TOITU TE WHENUA E Only the land remains, constant and enduring

Muriwhenua Land Claim (Wai-45)

A Preliminary Report on the Historical Evidence

Barry Rigby and John Koning Waitangi Tribunal Division

4 December 1989

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TABLE OF CONTENTS page

List of Maps 3

INTRODUCTION 4

I EARLY MAORljPAKEHA CONTACT 11

II THE IMPACT OF THE CMS MISSION 1832-1840 17

III LAND PURCHASES IN THE 1830s 33

IV THE SIGNING OF THE TREATY OF WAITANGI 52 AT KAITAIA v THE 1840 MANGONUI PURCHASE AND THE 61 ORIGINS OF THE ORURU DISPUTE

VI THE OLD LAND CLAIMS COMMISSIONS 1840-1860 76

VII THE DEMOGRAPHIC AND ECONOMIC CONTEXT 103 1848-1865

VIII CROWN LAND PURCHASES 1850-1865 110

IX MURIWHENUA AS A MODEL "NATIVE DISTRICT" 144 1861-1865

X ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL CONDITIONS 1865-1900 159

CONCLUSION 189

BIBLIOGRAPHY 194 - 3 -

List of Maps page

1. Muriwhenua Claim Area 1988 5

2. Muriwhenua Land Tenure 1864 8

3. Muriwhenua Land Tenure 1905 9

4. Muriwhenua Land Tenure 1978 10

5. Boundaries of Taylor's 1840 Claim 43 to Muriwhenua North

6. PanakareaojPororua Mangonui Claim 1840-1841 63

7. Old Land Claims 1840-1860 90

8. Muriwhenua Crown Purchases and 135 Maori Reserves 1850-1865 - 4 -

INTRODUCTION

By direction of the Chairman, Chief Judge Edward Taikahurei Durie, the Waitangi Tribunal commissioned a report on the historical aspects of the Muriwhenua Land Claim on 13 May 1987. On 15 May 1987 he commissioned a related enquiry into Peter Pangari's claim on behalf of Ngati Kahu people over Taemaro land. In both cases Chief Judge Durie commissioned Dr Michael Belgrave to prepare a historical report. Dr Belgrave commenced, but did not complete this report because he became heavily involved in research into the Ngai Tahu claim. On 3 July 1989, Chief Judge Durie transferred the original commission to Dr Barry Rigby and John Koning, the authors of this preliminary report. They gratefully acknowledge Dr Belgrave's assistance in the preparation of this report.

The purpose of this preliminary report is to provide the Waitangi Tribunal, Muriwhenua claimants and the Crown with a coherent presentation of the most significant evidence on the Crown's policies in Muriwhenua during the 19th century. As historians, the authors have consciously selected and interpreted the evidence which they believe is crucial to any understanding of what happened to Muriwhenua land. In rendering the voluminous evidence understandable, historians must select and interpret it. The authors emphasize, however, that this report, and their interpretations presented in it, are preliminary, not final interpretations.

The 19th century is the historical focus of this report because the larger part of Muriwhenua land (probably 75 percent) passed from Maori to Pakeha hands during the 19th century (see Maps 2 & 3, "Muriwhenua Land Tenure" 1864 & 1905, pp. 8-9). The available land evidence suggests that the proportion of Maori land that passed into Pakeha hands during the 20th century was quite small (see Maps 3 & 4, "Muriwhenua Land Tenure" 1905 & 19 7 8 pp. 9 -10) . - 5 -

The research embodied in this report has focussed on the Muriwhenua claim area as defined in the 1988 Muriwhenua Fishing Report (Wai-22). This area extends north from Whangape harbour in the west, and from Mangonui in the east. Nonetheless, the authors have crossed the boundaries of that claim area in one important respect. They believe that the area to the south and east of Mangonui and north and west of whangaroa Harbour (see Map 1, "Muriwhenua Claim Area" 1988 below) shares a common history with Muriwhenua proper. The 19th century "Mangonui Native District" included most of this area, and it is the ancestral homeland of important NgatiKahu, as well as Ngapuhi, hapu. Map 1 MURIWHENUA CLAIM AREA 1988

K[Y

--- MuriwhetluaC/aim Bouoda'J ..... MQ'230f1ui-\v'hq~qroQ ort::Q

I ;.I ...... / / / / / / /' /' /"

Source: Norman in Kawharu ed, Waitangi, p. 180 - 6 -

In tracing the main lines of Crown policy towards

. ~.. New Zealand, it

greatly influ~nced subsequent Crown policies. The report ,then examines the circumstances surrounding the signing of the Treaty of Waitangi at Kaitaia in 1840. The treaty connects Muriwhenua history with both colonial New Zealand history, and with British imperial history, especially with regard to land policies.

Crown land policies embodied in the Land Claims Commissions 1840-1860, are the subject of Chapter VI, and crown land purchase policies and practices from 1850 to 1865 are the subject of Chapter VIII. Included in this presentation is some treatment of the statutory basis of crown land policies, and the Maori and Pakeha political context which determined how these policies were put into practice. Chapter IX, Muriwhenua as a Model "Native District" 1861-1865 includes this kind of political analysis. Chapters VII and X attempt to explain the demographic and socioeconomic context of Muriwhenua land transfers. The authors believe that the process by which approximately 75 percent of Muriwhenua land passed from Maori into Pakeha hands cannot be understood without a prior understanding of the extent to which depopulation and impoverishment transformed Muriwhenua society during the 19th century.

In this preliminary report, the authors will examine both the intentions behind, and the results of, Crown policies towards Muriwhenua land. The authors fully understand that frequently Crown intentions were not reflected in the results of policies. For example, some of the evidence suggests that Crown officers responsible for implementing Crown policies in Muriwhenua during the 19th century did not intentionally - 7 -

contribute to the dispossession its Maori inhabitants. Crown officers were also not alone in contributing to the dispossession of Maori. CMS missionaries supported the Crown purchase policies during the 1850s and 60s (though their parent organisation opposed the Crown surplus land policies as being unjust to Maori). In some instances, Pakeha gumtraders appear to have contributed to dispossession by driving Maori into debt. The Maori who signed or witnessed deeds of sale transfering land to private or Crown purchasers may bear some responsibility for their own dispossession. These deeds of sale, however, can be understood only within the Maori and the social and economic context of the mid 19th century. It is only within that context that a historian can answer the question: were these deeds of sale binding contracts freely entered into and fully understood by Maori?

Whatever the case, in 1901, when Maori were 47 percent of the population of Mangonui County, they controlled less than 25 percent of the land, and less than 5 percent of the most economically valuable land. The extent of their dispossession is illustrated by the following sequence of land tenure maps. - 8 -

Map 2 MURIWHENUA LAND TENURE 1864

, KEY _ MQoriLond o General Lond

Source: Charles Heaphy, A-J, 1864 E-9, p.2. - 9 -

Map 3 MURIWHENUA LAND TENURE 1905

KEY - MQori Land o General Lond

( I I I .

• / I / / / / / / / / / / /

Source: Dept. of Lands & SurveYr A-J r 1905 r C-1, p. 82 - 10 -

Map 4 MURIWHENUA LAND TENURE 1978

KEY -MQoriLand o General Land

• / • / .. / ./ / ./ . / ./ / ./ ./ ./ ,

Source, Dept of Lands & Survey, NZMS 187, 1979. - 11 -

I. EARLY MAORI/PAKEHA CONTACT

The first Pakeha to contact Maori in the Muriwhenua area were the crews of the ships commanded by Abel Tasman and James Cook. In January 1643 two Dutch ships, the Heemskerck and the Zeehaenr under the command of Abel Tasman, anchored near Three Kings Islands. The Dutch failed in their attempt to obtain water at Great Island, the main island of the Three Kings grouPr but did notice kumara fields, canoes, and some 30 to 35 inhabitants. 1 In December 1769 James Cook charted the coast line of the Far North. When the Endeavour was becalmed at Doubtless Bay, local Maori sold a considerable quantity of fish to Cook and his crew. 2

The first overt Maori/Pakeha conflict in Muriwhenua occurred shortly after Coo~'s visit, when the St Jean Baptiste, commanded by Jean de Surviller anchored in Doubtless Bay. Crew members went ashore to cut firewood, fill water casks, and gather vegetables. Maori traded fish for linen and other goods. This amicable trading ceased, however, when De'Surville captured Ranginui, a local chief, in reprisal for the "theft" of a small landing craft or yawl. This acquisition of what had arrived on their shores was not theft to Maori. They believed that anything within their tribal domain should be shared with them. Since the local people failed to return the craft, the French refused to return their hostage. Later, on the passage to Peru aboard de Surville's ship, Ranginui died of scurvy.3 Polynesian "theft" of what they believed should be shared with them led not just to the tragic death of Ranginui in 1770 and to the death of James Cook at Kealakekua, Hawaii in 1779 r but also to a whole series of property transactions in Muriwhenua in which the Maori and Pakeha views of what had been exchanged were radically different.

Fortunately, the tragedy of Ranginui was not repeated when other French explorers visited Muriwhenua before 1800. In April 1772, the two ships of Marion du Fresner the Mascarin and the - 12 -

Marquis de Castries, sailed around the North Cape in search of fresh water. At Tom Bowling Bay the French went ashore and purchased fish from local Maori. Antoine d'Entrecasteaux visited the Far North in March 1793 with the Recherche and the Esperance. At the North Cape, Maori traded flax, weapons and fish for iron and axes with his crew. 4

Regular economic contact between Maori and Pakeha began in the 1790s when European whalers first arrived in the waters around the North Cape and Three Kings. The first such whaleship to call at a harbour in the Far North was the William and Ann which sailed into the wide inlet of Doubtless Bay in January 1792. 5 For over 75 years between the 1790s and 1860s European and North American whales hips called at northern ports, such as Parengarenga Harbour and Mangonui, to take on food and water from Maori communities. 6

New South Wales Lieutenant Governor Philip King initiated the first imperial intervention in Muriwhenua when in April 1793 he ordered the commander of the British naval store ship Daedulus to capture and transport Tuki and Huru of Oruru to the penal colony at Norfolk Island. King hoped the two young chiefs would instruct convicts in the method of processing the flax known to grow widely in New Zealand. Tuki and Huru, however, had little knowledge of such techniques, and in November returned home on the Britannia with them. Through them King introduced potatoes, garden seeds, and pigs, into Muriwhenua to ensure that it would continue to provide provisions for British ships calling there. 7 Some evidence suggests that King hoped that these presents would provide a food supply for settlers as well as seamen. According to at least one historian, "this may have been the decisive introduction of these plants and animals [to northern New Zealand] which soon became a vital part of the Maori economy. "8

During the early 1800s, Mangonui became a trading port which not only supplied provisions for whaleships, but also served as an export outlet for the Kauri timber trade. The - . , , , , c·, "'J~ ". ,: '..c•. '._.:'''': ,2,,'_\,,,,,,,,,'\I,),:,:'~:r,j._\. \J",,'\l\,:-\.,-,:-'-.';>'~~.;L"~~~':C~_"2"hhh2..',~l

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giant Kauri, growing as far north as Doubtless Bay, provided British shipbuilders with an important source of masts and spars during the first half of the 19th century. The export of Kauri timber from Mangonui probably peaked during the 1830s,

and by 1839, there were at least 11 resident sawyers ~here. Through the Pakeha whalers and timber traders, local Maori could, in return for their produce, gain access to European goods and technology.

By the 1840s and 1850s, Mangonui was one of the few New Zealand ports other than the Bay of Islands which attracted overseas whaleships on a large scale. Between 1835 and 1885, for example, 91 American whaling vessels called at Mangonui. 9 Some whaleship captains preferred Mangonui to the popular Bay of Islands because there was less likelihood of desertion. The Sydney press knew and spoke of the advantages of Mangonui over the Bay of Islands. One advantage was "no grogshops by which most vessels lose part of their crew." Another advantage was the cheap timber available from settled European sawyers. 10

The whaling trade at Mangonui provided a flourishing market for Maori produce and fish. In 1821 W.D. Phelps was aboard a whaling vessel which called at Mangonui. Maori canoes "came round the ship, exchanging their commodities for iron nails, knives, fish-hooks, etc., and during the day the ship was well supplied with fruit and fish."11 In 1838 the James Stewart bought so many onions that many had to be pickled before spoiling, while in January 1852 the Florida purchased eight tons of potatoes. 12

During the 1830s the possibility of Muriwhenua becoming a major supplier of raw materials for the British market induced at least twenty-eight Pakeha to attempt to buy land throughout the area. Although the expected export boom never materialised, as late as 1844, Walter Brodie, an influential witness before the New Zealand Committee of the House of Commons, promoted the commercial potential of the area. 13 Brodie himself mined and exported to Liverpool several hundred tons of copper ore from - 14 -

land he claimed on the Karikari Peninsula during the late 30s and early 40s.14 Maori people exported flax from the North Cape and Rangaunu Bay during the late 1820s and early 1830s. 15 Finally, the first shipment of kauri gum from New Zealand to the United States took place at Parengarenga Harbour in the early 1840s. 16

Nonetheless, Muriwhenua never came close to surpassing either the Bay of Islands or Hokianga as a centre of Maori/Pakeha trade. This had_y~ry important implications for Muriwhenua Maori because they believed that the greater trading activity to the immediate south gave their Ngapuhi neighbours a decisive economic and military advantage over them.

Muriwhenua Maori still eagerly participated in the trading contacts that introduced them to Pakeha for the first time. Pakeha possessed goods and services greatly in demand in Maori society. Equally, Maori provided provisions and other commodities such as timber and flax for which there was a great­ demand among the Pakeha shippers and traders they dealt with. These transactions, therefore, assumed the character of reciprocal exchanges which were consistent with pre-contact Maori trading. This kind of reciprocity, however, lasted only until Pakeha sought to treat land as a commodity to be exchanged in a market just like flax or timber. This notion of land as a commodity was not consistent with Maori custom and there was very little in the Maori experience of the reciprocal trade with Europeans before the 1830s that prepared them for its consequences. , , , ,.,~." '.. '. "'" ',. \, \,.',,;; c-:,~ \-,-,~:,-,:.,,: ~).::,-()i~·:"':<'~\;\~'~~>.~~\I}'\"\",~,~-v";'-~"'::~"'00' )w-"':>...J>~.h).u • .s• .:.ti .. )',.h",,"""'-",.h.')00'-'U ... :CG,,:v'000:Ci:.i.

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REFERENCES

1. J.Davidson, "Before the Pakeha", in B.Fraser (ed), The New Zealand Book of Events (Auckland 1986) p.19; A.J.Tasman, "Journal", in R.McNab (ed), Historical Records of New Zealand, (Wellington 1914) II:9.

2. F.Keene, To The Northward, (Whangarei n.d.) pp.2-4.

3. R.R.D.Milligan, "Ranginui, Captive Chief of Doubtless Bay, 1769", Journal of the Polynesian Society, (1958) 67:3, pp.181-203.

4. F.Keene, To The Northward, pp.4-5; "The Visit of Dentrecasteaux to the North Cape, New Zealand, in March, 1793", Journal of the Polynesain Society, (1919) 28, pp.117-120.

5. D.Grady, Sealers and Whalers in New Zealand Waters, (Auckland 1986) p.56.

6. Muriwhenua Fishing Report: Report of the Waitangi Tribunal on the Muriwhenua Fishing Claim (Wai 22), (Wellington 1988) p.58.

7. R.R.D.Milligan, The Map Drawn By The Chief Tuki-Tahua In 1793 (Mangonui 1964) p.5.

8. A.Ballara, "Maori and Pakeha", in B.Fraser (ed), The New Zealand Book of Events, p.20.

9. R.Langdon (ed), Thar She Went: An interim index to the Pacific ports and islands visited by American whalers and traders in the 19th century, (Canberra 1979) pp.20-22.

10. Sydney Gazette, 15 October 1836, quoted in H.Morton, The Whale's Wake, (Dunedin 1982) p.138.

11. W.D.Phelps, Fore and aft; or, leaves from the life of an old sailor, (Boston 1871) p.152.

12. H.Morton, The Whale's Wake, pp.183-186.

13. Walter Brodie, Remarks on the Past and Present State of New Zealand (London, 1845) pp.101-102. , ' ,. '. '" \',' •• ' \.' ,. '" "L"' L.c~', o.-.C~-' ~l':'," I;' ,;;,-:,-;.~ ,j,\'" ~ \;-\:~'·-·"),-h~~._·,, ',,'0 I \ ,,'. \ '- ~'\~:'~~.' ~',~ ',.!..\ '~~"';'~::"'':~':::;'~-;')~:';J~hH~~;:t~

- 16 -

14. Brodie's testimony 4-6 June 1844, in "Report from the Select Committee on New Zealand", British Parliamentary Papers, Colonies, New Zealand, Shannon, 1968 (hereafter: BPP) 1844 (556), p.52. [Doc B28]

15. R.P.Wigglesworth, "The New Zealand Timber and Flax Trade 1769-1840", PhD thesis, Massey University, 1981, p.99, pp.124-127.

16. Report of Kauri Gum Industry Enquiry Commission 1893, AJHR 1893 H-24, p. 1. - 17 -

II. THE CMS IN THE FAR NORTH 1832-1840

Just as the Muriwhenua area experienced an extended period of early trading contact with Pakeha, it was also one of the first areas in New Zealand to experience a sustained missionary presence. The missionary impact on Muriwhenua society was a most profound one. Missionaries were heavily involved in the social, economic, and political development of the entire community, particularly in the areas of land and conflict mediation. This impact, however, has to be considered as part of missionary activities throughout New Zealand, because the Muriwhenua experience was not a unique one.

In 1814 the Church Missionary Society (CMS), the group that established a mission station at Kaitaia 19 years later, founded a station at Rangihoua in the Bay of Islands. Samuel Marsden proposed to introduce European civilisation before Christianity, and accordingly, the first missionaries were laymen with technical skills. The early years of the Bay of Islands mission, however, were marked by failure. Indeed, the first missionaries, completely dependent upon local Maori communities for food, timber, and other supplies, achieved little beyond survival. 1

When it looked as though New Zealand's missionary history would be short-lived, the CMS received a new lease on life. In 1823, a new leader of the mission, the Rev. Henry Williams, arrived to establish a station at Paihia on the south side of the Bay of Islands. Williams altered the strategy of introducing ci~ilisation before Christianity. Greater emphasis was placed on learning Maori, translating religious texts, preaching the gospel, and holding schools. 2 Trade with Maori communities outside the Bay of Islands and the establishment of a farm at Waimate secured for the mission a degree of economic independence. The position of the CMS in New Zealand was further strengthened by the arrival of more missionaries, men such as William Williams, a Maori linguist, and William - 18 -

Colenso, a printer and Maori scholar. 3

Still, throughout the 1820s missionaries looked in vain for indications of conversion amongst Maori communities. The process of conversion was determined by both missionary effectiveness and the Maori response to the introduction of Christianity. Despite improvements in CMS resources and techniques, missionaries remained a small group with a

~ programme limited in scope, while Maori people in northern New Zealand only began to show an interest in missionary teaching after 1830. 4

For reasons still the subject of debate among historians, Christianity acquired rapid appeal among Maori communities during the 1830s. Large numbers of Maori went mihanere, that ) is, attended church schools and services, and became candidates for baptism. With increasing demand for its services outside the Bay of Islands, the CMS established new mission stations at Kaitaia, Thames, Waikato, Rotorua, and the Bay of Plenty. By. the late 1850s most North Island Maori called themselves Christian, or more accurately, Protestant. s

The first missionary contact with Muriwhenua occured in August 1831 when Henry Williams paid a visit to the Oruru Valley. According to Williams, local Maori who attended a service were "very attentive and expressed their ignorance in , these things, but a strong desire that Missionaries might reside near them, through whom they might be enabled to understand."6 Tarepa, a Te Rarawa chief, hoped that missionaries would settle in the Oruru Valley. Williams told Tarepa that he would "lay their case before the committee for consideration and we would see what could be done."? As a result of Williams's recommendation in November 1832, Joseph Matthews travelled to Te Ahu, now known as,Kaitaia, and met with Panakareao, who he, identified as the principal chief of Te Rarawa. Panakareao, apparently impressed with the sermon Matthews preached, invited the CMS to establish a mission station at Kaitaia. 8 - 19 -

Before accepting Panakareao's invitation the CMS sent another delegation to Kaitaia under the leadership of William Williams. This group sought to impart "religious instruction to the natives," and to ascertain "whether it would be feasible for a new settlement in that quarter." For the CMS the results of the visit were "extremely satisfactory, both as indicating the disposition of the natives to listen to the missionaries, and the facilities afforded for the extension of the mission."9 Undoubtedly, the purpose of these three visits was to make sure that there was sufficient local Maori support to justify the establishment of a new mission station. In addition, these successive visits undoubtedly left Panakareao and his people with the distinct impression that it was a great ) privilege to have missionaries in Muriwhenua.

Finally, in January 1833, the CMS Executive at the Bay of Islands decided, after further debate, to establish a mission station at Kaitaia. It appointed Matthews, Charles Baker, and William Puckey to the station. Matthews and Puc key came first, with Baker to join them later. In accordance with Maori ideas of incorporating Pakeha into his own community, Panakareao chose Baker as "his" missionary because he was the oldest, and assigned Matthews and Puc key to Tiro and Waka, two chiefs in neighbouring communities. 1o

In March 1833, in the process of establishing the mission at Kaitaia within his own community, Panakareao and other Te Rarawa agreed to sell to the CMS a 2000 acre block of land at Kaitaia. Since this was the first major land sale in Muriwhenua, the context is very important. On Panakareao's part the land was clearly intended to induce the "missionaries to remain in his area permanently. To ensure, also, that the missionaries occupied the land, he had three raupo houses built for them, and he had an area between these houses and the Awanui River cleared for cultivation. Finally, he had his people cut a road from the mission station to the river to ensure that sailing vessels could supply the mission. In all, - 20 -

his people spent 3 months of hard labour establishing a mission station that they hoped would be a permanent fixture in their community.

The deed for this CMS land, signed by Panakareao, Puckey and three other Te Rarawa chiefs, one year after the original negotiation is important both for what it includes, and for what it does not include. For example, it does not include an accurate estimate of the area involved. The deed states: "The size of this land may be one thousand acres either more or less." In fact, it was 2,000 acres. It also does not include an explicit joint occupancy agreement. It does include terms implying an absolute alienation: " ... 1 Panakareao and tribe have sold to Mr. Puc key for the Church Missionary Society a piece of land with all the trees on it and every thing else that grows on it and every thing under it." The deed includes a place-name based boundary description and a detailed list of the goods exchanged: "80 Blankets, 30 Hoes, 30 Iron pots, 30 scissors, ten shark hooks, forty axes, eighty plane irons, 2,000 fish hooks, 48 combs, 600 heads of tobacco .•. "11

Te Rarawa, from their experiences with Pakeha traders, understood the value of these goods exchanged. The missionaries probably expected Maori to donate their labour, but Te Rarawa considered that the price for the mission station land should include goods in payment for Maori labour. According to Baker, when told there would not be a further payment due to an unexpected shortage of blankets, Te Rarawa did not conceal their disappointment. However, after a discussion with Matthews and Puckey, Panakareao apparently agreed to accept the payments offered by the CMS.12

Although Te Rarawa agreed to the CMS payment, the missionaries were soon to discover that Maori/Pakeha land transfers involved agreement on who was to receive a given proportion of the total payment. When the missionaries paid for the mission station land in April 1834, Te Rarawa debated the proper division of the payment. This left many dissatisfied. , , "-.-. ·~-~'"'-"-..·-""'''-"\''~~~~.\.,::,-._\,:,~<-"':J~~.LV'-·''"",,U'~'''''-'>'''' >-'- ~- ~,~. '~'~-." •. , -.-•• -~ --.-.- ---'- - --- ~ ------·"""-".. ·~'~-"'<.:>.'-'-"~.u1.).~~.n.UJJ_i:l~:r&),,:..~;_,,~'",~2~:,

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The people who had cleared the land, built the houses and cut the road performed haka and threatened to plunder their very own mission station. The matter was settled only after a further debate between the dis·putants. Barely comprehending what was going on, eMS missionary Richard Taylor observed, "both parties had their war dance, and made speeches, which showed that the quarrel was between themselves." 13

An essential part of the original agreement between Te Rarawa and the missionaries, as far as Panakareao was concerned, was that each of the three missionaries appointed to come to Kaitaia should remain as wards of their respective Te Rarawa guardians. In August 1833, however, Baker decided not to accept the post at Kaitaia and the eMS sent a Maori teacher, Paratene, to help Matthews and Puckey. Panakareao was, to say the least, disappointed when he heard that "his" ward had forsaken him. Matthews then aggravated the situation by taking the house that had been built for Baker without consulting Panakareao. The Te Rarawa chief shunned Matthews for two years. During this time he even threatened to apprehend Baker and physically drag him to Kaitaia where he belonged. Not only did he believe the eMS failure to deliver Baker to be a violation of his agreement with them, but he also believed that this failure slighted his mana in the eyes of other chiefs. Another chief expressed a similar view when he declared that Te Rarawa should oppose the transfer of missionaries from Muriwhenua as an indignity.14

Inter-tribal political considerations influenced Te Rarawa chiefs originally to invite the eMS to Kaitaia. Until the 1830s, missionary activity in New Zealand had been restricted to the Bay of Islands, Ngapuhi:territory. In an attempt to counterbalance this Ngapuhi advantage, Te Rarawa chiefs sought to establish their mana by having missionaries settle in their territory. When William Williams visited Kaitaia in 1832, Panakareao had "expressed the wish to have missionaries, saying 'that the Ngapuhi alone had the missionaries hitherto; and that if the Rarawa are instructed they will give up their present - 22 -

mode of life. '"15

As well as assisting in the "pursuit of mana", Maori saw missionaries as playing a very important role in mediating conflict both between and within tribes that could not be dealt with by traditional means. Soon after arriving at Kaitaia, Matthews noted that Te Rarawa had been engaged in incessant warfare for many years. During the early 1830s they apparently conducted a disastrous taua to Tauranga where some of their principal chiefs died in battle and the survivors arrived home in a "poverty-struck condition. "16 Panakareao then planned a return expedition to seek utu for the fallen. Apparently, the missionaries prevailed upon him to forsake vengeance (which would probably have been even costlier than the original taua), ) and instead to put his people to work in building the largest church in New Zealand at Kaitaia. 17 Although this was not a case of direct mediation, it illustrates how useful missionaries could be in preventing unnecessary conflict. By 1837 the eMS had succeeded in mediating between Panakareao and his Hokianga enemy, Tawhai, who had just been baptised Moses (or Mohi). They brought Tawhai to sit in the Kaitaia church with Panakareao to "bury the hatchet. "18 Muriwhenua people apparently welcomed missionary mediation.

Te Rarawa viewed the missionaries not only as a source of prestige and as useful mediators, but also as a means of acquiring European goods. Te Rarawa greatly valued missionary access to tobacco, blankets, tools, and various other items. Baker warned of giving Te Rarawa the wrong idea "with regard to the temporal advantages of our living among them. "19 Puc key found that even those who refused to accept missionary teachings were, at all times, friendly to the missionaries. He attributed this to the goods and services the missionaries brought with them to Muriwhenua. 20

Although Muriwhenua people valued religious instruction, the missionaries seldom understood why. Maori travelled considerable distances to attend services at Kaitaia. In 1835 - 23 -

Puckey wrote, "the natives come from a great distance every Saturday afternoon bringing their provisions with them in order that they may spend their sabbath with us and be present at our services." 21 Clearly, Maori responded well to CMS liturgy and sermons in the vernacular because it extended the range of their own language and culture, and because it added a further oral and ceremonial dimension to their already rich oral and ceremonial traditions.

Furthermore, Christian ideas were novel and exciting for Maori. By 1840 the number of Maori regularly attending services

at Kai~aia was between 300 and 400. According to Joseph Matthews, Sunday schools were always well attended, with the pupils, both young and old, "taking great delight in propounding questions to each other. "22 When the missionaries who visited Kaitaia in 1832 held a service, Baker thought "there was most profound attention paid to the word spoken. There were a number of old, venerable chiefs among this party, who seemed quite struck with the new idea. 1123 They showed a great deal of interest in religious texts, in addition to their fascination with the spoken word. Literacy became a prized possession. Puc key knew many "who spent much of their leisure time in reading the Bible; and they read so much that their books soon wore out. 1124

Most historians now accept that a major reason for the rapid acceptance of Christianity, not just in Muriwhenua, but throughout Polynesia, was the ease with which Maori and other Polynesians adapted it to their own belief systems. They consciously mingled indigenous and Christian beliefs so that the kind of Christianity they followed was distinctively Maori.25 Matthews discovered this adaptation process when he found found that "tribes who live at a great distance from us, and who are not visited regularly, very often connect many .. superstitious ideas with the doctrine of the Gospel, which we have to contend against. "26 Matthews tacitly accepted this process and reciprocated by adapting his services to Maori "spiritual wants," while, at the same time, convincing himself - 24 -

that he was combatting heathen beliefs. In his words, the Christian message was "composed of sound Scriptural truths," giving Maori "something to lead them and balance them; otherwise they would so mix up their native kupu whakarite (parabolical way of speaking) as to mislead themselves into way of error. "27 Generally, Matthews and Puc key found the reciprocal process of missionary adapting Christianity to the Maori world, and vice versa, a complex and often frustrating one. As Matthews wrote in 1836, "the word of the Lord, I am happy to say, is beginning to show its general effects among the natives of this part; yet their old habits seem to fall away only a little at a time. ,,28

A process of reciprocal adaptation also marked the ) missionary impact on Muriwhenua's political world. Panakareao, after two years of shunning Matthews because of his indiscretions in 1834, came to realise that he could not afford to continue to distance himself from the CMS as a matter of ' spite. His opportunity to restore his original alliance with the CMS came in November 1836. Matthews was able to convert Manu, Panakareao's father-in-law, on his deathbed in the presence of at least 100 Maori. Panakareao then agreed to allow Manu a Christian burial in the Kaitaia Churchyard (where he and his father, Kaka, would eventually be buried), and on 21 November 1836 had himself baptised as Nopera by William Williams. His very powerful wife, Ereonora, and 44 adults followed him in accepting baptism. 29

No doubt, Panakareao had many reasons for accepting Christianity. Politically, it would have been most unwise for him to have continued to allow Matthews's 1834 insult to have stood between him and the CMS. His approval of Manu's Christian burial recognised the political power of the CMS. Upon Manu's death, he told Matthews and Puckey "one of our canoes has arrived safe on shore, let us with ours be very strong to follow it."3o He had to consider both his position within Te Rarawa society and the relationship between Te Rarawa and Ngapuhi who had sealed their alliances with missionaries. As in - 25 -

the rest of New Zealand and Polynesia, the conversion of the principal chief was accompanied by the conversion of those who recognised his authority. In 1838 Matthews claimed that a congregation of over 400 baptised adults gathered in the newly completed Kaitaia Church, which was large enough to accomodate twice that number. 31

Panakareao's renewed political alliance with the CMS also recognised the economic and medical impact of the Kaitaia mission. Puckey and Matthews reported in 1837 that Te Rarawa were "almost completely dependent on us for every article of clothing both for male and female, but they are more especially so in the case of sickness." Without any specialised medical knowledge they nonetheless dispensed medicine to thousands of people far and wide. 32 Even though most of the medicine would not have cured Maori, it certainly had sufficient ameliorative effect to increase missionary mana.

The missionary impact on the Maori medical world was as profound as their political and economic impact. During 1838 and 1839 Matthews and Puc key summoned Samuel Ford, a CMS physician, to Kaitaia on several occasions to attend to stricken Maori and Pakeha. Ford reported "there appears to have been more disease amongst" Northern Maori " ... during this period than has ever been observed at any previous part of their history." The influenza and 'erysipholatis' (or streptococcal) epidemics that afflicted Maori and Pakeha throughout Northern New Zealand in 1838-1839 claimed 1200 victims at Paihia in the Bay of Islands. In 1839 both Panakareao and his wife almost died of influenza, but because of missionary medicine, according to Matthews, only four out of the 200 influenza victims at Kaitaia died. Panakareao thanked God for his deliverance, expressing this gratitude by becoming a mission teacher. Matthews added that even after the dreadful epidemic had passed, "we are sought, too, by all of them for advice and for medicine and clothing .... " Medicine, and clothing, certainly increased the appeal of Christianity to Maori. 33 - 26 -

Matthews also taught the Maori agricultural techniques on the Kaitaia Mission farm. By April 1838 Maori had harvested 300 acres of wheat, and were filling many sailing vessels bound for Europe "with grain and potatoes ... " Matthews believed this abundance, which Maori shared with newly arrived Pakeha settlers, represented "a great advance in civilization," since "bad clothing and lcJ-ttle food" was a mark of "savagery.,,34

Matthew's interest in agriculture tied in very closely with his interest in acquiring Maori land for himself and his heirs. CMS policy allowed missionaries to acquire a land "to a moderate extent" for the support of their children since the organisation could not afford to support these children after their fifteenth birthday out of CMS funds. Both Matthews and Puc key believed their children should not suffer financial insecurity because of the sacrifices their parents were prepared to make for the CMS.35

On one question Matthews departed from CMS policy in a way that would contribute to the history of Muriwhenua land. During 1838 and 1839 when Northern New Zealand, and Muriwhenua, experienced a Pakeha land rush, the CMS organisation in London and the Bay of Islands opposed it. Both CMS Secretary Dandeson Coates, and Henry Williams, effective head of the New Zealand mission, believed that widespread Pakeha settlement would jeopardise years of painstaking missionary work in building Christian communities among Maori. 36 Matthews, however, as an agricultural missionary, believed that Pakeha settlement was inevitable and beneficial to New Zealand, if not to Maori. He wrote to Jowett, CMS Corresponding Secretary, on 26 September 1839

I have my fear that the [Maori] race will ... be [soon] only known as amalgamated among the Europeans. How true is the word ... God shall enlarge Japeth and he shall dwell in the tents of Shem. The tide of emigration is undoubtedly (although we as missionaries are opposed to it) fulfilling the decree of the Almighty! ... The earth shall be filled with the knowledge of the Lord ... But it must first be filled with men which it never would be without - 27 -

emigration. 37

In other words, Matthews believed that, despite missionary aid in developing Maori agriculture and combatting disease, they were a dying race and if they survived at all it would only be by marrying Pakeha settlers. As he put it to Coates in a letter two days later

I think it is the duty of the missionaries to assist the Natives in temporal [matters]. We came out for their good and we ought to seek it in all things. The tide of emigration which is flowing towards New Zealand will tend to obliterate their name from the earth as though their names were written only on the sands of the seashore, but out of evil good will be educed [sic]. The Lord says ... 'go forth and replenish the earth .... ' Happy is he who can cause 'a blade of grass to grow where none grew before.' 38

Puckey and Richard Taylor, who visited Muriwhenua in 1840, generally shared with Matthews his support of Pakeha settlement. For this reason all three, together with Samuel Ford and Richard Davis, who arrived in Muriwhenua in 1839, supported British annexation of New Zealand as necessary to control Pakeha settlement and its impact on Maori. 39 They also engaged in several large scale land purchases for themselves and facilitated the purchases of Maori land by other Pakeha in Muriwhenua (see Ch.III Land Purchases in the 1830s)

Despite "the tide of emigration flowing towards New Zealand" in 1839, Te Rarawa continued to view the mission station at Kaitaia as part of an essentially Maori world. When the CMS proposed to replace one of the Kaitaia missionaries in 1839, Matthews warned that there could be no greater insult to Te Rarawa than to suggest the removal of a missionary. Panakareao wrote a letter of protest to the CMS, "our hearts have been made dark. We do not like to have our candlesticks taken away. If the committee strive to take away one of our candlesticks, we shall strive to keep them, and it will remain as a strife between us." He politely pointed out to the eMS, "according to our native mode it is not right after one man has carried on a work, for another to come and finish it." 40 - 28 -

William Williams, who as the sole CMS representative on the East Cape had proposed the posting of Matthews or Puc key there, commented tartly that two candlesticks "was doubtless a comfort to persons with weak eyes but poor people are often obliged to be content wi.th one." 4 1 Puckey, however, made it clear to the CMS that Panakareao would not accept the removal of either

of the missionaries, and hinted that the Te Rar~wa chief would consider using force of arms to keep Matthews and Puc key at Kaitaia. Puckey wrote,

I believe that it is not unlikely, but that he might restrain us forcibly from going, even if it was our wish to go. Why might he not? Would not he consider his authority as treated with contempt? He appears much concerned about this threatened removal. And for this and many other reasons our path of duty seems plainly to say 'stay at home' .42

Needless to say, both Matthews and Puckey remained at Kaitaia.

Despite half a century of regular trading contact with Pakeha, a decade of land sales, and a quarter of a century of missionary contact, northern New Zealand was still a Maori world in 1840. Christianity had changed Maori society, but in the process had changed itself. For example, it had clearly become part of the Maori political world. Puckey noted that Maori transformed the hapu rivalries which predated Christianity into rivalries between Christian and non-Christian hapu, and between Christian hapu of different denominations. 43 Moreover, missionaries were obliged to take the mana of hapu into consideration. In 1836 Matthews wrote, "such is the jealous character of the New Zealander that he will not go on another man's ground to hear the Word of God; but thinks himself slighted unless we stop at each place, and have separate services there." The missionaries, unwilling to let any opportunity of spreading the gospel pass, "many times complied with their wishes. "44

After 1837 Panakareao had used the CMS missionaries to consolidate his power as paramount chief in Muriwhenua, but he ( \ " ' - 29 -

did so in consultation with his people. The CMS had mediated in his conflict with Tawhai to ensure that Muriwhenua would not be invaded by Hokianga people, and they had persuaded Te Rarawa not to invade Tauranga and Taranaki. In preventing Te Rarawa from bidding for political paramountcy further south, the missionaries allowed them to consolidate their power at home rather than dissipate it away from home. The missionaries usually overestimated Panakareao's individual role. In Muriwhenua, Matthews wrote in 1839, "Panakareao has by right of conquest as well as by birth the 'Ki Wainga' ... the word and power." His word alone was sufficient to summon "all the tribes of the Rarawa which would amount to fourteen or sixteen thousand fighting men." But, instead, the missionaries had persuaded him to spread the word of God. Matthews believed he was the most Christian of all the New Zealand chiefs. 45

Te Rarawa's alliance with the CMS profoundly altered Muriwhenua history. They brought them to Muriwhenua. They negotiated with them the first major land sale in Muriwhenua. Whether this alliance with them would continue while Ita tide of emigration flowed towards New Zealand" would depend very much upon subsequent land sales. - 30 -

REFERENCES

1. On the CMS in New Zealand, see K.R.Howe, Where the Waves Fall. A New South Sea Islands History from First Settlement to Colonial Rule, (Sydney 1984), pp.212-214.

2. Ibid., p.223.

3. J.M.R.Owens, "New Zealand Before Annexation", in W.H.Oliver (ed), The Oxford History of New Zealand, (Wellington 1981) pp.36-39.

