholarly articles for the better. From him,
I learned valuable skills such as writing linguistic abstracts. His comments and questions were very helpful in refining my thesis. I want to thank Dr. Mineharu Nakayama, also a member of my advising committee. He put forth a lot of effort in reviewing the drafts of my thesis, and I very much appreciate all that he did. His comments and formatting suggestions helped to significantly clarify my thesis. He provided a very much needed perspective as someone who is not a speaker of Chinese, so I needed to be sure that other readers like him would be able to follow any examples I give by providing as accurate
iii translations as possible. Jingdi Shen, one of my former classmates, is another person I am extremely grateful towards. She was my classmate during my first semester as a graduate student, and often informed me of classes that would be beneficial for me to enroll in.
Her own MA thesis inspired my research, so for that I would like to thank her. Amy
Carey, the coordinator for the FLAS fellowship, was also very helpful to me as she ensured I met all the requirements of the fellowship. Her periodic check-ins showed that she genuinely cared about her students and also kept me on-track. I would also like to thank my parents for their patience and support. I never shared much about what I was working on, but they continued to support my desire to do research nonetheless. Last but not least, I want to thank Phimon-orn Visitthanaporn for the company on the many late nights spent working on thesis drafts and coding. All of these people made this thesis possible.
iv
Vita
2012 - 2016……..……..……..………………..B.S. Computer Science & Engineering
The Ohio State University
2018-Present……………………………………FLAS Fellow, East Asian Studies
Interdisciplinary, The Ohio State
University
Fields of Study
Major field: East Asian Studies
Area of emphasis: Chinese linguistics/computational linguistics
v
Table of Contents
Abstract ...... ii Acknowledgments...... iii Vita ...... v Table of Contents ...... vi List of Tables ...... vii List of Figures ...... viii Chapter 1. Introduction ...... 1 1.1 Historical Background...... 2 1.2 History of Protests ...... 4 Chapter 2. The 2019 Protests at a Glance: Three Phases of Protest ...... 10 2.1. Phase 1: Prelude to the Protests (March - June 2019) ...... 13 2.2. Phase 2: Escalation (July - August 2019) ...... 14 2.3. Phase 3: Climax of the Crisis & Lull (September - December 2019) ...... 15 Chapter 3. Methodology ...... 18 Chapter 4. Findings ...... 25 4.1 News Findings ...... 26 4.2. Twitter Findings ...... 43 Chapter 5. Conclusion ...... 54 Bibliography ...... 59
vi
List of Tables
Table 1: Distribution of the News Articles Across the Three Phases ...... 25 Table 2: Contents of the 30 CCTV News Articles ...... 42
vii
List of Figures
Figure 1. Timeline of the 2019 Hong Kong Protests ...... 12 Figure 2: Occurrences of “Illegal/Unlawful” in the 30 CCTV News Articles ...... 33 Figure 3: Occurrences of “Violent” in the 30 CCTV News Articles ...... 39 Figure 4: Occurrences of Hashtags Referring to Police in the 772 messages ...... 46 Figure 5: Most Used Terms for Protestors in the 772 messages...... 48 Figure 6: Occurrences of Frequently-Used Terms on Twitter in the 772 messages ...... 52
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Chapter 1. Introduction
Hong Kong’s political identity as well as its relationship with mainland China has long been complicated. There have been many disputes as to how Hong Kong should govern itself, with there being a clear divide between the desires of Hong Kong’s citizens and those in Beijing.
This has led to dissent and protests several times in the past. It does not appear as though this divide will be mended in the near future, as once again Hong Kong finds itself in the midst of another pro-Democracy protest. The ongoing protests that broke out in the middle of 2019 are the result of long-standing tensions in the Special Administrative Region, a designation gained as a result of Hong Kong’s status as a former British Colony and an agreement made for its subsequent return to China. In order to understand the stances of both sides of the conflict it is important to know the history of Hong Kong, and how this history eventually led up to the events that we are seeing unfold today.
The goal of this thesis is to analyze the rhetoric of the Chinese government in regard to the protests that broke out in mid-2019 and to determine how this reflects their view on Hong
Kong. This two-prong goal will be accomplished through the use of quantitative analysis, to be detailed in Chapter 3.
The thesis is organized as follows. This first chapter will be used to provide some background information about the history of Hong Kong and its relationship with mainland
China. In Chapter 2, three phases will be posited, together with a timeline highlighting the significant events of the 2019 Hong Kong Protests. Chapter 3 will contain the research methodology and Chapter 4 a presentation and analysis of the findings. Chapter 5 will serve as 1 the conclusion containing a discussion of current events in Hong Kong and some speculations on what the future of Hong Kong and mainland China’s relationship will look like moving forward.
1.1 Historical Background
Having been a territory since the Qin Dynasty, Hong Kong has a long history as a part of
China. However, this lengthy span of time under Chinese rule did not take place uninterrupted.
Various points of time under the rule of other nations have greatly influenced the territory. Hong
Kong was seen as an important financial hub in the early 19th century. As a major Chinese port,
Hong Kong saw a lot of trade going through. International trade would be of major importance, most notably with the United Kingdom. The British sent goods to ports such as Hong Kong in exchange for tea. However, this trade became problematic, as opium was one of the goods China was receiving, leading to widespread addiction problems. The ban of the opium trade led to the start of the First Opium War in 1839. During this conflict, the British seized control of the island of Hong Kong, and used it as an important base for military operations. The Treaty of Nanking ended the war, and as part of this treaty, Hong Kong was ceded to the United Kingdom.
Following the ending of the Second Opium War in 1860, it also acquired Kowloon. This essentially gave the British full control over the Hong Kong territory. Later on in 1898, the terms of Hong Kong’s lease was discussed in the Second Convention of Beijing. It was also during this time that the New Territories, which make up more than 86% of Hong Kong’s territory, were added.1 This lease was to last for nearly one hundred years, ending in 1997.2
The British would mostly retain control over Hong Kong, although it was occupied by
Japan during World War II. Despite many European powers giving up many of their colonies
1 https://www.britannica.com/place/New-Territories 2 https://www.britannica.com/place/Hong-Kong/Cultural-life#ref11639 2 following the war, the United Kingdom held onto Hong Kong. Hong Kong had quickly become a booming industrial and manufacturing zone. The people there enjoyed rights that many in mainland China did not have. Citizens of Hong Kong had more freedom of speech and had a capitalist economy. Given their population at the time of nearly 6.5 million people, Hong Kong in many ways appeared like a country in its own right. The same can be said about present-day
Hong Kong as they have continued to grow over the years, with the population currently approaching 7.5 million people.3
Hong Kong differed from mainland China in other ways as well, including major cultural and language differences. The people of Hong Kong use Cantonese while Putonghua, standardized Mandarin, was being promoted as the national language of the mainland. The region even uses traditional Chinese characters as opposed to the simplified ones used in the mainland. For example, the character meaning ‘to speak’ is written as “说” in simplified form, and as “說” in the traditional form. The thought behind the promotion of the use of one language across the nation is related to the government’s idea of one unified China. While mainland China only recognizes Putonghua, or Standard Mandarin, as its official language, Hong Kong today has three officially recognized languages: Mandarin, Cantonese, and English. With these differences the territory seemed like it was almost its own country, and today the differences are as pronounced as they have ever been. The influence of English colonialism on the territory can be clearly seen today. Several studies have shown the necessity of English proficiency in Hong
Kong. Language attitude studies such as Lai (2005) and Chan (2018) show that many believe that English is the language of upper mobility, and that being able to speak it well will assist in advancing their careers. Higher education and businesses frequently use English in their daily
3 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL?locations=HK 3 operations. As such, many view a high level of proficiency in the English language to be a symbol of prestige.
At the time of the territory’s return to China in 1997, the United Kingdom established a condition that Hong Kong would continue operating under the current systems at the time for fifty years. This was the establishment of “one country, two systems” as part of The Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China, which has served as Hong Kong’s constitution since the 1997 handover. This agreement has become a point of contention on multiple occasions since its adoption. The people of Hong Kong did not have a say in the matter of their handover. They could not become independent, and later on, their way of life would likely be lost as they would be assimilated to be part of the mainland.
1.2 History of Protests
The 2019 Protests are not the only ones in the history of Hong Kong, and several of them have stemmed from similar underlying issues. At the center of many of these protests is the conflict between differing political viewpoints. In the late 1960s, tensions rose between pro-
Beijing supporters and the government of Hong Kong. Despite the fact that the dissenters were supportive of the mainland, the situation had quite a few similarities to the 2019 Protests. Events resulting from these tensions also had a lasting influence on future protests, namely in the worsening of public opinion towards Beijing. The situation was largely a clash between Hong
Kong police and supporters of the communist government who had grown tired of colonial rule.
Public opinion towards mainland China has been deteriorating in recent years due to the people demanding a true democratic system and pushing for more transparency from the government. Due to the resulting tension caused by this deteriorating relationship, anti-mainland
4 protests have broken out on more than one occasion.4 Pro-Democracy protests broke out in 2005 amid proposals for reforms to the electoral system. In 2014 the Umbrella Movement began with the main goal of pushing the government towards democracy. People wanted more control over who would be their elected officials, and felt that Beijing was choosing candidates that would be supportive of its own plans. Beijing had proposed that voters in Hong Kong would be allowed to vote for their chief executive in 2017, but their only options would be nominees chosen by an electoral committee similar to the one that already existed. The Hongkongers did not feel fairly represented by this committee. They felt that this was not a true democracy, and this proposal was what sparked the protests.
The Umbrella Movement is most similar to the 2019 Protests in many ways. The involvement of young people is one of the major similarities between the two. This is not to say that the youth were not involved in any of the previous protests; rather, their influence was more pronounced during the Umbrella Movement. Many of the activists were students, and the students themselves played major roles in organizing these protests. Social media also emerged as a major tool for the protesters this time around. The 2014 Umbrella Movement was the first time that the Net Generation took part in a large-scale anti-Beijing protest in Hong Kong. These people are known as “digital natives.” The young people from that era grew up in a time when technology is widely available and ever-present in their daily lives. With smartphones growing in popularity along with social media, it was inevitable for the new technology to emerge as tools in these protests. Studies conducted at the time indicated that a large percentage of people belonging to the Net Generation frequently used social media. A survey conducted in 2014 by the Centre for Communication and Public Opinion showed that only approximately 8% of Hong
Kong Net Geners—defined as being between 18-29 at the time—did not use their mobile phones
4 https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-pacific-16526765 5 to get news information, compared to the 30% of people age 60 and older who did not. An even greater discrepancy can be seen in their usage of social media. Nearly everyone in the Net
Generation used some form of social media, whereas more than half of the older group did not.
