Earthquakes and Soil Subsidence Caused by Gas Extraction in The

Title page

UNIVERSITY OF AMSTERDAM

GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES

MASTER THESIS ENVIRONMENTAL GEOGRAPHY

Earthquakes and soil subsidence caused by gas extraction in the province of Groningen, the Netherlands The framework of energy justice applied to implications of gas extraction in Groningen

Student: Herman Hilverda, 10181105 Supervisor: dr. Eric Chu Second Assessor: Prof. dr. Joyeeta Gupta E-mail address: [email protected] Date of publication: 26 June 2017

Source picture on title page: NU.nl (2015)

Abstract This study aims to explore and explain the implications of earthquakes and soil subsidence resulting from gas extraction in the province of Groningen in the North of the Netherlands from the evaluative framework of energy justice. Energy justice has three pillars: distributive, recognition and procedural justice. In this study, 15 interviews with municipal and provincial administrators, representatives of associations and foundations, journalists and experts are analyzed. Since gas extraction commenced in 1963, the risks and benefits have not been distributed evenly across the country. When in the late 1980s earthquakes and soil subsidence started to become an issue, claims for a relationship with gas extraction were not taken seriously. In 2012, an earthquake of 3.6 on Richter scale happened, which was a tipping point in the process of recognition for the risks of gas extraction. However, both residents and local administrators experience that receiving compensation for damage to houses can be a long and frustrating process. Today, residents and local administrators can design a new damage settlement protocol. This study aims to contribute to a better understanding of the spatial and social implications of earthquakes in Groningen, and to contribute to the emerging research agenda of energy justice in the field of energy geography.

Table of Contents Title page ...... 1 Abstract ...... 3 Introduction ...... 6 Theoretical framework ...... 8 Problem identification: spatial dimensions of the distribution of sources, risks and profits of fossil fuel extraction, hence the need to study “energy geographies”...... 8 Direct and indirect profits of fossil fuel extraction ...... 8 Direct and indirect risks of fossil fuel extraction ...... 8 Defining energy geographies: looking at the politics of governance arrangements in the state- resources frame ...... 10 Introducing field of energy geography ...... 10 Governance arrangements in the state-resource frame ...... 10 The justice and equity dimensions of energy justice: energy poverty and environmental justice .... 12 Energy poverty ...... 12 Environmental justice: Distributive, Procedural and Justice as Recognition ...... 12 Situating the theories in the Groningen case and identifying the gap in knowledge ...... 14 Methodology ...... 16 Reliability and validity ...... 17 Units of analysis ...... 18 Ethical aspects ...... 19 Analysis ...... 20 Past: distributive justice ...... 20 Introduction ...... 20 History of gas extraction in Groningen ...... 20 The Gas Building ...... 21 Distribution of costs and risks of gas extraction ...... 24 Distribution of revenues of gas extraction ...... 27 Conclusion ...... 31 Present (2012 – now): recognition? ...... 33 Introduction ...... 33 Soil subsidence and the water boards ...... 33 Selection of claims by others ...... 35 August, 2012: Earthquake of 3.6 on Richter scale in Huizinge, Loppersum ...... 38 National Coordinator Groningen ...... 41 Livability fund ...... 42

Damage protocol ...... 42 Court cases ...... 45 Conclusion ...... 47 Future: procedural justice ...... 48 Introduction ...... 48 Procedural justice in the past and the present ...... 48 Access to information and access to legal procedures ...... 50 Development new damage settlement protocol ...... 52 Task of strengthening all the buildings in the earthquake area ...... 55 Conclusion ...... 59 Conclusion and discussion ...... 61 Distributive justice ...... 61 Justice as recognition ...... 61 Procedural justice ...... 62 Discussion ...... 62 Conclusion ...... 63 Recommendations ...... 63 Bibliography ...... 65 Appendices ...... 74 Appendix 1: Anonymized list of interviewed people ...... 74 Appendix 2: Timeline most important events from discovery of gas until today ...... 75 Appendix 3: Scheme of the relevant actors concerning the current damage settlement protocol ..... 77 Appendix 4: Scheme of the relevant actors concerning the negotiations for a new damage settlement protocol ...... 78

Introduction In 1959, the biggest onshore natural gas field of Europe was discovered in the municipality of Slochteren, Groningen in the North of the Netherlands. Since then, vast amounts of gas have been extracted. This generated revenues for the NAM, the company that extracts the gas, and for the Dutch State, that receives the largest share of the revenues. As a result, the Netherlands has been able to finance its social welfare state and invest in large infrastructure projects. That the process of gas extraction was not without risks became clear in the 1970s, when reports attributed soil subsidence to gas extraction. In the late 1980s, the first earthquake happened and this event prompted many technical investigations on the relationship between gas extraction and soil subsidence and earthquakes. The conclusions of these reports were reassuring, since there would only be a minor change on earthquakes, and damage to properties of residents would also be minor. Therefore, there was no need to reduce gas extraction. In 2012, however, an earthquake of 3.6 on Richter scale happened. It now could no longer be ignored that gas extraction is causing earthquakes. The consequences are big: numerous houses are damaged, causing stress and feelings of unsafety for residents. However, for affected residents the process of to receive sufficient compensation for damage to their houses, is experienced to be difficult and unfair. Today, the monumental operation of inspecting and possibly strengthening all the buildings in the earthquake area will commence soon. Moreover, a new damage settlement protocol must be designed by local administrators and residents, since after political and social pressure, the NAM withdrew from the damage settlement process.