4. Ibid.

5. K.R.Howe, Where the Waves Fall, p.224.

6. L.M.Rogers (ed), The Early Journals of Henry Williams, (Christchurch 1961) p.186.

7. Ibid., p. 187 .

8. S.C. and L.J.Matthews, Matthews of Kaitaia. The Story of Joseph Matthews and the Kaitaia Mission, (Dunedin and wellington 1940) pp.20-22.

9. Cited in ibid., p.23.

10. J.Matthews to D.Coates, 5 March 1839, CMS/CN/0.61.

11. Kerekere Deed No.1, 17 March 1834, Turton's Maori Deeds of Old Private Land Purchases in New Zealand 1815-1840, p. 3 [Doc B33] .

12. Quoted in S.C and L.J.Matthews, Matthews of Kaitaia, p.61.

13. Ibid.

14. J.Matthews to Coates,S March 1839, CMS/CN/0.61.

15. Quoted in S.C. and L.J.Matthews, Matthews of Kaitaia, p.28. - 31 -

16. J.Matthews to W.Jowett, 8 June 1834, CMS/CN/0.61. On intertribal competition as a major force within nineteenth century society, see A.Parsonson, "The Pursuit of Mana", in W.H.Oliver (ed), The Oxford History of New Zealand, pp.140-147.

17. J.Matthews to Jowett, 6 March 1836, CMS/CN/0.61.

18. J.Matthews to Jqwett, 7 April 1837, CMS/CN/0.61.

19. Quoted in L.Hamilton, "Christianity among the Maoris. The Maoris and the Church Missionary Society's Mission, 1814-1868," PhD thesis, University of Otago, p.119.

20. Ibid., p.122.

(J 21. Puckey's Journals I: 25 (Doc C2]

22. Quoted in S.C. and L.J.Matthews, Matthews of Kaitaia, pp.81-82.

23. Quoted in ibid., p.37.

24. Quoted in ibid., pp.113-114.

25. On this process of Maori adaptation of Christianity to their own needs, see J.M.R.Owens, "New Zealand Before Annexation", in Oliver, Oxford History, pp.36-39. K.R.Howe in Where the Waves Fall argues that this adaptation process was as notable in the rest of Polynesia as it was in New Zealand.

26. Quoted in S.C. and L.J.Matthews, Matthews of Kaitaia, p.81.

27. Quoted in ibid., p.114.

28. Quoted in ibid., p.81.

29. Ibid., p.90. - 32 -

30. J.Matthews to Jowett, 7 April 1837, CMS/CN/O.61.

31. J.Matthews to Jowett, 22 November 1836, CMS/CN/O.61. J.Matthews to Coates, 13 April 1838, CMS/CN/O.61. In 1842 Matthews reported much less impressive conversion figures. He recorded 184 baptisms between 1835 and 1838 and 676 between 1839 and 1842. J.Matthews to Coates, 6 June 1842, CMS/CN/O.61.

32. Puc key and J.Matthews to Coates, 11 April 1837, CMS/CN/O.61.

33. S.H.Ford, Medical Report, December 1837 - June 1838, CMS/CN/O.41i J.Matthews to Coates 15 November 1838, CMS/CN/O.61; S.H.Ford, Medical Report, June - December 1838, CMS/CN/O.41.

34. J.Matthews to Jowett, 4 March 1839, CMS/CN/O.61. (J 35. T. Kenyon, "Land Purchases by Missionaries for the Church Missionary Society before 1840," MA thesis, Massey University 1970, p. 4.

36. P.Adams, Fatal Necessity: British Intervention in New Zealand 1830-1848, (Auckland 1977) pp.83-83, 94-95.

37. J.Matthews to Jowett, 26 September 1839, CMS/CN/O.61.

38. J.Matthews to Coates, 28 September 1839, CMS/CN/O.6I.

39. P.Adams, Fatal Necessity, pp.83-85. Richard Davis wrote the letter covering the missionary petition to the Queen in 1842 "supplinating " her to uphold the Treaty of Waitangi on the one hand, and missionary land claims on the other. Davis to Hobson, February 1842, CMS/CN/O.16.

40. Puckey's Journals I: 50-51. [Doc C2]

41. Quoted in L.Hamilton, "Christainity among the Maoris", p.122.

42. Puckey's Journals I: 48-49. [Doc C2]

43. L.Hamilton, "Christianity among the Maoris"l p.122.

44. Quoted in S.C. and L.J.Matthews, Matthews of Kaitaia, p.86.

45. J.Matthews to Jowett, 4 March 1839, CMS/CN/O.61. - 33 -

III. LAND PURCHASES IN THE 1830s

While Te Rarawa developed their power in alliance with CMS missionaries throughout much of Muriwhenua, the Matearoha hapu of Ngapuhi, led by Pororua Wharekauri, consolidated their power at Mangonui and Oruru in alliance with Pakeha settlers and traders. 1 The famous Oruru dispute, which would figure prominently in the history of Muriwhenua during the 1840s and 1850s, arose out of political rivalry between Te Rarawa and Ngapuhi. Ngati Kahu people residing at Oruru would be caught in the middle of this dispute. This rivalry centred on the fundamental question of Muriwhenua history, the control over land and the power, or mana, associated with control of land, custody of the tangata whenua.

During the 1830s, Ngapuhi and Te Rarawa developed land transfer policies designed to attract Europeans to Mangonui and Kaitaia. 2 By using transfers of land rights to seal alliances with Pakeha, they sought to establish small European communities within their respective tribal territories as a means of acquiring prestige and gaining access to European trade, technology, and agricultural skills. Since Ngapuhi controlled the immediate hinterland served by the busy port of Mangonui, he chose to ally himself with traders and settlers, although he preserved good relations with the Wesleyan missionaries at Whangaroa. Te Rarawa, on the other hand, brought the CMS missionaries to Kaitaia, partly to counter the way Ngapuhi power and access to European goods had increased through their association with missionaries and traders at the Bay of Islands, Hokianga, and Whangaroa.

During the early 1830s, Pororua transferred land rights on the eastern side of the Mangonui harbour to Pakeha involved in the flax and timber trades and in the refitting and provisioning of whaleships. These land sales allowed traders such as Thomas Ryan and George Thomas, to become settlers under Ngapuhi protection. In return, Pororua gained access to - 34 -

European goods.

In the first of these transactions, in October 1831, Ngapuhi transferred land rights to Ranulph Dacre, a Sydney merchant with an Admiralty spar contract. Dacre built a house on the land and imported a party of sawyers to start a sawmill. Unfortunately the trees proved to be unsuitable for spars, and the Dacre soon abandoned the mill, but the following year he allowed two of his sawyers, Thomas Ryan and James Berghan, to reside on the land as his tenants. 3 Ryan and Berghan worked in the colonial timber trade, and after a number of years as tenants, had acquired sufficient capital to purchase various blocks of land from Mangonui Ngapuhi.4

Ngapuhi saw the Dacre transaction as attracting a sawmill and a later William Butler transaction as attracting a store to Mangonui. In the late 1830s, Pororua and Kiwa, another Ngapuhi chief, granted Butler, a former whaling captain, use of the Paewhenua Island and Pukakawa blocks in Mangonui harbour. There Butler established a flourishing business buy1ng and selling flax, timber, and kauri gum, and opened, probably in the early 1840s, the only store at Mangonui selling general merchanise to Maori and Pakeha alike. s

For Ngapuhi, these transactions were not only an attempt to attract Pakeha to the district, but were also a way of asserting a tribal right to land at Mangonui contested by Te Rarawa and previously occupied by Ngati Kahu. 6 At the expense of Ngati Kahu, both Ngapuhl and Te Rarawa claimed rights to this land through conquest, and Ngapuhi sought to reinforce their authority by granting land rights to Europeans. By granting Pakeha occupancy rights, their Maori grantors sought to protect their title. By these grants, however, they believed they maintained, and even strengthened, their claim. Ngapuhi grants to Dacre and Butler were therefore not land transfers in the European sense of absolute alienation. They transferred to their Pakeha wards (Dacre and Butler) rights to use the land, but not the sole and permanent ownership of the land. In - 35 -

purchasing the right to occupy land, Pakeha acknowledged the continuation of Ngapuhi rights in the land. The land in question symbolised a continuing bond between the Maori sellers and the Pakeha occupants.?

If land was to symbolise a bond between people, public negotiation and payment for the land was necessary. This ensured, firstly, that the transaction was sufficiently significant to be recorded in tribal tradition, and secondly,

to announce to rivals that the grantor's ~laims to the land in question had been vindicated. 8 For example, Clement Partridge, in describing his purchase of rights to occupy the 1000 acre Ngawai Tioararoa block on the east side of Mangonui harbour on 15 October 1839, wrote "there were no natives o residing on it nor for some years previous to the purchase." According to Partridge, "all the principal Chiefs ... and about 100 of their tribe" were present " ... at the time of the sale, and the payment for the same was distributed amongst them to their perfect satisfaction." 9

Te Rarawa's transfer of 2,000 acres of land to the CMS at Kaitaia in 1833 followed the same kind of public process. This land symbolised Te Rarawa's relationship with the missionaries. They saw it as symbolising a permanent bond between the two, in which Panakareao, Tiro and Wakaserved as guardians of Baker, Puc key and Matthews, and they became wards of Te Rarawa. 10 . In the case of sales by both Ngapuhi and Te Rarawa transfers to traders and missionaries, the agreements often specified joint occupancy. In other words, by granting traders and missionaries the right to use land as the primary occupants, they did not allow their Pakeha wards to deny Maori use of at least part of the same land for agriculture, fishing, wood-cutting or for ceremonial purposes. The missionaries accepted this kind of joint occupancy. In most cases joint occupancy agreements were verbal, but some of the "deeds of sale" specifying land purchased by missionaries contained explicit provisions for continued Maori rights of occupation - 36 -

and cultivation. puckey's purchase of the 1,500 acre Ohoto block near Kaitaia in July 1835 included such a provision. The deed stated that although the land had been transferred to Puckey, existing Maori rights to live and cultivate within the boundaries of the block were to be preserved. When questioned by Land Claims Commissioner Edward Godfrey in 1843, Puc key stated, "the term in the deed 'also for the use of the Natives' was inserted because it guaranteed to them the undisturbed possession of as much land as they required for cultivation. "11

Similarly, CMS surgeon Samuel Hayward Ford's September 1839 deed to the Waioioi, Oruru, and Parawai blocks in the crucial Oruru Valley and Kohumaru area, stipulated that "the people of C) Kohumaru with their children may sit upon this place from this generation to another: but not the people of other parts: those of the place only. Also the people of Oruru may sit upon their places on the said land within the boundary." Panakareao and fifty other Te Rarawa chiefs signed this deed of sale witnessed by Joseph and Richard Matthews and puckey. Since this land became part of the most disputed area in Muriwhenua, the original joint occupancy agreement is most significant. 12

Ngapuhi disputed the right of Te Rarawa chiefs to transfer access to these blocks, crudely estimated at 20,000 acres, which would have covered the entire Oruru Valley. Both Te Rarawa and Ngapuhi claimed rights to Oruru, and through the transfer to Ford, Te Rarawa no doubt hoped that their primacy would be acknowledged. However, in an endorsement dated 5 October 1840, Ford, in agreement with Te Rarawa chiefs, returned around two thirds of the land to Te Rarawa, a substantial modification of the boundaries of the transaction. The endorsement, which is attached to the deed of sale, does not make clear why Ford returned the land. Te Rarawa probably offered Oruru to induce Ford, the only CMS physician to visit Muriwhenua, to reside there and serve their medical needs. When Ford failed to take up residence, Te Rarawa had every reason to modify their original agreement. Government pressure on Ford to - 37 -

reduce the size of his claim may also help explain Panakareao's action, in view of the fact that Henry Kemp, the Assistant Protector of the Aborigines, signed his October 1840 endorsement. 13

Even if the deed of sale did not contain an explicit provision for joint occupancy, the CMS at Kaitaia appear to have allowed Te Rarawa access to mission station land, probably in accordance with a verbal agreement. The CMS purchased the Kerekere block for the mission station without mentioning any rights of occupation and cultivation in the deed. Nonetheless, when appearing before Land Claims Commissioner Dillon Bell in September 1859, Robert Burrows, Secretary of the Land Committee of the CMS, stated that Te Rarawa, with permission from the C) CMS, had continued to cultivate on the Kerekere block. 14

These verbal agreements, consistent with Maori custom but hard to define in Pakeha legal terms, were probably the rule rather than the exception. Of the 42 deeds of sale in Turton's Private Land Deeds for Muriwhenua, only 4 have explicit joint occupancy agreements, but since Maori continued to reside on much of the land transferred, we can assume the prevalence of verbal joint occupancy agreements. 15

Whatever the case, during the 1840s, Edward Gibbon Wakefield of the New Zealand Company and Governor Grey, criticised CMS land purchases. 16 In reply to such criticism, puckey provided an insight into how missionaries viewed these purchases. Puc key believed that

none in the mission ever thought their characters would be so wickedly aspersed as they are, when those purchases were made. It appeared to me a paramount duty situated as we were in this land to prepare for my children, and buying land for them seemed the only way - but other equally as great considerations influenced me in buying what I did. At the period our purchases were made , the natives were selling land in all directions; insomuch that both Mr Matthews and myself entertained serious apprehensions that the natives would part with more than they could spare from their families and in the end occasion material injury to them. :This led us to buy more land than we otherwise would, and with this proviso stated in the deed that the natives should occupy it with - 38 -

their own children, thereby doing them a kindness by providing them with homes which they could never alienate from their families. 17

puckey's acknowledgement of the joint occupation provisions of these purchases indicates that this was a general understanding even if it was not specified in every deed. In purchasing land, then, Puckey and Matthews claimed they were motivated by a

concern at the rate of Maori land loss in the late 1830s~ perhaps even a determination to halt the loss of Maori land to Pakeha land sharks.

Although there definitely was a land rush during the l830s, the argument presented by Matthews and Puckey that non-missionary land sharks were responsible for this is o misleading. As a group, missionaries accumulated claims to 68,500 acres of land during the 1830s, while the traders and settlers they identified as land sharks, claimed 48,054 acres. 18 While the missionary figure includes the vast 50,000 acre claim of Richard Taylor, the point is that the missionaries claimed title to more land in Muriwhenua than the land sharks. In Taylor's case, he even used an absentee speculator to pay over 60 percent of the purchase price for Muriwhenua North, and his 20 January 1840 initial purchase date indicates a desire to beat British annexation by the narrowest of margins.

While genuinely concerned that Maori would become a dispossessed people, notions of cultural superiority led Taylor, Matthews and Puc key to believe that Maori were incapable of protecting their own interests. The eMS assumption that Maori people would attempt to alienate all their land, ignored the joint occupancy provisions of Te Rarawa and Ngapuhi land sales to traders and settlers as well as to missionaries. It also discounted the more general tribal constraints on the alienation of land, such as the requirement for public negotiations of the terms of transfer, the need for representation of all parties with rights to the land to be present at such negotiations, and the need for the consent of - 39 -

all these parties before the land could be sold in a manner consistent with Maori custom.

Unlike many of the traders and settlers clamouring for the acquisition of Maori land, Matthews and Puc key realised that the prevailing market conditions and available technology of the 1830s limited the agricultural potential of Muriwhenua. In 1846 Puc key wrote, "when people speak of millions of acres uncultivated by the Natives which can well be spared for Europeans, it ought to be borne in mind that those millions of acres consist principally of barren hills which will never be brought into cultivation and which would not even afford support for cattle. "19 Again, Puc key , s statement is misleading. Although he was correct to refer to barren hills, CD such as those of the Karikari Peninsula and the Te. Aupouri Peninsula north oftoday's Te Hapua, as being agriculturally valueless, Puc key and Matthews claimed no land in those hills. They claimed more fertile Kaitaia Valley and Doubtless Bay lands.

Muriwhenua North/Richard Matthews Richard Taylor's purchase of the vast Muriwhenua North block, situated between Cape Maria van Dieman, Cape Reinga, and Parengarenga Harbour, could be described as containing "barren hills".This was another example of a joint occupancy agreement between missionary and Maori. When Taylor visited Kaitaia in November 1839 he told his CMS colleague Joseph Matthews that he had received a consignment of goods valued at 160 pounds from his friend Lieutenant Sadlier of the Royal Navy to buy land before New Zealand became a British colony. Apparently Matthews said he would "like a good man such as Mr Sadlier to have land in his neighbourhood in preference to the many dissolute characters who were then seeking to obtain it of Noble. "20 Matthews subsequently negotiated with Te Rarawa the purchase of Muriwhenua North for Taylor and Sadlier. Panakareao told Matthews "he had a very large tract of land which he wanted to sell and that Mr Sadlier would be the proper person to purchase I it as he was a good man." However, besides the goods, - 40 -

Panakareao demanded 100 pounds, "as the district was so extensive. 1121

Just as with the Oruru sale to Ford which Panakareao negotiated before the Muriwhenua North sale, the prior occupants of the area were not represented in the preliminary negotiations. Muriwhenua was the ancestral land of Te Aupouri, who, Panakareao thought, "might again come and settle upon it." Nonetheless, just as Te Rarawa had failed to consult Ngati Kahu when they offered Oruru to Ford, they also failed to consult Te Aupouri when he offered Muriwhenua North to Sadlier and Taylor. e even told Matthews that he would not allow Te Aupouri to reside on the land, "although they were then striving to obtain o permission." 2 2 Taylor, however, as a visitor among the Te Aupouri, saw how he could win their loyalty by protecting their occupancy rights. With Taylor providing 100 pounds in addition to the goods sent by Sadlier, Te Rarawa conceded the Te Aupouri right to occupy their ancestral land in the first of three deeds of. sale signed on 20 January 1840. This deed, signed only by Te Rarawa chiefs and Taylor, apparently stipulated that "the Aupouri should be permitted to return to their land and that all but an equivalent for the money invested should be given up to them. "23 Taylor told the eMS that "Noble gave me the fullest title conceding even the chieftanship of that district and permission to the Aupouri to return in peace to the abodes of their forefathers. "24 Whatever Taylor's intentions were, by this deed he and Sadlier obtained title to both Te Aupouri ancestral land and to "Te Rerenga Wairua", a place sacred to all Maori, the place where their spirits depart this life. The so-called 'Taylor claim' of over 50,000 acres, therefore, became a cause of concern to Maori throughout New Zealand for generations afterwards.

Since this was the largest piece of land ever claimed by a missionary in New Zealand, Governor Grey may have had it in mind when he later condemned "the efforts which have been made by some of the missionaries to acquire large tracts of land in - 41 -

a manner I considered both unjust to the natives and derogatory to their own calling. "25 Although Taylor estimated the acreage to be 50,000 acres, the accompanying map of the boundaries to his claim (see Map 5 "Boundaries of Taylor's 1840 Claim to Muriwhenua North" p.42), reveals that it was probably closer to 65,000 acres. Even at the underestimation of 50,000 acres it constituted fully 31 percent of all land claimed by missionaries in New Zealand prior to British anne~ation.26

If Grey's condemnation of large-scale missionary land purchases was directed at Taylor, it was probably unfair. On the other hand, Taylor was less than frank about the economic and the resale value of the land. Taylor asserted that the land had "little real value" because of its location at "the o extremity of the island far removed from the all settlements," and because it was " ... of a broken character ... [with] one entire series of sand hills on the western side extending at least two miles inland. ,,27 Immediate settler interest in the Muriwhenua block, however, contradicts Taylor's assertion that it was almost valueless. After the purchase Taylor "heard of no less than 3 applications made from pakehas to buy it. A messenger from one arrived just as the deed was being signed but all were anxious I should have it."28

Taylor covered himself against Grey's charge of being "unjust to the natives" by honouring the joint occupancy provisions of the deed he negotiated with Panakareao. Just after he signed the deed with the Te Rarawa chiefs, a large group of Te Aupouri, probably from Kaitaia and Whangaroa, visited Taylor at Kaitaia. 29 He gave Te Aupouri "formal possession of the entire district excepting one part which was retained as an equitable return for the money advanced." The Te Aupouri representatives acknowledged that "they had no power of alienating any portion but were to consider it as a reserve in perpetuity for their tribe." According to Taylor, the Te Aupouri "then subscribed their names to this condition and then

to the number of nearly 100 returned to their former home." 30 - 42 -

Ernst Dieffenbach, a New Zealand Company naturalist who visited the Far North in late 1840 and early 1841, confirmed the return of Te Aupouri to their ancestral land. He wrote "it was only a short time before my arrival in Parenga-renga, in the beginning of 1841, that about sixty Natives of the Haupouri tribe had returned to their old country with the permission of Pana kareao, the chief at Kaitaia, intending again to settle here. "31

Nonetheless, Taylor did not receive the gratitude he expected from the people he thought he had saved from total dispossession. When he travelled back to Parengarenga immediately after completing negotiations with Te Rarawa and Te Aupouri in Kaitaia, he received, in his own words, "a very cool o reception from the natives. They knew that I had purchased the North Cape and they said Noble had no business to sell it without them. They made enquiries respecting my intentions." The next day Taylor had "a long korero with the natives after which we became friends. "32 Still Te Aupouri people insisted on maintaining their claim to "all the coast almost as far as Pakohu from Murimotu which Noble had sold me." At a meeting Te Aupouri chiefs "stated what part of the purchase they allowed, which is the land from Pakohu to Waitohoia and thence to Parengarenga and Matapia."33 As at Kaitaia, after Taylor had explained his intentions and gave permission to Te Aupouri to reside on the land, a number of Te Aupouri apparently signed yet another deed of sale.34

After Te Rarawa chiefs had signed the deed at Kaitaia,

Taylor recorded that ",the Aupouri were rejoiced. II 35 They probably rejoiced at apparently having their occupancy rights finally recognised by Pakeha and Panakareao. Panakareao probably agreed to Taylor's joint occupancy terms because he wanted to attract Taylor to Muriwhenua. At the time Taylor was based at the Bay of Islands and the CMS were planning to transfer him to wanganui. On the other hand, they must have been perplexed when Taylor, after having agreed to return to - 43 -

them "formal possession of the entire district excepting one part," reasserted his claim to a very large part of it at Parengarega. Out of such inconsistencies grew Maori grievances over Taylor's claim. 36

Map 5 BOUNDARIES OF TAYLOR'S 1840 CLAIM TO MURIWHENUA NORTH

N. Coast of N. Island 0/ Ne: 7~aland taken by R.Taylor ~ Will· King.

Source: Richard Taylor's Journal II: 231. - 44 -

Awanui!Henry. Southee While joint occupancy was the essence of the Ford/Oruru, the CMS/Kaitaia, and the Taylor/Muriwhenua North purchases, as far as Maori were concerned, there is strong evidence that similar provisions were also negotiated with traders and settlers seeking land. Again, these provisions created special links between tribe and purchaser. For example/ Henry Southee, who-established a trading post and farm at Awanui during the mid 30s, established his links with Maori through both kinship and land.

In Maori society kinship ties and land rights were intertwined. After Southee married Eliza Ati, the daughter of Ruanui, a Te Rarawa chief in April 1838, Te Rarawa chiefs o granted Eliza the Otaki block for Southee to farm. The deed of gift implied that Eliza was to own, but Southee to control, the land. 37 On her death, the land was to be inherited by any male children of the marriage. The land passed to her husband only if there were no live male children. As with the Oruru, Kaitaia and Muriwhenua deeds, the Otaki deed explicitly protected existing Maori rights of occupation and cultivation. It stated "this place is to remain as a settlement for us the natives those persons who live on the place and we are to work on those spots where we wish if it does not interfere with the plantations of the European. "38

By late 1839 when it was clear that the British annexation of New Zealand was only a matter of time, Southee renegotiated his wife's original deed of gift to change it to a deed of sale. Panakareao, Puhipi Te Ripi, and other Te Rarawa chiefs, though not Ruanui who gifted the land 18 months earlier, conveyed 10,000 acres to Southee for cash 50 pounds and goods to the value of 438.18.0 pounds. Evidently, Southee wanted to formalise his ownership of the land so as to be sure of obtaining legal title after annexation. Nonetheless, the deed of sale maintained, and even reinforced, the joint occupancy provisions of the deed of gift. It reserved Maori cultivations along the side of the Awanui River, stating "let - 45 -

the natives hear who are living on this place that they are to have the banks of the river to cultivate for themselves the places are to remain sacred for them for ever. "39 When called upon to give evidence before Commissioner Godfrey, Panakareao stated "the banks of the river are free for the natives to cultivate and are to remain SO."40

The farm Southee established on his 10,000 acres along the Awanui River was, in many ways, a bicultural enterprise. About three hundred Maori lived beside Southee's farm and helped him cultivate some 275 acres of cropping land. They also learned from him how to raise cattle and other livestock, as well as helping him run his trading establishment. 41 When Dieffenbach visited Southee's farm in late 1840, "the maize, o growing ten or twelve feet high, and the fields of yellow wheat, bowing under the weight of the grain, showed what the land is capable of producing. Cattle were grazing about, and the well-stocked farm-yard bore testimony to an industry such as is very rarely met with among the numerous settlers of all classes."42 Governor Hobson was also impressed by Southee's farm when he visited it in June 1840. Southee was "a person with. whose cultivations Capt Hobson was so much pleased when at Kaitaia (the most having been performed entirely by the natives whom he had himself instructed) that on his return to Russell a Plough was sent to him as a present in Sept 1840."43

Southee's bicultural agricultural and commercial experiment did not impress the missionaries. They resented the way he challenged their monopoly over vocational training and trade goods. Furthermore, they condemned his "immoral" Maori ways.44 Maori, however, remained loyal to him. When flooding and drought forced Southee into economic difficulties a few years later, Panakareao wrote to the Governor in his defence, making it clear that he regarded Southee as a valuable member of Te Rarawa society:

o Sir the Governor

This is my speech to you. Southee has come hither to speak to me respecting his land which we the Chiefs of - 46 -

this place gave to him.

His native wife is dead, as are also his children - he was our first native European who supplied us with European things. It would indeed be well for you to be kind to him our European - as we regard him ourselves. Do you honor his letter and allow him to have the land we gave him for ever and ever. 45

Though his joint occupancy agreement with local Maori, Southee had become a part of Maori society. The land bound him to Maori as much as his shortlived marriage to Ruanui's daughter.

KarikarijWalter Brodie Not all 1830 land sales acknowledged joint occupancy o rights for Maori. Walter Brodie's purchase of land containing a copper deposit on Karikari Peninsula was a much more typically Pakeha transaction. Brodie's Karikari or Knuckle Point purchase is significant not only because of the mineral wealth there, but also because Brodie was an influential member of the upper echelons of British society, and a trenchant critic of Crown actions in New Zealand affecting land sales. His grandfather had founded the Times of London in 1785, and his father had been a Chaplain to King George IV.46 When Brodie arrived in the Bay of Islands to seek his fortune in late 1839, like the New Zealand Company, he tried to establish as many land claims as possible prior to British annexation. Land speculators who flocked to New Zealand during late 1839 in anticipation of annexation knew that they could buy land from Maori much more cheaply than they would be able to buy it from the Crown. Brodie, in particular, knew that the Crown would establish its sole right to purchase Maori land in annexing New Zealand, and he aimed to get as much of that land for himself before the Crown outlawed direct purchases. 47

In a matter of weeks, Brodie established land claims at the Bay of Islands, the Chatham Islands, and, most importantly, on Karikari Peninsula, in the vicinity of what Pakeha referred to as Knuckle Point and Brodie's Creek. According to his testimony before the 1844 House of Commons Select Committee on - 47 -

New Zealand, this Karikari land was "generally ... very hilly and bad ... " He chose to buy it "for one reason, on account of a copper mine being on it." At the time, local Maori did not ,understand the value of copper and therefore sold Brodie 14,000 acres for 227 pounds, with apparently no joint occupancy provisions included in the deed. 48

Although Brodie could be described as an archetypal land shark who initially cheated Maori out o·f valuable, mineral-rich land, Maori eventually renegotiated the deal and Brodie's subsequent activities were not uniformly hostile to Maori interests. During the 1840s, for example, he defended the Maori right to unoccupied land which Pakeha described as 'waste land.' He testified that Maori were shrewd defenders of their o own economic interests in land, and that they would never have signed away their sovereignty if they thought it jeopardised their land rights. He learned to respect Maori, in part because they learned he had cheated them out of Karikari copper, and they renegotiated his 1839 land sale accordingly prior to the 1843 Land Claims Commission. 49

The Maori who Brodie initially claimed 14,000 acres from insisted upon a radical reduction in the total area of the claim when they discovered the commercial value of Karikari. Brodie therefore agreed to reduce his claim to 1,200 acres (or 8.5 percent of the original claim) rather than have Maori dispute his claim before the Land Claims Commissioner.5o Here was another side of these early Maori land transactions. Even though Maori did not include a joint occupancy agreement in their deal with Brodie, they assumed that the original agreement could be renegotiated should conditions change. Most Maori agreements in Muriwhenua and elsewhere were not absolute contracts frozen in time. In Maori terms an agreement symbolised a human relationship which would change over time. They did not understand the Pakeha concept of a binding in perpetuity contract which required strict adherence to the original terms and where alteration took place only under extraordinary circumstances. : ' ,-, ,_" J_~ c ,.;, ,-, ••', ,--c0.Su~u,..:c .. ).0,~.h':-0;'~_0."";01..i~H~lili

- 48 -

REFERENCES

1. Note that Pororua Wharekauri was one person, not two as Ormond Wilson states in From Hongi Hika to Hone Heke. A quarter century of upheaval, (Dunedin 1985) pp.232.

2. Mangonui Sewerage Report: Report of the Waitangi Tribunal on the Ngati Kahu - Mangonui Sewerage Claim (Wai-17), (Wellington 1988) p.16.

3. R.P.Wigglesworth, "The New Zealand Timber and Flax Trade 1769-1840", p.127. o 4. Thomas Ryan OLC 403-407, James Berghan OLC 558-566. 5. R.H.Wynyard to G.Grey, 15 January 1852, encl W.B.White, Return of total number of persons at Mangonui, G 8/5/9.

6. Mangonui Sewerage Report, p.16.

7. For a general understanding of Maori land rights see H.Kawharu, Maori Land Tenure (Oxford 1977) pp.41-59. On the nature of land sales in Maori society, see A.Parsonson, "The Pursuit of Mana", in Oliver, Oxford History, pp.147-157, and A.Ballara, "The Pursuit of Mana? A Re-evaluation of Land Alienation by Maoris 1840-1890", The Journal of the Polynesian Society, (December 1982) 91: 4, pp.519-542.

8. A.Parsonson, "The Pursuit of Mana", in W.H.Oliver (ed), The Oxford History of New Zealand, p.148.

9. C.Partridge to Colonial Secretary, New South Wales, 15 February 1841, OLC 889-893.

10. J.Matthews to Coates, 5 March 1839, CMS/CN/0.61.

11. Statement of W.G.Puckey, Kaitaia, 28 January 1843, OLC 774.

12. Waioioi, Oruru, & Parawai deed No. 52, 12 November 1939,Turton's Private Land Purchases, p.46. [Doc B33] - 49 -

13. Ibid.; L.Johnson, "Crown Acquisition of Land at Mangonui-Oruru 1840-1843", 1988, unpublished interim report to the Waitangi Tribunal, p.6.

14. Statement of R.Burrows, Auckland, 20 September 1859, OLC 1/675.

15. Turton's Private Land Purchases, pp. 3-59.

16. T. Kenyon, "Missionary Land Purchases ... " pp. 50, 80-81.

17. W.G.Puckey to eMS, 22 January 1846, Puckey MS, University of Auckland Library, 11:96.

18. Appendix to the Report of the Land Claims Commissioner, o AJHR 1863 D-14.

19. Puckey to CMS 22 January 1846, Puckey Journal II: 96-97.

20. Taylor's claim is one of the most important Old Land Claims in which none of the original deeds have survived. We therefore have to reconstruct these transactions from his correspondence and Journal. R.Taylor to D.Coates, 9 January 1846, quoted in J.E.Ross, "The Missionary Work of the Rev. Richard Taylor at Wanganui," MA thesis, Victoria University, 1965, p.229.

21. Ibid., p.230.

22. Ibid.

23. Unfortunately these deeds have been misplaced or no longer exist. Statement by Richard Taylor in Defence and in Reply to A.S.Thompson's The Story of New Zealand, n.d., quoted in P.J.Phillips, "Taylor's Grant," 1975, unpublished report, p.4 . . [Doc D1]

24. R.Taylor to D.Coates, 9 January 1846, quoted in J.E.Ross, "The Missionary Work of the Rev. Richard Taylor at Wanganui," p.230.

25. G.Grey to H.Venn, 12 April 1847, CMS/CN/0.16.

26. Return of CMS Land Claims, 11 June 1845, BPP 1845, p.378; P.Adams, Fatal Necessity, p.175. -- i -~---~·-'·-''''''-'-''·~''--''~-'-L!Uw.'

- 50 -

27. R.Taylor to D.Coates, 9 January 1846, quoted in J.E.Ross, "The Missionary Work of the Rev. Richard Taylor at Wanganui," p.230.

28. R.Taylor, Journal, 20 January 1840, pp.184-18S.

29. Statement by Richard Taylor, quoted in P.J.Phillips, "Taylor's Grant," p.S. [Doc D1]

30. Ibid.

31. E.Dieffenbach, Travels in New Zealand, I (London 1843), p. 209. o 32. R.Taylor, Journal, 27 January 1841, p.227. 33. Ibid., 30 January 1841, p.234.

34. P. J. Phillips, "Taylor's Grant," p. 5. [Doc D1]

35. Statement by Richard Taylor, quoted in ibid.

36. The area of Taylor's claim featured prominently in the original Muriwhenua Claim, Appendix XI, Muriwhenua Fishing Report, pp.249,252.

37. Deed of Gift, 1 June 1838, OLC 875-877.

38. Ibid.

39. Turton's Maori Deeds of Old Private Purchases in New Zealand, p.55. [Doc B33]

40. Statement of Panakareao, Kaitaia, 31 January 1843, OLC 875-877.

41. E.Dieffenbach, Travels in New Zealand, I pp. 214-215.

42. Ibid. l - 51 -

43. Minute, author unknown, n.d., OLC 875-877.

44. Puckey's Journals, 30 July 1854, 11:292. [Doc C2]

45. Panakareao to Governor 15 April 1845, OLC 1/875-877.

46. M.W.Brockwell to R.R.D.Milligan,-17 November 1955, Milligan Papers, ATL. Dr.R.R.D.Milligan of Mangonui attempted to write a scholary biography of Brodie during the 1950s. Brockwell, a direct descendant of Brodie living in London, tried to write an adventure story about his grandfather, with predictable consequences. Brockwell manuscript, n.d., Brodie Papers, ATL.

47. On the general circumstances of the land rush, see P.Adams, o Fatal Necessity, pp.140, 175. 48. Brodie's testimony 4-6 June 1844, BPP 1844 (556), pp.25, 30-31, 51, 60. [Doc B28] Apparently Pakeha whalers told Brodie about the copper near Knuckle Point. Whaleships took on water at Brodie's Creek during the 1830s and noticed the green oxidation on the creek bed.

49. Ibid., pp.39,41. [Doc B28] Brodie blamed the missionaries for telling local Maori about the value of Karikari copper. It is unlikely that the missionaries would have brought any land transactions into question in view of the extent of their own claims.

50. Milligan to Surveyor General, 29 April 1955, Milligan Papers. - 52 -

IV. THE SIGNING OF THE TREATY OF WAITANGI AT KAITAIA

Brodie connects Muriwhenua to both the Treaty of Waitangi, and the larger imperial debate about the rights of indigenous peoples in British colonies. Although he did not witness the signing of the Treaty of Waitangi on 6 February 1840, he did witness the crucial debate of the previous day. In this debate Hokianga and Bay of Islands chiefs raised two crucial issues that particularly affected Muriwhenua people. Firstly, they debated the impact of the treaty on control over their lands and tangata whenua, and, secondly, they debated whether they could trust the missionaries and British Resident, o James Busby, faithfully to interpret their wishes into the treaty. 1

Four years later Brodie testified before the House of Commons New Zealand Committeee that many chiefs who had debated these issues at Waitangi were not satisfied with Hobson, Williams and Busby's answers to their questions about land and rangatiratanga. According to Brodie, they also called in an independent interpreter to make sure that they got their message through to the Governor without being dependent on what Henry Williams chose to translate to him. The main message Brodie brought back to Muriwhenua and to the House of Commons about the treaty was this: had Maori thought that there was anything in the treaty that jeopardised their land rights in any way, they would not have signed it.2

After the signing of the treaty at Waitangi on February 6 1840, Hobson dispatched agents to collect signatures from other parts of the country. In late March 1840, Willoughby Shortland, the Police Magistrate, Dr John Johnson, subsequently appointed Colonial 'Surgeon, and CMS missionary Richard Taylor, travelled to Kaitaia aboard the schooner New Zealander to get Te Rarawa and Te Aupouri chiefs to sign the treaty. At Mangonui they , , ._ L_ ,. ,_, c" J.,. '.~~, ,,-,,-. ''''.• _,-'' '-' ~-'.~~ '-'''-'-','''':;:-.1...0 ___ '-"-'- ,~b_.;'--',_·,:.,-'-~.:..I,.<..:..-,0~,~,."-\ ....\d~.\2~~'.\~

- 53 -

engaged a local chief to act as pilot, and after a week of sailing, the New Zealander anchored in the Awanui River some sixteen miles from Kaitaia. While Shortland remained on board, Johnson and Taylor went to the CMS mission station at Kaitaia to arrange with Puc key and Panakareao the day of the meeting.A day later the New Zealander weighed anchor and travelled up the Awanui River. At the head of the river the schooner was met by Puc key and a large number of Maori who escorted Shortland and his party to Kaitaia "where we were received by a discharge of

musketry, and shortly after were welcomed by a war dance." 3

The Kaitaia meeting produced the same kind of discussions that had taken place at Waitangi on 5-6 February. Panakareao, who had signed the 1835 Declaration of Independence, had a o preliminary discussion in which he questioned Puc key and members of the official party about the treaty, and in particular, the meaning of the word kawanatanga. They tried to make the word "intelligible" to him. 4 Shortland probably reassured him that the Governor's power would not interfere with his own legitimate chiefly rights, his rangatiratanga. According to Shortland, the other chiefs commenced preparations for the main meeting early the next day, "and at ten o'clock assembled on a large grass - plot before the verandah of Mr Matthew's house, whither I repaired, attended by Mr Puckey, who acted as interpreter, Nopera, the principal chief, and the

gentlemen by whom I was accompanied." 5

Just as the Waitangi meeting took place in a Pakeha setting, so did the Kaitaia meeting. Just as CMS missionaries undertook to translate for Maori at Waitangi, they did so at Kaitaia as well. The first to speak was Shortland. He addressed the meeting "with a solemnity befitting the occasion, and a pomposity which he deemed becoming his station." 6 In a reference to Pakeha settlers who had attempted to dissuade Maori chiefs from signing the treaty, Shortland denounced the "mischievous endeavours of some evil disposed persons to o - 54 -

misrepresent the intentions of Her Majesty's Government," and assured those present that Hobson would "strictly perform all engagements with them." 7

After Shortland had finished speaking, either Puc key or Matthews read the text of treaty to the assembled chiefs. According to Shortland, the subsequent debate among the chiefs on the terms of the treaty was "conducted much in the same manner as at Waitangi, with this exception, that there was but

very little opposition." 8 Some Kaitaia Maori hoped the treaty would increase chiefly status. Toketau told the meeting, "I have no land to give the Governor; we were gentlemen before; we shall be greater now." Other chiefs, particularly those who had adopted Christian names, expressed the hope that the treaty o would protect Maori interests. 'William' said to the official party, "they tell us you are come to murder all the Maories; but if your works are good, you will come to preserve us." 'Marsden' told his fellow chiefs, "they have come to protect us; let not our hearts be dark." 9

The comments of Te Rarawa assembled at Kaitaia reveals the influence of Protestant Christianity on their perceptions of the significance of the treaty. An unidentified chief reported Pakeha critics of the treaty (also unidentified) spreading malicious rumours that "the Governor comes to take the land .•. they say the soldiers are come to shoot us, and that the Governor will not be a shepherd for us ..• " Furthermore, these ill-disposed Pakeha alleged that Puckey and Matthews had deceived Maori about the true meaning of the treaty. 'William' said to Shortland that "If you are like the Missionaries, that will be good ... " Another chief with a missionary name, 'Davis', added: "I say, yes; I say, yes, for the Queen •.. lf the Governor comes to be our shepherd, that is good; but if he come to take our land, I will not have him ... Much land has been bought by the Pakehas. Let it not be said it has been taken by the Governor. 'Forde' continued in the same vein, "The Governor has not taken our land; it was taken before; my heart and my thought are with the Governor; I say yes, yes." In other words, I I ' ' , , " •.. - -'-"" ,--, ...-~. ,. ~~- '.. ~. '-'·-...... '.-'"~·"-""-~"'~'--"-.' .. j'-h:\~~\l.\_~~~':;,: '_'::":"~''-o.~".",\.,_,~:.",_"._" """-~.'-""-'''''''' ~__ <~_w_~._.'~ ----.--"'<~.'Wl4""J'<,%<.J:.;\l.~t,~;:.)~.:ft~~!:(hX)'iJ1>t:h.~"_~"_~... "~_"""VL ..."..,,,,,, ... ,,,, •• ~,. -.'"~",,,, -~j·''''·-''--·_~-'-'''''''''_'L~'':''''-''",':'i~i~o,:,.3'''''.c..,''i'

- 55 -

Maori identified a benevolent Governor, a shepherd watching over his flock, with the missionaries, and ill-disposed Pakeha with land sharks.