Moreover, a vast majority of these young people reported frequent use of social media. Facebook emerged as the most popular option among the various social sites (Lee, So and Leung 2015).
However, it should be noted that both sides of the protests were able to take advantage of this technology.
Social media’s role here had several important aspects to it that have allowed it to be an especially effective tool for the protestors. The first is that it provided the means to quickly spread information to a large number of people. This served to increase awareness of the cause.
It was also instrumental in organizing mass-gatherings such as sit-ins. Social media made it easy for people to keep track of when and where these events were taking place, and were much more efficient than previous modes of communication, such as informing people via phone call, email, or word-of-mouth. Social media sites, such as Facebook, also helped to bring like-minded individuals together so that they could connect and share their opinions and ideas. Once enough of these like-minded people come together, it forms a greater collective. People on social media tend to have a “mob mentality,” often following along with the actions and opinions of others in order to appear as part of a group. The same can be said for group-sharing of outrage towards something.
The tensions that led to the Umbrella Movement in 2014 also had an impact on language use in Hong Kong, and along with this change came a new style of code-switching. Known as
Kongish, this new form of code-switching consists of Cantonese and English. It is made up of direct translations from Cantonese to English, one example being “add oil,” a direct translation
6 of “加油
“same on you” instead of “shame on you”. Many saw Kongish as a means of identifying themselves as a Hongkonger, as outsiders would not understand the language. It was used by them to identify people they could trust when organizing protests and almost served as a means of encrypting their language, as it could not be easily translated (Lim 2016, 2019). Kongish was used extensively online on social media websites, particularly on Facebook, where the page,
Kongish Daily, was published (Wei 2020).
Symbolism is another similarity between the Umbrella Movement and the 2019 Protests.
The umbrellas used in the 2014 protests served as a protective measure as well as a symbol of their goal of achieving true democracy. Protestors brought umbrellas to protect themselves from tear gas and pepper spray. The yellow color of the umbrellas was a symbol for suffrage, calling back to yellow ribbons used as symbols for suffrage since the fight for women’s suffrage in the
U.S. in the late 19th and early 20th centuries.5,6 Pictures of the masses of protestors carrying umbrellas created powerful images that could be used as a part of their movement. The 2019 protests have a similar counterpart. Many protestors have been wearing different kinds of masks when they attend sit-ins and marches. Some wear them to protect their identity, while others wear them for a similar purpose as the umbrellas in 2014, namely, to protect themselves from the police’s tear gas and pepper spray. The masks have somewhat become an icon of the current protests, and the government had responded by issuing a ban on the wearing of masks in public, although many continued to wear them despite the ban. With the outbreak of COVID-19, more
5 https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-29975423 6 https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/hong-kong-protests-a-guide-to-yellow-ribbons-blue-ribbons-and- all-the-other-colours-9775324.html 7 began wearing masks again. The ban is still in place but largely ignored, with medical professionals encouraging their use anyway.7
The Umbrella Movement eventually came to an end as the police response became increasingly violent over time. As a result of these protests, some of the leaders of the pro- democracy push were arrested and sentenced to jail. Although they were jailed for their participation, they gained a lot of experience from the Umbrella Movement. Some of them, such as Joshua Wong, would return to become prominent faces of the 2019 protests. However, it has been difficult for them to assume leadership. They have attempted to take control, but given the scale of the protests and the rise of many anonymous organizers due to the increasing presence of social media, that goal has proven difficult. It appears as if the 2019 protests have, over the months, gradually changed to more and more encompass the demands of the Umbrella
Movement; that is, the demands for a more democratic government system. Thus, as time passed, what began as a dissent towards a bill has grown to encompass so much more.
The more recent protests of the 2014 Umbrella Movement are particularly important influences on the 2019 Hong Kong protests. Each of those protests, in some way, has changed the way that the people in Hong Kong go about showing their concern or discontent. In understanding these protests, one will have a better understanding of the most recent unrest.
Thus, the proximity to the Umbrella Movement, only four years earlier, has made its influence strongly apparent in the 2019 protests.
This history of protests shows that the Chinese government has dealt with situations similar to the 2019 Hong Kong Protests before. This experience would suggest that their responses to the protests would be practiced to some extent, given precedents from past protests.
7 https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/politics/article/3078851/remember-mask-ban-what-happens-if-hong- kong-court-upholds 8
The government’s language in regards to the protests is the main subject of interest in this study.
In this thesis, it is shown that throughout the protests there had been a noticeable shift in the tone of the Chinese government’s rhetoric. At first it appeared as if the protests were seen as a lesser challenge to the government’s authority, but as more people joined the side of the protestors, the
Chinese government began to respond more harshly. It is as though China wanted to tighten its grip and influence over Hong Kong and its people.
9
Chapter 2. The 2019 Protests at a Glance: Three Phases of Protest
The origins of the 2019 Hong Kong Protests date back to a murder case originating in
2018.8 Two residents of Hong Kong, Poon Hiu-wing and her boyfriend, Chan Tong-kai, went to
Taiwan in February 2018. Before they returned Poon was murdered by her boyfriend, who was later arrested in Hong Kong. Since the crime was committed in Taiwan, he would have to be extradited to stand trial. Being that there is no standing extradition agreement among Taiwan,
Hong Kong, and mainland China, this was used by Hong Kong’s government as a reason to propose the Fugitive Offenders and Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters Legislation
Bill, an amendment to Cap. 5259 and Cap. 503,10 a year later in February 2019. This amendment would allow for the arrest and transfer of suspected criminals to places with which Hong Kong has no extradition treaties, such as Taiwan and mainland China. The inclusion of China in the extradition bill, rather than solely establishing the agreement between Hong Kong and Taiwan, was concerning to many in Hong Kong. They feared the implications that this bill could have in the future, with many believing this could lead to the political kidnapping of dissenters of the
Chinese government. Others felt that this was a step in the degradation of the “one country, two systems” policy, and would greatly reduce Hong Kong’s independence from the mainland.
The protests themselves can be divided into three different phases. Phase 1 consists of the early signs of tensions caused by the proposal of the extradition bill in February 2019. This phase cover the time period from late March through the month of June. Throughout this first phase,
8 https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-50148577 9 https://www.hklii.hk/eng/hk/legis/ord/525/index.html 10 https://www.hklii.hk/eng/hk/legis/ord/503/index.html 10 the number of organized protests steadily increased over time, culminating with the events that occurred in the early summer of 2019. Phase 2 of the protests extends from July through August.
It is marked by escalation in tactics used by both sides, such that by mid-to-late summer, more violent tactics were being employed by both protestors and police alike. Phase 3 begins in the autumn of 2019, and extends through to the end of 2019, the termination point covered in this corpus-based study. This phase consists of the period after the announcement of the withdrawal of the Fugitive Offenders and Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters Legislation Bill, the extradition bill at the heart of the issues surrounding the protests. After months of protests, one major goal had been achieved. Note, however, that the end of Phase 3 in this study does not entail the end of the protests.
Some information is difficult to obtain for each of these phases. Most notably difficult to find are the attendance totals from each event. Numbers from both sides tended to be drastically different, which will be shown below. It is likely that both sides have reason to skew their numbers in one direction. Protest organizers likely over-report in order to give the appearance of a larger following and add legitimacy to their cause, while police could under-report numbers in order to minimize their size as a way to de-legitimize the protests.
In the following sections, more details concerning the three phases will be presented.11
11 https://www.cnn.com/specials/asia/hong-kong-protests-intl-hnk 11
Figure 1. Timeline of the 2019 Hong Kong Protests
12
2.1. Phase 1: Prelude to the Protests (March - June 2019)
The early actions against the Fugitive Offenders and Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal
Matters Legislation Bill of 2019 came in the form of organized sit-ins and marches.12 Early protests were peaceful for the most part. The first major event came shortly after the initial bill proposal. At the end of March, a large crowd gathered to march in protest of the bill. Estimates of the attendance of the protest differ greatly, with police estimating just over 5,000 in attendance, whereas the organizers put the number much higher, at around 12,000.13 Over
130,000 marched later in April, showing the growing support that the protests were gaining.14
June 2019 saw the first victory for the protestors, and the largest protests up to that point of time.
In the days leading up to the second reading of the bill, protestors marched in protest. Three days prior to the June 12, 2019, reading of the bill, protestors amassed over one million people to march in opposition to the extradition bill.15 The victory, albeit a small one, came on the day of the reading itself. Organizers gathered outside of the Legislative Council complex and successfully stopped the reading of the bill. While not as large as the gathering a few days before, this protest was much more intense.16 Just three days later, Chief Executive Carrie Lam announced that the bill was to be suspended.17 This was not enough for the protesters, as it was not a withdrawal of the bill. The protesters had established five conditions that had to be met in order for them to be satisfied, and they were not willing to accept any less. They wanted: (1) the withdrawal of the bill, (2) exoneration for arrested protesters, (3) removal of the characterization
12 https://news.now.com/home/local/player?newsId=340955 13 https://hongkongfp.com/2019/03/31/pictures-12000-hongkongers-march-protest-evil-china-extradition-law- organisers-say/ 14 https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/politics/article/3007999/thousands-set-join-protest-march-against- proposed 15 https://hongkongfp.com/2019/06/11/extradition-law-will-pass-despite-largest-protest-hong-kong-history/ 16 https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/politics/article/3014104/thousands-block-roads-downtown-hong-kong- defiant-protest 17 https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/politics/article/3014638/hong-kong-extradition-bill-carrie-lam-hit-pause- button 13 of the protests as riots, (4) independent investigation of police conduct, and (5) the resignation of
Carrie Lam. While suspension of the bill was a step towards their goal, it did not meet their demands. As a result, the protests continued, and as time passed, they would grow in scale.