The section above is, in short, the history of the gas extraction and its consequences in Groningen. In the field of energy geography, the research agenda of energy justice is emerging (Sovacool & Dworkin, 2015; Jenkins et al., 2016). Energy justice is a concept derived from the field of environmental justice (Walker, 2012). Like environmental justice, energy justice consist of three pillars: distributive justice, justice as recognition and procedural justice. Distributive justice is the notion of the distribution of the risks and the benefits of energy generation in time and space. Justice as recognition is the notion whether the (in)justice of the distribution of risks and benefits is being recognized. Procedural justice is the question about who has a say in the process of the distribution of the costs and benefits, specifically whether local residents and administrators can have formal influence on this distribution. In this thesis, I will explore the case of gas extraction in Groningen from the lens of energy justice and I will do so on the basis of the following research question:

How can the risks and impacts of gas extraction in Groningen be explained through the lens of energy justice?

In three chapters, I will analyze the three pillars of energy justice with data collected from the field. In the Spring of 2017, I stayed three weeks in Groningen and interviewed local administrators and

6 residents, as well as experts, journalists, representatives from associations and foundations. The questions to be answered in the consecutive chapters are the following:

How are the risks and benefits of gas extraction being distributed?

Are the risks resulting from gas extraction being recognized by the NAM and the State?

To what extent do both local administrators and residents have a say in procedures concerning the consequences of gas extraction?

In general, the analytical chapters encompass the past (distributive justice), the present (recognition) and future (procedural justice). However, since some issues encompass more timeframes there might be some overlap in the chapters. Moreover, since the case of gas extraction in Groningen, earthquakes and damage settlement is still developing, I decided not to include developments after I the time I did the field work. The scope of the thesis is therefore from the beginning of the gas extraction until the beginning of May 2017.

The thesis is organized as follows. First, the theories of energy geography and energy justice are introduced. Second, the methodology is explained more in-depth. Third, three analytical chapters of the three pillars of energy justice in the case of Groningen are presented. The thesis ends with a conclusion and discussion.

Theoretical framework

Problem identification: spatial dimensions of the distribution of sources, risks and profits of fossil fuel extraction, hence the need to study “energy geographies”.

Direct and indirect profits of fossil fuel extraction

Direct and indirect risks of fossil fuel extraction

Resource extraction can result in spatial patterns of unequal economic development, which pose governance challenges related to energy access, energy security, and issues of climate and energy justice, including the unequal burdens of energy extraction. “People and places unevenly experience the costs and the benefits of energy extraction, generation, financing, distribution and consumption” (Practical Action, 2010 cited in Newell & Mulvaney, 2013: 135). This notion of distributive energy injustice is shaped by different actors and institutions with sometimes conflicting interests, and their actions can influence international flows of energy provision and consumption (Newell & Mulvaney, 2013). Many authors relate the extraction of fossil fuels to issues of violence (e.g. Kennedy, 2014; Pasqualetti & Brown, 2014; Argent, 2016). For example, an increasing demand for energy might be a rationale for military conflicts in order to secure energy supply. According to Newell & Mulvaney (2013), these types of conflicts can especially be seen recently in the Middle East and North Africa. Ross (2012) goes as far to say that “countries that are rich in petroleum have less democracy, less economic stability and more frequent civil wars than countries without oil” (Ross, 2012 cited in Newell & Mulvaney, 2013). The concept related to this statement is the concept of the resource curse.

According to Badeeb et al. (2017), the resource curse was first coined by Richard Auty (1993). Others (i.e. Apergis et al, 2014) credit Meade and Russell with coming up with the thesis of the natural resource curse in 1957. Adam Smith and David Ricardo, the founding fathers of current (neo)liberal economic thinking, expected that nations with plenty resources have an economic advantage over nations without resources. Auty (1993) however, demonstrated that the relation between resources and economic prosperity does not have to positive per se. Indeed, recourse rich countries tend to rely on the revenues from the resources, which results in a lack of investments in other sectors of the economy and makes it harder to adapt when, for example, the mine is deplete of minerals. This especially applies to developing countries (Karl, 2005), which are associated with weak democratic institutions and corruption. Therefore this might explain the lack of investments in healthcare, education and the economy. In short, both the state (in the short term) and extracting companies profit from the resources, but the people near resource sites have to carry the burdens. These burdens include environmental degradation, lack of political influence on process of the distribution of revenues and underdevelopment of the regional economy. One would expect that resource extraction

8 creates jobs in a region, but according to Karl (2007), this is not the case per se. Oil and gas extraction requires a skilled workforce, which is often not present at the location, so these employers have to be flown in by the companies. Thus the sector creates only a few jobs at the location (Karl, 2007). According to the Dutch Safety Board, the mining sector in Groningen created 5400 direct and indirect jobs from 1963 onwards (Onderzoeksraad voor Veiligheid, 2014). However, this source does not mention whether locals or ‘expats’ fill these jobs, and what the rate is of direct and indirect jobs.

A specific kind of resource curse is the Dutch disease: “a decline in the export manufacturing and agricultural sectors, and inflation of domestic goods and service, caused by changes in real exchange rates and flows of capital and labor towards the boom sector” (Ross, 1999 cited in Kennedy, 2014: 264). If a state would spend the revenues of a resource well, for instance in investments with a high return rate, there would not be such a phenomena as the resource curse. However, this is often not the case and the money is used to finance domestic expenditures, such as the welfare state or to fill gaps in the budget. According to Stiglitz (2005), this also can result in an overvaluation of the exchange rate, and therefore negatively influencing export of goods produced in the industrial or agricultural sector. This is because the revenues in the gas sector increase, and so the national currency appreciates, which means that other sectors (i.e. industrial and agricultural) will get more expensive as well. The result is that these sectors will become less competitive. Norway, a country with a lot of recourses as well, decided to put all the revenues in a state fund (Larsen, 2006). According to Verhulst et al. (2014:6), the average revenues of this fund are 5,6%, and only 4% is annually added to general budget of the Norwegian state.