Another chief named 'Marsden' proclaimed that the Governor's men "have come to protect uSi let not our hearts be dark ..• if what we hear from our teachers be true, then what we hear from the Governor is not a lie." Puhipi Te Ripi, or 'Busby' expressed concern that the Governor would be too distant to punish adulterers, but Pi, another chief, declared "It will be good to see all the adulterers hanged in a row." Matiu, or 'Mathew' concluded "let all the Governors and all the Pakehas be like the Missionaries ... we have not been hurt by them. 'Broughton' then talked about how the Governor could be a o great mediator to prevent strife among Maori. He then made a Protestant theocratic suggestion: "I say send away Pikopo (Roman Catholic Bishop), send him back; he is the cause of strife among us. "1 0

Fully aware of how central land was in the Maori understanding of how the treaty would affect their lives, Shortland went to great lengths to explain the intent of Crown pre-emption. He told the assembled chiefs, "the Queen would not interfere with their native laws nor customs but would appoint gentlemen to protect them from being cheated in the sale of Lands - that Her Majesty was ready to purchase such as they did not require for their own use, to dispose of again to her subjects who she would take care were respectable men who would not injure them." 11

Of course, Panakareao, as paramount chief of Muriwhenua, had to have the final say. When the other chiefs had finished speaking, he "rose and delivered the great speech of the meeting." 12 He reminded those present that Te Rarawa had welcomed the Pakeha. "My grandfather brought the Pakehas to this very spot," he told the meeting, "and the chiefs agreed with what my grandfather did." Panakareao also thought that Maori people needed Hobson to act as "a helmsman", because they : C/ - 56 -

had no central government of their own. 13

On the related issues of land and power, he told the other chiefs that the treaty would not prevent the sale of land. Referring to Shortland's explanation of pre-emption, he said, "we will go to the Governor, and get a payment for our land, as before." Panakareao probably expected the Crown to assume not only direct responsibility for land purchases, but also to carry out purchases and pay Muriwhenua Maori for them in a process of continued consultation. In Panakareao's view, the treaty established British authority in New Zealand, but guaranteed Maori autonomy, especially in disposing of their lands as they thought fit. In an often quoted phrase, he said, "the shadow of the land goes to Queen Victoria, but the Q substance remains with us." 14

Because the missionary interpreters did not bother to record the Maori words Panakareao used to express "shadow" in contrast to "substance", our understanding of the exact meaning he tried to convey with these words is limited. According to Johnson, "the elegant figure" by which Panakareao expressed his understanding of the treaty "showed that he had ponder'd deeply on his conversation of the previous evening. "15 This suggests that he had been convinced that the treaty ceded a .general rather than a local power to govern. The Crown would ensure regular purchases of land , but Maori would decide what land they wished to transfer and negotiate the terms of transfer with the Crown. He apparently believed that while Governor Hobson would rule over him, in the way he ruled over Te Aupouri, he would retain his rangatiratanga throughout Muriwhenua.

Panakareao concluded his speech with a call to his fellow chiefs to agree unanimously to the treaty. "If you have anything else to say, say it," he said, "but if not, finish;

and all of you say yes. Say yes." 16 When he had finished speaking, sixty chiefs of Te Rarawa and Te Aupouri dutifully signed the treaty. In deference to Maori custom, Puc key and (~ - 57 -

Taylor allowed the redoubtable Ereonora, high - born wife of Panakareao, to sign the treaty.17 After all the signatures had been collected, Panakareao and Ereonora "provided all the food for the entertainment of the natives. "18 Shortland, representing Hobson, may have been expected to provide the food for the feast, but Panakareao and Ereonora refused his offer of payment. The Te Rarawa chief sent Hobson presents of pigs and

potatoes.1 9

Clearly, the decisive factor that ensured the success of the meeting as far as Pakeha were concerned was the way they were able to reassure Panakareao that the treaty did not limit his rangatiratanga. 2o Both missionaries and colonial officials recognised that he was a man of supreme importance in o the Far North. In the opinion of Puc key , the Te Rarawa chief possessed "an almost kingly authority over the northern tribes," while Hobson thought he had "unbounded influence in the District. "21 This authority meant that the Te Rarawa chief could provide more complete tribal agreement on the treaty than was possible through the more dispersed leadership of Ngapuhi.22 As one historian noted, Panakareao's "oratory swept away all vestige of possible opposition as chaff before the wind. ,,23 The sixty signatures collected at Kaitaia constituted a unanimous decision in favour of the treaty, and allowed Hobson to report to George Gipps, Governor of New South Wales, that Shortland had "succeeded in a highly satisfactory manner. ,,24

Nonetheless, the historian is left to answer the same kind of questions that went largely unanswered at Waitangi: was the Maori understanding of what they retained explicit enough in the treaty? Did the missionaries convey clearly enough to Maori that what the Governor wanted was substantive, not nominal sovereignty? Why did Shortland not attempt to explain to Panakareao that his "elegant figure" speech implied that he was ceding nominal rather than substantive sovereignty ("the substance remains with us.")? If this was Panakareao's understanding of the meaning of the treaty, it was clearly - 58 -

opposed to the Crown's understanding of what was being transferred.

Finally, the question remains: what bearing did the negotiations at Kaitaia, the all important Maori context of the signing, have on Maori land rights? In supporting Crown pre-emption, did Panakareao know he was forsaking his right to negotiate private transfers of land rights? He clearly assumed that the Crown would exercise its rights to purchase Maori land. But when the Crown did not proceed with these purchases during the 1840s, he became sorely disillusioned. Even as early as January 1841, when it became clear that the Crown would not sustain the exchange of land rights for goods and services that had gained momentum after 1838, Panakareao stated that perhaps he had exchanged the substance and not the shadow of the land at Kaitaia. 25 In Maori terms such a change of circumstances would necessitate a renegotiation of the original terms of agreement. In a sense, the Oruru dispute of the 1840s and 1850s stemmed from the Crown's failure to either make the terms of the treaty sufficiently explicit, or to renegotiate those terms once it became clear that the treaty produced severe misunderstandings over how it affected Muriwhenua land.

REFERENCES

1. For a perceptive account of this debate, see Claudia Orange, The Treaty of Waitangi (Wellington, 1987) pp. 38-50, 56-59.

2. Brodie's testimony 4-6 June 1844, BPP 1844 (556), pp. 39, 50-51. [Doc B28] Brodie, in his book entitled Remarks on the Past and Present State of New Zealand, published the following year, described the Treaty of Waitangi as "that most absurd and mischevious treaty," because Hobson promised to recognise previous Maori land sales, if they weren't disputed, but then went back on his word by appointing a land commission to investigate these sales. Brodie, State of New Zealand, pp. 4, 55. c - 59 -

3. Shortland to Hobson, 6 May 1840, BPP, 1841 (311), p.58.

4. C.Orange, Treaty of Waitangi, p.82.

5. Shortland to Hobson, 6 May 1840, BPP, 1841 (311), p.S8.

6. L.Buick, The Treaty of Waitangi; or How New Zealand became a British Colony, New Plymouth, 1936, p.184.

7. Shortland to Hobson, 6 May 1840, BPP, 1841 (311), p.S8.

8. Ibid. o 9 Shortland to Stanley, 18 January 1845, encl. speeches of Kaitaia chiefs, BPP, 1845 (108), p.9.

10. Ibid.

11. Johnson Journal, 28 April 1840, cited in O.Wilson, From Hongi Hika to Hone Heke. A quarter century of upheaval, p.228.

12. L.Buick, The Treaty of Waitangi, p.18S.

13. Shortland to Hobson, 6 May 1840, encl. speech of Panakareao, BPP, 1841 (311), p.S9.

14. Ibid., p.S8.

15. Johnson Journal, 27/28 April 1840, quoted in O.Wilson, From Hongi Hika, p.226.

16. Shortlandto Stanley, 6 May 1840, encl. speech of Panakareao, BPP, 1841 (311), p.59.

17. C.Orange, Treaty of Waitangi, p.90.

18. Shortland to Stanley, 6 May 1840, BPP, 1841 (311), p.S8.

19. Ibid. - 60 -

20. C.Orange, Treaty of Waitangi, p.82.

21. Puckey's Journal, 4 March 1839, p.44. [Doc C2]i Hobson to Gipps, 5 May 1840, BPP, 1841 (311), p.57.

22. C.Orange, Treaty of Waitangi, p.82.

23. L.Buick, The Treaty of Waitangi, p.187.

24. Hobson to Gipps, 5 May 1840, BPP, 1841 (311), p.57.

25. R. Taylor, Journal, 25 January 1841. o - 61 -

v THE 1840 MANGONUI PURCHASE AND THE ORIGINS OF THE ORURU DISPUTE

In early June 1840, Hobson, upon hearing from Shortland that Panakareao had played a vital role in gaining Te Rarawa accession to the treaty, visited the Te Rarawa chief. George Clarke, the newly appointed Protector of Aborigines, and John Johnson, then the acting Police Magistrate, accompanied Hobson on his visit to Kaitaia. After a welcome from the large number of Maori, Hobson and his party met with Panakareao and Ereonora, before leaving for Mangonui on 12 June. 1 At Kaitaia Hobson "entered into a preliminary arrangement with the Chief o Noble for the purchase of Mangonui." He paid 100 pounds to Panakareao as a deposit for his interests in land at Mangonui, without agreeing to the final purchase price, because, according to Hobson, "the extent of the land contained with his boundary" was unclear.2

The deed of sale defined the boundaries as

commencing at Oweto (in Doubtless Bay) continuing along the River Paekotare from there over to the Mouth of Kohumaru along the waters of Puta Kaka over hill and dale, until you come to Otangaroa, returning by Maukia, from thence to Wakapuku, from thence to Taemaro, the Watu and Oreti, over Rangitoto crossing to Rangi Kapite, from thence to Koe Korea, the Kopu and Parore, continuing until it meets Oweto.

There are, in fact, two deeds of sale. Both included the area around the port of Mangonui and the surrounding hinterland, but excluded the Oruru Valley. These deeds exist desp1te the fact that Henry Williams argued during the 1840s that Panakareao's deeds were "conveyed to Oruru and destroyed in the presence of the chiefs. "4 The deeds apparently appeared in the Internal Affairs files at National Archives in Wellington in 1985 after they had been considered missing for over 150 years. Williams argued that the burning of the original deeds was indicative of the private nature of the negotiations which led to them, but the actual deeds give every indication of being produced in - 62 -

public negotiations. In addition to Panakareao, four other Te Rarawa chiefs and George Clarke, the Protector of Aborigines, signed one of the deeds, and Puc key and Matthews witnessed both.

In purchasing Panakareao's interests in land at Mangonui, Hobson was, in his own words, "chiefly influenced ... in the hopes of being able to restrain, in some degree, the settlers from making encroachments on the land." Settler actions had caused "much annoyance to the natives. "5

The Mangonui purchase, however, involved the Crown in a tribal dispute over rights to land at Mangonui. From about 1810, members of Te Rarawa and Ngapuhi had occupied different parts of Mangonui and the adjacent Oruru valley, the ancestral o lands of Ngati Kahu. 6 This inter-tribal dispute over who controlled the land at Mangonui continued after the arrival of European settlers. Te Rarawa claimed a hereditary right to land at Mangonui and disputed the Ngapuhi right to sell land to Pakeha without his approval. On the other hand, Pororua claimed a right to land at Mangonui through conquest and occupation. Ngapuhi denounced the 1840 Mangonui purchase as a compact between the Crown and Te Rarawa which recognised a spurious Te Rarawa right over Ngapuhi lands. 7

In late June 1840, a party of Ngapuhi headed by Pororua travelled to the Bay of Islands to present the Ngapuhi case to Hobson. Henry Williams was prepared to champion the Ngapuhi cause and arranged for Pororua and Hohepa to meet with Hobson. At the meeting Williams told Hobson that he did not think that Panakareao had a right to sell land at Mangonui, and that there was a distinct possibility of armed conflict between Te Rarawa and Ngapuhi should the Government uphold Panakareao's claim. 8

On the strength of these representations, Hobson decided to recognise Ngapuhi rights to land at Mangonui. In May 1841, Hobson paid Pororua 100 pounds cash, and a horse, cloak, saddle, and bridle, for his interests in land at Mangonui. The deed of sale stated that the land in question "is mentioned and - 63 -

lies written in the book which sells the land of Panakareao to George Clarke which was written in the month of August [sic] in the year of Our Lord One thousand eight hundred and forty. "9 Thus, the boundaries of the land at Mangonui sold to the government by Panakareao in June 1840 and Pororua in May 1841 were identical. Map 6 PANAKAREAOjPOPORUA MANGONUI CLAIM 1840-1841 o ,.

r------~'" , HQrbour " , ,

, " ~: ~~<------~------~------~' ., ...... _- , ~haka PQku;!

------~------I1 1 '\------~----~------~ Oruru \ 1 '\ 1 \ \ \ / \ ! .------~------~ '\ 1 \

, \~------,:) '\ . ) '\ I' \ ' 1 , - / "/ , . -, " 'F \ I' . '---' 'I c-/ Oial'l!3arOQ

Source: Dept. Survey & Land Information, NZMS 261 (Waitangi

Tribunal Division r 1989) C) - 64 -

These deeds, the first Crown purchases to "extinguish Native title" in Muriwhenua illustrate the confusion between an absolute purchase and the purchase of specific rights in land. The 1840-1841 Mangonui purchases of an identical piece of land cannot be seen as an absolute in perpetuity purchase. For example, the Crown did not purchase the Pakeha Old Land Claims

within the area. It hoped to extinguish two different set~ of Maori rights: Te Rarawa rights based on prior occupancy and Ngapuhi based on conquest and current occupancy. By failing to explicitly recognise the different sources of these rights in the deeds, the Crown ensured continued confusion and conflict.

With these purchases the government hoped to prevent o further conflict between Te Rarawa and Ngapuhi, but when Land Claims Commissioner Edward Godfrey travelled to the Far North

~n early January 1843 the dispute almost exploded into war. The 250 Te Rarawa who greeted Godfrey at Mangonui refused to acknowledge Ngapuhi claims. Two days later a Ngapuhi contingent led by Pororua arrived at Mangonui determined to support their right to uphold land sales to Pakeha at Mangonui. 1 0

Godfrey hoped to obtain from Panakareao an admission that he had extinguished his claims in his 1840 settlement with the Crown. However, Godfrey thought there was "so strange a misunderstanding altogether with respect to this purchase that its assertion was of no benefit to me in this dispute. "11 Godfrey then proposed that Pororua retrospectively sanction land sales on the east side of the harbour, Panakareao on the west. Ngapuhi, after much hesitation, accepted this proposal, but Panakareao, on the advice of his fellow Te Rarawa chiefs, rejected it. 12

Panakareao told Godfrey he considered the 1840 government offer "to purchase his property over the heads of Europeans already settled upon those lands, was an absolute confirmation and admission of his Title."13 Given Hobson's C) - 65 -

account of the purchase, Panakareao could correctly claim that "the trifling property and cash" he had received from the Government in 1840, was a down-payment, npt full compensation for his claim to the land. 14 Panakareao told Godfrey that until the dispute was resolved he would permit settlers to occupy "the spots they reside on, with any cultivation attached." In other words, he wanted to maintain a landlord - tenant relationship within the purchase area until the Government resolved the conflict. He considered this "ample compensation to Pororua, & c, for any rights they might have had to the land." Panakareao, then, did recognise that Ngapuhi had some rights to land at Mangonui. 15 o Instead of recognising the possibility of a settlement in Panakareao's concession, Godfrey's clumsy ~ntervention made both sides more intractable. Over four hundred armed warriors from both Te Rarawa and Ngapuhi were present at the hearings of disputed claims at Mangonui. At one stage Godfrey thought that "they would have come to blows .... " After suspending the Mangonui hearings, Godfrey visited Panakareao on a number of occasions, "in the hope of finding him in a more tractable dispostion, but hitherto he has not given way in the least. "16

Having failed to resolve anything at Mangonui, Godfrey travelled to Kaitaia, where he investigated settler land claims not disputed by Te Rarawa or Ngapuhi. Immediately after Godfrey's arrival at Kaitaia, "all Nopera's tribes assembled there in considerable numbers, and in public conference many violent and seditious speeches were made by Nopera and other chiefs."17 Te Rarawa chiefs thought that the Government should acknowledge the claims of settlers at Kaitaia who had bought land from Te Rarawa, but demanded that surplus land be returned to the Maori vendors, and were opposed to any more land being sold to settlers or the government. They declared that they would exercise their traditional rights and privileges, and that they would not allow the government to interfere in tribal matters. According to Godfrey, Panakareao's fellow Te Rarawa chiefs were even more uncompromising than he o - 66 -

was in refusing mediation. 18 Godfrey thought that Te Rarawa dissatisfaction resulted "partly from a feeling that not being allowed to dispose of their lands to whosoever they please as formerly is an interference by the Government with a right they are not quite convinced they surrendered to the Crown. "19

After a considerable amount of debate, however, Te Rarawa relented. They accepted Godfrey's proposal of a reciprocal settlement on either side of the Mangonui harbour and apparently agreed to recognise all Pakeha land claims in the Far North. Their only condition for this cooperation was that they would not submit to any similar investigations in the future. 2o o Godfrey no doubt hoped that with Te Rarawa acceptance of the proposal, the dispute could be settled. Ngapuhi, however, after having accepted the Mangonui dividing line as the basis of a settlement a few days earlier, now refused to accept the proposal, declaring that "they would come to no compromise in the matter." In the opinion of Godfrey, the change in the attitude of Ngapuhi "may have arisen from Pororua having received offers of assistance from the Ngapuhis in the Bay of Islands, three large Canoes, with several Chiefs from that place, having visited him immediately upon hearing of Nopera's pretensions. "21 . They also won the support of Henry Williams, despite the CMS alliance with Panakareao and previous support for him in his conflict with Ngapuhi. Godfrey, admitting failure, returned to Auckland and suggested to the government that Protector of Aborigines George Clarke be sent to Kaitaia and Mangonui to resolve the differences between Te Rarawa and Ngapuhi.22

During January and February 1843, the focus of the conflict appears to have moved from Mangonui and Oruru, and by March, there was sporadic skirmishing between Te Rarawa and Ngapuhi at Oruru. According to the Rev. William Cotton, a resident of the Bay of Islands who heard about the conflict at Oruru, both sides suffered casualties. Cotton, however, did not - 67 -

pretend "to understand the cause of this war, which are as complic~ted as any in Thucydides."23

Because the CMS were active among both Te Rarawa and Ngapuhi, the Primate of New Zealand attempted to mediate between the two tribes. On 25 March 1843, Bishop Selwyn, in the course of a journey north, arrived at Oruru. He visited the various pa that had been-built at Oruru and succeeded in getting Te Rarawa and Ngapuhi to sign an agreement "that both parties should be free to get food from their grounds without molestation."24 This was, however, the extent of Selwyn's achievement.

On hearing of the armed conflict at Oruru, Shortland, o the acting Governor, accepted Godfrey's recommendation and "despatchedMr Clarke to Mungonui [sic] to expostulate with the contending parties. "25 On 24 March, Clarke arrived at the Bay of Islands to discover that Te Rarawa and Ngapuhi had agreed to a cessation of hostilities "until they could learn what assistance they might be able to procure. ,,26

In late March, Te Rarawa reinforcements from Kaitaia, and Ngapuhi from Hokianga and the Bay of Islands, arrived at Oruru. 27 Panakareao and Pororua's force each numbered about 500. 28 At the time Cotton wrote, "the very large numbers collected together, is, strange to say, a security that no battle will ensue." Each side knew "the dreadful loss which conquerors as well as the conquered must sustain in a pitched battle."29 Although Cotton was proved to be correct, the attitude of Pororua's Ngapuhi allies was of equal significance in preventing intertribal warfare. Missionary reports indicate that both Mohi Tawhai and Waka Nene, Ngapuhi chiefs from Hokianga, travelled to Oruru to prevent, rather than wage, war. 30

During the Mangonui purchase negotiations, the Crown used Mangonui harbour as a dividing line, but after mid-1843, Ngapuhi began to treat the Oruru River as the boundary between their land and Te Rarawa land. Whilst at the Bay of Islands, - 68 -

Clarke attended a large Ngapuhi gathering at Kerikeri. Ngapuhi chiefs thought that the Oruru river was a natural boundary between Te Rarawa and Ngapuhi and that the terms of peace should be "that the east side of the River should form the Ngapuhi boundary line, and the West side, that of the Rarawa." Clarke thought that there was "great plausibility" and "much apparent justice" in the Ngapuhi proposal which he hoped Te Rarawa would accept. 31

On arriving at Oruru, Clarke found Kemp, Selwyn, and the CMS missionaries, "exerting themselves to no great purpose to establish a peace. "32 Clarke visited the pa of the various chiefs involved in the Oruru dispute and drew up a peace plan based on the Ngapuhi proposal. Clarke warned Panakareao that o the government had a duty to make sure the dispute was settled peacefully, but Panakareao "continued inflexible, and continued to treat every intimation given him of the displeasure of HM Govnerment at his conduct, in this as well as the Mangonui affair, with insult. ,,33

On 10 April, Te Rarawa for some reason decided to leave Oruru, but Hone Heke, who had intervened in the dispute on behalf of Pororua, prohibited the retiring contingents from passing close to the outer Ngapuhi pa. Heke said if Te Rarawa came within a prescribed boundary, Ngapuhi would open fire. The majority of Te Rarawa, some 700 or 800, including women and children, were to return to Kaitaia along a different route, but Panakareao and several hundred warriors were, according to Clarke, "determined that Heke should not dictate, and to convince him of it, determined to pass within the prescribed lines."34 Te Rarawa warriors did cross over the boundary, and after some provocation, Ngapuhi opened fire. During the subsequent fighting on the beach at Taipa, Te Rarawa had six killed and six wounded, Ngapuhi one killed and one wounded. 35 This was the most serious conflict during the six weeks of hostilities between Te Rarawa and Ngapuhi.

During the fighting, a contingent of Bay of Islands - 69 -

Ngapuhi, accompanied by Henry Williams, arrived at Oruru, and according to Clarke, "had they been hostile, would have completely routed the Rarawa, but it was evident from their conduct that they only wished to honourably maintain their claim to Oruru.,,36 This was probably a Ngapuhi peace delegation sent to negotiate an end to the conflict.

The majority of Te Rarawa chiefs welcomed the Ngapuhi party, but Panakareao would only agree to see Williams. Panakareao proposed that both parties should leave Oruru, "for he would not consent to a division of the land." The next day, Clarke accompanied a Te Rarawa party to the Ngapuhi camp, but without Panakareao's agreement on the proposed division of o land, they had no power to conclude a peace. 37 As Clarke had predicted, both Te Rarawa and Ngapuhi left the Oruru district soon after this meeting. He thought that while Oruru remained unoccupied there would be peace, but that there could be no permanent settlement until the territorial boundaries of Te Rarawa and Ngapuhi were defined. 38 Clarke, of course, failed to understand that in Maori society there were different rights that different tribes could claim in the same area. For him, and for Godfrey, a simple territorial boundary was the only solution, but neither side would agree to either the Mangonui or the Oruru lines of demarcation.

Settler dissatisfaction with property damages suffered during the fighting added to the Government's problems. Shortland did not approve "of the system of taking a payment in land from the Natives for acts of agression on British subjects," because this would encourage "a repetition of similar offences" and "render the lower class of settlers more abusive towards the Natives." He stressed that the question of "the amendability of the Aborigines to British Law, leaves the treatment of such cases a matter of great delicacy and difficulty. "39

In August 1843, Shortland once again instructed Clarke - 70 -

to travel to Mangonui and Kaitaia to resolve the Oruru dispute. On arriving at Mangonui, Clarke spoke to Pororua, who was "concerned at the determined proceedings of Noble who had planted the British flag" on the hill above Mangonui, and he "protected it for five days with about 300 men."40 Clarke brought Panakareao and Pororua to a meeting, but, again, this only antagonised them. They "parted with unfriendly feelings." Pororua's people pulled down Panakareao's flag after Te Rarawa had departed. According to Pororua and others, "some liberty had been taken by Noble with His Excellency's name in support of his claim; he, reminding Pororua, that the Governor had soldiers and ships of war at his command.". Pororua replied "that he was not to be frightened with big words - he believed o that the Governor came to protect, and not to destroy them. "41 Clarke met with Otene, Pororua's older brother and a resident of Oruru, who admitted that "Noble had joint claims with them, to Mangonui, but accused Noble of having sold places without what they considered their jOint claims." The notion of a joint claim was the obvious way to attempt a settlement, but Clarke persisted in seeing a single territorial boundary between two distinct tribal domains as the only possible solution. 42

Clarke then travelled to Kaitaia where Panakareao remained adamant about his claims. He told Clarke that Ngapuhi chiefs had "sold all their lands in connexion with the Bay of Islands, and now wanted to claim his. " Panakareao said he would only agree to a settlement if he did not have to admit "the claims of any other chief." Panakareao claimed that the land at Mangonui had been "given up to the government and they should have it. "43

The settlement Clarke proposed, and Panakareao grudgingly accepted, was the payment of another $100 for his interests in land at Mangonui. Clarke drew up a deed which specified "claims or interests in the land set forth therein, and not necessarily clashing with the claims, and interests of - 71 -

others." The deed "honourably maintain[ed] Noble's rights" but also opened the way "for something to be done for Pororua, or any other chiefs who may have claims. ,,44 Panakareao signed the deed embodying this agreement on 24 August 1843 "in the presence of the principal people of the tribe ... "45

Clarke then travelled to Oruru and read the deed to Otene, whose "principal objection was that his character as a chief in the estimation of all Europeans was at stake; he, having sold them, portions of the land." Pororua was "evidently disconcerted" with the deed, but agreed when Clarke told him that his cultivations at Mangonui "would be especially secured to him and his family for ever. ,,46 Clarke hoped his settlement would lead to "an uninterrupted peace, harmony, and o good feeling throughout the Northern Tribes. ,,47

Clarke's hopes were not fulfilled, nor should we rely completely on the foregoing account which depends largely upon the Crown and missionary versions of what took place in the MangonuijOruru conflict. Since Clarke was a former missionary and land claimant, and since the CMS applauded his settlement, both versions should not be accepted at face value. Unfortunately, we have few Maori accounts of what took place, but we do have a Pakeha account which challenges the official version.

Walter Brodie, the Karikari land claimant who testified before the 1844 House of Commons Select Committee on New Zealand, roundly condemned the Crown's actions during the conflict. As an implacable opponent of the Shortland government, he definitely had an axe to grind. When local Maori discovered there was copper on the Karikari peninsular they forced him to reduce his claim from 14,000 to 1,200 acres, and then Godfrey reduced it further to 900 acres. 48 His 1844 testimony, however, cannot be dismissed as the rantings of a dissapointed land speculator. Although a supporter of settler interests in general, he also supported the Maori right to their unoccupied, or 'waste land', and he criticised the - 72 -

Government's acquisition of surplus land as a violation of Article II of the treaty.49

Brodie maintained that the Crown unjustly favoured Panakareao and Te Rarawa in its numerous attempts to settle the conflict. Even though Te Rarawa, in Brodie's view, were "the original possessor[s] of the soil," he maintained that Ngapuhi had effectively established the primacy of their claims to the Mangonui/Oruru area by right of conquest before 1840. He accused Clarke of having sustained Panakareao's claims because he "happened to be a missionary chief", and of opposing Pororua's claims because he was "heathen. lisa

Although Brodie attended the Godfrey commission hearing o just before the fighting at Oruru, he probably did not witness the events of April 1843. His assertion that more people lost their lives at Oruru than at Wairau later that year is highly questionable. Brodie argued that Ngapuhi were willing to go to war to defend their right to sell land to Pakeha settlers, and that the Crown, therefore, favoured a Maori claimant, not only over another stronger Maori claim, but also at the expense of Pakeha settlers. He concluded in his 1845 book that the Crown's native policy in this instance was "distinguished by the practice of faithlessness and deception, and the exercise of indecision, imbecility and fear."s1

While some of Brodie's criticism of the Crown is probably unfair, it is, nonetheless, a useful corrective to the official version of what took place and why. No doubt Maori held strong views about the Mangonui/Oruru conflict. They were probably as critical of the Crown as Brodie had been. The conflict Clarke thought he had solved in 1843, continued on during the 1850 and 1860s. - 73 -

REFERENCES

1. O.Wilson, From Hongi Hika to Hone Heke. A quarter century of upheaval, (Dunedin 1985) p.230.

2. Hobson to Gipps, 18 July 1840, G 36/1.

3. Deed of Sale, 24 June 1840, IA 15/4.

4. H.Williams, "Reminiscences" quoted in H.Carleton, The Life of Henry Williams, (Auckland 1877) 11:63.

5. Hobson to Gipps, 18 July 1840, G 36/1.

6. Waitangi Tribunal, Mangonui Sewerage Report, Wellington, o 1988, p.16.

7. Ibid., pp.17-18.

8. H.Carleton, The Life of Henry Williams, (Auckland 1877) pp. 62-63.

9. Turton's Maori Deeds to Crown Purchases, p.1. [Doc B32]

10. Godfrey to Colonial Secretary, 15 January 1843, G 30/3. [Doc B25]

11. Godfrey to Colonial Secretary, 16 February 1843, G 30/3. [Doc B27]

12. H.T.Kemp to G.Clarke, 10 February 1843, G 30/3. [Doc B26]

13. Godfrey to Colonial Secretary, 15 January 1843, G 30/3. [Doc B25]

14. Ibid.

15. Ibid.

16. Ibid. - 74 -

17. Godfrey to Colonial Secretary, 10 February 1843, G 30/3. [Doc B27]

18. Ibid.

19. Ibid.

20. Ibid.

21. Ibid.

22. Ibid. o 23. W.C. Cotton,. Journal 1841-1848, ATL, p.52.

24. G.A. Selwyn, Journal 1843-1844, ATL, p.10.

25. Shortland to Secretary of State, 15 June 1843, G 30/3. [Doc B29]

26. Clarke to Colonial Secretary, 1 June 1843, G 30/7.

) 27. O.Wilson, op.cit., pp.233-234.

28. Clarke to Colonial Secretary, 1 September 1845, G 30/7.

29. W.C.Cotton, op.cit., p.73.

30. O.Wilson, From Hongi., p.234.

31. Clarke to Colonial Secretary, 1 June 1843, G 30/7.

32. Ibid.

33. Ibid.

34. Ibid. - 75 -

35. Cf estimate of casualties in the Mangonui Sewerage Report, p. 20.

36. G.Clarke to Colonial Secretary, 1 June 1843, G 30/7.

37. Ibid.

38. Ibid.

39. Shortland to Secretary of State, 15 June 1843, G 30/3. [Doc B29] o 40. Clarke to Colonial Secretary, August 1843, G 30/7. 41. Ibid.

42. Ibid

43. Ibid.

44. Ibid.

45. Ibid.

46. Ibid.

47. Ibid.

48. Milligan to Surveyor-General 29 April 1955, Milligan Papers

49. Brodie's testimony 4-6 June 1844, BPP 1844 II: 27, 50-51 [Doc B28]; Brodie, State of New Zealand, 45-55.

50. Brodie's testimony, pp. 28-30. [Doc B28]

51. Brodie, State of New Zealand, p. 21-22, 36, 40-42. - 76 -

VI. OLD LAND CLAIMS COMMISSIONS 1840 - 1860

Neither Panakareao, in signing the Treaty of Waitangi at Kaitaia, nor Walter Brodie, who witnessed the debate about its meaning on 5 February 1840, understood that the Crown not only reserved to itself the right to purchase Maori land, but also included in that right the power to invalidate previous land purchases. The Crown exercised that power on 19 January 1840, when George Gipps, the Governor of New South Wales, issued the Land Titles Validity Proclamation. At Hobson's request, the Colonial Office drafted the proclamation which stated that no title to land in New Zealand was valid unless derived from the o Crown, that Commissioners would be appointed to investigate past purchases and that henceforth private purchases of Maori

land were illegal. 1

On 30 January 1840, before obtaining Maori consent to the annexation of New Zealand at Waitangi, Hobson proclaimed himself Lieutenant-Governor of New Zealand. In this capacity he then read the Land Titles Validity Proclamation to the British residents assembled at the small mission church at Kororareka, Bay of Islands. 2

The imperial government's policy towards the so-called

'Old Land Claims' derived from ~olonial Secretary Lord Normanby's final instructions to Hobson on 14 August 1839. In these instructions Normanby stressed the "indisputable" Maori "title to the soil and to the sovereignty of New Zealand •... " He instructed Hobson to negotiate a treaty with Maori chiefs which explicitly transferred pre-emption rights to the Crown. 3 The purpose of pre-emption was partly to protect Maori from Pakeha land sharks, but also to provide the Crown with sufficient revenue from resale of land to Pakeha settlers to allow it both to administer the colony and to finance planned colonisation. 4 Recognising that many highly questionable land sales would have preceded annexation, Normanby informed Hobson that he would instruct Gipps to --: I '.', "U'_'~.'''':'\.~''.'':'',_,,~:-_''::' ~.""

- 77 -

appoint Commissioners to investigate land claims. On rece~v~ng the report of the Commissioner, the Governor would decide which claims could be confirmed by the issue of a Crown grant. The extent and conditions of each grant would also be decided by

the Governor. 5

Hobson's contact with Sydney merchants and land speculators confirmed his belief in the necessity of setting up a land claims commission in New Zealand. On 10 January 1840, a group of land claimants, including Ranulph Dacre, the first Pakeha to purchase land at Mangonui, met with Hobson in Sydney. During the meeting Hobson apparently assured the deputation that the commission would recognise all equitable land claims in New Zealand after proper investigation. This assurance o encouraged the claimants to present Hobson with a congratulatory memorial addressed to "His Excellency Captain Hobson, RN, Lieutenant-Governor of the British Colony about to be established at New Zealand" at a second Sydney meeting on 15 January. 6

When Gipps issued the Land Titles Validity Proclamation four days later, the land claimants were less congratulatory. They argued that Gipps's assertion of authority over a country outside the British Empire was illegal. In the opinion of leading Sydney lawyers, to whom they referred the matter, bona fide land purchases in a foreign country made prior to the date

of Gipps's proclamation could~ot be invalidated. 7 This, of course, did not stop Hobson from acting upon the Proclamation in New Zealand, but it did oblige Gipps to give his proclamation statutory authority with the passage of his Land Claims Act by the New South Wales Legislative Council in August 1840.

New Zealand land claimants James Busby and William Wentworth attempted, without success, to defeat this bill. Wentworth tried to amend it in such a way that it could not apply to any pre-annexation land claims. 8 The Land Claims Act declared that "all titles to land in New Zealand which are not - 78 -

or may not hereafter be allowed by Her Majesty are and shall be absolutely null and void" and empowered the Governor of New South Wales to appoint Commissioners who were to be "guided by

the real justice and good conscience of the case. "9 The relevant principles of political economy were spelt out in section 5 of the Act. The Commissioners were to inquire into the original price paid to Maori vendors, but were strictly forbidden to take into consideration the price which may have been paid by any subsequent purchasers. The value of the land, then, was taken to be different from the purchase price. 10

The terms of the Act deliberately favoured long term residents at the expense of the speculators who tried to cash in on the 1839 land rush. A schedule limiting acreage to be o granted to 2,560 acres also increased the value of land for speculators, especially non-resident speculators. Thus a speculator like Brodie was supposed to pay approximately five to ten times more per acre in 1839 than the CMS were expected to pay for Kaitaia land in 1834.

Time when the Purchases Per acre were made s. d. s. d.