2.2. Phase 2: Escalation (July - August 2019)
The following months would see an increase in activity from the protesters, as well as an escalation in the response by the police. The protests themselves would also be less peaceful, with damage being done to property of the state. On July 1, 2019, not long after the suspension of the bill, protesters stormed the Legislative Council complex, causing damage to the buildings.18 Violence came later on July 21, 2019, in the town of Yuen Long, in the New
Territories, where it was suspected that individuals supported by the government began attacking people. Violence also erupted there between police and protesters, ending with many protesters being arrested and charged with rioting.19
Protesters also staged days-long sit-ins at the Hong Kong International Airport. This interrupted the daily procedures there and had an impact on travelers, causing flights to be cancelled. In August, Twitter also found that several accounts were being used by the Chinese government to spread propaganda against the Hong Kong protesters. The accounts were subsequently banned from the website. It was found that they were being used for the purpose of sowing discord in Hong Kong. The information from these accounts were then made available for the public to view.20
18 https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-48836048 19 https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/22/world/asia/hong-kong-protest-mob-attack-yuen-long.html 20 https://blog.twitter.com/en_us/topics/company/2019/information_operations_directed_at_Hong_Kong.html 14
2.3. Phase 3: Climax of the Crisis & Lull (September - December 2019)
September 2019 saw a few significant events. Students protested by refusing to attend school at the start of the new school year to show their anger and disapproval of the government.
A major victory for the protesters also came at the beginning of the month. On September 4,
2019, Carrie Lam announced that the extradition bill would be withdrawn. By this point, however, it might have been a little too late for this act to be sufficient. While the withdrawal was a step in the right direction for the protesters, they still demanded that the rest of their conditions be met. As a result, they continued to organize sit-ins at the airport and elsewhere in the city. And violence continued in the clashes between protesters and the police.21 Towards the end of the month, while the protests had grown smaller, they had also become increasingly more violent.
Early in October, what is believed to be the first case of a protestor being shot by a live round occurred. This is indicative of the increasingly violent nature of the clashes with police.22
Hongkongers finally saw the beginning of the support from the United States that they had been seeking when the House of Representatives passed the Hong Kong Human Rights and
Democracy Act on October 15, 2019.23 The bill would later be passed by the Senate on
November 19, and was officially signed on November 27.24 This required sanctions to be imposed on those who committed violations against human rights in Hong Kong. The extradition bill was officially withdrawn by the government on October 23, 2019.
In November 2019, the Chinese University of Hong Kong saw one of the most violent protests to date. A standoff between police and armed protestors took place beginning on
21 https://hongkongfp.com/2019/09/04/little-late-hong-kong-democrats-protesters-vow-action-despite-extradition- bill-withdrawal/ 22 https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/politics/article/3031325/hong-kong-protests-was-police-officer-justified- opening 23 https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/house-bill/3289 24 https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/senate-bill/1838/text 15
November 12. This led to the cancellation of classes and the “siege” of the campus. Protestors threw bricks and petrol bombs at the police, who fired rubber bullets and tear gas in return.
Carrie Lam stated that "if there is any wishful thinking that by escalating violence the government will yield to pressure to satisfy protesters' so-called demands, I'm making this clear that will not happen,"25 showing the government’s official stance on the matter. The situation at the campus lasted for over one week in total before the standoff ended. Later in the month, more anger erupted with the Chinese military’s presence in Hong Kong, which had come to assist in the cleanup of the aftermath of some of the demonstrations.
Protests continued through December, with some interesting developments. From pictures of the gatherings, it appears that many more people are carrying American flags and the like. Some even had large Donald Trump banners, calling for more intervention from the United
States.26 In a march on December 8, many protesters were seen carrying umbrellas. This harks back to the Umbrella Movement of 2014.27 Protestors ended the year by calling on people to attend a planned march on New Year’s Day. By the end of the year, they made it clear that they had no intention of ending their protests any time soon, not unless all of their demands were met.
It seems that by February 2020, a full year later, the protests sparked by the extradition bill had quieted down significantly. The largest contributing factor to this was the outbreak of the coronavirus near the end of 2019, and the citizens of Hong Kong’s criticism towards the mainland Chinese government’s handling of the virus epidemic. Fears over the virus all but completely put an end to public gatherings, meaning demonstrations from protestors have seemingly been put on hold indefinitely. Hongkongers’ attention has shifted towards their
25 https://www.cnn.com/asia/live-news/hong-kong-protests-nov-11-intl- hnk/h_b965e2b946b93c1a0637746120408f2c 26 https://news.rthk.hk/rthk/en/component/k2/1495388-20191201? 27 https://news.rthk.hk/rthk/en/component/k2/1496588-20191208? 16 perceived inadequacies regarding the government’s response to the virus.28 As the virus situation stabilizes people have begun returning to the streets and as of May 2020, amidst new fears of
China’s authoritarianism, the protests have been revitalized. Protests had their progress temporarily halted, but it appears that the end is still out of reach.
28 https://www.wsj.com/articles/hong-kong-protesters-refocus-ire-on-citys-handling-of-coronavirus-crisis- 11580475635 17
Chapter 3. Methodology
Before beginning the research on China’s rhetoric on the 2019 Hong Kong Protests, there were several topics to be addressed and hopefully explained. Firstly, of particular interest was that of observing the Chinese government’s official public response to the protests. What made this interesting to me is that there would be two aspects to this point. One aspect would be the statements issued to domestic news sources, such as Xinhua News, while the other would be the statements released to foreign news outlets, such as in public press conferences. It would be expected that these would not be identical, given the different intended audiences. Hence, it would be beneficial to conduct analyses over both types of sources. Secondly, was the involvement the Chinese government’s unofficial response to the situation. This would include comments and statements that could be linked back to the Chinese government, such as bots on social media, but do not come as statements sponsored by any office of the government.
Comparing and contrasting the rhetoric of the government’s official and unofficial attitudes could provide insight into their true attitude towards the Hong Kong protests.
In order to carry out this study, a corpus-based linguistic analysis was conducted over statements and remarks made concerning the Hong Kong protests, focusing on lexical choice.
The main focus of this study was mainland China’s perspective on the ongoing situation in Hong
Kong, with most of the responses coming from government officials or government-sponsored sources. It would also be worthwhile to include the responses of the Hong Kong police. The reason is that, as police, their duty is to serve and protect the people of Hong Kong; yet, at the same time, they still serve under the Hong Kong government and, by extension, Beijing. 18
The data for this study will consist of text taken from two sources: news releases and
Twitter messages. The primary data source, covering all three phases of the protests, is news releases from state-run Chinese news outlets. A total of 37 news articles were used to track the trends in China’s coverage of the protests on these state-run news media networks. A subset of the corpus, articles from CCTV News, was used for a small quantitative study. The second source of data for a quantitative analysis, covering Phases 1 and 2, comes from social media messages posted to Twitter.
The primary source of information consists of reports from news networks, those that are domestic Chinese as well as those from foreign countries. From these, the data collected are quotations from government officials, spokespeople of these officials, and law enforcement. Also of interest in this study is a closer look at news articles written by state-run media networks, such as China Daily or Xinhua News. Since they are operated by the state, it would be worth investigating the manner in which they report on the events going on in Hong Kong, which carry a strong anti-Beijing sentiment.
With regards to the second data source, what is special about the Twitter messages is the fact that the accounts that they were posted from were deemed by Twitter to be linked to the
Chinese state. These accounts were viewed as part of an undercover campaign by the Chinese government to spread disinformation regarding the Hong Kong protests.29 As a result, Twitter banned the accounts and later made their information available for the public to download and view. Facebook and Google experienced similar issues of their platforms being used in similar fashion. Twitter was able to figure out the link between the accounts and the Chinese government because of some patterns in their behavior. At some point, nearly all of them were used in order to promote the mainland’s version of the Hong Kong protests. Twitter was also
29 https://apnews.com/3893ae1284084aebac7af39f93bc8357 19 suspicious of many of them, given the fact that Twitter is banned in China. Despite this fact, there was a sizeable portion of messages from users located in China. Twitter has provided to the public these accounts and the millions of tweets made by them. In total there were nearly one thousand accounts banned from the site in August of 2019. As a result, the Twitter messages from these accounts covered our first two phases of the Hong Kong protests.
Exactly how these Twitter accounts were identified as being linked to the Chinese state was not made public. However, analysis conducted on the behavior of the accounts over time provides some explanation. Research done by NPR and other institutions suggested that the government has been seeding accounts, meaning that they were creating new accounts and gradually amassing a following for the individual accounts before using them. This strategy avoids the suspicion of a new account immediately having a large number of followers, which would provide just cause for flagging the account. These same researchers also noticed changes in the messages posted by some of the users, with spikes in posts coming around major events going on in China, with the Hong Kong protests being the most recent example.30 Many of the accounts were old, having been created prior to 2010, but did not even begin posting in Chinese until 2017 or later, at which time a large spike was seen. A disinformation campaign such as this required numerous accounts, as well as an audience of people to whom the messages can be spread. In order to do this, Chinese media sites and government agencies had been offering payment to gain followers on social media. This would allow for more people to see the messages from these accounts. They also paid people to make comments on social media, thus essentially sponsoring those posts. NPR’s research found it is likely that many of the accounts were bot accounts, or accounts that were stolen from their original users, stolen for the express
30 https://www.npr.org/2019/09/17/758146019/china-used-twitter-to-disrupt-hong-kong-protests-but-efforts-began- years-earlier 20 purpose of using them for this disinformation campaign. These accounts could potentially be used by the government to disseminate the narrative that they want others to see, and to provide the illusion that these messages are supported by a large number of people. The Chinese government can also use these accounts to negatively affect the image of whatever they oppose.
In this case it is the protestors in Hong Kong.
In order to handle the vast amount of data from the corpus, the messages from banned
Twitter accounts, I wrote a program to parse through the tweets. This was a task that would be nearly impossible to do completely manually, given that there were over 3 million messages contained within the corpus. The program was written in the Java programming language, and was used to trim down the corpus to only messages that would potentially be relevant to the
Hong Kong protests. The corpus was provided in a comma-separated format with a new line separating each entry. This format made it possible for me to more conveniently write all of the actual message text to a new file, removing all of the unnecessary text. Thus, excluded are the many messages in languages other than English or Chinese. I then used another program, the
Stanford Chinese Language Parser, in order to segment the new text files that I created from the original corpus data. Since Chinese is conventionally written without spaces, word-segmentation inserts a space between words, with each word consisting of one or more Chinese characters.
This word-segmentation task is a necessary step in order to obtain a more accurate word count.
In order to use the Stanford software, it is necessary to set up a Unix environment to run the programs provided. There were Java components provided with the software, which would have allowed me to use the segmenter’s components within my own program. However, not all of them appeared to function properly within the software that I was using to write and run my code. A text editor called “glogg” was very helpful for debugging my code. Given the size of the
21 text files, most applications were unable to open or process them. As “Glogg” is able to handle very large files, I was able to use it to find and verify the ordering of the data fields within the
“.csv” files.