Defining energy geographies: looking at the politics of governance arrangements in the state-resources frame

Introducing field of energy geography

Governance arrangements in the state-resource frame

“Decisions to allocate, use and consume energy are in particular ways for particular purposes are mostly made out of the public eye and rarely in democratic forums. Whether for reasons of commercial confidentiality or geo-strategic sensitivities, public participation and deliberation around questions of energy governance has traditionally been very weak” (Newell & Mulvaney, 2013: 135) Hence, a geographical view on the relationship between actors in the energy sector and communities present at a resource site is needed in order to understand the processes in energy governance.

According to Pasqualetti and Brown (2014), the relationship between energy and society is age old, but has to be given more concern today. Their article was published in the relatively new journal Energy Research & Social Science (2014), which aims to connect these two spheres as human demand for (renewable) energy influences society as a whole. Pasqualetti and Brown argue that there is a nexus between energy and society, and geography embraces energy and society. The authors state: “the sphere of geography is (…) particularly helpful in understanding the environmental and geopolitical ramifications of the entire supply chain” (Pasqualetti and Brown, 2014:123). In other words, a geographical perspective is best suited to understand the spatial and scalar pathways of energy production and consumption. Calvert (2015) shares this view of a geographical perspective best suited to understand the relation between different places of energy consumption and production. Geography has acquired more attention in the last years in understanding energy issues – Calvert attributes this to, one the one hand, increasing demand for energy by consumers and, on the other hand, on the growing concern of climate change (2015).

Much has been written about the impact of oil and gas extraction on the livelihoods of indigenous communities (O’Faurcheallaigh, 2013; Argent, 2016; Calvert, 2015). Often an oil company has only one goal, and that goal is to extract the resource in the most efficient way. Therefore it has little interest in economic development of the region where it extracts the recourses. From the perspective of liberal economic theory, the discovery of a resource would be beneficial for a region and can be the basis for economic development as it brings jobs for rural communities (Stevenson, 2014). However, other authors have demonstrated that this is not always the case. Empirical evidence provided by, for example by Zarsky and Stanley (2011), demonstrate that often communities in rural extractive regions do not benefit from the extraction activities, and that it sometimes even undermines existing economic activity. O’Faurcheallaigh attributes that to the fact that oil companies are often profit-driven, vertically organized multinational firms, and have both the financial resources and the power to

extract the resource (2013). The oil industry is a capital intensive sector, which means that extracting oil requires vast investments, but the profits are also high (Karl, 2004). The vertical organization contributes to a top down decision making process, and because of the high profits, oil companies have the financial resources to keep on investing. Moreover, resources flow from the extractive region to industrial centers, and leaves the extractive region underdeveloped, which results in spatial patterns of uneven economic development. O’Faurcheallaigh (2013: 21) notes that this phenomena can also be found in Australia (Newton, 1979) and the United States (Peluso et al. 1994).

The relationship between state agencies and rural communities is often a relationship with unequal power – states tend to have commercial interests and give resource extracting companies room to develop by ignoring the rights and interests of communities present on the site (O’Faurcheallaigh, 2013). O’Faurcheallaigh’s article is a case study of a remote aria in Western Australia, inhabited mainly by Aboriginals, where gas has been found. Given similar situations elsewhere, he is not too optimistic that the local communities will be included in the decision making process and will receive a fair share of the generated revenues from the gas extraction. However, the local communities did have influence in the process, when they refused to have the gas extraction developed on their lands, which was accounted for in legislation. This happened party mostly because the indigenous people had the rights to their lands. Moreover, O’Faurcheallaigh attributes this to the fact that today there is more global recognition of the rights of indigenous people and that companies have to take these into account. This can also be attributed to the ability of the communities to organize themselves and have an uniform communication. For resource extracting companies, this means that they need to acquire a ‘social license to operate’ (SLO) (e.g. Nelsen, 2006 for mining activities and Moffat & Zhang, 2014 for other extracting industries). A SLO is not an official license given by a government, but according to Nelsen a “SLO is a means to earn accountability, credibility, flexibility and capacity for both stakeholders and industry” (Nelsen, 2006: 161). Stakeholders in this sense are people that will potentially suffer from the extracting activities. In Europe, where we tend to think these matters are accounted for by states and companies, this is not necessarily the case. More research on European examples is therefore needed. This will be demonstrated in the presentation of the case of Groningen.

The justice and equity dimensions of energy justice: energy poverty and environmental justice

Energy poverty

Environmental justice: Distributive, Procedural and Justice as Recognition

The concept of Environmental Justice is in short about a fair distribution of environmental impacts among people. Gorden Walker assesses this concept in his book (2012) and divides environmental justice in three spheres: distributive justice (are environmental hazards evenly distributed?), procedural justice (do affected communities have a say in the process of decision making?) and justice as recognition (are the affected communities being recognized in their harm?). In his book, Walker applies these spheres to the examples of flood vulnerability and climate change, but not on harm caused by resource extraction activities. To a certain extent, this is has been done by O’Rourke & Connoly (2003), who address the environmental and social impacts of the production and consumption of oil with the use of an environmental justice framework. However, O’Rourke and Connoly mostly focus on the distribution of burdens related to oil extraction, and do not make mention of procedural justice or justice as recognition.

Walker notes that environmental justice is a normative notion. Normative means that a notion is not universal, because everyone has different ideas of how things ought to be. In other words, this means that justice does not mean the same for everyone. In order to make a claim of an unfair situation, evidence has to be provided by the claim-maker. Evidence is descriptive, so a justice advocate can choose whether or not to mention certain aspects of the situation. This relates to the issue of framing, according to Walker, “Framing is a nation that the world is not just “out there” waiting to be unproblematically discovered, but has to be given meaning, labelled and categorised, and interpreted through ideas, propositions and assertions about how things are and how they ought to be” (2012: 4).

It may be clear that in the process of claim making, normative notions and presented evidence are very much related. In this process, a claim maker has to demonstrate the exposure, vulnerability and responsibility in a situation and this process can be very complex. In relation to gas extraction, this means that neighbouring communities are exposed to the extraction activities. The communities may or may not be able to cope with the resulting physical and psychological damage. And finally the responsible actor (the state or the oil company) may or may not be cooperative in the process of recognition and therefrom following measures to compensate the victims of the extraction.