1815 - 1824 0 6 1825 - 1829 0 6 to 0 8 1830 - 1834 0 8 to 1 0 1835 - 1836 1 0 to 2" 0 1837 - 1838 2 0 to 4 0 1839 4 0 to 8 0

And fifty per cent. above these rates for persons not personally resident in New Zealand or not having a resident agent on the spot. Goods when given to the natives in barter for land to be estimated at three times their selling price in Sydney at the time. 11

When New Zealand became a Crown Colony separate from New South Wales in May 1841, Hobson proclaimed a Land Claims Ordinance to replace this Act. 12 Hobson added to the Act specific reference to the Crown's right of pre-emption already included in Article II of the Treaty of Waitangi and later included as clause 73 of the New Zealand Constitution which introduced representative government in 1854. - 79 -

Hobson's 1841 ordinance also paved the way for the Crown to acquire 'surplus lands', the difference between the amount of land claimed and that awarded upon the recommendation of the Commission. 13 Although Hobson continued to recognize Maori title to their unoccupied or 'waste land', he did not recognize their title to land sold to Pakeha. Hobson's land claims ordinance stated

That all unappropriated lands within the said Colony of New Zealand, subject however to the rightful and necessary occupation and use thereof by the aboriginal inhabitants of the said Colony, are and remain Crown or Domain Lands of Her Majesty ... and that all titles to land in the said Colony of New Zealand which are held or claimed by virtue of purchases or pretended purchases gifts or pretended gifts conveyances or pretended o conveyances leases or pretended leases agreements or other titles, either mediately or immediately from the chiefs or other individuals or individual of the aboriginal tribes inhabiting said Colony, and which are not or may not hereafter be allowed by Her Majesty, her heirs and successors, are and the same shall be absolutely null and void. 14

Thus in 1841 the Crown had laid the legal groundwork for acquiring thousands of acres of surplus land which Maori believed should have been returned to them. By mid 1843 Commissioner Godfrey had recommended awards of only 29,600 of the 199,200 acres claimed by Pakeha north of Auckland. His awards, therefore, represented about 20 percent of the total area claimed, so that the Crown could have acquired about 80 percent.15 While this action may have been an indignity to Pakeha claimants, to Maori it was the beginning of a pattern of injustice.

Captain Edward Godfrey's 1843 Land Commission proceedings were to have a profound impact on the history of northern New Zealand. In January and February 1843, he investigated claims to land in Muriwhenua. He was definitely not equipped for this task, having served in the British Army for 19 years before arriving in New South Wales in 1839. He lacked both legal skills and knowledge of New Zealand when Gipps appointed him as - 80 -

Land Titles Commissioner in September 1840. 16

Godfrey's terms of reference for his Land Commission investigation were contained both within sections of the 1841 Land Claims Ordinance and in the New Zealand Colonial Secretary's undated instructions to Land Commissioners. The ordinance allowed Commissioners to be "guided by the real justice of_ the case without regard to legal forms and solemnities" and to obtain "the best evidence they can procure" whether or not this was verifiable evidence. The Colonial Secreatary instructed Godfrey to notify all interested parties, fourteen days in advance, of the particulars of each and every claim by publishing these particulars in the Government Gazette. Godfrey was to conduct his proceedings in public, with the proviso that he could conduct some closed sittings if circumstances warranted.it. "In summoning and examining Witnesses, recording Evidence, and in every other step of their procedure," Commissioners were to "govern themselves strictly by the directions contained in the Ordinance." The trouble was that there were no "strict ... directions" in the Ordinance, because it had dispensed with "legal forms" without identifying alternative forms, such as those governing a regular commission _of enquiry. 17

ConsequentlYi Godfrey's hearings at Mangonui and Kaitaia were remakable for their lack of formality or attention to procedural matters. Since few newspapers or handbills reached the Far North, his prior announcement of the time and place of these hearings had to be communicated largely by word of mouth. Consequently, only a small proportion of the total number of claimants, and an even smaller proportion of Maori directly involved in each sale, appeared before Godfrey. When claimants appeared before Godfrey with their deeds, he would casually examine them and ask the claimant to describe the transaction in his own words. He would then ask Maori sellers and witnesses, if they were present at the hearing, to give their version of the transaction. If they did not appear before him, he had no power to subpoena them, and he would simply not get - 81 -

the Maori side of the story.18 On the basis of this haphazard proceeding, without compiling anything like a complete record of the oral evidence submitted, Godfrey recommended an award to the Governor. Once the Governor accepted this recommendation, he could issue a crown grant. The Crown could acquire the area claimed, but not granted, as surplus land. The situation regarding surplus land remained confused, however, because what the Crown could do, and what it did do, were often two entirely different things.

In reality, crown grants in Muriwhenua recommended by Godfrey, which amounted to less than 20 percent of the acreage claimed, were postponed until after the arrival of Governor FitzRoy in late 1843. Under instructions from Lord Stanley, who o believed Godfrey had been too generous to Pakeha, FitzRoy then conducted a reinvestigation. In March 1844 FitzRoy appointed Robert FitzGerald as a Special Commissioner of Land Claims to assist him in reviewing the evidence collected by Commissioners Godfrey, Richmond, and Spain. FitzRoy altered Godfrey's recommended awards without troubling himself to conduct a rehearing. 19 In the cases of CMS missionaries James Davis, Joseph Matthews, William Potter, and Richard Taylor, FitzRoy confirmed the Godfrey recommendations, but in the case of Walter Brodie he reduced it by almost 50 percent. In the cases of Joseph Matthews, William Puckey, and Henry Southee, who had invested in developing farms on their land, FitzRoy awarded them more than Godfrey's recommended number of acres.

Also under instructions from Stanley, FitzRoy introduced awards of scrip to allow claimants in remote areas such as Muriwhenua to exchange their awards there for crown grants elsewhere. Scrip allowed the Crown to induce claimants to move out of predominantly Maori areas, where claims were more likely to be disputed, closer to Pakeha settlement where they could receive,grants within the large area of surplus land. Since FitzRoy considered Mangonui and Oruru a disputed area, he offered 13 claimants there scrip valued at almost 13,000 pounds. The most significant offer, which was accepted, was I - , - , , , '" "~' .. '_-._'. >~,.~<--"--l~',, ',{\."" ""~''':: '.:->...." '.~,. ":"."';,-,-,'\.'~ "- "·':'~"·~-·'-·~.'~-"~H..n;o-'·:'"-""-:'-''''''''''''··'-~''--'"'C...~~':.'::>~.:2:.::i':::''D-::''''':·,.2:~~~-~~:.;..:._~'~~~;_~--

- 82 -

that of 1,725 pounds to Samuel Ford for his disputed land at Oruru. He also issued Southee 3,200 pounds in scrip to enable him to pay his debts. 20

Although FitzRoy's revisions of the original Godfrey recommendations gave them greater consistency, the final awards and exchanges of scrip were still chaotic. For example, in 1843 Godfrey qualified many of his recommendations in Muriwhenua with the words "excepting parts not sold by the natives," but he made no attempt to determine which parts of the land had been transferred or not transferred, and neither did FitzRoy. Moreover, many of FitzRoy's crown grants were issued to claimants who had not presented the government with surveyed plans of their land, and James Davis, Joseph Matthews, William o Potter, Richard Taylor, William Puckey, and Henry Southee, all saw their crown grants to unsurveyed land cancelled during the late 1850s.

This long drawn out and confused process created a considerable amount of bitterness among land claimants. To them many of the government's decisions appeared contradictory and arbitrary. In an attempt to ameliorate settler discontent, Governor Grey proclaimed the Quieting Titles Ordinance in 1849 which offered settlers some compensation for land where Commissioners found "Native title" had not been fully extinguished. 21 In May 1856 the House of Representatives appointed a Select Committee to consider the nature and extent of outstanding land claims. At this stage, there were still a number of claims in the Far North which the Government had not settled to the satisfaction of the claimants. The Select Committee agreed that there needed to be a court or tribunal with the power to investigate, hear, determine, and finally adjust and settle all outstanding land claims. The committee recommended the establishment of a Court of Land Claims, from which there could be no appeal, and laid down procedures that the Commissioners were to follow. It further recommended that no awards be made without proper surveys of the land, and that Court should investigate conflicting Maori and Pakeha land '.'. ',,' ,\. ',. ',~-,:.J,... ,,".. -,,-~, ",' ,'" ', •. , , ,

- 83 -

claims.22

The Land Claims Settlement Act of 1856 incorporated most of these recommendations.It provided for the appointment of Land Claims Commissioners with the power to investigate and validate or invalidate existing Crown Grants, and to order survey liens on unsurveyed land if necessary. If the claimant could not afford to pay survey fees, the Crown would acquire that proportion of his land necessary to pay these expenses. 23 The act also provided for an enquiry into the land claims of children of marriages between Maori women and Pakeha men, such as those of James Berghan of Mangonui. 24

The man appointed Land Claims Commissioner in 1856, o Francis Dillon Bell, was much better equipped to adjudicate than his predecessor, Godfrey. Bell, a fluent Maori speaker, had some legal training and the experience of a member of the House of Representatives. At his Mangonui hearings on 3-6 October, he investigated the outstanding land claims of Richard Matthews, the children of James Berghan, the Church Missionary Society, Joseph Matthews, William Puckey, Samuel Ford, William Maxwell, George Stephenson, James Berghan, George Thomas and Thomas Phillips, Clement Partridge, Thomas Flavell, the Catholic Mission, and John Smith. 25 The promptness of Bell's awards depended on how quickly the claimant provided a survey of the claim. william puckey, who produced a survey at the hearing, was issued a crown grant on 31 October 1857, whereas Joesph Matthews, who sent Bell a survey in September 1858, received his crown grant on 31 January 1859. 26

The process Bell followed in the settlement of claims can be illustrated by examining the way he adjudicated Joseph Matthews's claims. FitzRoy had issued Matthews three Crown Grants totalling 2,200 acres in 1844 and 1845. In the absence of a survey, Bell regarded these grants invalid. Because Matthews could not afford the required survey, Bell ordered a survey lien and calculated the award as follows.

The survey of the whole claim shows the extent to be - 84 -

10,451 acres. Claimant is accordingly entitled to: On old grant 2,200 acres Add one sixth 366 acres Survey allowance on 10,451 acres 1,567 acres Fees allowance _---'6"-4~ ac res 4,197 acres

Out of the total due to Matthews, Bell transferred 659 acres to William Clarke as payment for his surveying services. Accordingly, Bell issued Crown Grants totalling 3,538 acres to Matthews.

As a result of the Joseph Matthews settlement, the Crown acquired 5,914 acres of surplus land, the difference between o the total area surveyed and the final award. After the conclusion of Bell's Commission, approximately 33,000 acres of surplus land reverted to the Crown in Muriwhenua. 27 Although Bell could hardly be faulted for the thoroughness with which he conducted his investigation, and the procedural correctness which he followed in ordering liens and issuing awards, his Commission brought to the surface once more the burning issue of surplus land.

Surplus land had been an issue since cryptic references to it in Hobson's 1841 land claims ordinance (see above). The CMS opposed the reversion of surplus land to the Crown stating that it was hardly just to take land away from settlers on the grounds that they had improperly acquired it from Maori and then hold onto it instead of returning it to Maori. 28 After considerable debate at the Colonial Office, Stanley decided to justify and enforce the Crown's right to appropriate surplus land. He wrote to FitzRoy on 26 June 1843:

It is assumed, that neither on the ground of inadequacy of price, nor on any other ground, could the former proprietors of the land require the land to be set aside. But it is at the same time supposed, that the land then acquired exceeded the limitation which defines the extent of land to be holden by any European under a title originally derived from the aborigines. The question then is, who is the proprietor of the excess? ;:-,.c,o" ;:., .. ~, .. ,- .. '

- 85 -

To that question it must be answered, that by the terms of the supposition, the purchaser is not the proprietor; and that the hypothesis being that the claims of the aboriginal sellers have been justly extinguished, they are no longer the proprietors. Hence the consequence seems immediately to follow, that the property in the excess is vested in the Sovereign, as representing and protecting the interests of society at large. In other words, such land would become available for the purpose of sale and settlement. 29

Clearly, Stanley hoped that surplus land would provide revenue for administration and colonisation. However, he realised that

Maori would not accept this decision without protest. Thus, h~ advised FitzRoy "to deal with the original proprietors with the utmost tenderness, and even to humour their wishes, so far as it can be done, compatibly with the other and higher interests o over which your office will require you to watch." 30 Predictably, Stanley's decision to retain surplus land "seriously shook" Maori confidence in the Crown. 31 At the signing of the Treaty at Waitangi, Hobson and Busby assured chiefs that "all lands unjustly held " would revert to Maori ownership, and Panakareao, too, believed this after discussing the impact of the treaty with Shortland and the missionaries at Kaitaia. FitzRoy was so convinced that Stanley was greatly misguided in his surplus land policy that, according to Adams, he "disobeyed his instructions on this point to forestall Maori opposition. ,,32

Generations of Maori people therefore saw the Crown's acquisition of surplus land as a major injustice. Many Maori would most probably have been more or less content had the claimants obtained title to the whole area described in the deed, provided, of course, that the Maori understanding of the sale prevailed. Maori viewed a land transaction "as the first step in a long-term personal relationship between the tribe and the purchaser, where both would have continuing obligations to each other through subsequent generations".33 Maori believed that surplus land was a clear violation of their treaty guaranteed right to retain their taonga, which included their - 86 -

relationships with their Pakeha wards ..To Maori, land rights could be obtained only by direct participation in a transaction. It could therefore not be claimed by a third party. Maori asked how could the Crown claim land which they had not purchased? 34 Panakareao stated at Kaitaia in May 1840 that the government would not take Maori land (which included that in joint occupancy) without payment.35

A number of settlers, as well as the CMS, supported Maori on the question of surplus land. In 1840 Dieffenbach stated that surplus land should revert to Maori. In his 1842 book New Zealand: Its Advantages and Prospects as a British Colony, Charles Terry argued that surplus land should be retained by the Maori grantor and still be open to disposal to CL) the Crown. 36 Giving evidence before the 1844 House of Commons Committee on New Zealand, Walter Brodie stated that the government had no right to take land which Maori people acknowledged had been properly transferred to Pakeha. 37

Due, in part, to Maori opposition, the government initially failed to sell or lease surplus land. The question came to a crisis in May 1843 over the property of the CMS catechist William Fairburn. He claimed 40,000 acres in the Tamaki area, but the Land Claims Commissioners only awarded him 2,560 acres. The Government had great difficulty in cashing in on the surplus land from the much reduced Fairburn award even though its proximity to Auckland should have made it a valuable piece of property. Not until May 1843, was the government able to lease some of the land to a Mr Terry who wanted to set up a flax milling operation. 38 Local Maori, however, would not let Terry onto the land, declaring "that they had not sold their land to the Government but to Mr Fairburn; he alone had a right to it, and if Mr Fairburn had told him that he might go there well and good, but in the event of Mr Fairburn's claim being disallowed the land must return to them the original owners."39 The government immediately sent a Protector of Aborigines to defuse the situation. According to Brodie, he was able to moderate Maori opposition by "a little money and plenty - 87 -

of promises". 40

However, this did not resolve the issue. In October 1844 FitzRoy reported that, although he had pacified local Maori dissatisfied with the Fairburn surplus land, this specific grievance had even "raised a commotion among the Waikato tribes, which caused great alarm, but was hushed up, although they were then so irritated, as to be on the point of rising against the local Government. ,,41 By this tlme, FitzRoy told Stanley that selling surplus land was impossible because "the natives would never have allowed it to take effect; and the attempt to do so would have injured the character of the Queen's Government very seriously, if not irretrievably, so tenacious are the natives of what they consider to be strict justice." He concluded: "as yet it is quite impossible to make o them comprehend our strictly legal view of such cases."42

Generations of Maori people in Muriwhenua protested the Crown's retention of surplus land, but their protests were often muffled by general confusion about what the Crown claimed as surplus land. For example, the Crown never claimed 50,000 acres of Taylor's Muriwhenua North purchase even though it could have done so legally. In February 1843, Te Rarawa chiefs demanded that surplus land be returned to the original proprietor. 43 At Bell's October 1857 hearings at Mangonui, "the whole question was gone into with the natives respecting the surplus reverting to the Crown. ,,44 In April 1885, H W Bishop, the Resident Magistrate of the Mangonui district, reported that surplus land was "a matter which has been for some time past attracting the attention in every direction among the Natives". They hoped to "recover possession of these lands and in some cases considerable sums of money have been collected in order to enable these claims to be prosecuted. ,,45

Government surplus land policy compounded a situation in which the Crown denied the existence of a distinctively Maori kind of land transfer. The Land Claims Commissioners treated all land sales as the complete, or absolute, alienation of - 88 -

property. This flew in the face of the fact that most pre-treaty land transfers were limited, not complete, conditional, not absolute. Far from alienating the seller from the land, Maori land transfers either incorporated the purchaser into the tribe, or sealed a political alliance. 46 Some deeds of sale explicitly protected Maori rights of occupation and cultivation, and almost all implied a continuing relationship between buyer and seller.

The land commissions by treating land transfer as alienation, contributed to severing the human relationship between Maori and Pakeha. Once land had passed through the Land Commissions, the purchasers were freed from all tribal obligations. With a Crown Grant, Pakeha could mortgage, Q subdivide, or resell land without reference to the needs and wishes of local Maori. In some cases land commissioners attempted to replace pre-treaty joint occupancy agreements with "native reserves", but these reserves violated the essence of those agreements. Joint occupancy was designed to integrate Pakeha into Maori society, while reserves sought to segregate Maori within Pakeha society. Finally, "there was no full enquiry by the Land Claims Commissioners as to who had the right to sell, whether absolute sales were intended at all, or

whether lands unjustly held should be returned. ,,47 The land commissions virtually ignored the realities of Maori land tenure in their determination to transform it into Pakeha land tenure.

The following list and map of Old Land Claims illustrates the scale and distribution of the private transactions during the 1830s, and how the Land Claims Commissioners set the tone for the major Crown land purchases of the 1850s and 60s. The list of claims reveals a total acreage of 123,791 acres claimed (approximately 20 percent of the total land area). Of the area claimed, 20,213 acres (or 16.3 percent of claimed acreage) was awarded to private Pakeha

landowners, and the Crown acquired 32,524 acres (or 26~2 percent of claimed acreage) as surplus land. Only 786 acres of the total (or 0.06 percent) was reserved for Maori use. 0,,--/

OLD LAND CLAIMS - MURIWHENUA

DATE OF PURCHASE CLAIMANT SCHEDULE NO. AREA CLAIMED AWARD SURVEY MAORI RESERVES SURPLUS

November 1831 RanuLph Dacre 155 5000 acres disaLLowed 21 June 1837 James Davis 160 1000 acres 466 acres 4880 acres '4414 acres 20 JuLy 1835 Joseph Matthews 328 1400 acres 2449 acres 3134 acres 685 acres 14 November 1839 ------329 800 acres 1748 acres 7317 acres 340 acres 5229 acres 6 May 1839* Richard Matthews 330 3000 acres 1183 acres 1750 acres 567 acres 27 December 1839 William Potter 382 1200 acres L 130 scrip 20 January 1840 Richard TayLor 458 50000 acres 1704 acres 1704 acres 23 November 1839 John Reid 395 40 acres disallowed 14 May 1836* Thomas Ryan 403-407 2280 acres 3 acres, L3042 scrip 4 January 1840* Thomas Spicer 443 2000 acres claim withdrawn 14 May 1836* James Berghan 558-566 4600 acres 1862 acres 4600 acres 2737 acres 3 January 1840 WaLter Brodie 570 1200 acres 947 1/2 acres 1326 acres 378 1/2 acres 1 November 1836* George Thomas and Thomas PhilLips 617-623 3750 acres 1288 acres 1108 acres 2462 acres (X) 17 March 1834* CMS 675 2000 acres 1470 acres 1727 acres 257 acres '0 November 1839 SamueL Ford 704 5000 acres L1725 scrip 8280 acres 11 September 1839 ------705 3000 acres 2627 acres 5653 acres 1839 Jean Bernard 751-752 disaLLowed May 1838 AB Victor de Sentis 770 disallowed 20 JuLy 1835 Will iam Puckey 774 1500 acres 2581 acres 1455 acres 19 December 1839 ------775 800 acres 765 acres 246 acres 1835 ------776 cLaim withdrawn 1836* WilLiam Murphy 847-849 702 acres L 215 scrip November 1839 CharLes OLman 850 60 acres L 83 scrip 26 October 1836* Stephen WrathaLL 851-856 9800 acres L 640 scrip 17 September 1839 Henry Sou thee 875-877 10000 acres L3200 scrip 13684 acres 200 acres 8560 acres November 1839 Hibernia Smyth 887-888 1100 acres L 500 scrip 15 October 1839* Clement Partridge 889-893 9000 acres L2310 scrip JuLy 1839 WiL l iam Wright 894-895 20 acres L 71 scrip c 22 November 1838* Wi Ll i am But ler 913-914 3640 acres L1054 scrip ~; c 8 January 1840 John Ryder 1025 200 acres 120 acres ,f 1842 George Stephenson 1294 699 acres 1000 acres 2842 acres 1482 acres ?~

ft/ r.~ , TOTALS 123,791 acres 20213 acres L12,970 53809 acres 786 acres 32524 acres 1:

B~ )~ KEY Source: OLC 1/155-1294; Appendix to the Report 1,:;f:. of the Land Claims Commissioner, AJHR 1863 D-14 ~. the date of the first of the claimant's purchases L pounds * ~. l. ' ::: - 90 -

Map 7 OLD LAND CLAIMS 1840-1860

Maori Reserves

I. Pukepo+o 2. Woi("wl)oni 3. Okokori

KEY !llI Cro\.ln Grants10 Pakeha BLonds Revedecl10 Maori [J Surplus +0 Old Land Cloims II Lands Rfse(veci fo Maori

Source: Dept. Survey & Land Information, NZMS 261 (Waitangi Tribunal Division, 1989) - 91 -

The tiny Maori reserves at Pukepoto, Waimanoni, and Okokori were all that remained from the joint occupancy agreements of the 1830s (see Map 7 "Old Land Claims" above). Although Pakeha landowners received only 16 percent of acreage claimed, Map 7 reveals how these grants centred on the economically valuable Kaitaia Valley. The less economically valuable Muriwhenua North (or Taylor's claim) reverted to Maori ownership, until it too passed into private Pakeha ownership in 1873. With this historical and geographic background in mind, the following section examines a small number of representative claims in detail to give a more specific indication of the impact the operation of the Land Claims Commissions had upon Pakeha and Maori people in Muriwhenua during the 1840s and the C) 1850s.

Mangatete/James Davis When Godfrey visited Kaitaia in 1843, James Davis, a member of the missionary community, claimed, through his agent William Puckey, a 1,000 acres Mangatete block. Davis, however, believed this block contained 4,000-5,000 acres. 48 Maori did not dispute his claim. Taua, the sole seller, and Henare Popota, a witness to the sale, confirmed his right to sell the block, when they appeared before Godfrey.49

Since Davis had not been able to obtain a survey of his Grant, Bell required this in 1857. Due to Maori opposition, the surveyor was able to cover only 535 acres, from which he took his new grant. In order to allow the rest of the block to be surveyed, and transferred to the Crown, Bell instructed W B White, the Resident Magistrate, to negotiate with the Maori opponents of the Grant. While White did secure their agreement to allow the block to be surveyed, subsequent events showed that local Maori were not reconciled to the transfer of 4,414 acres of surplus land to the Crown.

In 1877, when the Native Land Court sought to define the boundaries of adjacent Maori land, Davis became an ardent supporter of the Crown's retention of all its Mangatete surplus - 92 -

land. He urged the Department of Lands to resist any attempt to have any part this land returned to Maori ownership. However, in a letter to a departmental officer, William Webster, he provided an indication of how Maori viewed pre-treaty sales. He referred to how the Mangatete people " ... owned my right as they have always done but not the right of the Government .... "50 In other words, in 1877, Davis still considered his rights to Mangatete as "owned" or acknowledged by Maori, but that Maori had not acknowledged the absolute right of the government. Mangatete Maori, however, could not communicate their understanding of the nature of the sale and the obligations which may have been placed on Davis as a purchaser. Davis went on to suggest that Mangatete surplus land be leased to his C) nephew Herbert Matthews. He implied that keeping the block in the family would be politically advisable and allow the Crown to maintain title with the least difficulty.

During the 1880s, Mangatete became part of a legal conflict between the Crown and Muriwhenua tribes over the whole issue of surplus lands. In 1880 a survey was made for Te Rarawa of the Taipaku and Pukewha blocks in an attempt to gain Maori title through the Native Land Court. Both blocks were entirely within the boundaries of the Mangetete surplus land. Lands Department had agreed to the survey in the mistaken belief that the lands being claimed were south of the Mangatete River and therefore outside the Mangatete block. A hurried series of telegrams passed between a number o,f Government officials and Judge Symonds of the Native Land Court. Eventually Symonds refused to hear the case. S Percy Smith, the Chief Surveyor concluded, There is no doubt whatever that the Native claims are within the surplus land, .further, I think that enquiry in the district would bring out the fact that they were perfectly well aware of this fact when sending in the claims to the Court. The maps were both marked by me 'Surplus land of the Crown' .... My opinion is that this is an attempt to again raise the question of the validity of the Crown's title to the "Surplus Lands", a question which is constantly cropping up and giving rise to endless trouble. 51 - 93 -

parapara-Raramata/Joseph Matthews Joseph Matthews purchased the Parapara block extending to Doubtless Bay from Panakareao and others in November 1839. The block included an inland section of approximately 4,000 acres (Parapara), and a coastal section (Raramata) of approximately 3,000 acres. The deed of sale stated that "ten

~cres of Raramata for Mr Matthews, the remainder for the Natives."52 Appearing before Godfrey in January 1843, Panakareao said "Mr Matthews has but a small portion of Raramata - the remainder of that place belongs to the natives still."53 Matthews received a crown granf for 306 1/2 acres there in October 1844. After Matthews wrote to FitzRoy in June 1845 requesting as extension to the award, he received a c) further crown grant for 493 1/2 acres in December 1845. 54

Te Wiremu Papahia, the son of a Te Rarawa chief, disputed the Parapara sale in 1855, claiming that Matthews had failed to recognise his father's right to part of the land. He recommended that the Government remedy this oversight on the part of Matthews through the payment of some form of compensation. 55 There is no evidence that the Government ever responded to Papahia's request or that he ever received any compensation from Matthews.

The first Crown grant issued to Joseph Matthews in October 1844 stipulated that Raramata be reserved for local Maori. When he appeared before Bell in October 1857, Matthews stated that he was "desirous in performance of my provisions to the Natives, the whole of the land between the Raramata (or Awapoka) River and Te Pikanga should be given up as a Reserve for their use."56 According to Bell, Matthews was "very anxious to return to the natives the 3000 acre block north of the Raramata river, having about 5 miles frontage to the beach." Bell, -however, on the advice of Maori occupants, "declined to accede to this."57 Within the 7,317 Parapara block, Bell set aside only 340 acres as a Maori reserve because Maori agreed to claim only about 10 percent of what Matthews - 94 -

was prepared to grant them, while 5,229 acres reverted to the Crown as surplus land in 1859. The reasons Maori voluntarily reduced the size of their reserves apparently had something to do with wahi tapu on the land which contained the bones of many of their ancestors.

Mangonui/Thomas, Ryan Thomas Ryan's small claims in the vicinity of Mangonui illustrate how the Government could use the issue of scrip to avoid potential land disputes. Due to the dispute between Te Rarawa and Ngapuhi over the right to sell land at Mangonui, Godfrey recommended scrip in the settlement of Thomas Ryan's claims. Since Gilbert Mair, the Bay of Islands merchant, held a mortgage on Ryan's land, he received scrip for $1500. Ryan, however, refused the Government's scrip offer. The Government then refused his request for a crown grant. 58

In 1850, Captain William Butler, to whom Ryan had transferred his claims, obtained permiSSion from the government to have certain portions of land contained in Ryan's claims put up for sale. Butler later purchased these parcels of land at a government auction. In the settlement of claim 407, which was within the area required for the township of Mangonui, W.B. White recommended that Butler should receive a grant for three acres on the east side of the Mangonui harbour. Bell subsequently issued Ryan a grant for three acres at Waikiekie or Mangonui township within which Ryan subsequently conveyed a small area to Bishop Pompallier as the site for a Catholic church. 59

Both Bell and White assumed that Godfrey recommended scrip exchanges for Mangonui land after examining the validity of title, but such was not the case. Therefore the Crown, after the l840s, proceeded on the basis of a false assuption by treating scrip exchanges as indicating valid, that is examined, Pakeha title. The most important of Ryan's claims so far as the Government was concerned were those on the east side of the Mangonui harbour on land claimed by Pororua. The Government, - 95 -

anxious to avoid antagonising Pororua any further than it had already done in the Oruru dispute, persuaded Ryan to accept scrip for these claims. By accepting Ryan's title without examining it, Bell and White proceeded to negotiate a very ambiguous purchase of the entire area of almost 20,000 acres, the so-called Mangonui block, from Pororua in 1863. This purchase, however, was flawed in two respects. It accepted Ryan's scrip exchange as proof of valid title and it failed to distinguish between other OLe and Maori lands.

Ohoto/William. Puc key Perhaps the first explicit joint occupancy agreement negotiated between Maori and Pakeha was that between Panakareao and Puc key at Ohoto in the vicinity of Kaitaia in 1835. In 1840, Panakareao, deeming the original purchase price of 20 pounds cash for this land insufficient, extracted from Puckey a further payment of goods to the value of $84.10.0.60 This was consistent with the Maori view that an agreement should be open to renegotiation if the conditions affecting it should change. The 1835 deed of sale clearly stated that although the land was transferred to Puckey Maori rights to reside on the land were to be preserved. When he appeared before Godfrey in 1843, Puckey stated that the deed was worded so as to guarantee Maori possession of as much land as they required for their cultivations.61

Nonetheless, in his statement, Joseph Matthews, a witness to the sale, indicated that the missionary view of joint occupancy had changed. He told Godfrey that the "term placed in the deed 'for the use of the Natives also' was explained to them to be 'on sufferance. ,.,62 However, Panakareao's view of the situation had not changed. He told Godfrey "the Natives are allowed to live and cultivate upon this land but are prohibited from selling or alienating any part of it."63 When Bell investigated this again in 1857, Puckey requested that a permanent reserve be allocated, although the reserve was originally meant to revert to himself on the death of the Maori occupants. 64 With the agreement of - 96 -

Puhipi, the reserve was set at 246 acres. Such a reserve was a poor substitute for the extensive joint occupancy rights contained in the original 1835 agreement.

Awanui /Hem::y Southee and William Maxwell Southee's 1839 Awanui deed of sale stipulated that Te Rarawa could reside on the banks of the river. Panakareao and the other Te Rarawa sellers required this, and Joseph Matthews confirmed this as a witness to the sale in his statement before Godfrey in January 1843.65 Southee, perhaps to pay his accumulating debts, sold part of this land to Maxwell in 1843, and mortgaged another part to William Powditch. In June 1846 the Government issued scrip to both Powditch and another of Southees creditors, took 8,560 acres of surplus land from Southee's original claim, and allowed him to retain 500 acres of land at and immediately around his dwelling and cultivations.66 This left Maxwell and Southee as the only European claimants to the block.

Southee died in September 1854 before any survey could be made to confirm his 1846 award. During 1853 relations between Maxwell and Te Rarawa began to deteriote. Maxwell attempted to use his unsurveyed 2560 acre award to assert control over the whole block. The precise location of Maxwell's grant was unclear, and he asserted his rights over the whole area of 10,000 acres. In October 1857 Maxwell and some Te Rarawa chiefs agreed to have a reserve of 200 acres set aside and to fulfill the requirements of the deed of sale and the 1843 award. While Maxwell maintained that there were no Maori objections to his claim, Ahipara chiefs consistently objected to Maxwell's claim. 67 So intense were Maori disputes over the block that William Clarke, the surveyor, had to make three trips to Awanui to complete the survey.68

Maori anger over Maxwell's behaviour was probably heightened by the memory of their cordial relations with Southee. In February 1859 Maxwell informed Bell that he had promised Henry Southee's illegitimate, half caste son 500 acres - 97 -

of land. Henry Southee Jnr. was a seaman whose whereabouts was unknown. Maxwell's generosity towards him was probably an attempt to improve his relations with Maori. Bell agreed to the further grant, and issued the grant in Maxwell's name, but required him to transfer the 500 acres to Southee immediately on his return. This was done in March 1862. In July 1862, Bell granted Maxwell 26 acres, a subdivision allowance.

To add a further dimension to Maori dissatisfaction, in 1858 Puhipi Te Ripi, the most influential Te Rarawa chief after Panakareao's death, intervened. He challenged the sale of a portion of the block between Kaikino and the West Coast. He was bitterly offended by Awanui Maori who knocked him down while he attempted to recover a stolen theodolyte. As compensation Puhipi demanded 200 acres. For obviou.s political reasons, White promised Puhipi a reserve of 200 acres from the surplus land.69

White, however, failed to deliver this 200 acres. Puhipi believed he owned the block, and it was only 30 years later that his son found that no title had ever been awarded. During the late 1880s, Timoti Puhipi also discovered that 26 acres of land within the block had apparently been awarded to Francis Dart Fenton, Chief Judge of the Native Land Court from 1865 to 1881, in 1861. Puhipi demanded that he be given title to the block promised to his father. The Commissioner of Crown Lands replied that this was "the first I have heard of the claim, and there are no documents in the Office."70 Since Bell confirmed Fenton's award, the Commissioner refused to comply with Timoti Puhipi's request. He advised Puhipi to try the Native Department, but held out little hope that the claim would be upheld. 71 There the matter rested.

The settlement of Southee's claims took an awfully long time. The sale to Southee occurred in 1839, before the Treaty of Waitangi, but the final awards of Dillon Bell's Land Claims Commission were not made until 1859, twenty years later. In the meantime much changed in the relationship between Maori and - 98 -

Pakeha, all of which can be seen as dramatically altering the way the original transactions may have been seen by both Maori and Pakeha. When Southee purchased rights to the original block, he did so through his close relationship to the Maori occupants, a relationship confirmed by marriage and several years trading. By 1859 the situation had changed dramatically. In the country as a whole, the demographic and political balance had shifted in favour of Pakeha who extended direct or indirect political control over most areas of New Zealand by the Crown's land purchase policies and by the introduction of settler self-government with a franchise that effectively excluded all Maori.

REFERENCES

1. A.H.McLintock, Crown Colony Government in New Zealand, (Wellington 1958) pp.54-55.

2. R.Tonk, "The First New Zealand Land Commissions, 1840-1845," MA thesis, University of Canterbury, 1986, pp.13-14.

3. Normanby to Hobson, 14 August 1839, CO 209/5, pp.251-256. P.Adams, Fatal Necessity, pp.14-15, 239-41.

4. R.Tonk, "Land Commissions", p.14.

5. Ibid., p. 15 .

6. A.H.McLintock, Crown Colony Government, p.54.

7. Ibid.

8. R.Tonk, "Land Commissions," p.22.

9. E.T.Healy, "Old Land Claims, More Particularly the Northern Area," N.Z. Survey Draughtsmen's Journal, (1951) 1:6, p.198. - 99 -

10. D.V.Williams, "The Use of Law in the Process of Colonisation. An Historical and Comparative Study with Particular Reference to Tanzania (Mainland) and New Zealand," PhD thesis, University of Dar es Salaam, 1983, p.183.

11. Ibid.

12. R.Tonk, "Land Commissions," p.48.

13. Ibid., p.51.

14. New Zealand Ordinance, 4 Victoria No.2, The Ordinances of the Legislative Council of New Zealand and of the Legislative Council of the Province of New Munster, (Wellington 1871) . pp.5-6.

15. "Return of Claims to Land in New Zealand ... " 15 June 1843, BPP 1845 (246) pp.3-12.

16. G.H.Scholefield, Dictionary of New Zealand Biography, vol.1, (Wellington 1940) p.302.

17. New Zealand Land Claims Ordinance 1841, Ordinances of New Zealand, pp. 4-11; Instructions to Commissioners, nd, OLC 5/4.

18. Brodie's testimony 4-6 June, BPP (556), pp.51, 58-9, 60. [Doc B28]

19. R.Tonk, "Land Commissions," p.107

20. Report of Commissioner Godfrey on Mangonui Land Claim of Samuel Ford, 10 March 1844; R.FitzROY, Minute, 20 May 1844, OLC 1/704; Report on Henry Southee Land Claim, n.d., OLC 1/875-877.

21. An Ordinance for Quieting Titles to Land in the Province of New Ulster, 25 August 1849, Ordinances of New Zealand, pp.320-323.

22. E.T.Healy, "Old Land Claims," p.208.

23. Ibid., pp.208-209. - , . '.. ".,,,,-,. ·~·~'·.c''''~\-'-,,-~,~';....s.:·,.:..}...s,';'·...)'-'.~ili.:..'::''\ __,. ,~....:.~>.;.~, , ...~{\,~,":., .. '.-" ,,), '--.:- ."'-. '-."- ~" • " -•.. "- - .". - - _ .. - -,- - - .

- 100 -

24. Ibid., p.210.

25. F.D.Bell, Notes of Various Sittings of the Land Claims Court at Auckland, Russell, Whangaroa, Mangonui, Waimate, and Coromandel, OLC 5/34.

26. Grants to William Puckey, Court of Claims, 31 October 1857, OLC 1/774; J.Matthews to F.D.Bell, 3 September 1858, Grants to Jqseph Matthews, Court of Claims, 31 January 1859, OLC 1/328.

27. This figure does not include land that reverted to the Crown throught the issue of scrip. See schedule of Old Land Claims, p. 89

28. P.Adams, Fatal Necessity, pp.192, 284.

29. Stanley to FitzRoy, 26 June 1843, BPP, 1844 (556), pp.389-390.

30. Ibid.

31. C.Orange, The Treaty of Waitangi, p.97.

32. Ibid.; P.Adams, Fatal Necessity, p.192.

33. Mangonui Sewerage Report, p.19.

34. E.W.Wilson, Land Problems of the New Zealand Settlers of the 'Forties, (Dunedin and Wellington 1935) p.197.

35. Shortland to Stanley 18 June 1845, BPP 1843-5 (108) p. 10.

36. E.W.Wilson, Land Problems, p.197; E.Dieffenbach, Travels in New Zealand I: 221.

37. Brodie's testimony 4-6 June 1844, BPP, II, p.41. [Doc B28]

38. This may have been Charles Terry the author of New Zealand: Its Advantages and Prospects as a British Colony, see E.W.Wilson, Land Problems, p.200.