The corpus provided by Twitter includes all of the data associated with each tweet, including the date that the message was posted. This additional information proved to be quite useful. Since some of the tweets from various accounts may date back years before the protests, it is important to filter out those tweets. Relevant messages would most likely fall between
February and August of 2019. Then, to further filter the results, I adjusted my program to only select messages that contained words that would potentially be relevant to this study. This would include words such as “Hong Kong”, “香港”
Chinese and English, there also were tweets in Arabic, Korean, and other languages. Each message had a data field containing a two-letter code representing the language in which the message was written. Using these codes, it was possible to select the languages for this study, namely, Chinese and English. While it is possible that the contents of the messages in other languages may have relevance to this study, I am not familiar with those other languages and do not trust online translations enough to consider using them for the current study.
With regards to culling the news articles, I simply searched for relevant news articles about the Hong Kong protests from varying Chinese news networks. Only relatively well-known news publications are used for this study. The larger publications would be more easily
22 accessible and are likely to have bigger audiences, thus making their choices regarding language use all the more important.
Once the data was all collected, the next step was to conduct a lexical analysis on its contents. My study was separated into quantitative analyses on the news articles and Twitter messages. The goal was to pay particular attention to their choice of words when describing the situation in Hong Kong. Of interest for this study are the kinds of words—nouns, verbs and adjectives—that were used to describe the protestors, as well as their gatherings and other actions. For example, there is a difference in calling the participants “protestors” versus calling them “terrorists.” These two words create an entirely different picture in the minds of those reading them, and bias towards the use of one of these terms over the other could be indicative of some motive behind the statements in which they are used. The media’s portrayal of the events of the protests is also important to heed. The government can create an entirely different image if they choose the word “riot” instead of “march,” for example, when they describe the protestors as ‘rioting in the streets’ as opposed to describing them as ‘marching in the streets.’ In order to create the image that they want, as well as to spread disinformation, the government would choose their words very carefully. While most people suspect the Twitter messages are from the government, the quotes from the news agencies are able to be directly tied to government officials. Quotes from organizations such as these news agencies represent the official stance of the government, allowing one to read into the message that the government wants to get across to its audience. Using the previously specified methods, I aim to explore the intentions behind the posts on Twitter and the statements made by the government about the 2019 Hong Kong protests.
23
After filtering the original Twitter corpus, the resulting data set consisted of 6,315 tweets that explicitly mention Hong Kong. Of these tweets, only 772 of them fell within the time frame of the protests, which began in June of 2019. Using this newly organized data set, the goal is to determine if there are any trends in the language used on Twitter and by Chinese news media, and if so, identify what those trends are. The other question of interest concerns suspicions that the Twitter messages are created by state-owned bot accounts. Determining consistencies between the two sets of data in this study would serve to confirm these suspicions.
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Chapter 4. Findings
The 2019 Hong Kong Protests stretched over many months, yielding countless news articles covering the subject and countless messages about the subject on social media. A brief overview of trends in China’s coverage of the protests on state run news media networks , followed by a closer analysis of a smaller subsection of news articles, will provide evidence to the shifting in tone that the Chinese government had in their response to the protestors. Using the corpus provided by Twitter, a quantitative analysis will assist in determining the message or idea that the Chinese government was trying to convey through these suspected bot accounts.
Comments on overall trends will be presented following the findings from news media and
Twitter. Articles from Chinese state media found and used for this study are distributed across the three phases as shown in Table 1. Among the three phases, those of Phase 2 and Phase 3 contain more eventful articles. Those articles were, moreover, much more easily accessible.
Among these sources, 30 of them were compiled into CCTV News’ English site. Those articles are chosen close analysis.
Number of Phase News Articles
Phase 1 6 (2 CCTV) March to June
Phase 2 21 (19 CCTV) July to August
Phase 3 10 (9 CCTV) September to December
Total 37 (30 CCTV)
Table 1: Distribution of the News Articles Across the Three Phases
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4.1 News Findings
This section will begin with a preliminary glance into how the Chinese government has responded to the unrest brought about by the Fugitive Offenders and Mutual Legal Assistance in
Criminal Matters Legislation Bill, which was proposed by the government of Hong Kong in
February of 2019. The articles used for this portion of the study were in English, posted to the
English pages of their respective websites, such as CCTV and Xinhua News. At the beginning of the protests, during Phase 1, the government’s response was relatively light. Initial responses were mostly made through state-run media outlets. A total of 37 articles were used, 30 of which were used for close analysis while the remaining 7 were used for examples and additional commentary. These articles published by Chinese state-run media, they tended to condemn the actions of the protestors as being violent. The protesters are likened to an angry mob that seek to express their contempt for the rule of law and are the ones that have “trampled on the rule of law and social order.”31 “Trample” is used multiple times across articles, showing that the government officials not only feel that the protestors are disregarding the law, but they are flagrantly doing so. In short, these people are the ones causing trouble within Hong Kong society. A quote from one of the news articles published in early July was particularly telling of mainland China’s position, and would be corroborated by their future responses. They stated that
“although Hong Kong is a capitalist city, it will never condone such violent behavior,”32 implying that the kind of actions being taken by the protestors are to be expected from capitalist societies.
The first official response from Beijing did not come until after nearly eight weeks of protests, and when it did, it was in the form of a press conference on July 29, 2019. The Chinese
31 http://english.cctv.com/2019/08/17/ARTI8sppTobUQ3wrroaEEatr190817.shtml 32 http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1156439.shtml 26 government was initially dismissive of the protestors and their demands, and mostly criticized the actions of the protestors while showing its support for the Hong Kong police. In fact, the
Chinese government ignored the root of the problem in their initial address and, instead, said that the real problem in Hong Kong—and the cause of the ongoing protests—is the socioeconomic situation there. As a case in point, Yang Guang, spokesman for Beijing’s Hong Kong and Macau
Affairs Office, in the press conference held on July 29, 2019, stated that “[economic]
Development is the golden key to solving Hong Kong’s issues,”33 and did not make any reference to the demands of the protestors. The Chinese government took the opportunity to remind people that Hong Kong belonged to China, and that Hong Kong’s problems were also
China’s problems. What many news outlets pointed out at the time was how silent the Hong
Kong government was at the early weeks of the protests. Chief Executive Carrie Lam made very few public appearances or statements, as she did not meet with the general public to address the situation in Hong Kong until late September.34
At least a couple of common themes can be discerned from the government responses.
One common early theme is the lack of accountability on the part of the governments of both mainland China and Hong Kong. Seventeen out of the 30 articles (56.67%) used for close analysis, which were aggregated onto the CCTV News website,35 contained language that suggested the protests had foreign influences as the root cause, rather than domestic issues.
”Foreign meddling”36 and “wirepullers”37 are said to be the driving forces of the discontent and were denounced by Chinese officials. For instance, consider example (1), which shows some of the accusations the news media has made towards foreign influences.
33 https://qz.com/1676926/beijing-affirms-support-for-hong-kong-government-in-rare-press-conference/ 34 https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/26/world/asia/carrie-lam-hong-kong-protests.html 35 Article Sources Count: Xinhua News- 22; Chinaplus- 5; CGTN- 3 36 http://english.cctv.com/2019/08/15/ARTIlFoUdzTPHyJsetKf0AuF190815.shtml 37 http://english.cctv.com/2019/08/04/ARTIukTOceHdLVTyRTT1EAt9190804.shtml 27
(1) “Some U.S. and British politicians have tried to blur the boundary between what constitutes a violent riot and a peaceful rally. By whitewashing the violence in Hong Kong, they are seeking to damage the legitimacy of the territory’s government…”- China Plus 8-15-2019
In (1) the stance on outside interference is made clear, showing their perspective on the intentions behind foreigners’ involvement in the Hong Kong situation. Both have framed those protests as having been influenced by outside sources, namely western ones, accusing them of wishing to “undermine ‘one country, two systems’ for their own political gains.”38 Twelve out of the 30 CCTV New articles (40%) contain language suggestive of this. A spokeswoman for the
Chinese Foreign Ministry responded to the remarks made by U.S. Secretary of State Mike
Pompeo by saying that “He might think that violent activities in Hong Kong are reasonable because after all, this is the creation of the U.S.”39 The media has encouraged other countries to see the events from China’s perspective. Chinese officials took offense to any nation calling for the Chinese government to listen to the demands of the protestors. The Chinese government responded to such remarks by arguing that “Western media should engage in fair and unbiased reporting since readers are entitled to know what's really going on in Hong Kong.”40
Joshua Wong, one of the leaders of 2014’s Umbrella Movement who was released from prison around the time that the protests began to escalate, met with the Chancellor of Germany,
Angela Merkel, to discuss the situation in Hong Kong and to ask for her help. This action was met with strong disapproval and condemnation from the Chinese government. A spokeswoman for the Chinese Foreign Ministry said that their meeting “constitutes disrespect for China's
38 http://english.cctv.com/2019/08/13/ARTIuEucRDsQvHcdMnLEiSUj190813.shtml 39 https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-07-30/china-says-hong-kong-protest-violence-is-creation-of-u-s 40 http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-08/15/c_138311607.htm 28 sovereignty and interference with China's internal affairs."41 The Chinese Foreign Ministry considered any foreign powers calling on them to act to be an undermining of their handling of the situation and was therefore deemed inappropriate.
Another common theme that was present in much of the rhetoric from mainland China as well as from Hong Kong’s legislature was the presentation of the feelings or emotions of the
Chinese people. This ranged from expressing disapproval of the protestors’ actions to their displays of love for the city of Hong Kong. Nine out of the 30 articles (30%) contained emotive language, as well as including quotes from Hongkongers such as “I love Hong Kong. Hong
Kong is my home”42 and “It saddens me to see all the controversy and disturbances in Hong
Kong over the summer.”43 Although not inherently emotive themselves, statements such as
“[protestors] ruin the futures of young Hong Kong people who were coerced, incited and instigated by them,”44 are meant to bring out a feeling of sympathy for the affected people. It seems as though whenever Carrie Lam gave a public address, she was speaking mostly to the people of Hong Kong. She gave her addresses in Cantonese, the native tongue for most in Hong
Kong, or in English, the prestige language of the region. Use of both of these languages is seen as part of the identity of a Hongkonger (Chan 2018, Weston 2016). Yet, most of her rhetoric was still similar to what was coming from the mainland Chinese government. She spoke many times in ways that would condemn the actions of the protestors.45 She told them that they were
“hurting the feelings” of the Chinese people with their actions. She was accusing them of disrespecting the power and rule of mainland China, and as such this greatly disappoints fellow
Chinese people. In one of her addresses, given in English, Chief Executive Lam used words such
41 http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-09/10/c_138381709.htm 42 http://english.cctv.com/2019/08/04/ARTIZl9Au8aKR1o3furDXXAx190804.shtml 43 http://english.cctv.com/2019/09/03/ARTIKr18dhhCONEd920vNgNo190903.shtml 44 http://english.cctv.com/2019/08/13/ARTIuEucRDsQvHcdMnLEiSUj190813.shtml 45 https://www.cnbc.com/2019/11/12/hong-kong-protesters-selfish-for-paralyzing-city-carrie-lam-says.html 29 as ”selfish”, and “riotous”46 to describe the protestors, serving as a means to make her disapproval known to the public. The underlying message in what Lam is saying is that
Hongkongers are Chinese, and not some other national entity.