Because energy provisioning is in the private sector and not in the public domain, it is difficult to hold parties responsible for environmental injustice issues, all the more because these parties are often ‘powerful elites or multinational corporations’ (Newell & Mulvaney, 2013). Environmental justice

advocates have a long history of successfully litigating against companies and states which interfere in environmental injustice practices (Agyeman et al. 2002; Figueroa, 2009; Mohai et al. 2009, Walker, 2012). However, most examples presented by these authors encompass, among other examples, issues of polluting industries, air quality and mining activities in the United States or developing countries. Very little has been written on environmental justice in oil or gas extracting companies in Europe.

At first sight the relationship between energy and justice may not be so apparent, but our collective energy decisions have moral implications (Sovacool & Dworkin, 2015). The authors argue that energy justice has three key elements: “Costs, or how the hazards and externalities of the energy system are imposed on communities unequally, often the poor and marginalized. Benefits, or how access to modern energy systems and services are highly uneven. Procedures, or how many energy projects proceed with exclusionary forms of decision-making that lack due process and representation” (Sovacool & Dworkin, 2015: 437). Energy justice therefore act as an appropriate analytical tool to investigate the case of the earthquakes in Groningen.

Situating the theories in the Groningen case and identifying the gap in knowledge

In the late 1950s, a gigantic gas field was discovered in the Dutch province of Groningen. The discovery of the gas made it possible for Dutch households to heat their houses and to cook on gas, moreover it financed for a great part the Dutch welfare state. Since the 1980s, there have been several earthquakes in Groningen, but the NAM (the company responsible for the extraction) and the state was reserved in acknowledging the relation between gas extraction and earthquakes, as it is dependent on the revenues generated by the gas extraction (Verhulst et al. 2014), and Dutch households being dependent on the gas for cooking and heating (Trommelen, 2016). The relationship was finally acknowledged, but this did not result in a hold in gas extraction. To date, all political parties wish to reduce the volume of gas being extracted or turn off the gas tap completely. This might be related to the fact that attention has been given to the subject in the satiric late night show Zondag met Lubach and comedian Freek de Jonge started a protest as well, which resulted in a national dander on the way the NAM treats the victims of the earthquakes. In the light of the coming parliament’s elections in March 2017, the political parties must take a stand on the subject.

Many articles and reports have been written on the Groningen gas field (Van Eck et al, 2006; Fokker & Van Thienen-Visser, 2015; van Thienen-Visser & Breunese, 2015; Juez-Larré et al, 2016; Spetzler & Dost, 2016; Van de Voort & Vanclay, 2015; Kester, 2017). Except from the latter two contributions, all articles have a technical perspective on the situation in Groningen. The main conclusion that can be drawn from the articles is that the relation between gas extraction and earthquakes is scientifically proven. On the other hand, the literature on the impacts of the earthquake on the residents in the area is rather limited.

Van de Voort & Vanclay (2015) assess the impacts of earthquakes on the local residents and how this influences their trust in the NAM and the government. This article gives a good overview of the history of the situation in Groningen, but does so from an environmental impact assessment point of view. This means that the article is mainly focused on the environmental and social impacts of the earthquakes in Groningen, and the authors argue that a new environmental and social impact assessment has to be undertaken for the NAM to remain their ‘social license to operate’. Despite written by two cultural geographers, the article lacks a geographical perspective because it not address in depth the conflicting interests of the different stakeholders, such as the NAM, state and the affected residents, and the scalar and spatial distribution of the gas revenues.

This literature review demonstrated that much has been written on the relationship between states and companies and rural or indigenous communities in, mostly, developing countries. Compared to the Randstad, Groningen has a low population density, but compared to other resource rich areas in the

14 world, Groningen has still a relatively high population density. Thus, a knowledge gap exists in the governance of risks and profits of resource extracting activities in rural areas of developed countries. Moreover, the field of energy geography has not been applied yet on this case, and neither is the evaluative framework of environmental justice.

Methodology The type of the research that was conducted is explorative. I explored gas extraction in Groningen and its consequences from the perspective of energy justice. For this, I used the qualitative method of in- depth interviews. I interviewed administrators of affected municipalities and the provincial executive of Groningen, responsible for the dossier of earthquakes. I also interviewed representatives of several projects sponsored by NAM’s livability fund, as well as the president of this fund. Moreover, I interviewed representatives from associations and foundations that defend the interests of different groups in the society of Groningen, including the Groninger Bodem Beweging (Groningen Ground Movement) and the Stichting Groninger Dorpen (Foundation Groningen Villages). Furthermore, I interviewed a law professor, journalists of the local newspaper and the local television station, an official from the National Coordinator Groningen (NCG) and an official from GasTerra, the company that buys and sells gas that the NAM extracts. Lastly, I attended an evening for affected residents to find out about their experiences with the NAM and the State. I also wished to interview a representative of the NAM, but I was not able to make an appointment with the NAM. In appendix 1, a complete anonymized list of the persons I have interviewed, can be found.

During the interviews, I asked questions concerning distributive justice, justice as recognition and procedural justice and how this is experienced by the representatives. During the interviews, I also tried to understand the role of the NCG and the implementation of the Meerjarenprogramma Aardbevingsbestendig en Kansrijk Groningen 2017-2021 (NCG, 2016a). In the phase prior to the interviews, I assessed this multi-annual plan, which is the policy the province as a whole can cope with the consequences of the earthquakes. From this policy, I deducted the role of municipalities and its citizens in the light of energy justice.

The research design can be considered as a case study design (Yin, 2009). I will investigate two municipalities and its projects, Loppersum and Slochteren, in depth. I chose these two municipalities because Loppersum is the middle of the gas field and Slochteren is the place where the gas originally has been discovered. The interviews will be semi-structured and topics of distributive and procedural justice will be addressed, as well as justice as recognition. Indicators for this are, among others, distribution of revenues of gas extraction, the municipality’s say in the procedure and if a municipality feels that the earthquakes and resulting losses are being recognized.