39. Ibid., pp.199-200. - 101 -

40. R.Tonk, "Land Commissions," p.87; W.Brodie, Remarks on the Past and Present State of New Zealand, p.47.

41. FitzRoy to Stanley, 15 October 1844, BPP 1845 (369), p.29. [Doc B31]

42. Ibid.

43. H.T.Kemp to G.Clarke, 10 February 1843, G 30/3. [Doc B26]

44. F.D.Bell, Note of Various Sittings, OLC 5/34.

45. Bishop to Under Sec. Native Dept., 30 April 1885, No.3, AJHR 1885 G-2, pp.2-4. [Doc B15]

46. Mangonui Sewerage Report, p.20.

47. Ibid.

48. An account of land purchased by J.Davis, n.d., OLC 1/160.

49. Statements of Taua and Popota, Kaitaia, 31 July 1843, OLC 1/160.

50. J.Davis to W.Webster, 15 May 1877, OLC 1/160.

51. Note by S.P.Smith, 23 August 1882, MA 91.

52. Turton's Maori Deeds of Old Private Land Purchases in New Zealand, p.48. [Doc B33]

53. Statement of Panakareao, 28 January 1843, OLC 1/329.

54. J.Matthews to Colonial Secretary, 2 June 1845, OLC 1/329.

55. Papahia to the Governor, 19 September 1855, OLC 1/328.

56. Statement of Joseph Matthews,S October 1857, OLC 1/328. - 102 -

57. F.D.Bell, Notes of Various Sittings, OLC 5/34.

58. A.Sinclair, Colonial Secretary, Memorandum on the Claims of Thomas Ryan, 17 May 1850, OLC 1/403-407.

59. Grant to William Butler, Court of Claims, 26 September 1859, OLC 1/ 403-404.

60. Statement of William Puckey, Kaitaia, 28 January 1843, OLC 1/774.

61. Ibid.

62. Statement of Joseph Matthews, Kaitaia, 28 January 1843, OLC 1/774.

63. Statement of Panakareao, Kaitaia, 28 January 1843, OLC 1/774.

64. Statement of William Puckey, Mangonui, 5 October 1857, OLC 1/774.

65. Statements of Panakareao, Rauri, Ripi, and Joseph Matthews, 31 January 1843, OLC 1/875-877.

66. H.Southee to Colonial Secretary, 10 July 1843; Memorial of Henry Southee, n.d.; H.Southee to FitzRoy, April 1845, Minutes of the Executive Council, 21 June 1846; A.Sinclair to H.Southee, 11 July 1845, OLC1/875-877.

67. W.B.White to F.D.Bell, 8 July 1858, OLe 1/875-877.

68. W.Clarke to F.D.Bell, 28 September 1859, OLC 1/875-877.

69. W.B.White to F.D.Bell, 16 August 1858, OLC 1/875-877.

70. Kensington to Houston, 12 March 1892, LS-A-[8] Box 88 File 2173, National Archives, Auckland.

71. Ibid. - 103 -

VII THE DEMOGRAPHIC AND ECONOMIC CONTEXT 1848-1865

The history of the 18 years from after the end of the Northern War in mid 1846 to the end of the most intensive phase of Crown land purchases in 1865 cannot be understood without considering the demographic and economic context of land transfers. This chapter is an attempt to provide this essential demographic and economic context before going on to explain the major Crown purchases in Chapter 10.

The period 1848 to 1865 was, broadly speaking, a period of continued depopulation and economic fluctuation in Muriwhenua. Though the relationship between depopulation, economic fluctuation and land transfers cannot be considered simply in terms of cause and effect, the relationship did exist. The only question to be answered is: what was the precise nature of that relationship?

Though the Northern War of 1844-1846 was partly a consequence of the southward shift of economic and political power from the Bay of Islands to Auckland, Muriwhenua in 1848 was still a populous area. Most estimates of Muriwhenua's population during the 1840s (as unreliable as they were) put it at about 4,000. When White arrived to begin official duties at Mangonui in 1848 he found large villages throughout Muriwhenua, and a brisk trade between Muriwhenua, visting whalers, Auckland and even Sydney. According to Puckey, most villages operated flour mills and produced a surplus of flour, corn, onions and potatoes for sale to Pakeha. 1

In addition to supplying Pakeha with food, Muriwhenua people had also entered the fledgling Kauri gum trade during the 1840s. Gum digging, which was later to dominate the Muriwhenua economy, was, at best, a mixed blessing. Puckey, as a missionary, seeking cash donations for the CMS, rejoiced at Maori participation in any activity that promised cash returns, but during the early gum digging years its cash returns were - 104 - almost non-existent. In 1845 Puckey reported that a hundredweight of gum (just over 50 kilograms) fetched only 7 yards of "common print .. (cloth worth perhaps 2/6d. or 50 cents) for the Maori diggers. The diggers had first to extract the gum from beneath the soil, and then transport it on their backs to Pakeha merchants, such as Southee at Awanui and Berghan at Mangonui, to receive a pittance. Gum prices rose dramatically during the 1850s, and then fell again in the 1860s. Such economic fluctuations not only reflected nationaL_and international market conditions, but may help explain why Muriwhenua people became engaged in a cash economy, and eventually sold land in return for cash. 2

A demographic change with an immediate economic effect was the increase in the Pakeha population of Muriwhenua during the l850s. By 1851 there were already 188 Pakeha recorded in the first provincial census, whereas an 1846 informal survey counted only 67 Pakeha (including 16 "half-castes") in the area. By 1861 the Pakeha adult population had increased to 487, suggesting a total Pakeha population of over 650. 3 As the Pakeha population increased, so did the market demand for Maori agricultural produce. The eMS missionaries had always encouraged Maori agriculture as the lay equivalent of "sowing to the spirit .. and an alternative to "serving the Devil, quarrelling and fighting ..... In 1852 Puckey approvingly remarked that Maori had "much enlarged their plantations of potatoes and wheat ..... in order to feed Pakeha newcomers.4

While Pakeha population increased during the 1850s, Maori population continued to decline from approximately 4,000 in 1845 to about 2,000 in 1858 .. Many of the entries in Puckey's Journals during this period concerned ministering to the needs of sick and dying Maoris. Disease deprived Te Rarawa of their highest ranking chiefs, beginning with Panakareao's wife, Ereonora (a high-born woman who actually out-ranked him) in 1848. Then Motu (who also outranked Panakareao) died of a secondary infection associated with measles in 1855. Finally, Panakareao, the paramount chief of Muriwhenua, the dominant - 105 - figure in the signing of the Treaty of Waitangi at Kaitaia, died of what appears to have been a streptococcal infection on 13 April 1856. 5 These deaths, and the 100% decline in Muriwhenua's population between the 1840s and 1860s must have had some impact on the flood of land sales beginning in 1856. The fact that these major land sales began a few months after Panakareao's death and proceeded during a period of rapid depopulation could not have been coincidental.

When illness struck Maori communities, their cash needs increased. Because whole families were often laid low, food production would suffer and store-bought goods would become a necessity. In August 1860 when White was negotiating the purchase of the 4,705 acre Hikurangi block near Oruru, he referred to this desperate need. He urged prompt payment of the 250 pound purchase price because, he said, the sellers were "very sickly and the money would be the means of providing them with food of a nourishing nature, of which they stand much in need." He also engaged in "entertainment of Natives" during the negotiations which undoubtedly involved feeding them and probably influenced them in favour of selling. 6

In addition to radically reducing the Maori population (at a time of increasing Pakeha population), disease had an extremely demoralising impact. In 1861 a typhoid epidemic introduced, according to Puckey, by an American ship calling at Mangonui, swept through Muriwhenua. For months Puckey reported that he was "incessantly attending to the wants of the sick and dying." At the end of the year he described the demoralising impact of the epidemic saying that Maori "seem stupified through the numerous deaths, each one expecting it to be his turn next. "7 While not necessarily subscribing to Featherstone's "dying race" thesis, Puckey believed in the divine origins of these afflictions. His insistence that epidemics were "sent by the Lord for our soul's welfare" would have done little to improve the morale of the survivors, but it yielded many death-bed conversions for him. Irrespective of the souls he saved, Puckey admitted 1861 was a terrible year. - 106 -

Although disease usually made Maori more inclined to sell land that had fallen into disuse, 1861 was an exception. Only one major Crown purchase occurred that year. This could be explained, in part, by the reaction to land sales started in Taranaki, but also, in part, by the demoralisation and social disruption caused by the epidemic.

In addition to depopulation, the major land sales were also accompanied by a gum digging boom. This must also be considered an essential part of explaining why so much land passed out of Maori hands so rapidly during the 1850s.and 60s. After receiving little more than one cent for each kilo of gum in the 1840s, by early 1856 Maori diggers were recelvlng the equivalent of 8.5 cents per kilo (one guinea per hundredweight). For the first time since the 1830s, Maori people had cash to spend. In 1856, the newly appointed Northern Land Purchase Commissioner, H.T.Kemp, reported that gum dominated the exports of all areas north of Auckland, and that Mangonui and Kaitaia Maori diggers had just bought 500 tents from Auckland to provide them shelter at their itinerant diggings. 9 Puc key deplored their increasingly "worldly state", by which he probably meant their tendency to buy goods from Pakeha stores without necessarily increasing their cash contributions to the CMS.

Whatever the case, Maori became more dependent on the Pakeha cash economy during periods of high gum prices, and this made them likely to run up debts with Pakeha storeownwers during depressed periods. Between 1 January 1860 and 19 October 1863 debt offences accounted for 42 out of the 82 civil and criminal cases judged by White as Resident Magistrate. All except one of these debtors was Maori, and White judged in favour of the creditors in all except one case. Th~s when gum prices fell, and Maori debts increased during the 1860s,land sales became a means of economic survival for many Maori.1o

Perhaps the most telling account of the impact of disease was one that White produced in early 1861. Writing before the devastating typhoid epidemic struck, White referred to how he - 107 - considered it his "high Christian duty" to "raise this people in the scale of civilization, before the unswerving hand of time shall have swept them beyond our reach." In dealing with the Governor's proposal for a system of local government in Muriwhenua, White wondered out loud whether it was all futile. He feared that the toll taken by disease, poor housing and "great poverty, will soon leave us without a people to experiment with (I write of my own district)."11 These are the words of the majo~ architect of the Crown purchases between 1850 and 1865. Undoubtedly, the assumption that he was dealing with a people "fast passing away" would have influenced his approach to land purchases.

In a specific instance in 1860, the relationship between disease and land sales is abundantly clear. Karaka Te Kawau, a Te Rarawa Mangatete chief who had consistently opposed the sale of the Victoria Valley throughout the 1850s, abruptly changed his mind in 1860. White reports that his dramatic conversion from opponent to seller occured when "on recovering from an attack of fever," he remembered White scolding him '" that he would die without deriving any advantage from the sale' (It was then I made him the offer of 50 pounds)." White gave Karaka this money to induce him to persuade the other Maori claimants to the valley to sell. White considered it a down-payment, but other Maori may have considered it a bribe. Whatever the case, with 50 pounds in his hand, Karaka tried to sell the valley, believing that he might not survive his next bout with disease. 12

When Governor Gore-Browne visited Mangonui with his Native Secretary Donald McLean on 15 February 1861, White took the opportunity to ask them to establish a Government Hospital staffed by a Native Medical Officer there. Even before the typhoid epidemic of that year, White expressed concern "at the want of energy and careless indifference [to proper health care] displayed " by the young men of his district. Since the Government at that time considered recruiting these men into the colonial military forces to fight in Taranaki, this was an - 108 - opportune time for white to make such a request. 13 A few weeks later White repeated his request, with a note of urgency. He believed it was "a serious question as to whether we shall preserve the Rarawa very long ... " He added that providing them with Government health care services would reward their loyalty. As he put it, " ... they have been so quiet and well disposed that I think we owe them a little. ,,14 Shortly afterwards, the Government established a hospital at Mangonui under the supervision of Dr.Trimnell, the Native Medical Officer.

REFERENCES

1. White to Native Department 5 Sept. 1868, AJHR 1868 A-4, No. 16, pp.36-37 [Doc B2]; Puckey's Annual Report 1845, Journals I: 88 [Doc C2]; George Clarke's estimate of Rarawa population, 1 April 1845, cited in Micheal Eyes, "Maori and European Population Histories in the Muriwhenua Region 1810-1901" (Waitangi Tribunal Division,1989) p.20. [Doc D2]

2. Puckey's Annual Report 1845, Journals I: 88. [Doc C2]

3. James R. Clendon's Population Survey 1846, Blue Book of Statistics 1847; Census of New Ulster 1851; Table 4, Electoral District Summary 1861, cited in Eyes, "Population Histories" pp.7-8. [Doc D2]

4. Puckey's Annual Report 1847, Journals I: 183-184; ibid, II: 256-257. [Doc C2]

5. F.D. Fenton, Observations on the State of the Aboriginal Inhabitants of New Zealand (Auckland, 1859) cited in Eyes, "Population Histories" p. 22 [Doc D2]; Puckey's Journal, I: 203; II: 302,323-324. [Doc C2]

6. White to Kemp 8 Aug. 1860, encl. in Kemp to McLean 25 August 1860, No. 90, AJHR 1861, C-1, pp.41-42. [Doc B20] - 109 -

7. Puckey's Journal II: 435, 439-440, 442-443. [Doc C2]

8. Ibid. II: 445.

9. Kemp to McLean 6 April 1856, No.9, AJHR 1861, C-1, p.6. [Doc B20]

10. "Return of Cases between Europeans and· Natives in the Resident Magistrate's Court and District Court ... [~angonui]", AJHR 1863 D-11, pp.1-4. [Doc B24]

11. White to Gore-Browne 30 March 1861[ No.7, ibid, 1861, E-3d, pp.5-6. [Doc B22]

12. White to Native Minister 23 Dec. 1861, No.6, AJHR 1862 C-1, pp.373-374. [Doc B20]

13. White to McLean 18 Feb. 1861, McLean Papers 633, Alexander Turnbull Library, Wellington.

14. White to McLean 1 April 1861, ibid. - 110 -

VIII CROWN LAND PURCHASES 1850-1865

The Crown purchases of Muriwhenua land which began on a very small scale in 1850, and moved into high gear after 1856, were all premised upon a solution to the Oruru problem. During the 1840s, the Government's attempt to treat Te Rarawa and Ngapuhias equal owners of the Oruru Block caused the Oruru War and failed to resolve the conflict. In an attempt to win the Crown's support for his Oruru claim, Panakareao recruited Te Rarawa troops who fought the Ngapuhi at Ruapekapeka in January 1846. After half his 14 warriors returned home wounded, Panakareao had to suffer the indignity of seeing them jeered at by Muriwhenua people who opposed the war. Nonetheless, Panakareao managed to extract some sort of promise from Sir George Grey that the Crown would support his right to return to Oruru. 1

Panakareao's move back to Oruru in 1848 coincided with the arrival of William Bertram White as the first resident Government official in Muriwhenua. For the next 30 years White remained the Crown's agent in Muriwhenua. Since he presided over the extension of state power to the Far North, and since he initiated most of the Crown land purchases, his background, and his relationship with Panakareao deserve close attention.

The son of a British naval officer, White trained as a surveyor before arriving in Wellington in the early 40s. During the war against Ngati Toa, White led the Hutt militia forces to capture a protesting Te Raupararaha near Porirua in 1846. Grey then posted White to the Taranaki-Wanganui area where he served with Donald McLean in the Armed Police Force, before Grey posted White as a Sub-Inspector of Police to Mangonui in April 1848. White arrived with a police sergeant and 7 privates to establish law and order in Muriwhenua, but he quickly became a general agent of the Crown. In late 1848, he became a Resident Magistrate, and a Sub-Collector of Customs. In addition, he acted as a surveyor for Pakeha settlers, an unofficial land - III - purchase agent and a personal confidant of the architect of colonial land purchase policy between 1853 and 1865, Donald McLean.

The chief significance of White's appointment at Mangonui was that he epitomised the shift to a policy of direct government control of a "Native District" which had previously been controlled indirectly through the Native Protectorate Department. Grey abolished this Department in 1846, took coercive action against both Hone Heke and Te Rauparaha, and replaced "moral suasion" with police power as the means of state control wherever possible. White, therefore, represented the extension of state power over Maori, a process that was accompanied both by Crown land purchases and Maori resistance. 2

When White arrived at Mangonui, Panakareao's mana had still not recovered from the jeering that had greeted his men on their return from battle at Ruapekapeka in 1846. White actually set up his administrative headquarters in full view of the flagstaff Panakareao had erected to symbolise his alliance with the Crown supposedly sealed at Ruapekapeka. Nonetheless, Panakareao fell out with both Pakeha missionaries and local people by returning to Oruru and living with two women there after the death of his wife in 1848. He apparently offended both Ngati Kahu and Ngapuhi by returning to Oruru without their consent. He definitely offended Puckey by living, unrepentantly, "in sin" with his two "concubines." Puckey reported that disapproving chiefs added insult to injury by ignoring his challenge to them over these issues. The upshot of this was that when White came to name his first list of chiefs to assist him in the administration of justice, he had to omit Panakareao. 3

Perhaps in an effort to restore his lost mana in 1850, Panakareao signed the first Crown land purchase deed in Muriwhenua in May 1850. He sold a mere 32 acres of Mangonui , township land in return for a tiny "twenty eight yards" square - 112 - reserve for himself and five pounds in cash from White. 4 Perhaps this purchase, which was the only one negotiated between 1848 and 1856, influenced White to add Panakareao to his list of salaried Assessors. By October 1850 White was again referring to Panakareao as "the principal chief of the District North of Mangonui", even though he clearly preferred to work with Puhipi Te Ripi, "the second chief" [sic], a loyal CMS ally and the most conscientious Assessor. 5

Despite this Crown recognition of his mana, Panakareao had to struggle to uphold his mana with Maori. In late 1850 he successfully rescued a beleaguered Ngati Kuri hapu from Ngapuhi retribution at Taupo Bay just north of Whangaroa. Ngati Kuri people had killed members of the Ngatitapango hapu of Ngapuhi. This hapu then laid siege and the Ngati Kuri had begun to drink sea-water when Panakareao evacuated them to his Oruru residence at Taipa. This naturally enraged the Ngapuhi who told White that, if the killers remained under Panakareao's protection, they would renew "their ancient feud about the land in the vicinity of Mangonui." White, fearing more armed conflict at Oruru, called upon the colonial government to send a warship, but none was available. This could not have enhanced White's mana. Q

The sequel to the Taupo Bay incident occurred almost exactly one year later when Panakareao aboard a waka manned by his Ngati Kuri allies challenged White's authority at Mangonui. He wished to assert his authority over Mangonui Maori residents, and told White that he had no intention of harming Pakeha. White, however, was not convinced, since Panakareao's men performed haka "just opposite my house." Though White believed Panakareao's support was limited to his Ngati Kuri warriors, he again beseeched the government to send a warship, and, again, the government had none to spare. 7

While he remained at Taipa with his Ngati Kuri allies, Panakareao antagonised both Ngati Kahu led by Tipene, and - 113 -

Pororua, the Ngapuhi claimant to Oruru land. Taipa, at the mouth of the Oruru River, was and remains the turangawaewae of the Ngati Kahu people. Ngati Kahu had maintained their rights to occupy the Oruru from Taipa south even though their more powerful Te Rarawa and Ngapuhi neighbors fought over this land at Taipa in 1843. With close kinship links to both Te Rarawa and Ngapuhi, Ngati Kahu sought alliances with both. When Panakareao moved to Taipa in 1848, and brought his Ngati Kuri allies there in 1850, however, Tipene began negotiating an alliance with his Ngapuhi rivals. 8 In July 1852, Tipene's men actually fought Panakareao's followers, after Puckey failed to mediate between the two sides. Afterwards an uneasy truce reigned. White attempted to settle Pakeha near Taipa, and even surveyed the land himself, but McLean instructed him to postpone negotiation for Crown purchases until the perennial Oruru problem was solved. 9

Oruru, however, was not the only dispute during the pre-Crown purchase period. In April 1853, Panakareao brought a taua to Ahipara, and Puckey persuaded the offenders to donate three horses to ensure a peaceful resolution of the conflict. Popota, a Te Rarawa/Kaitote Assessor from Mangatete, was also engaged in a land dispute which White feared he would take to McLean in Auckland during 1855. 10 This would suggest that in the period immediately preceeding the major Crown purchases, there was a high degree of competition for both political authority and for the control of land in Muriwhenua.

In this competititive environment, Panakareao had every reason to feel insecure about the future of his Oruru claim. In July 1854 he lured White into validating his claim (which he believed Grey had promised in 1846). Pakeha settlers urged White to strike a deal with Panakareao, which he felt very uneasy about. He asked McLean's assistant, Ligar, to see if McLean himself would personally negotiate saying "it is more easy for McLean to get a thousand acres than for me to get a hundred ... " Nonetheless, White had established a country - 114 - cottage at Oruru and he wanted to have Pakeha neighbours. He said that William Clarke and three other prospective settlers wanted the Government to extinguish Panakareao's claim. 11

When White signed the deed to extinguish Panakareao's Oruru claim on 3 July 1854, it was witnessed by Clarke. Given the way all claimants were demanding recognition of their ownership through sale, the wording of the deed is significant. It stated categorically that Panakareao' s was "the only m:ltive claim existing" in the entire Oruru Valley within the boundaries of Ford's Old Land Claim. In exchange for 100 pounds and a 100 acre reserve "including the present site of my pa" (presumably at Taipa), he deeded Oruru to the Crown. 12 Although White was acting on his own initiative, and had to ask for official sanction for his action, the Surveyor General and Donald McLean, as Chief Land Purchase Commissioner, were delighted with the move, and they assumed that native title over the Oruru had finally been extinguished. 13

In 1854-1855 McLean was trying to push ahead with major land sales in Auckland province. He reported in August 1855 that his agents were negotiating purchase agreements for 600,000 acres in Auckland, for which he requested 50,000 pounds from the General Assembly. Without these funds, he said, he could not meet the increased demand for land of the wave of immigrants to New Zealand during these years. Consequently, the Assembly voted over 20,000 pounds for Auckland land purchases. In November of the same year McLean instructed Kemp "to proceed to Mangonui, and use every exertion to acquire such lands in that vicinity as would be eligible for the location of a body of immigrants expected from Toronto, if sufficient inducement could be held out to them ... "14 This Canadian project was apparently based on the successful settlement of Nova Scotians at Waipu, 12 miles south of Whangarei, but more generally it was related to McLean's vision of the growing commercial importance of the north. McLean believed that the increase in kauri gum and timber exports, the proximity of northern - 115 - harbours to "the Panama line" of steamers about to be established, and the willingness of Te Rarawa, Ngapuhi and Ngati Whatua chiefs to negotiate land transfers, all made Northland a fertile field for Pakeha settlement. 15 In Muriwhenua, however, the Oruru problem interfered with such settlement

Panakareao's 1854 deal, naturally, offended the other claimants.In November 1855, McLean instructed John Grant Johnson, the Bay of Islands District Land Commissioner, to investigate the Oruru problem with a view to negotiating a settlement with the other claimants. Johnson reported Grey's alleged promise to Panakareao, and indicated that white had already extinguished his claims with his 100 pound payment the previous July. He stressed the need to extinguish all other claims since the land in question was "required for the location of settlers." Johnson indicated that Tamati Waka Nene's Ngapuhi hapu now supported Ngati Kahu claims advanced by Tipene. In addition, he had to consider Pororua and other Rarawa claimants from Hokianga and Pukepoto. He therefore recommended that the Crown pay Pororua and the Hokianga claimants (whom he wrongly assumed to be Ngapuhi) 150 pounds, Tipene 100 pounds, and Puhipi (for the Pukepoto survivors of the Oruru War) a further 50 pounds. He admitted that some of the claimants would remain dissatisfied and "insolent in their demands, notwithstanding the liberal manner in which I have dealt with their claims." Nonetheless, White assured him that this was the only just settlement of a dispute that was holding up all other purchases in Muriwhenua. 16

Johnson did not have an easy time of it at the Oruru, and Ngati Kahu were far from satisfied with the 100 pounds offered them. As a result, Waka Nene and Tipene took their complaints to the Government in Auckland. Waka Nene maintained that Tipene's claim was the equal of Pororua's and that he was entitled to an extra 50 pounds, some of which would be used to satisfy further outstanding claims, in particular that of - 116 - rangatira of Hokianga. 17

While the cross-claimants were presenting their case in Auckland, Panakareao began to organise preliminary negotiations for large-scale Crown purchases on condition that the Oruru problem be settled to his satisfaction. With Kepa, a Te Rarawa chief from the upper Oruru Valley, he offered a large area of Maungataniwha land for sale to White on 10 May 1855. White reported that other chiefs were willing to sell land at Parengarenga, Awanui, Raitara, Paihaumau, Wharemaru, and other areas in the area between Ahipara and Mangonui. The one condition before proceeding to sell this land which "would be eagerly sought for by settlers" was" that Oruru should be settled for."18 In September Panakareao went even further by suggesting "that the whole of the land north of a line between Awanui and Ahipara can now be purchased," and that the Victoria Valley was also for sale. White urged the government to consider "the advantages this district would derive by having such [a] quantity of land open for settlement ... "19 The unstated condition of these sales was that, again, the Oruru problem be settled to Panakareao's satisfaction.

By late 1855 the government had planned large scale Pakeha settlement for Muriwhenua on the assumption that it would successfully resolve the Oruru problem. Colonial Secretary H.T. Kemp, shortly to replace Johnson as Northern Land Purchase Commissioner, noted in October that Panakareao's land offer of the previous month embraced "the land required for the 'Canadian Settlement' ..• " He recommended that the government proceed with purchase negotiations. 2o In November McLean charged Kemp with responsibility for conducting the Muriwhenua land purchase negotiation and brought Johnson back to Auckland. He stated he was sending one of his most experienced purchase agents to Muriwhenua "to give every facility to the settlement at Mangonui of a body of Canadians" brought to New Zealand by a Dr Stratford. He instructed Kemp to consult Waka Nene before proceeding to Mangonui, apparently to discuss the Oruru - 117 - problem. At Mangonui he was to investigate previous sales before negotiating new purchases. 21

An important provision in McLean's November 1855 instructions to Kemp was that all purchases were to be "subject to ample reservations for their own [Maori] present and future wants." These reserves were to be clearly identified with natural boundaries, such as rivers, to reduce surveying expenses and to prevent disputes. He suggested in a post script that these reserves could take the form of "a few Crown Grants, of from one to ten acres each, to four or five of the principal Chiefs out of the lands they may surrender to the Crown." With Oruru in mind he also cautioned Kemp "to use the utmost care and discretion ... as each Officer will be held responsible for any difficulties or disturbances that may arise from any purchase in which he is engaged. "22

Kemp, however, was detained in the Bay of Islands for several months. Meanwhile Pororua decided to press his claims further. He approached White on 30 January 1856, letting him know in no uncertain terms ("in a very insolent manner") his intention of occupying Oruru land. White described Pororua as a bitter rival of Panakareao's, and he feared the outbreak of further hostilities between them. 23 In March there was also a major dispute between two Oruru claimant groups, Hokianga Te Rarawa and Ngati Kahu (or "Patu" as Pakeha referred to them). Panakareao sided with the latter, calling for utu, while Puhipi called for the enforcement of "the English law ... " The matter was resolved without casualties, but neither White nor Puc key affected the outcome. 24

When Kemp finally reached Muriwhenua, he approached Panakareao about selling the Victoria Valley (or Takahue) where the government hoped to establish Stratford's Canadian settlement. Kemp believed he could purchase 20,000 acres of prime agricultural land in exchange for setting aside "a few reserves" of no more than 2,000 acres, and a payment of 3,000 - 118 - pounds. Panakareao, however, resisted Kemp's offer. He told Kemp that the valley would "be required for the use of the Natives, whenever the surrounding districts shall have been purchased." Kemp was also fully aware of the fact that any major purchases in this "the finest district in that part of the Province" would have to be preceded by a solution to the Oruru problem. Before Kemp could begin to attempt such a solution Panakareao suffered a "very sudden and serious illness." 25 When Panakareao died on 13 April he was buried beside his wife Ereonora at Takahue. Kemp would never settle Canadians there. 26

On 12 April 1856, the day before Panakareao's death, Kemp reported some progress in the Oruru negotiations. By this time the various Maori demands appeared to have been brought down to 150 pounds for Tipene and either 200 pounds or 150 pounds and 100 acres of land for Pororua. Kemp acknowldged that the original S.H.Ford Oruru purchase in 1839 and 1843 was defective in that Panakareao, but none of the other claimants, received payment. He also acknowledged that Grey had sanctioned Panakareao's return to Oruru in 1846. Kemp mistakenly believed Tipene (Ngati Kahu) represented Moetara (Te Rarawa-Hokianga) as well as Puhipi (Te Rarawa-Pukepoto), and would share his 150 pound payment with them. 27

Government officials were particularly anxious .to avoid granting any land at Oruru to Pororua, fearing that a continued Ngapuhi presence there would only lead to further conflict in the future. In June, W B White urged McLean to settle the affair, as he feared a new outbreak of trouble. He reported:

Tipene is constantly at variance with the people at Oruru, and is making vigorous efforts to return to settle there. Pororua the same. Between .the two, the settlers are kept in a constant state of excitement, and a sense of insecurity very much cripples their enterprise. Moreover, a portion of Mr.Campbell's [Oruru] land has been occupied, but I cannot interfere in consequence of the unsettled question of payment.28 - 119 -

Although Kemp recommended a 350 pound Oruru settlement in April, McLean authorised a 300 pound payment in August (a sum recommended by Johnson in February 1855). Kemp's April recommendation mentioned the possibilty of awarding Pororua 150 pounds and a 100 reserve instead of 200 pounds. This would have reduced the total settlement sum to 300 pounds, but Kemp advised McLean against granting Pororua a reserve at Oruru to match that White had granted Panakareao in l854-because he believed this would prolong the conflict "which for the sake of the district and of the settlers, it would be very desirable indeed to avoid." McLean, while giving Kemp only 300 pounds, specified that he do his "utmost" to avoid granting Pororua an Oruru reserve, "as his retention of any land in Oruru" would probably "give rise to disputes with the Rarawa ... " If Kemp was unable to avoid giving Pororua a reserve, he was to negotiate "a conveyance from all the Natives concerned ... " In other words, a final settlement required the consent of all the claimants. 29

In response to McLean's August instructions, Kemp indicated that he thought he could get Waka Nene to prevail upon Pororua not to insist upon an Oruru reserve equivalent to Panakareao's. To do this, however, he wanted an additional 200 pounds. He said this was necessary to bring about a rapid settlement because Pororua's people were about to begin planting their crops at Oruru. Tipene's people had "abstained from cultivating" Oruru at Panakareao's request, but they would undoubtely abstain no more if Pororua's people defied them. 3D

McLean denied Kemp the additional 200 pounds requested, but before receiving this information Kemp concluded what he described as a final settlement for 350 pounds. 31 During the negotiations leading to the 17 September agreement, Pororua had held out "for several days" for a 100 acre reserve. Since his people had planted crops there, Kemp paid him 200 pounds on the understanding that his people would abandon their 1.5 acre - 120 - kainga after harvesting the crops. Kemp mentioned that he set aside two quarter acre reserves "at the entrance to the Oruru River ... for the use of the Natives generally" as canoe landing places, and that White would survey them. Puhipi also suggested that the Crown purchase Panakareao's 100 acre Taipa reserve occupied by surviving members of his family.32

The deed signed by Pororua, Tipene, Puhipi and 34 other chiefs (though not by Moetara or other Hokianga Te Rarawa) is a highly significant document requiring close attention. Firstly, unlike most Crown deeds neither the signers nor subsequent historians have had the benefit of a map to determine the exact boundaries referred to. 33 The 1856 deed refers to the boundaries "in the peed of Sale originally made by the Natives to Dr. Ford", dated 12 November 1839. This was an area of approximately 20,000 acres embracing the entire valley. The boundary descriptions in the 1856 Deed, however, include only part of the eastern side of the valley embracing just over 9,000 acres. This discrepancy appears to be due to the fact that the 1856 boundaries followed Panakareao's 5 October 1840 "Endorsement" of the original deed, which reduced it to one-third of Ford's claim, not the original claim boundaries. 34 Without any sort of plan or common understanding of the boundaries, the parties to this agreement naturally interpreted the deed in many different ways.

The deed also excluded Ngati Kahu from the status as a claimant independent of both Te Rarawa and Ngapuhi. As a result Pororua received 200 pounds and Puhipi 100 pounds, but Tipene only 50 pounds, despite the fact that Ngati Kahu could claim prior occupation. To add insult to injury Kemp expected Tipene to share his paltry sum with the Hokianga Te Rarawa claimants not present to sign the deed. 35 A further omission from the deed was any mention of Panakareao's 100 acre Taipa reserve, obviously to avoid offending Pororua. Consequently, Kemp's claim that this was "the final and complete settlement of the Valley of Oruru ... " was a false one. His deed, which stated - 121 -

that the valley would pass "to the Government, as a perpetual possession for the White people for ever and ever" (in Maori "ara ki te Kawanatanga, hei whenua mo Pakeha ake tonu atu."), was flawed by its omission of precise boundaries, of proper recognition of Ngati Kahu and Hokianga Te Rarawa claims, and of any reference to Panakareao's reserve.

McLean didn't quibble about the additional 50 pounds Kemp had spent on Oruru. He thanked him "for the very satisfactory manner in which this long pending and troublesome question has been adjusted by yourself and Mr White. "36 Soon McLean .. discovered that Kemp hadn't "extinguished Native title" in the manner expected of him. White informed him in November that the brother of Samuel Yates, a local trader, had tried to persuade Maori that the Government would not uphold the Oruru purchase. He accused the Yates brothers of being "Jew" operators who were "not very particular about how they make money or what they say." White, himself, claimed credit for the negotiation of the purchase and asked McLean to write to Puhipi and Popota approving their "conduct in assisting me at Oruru ... lt will give me great power with them. "37

Then, in December, five Hokianga Te Rar.awa chiefs (Wiremu Tana Papahia, Tomairangi, Ngarewa, Te Karu, and Marupe) visited Auckland complaining that they had received none of the payment due to them as Oruru claimants. They offered "to sell the Maungataniwha district" as incentive for this Oruru payment. 38 White reported on their claims a few months later, recommending that they be paid 100 pounds for 4 acres at Taipa, and 500-600 acres of "backland lt near Mangonui. He mentioned

that Pororua was the "only objecting chief", but that It the Natives in this district treat his opposition with some

contempt. 1139

White upheld these Hokianga claims because he agreed that the Te Rarawa representatives at the signing of the Oruru deed had neglected Hokianga claims. McLean assumed the fault was , , .•... " .. , ", ·.·'-·'.~,_,-:.cC'-'--..'..'-~:_~._\)~~.:c'~';"'\'>-:"""" , .

- 122 -

Tipene's, but Tipene claimed that he "received no share" of the Oruru payment. McLean then told Kemp that if this was true, it should be "rectified without further delay. "40

Pororua remained adamant that any adjustment to the 1856 Oruru settlement required his consent. Even though White had referred to him as an "insolent Native" in this regard, he added Pororua to his Assessors list in December 1856, probably in an attempt to win his cooperation in the same way he had attempted to win Panakareao's.41 White continued to have problems with Pakeha as well. In March 1857 he reported that Samuel Yates had encouraged local Maori to disobey the "orders they have received to leave the Oruru valley." McLean told White that he should report this to the Governor if he could produce evidence that Yates was inciting Maori to resist removal. 42 Apparently the Maori in question were Panakareao's descendants occupying his Taipa reserves, and Yates represented a group of traders and settlers who believed that the continued Te Rarawa presence provided them insurance against competing claims to Oruru land.

As early as December 1856 White had tried to encourage Puhipi to claim guardianship over Panakareao's daughter, with a view to removing her whanau from Oruru. In fact, a man named Puru acted as her guardian and lived with her at Oruru. In March 1857 White asked McLean to write to "Puru and the other natives at Oruru" in an effort to get them to move voluntarily. He feared that if Puru didn't leave, Tipene might join him and wreck the Oruru settlement. In a post-script he added that there had already been a dispute between Puru's people and a Pakeha settler at Oruru. 43 In June White reported that Yates took Puru to Auckland to petition for his right to remain at Oruru. Apparently Yates had persuaded Puhipi to remain neutral in the affair, despite his previous assurances of support to White. Kemp and White prevailed upon Puhipi to move Puru's people, without success. White urged McLean to write to Puhipi to get him to change his mind, and accused Puru's people of committing "depredations" at Oruru. 44 - 123 -

A few days later, Kemp reported that Puru's people remained at Oruru despite having "been urged to move ... by the Government and by the Chiefs ... " White suggested that the Crown purchase Panakareao's "Reserve" from its "Native Trustees", with the proceeds invested in a trust account for the benefit of his daughter. He concluded: "The section itself, being an extremely valuable one, would be very soon purchased, and the Government would be at once reimbursed in the outlay that may be necessary for the extinguishment of the Native Title. "45 White then reported in September 1857 "that a large number of Natives are still living on Nopera's [ie. Panakareao's] reserve, that they greatly annoy the European settlers, and that not one of the individuals occupying the section has any right to be there. "46 McLean did not immediately accept Kemp's and White's recommendation on moving Panakareao's heir off the reserve. Smith, writing for him on 1 August stated that Kemp would have to explain the grounds for removal. The Governor wished "to express the opinion of the Government that ample provision ought to be made in landed property" for his heir, and "it is not apparent why the Oruru is an unfit or undesirable locality for this purpose. "47

White, however, was not to be diverted from his concerted intention to clear Oruru. During 1857 he had prepared the ground for a series of purchases around Oruru, even extending up to a few miles south of Te Kao. In November he privately complained to McLean that Kemp was confining his Bay of Islands purchases to the vicinity of Kerikeri. In this White was in full agreement with Henry Williams, drafter of the key Maori text of the Treaty of Waitangi. "My opinion is that the native title should be extinguished on all lands as soon as possible," wrote White." ... I would urge you to hasten Kemp in this matter ... " He added that the Williams family were "influential among the natives and Europeans" alike, and they would be indebted to McLean for his prompt attention to this matter. In relation to be Muriwhenua land, White noted that though he was - 124 - too busy to conduct further surveys, "1 can be of much use in purchasing lands and keeping plans."49

With land purchase in mind, McLean relented from his previous opposition to moving Puru's people from Oruru. In response to White's 10 December reiteration of this request, McLean wrote on 16 December that Governor Gore-Browne authorised "removing the Natives from the said reserve, if it can be done without hostility, or violence ~eing used towards them."so A year later, however, White again reported tIthe annoyances the European settlers in the Oruru valley are subjected to by Natives residing upon the land which has been finally [sold] to the Government ... " Yet again he called for the removal of these people "with the full concurence of the principal chiefs ... " McLean then instructed White to tell the people to move from Oruru in February 1859, assuming that, by then, they would have harvested their crops.S1

Although the Oruru dispute fades from the written record after 1859, undoubtedly it continued in one form or another. After causing a major conflict in 1843, Oruru continued to be a bone of contention because of the Crown's failure to deal with the causes of the conflict in a forthright manner. Inadequate boundary definition, failure to acknowledge Ngati Kahu and Hokianga Te Rarawa, as well as Panakareao and Pororua's rights, were bound to keep the Oruru pot boiling. The Crown's clumsy attempt to buy off Panakareao's interest in Oruru in 1854 with 100 pounds and a 100 acre reserve was reminiscent of its May 1841 attempt to buy off Pororua's interest in the same land for 100 pounds. The Crown negotiated both deals without consulting the other claimants, and in both cases the other claimants rejected these deals as a consequence. The only difference was that the 1841 Pororua deed eventually led to armed conflict, and the 1854 Panakareao deal was eventually dishonoured when the Crown moved his whanau from his reserve. 52

The main purpose of the Crown's Oruru deals in both the 1840s and 1850s had been to remove impediments to large scale - 125 - purchases and to resolve conflicts thus ensuring law and order. Even though the September 1856 Oruru agreement failed to remove the causes of conflict, the Crown believed it cleared the way for other large scale purchases. Consequently, between Sept 1856 and May 1865, the Crown purchased over 120,000 acres of Muriwhenua land. These purchases were negotiated in 43 separate transactions, many of which repeated some of the mistakes made in the long drawn out Oruru purchase. Almost all the purchases were negotiated at a time of cash shortage and declining population (see Chapter VII), and many were negotiated during the New Zealand Wars when Muriwhenua people were under subjective pressure to sell land in order to demonstrate their loyalty to the Crown. At the end of this process the Crown had acquired title to over 20 percent of the total land area of Muriwhenua (in addition to 20 percent obtained by the Crown and Pakeha landowners as a result of the 1840-1860 Land Claims Commissions), and in 1865 this Crown land accounted for almost 60 percent of the most agriculturally valuable land. 53

To investigate all 43 of these very important transactions would be unnecessarily laborious and repetitive. Instead it should be possible to investigate the most questionable features of several of the transactions with a view to understanding Maori grievances that grow out of them. The first such grievance had to do with the proximity of most Crown purchases to Oruru, the source of so much prolonged dissatisfaction. After concluding the Oruru purchase (at least in theory) in September 1856, White and Kemp attempted to extinguish Maori title on every side of it. A cursory examination of the map of Crown purchases of Muriwhenua land after 1856 shows how the Crown attempted to confine Maori land to a dozen or so 100-500 acre reserves between Whangaroa in the east and Ahipara in the West (see Map 8 "Muriwhenua Crown Purchases and Maori Reserves 1856-1865" p.135). By 1865 Maori could look back and see that the Oruru purchase, with all its attendant struggles, had been the thin end of th~ wedge, or a dagger thrust into the heart of Muriwhenua land.