The words “hurt feelings” would appear in many places whenever the topic of the protests was brought up. This type of language also appeared in other contexts as well. For instance, the Hong Kong protests led to tensions between the Chinese government and the
American National Basketball Association. Daryl Morey, the general manager of the Houston
Rockets, one of the teams in the NBA, used Twitter to show his support for the Hong Kong protestors. This angered the Chinese government, leading to them to refuse to broadcast NBA games over CCTV networks.47 Two statements were released in order to apologize to the
Chinese government as well as to fans who disagreed with the remarks made, one in English and the other in Mandarin. Both used the hurt feelings narrative in order to placate the Chinese government by acknowledging some wrongdoing. The Chinese version, originally posted to the
NBA’s account on Weibo, a Chinese social media website, translates the NBA apology to say the following in (2). The English statement, on the other hand, had a similar message, also admitting to hurting fans’ feelings, but it differed in tone, as shown in (3).
(2) “我们对休斯顿火箭队总经理达瑞尔-莫雷发表的不当言论感到极其失望，他无 疑已经严重地伤害了中国球迷的感情”.
‘We are very disappointed in the inappropriate statement made by Houston Rockets general manager Daryl Morey, who undoubtedly seriously hurt Chinese fans’ feelings.’ 48
46 https://time.com/5631385/hong-kong-violence-carrie-lam/ 47 https://www.washingtonpost.com/sports/2019/10/07/nba-china-tweet-daryl-morey/ 48 https://www.weibo.com/1883881851/IalZBw1eH? 30
(3) “We recognize that the views expressed by Houston Rockets General Manager Daryl Morey have deeply offended many of our friends and fans in China, which is regrettable.” 49
The English version in (3) was softer, with the intention of apologizing while still recognizing and defending Morey’s freedom to express his thoughts, stating that “the values of the league support individuals’ educating themselves and sharing their views on matters important to them.”
The Chinese version not only served as an apology from the NBA for Morey’s message, but also to reprimand him for making the statement in the first place. In the Chinese version of the apology, Morey’s statement was called “不当”
Chinese version was meant to show that China had been seriously wronged, and thus needed an apology that matched the severity of the transgression.
Anywhere from the dispute with the NBA to official press conferences from the chief executive, this type of rhetoric could be seen. It aligns with the victim image that China has tried to project during situations such as these, as they have done in the past with the Umbrella
Movement. At that time some Chinese leaders similarly accused the governments of the United
49 https://pr.nba.com/nba-statement/ 50 https://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/nba/2019/10/07/nba-china-statements-different-english- chinese/3898513002/ 31
States and the UK of inciting the protests.51 They believe themselves to be victims in that other countries, chiefly the United States, are undermining their authority and not recognizing their sovereignty by meddling and interfering with their territories. This is the main reason that outside opinions on the matter have been greatly unwelcome and largely ignored by the Chinese government, and this stance is made clear by the media with statements saying “to the outside forces meddling in Hong Kong, we have this message for you: Keep out!”52
The news coverage of the events pertaining to the protests highlights several issues. One is the legality of the protests. In analyzing the thirty articles published online to China Central
Television (CCTV) News’ English website, it is revealed that a majority of them take the position that the protests themselves are unlawful and illegal acts, as half of them explicitly refer to the protests in this manner. While the language regarding other topics shifts over time as the situation changes, this position remains relatively consistent. The articles commonly make mention of the “unlawful acts” of the protestors or specifically mention “unlawful assembly,” referring to the gatherings and other actions of the protestors. The words “illegal” or “unlawful,” when referring to the actions of the protestors, occur in 15 out of the 30 articles (50%), or one half of the articles, written between June and December of 2019.
51 https://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/11/world/asia/some-chinese-leaders-claim-us-and-britain-are-behind-hong- kong-protests-.html 52 http://english.cctv.com/2019/08/15/ARTIlFoUdzTPHyJsetKf0AuF190815.shtml 32
Figure 2: Occurrences of “Illegal/Unlawful” in the 30 CCTV News Articles
Figure 2 above shows that during the escalation in tensions between the protestors and police in
Phase 2, there was a spike in the usage of the words. The beginning of Phase 2 is included with the Phase 1 portion in order to further illustrate the shifting in language, as there are not many occurrences of the words between the two. Later on in Phase 2 there would be a significant increase in the instances of “illegal” or “unlawful” being used in the context of the protests.
While usage fell after this point, it remained higher than early on in Phase 1 of the protests. The protestors are also portrayed as a threat to society, and this is shown by the manner in which they discuss the rule of law. The words “rule of law” or “rule-of-law” appear in over half of the articles; that is, the words occur in 20 out of the 30 articles (66.67%). It appears that rule-of-law is an important subject based on the frequency it is mentioned, as it appeared a total of 36 times in these articles (or 1.8 per article). However, it is used in two different ways. Each manner in which it is used carries a different meaning. The first manner “rule-of-law” is used when characterizing the protestors. Making up 13 of the 36 appearances (36.1%) of this phrase, its use
33 is to negatively portray the people as being unlawful. “Rule-of-law” commonly appears with words such as “disregard”, “challenge”, “trash”, and “trample” preceding it. The example in (4) shows the manner in which “trample” is used in this context.
(4) “Nor do these freedoms give protesters the right to break the law, commit acts of violence, or trample on the rule of law.” -China Plus 7-08-2019
The other context in which “rule-of-law” is used is within reports about the police, their supporters, and Hong Kong’s society. The remaining 23 appearances of the phrase (63.9%) are of this type. Here, “rule of law” is being mentioned and used in a positive way. The police are characterized as the guardians of Hong Kong society, and the ones who protect the rule of law.
Rule of law is seen by those against the protests as the foundation of society, and the police are the ones who maintain it. The police are called the “backbone of safety, stability, and the rule of law,” and “safeguarding” is most commonly associated with the police and rule of law in these news articles, as shown in (5).
(5) “At the same time, they are piling blame on Hong Kong police who are performing their duty, safeguarding the rule of law and protecting the safety of life and property of Hong Kong citizens." -CGTN 11-19-2019
A few references to Hong Kong’s Basic Law were made as well, in order to further emphasize rule of law as the basis of Hong Kong society. This, in turn, would serve to further vilify the actions of the protestors, as they would be threatening to destabilize the Hong Kong way of life.
There were two articles of particular note, because they combined the issues of legality and foreign meddling. These two articles specifically made mention of the Catalonia situation in
34
Spain and the world’s view of the Hong Kong protests.53,54 The articles compared the Hong
Kong situation to others around the world that they view as similar. The people of the Catalonia region have long been calling for independence from Spain, and have taken action in recent years to make this a reality. Some of the actions do share some similarities with the protests in Hong
Kong, but the cause of demonstrations and the end goals were very different. In 2017, an independence referendum was held in Catalonia where a vote took place that was later declared to be illegal. In 2019, several Catalan leaders were jailed for organizing another similar referendum. Protests arose in Catalonia due to arrests of these leaders.55 Hong Kong officials view the current situation in a similar light as Spain did. They view the protestors as separatists that are being encouraged by outside sources, most notably western countries. Some of the key commonalities between these articles are the comparisons to protests in other parts of the world and the feeling that China’s situation is not being viewed in the same manner as those of other countries. CCTV says that the Catalonia situation, as well as protests elsewhere in the world, such as in Chile56 and London,57are copying or imitating Hong Kong. They go so far as to say that there is a double standard among world leaders when it comes to these issues. They claim that they also wish to be viewed “objectively and impartially,” implying that there is bias against
China concerning these issues. They believe that other countries have not been as vocal when it comes to protests outside of Hong Kong. They liken themselves to Catalonia because they would most likely wish to be able to handle the protestors in a similar manner, specifically with arrests and criminal charges, but without the global criticism that they are receiving. Although the Hong
Kong officials want to draw similarities to the Catalonia situation, the two situations are actually
53 http://english.cctv.com/2019/10/21/ARTIfBdMaxn4suVdQBI9naR1191021.shtml 54 http://english.cctv.com/2019/10/23/ARTIZPjQU8iR1WGhBUnbsgUW191023.shtml 55 https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-29478415 56 https://time.com/5710268/chile-protests/ 57 https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-49957521 35 quite different. The people of Catalonia are seeking independence from Spain, while protestors in Hong Kong are fighting for what many in western countries believe to be their rights, such as a true democratic system. It seems that the only time that opinions from foreign powers are welcome is when they supported the Chinese government. The Chinese government appears to either want others to be less vocal towards the Hong Kong situation or be equally vocal to situations in other regions in the world, despite fundamental differences between the situations in those other locales.
The language used to speak directly about the protestors themselves was also very telling.
Throughout the different phases of the protests—the prelude, the escalation, and the climax to the crisis—saw differences in the way that news reporting and officials characterized the protestors. There was a shift over time in the language used to describe the protests. These changes happened rather quickly, with noticeable differences becoming apparent throughout the summer of 2019 and into the fall. Starting with the early activities of the protests in late June and early July of 2019, initial coverage of the protests seems to be softer in tone than it would be later on. For instance, example (6) illustrates the difference between the tone of the news coverage at the start of Phase 2 (in 6a) versus the end of the phase (6b). The later article focuses on the violent actions, using words such as “attacked”, “besieged”, and “sabotaged.”