Table 1: indicators of energy justice, based on Walker, 2012, Sovacool & Dworkin, 2015 and Jenkins et al., 2016

Distributive Recognition Procedural Risks of gas extraction Recognition by NAM Access to information Benefits of gas extraction Recognition by national government Participation in decision making process Vulnerability* Compensation Access to legal processes Need* Say in distribution of risks Responsibility* Say in distribution of benefits Say in distribution of compensation *these concepts have been defined more in the next table

Table 2: definitions of selected concepts in table 1

Concept Definition Vulnerability Notion of who is vulnerable to the risk of resource extraction Need Notion of who is in need for compensation for the exposed harms Responsibility Notion of who is responsible for the environmental hazards resulting from gas extraction

The data is analyzed from the evaluative framework of energy justice. This means that I looked for the indicators of energy justice (distributive, procedural and recognition) mentioned in table 1, and what this means for the municipalities and province in practice. I realized that the list of indicators might not be complete and more indicators might arise during the interviews. However, I did expect new indicators to be able to be subsumed under one of the spheres of energy justice (distributive, recognition and procedural). During the analysis, I compared the different notions of the spheres of energy justice and this will result in a complete picture of how the relation between the NAM and the affected municipalities is.

In order to find out what the NAM finances and sponsors, I assessed NAM’s website which has a list of projects the NAM sponsors. With this information, I looked for the contact details of the respective projects or organizations of which there are 12 in total. To get to the NAM, I first tried to reach the contact persons who work with the projects and request him or her for an interview.

The conducted interviews have been recorded and transcribed in Dutch and therefore the coding was also been done in Dutch. The names of these files will be [interviewee X + occupation interviewee] to ensure that anonymity is guaranteed and interviewees could be confident to speak their minds. A thematic analysis was done in Dutch, using tables and indicators. This will be the basis of the eventual analysis in the thesis, which was of course written in English.

Reliability and validity The notion of reliability is about whether or not a study is repeatable, and if the outcomes would be the same if the study would be repeated (Bryman, 2012). The case of the earthquakes in Groningen

because of the gas extraction activities is an evolving case. The opinions and experiences of the interviewees may be changed in a year, or even during the process, because of not foreseen developments (e.g. more severe earthquakes or the announcement of a royal compensation for every affected community). During the three weeks I was in Groningen for the field work, there were indeed some developments. For example, the NAM withdrew from the damage settlement process, and negotiations about a new damage settlement protocol were in an impasse. These issues will be revisited in the analysis section.

It is clear that this influences the reliability and therefore, it is important to note that the project only gives an exploration and explanation of the situation of developments before and during Spring 2017. This is connected to validity, which is the question concerning whether the right conclusions are drawn from the analysis results (Bryman, 2012). It is therefore important to keep the research questions in mind at any time, e.g. does an interview reflect someone’s view on my definition of energy justice?

There were some practical constraints in doing this research. I was not sure whether someone from the NAM was willing to be interviewed by me on this subject. The NAM already has an image problem, and it might be not in their interest to be interviewed by a student. I hoped to cope with that by asking them to help me understand the recent court ruling. I stated my independence and objectivity to the NAM when I approached them for an interview. This is justified by the fact that I have no interest to tear down the NAM, but merely wish to understand the case from an perspective of energy justice, and the NAM is one of the involved actors in gas extraction. I approached the NAM several times, but eventually I was not able to make an appointment for an interview.

On the other hand, the representatives of the community side (i.e. representatives of municipalities, province and projects) were more willing to be interviewed. This can be explained by the fact that they might think that the problems around human induced earthquakes and the resulting damage needs to be exposed more, especially in other areas of the Netherlands.

Units of analysis The units of analysis are governmental representatives from the local, provincial and national governments. The local governments are the municipalities Loppersum en Slochteren, the provincial government is Groningen, and an official from the National Coordinator Groningen (NCG) can be considered as a representative of the national government, because the NCG is under the ministerial responsibility of the Minister of Economic Affairs. From the societal groups, the units of analysis are representatives of the Groninger Bodem Beweging (Groningen Ground Movement, GBB), Stichting Groninger Dorpen (Foundation Groningen Villages), Stichting Groninger Landschap (Foundation Groningen Landscape). The units of analysis which can be considered experts are two journalists from

the local newspaper and a local television station, and a law professor. Lastly, representatives of three organizations that received finance from NAM’s livability fund, who were able to tell the story of their financed project and also give a resident’s point of view. The resident’s point of view came also forward during a social movement evening for affected residents.

Next to interviews as a source, I assessed Multiannual Earthquake Resistant and Promising Groningen Plan of the NCG. In this policy plan, the plans of the NCG for the future of Groningen are presented. Four times per year, the proceedings of the NCG are published and I assessed the quarterly report of first three months of 2017. Some interviewees referred to other policy documents, court rulings or ministerial decisions as well, therefore these documents were also analyzed.

Ethical aspects The objective of this project was not to expose the NAM, the objective was to understand the earthquakes resulting from gas extraction and the consequences from a lens of energy justice. That is why during the interviews, I asked only ask exploratory and explanatory questions.

Before an interview started, the interviewee and I agreed on several issues. For the transcription of the interview and the following analysis, it is necessary that the interview was recorded. However, an informant had to agree that the interview was recorded. I stated that the recording will be saved in a password protected folder and will be deleted as soon as I have received my diploma. In the transcription, the name of the informant will be made anonymous, as well as in the thesis itself. It is useful to mention someone’s function and place of work, in order to conduct a fruitful analysis. The rationale behind this is that informants need to feel free to give their opinions on anything and talk about their experiences without being constrained by an idea that this might get back to them.