During 1857 Kemp and White also negotiated two purchases totalling 100,000 acres north of Kaitaia, thereby extinguishing - 126 -

Maori title across the lower reaches of the Te Aupouri peninsula. In May 1857 Kemp and White negotiated two separate purchases for blocks named Muriwhenua South and Wharemaru with Te Aupouri and Te Rarawa chiefs including Paraone, Te Morenga, Puhipi Te Ripi, and Waka Rangaunu. Kemp and White initially thought the vast area in question, stretching almost half the length of Ninety Mile Beach in the west to Houhora and Rangaunu Harbours in the east, totalled only 28,000 acres. Kemp described the land as sandy in the west, but with "good soil" in the east, and generally "well adapted for sheep farming." He added that negotiations with "leading chiefs of the district" who were "the principal sellers of the land ... [were] conducted in the most public manner ... " Perhaps with his Oruru mistakes in mind, he added, that "every facility [was] given to claimants, or other interested persons to appear. "54

Having submitted only a rough sketch of the land in question to McLean in June after the sellers had traversed the area with White and himself, Kemp had a new government surveyor, Campbell, prepare a proper plan with a more accurate acreage estimate. This plan (which was not published in Turton's Plans) revealed that the area contained over 86,885 acres, compared with White's original estimate of 28,000 acres. In September Kemp suggested a purchase price of 1,500 pounds (or 4d. per acre) to the sellers. He told McLean, again, that all negotiations were "carried out in the most public manner" and that the proposed sale price was "as economical .•. as could be expected." If his agreement was approved, he believed it would give satisfaction to the whole of the Native sellers, and help pave the way for future generations."s5

In approving these purchases, McLean warned Kemp that he should exercise "the greatest care" in drafting the deeds, because some of his previous deeds were "vague and therefore objectionable." McLean suggested that he avoid such hazardous vagueness by following a model deed used by other purchase agents to ensure the transaction was "intelligible to, and - 127 - binding upon, the Natives. "56 The deed Kemp prepared for Muriwhenua South is more specific than his Oruru deed in one important respect. In it he made specific provision for a 100 acre reserve for Paraone (Te Aupouri) at Houhora, in contrast to his deliberate omission of Panakareao's reserve in the Oruru deed. Since both blocks were surveyed prior to sale (again in contrast to Oruru), boundary definitions were much more precise than at Oruru. Both Muriwhenua South and Wharemaru deeds referred to the s~rveyor's plan as the ultimate authority on boundaries. This was clearly much better than the Oruru deed which was not accompanied by a surveyed plan but there remains the question of whether the sellers saw and understood the plan before they signed the deeds on 3 February 1858. 57

The absence of a plan also hampers our understanding of the Otengi purchase negotiated at the same time as those of Muriwhenua South and Wharemaru. This deficiency may be related to the fact that White surveyed both the Oruru and Otengi blocks. 58 Immediately adjacent to Oruru, and in the area covered by the 1987 "Mangonui Sewerage" claim, Otengi included the turangawaewae of the Ngati Kahu people. Kemp told McLean of his intention to purchase Otengi in June 1857, and without waiting for McLean's approval, negotiated the ourchase of 2,722 acres for 230 pounds in September 1857.59 McLean approved the purchase price in December, and Tipene (Ngati Kahu), Reihana Kiriwi (Ngati Kahu), and Puhipi and Waka Rangaunu (Te Rarawa) signed the deed on the same day the Muriwhenua South and Wharemaru deeds were signed (3 February 1858). Included in the deed was specific provision for a 79 acre reserve for Tipene "a little above the settlement of Taipa."60

Since the question of reserves came up in at least 14 of the 45 Crown purchases between 1850 and 1865, the origins of Crown policy in regard to reserves is worth investigating. According to Alan Ward in his recent Ngai Tahu report, Crown reserve policy in New Zealand originated in an Aborigines Protection Society (APS) proposal to the Colonial Office in - 128 -

July 1840. Although the New Zealand Company had independently formulated a system of reserving one-tenth of the land it purchased for Maori, Ward maintains Crown actions were much more directly influenced by the APS proposal to set aside a proportion of proceeds from the resale of Crown land for providing for the needs of Maori communities. Since these resale proceeds were meagre indeed during the 1840s, the Crown began to set aside land as reserves for Maori in many of the purchases negotiated in both the 1840s and 50s.61 When McLean was about to launch his Crown purchase campaign in 1854-1855, he reported to the Colonial Secretary on the purpose and administration of the numerous reserves created after 1840. Reserves, he said, consisted of

... blocks of land excepted by the Natives, for their own use and subsistence, within the tracts of land they have ceded to the Crown for colonization, and in general there has been a distinct understanding that they should not at any time be called upon to alienate any lands so reserved, it being considered essential for their own maintenance and welfare to retain them. Those lands are in general cultivated and occupied by the Natives, and in most instances the reserves are sufficiently extensive to provide for their present and future wants.

McLean proposed that mixed local Boards consisting of Resident Magistrates, missionaries, "together with one or two intelligent Native chiefs ... " should administer these reserves "for the social, industrial, religious and educational advancement of the Natives." He was careful to add, however, that these Boards should not have the power to alienate any reserves without the Governor's express permission, because these lands "should be permanently retained ... " He concluded:

In the several purchases made of late years by the Government, the Natives have retained generally, where practicable, large reserves for themselves within well defined natural boundaries, such as rivers, &c., which has greatly contributed to a good understanding between themselves and European settlers.62

Clearly, McLean committed himself to a policy of inalienable reserves, in the interests of placating Maori as much as in an - 129 - attempt to prevent their total dispossession. In a May 1861 circular to all District Land Purchase Commissioners, McLean reiterated the Governor's long-standing reserves policy. Before final payment for land purchased from Maori" reserves were to be clearly defined with natural boundaries, if possible (to prevent any misunderstandings). These reserves were to be properly surveyed before purchase agents submitted the block plans to the Commissioner of Crown lands.63

In the case of Panakareao's Oruru reserve, Kemp and White sacrificed this policy to what they perceived as their need to clean the slate regarding the history of prolonged intertribal rivalry. In the case of Tipene's Taipa reserve there was no such pressing need. Nonetheless, within weeks of the signing of the Otengi deed, White was suggesting the purchase of Tipene's reserve. 64 Eventually, White and Kemp purchased the reserve in October 1864 for 39 pounds, 10 shillings. Though this was only 79 acres, it represented "the last Ngati Kahu.foothold at Taipa" and the violation of an undertaking by McLean a decade earlier that reserves would, except in special circumstances, be held in trust for future generations. 65

Another Crown purchase involving very specific and sizeable reserves was the December 1856 Te Whakapaku purchase. This 2,688 acre purchase along the coast between Mangonui and Whangaroa, negotiated by White and Kemp with Ururoa, and other Ngapuhi chiefs (though not Pororua) adjoined the Old Land Claims of Partridge, Berghan and Snowden. For many years afterwards descendants of the sellers believed that the Crown based its claims to Whakapaku and the enclosed Motukahakaha and Taupo reserves on the surplus land provisions of the original ordinance affecting Old Land Claims. Be that as it may, the Crown clearly exempted from purchase a 400 acre Taupo reserve and a 190 acre Motukahakaha (misspelt "Motukaha") reserve, in both the written deed and the plan accompanying it. (See Whakapaku map, Turtons Plans, p.29)66 - 130 -

The May 1863 Crown purchase to extinguish Pororua's Mangonui claims involved the same kinds of reserve provisions. For many years White had wanted to move that "insolent Native" Pororua, as he referred to him in 1855, as far away from both the Oruru Valley and from Mangonui township as possible. Pororua had contested several Old Land Claims in the vicinity of the predominantly Pakeha township. White told McLean in October 1858 that he had been offered land within Pororua's claim (as acknowledged by Protector of Aborigines Clarke in 1840) near Mangonui. This was almost certainly within the eventual Mangonui Crown purchase area (east and south of the township). This land, "I must confess", was still in dispute in 1858, said White, but by 1863 he glossed over the dispute. 67 The land was in dispute between a Ngati Kahu people who occupied it, and Pororua, who claimed it by right of conquest. In 1861 White reported that Ngapuhi had left the Mangonui area for Whangaroa, and that Pororua, a "dissipated, unscrupulous" chief retained "scarcely any influence" over his own people. He then identified the Ngati Kahu hapu as'Ngatirehia' and 'Ngatiteaukiwi.' White said he had moved the former to the Waiaua reserve ,"I made for them out of Ryan's land claim," and the latter to the 'Taimaro and Motukaka'[sic] reserves which he had also created out of the surplus land from other Old Land Claims.68

The 1863 Mangonui deed, which supposedly transferred perhaps 20,000 acres to the Crown (although the Crown never estimated the acreage of this purchase) acknowledged only Pororua's Te Matearoha "Tribe" (actually a Ngapuhi hapu) as owners of the land. Turton's Plan of the 1863 Mangonui block covers approximately 20,000 acres, but fails to indentify private Pakeha land within the area and Ngapuhi, as opposed to Ngati Kahu, land outside reserves. The Taemaro and Waiaua reserves were clearly exempted from purchase after having been "distinctly laid down and marked off by the Government surveyor ... " As it turned out, the Ngati Kahu people who White had moved to these reserves, never understood that in so doing they were foresaking their claims to the land surrounding their - 131 - kainga. For them, and for their succeeding generations, the 1863 Mangonui purchase was unjust. 69

With the 1856 and 1863 Te Whakapaku and Mangonui purchases, Kemp and White believed they had" extinguished" Maori ownership immediately to the east of Oruru. During that time they were also active in purchases to the south and west of Oruru. In June 1858 White wrote to McLean: "I think it will be not long before we have that coveted land 'Victoria Valley. ' There is a strong growing inclination to sell and if you come down[,] which I hope you will, I think you would do wonders ... " in clinching the deal. 7o White then reported in September his desire to purchase all land between Mangonui and Victoria in a band around Oruru. White assured Kemp that he had obtained Maori consent for purchases totalling 15,000 acres. He convinced Kemp "that a junction with the Victoria could be made with but little difficulty, thereby bringing the whole of that fertile district into connection with the port of Mangonui ... "71 In pressing forward with these negotiations, Kemp expressed the view that there was less "delay and uncertainty" than there had been (before the Oruru purchase, perhaps), and that Maori now understood better" the terms under which the Government propose to deal with them for their waste Lands ... " Consequently, he believed that if the Crown retained its pre-emptive rights, "the extinguishment of Native Title may go on uninterruptedly for some time to come in this District. "72

Kemp received the full authority of Governor Gore Browne to press ahead with these and other purchases since "the quantity of land at the disposal of the [Auckland] Provincial Government" was "insufficient to meet the requirements of immigrants expected to arrive in the Colony within the next year.,,73 By September 1859 White and Kemp had progressed further in their strategy of purchasing everything except a dozen or so reserves between Whangaroa and Ahipara. Kemp reported that the Waiake, Ohinu, Kaiawe, Ahipara, and Mangatete blocks (totalling over 26,000 acres) were "ready for survey and occupation without any delay whatever. "74 - 132 -

Thomas Smith, writing for McLean and Gore Browne, continued to encourage Kemp to press forward with further purchases. In November 1859 Gore Browne instructed Kemp to conclude the Ahipara purchase "in order that this block may be proclaimed and made available for settlement." When Puhipi went to Auckland soon afterwards to offer to increase the size of

the Ahipara block under negotiation, Smith co~veyed Gore Browne's wish that this offer be accepted "on reasonable terms."75 This enlarged Ahipara purchase was fully supported by missionary, William Puckey. In his 1859 Annual Report he stated that "Rarawa chiefs have shown the utmost liberality in giving so fine and large a portion of ground - and they well deserve a good and kind class of settlers ..... He went on to conclude after referring to the Ahipara purchase that "the Natives of the North will dispose of still larger quantities of their waste lands to Government, in whom and in Europeans generally[,] they place implicit confidence." Puckey compared Pakeha settlers to the sons of Japeth occupying the tents of Shem. This revealing Biblical analogy to the sons of Moses was perhaps respectfri~ of Muriwhenua people as a chosen people, but ultimately it was wishful thinking that "matters will proceed well with the newcomers" about to dwell in the Promised Land. 76

A year later Gore-Browne instructed Kemp to proceed to Parengarenga with White to investigate a block White reported .. the Rarawa tribe" were offering for sale. In fact the occupants of the land in question were Te Aupouri, which White considered to be a sub-tribe, or hapu, of Te Rarawa. This perhaps caused the"disagreement between the Native claimants" that stalled the negotiations for 40,000 acres in the vicinity of North Cape. Kemp was willing to offer the prospective sellers "a Reserve for their own use ... ", but when this still

failed to conclude the sale he consoled his supe~iors with the information the the land was "inferior in quality, and not required at the present time for settlers. "77 - 133 -

Another factor stalling the Parengarenga negotiations was the increasing awareness in Muriwhenua of the opposition to land sales in Taranaki and the Waikato. In June 1861 Kemp reported concluding no major purchases in the preceeding 3 months because this opposition had become "the subject of permanent discussion with the Natives here ... " Kemp believed that land sale opponents in Muriwhenua and further south had denounced "the present system of [Crown]purchase ... [as] part of a scheme to dispossess them of their lands, (the price given far below its real value) ... " These opponents alleged that the bulk of their lands would "become unconditionally the property of the Crown", while Maori w'ould be eventually confined "to certain limited spot;:;" reserved for them. Kemp defended himself by saying that Maori grievances over the low prices they received for their land were due to "their confused notions of the real value of land, [which] made it very difficult to convince them, that the price paid per acre by the Government for Waste Lands is generally speaking fair and reasonable. "78

However legal the string of sales (on top of the Old Land Claims) may have been, they left Te Rarawa, Te Aupouri, and Ngati Kahu unsure just what land had been sold, when it had been sold and whether these sales had been legal or illegal, just or unjust. This is most clear in Ngati Kahu's later grievances against the Oruru, Otengi, Waimutu and Mangonui purchases. In some cases the plans do not appear to have been in evidence when the deeds were signed, so that the Maori sellers could not be sure of the exact extent of the land transfered. In each of these cases, too, the reserve provisions of the original deeds were either overridden or unsatisfactory sales.

As we have already seen, the sales were complex, since there was no one single sale, but several. The Crown purchases, too, were staggered by initially reserving land from purchase, and then later purchasing these reserves. While in most cases the sales would appear to have been strictly legal, the - 134 - confusion that resulted was based on a deep suspicion that somehow the Crown had acted without justice, and that large areas of land had been confiscated in one way or another. Attempts by the Crown to point out the exact circumstances of each sale were treated with open distrust, and it is possible to trace a repeated pattern of complaint over specific blocks such as Taemaro right through from the 1865 to the present. 79

Finally, the impact of Crown land purcha~e policy between 1850 and 1865 can be best illustrated by the accompanying sketch map. (See Map 8 "Muriwhenua Crown Purchases and Maori Reserves 1850-1865" p. 135). The band of Crown purchases stretching from Ahipara to Whangaroa included perhaps 40,000 acres if the Mangonui purchase is estimated at 20,000 acres.

~ This area contained much of the most valuable agricultural and forestry land in Muriwhenua. Within this same area the Crown obtained approximately the same area as surplus land from the deliberations of the Land Claims Commissions between 1830 and 1860. Within this area, Maori land after 1865 became restricted :4- to the Reserves 1-13 listed on Map 8, three other Reserves (shown on Map 7 "Old Land Claims 1840-1860" p. 90) created by the Land Claims Commissions out of Goverment surplus land, and Maori customary land of approximately 10,000 acres. Most of the Maori Reserves within Crown purchases were surveyed at about 100 acres, but they were never Gazetted as Maori land, and they were apparently never administered as Reserves under the terms of the 1856 Native Reserves Act. This act provided for the establishment, with Maori consent, of local Boards of Trustees for administering the Reserves in the interests of future generations of Maori. The authors of this report have been unable to find any evidence that suggests that the Crown ever made any attempt to consult Maori about the appointing of such Trustees.

The two large purchases made in 1858 north of Awanui, the 13,555 acre Wharemaru and the 86, 885 acre Muriwhenua South blocks, did not fall within the most economically valuable area - 135 - during the 19th century. At that time Wharemaru was mostly swampland, and Muriwhenua South was mostly sand dunes. This is not to suggest that they were economically valueless. Far from it, both purchases contained valuable gumfields which became Kauri Gum Reserves after 1898, and they adjoined the valuable fisheries of Houhora and Rangaunu Harbour, and Ninety Mile Beach. Map 8 MURIWHENUA CROWN PURCHASES AND MAORI RESERVES 1850-1856

Ah;p..,d. II/Sf

Kaj~~~~--'---'C Il!'Sf

I

Source: Dept. Survey & Land Information, NZMS 261 (Waitangi Tribunal Division, 1989) CROWN PURCHASES - KURIWHENUA

DATE OF PURCHASE TURTON DEED NO. PURCHASE PRICE BLOCK AREA

28 May 1841 100.0.0 Pororua's interests 3 May 1850 2 5.0.0 Waikiekie 32 acres 17 September 1856 3 350.0.0 Oruru Valley 9,110 acres 22 September 1856 31 200.0.0 Te Whakapahu 2,688 acres 3 February 1858 34 1,100.0.0 Muriwhenua (South) 86,885 acres 3 February 1858 35 400.0.0 Wharemaru 13,555 acres 3 February 1858 36 230.0.0 Otengi 2,722 acres 29 August 1859 4 400.0.0 Kohumaru (Upper) 11,062 acres 30 August 1859 5 220.0.0 Waiake (Upper Aorere) 6,950 acres 7 September 1859 6 58.0.0 Kaiawe 1,375 acres 7 September 1859 7 300.0.0 Puheke 6,000 acres 7 September 1859 100.0.0 Ohinu 2,703 acres 13 December 1859 8 700.0.0 Ahipara 9,470 acres 25 January 1861 44 50.0.0 Kokohuia (Ahipara) 800 acres f--' 15 March 1861 11 250.0.0 Hikurangi 4,705 acres w 2 August 1862 12 388.3.3 Maungataniwha (East) 8,469 acres 0"1 2 August 1862 13 509 .17 .11 Mangatete 5,649 acres 14 January 1863 14 647.0.0 Maungataniwha (West) 12,940 acres No.1 14 January 1863 15 560.2.0 Maungataniwha (West) 11,002 acres No. 2 19 May 1863 16 100.0.0 Mangonui (Pororua's cLaims) 8 October 1863 17 1,2713.16.3 Te Pupuke (Upper side) 19,003 acres 27 September 1864 18 5.10.0 Taunoke (Victoria Valley) 44 acres 21 October 1864 19 39.10.0 Waimutu 79 acres 11 November 1864 20 43.2.6 Poneke 345 acres 30 May 1865 21 386.6.0 Toatoa 3,863 acres 30 May 1865 22 1,114.1.0 Kaiaka 7,427 acres

TOTALS: 9,530.8.11 2j9d per acre 120,988 acres

Source: Turton's Maori Deeds - 137 -

REFERENCES

1. Puckey's Journals I: 92-93, 154-155 [Doc C2]i J.G. Johnson (District Land Commissioner) to McLean (Head, Land Purchase Dept.) 23 February 1855, No.1, AJHR 1861 C~l, p.1. [Doc B20]

2. On White's Background see W.B. White "Reminiscences 1821-1908" (typescript, Auckland Public Library) pp. 1-14 [Doc C1]i and Richard Hill, Policing the Colonial Frontier 1767-1867 (Wellington, 1986) 1:267-269, 272-273, 280-281.

3. Puckey's Journals I: 216, 225-226. [Doc C2] White appointed as his first Assessors under Grey's Resident Magistrates Courts Ordinance the following chiefs: Puhipi (Rarawa) of Pukepotoi Popota (Rarawa, Kaitote hapu) of Mangatete; Makoari Kokota (Te Aupouri) of Parengarengai and Hohepa Poutama (Ngai Takoto) of Pukewhau. White to Colonial Secretary 28 December 1848, IA 48/124. On the political origins of the extension of colonial judicial power into Muriwhenua, see Alan Ward, Show of Justice (Auckland, 1973) pp. 74-75.

4. In this transaction Panakareao also gave up his claim to land along the Taipa Road from Mangonui. Waikiekie purchase , 3 May 1850 Turton's Maori Deeds of Land Purchases in the. North Island of New Zealand, No 2, p 2. [Doc B32]

5. White to Col. Sec. 8 Oct. 1850, IA 50/1826. Motu actually outranked both Panakareaoand Puhipi even though White and Puc key considered him insignificant. Register of Chiefs n.d. MA 23/25.

6. White to Col. Sec. 18, 31 Dec. 1850, 27 Jan. 1851, IA 51/47, 82, 253. Ward is quite mistaken in his view that White successfully "overawed" Panakareao in this instance. Show of Justice, pp. 78-79, 83. See also Hill, Policing the Colonial Frontier, 1:292.

7. White to Police Commissioner, Auckland, 2 Jan. 1852, IA 52/85. Despite Panakareao's protestations that he sought nothing more than forcing Maori "into obedience to his law," White maintained he "threatened to exterminate the whites unless his law was obeyed."

8. The Waitangi Tribunal considered the issue of Ngati Kahu rights in an area in which their neighbors claimed land rights , , ' ,,~. ~;~ ';-". ;".>::f;,~'C;;~h7;;-·~.::'<;"""''''G,(;;.~c. h h '~~'~''''-_"''',"=''''''''--'''''''''--'''~~~~''''''''~_""'\,:-~.-''~-'''~-;;'.",",,:>-·\C ',:, ,:>~:~: ·.~·.~'.;,C ~~) ~ -;;_i~:·,.:,:": ~~;_: :_:': :.s::::

- 138 - in Report ... on the Mangonui Sewerage Claim. (Wai-17) , August 1988, pp .12-21.

9. Puckey's Journal II: 260, 278-279 [Doc C2]; White to Col. Sec. 27 May, 1 July 1853, IA 53/1047, 1289.

10. Puckey's Journal II: 269 [Doc C2]; White to Col. Sec. 24 April 1855, IA 55/1305.

11. White to Ligar 15 June 1854, McLean Papers 633

12. Turton's Maori Deeds, Receipt No I, p 715.

13. WB White to Surveyor General, 3 July 1854; with annotations by CWD Ligar, 17 July 1854 and Donald McLean,28 July 1854, Ma Series 19/19, File N.

14. McLean to Col. Sec. 30 Aug. 1855, No. 52, Turtons Epitome of Documents, A-I, pp. 53-54; McLean to [Governor's] Private Sec. 21 April 1856, No. 53, ibid pp.54-55.

15. McLean to Governor Gore-Browne 20 March 1857, No. 56, ibid., pp. 56-58. Gore-Browne minuted this despatch on 27 April 1857: "1 concur in all that the Native Secretary says." ibid., p. 58.

16. Johnson to McLean 23 Feb. 1855, No.1, AJHR, 1861 C-1, p.1. [Doc B20]

17. H.T. Kemp (Native Sec.) memo 4 May 1855, No.2, ibid. p.2.

18. Nopera & Kepa to White 10 May 1855, encl. in White to Col. Sec. 30 May 1855, IA 55/1860. [Doc AI] McLean minuted that he appreciated White's action in reporting Panakareao's offer. He instructed Kemp to "give early attenion to the purchase of land at Mangonui." McLean memo. 18 June 1855, ibid.

19. White to Col. Sec. 18 Sept. 1855, IA 55/3275. [Doc A2] White also recommended that Johnson also be charged with defining Old Land Claim boundaries "as at present they give rise to many disputes."

20. Kemp minute 12 Oct. 1855, ibid. - 139 -

21. McLean to Kemp 17 Nov. 1855, encl. in Johnson (Acting Chief Commissioner) to Kemp (District Commissioner, Bay of Islands) 7 Dec. 1855, No.6, AJHR 1861, C-1, p. 4. [Doc B20]

22. Ibid.

23. White to Col. Sec. 31 Jan. 1856, IA 56/336. [Doc A4]

24. Puckey's Journal II: 306-309. [Doc C2]

25. Kemp to McLean 11 April 1856, No. 10, AJHR 1861, C-1, p. 7. [Doc B20]

26. Puckey's Journal II: 323-326. [Doc C2] Because Puc key did not render Panakareao contrite on his deathbed (as was the missionary custom), the dissatisfied missionary recorded that "his death was alas to all human appearances dark." Puckey also feared that Hokianga Te Rarawa would disinter the bones of Panakareao's father, Kaka, from his grave in the Kaitaia churchyard, and reinter them at Takahue.

27. Kemp to McLean, 12 April 1856, No. 11,. AJHR 1861, C-1, p. 8 [Doc B20]

28. White to McLean, 25 June 1856, No. 13, ibid. p. 9.

29. McLean to Kemp 29 August 1856, No. 16, ibid. p. 10. McLean's draft instruction was approved by both C.W. Richmond, the Native Minister and Governor Gore-Browne. Richmond & Gore-Browne minutes, 22,23 August on McLean to [Governor's] Private Secretary 22 August 1856, IA 56/2832. [Doc A6] Gore-Browne noted: "Approved and to be acted on without delay."

30. Kemp to McLean 7 Sept. 1856, No. 17, AJHR 1861 C-1, p. 11. [Doc B20].

31. McLean to Kemp 16 Sept. 1856, No. 19, ibid. In the same depatch McLean authorised Kemp to use White in the surveying of Crown purchases.

32. Kemp to McLean 29 Sept. 1856, No. 20, ibid. p. 12. - 140 -

33. In fact, White, who surveyed the block, did not complete his plan until June 1858, over 18 months after the deed was signed. White to McLean 29 June 1858, McLean Papers 633.

34. Oruru Valley Deed, 17 Sept. 1856, No.3, Turton's Maori Deeds I: 3-4 [Doc B32]; Waioioi, Oruru, and Parawai Block deeds [Ford's original Old Land Claim], 12 Nov. 1839, Panakareao's Endorsement,S Oct. 1840, No. 52, Turton's Private Purchases, pp. 44-46. [Doc B33]

35. McLean to Kemp 11 Dec. 1856, No. 27, AJHR 1861, C-1, p. 15.

36. McLean to Kemp 7 Oct. 1856, No. 22, ibid, p. 13.

37. White to McLean 15 Nov. 1856, McLeap Papers 633. A month later White wrote that Yates "has not the sanction of a single chief or European" in seeking to discredit the Oruru purchase. White to McLean 15 Dec. 1856, ibid.

38. McLean to Kemp 11 Dec. 1856, No. 27. AJHR 1861 C-1, p. 15. [Doc B20]

39. "Memorandum by Mr. White, Surveyor, Mangonui" nd. encl. in Kemp to McLean 19 March 1857, No. 32, ibid., p. 19.

40. McLean to Kemp 25 March 1857, No. 33, ibid. In a postscript, McLean reiterated that if "any injustice has been done towards him fie. Tipene], it must be rectified."

41. McLean to White 26 Dec. 1856, MA 4/2, p.126.

42. McLean to White 11 May 1857, No. 22, ibid. p.140.

43. White to McLean 15 Dec. 1856, 2, 9 March 1857, McLean Papers 633.

44. White to McLean 3 June 1857, ibid.

45. Kemp to McLean 12 June 1857, No. 37, AJHR 1861, C-1, p. 21. [Doc B20]

46. White's 21 September 1857 despatch as referred to in McLean to White 16 December 1857, No. 94, MA 4/2, p. 191. - 141 -

47. Thomas H. Smith (for McLean) to Kemp 1 August 1857, No. 47, / Turtons Epitome, D., p.28

48. McLean to White 16 Dec. 1857, No. 94, MA 4/2, p. 191.

49. White to McLean 10 Nov. 1857 (private), McLean Papers 633.

50. McLean to White 16 Dec. 1857, No. 94, MA 4/2, p. 191.

51. McLean to White 26 December 1858, No. 201, ibid. p.126.

52. Interest of Pororua and tribe in Land sold by Nopera, 28 May 1841, No.1; Oruru Deed 3 July 1854, Deed Receipts No.1, Turton's Maori Deeds I: 1, 715. [Doc B32]

53. According to the Department of Survey and Land Information's Annual Returns: Areas of Counties, the total land area of today's Mangonui County (which embraces 90% of the Muriwhenua claim area) is 248,300 hectares or 613,574.13 acres. In addition to 120,988 acres purchased by the Crown between 1850 and 1865, the Crown reserved to itself 37,712 acres in surplus land from the Old Land Claims The Crown also purchased 18,280 acres of land included in the Old Land Claims for scrip. Kemp to McLean 11 Feb 1857, No. 30, AJHR 1861, C-1, pp. 17-18. [Doc B20]

54. Kemp to McLean 10 June 1857, No. 35, ibid. p. 20; White to McLean 3 June 1857, McLean Papers 633. White noted that the sellers had agreed that, as soon as Muriwhenua South and Otengi (at the mouth of the Oruru River) had been sold, "the block formerly offered at Ahipara and at 'Pukeke , ... about which there is at present some difficulty, shall be sold to the Government ... " This indicates the cumulative effect of many of the Crown Purchases.

55. McLean to Kemp 26 Sept. 1857, No. 41, ; Kemp to McLean 7 Sept. 1857, No. 42, AJHR 1861, C-1, pp 22-23. [Doc B20]

56. McLean to Kemp 21 Dec. 1857, No. 43, ibid. p. 23.

57. Muriwhenua South, Wharemaru deeds 3 Feb. 1858, Nos. 34,35, Turtons Maori Deeds 1:48-51. [Doc B33] The difficulty in answering the questions about the plans referred to in these deeds is compounded by there absence from Turton's published volume of plans which accompanied his deeds volume. - 142 -

58. White to McLean 3 June 1857, McLean Papers 633.

59. Kemp to McLean 10 June 1857; McLean to Kemp 26 Sept. 1857; Kemp to McLean 7 Sept. 1857, Nos. 35,41,42, AJHR 1861 C-1, pp. 20, 22. [Doc B20]

60. Otengi deed 3 February 1858, No.36, Turton's Maori Deeds, I: 51-52 [Doc B32]; Waitangi Tribunal, "Mangonui Sewerage Report" Wai-17 (August 1988) p.22.

61. Alan Ward, "A Report on the Historical Evidence: The Ngai Tahu Claim", Wai-27 (May 1989) and the Crown submission, doc X6 (Wai-27). See also Ward, Show of Justice, pp. 35-36, 57.

62. McLean to Col. Sec. 29 July 1854, No. 41, Turtons Epitome, D., p. 21.

63. McLean to District Commissioners 3 May 1861, AJHR 1861, C-8, p. 1.

64. John Rogan (Acting Commissioner) to Kemp 21 April 1858, No. 50, ibid. 1861, C-1, p. 26. [Doc B20] The printed version of this letter refers to White's letter calling for the purchase of Tipene's reserve as enclosed, but it is not enclosed in the Appendices.

65. Waimutu deed 21 Oct. 1864, No. 19 Turton's Maori Deeds I: 22.1:22-23 [Doc B32]; "Mangonui Sewerage Report", p. 22.

66. The wording of the deed is: "The Settlements .of 'Taupo' and 'Motukahakaha' are excepted from this purchase; 'Taupo' 400 acres, 'Motukahakaha' 180 acres." Te Whakapaku deed, 22 December 1856, No. 31, Turtons Maori Deeds I: 45-46. [Doc B32] On the same day, White and Kemp concluded another purchase with Ururoa and Pororua on the other side of Whangaroa. Taraire I deed 22 December 1856, No. 32, ibid. pp. 47-48.

67. White to Mclean 28 Oct. 1858, McLean Papers 633. In this letter, White also mentioned Mangatete land which "politically it would be very desirable to purchase ... "

68. White to Native Secretary 28 August 1861, No.9, AJHR 1862, E-7, pp. 22-24. [Doc B1] White described the Ngati Kahu people living east of Mangonui as "civil and industrious and attached - 143 - to Europeans."

69. Mangonui deed 19 May 1863, No. 16, Turton's Maori Deeds I: 19-20. [Doc B32] The Waitangi Tribunal Division commissioned the services of Mr Peter Pangari, a descendant of Taemaro residents, to conduct independent research on subsequent transactions affecting his hapu.

70. White to McLean 29 June 1858, McLean Papers 633.

71. White to Kemp 7 Sept. 1858, encl. im Kemp to McLean 22 Sept. 1858, No. 59, AJHR 1861, C-1, p. 29. [Doc B20]

72. Kemp to McLean 16 Oct. 1858, No 63, ibid p. 31. The purchases in question were Puheke (6,000 acres), Kohumaru (11,062 acres) and Maungataniwha (East) concluded in Sept. 1859, Aug.1859, and Aug. 1862. Deeds, Nos. 7, 4, 12, Turtons Maori Deeds I: 4,8,14 [Doc B32]

73. Smith to Kemp 29 Nov. 1858, No. 65, AJHR 1861, C-1, p.32. [Doc B20]

74. Kemp to McLean 12 Sept. 1859, No. 80, ibid. p. 38. These purchases were concluded in late 1859 and (for Mangatete) in August 1862. Deeds, Nos. 5, 6, 8, 13, Turton's Maori Deeds I: 6,7,9,15. [Doc B32]

75. Smith to Kemp 17 Nov., 3 Dec. 1859, Nos. 84, 85, AJHR 1861, C-1, p. 40. [Doc B20]

76. Puc key Journal II: 405-406, 408-409. [Doc C2]

77. McLean to Kemp 15 Dec. 1860, 17 April 1861, Nos. 92, 94, AJHR 1861 C-1, pp. 42-43. [Doc B20]

78. Kemp to McLean 7 June 1861, No. 95, ibid. pp. 43-44. Enclosure 2 in this despatch, entitled "Accumulated purchases, Bay of Islands District, to March 1861" recorded that Kemp had purchased 217,718 acres for 7,558 pounds, and that he was negotiating the purchase of a further 109,800 acres.

79. Peter Pangari, a descendant of Taemaro residents, is documenting this series of Maori protests from 1865 to the present over this particular block. Peter Pangari, "History of the Taemaro Block" (Waitangi Tribunal Division, forthcoming). - 144 -

IX MURIWHENUA AS A MODEL "NATIVE DISTRICT" 1861-1865

At the beginning of the New Zealand Wars in 1861, Pakeha apologists for government policy denied that Maori opposition to rampant land sales caused the conflict. Charles Heaphy, a government surveyor, war hero, and later Commissioner of Native Reserves, presented this case to the House of Representatives. His 1861 submission, with a highly illustrative map (reprinted to help justify the invasion of the Waikato 3 years later), argued that the war was not a revolt of the dispossessed because Taranaki and Waikato, the most "hostile" areas, were the least affected by Crown purchases. Heaphy identified Muriwhenua as one of the three areas most affected by Crown purchases (the others were the Ngati Whatua and Ngati Kahungungu areas), which was also one of the most "loyal" areas. Referring to Muriwhenua people as " the Rarawa tribe at the North Cape [sic], numbering 107 souls [sic]", he stated, they had "retained but 264,000 acres [sic]" of their original tribal lands, but were nonetheless "loyal." Not only were they loyal, he claimed but they were also prosperous. They were "busily engaged in supplying the markets of Mangonui and Auckland with their produce ... [and] seem to be perfectly satisfied with ... the White man to whom they have sold a moiety, at least of their lands. "1 Heaphy's assumption of Muriwhenua loyalty during the wars contributed to the Pakeha myth of a Model "Native District."