(6) a. “In Hong Kong, there have been expressions of different opinions in this regard. After the protesters took part in street demonstrations and even riots, the SAR Government decided to suspend the amendments in order to listen more widely to the views of the various aspects of society and jointly advance the rule of law.” - China Plus, 7-03-2019
b. “Since June 9, violent protesters have harrowed Hong Kong through confrontations with police and extensive vandalism. They have deliberately attacked police, besieged police stations, sabotaged public facilities and assaulted innocent people, forcing officers to respond to prevent further destruction.” – Xinhua News, August 28, 2019:
36
Notably, most references to the protestors do not carry any adjectives with them in many of the early reports. They are simply referred to as “protestors.” Even more noteworthy is that at this point in time, those who demonstrated more extreme actions in their protests were labeled as
“extremes” or “radicals,” as in example (7).
(7) “On July 1, the 22nd anniversary of the return of Hong Kong to Chinese sovereignty, some extremists stormed and vandalized the Legislative Council building in Hong Kong.” – China Plus 7-03-2019
They were regarded as being separate from the other protestors who, for the most part, did not behave in this manner. The gradual shifting in terminology used showed that the earliest phase of the protests truly was a prelude for things to come.
By early August, well into Phase 2, the escalation phase of the protests, this started to change. It was admitted that the early protests were mostly “peaceful demonstrations,” but at this point the word choice became marked, such that it painted the protestors in a more negative light, as in example (8).
(8) “Sunday's marches took place in Tsuen Wan and neighboring areas. After the marches ended, violent protesters deviated from their routes to attack police officers.”- Xinhua News 8-26-2019
The example given in (8) not only calls the protesters violent, but also suggests that they would deviate from their activities for the sole purpose of attacking the police. The word “protestors” began to more frequently carry descriptors modifying the noun, almost all of which were very negative. While “protestors” still appeared without any descriptors, though significantly less frequently than before, the most frequently-occurring adjective modifying “protestor” at this point was “radical,” followed by “violent,” as in (9). Previously, “radical” was used to refer to a
37 few individuals in the group of protestors whose behavior did not conform with the others, as in
(10). By this time, “radical” is used to describe the protestors in general, as seen in (9), and the word “some” has been omitted. There is little to no distinction between those who use violence and those who do not.
(9) “Tang Ping-keung, deputy commissioner of police, said at a press briefing on Monday that during the series of protests, radical protesters acted lawlessly and escalated the level of violence.“- Xinhua News 8-13-2019
(10) “Chan said from storming and vandalizing the Legislative Council (LegCo) building, storming the institution of the central government in Hong Kong and defacing the Chinese national emblem, to throwing the national flag into the sea, some radicals have been escalating their behaviors in an attempt to abuse the principle of "one country, two systems" and trample on the national dignity.”- Xinhua News 8-04-2019
Towards the end of the month of August there was even more change. Moving into Phase
3 of the protests, the height of the unrest, the words “riot” and “rioters” became more commonly used, appearing a total of 37 times in 16 articles for an average of just over twice per article.
(11) “Some sanctimonious U.S. lawmakers including House Speaker Nancy Pelosi even showed sympathy for the fanatic rioters and called their atrocities ‘a beautiful sight to behold,’ while others defamed Hong Kong police and judicial bodies who have been strictly enforcing the law.”- Xinhua 11-18-2019
Only eight of these appearances (21.6%), coming from two articles (12.5%), occurred before mid-August, showing a change in rhetoric towards the protests. The language changed from using the much less stigmatized “demonstration” and “protest” to the very negative term “riot” when writing about the actions of the protestors. The instances of characterizing the protestors as
“radical” and “violent” increased as well. Occurrences of “violent” and “violence” increased greatly after mid-August. Prior to this time, articles containing these words used them an average of 5 times per article, with the peak usage of 7 times. However by late August it had increased to an average of just over 7 times, with the peak number of uses in a single article being 16 times in
38 an article posted on August 28, 201958. Figure 3 below shows the upward trend in the occurrence of the term throughout Phase 2, the escalation phase, from July through August. The peak comes around the time where clashes between protestors and police increased in frequency and intensity, as did tensions between the two groups.
Uses of "Violent" 70
60
50
40
30
20 NumberofOccurrences 10
0 June- mid July mid July-mid August mid-end August Sept.-Oct. Nov.-Dec.
"Violent"
Figure 3: Occurrences of “Violent” in the 30 CCTV News Articles
Not only did the news sources shift from calling these protests “demonstrations” to calling them
“riots,” but they also began to call the protestors’ actions “shameful,” and most strongly “flagrant violations of basic human rights.”59
(12) “At this critical juncture for Hong Kong's future, it is an imperative duty for all people who care about Hong Kong to step forward to speak out against violent radicals and support the HKSAR government in stabilizing the situation.” – Xinhua News 8-13-2019
58 http://english.cctv.com/2019/08/28/ARTIPMRGOwdT9eQ6sY2VwCZn190828.shtml 59 http://english.cctv.com/2019/08/15/ARTIAfuTzA2BCY81yVhUoQlv190815.shtml 39
It was at this point that rhetoric that is typically associated with terrorism began to appear more frequently, stemming from a statement, shown in (13), that was read out in Beijing in August to the Hong Kong media by Yang Guang, a spokesman for the Hong Kong and Macau Affairs
Office.
(13) “Hong Kong’s radical protesters have repeatedly attacked police with highly dangerous tools, which constitute serious violent crimes and have started to show signs of terrorism.” (Yang Guang, August 12, 2019)60
Shortly after this statement, the words “terrorists” and “terrorism” appeared in articles posted to the CCTV News website. CCTV News claimed on August 13, 2019, that “black-clad mobsters have created an atmosphere of terror on the Hong Kong streets” and that “The attacks on police with extremely dangerous tools were a serious crime and showed initial signs of terrorism.”61
There were no instances of this type of language being used prior to this point. The timing of the shift from “demonstrations” to “riots” is also consistent with the statement made by Yang, as the change can be seen shortly after his statement was made. This suggests that the news media was following the lead of the government officials in terms of lexical choice and tone. Much of the coverage has shifted towards the violent actions of the protestors and the attacks that they have made on the police, who are, after all, just doing their duty to protect the rule of law.
News articles from September and into the fall again changed their stance on the protestors. Similar language was being used to describe the protestors, although “mob” was being used to describe groups of protestors, as in (14).
60 https://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/3022438/beijing-warns-signs-terrorism-violent-unrest-hong- kong 61 http://english.cctv.com/2019/08/13/ARTIuEucRDsQvHcdMnLEiSUj190813.shtml 40
(14) “Police officers were injured on the job, while innocent residents with different views were also harassed, attacked or even beaten up by mobs.” – Xinhua News 8- 13-2019
In (14), the acts of the protestors are shown as being violent, highlighted by calling the groups
“mobs.” Significantly, it is language concerning their cause that has changed. Throughout the protests, the goals of the protestors were not mentioned in the reports found on the CCTV News website, likely in order to avoid legitimizing the protesters, or to avoid informing others and risk helping the protestors to gain support. A common stance in many of the articles is the denouncing of the disruptive behavior of the protestors, and highlighting anything that inhibits the normal flow of society. A September 1, 2019, article by Xinhua News stated that “behind the violence and chaos in Hong Kong is an elaborate scheme of the rioters and their patrons whose real intent is clearly exposed now,” and this intent, according to the government and other news networks, is to create unrest and to “kidnap Hong Kong.” It is around this time that accusations towards western countries are being made, together with the use of the aforementioned victim language. A few headlines make use of the words “backfire” and “interference.” They are used to indicate that other countries’ influence on the Hong Kong protest is unwarranted meddling in
Chinese internal affairs, and that negative consequences may result from this. They suggest that these foreign influences are enabling agents of chaos in Hong Kong and are biased against, and hypocritical towards, China when it comes to situations such as what is going on in Hong Kong.
The main premise is that China is getting unfair treatment from other world leaders in this situation, and if it were looked at objectively, public opinion on the matter would be different.
The focus seems to shift towards the politics of the matter during the later parts of the fall. That shift coincides with increased discussion of the topic in the United States and with the signing of the Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act in November. Articles still
41 covered violent incidents, but by this time, the Chinese sources believed that they had already established as fact that the protestors were no longer peaceful. For the most part, the articles portray the protests in a negative manner. Using Table 2 below as a summary of the contents of the 30 CCTV News articles, one can see that the state media was very critical and disapproving of the protestors.
Subject/Content Number of Articles
Emotive Language 9 (30%)
Foreign Interference 17 (56.67%)
Illegal/Unlawful Activity 15 (50%)
Rule of Law 20 (66.67%)
Table 2: Contents of the 30 CCTV News Articles
Over time, the narrative in the news shifted to match the rapidly changing situation in
Hong Kong. While initially quite benign, the rhetoric towards the protests hardened as tensions rose, ending with the view that the protestors are terrorists and mobs that are supported, or even incited, by foreign powers to disrupt society in Hong Kong and to undermine Chinese sovereignty. The changes came rather quickly, indicating that the government quickly lost its patience with the protestors and would not be tolerant of their actions. The strengthening of the language also indicated that the government did not have plans to listen to the demands of the protestors. The characterization of the protestors as mobs and terrorists made them appear as nothing more than agents of chaos and could not be reasoned with, perhaps thereby justifying the increasingly violent tactics being employed by the police. Creating a narrative is one of the most powerful methods of persuading people. By gradually strengthening their rhetoric regarding the
42 protests, the Chinese government sought to characterize the protestors as violent threats to society. Whether or not this tactic was effective in persuading the people of Hong Kong is difficult to say, but their intentions can be inferred based on the observations presented here.
4.2. Twitter Findings
Among the 936 accounts that were banned from Twitter in August 2019, it was fairly easy to spot cases that would have been flagged by Twitter for suspicious behavior. There were several instances of identical messages being posted by the same account, suggesting the account was being used for the purpose of spamming. Sometimes these messages would be repeatedly posted in quick succession while others were spaced out more, perhaps to avoid suspicion. The corpus also provided such information as the devices used to send the Twitter messages, which also gives more reason to suggest that they were bot accounts. Looking at what was used to send the Tweets revealed that a majority of them were sent using IFTTT. IFTTT is a web-based software program that one can set up using chains of conditional statements to accomplish a task, such as sending Twitter messages. This suggests that there was some level of automation involved in the posts from the Twitter accounts in question.
Although many of these accounts displayed this type of behavior, a significant portion of them had little or nothing to do with Hong Kong. The contents of these messages ranged from advertisements to posts of news articles. The accounts that were banned had messages dating back years before the protests, and thus were not related to the current situation in Hong Kong.