I mostly interviewed representatives from the ‘victim’ side of the earthquakes, because I expected that the ‘responsible’ side will not be too willing to be interviewed by me. Nevertheless, I tried to make an appointment with the NAM, however unfortunately in this I did not succeed. It was important to try to be as objective as possible, and not sympathize with the victims and not consider the NAM as the enemy of every citizen in Groningen. As stated, the objective is not to expose the NAM, but merely to understand the earthquakes resulting from gas extraction and the consequences from a lens of energy justice

Analysis

Past: distributive justice

Introduction This chapter analyses the first pillar of energy justice, distributive justice. Distributive justice in the light of energy generation is the notion of whether the costs and risks are evenly distributed across time, place and space, as well as the distribution of the benefits of energy generation (Sovacool & Dworkin, 2015). This chapter notes that the distribution of the advantages and disadvantages of gas extraction in the province of Groningen is experienced to be unfair by the residents of Groningen, but at the same time it is acknowledged that the gas field is just in Groningen and it cannot be moved. Moreover, the ‘economic motor of the Netherlands’ happens to be not in Groningen, but in the West of the country, so it is reasonable that more of the revenues flow to that part of the country. In this chapter, I will give an overview of the history of the gas extraction in Groningen and the calls for a fairer distribution of the revenues, as well as an overview of several politicians and scientists who have claimed the existence of the relationship between gas extraction and soil declines and related earthquakes. In this chapter, the sub question to be answered is: how are the risks and benefits of gas extraction being distributed?

History of gas extraction in Groningen In 1959, on the land of farmer Boon in Kolham in the municipality of Slochteren, Groningen, a large field of low caloric natural gas was discovered by geologists of the Nederlandse Aardolie Maatschappij (Dutch Oil Company, or NAM). According to the Mining Law, which was instituted under Napoleonic rule in 1810, the State is the owner of all the natural resources under the ground. Four years later, in 1963, gas extraction began. The Dutch State gave the NAM the concession to extract the gas. The concession was fully given to the NAM in the first place because the NAM discovered the oil, but more importantly, because the Dutch State wished to exploit the gas itself with the use of a state company. Since the Netherlands is not a member of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), Shell warned the Dutch State that its wish could lead to problems with OPEC if the State would extract the gas (Correljé, 1998). The Gas Building was constructed in order to secure the State’s influence on the gas extraction. The Gas Building will be discussed later in this chapter.

The NAM was founded in 1947 and since then has been extracting oil and gas from relatively small on- and offshore locations in the Netherlands. Because the gas field in Groningen was estimated to be very large, new agreements had to be made and concessions had to be given. The new agreements were secured in the Gas Building. The ownership of the NAM is split 50-50 between Shell and ExxonMobil, two giants in the oil industry. Most of the income generated from gas extraction flows to

20 the State as a whole, so the minister of Finance administrates it as income. It is however not clear exactly what percentage of the gas revenues flow to the State. Some of the interviewed say 90% to 95% while others speak of 70% to 80%. This might relate to the fact that the Gas Building (Gasgebouw) only recently became more transparent as a result of European guidelines concerning the liberalization of the energy market (Gastel et al, 2014). The Gas Building is a legal construct in which the roles and responsibilities of different actors (State, private and private-public actors) around the gas extraction are laid down.

When the gas field was discovered, it was estimated to be 60 billion cubic meters (Gastel et al, 2014). Since then, the estimates changed regularly and eventually it was discovered that the Groningen gas field is the biggest onshore gas field in the world with 2900 billion cubic meters of gas (idem). Until today, 2065 billion cubic meters of gas has been extracted (NAM, 2017b).

The Gas Building Before coming to the distribution of the costs and risks of gas extraction, it is relevant to explain the roles and responsibilities of the different actors in the Gas Building. On page 23, the Gas Building can be found (Creeze, 2016; interviewee 6). The construction of the Gas Building is very complex and some actors are wearing different hats. The construction of the Gas Building is relevant because in this legal construct the different roles and responsibilities of the concerned actors are secured. In relation to human induced earthquakes, an examination of the Gas Building can provide a starting point to find out who is responsible for which aspect of gas extraction. Moreover, to know the Gas Building will contribute to a better understanding of the concerned actors and their behaviour. In order to avoid confusion, I will address the different actors one by one.

As mentioned earlier, 50% of the NAM is owned by Shell and another 50% by ExxonMobil. The NAM has a concession from the State to extract the gas from the Groningen field. The NAM then sells gas to GasTerra, which in turn sells the gas on the gas and oil market. Before 2005, this was done by Gasunie, a state enterprise that was responsible for both trade and transport of the gas. In the light of the European guidelines for the liberalization of the energy market (Gastel et al, 2014), Gasunie was split into the trading company GasTerra and Gasunie remained a state enterprise only responsible for the transportation of gas.

As any other company, the NAM pays taxes and levies for its activities to the State. Since NAM is a privately owned company by Shell and ExxonMobil, there is no obligation to publish annual reports on profits and taxes. ExxonMobil and Shell are quoted companies, so they do publish annual reports, it is however not possible to find exact figures of their tax obligations. Nevertheless, new European regulation require oil- and gas companies to publish their payments to the government (European Parliament, 2013). Recently, the NAM published its annual financial report of the year 2016. In 2016,

the NAM had a turnover of €3.5 billion and made a profit €526 million, from which almost completely flows to Shell and ExxonMobil (NAM, 2017a). This figure encompasses all activities of the NAM, so not only gas extraction in Groningen, but also offshore oil and gas extraction. In 2016, NAM payed €3 billion to the Dutch State (NAM, 2017a). This year was the first year NAM published its annual financial report.