The imperial government authorised the establishment of "Native Districts" in New Zealand as early as 1846 when it instructed Governor Grey to establish a new constitution for the colony. Grey, however, succeeded in delaying the adoption of this constitution for nine years. Since he objected to transfering substantial powers to a settler parliament, Grey delayed the colony's transition to "responsible government" until after the conclusion of his first term as Governor in 1853. Nonetheless, the imperial government insisted on - : -- " " ., '" -, '''-'~'~d",:, •. )_·_~:_,:,,,."'~:.J.:C'~:':;:::'~~:':::''~{{~>~"':'~"0'::''''':~:~. '~'''-.'"''-:'-.t'-'''-....,,_ ""-~~"-'~ '.~." '>, ":.<"-"-"" ~",.-" '~'-"" ", ,",-''-;' -'-'':'__ '':' •• ' '~"O',._'

- 145 - including provision for the creation of "Native Districts" as section 71 of the 1852 Constitution Act, which was not implemented until 1854. 2 Grey's successor, Gore-Browne, demurred from proclaiming "Native Districts" during his term (1854-1861) for fear of alienating the settler parliament which believed that such districts would limit its power over important areas of Pakeha settlement. Because Maori interests were not represented in the settler parliament (until the 1867 Maori Representation Act), imperial authorities hoped that, within "Native Districts", they would be represented in local government. Although such districts were never proclaimed, Muriwhenua was effectively recognised as such a district under the terms of the 1858 Native Circuit Courts Act. Muriwhenua or "Mangonui", proclaimed the first district under this act in the following year, became, in Pakeha eyes, a model of cooperation between Maori and the Crown. Ward depicts it as an example of how the New Zealand Wars could have been avoided. 3

Pakeha assumptions of Muriwhenua loyalty were probably based on the substance of White's reports, and the warm receptions Governor Gore-Browne received on his visits to Mangonui in 1857 and 1861. According to Puc key who met Gore-Browne at Mangonui on 15 February 1861, the Governor expressed his appreciation "that the people were all so well affected by the Queen's Government. "4 Puckey evidently failed to inform the Vice-regal representative that, had he attended a meeting to discuss the Taranaki situation at Ahipara on 16 January, he would have gained a different impression. Puckey had prepared Northern Te Rarawa chiefs for this meeting by assuring them "that the Queen had thier welfare at heart and would not take their lands from them nolens volens as some people wished to make them believe."s These chiefs, according to Puckey, dutifully registered their loyalty to the Crown at the Ahipara meeting, but Hokianga Te Rarawa chiefs, in the presence of several Pakeha settlers, denounced the government. One Hokianga chief even advocated driving the Pakeha off the land. 6 - 146 -

Despite the truculence of such "disloyal" kin, Puckey and White could console themselves that this "disloyalty" was confined to the Hokianga area where the dominant missionary influence was Catholic, not CMS, and which was outside the Native District administered from Mangonui. Six months later White actually went to Hokianga and apparently presented local Ngapuhi and Te Rarawa with a challenge to affirm their loyalty. At White's advice, Gore-Browne presumably wrote letters "to all the principal chiefs calling upon them individually to come forward, in aid of the Government in the event of their assistance being required. "7

White saw a clear relationship between loyalty and land sales. When he was reporting the Ahipara and Hikurangi purchases (involving 15,000 acres) in August 1861, he stated: "I was glad to engage the natives about these lands ... " By ensuring speedy payment for these purchases, he wrote, he would provide "a practical illustration of the benefits of selling land and of obtaining money [which] may be brought into opposition to· [or contrasted with] the evils of War." In the same despatch he went on to say that there would be "no peace [in Taranaki] until the natives are thoroughly beaten, no compromise [if] it is to leave chance of another War."s Two weeks later, White added that, in contrast to the "troublesome" Ngati Kuri, Te Rarawa people, led by Puhipi and Waka Rangaunu "have shown a laudable desire to improve their condition" and opposed the Taranaki "rebels." The government, however, had to be vigilant to (3nsure that they continued "to abandon their old customs." Otherwise, he concluded, they would regress to "indolence"and resistance to change. 9

Whether or not White succeeded in eliciting the cooperation of Hokianga chiefs in 1861, he had attempted to win the cooperation of Muriwhenua chiefs ever since 1848 by putting them on the government pay-roll. The Model Native District that later historians have credited White with creating in Muriwhenua was based on the appointment of chiefly Assessors to assist him in the administration of justice and the negotiation - 147 - of land sales. Thus, White appointed Panakareao as an Assessor just prior to his signing the deed for the first Crown purchase in 1850 at Mangonui township. Similarly, he appointed that "insolent Native" Pororua as an Assessor in late 1856, when the Oruru deal of that year looked decidedly shakey.

Richard Hill, in his official Police history, points out that, given the meagre resources at his disposal, this Assessor system was the only way in which White could have exercised effective authority in Muriwhenua. His police force after 1854 consisted of two men, a Pakeha Corporal, and a Maori Private. In this situation he was almost completely reliant upon Assessor cooperation in bringing offenders to justice.1o

McLean, the guiding force behind Crown land purchase policy during the 1850s and early 60s, stressed the need to appoint as Assessors reliable chiefs who had cooperated in land sales. These were the chiefs for whom land should be reserved "proportionable to their rank" after the "extinction of tribal title." He stated, quite candidly, that "English law cannot be strictly carried out without the agency of the Natives. "11 When the 1858 Native Circuit Courts Act reinforced Assessor authority, Mangonui became the first official "Circuit Court District".12 In 1860 Gore-Browne sought to replace the Assessor system with a single chief "selected [by the Magistrate], with the consent and approval of the hapu to which he belongs ... "13 White responded by defending his Assessors and calling for an increase in their pay. This, he said, would make them more responsible for their acts to that power [ie. the Crown] which it is not only our duty to cause them to submit to,by the only means by which the Native race can be preserved. "1 4

After returning from his February 1861 visit to Mangonui where he undoubtedly discussed the matter with White, Gore-Browne drafted a proposal for a "Better System of Government among the Rarawas" which was to serve as a model for -'.',-.. _'

- 148 - the rest of New Zealand. Instead of eliminating the Assessors, he proposed to appoint two to assist a salaried chief and the Resident Magistrate. With Taranaki very much on his mind, the Governor defined the main role of this new system as resolving disputes over the extent of tribal land until "an individualization of title may be ultimately accomplished. ,,15 McLean supported this proposal, but White saw its divisive potential. Speaking for his own district, he stated that appointing Puhipi as high chief would not only offend Ngapuhi, but also do little for his own Te Rarawa people because Puhipi (the only logical choice for the position) was "a man of the old school, kind, indolent, easy and always agreeing with the last speaker .•. "1 6

Throughout the war years Native policy dominated the colonial political agenda. In May 1861, the General Assembly forced McLean's resignation as Native Secretary (a position he had held together with that of Chief Land Purchase Commisioner since 1856). Premier William Fox saw the combination of two offices in the person of McLean as disastrous for Native policy in that it led Maori to suspect "that all acts of the Government originate[d] in a desire to get possesion of their land."17 Gore-Browne, too, lost the confidence of the Imperial government which relaced him with George Grey in October 1861.

Grey's Native policy, as analysed by Hill, concentrated on "incorporating selected Maoris into the pakeha state •.. [and] fostering state sanctioned Maori self-government. "18 Shortly after beginning his second term, Grey toured Northland with Francis Fenton and George Clarke (son of the original Protector of Aborigines in New Zealand) to launch this policy. His famed "Runanga" system had its pilot run in Muriwhenua where Grey dramatically increased the salaries of White's Assessors and created other positions for Maori. 19 After working with eight Assessors who were paid an average of nine pounds per year between 1858 and 1861, White was suddenly able to pay seven Assessors 40 pounds each, five "Probationers", three "Wardens, - 149 - and fourteen "Karere",or policemen, 10 pounds each. In addition, White was able to pension off five of his old Assessors at 20 pounds per year. This meant that White's Maori pay-roll increased from a paltry 67 pounds in 1860 to a more princely sum of 660 pounds in 1862. 20 Clearly, Grey's policy of increasing the number of Maori positions and the pay associated with them aimed not only at maintaining Muriwhenua loyalty to the Crown during the wars, but also at ensuring Maori cooperation.

Grey and White, however, were not always able to buy Maori cooperation, as the Victoria Valley/Takahue dispute of 1861-1862 illustrates. White and Kemp had failed in several attempts to acquire this area for a Canadian settlement in 1856-57, mainly because Panakareao and Ereonora were buried there. Karaka Te Kawau, the chief with local jurisdiction, also opposed the sale until 1860. That year his recovery from fever and White's 50 pound advance induced him to relent from his previous opposition. 21 White then brought his Assessors (who he was already referring to as the Runanga) to Victoria on 18 November 1861 to negotiate boundaries. Puhipi, Waka Rangaunu and Wiremu Kingi (a Te Rarawa Assessor between 1858 and 1862) opposed the sale because Karaka had failed to consult them in advance of his decision to sell. According to White: "This offended the dignity of the Chiefs, who opposed the sale to­ show that Karaka could not do as he pleased. "22 White and Kemp proceeded to conclude purchase of the adjoining Mangatete and Maungataniwha blocks on the assumption that they would eventually get control of Victoria. In June 1862, however, Hokianga Te Rarawa intervened to press their claims to the area, and Kemp decided to discontinue negotiations until "the whole of the claimants were united in their willingness to sell. "23

After having negotiated for between 10,000 and 20,000 acres of prime agricultural land, and after placing Karaka on the government pay-roll in 1862, the Crown ended up with only 44 acres of Victoria Valley land in 1864. The sellers of this - 150 - small piece of land across the Victoria River from the Mangataiore Native reserve included none of the members of White's Runanga. 24

Despite White's failure to buy-off Runanga members in an effort to clinch the Victoria Valley/Takahue deal, he was able to arrange the purchase of 68,821 acres (excluding the Mangonui purchase which probably came to 12,000 acres) of other Muriwhenua land between 1862 and 1865. The following chart shows the number of Runanga members involved in these purchases:

1862-1863 Runanga members involved in land sales

Member Crown Purchase Deeds Signed

Paraone Muriwhenua Puhipi Oruru, Kaiawe, Muriwhenua, Wharemaru, Otengi, Kokohuia Poutama Muriwhenua, Ohinu Karaka Oruru, Mangatete, Poneke, Toatoa, Muriwhenua, Wharemaru Tipene Oruru, Kohumaru, Maungataniwha, Waimutu, Toatoa Kaiaka, Otengi Paora Putete Maungataniwha, pupuke, Te Whakapaku Morenga Muriwhenua, Kokohuia Tuhua (none) Timoti Ngatote Puheke, Waimutu Ruinga Te Whakapaku, Pupuke Waka Rangaunu Oruru, Kaiawe, Muriwhenua, Wharemaru, Otengi, Kokohuia Reihana Kiriwi Oruru, Kaiawe, Muriwhenua, Wharemaru, Otengi, Kokohuia, Maungataniwha, Poneke, Toatoa, Kaiaka Heremaia Te Ara Maungataniwha, Pororua Oruru, Kohumaru, Manganui

NB. Positive identification of Runanga members on Crown Purchase Deeds is impossible because Turton's spellings of the names reconstructed from the signatures on the original deeds varies so much. The above list is therefore a guide to Runanga participation in land sales, rather than a precise record.

Source: Turtons Maori Deeds

The above list appears to substantiate Ward's conclusion that White was able to elicit Runanga cooperation in land sales (and other matters such as stock control and hospital administration). On these grounds, Ward states that White was New Zealand's "most successful [Resident Magistrate] in working - 151 - the Runanga system ... " Ward agrees with ex-Premier Henry Sewell who wrote in 1864 that the Runanga system, had it been given a fair trial, could have "reconciled native self-government with

British supremacy. ,,25 Unfortunately, in Muriwhenua the extent to which Pakeha were willing to concede "native self-government" depended upon continued Maori cooperation in selling land to the Crown. In a sense, Muriwhenua became a model "Native District", for Ward an example of how the New Zealand Wars elsewhere could have been avoided, only because land sales continued.

The Pirimona affair of 1863 demonstrates the limits of Muriwhenua loyalty, on which the notion of a model "Native District" is based. Rev.Pirimona Te Karari, a CMS clergyman, brought news of much exaggerated King military successes to Muriwhenua in October 1863. White suspected that King movement agents had been attempting to win support in Muriwhenua. He was therefore alarmed by Pirimona's statements which, he claimed threw Muriwhenua people "into a great state of excitement ... " Using Puckey as an interpreter, White confronted Pirimona at Kaitaia on 21 October accusing him of "acting more as an agent for Waikato than as a minister of religion." He explained to his superior in Auckland that Maori "national vanity" explained the popularity of Pirimona's message in Muriwhenua. Te Rarawa chiefs were as willing as ever to profess their loyalty, but suggested that White escort them to Auckland to size up the Waikato "threat." White recommended compliance with their request "after the [British] troops have made a forward movement, as it would tend to dispel the doubt of our position ..• "26

White later admitted that during the war years younger Maori "assumed an overbearing and boastful manner." For this reason, White, in April 1864, took Muriwhenua chiefs on a government sponsored guided tour of the Orakau battlefield. This apparently succeeded in convincing them that the government was in control of the military situation. More importantly, it shows that Muriwhenua loyalty was not as - 152 - unquestioning as white wanted to believe. Ultimately it was based on a recognition of the superior power and resources of the Crown. white had the good fortune to be able to display this power and resources at Orakau in April 1864. Had he attempted to display it to Muriwhenua chiefs at Gate Pa later that month, the outcome might have been quite different. 27

The final demonstration of Muriwhenua loyalty during the

New Zealand Wars c~me at a Hokianga meeting in 1865. Hokianga chiefs had called the meeting, apparently to respond to the confiscation policy the Government was putting into practice in the Waikato and Taranaki. At the beginning of the meeting, a Hokianga chief identified by a missionary informant as "Charlie Pukikura" called for the strongest possible response to confiscations. He declared "let us kill all the whites." Wiremu Kingi Rangaihi, one of White's Assessors then rose ln indignation saying that Te Rarawa had never murdered whites (an apparent reference to the killing of Volkner, the missionary, at Opotiki): "Kill the whites? No! No! ... let us be kind to and protect the whites ..• " Mohi Tawhai of Hokianga, a former mortal enemy of Panakareao who had buried the hatchet upon his conversion to Christianity in 1837, reaffirmed his loyalty. He called upon those present to look at the clothes they and their children wore, to look at the money they had, as examples of the good things whites had brought to New Zealand. Finally he called for a rejection of Pai Mairire and Hau Hau. 28

In the midst of the New Zealand Wars, McLean took time off from his pressing war-time duties in Auckland personally to participate in the Mangonui purchase negotiations. This is one of the few transactions throughout the Crown purchase period for which we have a Maori record. Hemi Paeara, one of the signers of the Mangonui deed, unlike White and Kemp who signed the deed for the Crown, recorded the significance of McLean's presence during the negotiations. In responding to Paeara's 1891 petition disputing the boundaries of the Mangonui purchase, White disengenuously denied cooperating with McLean in these negotiations. He stated that McLean mingled freely - 153 - among Muriwhenua people, "many of them he knew personally ... ", but he heard of no grievances raised in the many open, public meetings McLean appeared at for this very purpose. Paeara maintained that White had deliberately prevented Maori from presenting their grievances, particularly over the poorly defined Mangonui purchase boundaries, in mid 1863.29

Though it is difficult to verify Paeara's charges against White, who he described as a "land shark", it is clear that something very important happened at Mangonui in mid 1863. McLean would not have come there in the middle of the crucial Waikato campaign had he not believed that his presence was required to clinch the deal. In those circumstances, White probably attempted to shield him from any criticism of White's behaviour in an earlier phase of the negotiations. In any case, the people most aggrieved by the Mangonui purchase, Ngati Kahu Taemaro residents, have continued to protest the 1863 transaction to this very day.3D

White's own perceptions of his relationship with Maori during the New Zealand Wars is very revealing about what he thought was the proper role of the Crown in Muriwhenua. In writing to his friend Walter Mantell, McLean's second in command during the early 1860s, he stated that he hoped he hadn't been "quite a useless Government officer" during his 13 years at Mangonui. He believed that he had more detractors among Pakeha settlers than among Maori, "but still I have conquered in the main and established the fear of God in the hearts of all my known enemies." In his correspondence with McLean, White had identified the two most prominent of his "known enemies" as Samuel Yates of Oruru, and Walter Brodie, the Karikari land claimant who denounced Government land policy at the House of Commons in 1844, and became a member of the House of Representatives (and a stern critic of Governor Grey) during the 1850s.31 Though he had conquered such enemies who had accused him of arbitrary actions, especially in dealing with settler land, "I must confess they have left many a wound ... " On the other hand, with Maori "I generally have my , ; - ~-.,-- "'_~''''_''.-'''':'•• ,';::'.. 0':: ~::...:~,-,;:;:::.-...:.~. "~'< ~:

- 154 - way and they know it though I am not a bully, but I must give the natives credit, they are not really difficult to manage, if you go the right way about it [his emphasis]. White concluded by saying, on the eve of Grey's return to New Zealand, that he had great faith in Grey, and that he hoped Grey "will be able to establish his former influence among ... " Maori. 32

Though White believed Maori were easy "to manage", one of the requirements of White's successful Maori management programme was the continuation of his Runanga system of well paid Assessors, and the continued flow of Government payments for land. In 1865, when Mantell briefly succeeded McLean as Native Secretary, White asked him to increase the salaries of his 5 Probationers to bring them in line with his seven Assessors' salary of 40 pounds a year. He explained that " ... the amount is small but it puts the chiefs on an equality and prevents jealousies ... " Mantell, however, was unable to comply with White's request because, in 1865, he presided over the demise of the Native Department and had to observe the General Assembly slash the generous Runanga budget, the basis of Grey and White's Maori management policy.33

The slashing of the Runanga budget was also accompanied by delays in transmitting payments for land purchases White had already completed. He confided in Mantell:· "You know how impatient natives are when there is money due to them ... " Then he added, in apparent contradiction of this statement " •.. You have no idea how these delays annoy the natives and the trouble, they give me[.] Of course they all blame mer,] Europeans and all." This, of course, also contradicted his general belief that Maori were easy to manage if dealt with the right way. The right way depended on rewarding selected chiefs for their cooperation. It also depended on White maintaining his monopoly over state resources and power in Muriwhenua, something which antagonised Pakeha settlers there. In 1865 White feared that his reign as the Maharajah of Muriwhenua was coming to an end. Although he was appointed a Judge of the newly established Native Land Court, he feared that Chief Judge Francis Dart - 155 -

Fenton, the son in law of Captain William Butler (one of White's Pakeha settler critics), and an Awanui land claimant, would interfere with his right to continue his reign in Muriwhenua. 29

REFERENCES

1. Charles Heaphy, "Statistical Notes Relating to Maoris and their Territory" in "Further Papers Relative to the Native Insurrection" nd. AJHR 1861 E-1c, pp.1-4. [Doc B21] Heaphy's gross underestimation of Muriwhenua population is apparently based on a census conducted by Andrew Sinclair, Commissioner of Crown Lands in October 1860.

2. Ward, Show of Justice, pp. 85-87, 90-91.

3. Col. Sec. to White 30 Nov. 1859, No. 400, MA 4/3, pp. 238-239; Ward, Show of Justice, pp. 137-139.

4. McLean to White 17 Nov. 1857, No. 82, MA 4/2, p.183; Puc keys Journal 11:434. [Doc C2]

5. Ibid.,433

6. Ibid.

7. Smith to White 11 August 1861, No. 356, MA 4/4 p.374.

8. White to McLean 13 August 1861, McLean Papers 633.

9. White to Native Sec. 28 August 1861, No.9, AJHR, 1862, E-7, pp. 22-24. [Doc B1]

10. Richard Hill, Policing the Colonial Frontier I: 420. Hill points out that even though White continued acting as a provincial Inspector of Police after 1854, he relied entirely on his Magistrate's salary. He supplemented this income with surveying and customs fees. - 156 -

11. McLean to Gore-Browne 20 March 1857, AJHR 1862 C-1, pp. 356-357.

12. McLean memo 29 Dec. 1860 encl.1 in Gore-Browne to Newcastle 29 Dec. 1860, No.4, ibid. E-1, pp. 9-10.

13. Gore-Browne to Newcastle 29 Dec, 1860, No.4, ibid.

14. White to Native Sec. 31 Jan. 1861, No.1, ibid. 1861 E-3i, p. 3.

15. Browne memo nd. No.4, ibid. 1861 E-3d, pp. 3-4. [Doc B22]

16. White to Gore-Browne 30 March 1861, Puckey to Gore-Browne 15 March 1861, Nos. 7 & 8, ibid. pp. 5-6.

17. Fox minute [on Native policy] 8 Oct. 1861, No.2, ibid .. 1862 E-2, pp. 8-10.

18. Hill, Policing pp. 813-815. Grey had used a system similar to Runangas as Governor of Cape Colony before 1861.

19. Ibid. pp. 816-819. Grey initially placed White under the supervision of Clarke who he appointed as Civil Commissioner at the Bay of Islands. White, however, quickly established his independence with Grey's permission. Henry Halse to Clarke 27 Jan. 1862, No.2, AJHR 1862 E-9, p.6

20. "Returns of Officers employed in Native Districts, Mangonui District nd. ibid. 1864 E-7, pp. 2-3.

21. White to McLean 24 Oct. 1861, White to Native Min. 23 Dec. 1861, Nos. 2 & 6, ibid. pp. 371-374.

22~ Kemp to McLean 8 Dec. 1861, White to Native Min. 23 Dec. 1861, Nos. 4 & 6, ibid. pp. 372-374. On the other hand, White said, the other chiefs "assured me privately that the valley was virtually sold." Ibid.

23. Kemp to McLean 5 May, 18 June 1862, Nos. 7 & 9, ibid. pp. 374-375. - 157 -

24. Taunoke deed 27 Sept. 1864, No. 18, Turtons Maori Deeds I: 21-22. [Doc B32] The Victoria Valley/Takahue dispute paralleled the better known Tirarau/Matiu dispute at Hokianga during 1862. In both cases the Crown tried and failed to resolve them. White proudly claimed, at the conclusion of this dispute: "None of the people in my district joined in Tirarau's taua." White to McLean 4 July 1862, McLean Papers 633; Ward, Show of Justice p. 137.

25. Henry Sewell, "The New Zealand Native Rebellion" p. 14, cited in ibid., pp. 137-138, 145-146.

26. White to Native Sec. 2 Nov. 1863, No.2 AJHR 1863 E-20, pp. 2-3. Pirimona's account of King movement military successes were definitely exaggerated. He calculated that the Battle of Kirikiri (on 22 July 1863) cost the British 1,080 deaths and King forces only 7 deaths. According to Belich, in his widely respected study of the wars, Waikato military actions between 17 and 30 July 1863 cost the British only 27 "casualties" (ie. dead and wounded). Nonetheless, Pirimona's observations are consistent with Belich's main thesis that Pakeha invariably underestimated Maori military prowess. James Belich, The New Zealand Wars and the Victorian Interpretation of Racial Conflict (Auckland 1986) pp. 134-135.

27. White to UnderSec., Native Dept. 5 September, No. 16, A-J, 1868, A-4, pp. 36-37. [Doc B2] Belich recognises that Orakau was a "bitter defeat" for the King movement, even though it was not the great Pakeha victory claimed by later historians. Gate Pa, on the other hand, was unquestionably a Maori victory. Ibid., pp. 166-176, 178-188.

28. J. Matthews to Venn 26 May 1865, CMS/CN/O 61.

29. White to UnderSecretary for Lands 21 July 1891, encl. in Hemi Paeara's Petition No. 179/1921, Sess. II, MA 1925/306.

30. The Waitangi Tribunal Division has commissioned Peter Pangari, a direct descendant of Hemi Paeara, to investigate the full history of this claim.

31. White to Mantell 19 August 1861, Mantell Papers 401, Alexander Turnbull Library; White to McLean 29 June 1858, 5 July 1864, McLean Papers 633. On Brodie's criticism of Grey's Native policy, see Walter Brodie, New Zealand and the Constitution Act (Auckland, 1861). ' .• :····:-•.\~\u~.,'-' __ ,_\_" • , '

- 158 -

32. White to Mantell 19 Aug. 1861, Mantell Papers 401.

33. White to Mantell 20 March 1865, ibid.

34. Ibid. - 159 -

X ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL CONDITIONS 1865 TO 1900

After 1865 farming and gumdigging appeared to hold much promise for Maori economic adjustment. But there was much that was uncertain, and even futile, in the kind of agricultural experiments which missionaries like Matthews, and trading settlers such as Southee and Yates introduced. The cost of creating pasture or cropping land was prohibitive. Much of the land was not suited to the new agriculture, with the farms often poorly sited on bad soil in areas subject to flooding. During the 1850s and 60s the CMS mission farm at Kaitaia failed to generate significant agricultural and pastoral income. Consequently, Matthews sought to sell the land " ... giving the natives the first privilege of buying ... ", and, when that failed, he sought to rent it. Even then he was able to rent only 35 of the 1470 acres for a nominal price. 1

Despite his investment, the co-operation of Panakareao, and cheap Maori labour, Southee quickly got into economic difficulties, suffered bad flooding and crop failure. Consequently, Southee's Awanui farm which had so impressed Dieffenbach in 1843 was virtually abandoned by the time of his death in 1856. For the last decade of his life he was almost entirely dependent on his trading income. Even Samuel Yates, who was able to purchase the Muriwhenua No~th block in 1873 (with financial backing from an Auckland capitalist) for over 1,000 pounds, had to abandon farming in the Oruru valley" for extensive sheep rearing in the hill country of the area adjacent to Cape Reinga. 2

Further south, land so expensively developed for pasture became quickly overworked. Neither Maori nor Pakeha farmers appreciated that without systematic crop rotation and fertilizer, the agricultural methods being introduced were in many ways inferior to the early Maori cultivation where land was cleared, planted and then abandoned for new plots. While the Pakeha assumption was simply that modern 19th century methods were unquestionably superior, Maori expectations had I -- , , ...... ''>--·,...:', •• 'L\.:·....:.~cYt.:,{:,:,.Yi)ii:.S;.Y,~,.''''''';,,;L~:;::l.'"'}_i~....:·;3-,(...... _""-'''''-'·''-'''~'<~ _~,. '.'-" •• u< ~ «-,,-,

- 160 - been based on the belief that such methods would provide continued access to Pakeha wealth and goods. In this they were to be sorely dissappointed.

The Muriwhenua economy, of course, after 1865, and possibly as early as 1845, functioned within a national and world economy. In a national context, gold fields, sheep farming, even the wars of the 1860s and 1870s, left the

Muriwhenua economy in a ~ackwater. The global context was provided by the fact that after 1865 Kauri gum became an international commodity exported to both Britain and the United States.

Between 1865 and 1900 the Maori economy of Muriwhenua was dominated by a single commodity - gum. The extraction of Kauri gum has commonly been associated with Dalmation immigrants, but almost all Maori families of Te Aupouri, Ngati Kuri, Ngai Takoto, Ngati Kahu, and Te Rarawa were dependent on gum digging for a substantial part of their livelihoods for the whole of this seventy year period.

Apparently, Te Aupouri people inaugurated gum shipments to New Zealand's first gum export market, the United States, in the early 1840s when "a small consignment was shipped from Parengarenga to America." During the 1840s and early 50s, however, gum prices for New Zealand merchants remained at a miserable five pounds per ton, which translated into the appalling one cent per kilo Muriwhenua gumdiggers were receiving before 1856. By 1856, however, increased British demand for gum as a basic ingredient in high grade varnish production led to an increase in the export (merchant) price to thirteen pounds per ton. This trickled down to Muriwhenua diggers at the rate of 8.5 cents per kilo (see Ch. VII). A drop in gum prices in,1860 cut deeply into digger returns but after 1865 gum production, export prices and digger returns continued to increase until all three reached a peak in 1899 (see "Graph showing rise and fall of kauri gum exported from New Zealand 1850-1980," below).3 - 161 -

RISE AND FALL OF NEW ZEALAND KAURI GUH EXPORTS 1850-1980

9000

8000

WWl syllthetlcs Inlloduced 7000 . 6000 ~

5000 ~ e-o 4000 : c o 3000

2000

1000

~/__ ~~ __~~ __r-~ __~~ __~~~~~~~~O 1850 1860 1870 18801890 1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 19701980

Source: Bruce W. Hayward, Kauri Gum and Gumdiggers (Auckland, 1982) p. 46.

At first the gum was so readily available that it was simply collected from the surface, but once this had been taken, it was dug from the ground where it had fallen from Kauri forests long since decayed or burnt. On the Parengarenga Peninsula the trees had long since gone, but the gum remained below the surface over the entire area. The gum was located by means of a spear, a long thin rod of steel attached to a shovel handle and poked into soft swampy ground until it hit the hard pieces of gum beneath. The gum was then lifted to the surface with a hook on the end of a length of piping, or dug with a spade. A sack, known by diggers as a pikau, was used for carrying the tools and the recovered gum. The technology was simple, and although there were attempts to mechanise the operation, the technology remained much the same from the 1860s right through to the 1950s. Pumps were used, but the invention of devices to extract gum from the soil was never entirely successful and never threatened the economic position of the individual digger. Whereas in gold mining and forestry, the - 162 - technology involved favoured the creation of large, capital intensive companies, while there was gum, anyone was capable of taking it. As a result Maori diggers were never pushed out of the field, although they often became dependent on the power of individual gum buyers and their stores. 4

Although the technology was simple enough, the social organisation of gum digging was extremely varied and very culturally dependent. The Dalmatians remained tight knit, they were almost exclusively male, they adopted exhaustive methods of bringing the gum from the ground, digging out whole areas, leaving nothing behind. Much of their profits went back to Austria, often to fund the chain migration of relatives. Pakeha settlers used more individual approaches, going to the gum fields to earn some cash while trying to break in the farm or supplementing their incomes, when money was short or prices low. Many settlers regarded the gum fields of the north as some form of compensation for poor soils and isolation.

Maori gum digging was quite different altogether. It was part-time: few of the Maori diggers worked all year round, unlike the vast majority of Dalmatians, and all the British diggers who were not primarily farmers. But as with all nineteenth-century occupations, full-time cannot be assumed to be a continuing career. Many drifted in and out of the field, attempting a wide range of other occupations. For Maori diggers, gum was the safety-valve, the way of surviving until the next harvest, of coping with the disasters of floods, or crop failure, or because the demands of hospitality had called too heavily on the food supply. Although gum digging was very much a supplement to subsistence farming, at times when prices were high, farming suffered and crops were not planted at all. In contrast to Europeans, Maori gum diggers dug in families: they went to the field in family groups and women and children were all involved in the industry. Quite young children could be included in the monotonous and laborious task of cleaning gum for sale at the store.s - 163 -

Although gumdigging was necessary to support an increasingly landless people after 1856 (the date of the first major Crown land purchase), the Crown's representatives in Muriwhenua were often critical of its impact on Maori society. White reported in 1872 that Muriwhenua people "have been much occupied by kauri gum digging, and though this pursuit is no doubt profitable to them, I fear it is fraught with evil." He believed that gum digging exposed Maori to disease, because they had to camp out in the gum fields during the winter when food was scarce and disease spread. 6 His concern over the impact of gum-digging on Maori health, however, did not lead him to advocate viable economic alternatives to digging. Although White, and his successors, deplored the decline of Muriwhenua agriculture and whaling, they did nothing to foster these alternatives to gumdigging. Consequently, Muriwhenua people had to supplement agriculture and whaling production with gumdigging at the time of the year when gumfield living conditions were at their worst.

,Nor did White and his successors as Crown agents in Muriwhenua ponder the relationship between Maori dependence on gumdigging as a means of survival, and Maori landlessness after 1865 (the date of the last major Crown land purchase). The sale of over 120,000 acres of their best agricultural, pastoral and forest lands between 1856 and 1865 (see Chapters VII & VIII) greatly increased Muriwhenua dependence on gum, and on cash. White, the man who laid the ground work for the transfer of the best Muriwhenua land from Maori to Pakeha before 1865, also presided over the next phase in the transfer of remaining Maori land from tribal to individual ownership. As the Judge of the Native Land Court at its Muriwhenua sittings between 18 April 1865 and 19 October 1869, White inaugurated the pattern of fragmentation that rendered many Maori lands uneconomic for over 100 years. Both land loss and fragmentation combined to increase Maori dependence on a cash-based gum economy that persisted until the 1920s. - 164 -

Although White did not intend to render Maori lands in Muriwhenua uneconomic by fragmenting them, he set in train over 100 years of Native (then Maori) Land Court decisions on Muriwhenua agriculture. As early as 1861, White sought to persuade Muriwhenua people to cooperate in "individualizing their lands .•. " At that time he admitted that this process would be extremely confused by the multiple "tribal and hapu right[s]" involved, but he assured his superiors in Wellington that Maori conceded the "desirability" of such a process. 7 After presiding over 8 Native Land Court sittings over 3 years, White proclaimed the Court a great civilising institution. In his opinion individualizing land titles was "the best thing which had been done for the Native race; it is the surest guarantee to peace, as it gives them a real stake in the prosperity of the country, and enables them to dispose of their surplus land in the way which pleases them best."B Five years later, in a similar self-congratulatory tone, White reported that Muriwhenua people continued their "steadily improving in civilization." He wrote that those to whom he had awarded individual title during his Native Land Court sittings were selling this land to both the Government and to Pakeha settlers. He thoroughly approved of such sales because it enabled Maori divesting themselves of their land "to live better" with the cash proceeds of the sale. The fact that they were then forced to either work for Pakeha farmers, sawmillers, or dig gum apparently escaped him. 9

The individualization of Maori land, of course, was a national process, not just one that affected Muriwhenua people. Francis Dart Fenton, Chief Judge of the Native Land Court for its first 16 years, and an Awanui landowner, believed the Court performed a great service to New Zealand by "putting an end to Maori communal ownership. He also believed that any restriction placed on the sale of Maori land, after it had passed through the Court, "would tend to perpetuate the evil [of communal ownership] instead of removing it."1o Ex-Premier and Native Minister Henry Sewell explained the two-fold purpose of the - 165 -

Court as, firstly, to "bring the great bulk" of Maori land "within the reach of [Pakeha] colonisation,"and, secondly, "to destroy if it were possible the principle of communism ... which stood as a barrier in the way of all attempts to amalgamate the Native race into our own social and political system. "11

until his retirement in 1877, White exercised the authority of the Crown in Muriwhenua in keeping with this vision of amalgamation of Maori into the Pakeha world. His reports, and those of his successors, all bear the stamp of a paternalism towards Muriwhenua people based on both his Victorian sense of cultural superiority, and on the very real power he exerted over Maori in his district. He could exert this power either as a Native Land Court Judge (between 1865 and 1869), or as a Resident Magistrate with both police and judicial powers. His successors, G. Kelly (1878-1881) and H. W. Bishop (1882-1900), followed in his footsteps. Their reports to Native Ministers and Under Secretaries of the Native Department (until it was abolished in 1892) provide the best available record of the motives and outcomes of Crown policy in Muriwhenua between 1865 and 1900. 12

Just as White stressed Muriwhenua loyalty in his reports during the New Zealand Wars (1861-1865), he continued to stress their willing compliance with the law after 1865. But just as this loyalty before 1865 was not unquestioning obedience (see Ch. XI), so Muriwhenua cooperation after 1865 was not unconditional. The first condition for cooperation was that White continue to rule Muriwhenua indirectly through the Runanga he had originally set up in 1848. Although he was forced to reduce Assessor salaries in 1865, when Parliament cut Grey's Runanga budget and temporarily abolished the Native Department, White continued to rule through Maori Assessors. In 1868 he complemented their "impartial and painstaking. administration of justice, "and he claimed "this is the only country district in New Zealand" where Maori had not had to be coerced into obeying the law.13 - 166 -

Another condition of loyalty to the Crown was that it provide Muriwhenua people with an effective mediation service, especially in resolving inter-hapu land disputes. In mid 1867 300 warriors gathered in the Victoria Valley where Whangape and local residents disputed the location of their land boundaries. After they had exchanged volleys of shots, White intervened successfully by staking out mutually acceptable boundaries. White, of course, saw his mediation as confirming the legitimacy of Pakeha rule. Muriwhenua people probably accepted his role in this regard, but their acceptance was based on his successful performance in this, and in other roles. In so far as they perceived him protecting Maori interests he was successful, but on land questions generally he was usually perceived as jeopardising Maori interests. 14

The complexity of White's relationship with Muriwhenua chiefs is revealed in the 1869 "Register of Chiefs" compiled by the revived Native Department. The report card for each chief was based on both White's reports to Wellington, and on the added comments of E. W. Puckey (the son of W. G. Puckey who grew up in Kaitaia during White's regime, and who himself became a Resident Magistrate further South, and a candidate for White's position when he was due to retire during the 1870s). White praised Te Morenga of Ahipara as a "peacemaker" and Reihana Kiriwi of Parapara as "An Assessor under the Native Land Court-a very clever well informed sensible chief." Puc key added: "The Resident Magistrate's right-hand man." Likewise, Waka Rangaunu (Ahipara) was "a great upholder of the Law," and Puhipi Te Ripi (Pukepoto) "an amiable man possessing great influence •.. anxious to stand well with Europeans •.. " On the other hand, Hohepa Poutama was an "argumentative chief-is always first in land questions but has little influence in other respects." Puckey, however, disagreed with this last statement. He also disagreed with White's description of Tipene Te Taha (Oruru) as "very ambitrous proud or overbearing hasty in disposition ... " but without "much influence", quoting - 167 -

White's own reports as contradicting this negative judgement. During the 1850s White had condemned both Tipene and Pororua Wharekauri as "insolent natives" (which didn't prevent him from appointing both as Assessors), but while still denouncing Tipene, in 1869 he had come to find Pororua praiseworthy. He dismissed Tipene from the Runanga for "allowing a criminal to escape," but, remarkably, he praised Pororua as "a sensible chief of high rank and considerable influence, personally and by birth. "1 5

This Register of Chiefs reveals a close but changing relationship between White and his Assessors. Assessors earning most praise were probably those who White found most cooperative at the time. Those who cooperated most of the time, such as Reihana and Puhipi, were probably highest in his esteem, especially if they cooperated in selling land. White, even admitted, however, that Assessor cooperation was based on the fact that economic weakness and depopulation continued to be a major characteristic of the area, at least until the late 1870s. White remarked that this situation increased Muriwhenua dependence on Government assistance, which was reflected in Assessor cooperation with him. 16

Despite this candid recognition of the plight of Muriwhenua people in 1872, White's paternalism allowed him to see hopeful economic signs. That year he also reported agricultural development with Maori acquiring more Pakeha implements and draft animals, putting in new fences and increasing crop acreages. He also noted Maori bushmen taking on timber cutting contracts with local sawmillers. Hauling out logs with their own bullocks, they demonstrated "an unmistakeable desire to share with the Europeans the profits of industrial pursuits. "17 His hopes for Maori economic success on Pakeha terms, however, assumed that Maori would have access to sufficient productive land to allow them to expand their enterprises. Unfortunately, the best forestry land for Maori bushmen, between Ahipara and Whangaroa, had passed almost - 168 - entirely out of Maori hands between 1856 and 1865, a process greatly facilitated by White.

White could have supported Maori pastoral activities on the Te Aupouri Peninsula by ensuring that the land north of Te Kao stayed in Maori hands. Since neither agriculture nor forestry on a commercial scale were possible north of Awanui, sheep and pig rearing was the only alternative to gumdigging and whaling in that area. White advised the Government not to assert its right to own the Muriwhenua North Block as part of the surplus land portion of Taylor's claim dating back to 1839-40. He realized that this would have outraged the Te Aupouri people who rejected the Government's claim to the block, but instead of urging Te Aupouri retention of the 56,000 acre block for pastoral purposes, White negotiated the sale of this land to Samuel Yates and his Auckland-based partner for 1,050 pounds in 1873. This, he wrote, ensured that "the Government, without trouble or expense, derive a revenue, both directly by fees and indirectly by the beneficial occupation of the land by Europeans." He clearly assumed that only Pakeha were capable of developing the land, and Maori, therefore, became virtually landless up and down the Te Aupouri Peninsula. 18

Although disputing the terms of this sale, Te Aupouri let it go through. Perhaps this was because they were "occupied in digging gum" (at a time of rising gum prices) rather than in raising sheep. Many Te Aupouri were also deeply in debt with Yates who was the only gum trader in the area. In reporting the transaction, White went out of his way to exempt Yates from criticism of the way other Pakeha gum traders bought cheap and sold dear to Maori diggers. Although he had accused Yates of "Jew" trading practices when he operated at Oruru in the 1850s, in 1873 White described his former implacable opponent as "most kind and gentle with the Natives," a person who had "their confidence." This transformation of White's relationship with Yates from one of hostility in the 1850s, to one that - 169 -

facilitated the largest private land purchase in Muriwhenua history leaves many questions unanswered. For example, why was a public official negotiating a private purchase? Did he receive a commission for his services in negotiating this purchase and distributing the proceeds among the Te Aupouri sellers? 19

As White neared the end of his career, he expressed to Native Minister McLean, his personal friend, warm feelings of the "strong influence in and regard for the [Muriwhenua] people over whom I have presided for over a quarter of a century ... " He told McLean that if he was replaced as Resident Magistrate, however, "the Natives would fall back into their old habits. "20 While publicly praising the Native Land Court as a civilizing agency, White privately denounced Fenton's control of its procedures as creating Ita most expensive and solemn farce [sic.] quite opposed to the simple ascertainment of native title intended by the Legislature at first ... " He also accused his fellow Native Land Court Judge, Frederick Maning, of a conflict of interest in dealing with the Te Rarawa claims of his wife'S relatives. Finally, he accused Gilbert Puc key of "intriguing to get the natives to petition for his son Walter's" appointment as White's replacement. 21 White's private accusations belie the public image of the benevolent ruler he so assiduously cultivated for himself.