The users themselves were reported to be from all over the world, with a variety of languages being used. The corpus was divided into two files, one of which consisted of a large quantity of
Arabic messages. By the time these types of messages were filtered out, the data set, totaling 43
6,315 messages before narrowing down to the time of the protests, which was much smaller and more manageable, containing only the English and Chinese language messages. This was then further reduced to the 772 messages related to the 2019 Hong Kong protests. Given these accounts were banned in early August of 2019, the corpus only covers Phases 1 and 2 of the protests.
The relevant messages had content that could be divided into three different categories.
The two most prominent categories dealt with the police and with the protestors. The third category dealt with bystanders or with Hong Kong society in general. In addition, there were other, miscellaneous types of messages that were unrelated to the protests and were, moreover, not as frequent as these three categories.
Turning to the first category, the messages about the police, these seemingly always portrayed them in a positive light. Based on what can be found in the data, there does not appear to be any criticism whatsoever of the police. Firstly, “警察”< jǐngchá> is the term used more often to refer to the police. This word appears 511 times in the nearly 800 messages in the corpus, compared to only 11 for “police” in those messages. Most of the talk about the police had a tone that expressed gratitude for their actions, frequently outright thanking them for doing their duty in defending against the violent actions of the protestors. Chinese examples are in (15) while
English samples are in (16).
(15) a. 希望社會上每一位理性人士都站出嚟，支持香港警方嚴正執法， 正系因為佢哋履行着警察嘅使命、保衛着市民嘅生命安全。
‘I hope that all reasonable people stand up, support Hong Kong police to strictly enforce laws, because they are doing their duty, protecting the lives and safety of the citizens.’
b. 維護香港警察合法利益，還香港安寧！
‘Safeguard the lawful interests of the Hong Kong police, and a peaceful Hong Kong.’ 44
(16) a. Hong Kong police cannot bow to bad people. The rule of law in Hong Kong does not allow bad people to destroy it.
b. Hong Kong's thugs attacked police officers, making people angry.
c. People with ulterior motives attempt to make waves in Hong Kong through the "color revolution", inciting student groups and Hong Kong citizens who do not know the truth, besieging the police headquarters and intending to undermine Hong Kong's stability.
d. Hong Kong is a beautiful city, but it is not safe at all. I hope the police will severely punish the criminals.
Not only do many of these tweets, or messages, speak highly of the actions of the police, but they also, in many cases, come to the defense of the police. They deem the protesters’ reporting to be dishonest or misleading, accusing them of trying to make the police seem abusive or overly violent. These Twitter users claim that it is the right of the police to use force to uphold the law, especially when met with force themselves. Words most commonly associated with the police include “stability” (as in (16c)), “protecting,” and “穩定”
Calls to support the police, as well as to respect them, are also frequently made. Respect was a subject that came up in other contexts as well. The words “respect” and “尊重”
Those two words were also used in discussions about the law in general. The character “衛”
(simplified 卫) < wèi > was often used in reference to the police officers. It was most commonly used as part of compounds, such as “保衛” >, meaning ‘to safeguard,’ ‘maintain,’ and ‘guardian’ respectively. These words were found a combined 52 times. Several hashtags associated with the protests were used by these Twitter accounts. Hashtags are tags that users can put in their messages so that they will be grouped with other messages about the same topic. There were 2,942 hashtagged words in the data set. The three 45 most commonly used in reference to the police were “#香港警察 警 58, 32, and 5 appearances, respectively, as shown in Figure 4. Hashtags Referring to Police 70 60 50 40 30 20 NumberofOccurences 10 0 #香港警察 (Hong Kong Police) #撐港警 (Hong Kong Police) #支持警方(Support Hong Kong Police) Term Figure 4: Occurrences of Hashtags Referring to Police in the 772 messages Messages such as the one in (17) below display the support that these Twitter accounts showed for the police. According to the Twitter messages, the police are doing what is right despite some reports in the media that suggest otherwise, as some news reports claim that the police are using excessive force on the protestors. The messages go so far as to claim the opposite, stating that the police are encountering excessive violence from the protestors. This seems very similar, almost identical to, what the Chinese government had to say about the topic. 46 (17) #HongKong #HK 香港警方尽忠职守，为了香港的稳定和香港市民的 正常生活，尽职尽责，但却被反对派污蔑诽谤，游行示威者居然对警察大打出 手，挑衅香港警方，挑战香港的法治，游行早已变为暴力活动。 ‘The Hong Kong police are devoted to their duty, For the stability and normal life of the Hong Kong citizens, they do their duty, but the opposition slander them, demonstrators attacked the police, provoked the Hong Kong police, and challenged Hong Kong’s rule of law, the march long became a violent activity.’ The second category in the Twitter corpus pertains to protestors. The Twitter corpus after filtering showed no messages about the protestors that were supportive or sympathetic. While none were found in this data set after filtering, it is possible that some may have been lost in the process, making it difficult to say that these kinds of messages did not exist at all. The relevant messages spoke very harshly about this group of people. There seems to be a common approach of separating the people of Hong Kong into two different groups. There are the regular citizens of Hong Kong and “those people,” a term that is commonly used to refer to the protestors. The most common adjective accompanying talk of the protestors and their actions was ”暴力” (18) 唯恐天下不乱、企图颠覆香港的郭文贵不仅暗中支持香港占中分子搞暴力破 坏，还公开支持暴力游行示威，难道这一小撮入狱的暴民就是文贵口中的“香 港人”？ ‘Fearing the world is not in disorder, attempting to subvert Hong Kong, Guo Wengui not only secretly supports the forces occupying Hong Kong partaking in violent destruction, but also publicly supports violent demonstrations. Is this small group of imprisoned mobs Wengui’s “Hong Kong people”?’ “Protester” is not the only term used to refer to the group of activists, but it may be the most neutral term used. There was only one occurrence of this word, “示威者” ‘demonstrator.’ It was used more frequently, a total of 80 times across 47 tweets, and an example can be seen in (19) below. 47 (19) 灣仔警察總部被包圍近 17 小時，#香港警察 忍辱負重，以極高 EQ 容忍大批示 威者嘅犯法甚至唔合理行為，系香港警察愛護不明事理嘅後生嘅表現，抵全球 稱贊。若同類事情發生喺任何國家，早便出動軍隊了…本報 #支持警方 嚴肅處 理此事件，對號… ‘Wan Chai Police Headquarters was surrounded for almost 17 hours. #Hong Kong police endures insult and bears a heavy burden, With high EQ they tolerate many demonstrators breaking the law and even unreasonable behavior, Hong Kong police department cares about unreasonable people, for this the whole world praises them. If this kind of thing happened in another country, the military would have been sent in long ago. #SupportHongKongpolice to handle this matter seriously’ More neutral terms to name the protestors, such as those given above, were very infrequently used compared to words with a more negative connotation. Stigmatized words such as ”暴民“ 180 160 140 120 100 80 60 NumberofOccurrences 40 20 0 暴徒 (Thug) 暴民 (Mob) 示威者 (Demonstrator) Term Figure 5: Most Used Terms for Protestors in the 772 messages 48 Both “mobs” and “thugs” have connotations of violence associated with them, which is consistent with the rhetoric used when talking about the protests in Hong Kong. Example (20) shows that, according to the Twitter users, the ‘thug’ is not the type of person that respects the law. These people are not viewed positively, judging by the messages posted by the banned Twitter accounts. “反对” (20) 香港作为一个法治社会的典范，这种暴徒行径一定要严惩，换民众一个公道！ ‘Hong Kong as a model of a rule of law society, this type of acts by thugs should be punished severely, give the people justice!’ (21) 香港青少年应该明白，反对派的目的不是法治，不是自由，只是为了搞乱香港。 ‘Hong Kong’s youth should understand, the opposition’s objective is not rule of law, it is not freedom, it is only to subvert Hong Kong.’ The third category of messages in the Twitter corpus dealt with Hong Kong society, the legislative council, or the citizens of Hong Kong. Pertaining to topics on Hong Kong society, talk of the rule of law was popular once again. “法治 “ 49 people to do something, with the word being used over 300 times. Most often “市民” is used to rally people to come together and support the police. Talk of the legislative council was limited to messages saying that the “legislative council belongs to the people” or references to the protestors attack on the legislative council’s complex. Their defense of the council, the legislative council being the lawmakers, follows the trend of law and legality being important issues. Examples (22) and (23) contain sentences relating to Hong Kong society. (22) a. 逃犯条例 香港的“反送中”“和平示威”到底是什么？是“反送中”还是 “反中”，是“和平示威”还是“暴动”？这就是一场赤裸裸的暴动！为了 香港的法治香港的未来，大家一定要擦亮双眼，看清楚那些暴徒的真实面 目，谴责暴力！！支持修例！！！ ‘What are Hong Kong’s fugitive regulation “anti-sending to China” and “peaceful demonstrations” after all? Is it “peaceful demonstration” or “riot”? This is clearly a riot! For the future of rule of law in Hong Kong, everyone must open their eyes, see clearly the true faces of the thugs, condemn the violence! Support revision!’ b. 香港反对派鼓动市民上街游戏，鼓吹所谓“三罢”，即罢课，罢工，罢市。 为此不少人质疑： 反对派连日与外部势力里应外合，暴力对抗警察，肆意 造谣、诋毁香港的法治制度，反对派如此撕裂社会，摧毁香港经济民生， 究竟是为了谁？ ‘Hong Kong’s opposition has encouraged the people to play games in the streets, advocating “three strikes”, strike class, work strike, and market strikes. For this reason, many people ask: The opposition has been working with external forces, violently confronting the police, and slandering Hong Kong’s rule of law system. For who does the opposition split society, ruin Hong Kong’s economy and people’s livelihoods?’ (23) The legislative council belongs to the people of Hong Kong. Those people with ulterior motives indicated by forces hide behind… In (22a) and (22b), the use of rhetorical questions can be seen in order to get the reader to question the motives of the protests. Example (23) is different in that it attempts to raise suspicion about the alleged “ulterior motives.” Both (22) and (23) are attempts to open the eyes of the readers in order to unite them against the protestors, so they are similar in that manner despite their difference in methodology. 50 Another overall theme from the Twitter corpus was the idea that the information about the police is being distorted. They claimed that reasonable citizens would be able to find the facts and that justice would prevail. “正义” Examples are provided in (24). (24) a. 这场针对修改《逃犯条例》的暴力行为是别有用心的人挑唆，是对特区政府 行使正当立法权的破坏。特区政府应当依法打击所有的暴力行为，这是影 响了社会公平正义的行为，暴力行为是与香港的法制精神违背而行。 ‘This violent act against amending the "Fugitive Offenders Ordinance" was instigated by people with ulterior motives, and it was a violation of the SAR government's exercise of legitimate legislative power. The SAR Government should crack down on all acts of violence in accordance with the law. This is an act that affects social fairness and justice. Violence goes against the spirit of Hong Kong’s legal system.’ b. 香港青年應該明白，反對派的目的從來就不是自由、民主、正義。試問， 真正的自由，難道就是那些罔顧事實、散播恐慌的謠言嗎？ ‘The youth of Hong Kong should understand, the opposition’s goal was never freedom, democracy, or justice. Just ask, is true freedom considering rumors and ignoring the facts, spreading rumors of panic?’ The above examples could be seen as attempts to discredit any news reporting that suggests the police were engaging in suspicious or extreme behavior. The claims that the protestors are “ignoring the facts” portrays them as ignorant, thus harming their image, and at the same time, protect that of the police. Facts were brought up as something that one had to search for, as they were being hidden from the public through malicious reporting. Once again, the victim language is present, with the police now being the recipient of unfair treatment by the press and their opposition. This can be seen in (17) given earlier, as accusations of slander against the police were made. This suggests that attempts to harm the good image of the police are being made. 51 Over time, the language used in official news media and that used online on Twitter converged. The Twitter messages were relatively consistent throughout the relevant time period. Although the Twitter corpus only contains messages through July of 2019, there was still a noticeable change in the rhetoric of the official sources up to that point. A recap of some of the most frequently used terms on Twitter can be seen in Figure 6. Frequently Used Terms on Twitter 600 500 400 300 200 NumberofOccurrences 100 0 警察 (Police) 暴力 (Violent) 反對 (Opposition) 法治 (Rule of Law) 市民 (Citizens) Term Figure 6: Occurrences of Frequently-Used Terms on Twitter in the 772 messages During Phase 1 of the protests, there was a noticeable difference between the news articles and the Tweets, the two sources, in the tone of the messages. The official statements of the government were initially much more neutral and benign than the ones from social media. Early on in June and July, the word “some” was used to talk about the more extreme protestors, as in example (7), repeated below as (25). (25) “On July 1, the 22nd anniversary of the return of Hong Kong to Chinese sovereignty, some extremists stormed and vandalized the Legislative Council building in Hong Kong.” – China Plus 7-03-2019 While “some” appeared in the Twitter corpus, it was found in retweets or account names, making them irrelevant to the study. The two sets of sources gradually came to use the same 52 terminology as found in the Twitter messages, which were very harsh towards the protestors. “Mob” and “thug” were used most in the news articles, whereas the Chinese equivalents were used most often on Twitter. Given the very likely connection between the government and the banned Twitter accounts, it could be inferred that the government had always vehemently disapproved of the protests and wished to strongly condemn its participants. However, they possibly worried that harshly rebuking the protestors early on would reflect poorly on them in the eyes of observers internationally. Consequently, the news media and government officials waited so that they may sharpen their criticism with stronger language as time wore on, as evidenced in the findings from the news articles. The messages on Twitter, then, represented their true attitude all along. The government was publicly relatively soft in tone towards the protests but used bot accounts on Twitter to spread a different narrative, and with this narrative came a harsher tone towards the protests and protesters themselves. The contents of the Twitter corpus and the news articles reveal the attitude that the Chinese government has towards the protests in Hong Kong. The government used social media and the news to push the narrative that the protestors are violent and only wish to undermine the government for their own selfish goals. The government portrayed the police as the symbol of morality and righteousness in order to sway the opinions of Hongkongers and mainland Chinese alike. 53 Chapter 5. Conclusion Accessing only the reports and statements coming from Chinese government sponsored sources, one may get a completely different idea regarding the protests taking place in Hong Kong. This would be the ideal outcome in their eyes. The image that the Chinese government is trying to create of the protests is one of chaos, danger and destruction. The government is attempting to delegitimize the protestors’ cause, and their rhetoric is one tool at their disposal for doing so. To push the narrative that they would like to promote, the Chinese government approaches the subject from two different fronts, each one with a different goal in mind. From the language used by government officials in the collection of news articles and Twitter messages, it is apparent that they sought to quell the protests by dividing the people of Hong Kong. They attempted to do so using two different strategies. One strategy is that of manipulating what is the perceived public opinion, and the other that of issuing official statements to show clear support for the Hong Kong police force above all else. The Chinese government had a goal of sowing doubt on the legitimacy of the protests, and doing so by creating a narrative that supported their own interests. The government delegitimized the protestors’ cause by accusing them of slander and of attacking the police. The language used by the Chinese news networks appeared to follow closely the sentiments expressed by the Chinese government. As the government strengthened its response towards the protests, so did the news reporting. The contents of the Twitter messages displayed similar motives as the news reports and statements issued by government officials. First and foremost, they portrayed the police as the 54 guardians of Hong Kong society and as symbols of stability. The government desired people to use their voices to show support to the police, thereby creating opposition for the protestors. Both sources also tend to portray the protestors generally as a group of violent people who seek only to disrupt and destroy. It is worth noting that neither the Twitter messages nor the news releases mention the grievances of the protestors. These sources also make no mention of their demands. By withholding this information from the public, it would be much easier for the government to create the perception that the protestors really are just lawless, violent criminals. The language used across the two sources was largely consistent, both citing the law to some degree. Based on the similarities in the messages from the two sources, one can argue that these Twitter accounts were being used as part of a campaign to alter public perception on the Hong Kong protests, with aims to achieve it by presenting false accounts of recent events and fabricated opinions. A survey taken in Hong Kong shows that most Hongkongers do not support the police, thus, making the overwhelming support on Twitter appear highly suspicious.62 From presenting different attendance numbers at protests to accusing other news networks of slandering the Hong Kong police force, it seemed as though the Chinese government was determined to sway the minds of Chinese and Hong Kong citizens through their utilization of the media. The use of Twitter and the effect that it could potentially have on public opinion is very powerful. It is likely that the intent behind harnessing Twitter to denounce the protestors was to make it seem as though the general population was not in support of their actions. The government speaking out against them alone would not have the same effect as having both the 62 https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/politics/article/3030211/disband-hong-kongs-police-force-online-poll- shows-most 55 government and a Twitter populace sharing similar views. The intended cumulative effect is the impression that nobody outside of the protestors themselves are supportive of their actions. The statements that were most telling of the Chinese government’s stance regarding the protests were the references to the Catalonian independence movement. By citing the world’s response, or lack thereof, to actions taken by the Spanish government in Catalonia as evidence of a double standard to which China is a victim, the Chinese government is effectively claiming that the two situations are similar. They see the protests as a move that threatens their sovereignty. They wish to be able to criminally punish those involved, just as Spain did, without backlash or intervention from other countries around the world. Although it is a Special Administrative Region, Hong Kong is still a part of China. The government’s response to the protests seems to be a reminder of the latter part and a display of its authority. They see the protests in Hong Kong as a rebellion in the same manner as Catalonia’s push for independence. It is possible that they fear the current protests could evolve to become an independence movement. The comparison could foreshadow actions that China will take against the protestors and claiming this double standard may serve as a preemptive defense for such actions. Social media is a powerful tool, as shown by the Chinese government’s desire to adopt it to spread disinformation. It has also been a tool for the protestors through the use of Kongish. This new style of code-switching gave more power to online supporters of the movement. Being difficult for outsiders to understand, Kongish could be used by protest organizers to keep others informed, all while reducing the probability of their plans being intercepted or disrupted ahead of time by undercover police or infiltrators in online groups. The Hong Kong protests of 2019 came with a resurgence in the use of Kongish after it gained popularity during the Umbrella Movement five years prior. In 2019, new words and 56 phrases in Kongish became popular following certain events of the protests. “黑警還眼” Ging Wan Ngaan>63 is one such example. The meaning, ‘an eye for an eye,’ is a response to the police severely damaging the eye of a reporter after firing rubber bullets at a crowd. This is Kongish, because outside of this context, the four-character phrase would not make sense. “黑警 ,” which literally means ‘black police,’ refers to dirty or corrupt police officers, while “還眼” means ‘return eye.’ Together, they fit the intended purpose of criticizing the forceful response of the police that resulted in injury. Many of the slogans and catchphrases popularized during the protests are actually Kongish, and many of them can be found on the Kongish Daily’s Facebook page. That page itself has recently become a place where many criticize Hong Kong’s chief executive, Carrie Lam. Kongish Daily could be a valuable resource in the future for understanding the protests from the side of the protestors. It is now approaching one year since the beginning of the protests in summer of 2019, and the demands of the protestors have still yet to be met. However, progress seems to have stalled due to the COVID-19 outbreak. Safety precautions have led to the temporary cessation of mass gatherings. This does not mean that Hongkongers are no longer actively fighting for their demands. They are still using the internet to show their disapproval of Hong Kong’s government and its policies. Pages such as the Kongish Daily on Facebook remain popular places for citizens to post their criticisms and to hold discussions. There will be a great deal of uncertainty surrounding the situation in Hong Kong once the virus situation is under control. I aim to continue to monitor the status of the Hong Kong protests. As public protests resume, they may look different due to restrictions that have been put into place. With the outbreak of COVID-19 the wearing of masks has become more necessary 63 https://www.helphk.info/kongish 57 than before, despite the government’s ban on them in response to the protests. Law enforcement may have a difficult time distinguishing protestors from bystanders. This could potentially create a more chaotic situation. Hong Kong has already seen the banning of public gatherings, so what changes may take place in the future remain to be seen. Hopefully, the protests can be resolved without further escalation but, until then, the Hong Kong protests will remain a subject for close scrutiny. And, as the situation develops, the true plans that the Chinese government has for the former British colony will become more evident, especially if recent actions taken by the government are any indication of their future plans. To recap, on May 21, 2019, China announced a law to ban sedition and acts of treason against the Central People’s Government.64 The Chinese government approved this law, bypassing Hong Kong’s local government.65 The law that was passed came into effect on June 30, 2019,66 to the dismay of the protestors. With this law, Hongkongers fear any action could be interpreted by the Chinese government as treason. The passing of this new law oversteps the autonomy of Hong Kong, and disregards the ‘two systems’ part of the “one country, two systems” agreement. Perhaps China is taking action to hasten its incorporation of the territory, reneging the 50-year agreement that is supposed to extend through 2047. 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