The State Supervision on the Mines supervises the activities of the NAM and advises the national Ministry of Economic Affairs on the gas extraction and safety issues. The NAM is for 60% owner of the Maatschap Groningen (Partnership Groningen), which is responsible for the costs and the risks of the exploitation and management of the gas fields. Although Maatschap Groningen is owned 60% by the NAM owns 60% of the NAM, it has a say of 50% in the decision-making. According to Correljé (1998) this was the outcome of the negotiations between Shell, ExxonMobil and the Dutch State in the early 1960’s.

The State is the only owner of Energie Beheer Nederland (Energy Management Netherlands, EBN) and its dividend generated by its activities flow to the State. It is EBN that generates the revenues of gas for the State. EBN is the 40% owner of GasTerra B.V. and is also owns 40% of Maatschap Groningen (Partnership Groningen). However, EBN has a 50% say in the decision-making process. In conclusion, Maatschap Groningen is managed 50-50 by a state actor (EBN) and a private company (NAM), but NAM owns 60% and EBN 40%. The Maatschap Groningen is the actor that carries the economic costs and risks of gas extraction, and is the actor that decides on the volume of gas to be extracted from the gas field. Since Maatschap Groningen is both privately and publicly owned, both the NAM and the State are liable for the decisions made by the Maatschap.

GasTerra B.V. is a company that trades in gas. It buys gas from the NAM and sells it on the market to energy companies and industries. When, for example, an energy company wishes to generate electricity with the use of gas, it can buy gas from GasTerra. It is Gasunie that is responsible for the transportation of the gas via pipelines or ships. GasTerra also trades internationally because of the liberalization of the energy market in the European Union since the 2000’s. This means that it not only trades in Dutch gas, but also in Norwegian or Russian gas. GasTerra is 25% owned by Shell and 25% by ExxonMobil, the State is the 10% owner of GasTerra, and EBN owns 40% of GasTerra.

Gas Building

dividend Dutch State

Taxes and levies

50% 25% 10% ExxonMobil

State Supervision on 100% dividend the Mines

50% 25% Shell Supervision on

Nederlandse Maatschap Energie Beheer Aardolie 60% Groningen 40% Nederland B.V. (EBN) 40% Maatschappij B.V. (Partnership (Energy Management GasTerra B.V. (NAM) Groningen) Netherlands)

Concession for exploitation of Sells gas to Costs and risks of exploitation for

Gas from the Market Groningen-field Is being sold to

Distribution of costs and risks of gas extraction Considering the distribution of the risks and costs of gas extraction, one has to be aware that the relevant assets in this case are not owned by the same actors. The underground gas is owned by the State and only the State can give concessions to an oil company to extract it. The ground above the gas, however, is owned by land- or home-owners and, as a consequence, the properties on these plots are privately owned as well. It is not up to the homeowner to say whether he/she wants the gas to be extracted, but it is the State that makes the decision. What we will see, however, is that the residents of the area are bearing the risks of the gas extraction.

Already in 1972, the young new member of parliament Jan Terlouw for the liberal democratic party D66 claimed that there was a relationship between gas extraction and soil decline in Groningen. The then Minister of Economic Affairs, Harrie Langman, said that this relationship was not true (Schenk & Timmer, 2009). He based his statement on a report produced by the NAM, which concluded that soil decline due to gas extraction was only happening at a very slow rate, so it was not necessary limit gas extraction (Schenk & Timmer, 2009).

On the other hand, the NAM seemed to realize that gas extraction was not without risks. A board member of the local tennis club in the village of Middelstum, Loppersum, who I spoke to because the tennis club received a subsidy of NAM’s livability fund for solar panels on the roof of the canteen, used to work at the regional water authorities (interviewee 5). She noted that in the 1970s, the NAM established a fund for water authorities to adapt to soil decline (idem). Soil decline is happening in Groningen in the shape of a ‘soup plate’, where soil subsidence most in the center of the field while at the border the soil declines at a slower rate (see also map 3 on page 35). The ground water level remains more or less the same, so in the middle of the ‘soup plate’ the soil is getting wetter. In the Netherlands, soil subsidence is a natural phenomenon that is quite common and is often tackled via the use of water pump stations to pump water away to ditches and canals. In Groningen, however, soil subsidence happens faster because of gas extraction (interviewee 5). In a sense, one could argue that the NAM did recognize their liability in the soil subsidence because they financed the building of water pump stations. The fund was completely financed by the NAM and the NAM transferred 650 million guilders to the fund (Correljé, 1998). The water boards called these specific stations ‘NAM water pump stations’ since they were eventually financed by the NAM (interviewee 5). Other things that were financed with subsidies from this fund were, for example, the improvement of dykes in order to make them stronger and better able to absorb shocks in the ground and soil subsidence.

Report Dutch Safety Board (2014) In 2014, the Dutch Safety Board published a damning report on the extent to which residents’ safety was taken into account in the decision-making process of gas extraction (Onderzoeksraad voor Veiligheid (OVV), 2014). The Dutch Safety Board is an authority that independently can decide to

investigate people’s safety in many areas of society, including (chemical) industries, transport and construction sites. The Dutch Safety Board decided to conduct the investigation after the most severe earthquake of Huizinge in 2012 which caused damage to properties and ‘the confidence of residents in the safety of the gas extraction and the parties involved reached a low point’ (OVV, 2014:5). According to the writers of the report, it was long thought that the risks of earthquakes to happen were minimal and ground subsidence was a natural phenomenon on which gas extraction had a minimal effect (OVV, 2014). The aim of the report was to examine to what extent residents’ safety was taken into account in decisions concerning gas extraction.

The conclusion was strong: residents’ safety was not at all taken into account. The authors write that three factors explain why this was the case. Firstly, safety was not included as a separate interest in the system of responsibilities around gas extraction; secondly, among the involved parties, which are Economic Affairs, the NAM and Maatschap Groningen, there was a lack of urgency in conducting research on reducing the uncertainties and risks of gas extraction; and thirdly, in regard to the citizens of Groningen, there was a lack of communication and accountability (OVV, 2014). According to the Safety Board, the Gas Building has always been a nontransparent structure in which the different actors were understanding each other’s interests and were always looking for consensus, and as a result, there was no room for critique or back pressure (OVV, 2014).