Kelly, the man who replaced White in 1877, continued his paternalist tradition, but he inherited 'some of the serious problems issuing from Maori resentment at the powerlessness White had consigned them to. During the 1880s he and his successor, H.W.Bishop, had to confront a Waitangi inspired Runanga movement which attempted to win local autonomy for Maori. Kelly identified this movement as an attempt "to inaugurate a new system of self-government", which he saw as a threat to his own authority. He believed the main source of dissatisfaction with his administration was his enforcement of dog and sheep taxes which had led him to fine Maori who refused to pay. This, he believed, meant that "with the assistance of - 170 -

Reihana Matiu of Kaitaia", his most "loyal" Assessor, he had "succeeded in stamping it [the Runanga movement] out entirely." This was quite mistaken, as his successor would soon discover.22

Another problem Kelly inherited from White and bequeathed to his own successor Bishop was that of inter-hapu land disputes. In late a 1880 dispute between three hapu in the

Ahipara ar~a almost erupted in warfare. Puhipi Te Ripi's son, Timoti, failed to mediate successfully. After a fruitless 6 hour meeting of 300 angry people on 25 December 1880, Kelly, in exasperation, asked those present if they had reflected upon the significance of Christmas in their own lives. This, he wrote, "had a magic effect upon them, and was the means of enabling me to bring about a reconciliation." He added that they had "now returned to their former quiet" and, with all Te Rarawa people, exhibited "loyal and obedient submission to our laws ... "23

When H. W. Bishop took over from Kelly in 1883, he too referred to Muriwhenua people as being "as peaceful and loyal as ever ... " Like White he believed Maori wanted to individualize their land, but regretted that steep survey and legal costs associated with this made it prohibitive. These costs formed part of a major Maori grievance against the operation of the Native Land Court throughout the country. Before 1865 the Government paid for the surveys of the Crown purchases and the drafting of legally binding deeds of sale, but after 1865 these costs were passed on to the Maori awarded title by the Court. If the awardees were unable to pay these costs, a lien was placed on their land and part of it could be sold to private bidders (usually Pakeha) to pay the costS.24

Though he saw the practical hazards of individualizing Maori land, Bishop was nonetheless ideologically committed to this process as the essential path to progress for Muriwhenua people. He convinced himself that under the communal system enterpising individuals had no incentive to improve land - 171 - because their lazy relatives would reap the benefits. Individualization, he proclaimed:

would, in the end, have the effect of doing more to break up the mischevious system of communism than anything else that could be suggested. Huis, hakaris, &c would then be almost impossible, and the popular means of impoverishment would be done away with.

He recommended the subdivision of all Muriwhenua Maori land into 10 acre lots, which would have been uneconomic units, but did not suggest how awardees would pay for the associated survey and legal costS. 25

The hui and hakari Bishop identified as the source of impoverishment for Maori were in fact those held in conjunction with the Runanga movement which swept Northland during the 1880s. Far from stamping out this movement, Kelly increased its appeal in Muriwhenua by arresting its leaders on tax-evasion charges. A large Muriwhenua delegation attended the 1883 waitangi meeting which Bishop described as Ita most unhealthy agitation ... " On the dog and sheep tax, he admitted, Muriwhenua people would resist it "by every means in their power ... ,,26 Bishop condemned Ngapuhi "harping up on the Treaty of Waitangi .•. "and tried to convince himself that Muriwhenua people would have none of their "agitation." Not only was this untrue of Muriwhenua people, who supported the movement, it was also untrue to charge Ngapuhi with "disloyalty." When former M.P. Mohi Tawhai brought the Bay of Islands Runanga to Mangonui in January 1885, he took the oath of allegiance to the Crown in Bishop's presence, and then administered it to the other 10 Runanga members. On one count Bishop was willing to acknowledge the truth. He admitted that: "For a long time past Natives have got into the way of looking upon the Government as an opposing power, determined to grind them down ... "27

A widespread grievance against Government that contributed to the autonomous Runanga movement was the longstanding issue of surplus land. Bishop recognsed that Muriwhenua people had: , , , ."" ',,':',', ~ '>2t~j;":, ~'::':":'~"-'-::"~~~~_~~~:c0~ >:;';.;.'(.5-;:~ ~.J.0:::,..;>\~,~~h~00 ... )~-,>w ~J',.<, •• ~0u, ;'C'~~'''''::;d,~ L;_'''>''':.-''': ,.:: ,.:.. :.'·.:'..~-·;2 \-~ \;'_':: '-;,~ \::!;;>.\:

- 172 -

a fixed idea that it is possible for them to recover possession of these lands, and in some cases considerable sums of money have been collected in order to enable these claims to be prosecuted

He saw no possibility of redress except through the Native Land Court. He also was willing to admit that unless Muriwhenua people believed they were adequately represented in local government, they would refuse to pay taxes designed to support local government such as the dog andfoheep tax. Nonetheless, he believed that ultimately they would have to "reconcile themselves to the inevitable" and recognise the futility of their protest. 28

The autonomous Runanga movement would not go away, however, as much as Bishop wanted it to. The March 1889 waitangi meeting attracted 1500 participants and 3 years later it was still well attended. On both occasions Bishop condemned it as being impractical. The 1889 affair was nothing but a "big show" as far as Bishop was concerned, "with the result that they [the participants] have subsequently to undergo a lengthened period of semi-starvation. "29 Here again was his identification of hui and hakari with impoverishment rather than empowerment, but for all his criticism of the impracticality of the Runanga movement, he was unable to suggest practical solutions to the problems of landlessness and powerless that gave rise to the movement.

Generally, Bishop evaded practical solutions in favour of ideological formulations. While he recognised the flaws in the Native Land Court, he continued to see it as the vehicle of Maori redemption which would require not only "a radical improvement in their mode of living," but also "a complete abandonment of the system of communism" that shackled them in its savage grasp. He hoped for a future "when we shall see the Maoris a happy and prosperous people, able to compete with Europeans in all those industries and walks of life which conduce so much to prosperity. "30 - 173 -

While Bishop talked of his hopes for Muriwhenua prosperity, the reality of life for Maori there was one of poverty. As early as 1868, missionary William Puckey noted the existence of widespred poverty in Muriwhenua, even among Pakeha. He reported that many Maori and almost half the Pakeha settlers had gone to the Thames and Coromandel goldfields, "such was the depression and almost total absence of money ..• " In connection with this poverty, he remarked that Maori " have sold land and want to sell more to the Government ... ", but the Government was unable to resell its land to Pakeha, and therefore would not buy much more Maori land. He believed "the Maoris are decreasing in numbers and influence, and nothing but true and vital godliness can raise them." He believed that they were much poorer than they were 20 years earlier, a judgement White made too in his annual report that year compiled 20 years after his arrival at Muriwhenua. Puckey's judgement that Maori sold land, not necessarily because they wanted to, but because dire poverty forced them to, is amply supported by the historical evidence. 31

White in 1873 noted that the indebtedness of many Maori was so serious that they had lost hope of ever completely repaying their creditors. He suggested that Pakeha gum traders and storekeepers were chiefly responsible for this deplorable situation, and he recommended that the Government should legally protect Maori from what we recognise today as debt-peonage. 32 White also noted the incidence of unemployment among Maori, though seldom relating this to discrimination or landlessness. Maori would compete with Pakeha for the many road and bridge-building contracts let during the 1870s, but Maori, he wrote, "are scarcely to be trusted with the building of culverts." In the same report he did note the impact of landlessness on gumdigging when he stated that the fact "that the large majority of [gum] lands had passed out of the hands of the Natives" had restricted their digging. 33

Bishop normally explained as the causes of Maori poverty, - 174 - idleness and resultant neglect of agriculture and forestry. He reported in 1884 that there was always plenty of work cutting Kauri for local sawmillers, "but Maoris are not suited to constant labour ... They are fond of change and novelty and cannot be induced to remain long in any settled employment." This shiftlessness he also saw as the source of the decline in cropping. 33 In his 1885 report he accused Maori of "frittering away" their timber and gum income, but he contradicted this in referring to the difficulties inherent in timber cutting contracts. He stated that Maori bushmen would begin cutting for sawmills "in a flourishing manner" but then find they lacked the capital to replace equipment and deliver the timber to the mill. Consequently, they were forced to default on their contracts and pay the penalty.34

Bishop was honest enough to recognise how the New Zealand and world-wide economic depression of the late 1880s and early 90s exacerbated Maori poverty, especially in contributing to a drop in gum prices. 35 But he continued to blame the victim. In 1891 he wrote: "Laziness and want of thrift are the curse of the Maori ... They lack the main incentive to downright industry, ie. poverty, for they can always command a fair amount of income by spasmodic gumdigging ... "36 Thus, having remarked upon widespread poverty as a serious problem in all his annual reports between 1884 and 1888, Bishop decided,in the midst of the depression, that Muriwhenua's main problem was the lack of poverty. Once more his ideological formulation, based on his abiding Eurocentric faith in the individual as the master of his fate, precluded suggestion of any practical solutions to Muriwhenua's basic economic problems.

Both a cause and consequence of poverty was the persistent ill-health of many Muriwhenua people from 1865 to 1900. Both White and Bishop, again, tended to blame the victim in explaining this problem to their superiors. White, in 1868, explained as the causes of the 50% reduction in Muriwhenua Maori population during his 20 years at his post " ... deleterious food, immoral habits, constant state of war [?] - 175 - and anxiety.37 Four years later he explained how the harsh conditions of winter gumdigging contributed to mortality. On that occasion, he prevailed upon his friend McLean to reappoint a Native Medical Officer at Mangonui. The Government had abolished this position and closed its hospital at Mangonui as a cost-cutting measure in 1865.38 When Dr. Trimnell resumed his duties in the late 70s he found himself in competition with a popular Maori healer, a female tohunga at Ahipara who attracted patients from as far afield as Auckland. Her popularity interfered with Trimnel's vaccination campaigns. When Muriwhenua encountered its last major typhoid epidemic in 1884, Bishop couldn't refrain from again blaming the victim. Maori knew full well that they were responsible for this, he wrote. Their "choice of low lying and damp situations as the sites for their kaingas, and an utter and persitent disregard of the most ordinary sanitary precautions" caused the epidemic, as far as he was concerned.39

When, in 1887, Bishop proclaimed that it was "apparent to everyone that •.. only by a radical improvement in their [Maori] mode of living, and by a complete abandonment of the system of communism ... can we hope to stay the gradual decay of the race," he was referring to sanitation. 4o The following year, in exasperation, he announced that they had ignored his advice to select "more healthy situations for their kaingas." Their ill-health, he believed, would continue until they were forced to individualize their land, "and thereby ... break up their present communistic style of living.41 Here, again is Bishop's ideology standing in for practical solutions: "communism" was the source of all Maori problems, and to solve any of them they had essentially to become Pakeha.

Had Bishop taken a more practical position, he would have noticed that there were some hopeful demographic and economic signs during the 1880s and 90s. The Maori Census Returns for the period from 1870 until 1901 suggest that Muriwhenua's Maori population slowly recovered after 1878 from a low of 1,743 to reach 2,101 in 1886, 2,117 in 1891 , 2,275 in 1896 and 2,836 in - 176 -

1901. This is despite the fact that 19th century Maori Census Returns normally underestimated Maori population in remote areas, and the fact of increased migration to Hokianga and the Bay of Islands during this period. 42

MURIWHENUA POPULATION 1867-1901 (within the Mangonui Native District and County)

3,000

2,500

2,000 ~- /

1,500 18~0

Source: Michael Eyes, "Maori and European Population Histories in the Muriwhenua Region 1810-1901 (Waitangi Tribunal Division, 1989) p. 30. - 177 -

The point is that Bishop paid no attention to these statistics. Neither did he pay heed to agricultural census information published in 1886, 1891 and 1896 which revealed increases in individual, and declines in communal, Maori production. The following chart presents a picture which partly confirms Bishop's observations on the "neglect of the kaingas", ie communal cultivation, which he would regard as a hopeful sign, but this is balanced by the increases in individual cropping, and the increases in numbers of sheep and pigs.

Mangonui County Agricultural and Pastoral Statistics 1886-1901

Individual Crops Common Cultivation Livestock (acres) Potato Wheat Maize Grass Other Potato Wheat Other Sheep Pigs

1886 70 86 174 90 125 2 378 896 2835 1891 30 14 131 368 94 78 299 1090 2302 1896 193 20 188 408 542 16 46 3336 2686 1901 291 37 255 713 331 25 24 4329 3251

Source: New Zealand Census, Maori Population 1886-1891

Common cultivation, which exceeded individual cultivation in 1886 by 505 acres to 420, by 1901 included only 49 acres, while by then 1627 acres were in individual cultivation.

Unfortunately 19th century Census returns did not compare Pakeha and Maori agricultural production on a county by county basis. The only comparable local statistics are those for livestock and population~ The 1891 Census recorded that Pakeha owned 16,336 sheep, 5,548 cattle and 1,092 pigs, compared with the 1,090, 975, and 2,302, respectively, owned by Maori in Mangonui County that year. 43 On a per capita basis, Pakeha owned 10.13 head of livestock, while Maori owned only 2.06 head , - '".' .. .:; -,' ...",::' ,2 ~:-~-~;..:. -:_~~" .. ~~:,:~~'~_,".-~;_;, ,. ~:, ,.1: ~ -

- 178 - in 1891. Population figures show that by 1891, Pakeha outnumbered Maori in Mangonui County, although between 1896 and 1901 Maori population grew faster than Pakeha.

Maori-Pakeha Population 1874-1901

Year Maori Pakeha Ratio

1878 1,743 1,204 1.5: 1 1881 1,767 1,471 1. 2: 1 1886 2,101 1,833 1.1: 1 1891 2,117 2,267 0.9:1 1896 2,275 2,858 0.8:1 1901 2,838 3,201 0.9:1

Source: New Zealand Census 1878-1901

Government attempts to promote socioecomic development in Muriwhenua between 1865 and 1900 included its efforts to foster public education, with a heavy dose of vocational training for boys and domestic training for girls. In 1868, one of the sons of Joseph Matthews ran the Government school at Awanui, but he had great difficulty in getting Maori parents from other parts of the district to send their children there. White believed that without the Government compelling parents to cooperate "education in this district is a dead letter. 1144 Once the Government built another school at Pukepoto a few years later, attendance improved. In this case, however, White complained that Timoti Puhipi should have been compelled to contribute 20 pounds towards the Pukepoto school, and that other communities wanting Government schools should be likewise compelled to contribute to their construction, maintenance, and to teacher salaries. 45

The Government opened a Parengarenga school in October 1873, but problems with accommodation and staff led to its closure only 17 months later. 46 The 85 pounds raised had supposedly been provided for a church and a school, and the non-provlslon of either remained a sore point for Te Aupouri, especially as sending children as far away as Awanui and - 179 -

Pukepoto caused considerable distress. 47 Officials pondered the reopening of the school for some years, unable to decide just where a school should be located for the scattered whanau of Muriwhenua. 48

In 1874 White reported six schools operating in his district. The Government followed his advice and required community contributions to their building and upkeep. White, with great satisfaction, wrote that this would help bre~k down "that constant craving for Government support which has been so conspicuous in all former efforts to raise the standard of Native character. ,,49

Te Aupouri people were left without a school for their children after 1874 until they were able to open one at Te Kao in the early 1880s. This decision did not satisfy those who lived 30 kilometres north at Kapowairua. In 1891 Muru R Hongi and Matai Tipene, along with 25 others, petitioned the Native Minister for a school, arguing that Te Kao was just too far away for their children. 50 At the time, Te Aupouri were scattered throughout Muriwhenua, and there was no single place with sufficient children to warrant a school. The largest kainga were at Kapowairua and Parengarenga, but there were about eight other settlements, usually occupied by one or two families. None of the settlements held more than a dozen children. Political considerations were important in the choice of a site. The selection was made by consulting Te Aupouri, and the Department appears to have believed quite strongly that any decision would only provide a workable school if it had Maori support. 51

At the time, Te Aupouri were in almost complete economic dependence on Samuel Yates. As the Department's agent reported in a confidential note:

Mr Yates is the only trader of any importance in that district; he also leases or owns all the land, - except Maori reserves - North of Parenga Harbour; All the Maoris - ,- , • ',.',."\! I, "\L"''',),c'.0< '._\.~ ,. ,:..:', .... ,;,":~~~,\, "{\.,,.",j,'d. h"'. '. -.-. ,,',. -.. ,. '._':"--\".:" \--h"'<,"1-C~.0.."~,-:,,,:....,.:...~:..,.. ~~~0~~~~0~~~!~

- 180 -

are in his debt; and their improvidence is likely to keep them SO.52

Yates had two children of his own and demanded that the school be based at Parengarenga. He appeared to have little difficulty in influencing Maori opinion to have the school sited at Te Hapua.

The decision was unfortunate. At Te Hapua there was 700 - acres of reserve land, but most was swampy and low lying. Water would be a continuing problem. In winter there was too much of it, and a great part of the area was flooded; in summer the only creeks dried up and the whole settlement was often threatened with a complete evacuation. While the siting of the school at Te Hapua ensured its development as the major centre of Te Aupouri life in the northern part of Muriwhenua, there was no possibility of economic self-sufficiency and only the promise of further dependency on gum digging, continuing debt and uncomfortable living conditions. At first the children were sent to the school as a group, camping in tents and huts, with the older children looking after the younger. On Friday nights they trooped home again only to return again on Monday morning. The separation caused considerable hardship, and families gradually shifted into the settlement from their outlying kainga, ensuring they were no longer separated from their children. 53

The enthusiasm for schools and their promises of access to the Pakeha world continued well into the twentieth century. One petition for a school expressed the complaint that their children were "growing up ignorant, like US".54 As early as the 1870s Maori communities became convinced that their children had to achieve success in the Pakeha world. Yet despite the establishment of these schools education never really lived up to the promise. Schools were received with enthusiasm, not simply because they promised access to skills and technology, but because building them and servicing them was a significant addition to the local economy. Maori - 181 - committees provided work, timber, contracts for ferrying children to school, for repairs to buildings. Teachers added to the local economy, brought sewing machines and medicines as well as skills in English and in some cases trades.

The Pakeha education, which offered so much, failed to deliver. The skills which European educators so cherished as the vehicle for Maori development, were of little relevance to these underdeveloped Maori communities. Learning English, and in this school committees and inspectors were united, had little relevance for an almost completely Maori speaking community. Most of the trade skills which were taught would only have benefitted young adults if they had left the far north, looking for jobs in the towns, where their race made them unacceptable until during the second world war. Even basic mathematics had little relevance. School teachers began night classes for adults only to find that few were willing or able to attend.

If the economy was fragile and based on subsistence, a major natural disaster could place whole communities on the brink of starvation, forcing them onto the gumfields in a desperate search for cash to purchase emergency stores. On 23 February 1893, Ngati Kuri in Whangape were hit by a flood which destroyed their summer crops, just at the point when they were nearly ready for harvest. The local schoolteacher described the destruction •

.•. I found the beach thickly strewn with melons pumpkins kumaras, apples figs etc etc. (I also picked up a feather pillow). But when I got to the settlement the scene of desolation and ruin that met my gaze was utterly appalling. Thousands of large trees - some of them over three feet in diameter - torn up by the roots were heaped in wild confusion allover the cultivations. The ground everywhere torn up by the force of water; whares overturned and carried away ... I don't know I am sure what they are going to do for food this year. 55

Such events only increased the dependence on gum. Six months later, when James Pope inspected the school he was particularly critical of the effects of "the abandonment by the , , " ,_ ,_,: .;",:-\-~,~-,_~~.".)..::., ... ,-~.,-; ,; ,-"c~\~\h)~h)L'" \ •. ,.~-,,-,,_.,--.,.,,c...,--'~"_" ".'--'~_"_",J,-:,-" ...... l .... -'-"-.. - .•. #.'~::.;. .. ,~.::.~~~""~;\:!;::,iY --

- 182 - natives of their village homes for the vagabond life of the gumfields".56 The demoralising effect of so tenuous a grip on life particularly concerned Pope. So dependent on weather, and on gum prices, there was little possibility of long term preparedness for even harder times. As a result personal communal sanitation was rudimentary and the resulting rates of mortality, which had dropped elsewhere in Muriwhenua, remained high in the Te Aupouri Peninsula.

Throughout the period 1865 to 1900 political and socioeconomic developments remained inextricably intertwined. Individualization of Maori land required political cooperation. Public works funded through the collection of local rates and taxes (such as the sheep and dog tax) required political cooperation. If Maori were to take full advantage of Pakeha health care and education services, this too required political cooperation. The lesson of Muriwhenua history after 1865, however, was that Maori would seldom cooperate with Pakeha unless they were able to set some of the conditions for such cooperation.

White's system of indirect rule, established in 1848, expanded in 1861, and surviving after 1865 in spite of government retrenchment, allowed Muriwhenua chiefs to set some conditions for their cooperation. They expected White to provide them with Government assistance in economic development, public works, dispute mediation, health care and education, and to allow them to participate in making decisions that affected the welfare of their communities. For example, even though White appointed his own Assessors, he appointed only those chiefs who had been nominated by the Runanga, and he refrained from interfering in the hui at which they decided who to nominate. 57

The extent to which Bishop failed to cooperate with the surviving members of White's Runanga was probably the extent to which he unwittingly encouraged the formation of an autonomous - 183 -

Runanga asserting Maori rights to participate in local government. Apparently, Bishop relied upon the cooperation of Maori clergymen, such as Renata Tangata, Ihaka Te Tau and Rupene Paerata. When all three died during the 1880s, he described this as lOa calamity to the native race generally.,,5s White's "official" Runanga had become virtually moribund by 1888 when it evidently ceased to operate as an intermediary between Maori offenders and Pakeha law. For White, the Runanga's basic purpose was to ensure that Maori offenders were brought before his Court by the Assessor responsible for each hapu or iwi. Often the hapu or iwi would pay the fine White levied on an offender. Bishop, on the other hand, failed to recognise the utility of this "mixed" Maori-Pakeha justice system. He boasted that Maori offenders would now submit to the direct authority of his Court without invoking "as in the past, the aid of the Maori Runanga.,,59 Strange as it may seem, Bishop seems to have ignored the difference between White's Runanga, with its associated system of indirect rule, and the Maori Runanga based on the rangatiratanga principle.

REFERENCES

1. Matthews to Venn 3 April 1856, CMS/CN 0 61; R. Burrows to Sec.CMS 25 Nov. 1859, ibid. 0 15.

2. Ernst Dieffenbach, Travels in New Zealand (London, 1843) I: 197-221; White to Native Minister 22 April 1873, No.2, AJHR 1873 G-1, pp.1-2 [Doc B4] (hereafter: White Report 1873).

3. Report of the Kauri Gum Industry Inquiry Commission 1893, ibid. 1893 H-24, pp. 1-2. In 1891, New Zealand Kauri gum supplied the British varnish industry with two-thirds of its gum additives. Ibid. pp. 2-3. Bruce W. Hayward, Kauri Gum and Gumdiggers (Auckland, 1982) pp. 46-47.

4. For a general account of early 20th century gumdigging - 184 - techniques, which had not changed markedly since the late 19th century, see Roy Wagener, Gumfields of Aupouri (Kaitaia, 1977); and, The 'Desart' Shore (Whangarei, 1983).

5. The 1893 Kauri gum Commission reported 1,114 Maori were digging gum that year (out of a total number of 5,779 diggers) in Northland. It then qualified this figure, however, by stating that it represented only 40% of the total number of Maori involved. This total Maori figure would therefore be 2,673. The Commission reduced this number to 40% of the total because it believed that many Maori,' such as women and children, were part-time diggers. Kauri Gum Commission Report 1893, AJHR 1893 H-24, p.24.

6. White to Native Min. 21 June 1872, No.1, ibid. 1872 F-3, pp. 3-4 [Doc B3] (hereafter: White Report 1872)

7. White to Native Sec. 28 Aug. 1861, No.9, ibid. 1862 E-7, pp. 22-24. [Doc B1]

8. White to UnderSec., Native Dept. 5 Sept. 1868, No. 16, ibid. 1868 A-4, pp. 36-37 [Doc B2] (hereafter: White Report 1868).

9. White Report 1873 [Doc B4]

10. Native Land Court 3 Nov. 1880, AJHR 1886 G-9, pp. 15-16. Fenton was married to the daughter of Captain William Butler of Mangonui. For a general critique of the Native Land Court see Hugh Kawharu, Maori Land Tenure (Oxford, 1977) pp. 15-16; and, Ward, Show of Justice, pp. 212-220.

11. New Zealand Parliamentary Debates 1870, IX: 361, cited in Keith Sorrenson, "Land Purchase Methods and their Effect on Maori population 1865-1901," Journal of the Polynesian Society (1956) 14:3, pp. 184-185.

12. During his time as Resident Magistrate at Mangonui, Bishop was also a "Recorder" for the Native Land Court, hearing simple succession and probate cases. After 1890 he was stationed in Auckland, exercising authority as a [non] Resident Magistrate for all of Northland. Ward, Show of Justice, pp. 300, 302.

13. White Report 1868. [Doc B2]

14. Ibid., Puc key Journal II: 491-493, 513-517. [Doc C2] -- -- ',- , ,-.,i -" • ~,,,-,,,,,,,,,·, .. ~.",~c"'. '-' ..... ,."... ~.f'•••• _ ....:'."-,_,.c,~ '.L~."'':~J:.\''~0':''''':~~{)~'-~';~{;''illb't-:::..~.;~~~~~;~~~~ ~\: ::-~:,~:.~5~ <::..:. ',:C"';":.",;' \,.', •. : '.', " ,

- 185 -

15. Register of Chiefs [1869], MA 23/25, National Archives, Wellington.

16. White Report 1872. [Doc B3]

17. Ibid.

18. Ibid., 1873. [Doc B4]

19. His private corresondence with Native Minister Donald McLean fails to permit a definitive answer to these questions. As early as March 1870, White informed McLean: "there is shortly to be a great talk about the North Cape lands - a portion (now? or soon?) surveyed and applications made to Fenton to pass it through the Court ... " He asked McLean to send him "any papers the government possess to enable me to fill up the case ... " White to McLean 18 March 1870 (private), McLean papers 633. Not only did White negotiate the sale for Yates and Jones, he even distributed the purchase price to the Te Aupouri sellers. White to McLean 12 March 1873, Ibid.; White Report 1873. [Doc B3]

20. Ibid.

21. White to McLean 13 Sept., 9 April 1870, 12 March 1873, McLean Papers 633.

22. G. Kelly to UnderSec., Native Dept. 16 May 1881, No.2, AJHR 1881 G-8, pp. 1-2. [Doc B11]

23. Ibid.

24. H. W. Bishop to UnderSec., Native Dept. 5 June 1883, No. I, AJHR 1883 G-1a, pp. 1-2 [Doc B13] (hereafter: Bishop Report 1883).An illustration of Maori enmity towards Pakeha surveyors is the 1883 incident when the Maori owners of the Mangataiore Block threw one of them off their land. H. W. Bishop to UnderSec., Native Dept. 12 May 1884, No.2, ibid. 1884 G~l, pp. 1-2. [Doc B14] (hereafter: Bishop Report 1884).

25. Bishop to UnderSec., Native Dept. 30 April 1885, No.3 ibid. 1885 G-2, pp. 2-4 [Doc B15] (hereafter: Bishop Report 1885) • - 186 -

26. Bishop Report 1883. [Doc B13]

27. Bishop Report 1885. [Doc B15]

28. Ibid., Bishop to UnderSec., Native Dept. 17 May 1887, No.2 ibid. 1887 G-1, pp. 1-2 [Doc B16] (hereafter: Bishop Report 1887).

29. Bishop to UnderSec., Native Dept. 15 June 1889, No.2, ibid. 1889 G-3, pp. 1-2 [Doc B18] (hereafter: Bishop Report 1889); Bishop to UnderSec., Native Dept. 24 June 1892, No.2 A-J 1892 G-3, pp. 1-2 (hereafter: Bishop Report 1892).

30. Bishop Report 1885. [Doc B15]

31. Puc key Journal II: 527-30; White Report 1868.

32. White Report 1873. [Doc B4].

33. White to UnderSec., Native Dept. 18 May 1876 No. 22, AJHR 1877 G-1 p. 18 [Qoc B6] (hereafter: White Report 1876).

34. Bishop Report 1884. [Doc B14]

35. Ibid.

36. Ibid. 1887,1888,1889. [Doc B16-18]

37. Ibid. 1891

38. White Report 1868. [Doc B2]

39. Bishop Report 1883. [Doc B13]

40. Ibid. 1884. [Doc B14]

41. Ibid. 1887. [Doc B16]

42. Ibid. 1888. Bishop failed to consider how the process of individualising Maori could, by destroying social and economic cohesion within Maori, contribute to depopulation. Sorrenson - 187 - argues this in his "Land Purchase Methods and their Effect on Maori Population 1865-1901", Journal of the Polynesian Society (1956) 14:3, pp. 183-199.

43. New Zealand Census, Maori Population 1870-1901.

44. "Extent of Occupied Holdings over One Acre and Livestock," Appendix A, Table II, New Zealand Census 1891, p. xl.

45. White Report_1868 [Doc B2]

46. Ibid. 1872. [Doc B3]

47. In 1872 a site had been offered by Te Aupouri along with 40 pounds towards a teacher's salary, Col Russell to W B White, 13 April 1872; Hemi Taitimu complained that the teacher "went wrong", Taitimu to Sheehan, 25 June 1878; W B White to Under Secretary, Native Department, 5 April 1876, BAAA 1001/574b., National Archives, Auckland.

48. White to Secretary Native Schools, 6 February 1877 Taitimu to Sheehan, 25 June 1878. When a church was built Taitimu again demanded the return of the 85 pounds, Taiutimu to Sheehan, 28 January 1879, BAAA 1001/574b.

49. R Paerata to Henry Kemp, 27 March 1879; Geo Kelly to Kemp 10 April 1879; Report of James Pope, 18 May 1880; memo, Geo Kelly, 1 June 1880; Hongi Keepa to Bryce, 7 October 1882; BAAA 1001/574b.

50. White Report 1874. [Doc B5]

51. James Pope argued that nothing should be done about a school at North Cape until the Te Kao school had proven itself, report, 4 June 1884, BAAA 101/574b.

52. They were concerned that Taitimu did not have sufficient mana to ensure the school's success, despite being a Maori magistrate, and they made genuine attempts to sound out local opinion and find a committee which did have standing in Te Aupouri, report, James Pope, 18 May 1880; John McGavin to Secretary of Education, 15 July 1891; BAAA 101/574b.

53. McGavin to the Secretary of Education, 15 July 1891,· BAAA 101/574b. - 188 -

53. Charles Irvine to Pope, 19 April 1897, BAAA 101/574b.

54. Petition of Rewiri Kaiwaka, Wiamahana, September 1904, BAAA 1001a, National Archives, Auckland.

55. James Nicholson to the Secretary of Education, 28 November 1893, BAAA 1001/750c, National Archives, Auckland.

56. Annual Report, Whangape School, 4 September 1893, BAAA 1001/750c.

57. White Report 1876. [Doc B6]

58. Bishop Report 1887. [Doc B16]

59. Ibid. 1888. [Doc B17] - 189 -

CONCLUSION

The problem of the dispossession of Muriwhenua Maori addressed in this preliminary report cannot be understood except in historical perspective. The term dispossession itself is a historical term which has acquired a different meaning today to that which it had acquired for 19th century Pakeha. For the major Crown officers in Muriwhenua after 1847, W.B. White and H.W. Bishop, the Crown's purchase of vaste acreages of Maori land was necessary for the "progress" of the colony. They believed that unoccupied Maori land was "waste" land, a Eurocentric Victorian term indicating land without productive value. Consequently, they would not consider the Crown's purchase of unoccupied land, which in Maori hands possessed no value, as dispossession.

White and Bishop's shared the prevailing Pakeha view during the 19th century that land acquired value only when continuous labour and capital were invested in it. The fact that Maori used much of their lands, forests and fisheries in different ways, such as foraging for food, and acknowledging the spiritual associations of different places, made no sense to White and Bishop. Because Maori engaged in shifting (rather than continuous) cultivation their land could not acquire value as White and Bishop understood it. It cou'ld acquire value only in hands of an individual farmer, continuously working or "improving" the same piece of land by investing his labour and capital (usually implements) in it. Therefore, the only possibility of Maori investing labour and capital in land to endow it with value was if they adopted Pakeha ways. Furthermore, White and Bishop assumed that, even if Maori became individual farmers, since their population was declining (Bishop, of course, was wrong about this), Maori would require much less land than Pakeha.

Both White and Bishop believed that Maori had to divest themselves of their traditional communal ways of living if they - 190 - were to survive as a race. Their Eurocentric vision of the Maori future was not unlike that of missionary Joseph Matthews in 1839 when he stated that the only way for Maori to survive was for them to "amalgamate" with Pakeha, and thus cease being Maori. Bishop even suggested that individual Maori farmers needed only 10 acres each to support their families. He apparently believed that Maori could divest themselves of their culture by rejecting their "mischevious system of communism", and that if they did this they could divest themselves of all except 10 acres of land for each nuclear (ie. Pakeha) family.

In sum, what White and Bishop referred to as "progress", the authors of this report refer to as the dispossession of Maori. The outcome of both Crown and private land purchases was that by 1900 Muriwhenua Maori people, who were 47% of the total population of Mangonui County, controlled approximately 25% of Muriwhenua land, and only about 5% of the most economically valuable land.

As stated in the introduction, the Crown was not solely responsible for this dispossession. Many private individuals contributed to dispossession both before and after 1840. The Crown, however, signed an agreement at Waitangi which guaranteed Maori "possession" (in English), and "ka wakarite ka wakaae ki nga Rangatira ki nga hapu - ki nga tangata katoa 0 Nu Tirani te tino rangatiratanga" (in Maori), or "protection," of their taonga. 1 The Crown therefore bears some responsibility for the acts of private individuals involved in dispossessing Maori.

There remains the problem, raised in the introduction, of determining whether or not Maori fully and freely consented to their own dispossession. Article II of the Treaty of Waitangi gave Maori the right to not "retain ... possession" of their land if they wished to sell it to the Crown.

Full and free consent to the sale of land implies a full understanding of the consequences of that act. In the view of - 191 - the authors, the Maori understanding of what they agreed to in signing deeds of sale was formed during the 1830s when they negotiated joint occupancy agreements with private Pakeha purchasers. They understood these sales to mean incorporation of Pakeha within their communities, and not the alienation of land in the Pakeha sense. Godfrey and Bell's Land Claims Commissions transformed these original joint occupancy agreements into the absolute alienation of Maori land. Commission decisions, however, were handed down over a large number of years in a very piecemeal and confusing way. For example, the Government refrained from claiming surplus land for many years, knowing how Maori would react. When the Crown began its major purchases during the 1850s and 60s, Maori had yet to experience the consequences of absolute alienation. They, therefore, could not have fully consented to Crown purchases without a full understanding of these consequences.

The question of how freely Maori consented to major land sales has to be considered with reference to what their alternatives were. Freedom implies choice, but did Maori have realistic choices? Did they have alternatives to selling land in order to provide for their families? Trading and missionary contact drew them into a cash economy even before 1840, but within that mixed MaorijPakeha trading economy, Maori were normally at a disadvantage. Prices paid by Pakeha traders for Maori gum in the 1840s, for example, left Maori with little cash at a time when their cash needs were increasing. They needed Pakeha goods, especially clothing and medicine, and they needed cash to pay for them. The point is that disease and poverty disadvantaged Maori in such a way as to make the selling of land necessary for their survival.

Though Maori produced goods of economic value for a Pakeha market, this value was seldom adequately realized in the market. Land, therefore, which the Crown did value, became the only marketable resource Maori could use to generate needed cash. Even then the Crown did not pay a full market price for , ,

------. - "' "~'~''---''_-'-'..!'4,.• '~.'.-''..'..l.:.':..'.)_~, ,~~, '-,. u","·' •. _" >

- 192 - it, because the Crown, before 1865, monopolised land purchases, and after 1865, cooperated with Pakeha purchasers, such as Yates and Jones in Muriwhenua North, to facilitate below market rate purchases.

The authors of this report conclude, therefore, that Maori within this historical, cultural, and economic context, did not fully understand and freely consent to their own dispossession.

They also receiv~d a market price for their land which fell far short of its economic value. Full economic value should be determined by the extent to which land can provide a resource which people can use to produce goods in demand. Land provides a valuable productive resource, whether the producers be Maori or Pakeha, and whether they organise their production along communal or individual lines.

Though Crown officers White and Bishop had an idelogical commitment to seeing everything communal and Maori as counter-productive. This perhaps explains their failure to set aside adequate Maori reserves. Yet, some of their contemporaries rejected their conservative Eurocentrism. In reporting on the subject of Native Land Laws in 1891, a bicultural Royal Commission condemned the process of individualising Maori land saying: "the work which we have with so much care been doing amongst ourselves for centuries - namely the binding-together of individuals in corporations - we deliberately undid in our government of the Maoris. "2 Had Crown policy followed the recommendations of this bicultural Commission, the history of Muriwhenua land during the 19th century, and today, would be very different. - , • - ~- c_"-,-.·.--~-y~-:",<_~,,,-.L>_"':~<..2-'::"''''':',,!,--I.~_,-":.. ;~''~:.l\;--

- 193 -

REFERENCES

1. Texts of the Treaty of Waitangi (translation of Maori text by I.H. Kawharu) in I.H. Kawharu ed., Waitangi: Maori and Pakeha Perspectives on the Treaty of Waitangi (Auckland, 1989) pp. 316-321.

2. Report of the Native Land Laws Commission, 1891, AJHR 1891, G-l, p. xviii. , - -- -" '. \. \...... " .•. "_"_'~,._._·,.l ~\.~. ;.:;._~_"_'c ','. ',. \. '.''-. '-., .. , .

- 194 -

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