The Safety Board also made some recommendations for the future of gas extraction (OVV, 2014). First of all, the actors in the Gas Building need to recognize their failure to take residents’ safety into account and should assign residents’ safety a strong position in future decision concerning gas extraction. One way to do this is to include a citizens’ perspective in the decision-making process. Lastly, the Safety Board recommends that the State Supervision on the Mines should get a more independent position in relation to the Ministry of Economic Affairs. In March 2017, the Safety Board published report in which an update was provided of how the recommendations were followed up (OVV, 2017). I will revisit this report in the next chapter.

Map 1: Earthquakes in Groningen from 1986 until today (only earthquakes with a magnitude of 2.0 or higher are shown), source (NAM, 2017b)

In the scheme of the Gas Building, it can be seen that the Maatschap Groningen is responsible for the risks and costs for gas extraction. However it is not clear what this exactly means – are these standard economic costs and risks that apply to every company that does business or are the costs and risks as a result of earthquakes caused by gas extraction also taken into consideration at the Maatschap Groningen? Moreover, both the State and the NAM point their finger at the other when considering the responsibility earthquakes since both the State and the NAM are in the Maatschap Groningen. Many people in the region consider the NAM to be responsible for the misery done to them, but it is the State that gives concessions and receives the largest share of revenues, and it is a state firm that has an equal say in the management of gas exploitation. I will revisit the local impacts in the chapter on justice as recognition. Many people in Groningen that have cracks in their houses feel that they have been carrying the costs and risks of earthquakes, while the companies can get away with it. All the more because it is very difficult for residents to receive a decent compensation for the damages done to their properties, procedures are extended and it is up to the resident to prove that the damage has been caused by earthquakes, instead of the NAM has to prove that is has not been caused by earthquakes. This issue of recognition will be addressed more in depth in the next chapters on recognition and procedural justice.

Distribution of revenues of gas extraction As stated above, the revenues of gas extraction do not stay in the province of Groningen. A share of the revenues is earned by the NAM, but the biggest share goes to the State. In that sense, every citizen of the Netherlands benefits from the revenues generated by gas extraction, addition to residents of Groningen. The coordinator of the earthquake dossier in Slochteren – the municipality where gas was first discovered – noted that,

‘(…) mensen zeggen van: “Ja, je profiteert er toch ook van?” Ja natuurlijk dat is zo, maar alleen het gaat om de evenredigheid en de balans. (interviewee 1)

‘Of course also people in Groningen benefit also from gas extraction, but what is important are proportionality and balance.’ (interviewee 1, own translation)

In this section, I will address the distribution of the revenues of the gas extraction on the basis of a report by the Dutch Court of Audit, a report of Statistics Netherlands, and data from the conducted interviews.

When gas extraction activities began in 1963, an engineer, Willem Meiborg, wrote an open letter to the local newspaper of Groningen in which he predicted that the revenues would not be distributed evenly across the country:

‘Nog is er geen gas in huis of in de kranten staat al hoe groot de winsten voor de Staat (Holland!) en voor de oliemaatschappijen zullen zijn, enz. Maar welke voordelen zullen ter beschikking worden gesteld voor de besturen en voor de bewoners der noordelijke provincies? Daarover leest men tot heden niets’ (Meiborg, 1963)

‘Not a single house has been connected to the gas network and already the State (Western provinces!) and the oil companies are predicting high profits. What will be the benefits for the local administrators and residents? Nothing is said about that yet’ (Meiborg, 1963, own translation).

Moreover, he calls for a fund to be established to cover damages attributed to future soil subsidence, which will be more severe because of gas extraction. Meiborg did not receive a serious response from neither the NAM nor the State, but today his prediction became the truth. I was not able to find out what the responses of others were in that time, but his grandson, Willem Meiborg, is still fighting for recognition of the harm done to the residents in Groningen by the NAM.

Report of Court of Audit (2014) According to the Dutch Court of Audit’s report in 2014, in the period from 1960 to 2013, the Dutch State earned around €265 billion from gas revenues. From this figure, €239 billion has been used for

general means such as welfare benefits, education, and healthcare, though it cannot be traced exactly where and what this money has been used. The reason for this it that the revenues have been part of the general budget, and was in this setting not assigned to specific projects. A total of €26 billion has been used for the Fonds Economische Structuurversterking (Economic Structure Enhancement Fund, FES), which existed from 1995 to 2010, to finance infrastructural projects such as the Amsterdam South-Axis and the Amsterdam ring road (Verhulst et al., 2014). The fund was managed by both the Ministry of Economic Affairs and the Ministry of Finance (Wet Fonds economische structuurversterking, 1995), which mean that these ministries have the power to assign money to specific projects.

In the report, the authors also describe three scenarios of how the Dutch government could use gas revenues in the future (Verhulst et al, 2014). First, revenues can be used for the general budget, but then it would be difficult to trace how the money is spent. Moreover, when there are limitations on gas extraction, for example because of the increased awareness of the risks of gas extraction such as earthquakes and soil subsidence, financial cuts will be made by the Ministry of Finance. The second option would be to reinstall an enhancement fund in order to trace how the money is spent and, in this way, invest more in Groningen, for example in infrastructure projects or in regional employment. Finally, the third option is for the State to decide where to invest the revenues through establishing an investment fund – as Norway did – and only use the interests of the fund for state expenditures. The advantage of this last scenario is that the fund, if invested well, will generate long-term financial gains.

According to Verhulst et al. (2014), in the general budget of the Netherlands from 1963 to 2013, gas revenues contributed approximately 10% to 20% of the total budget. As a result of a limitation of gas extraction because of the earthquakes, this figure has been decreasing. In 2013 9,8% of the total budget was attributed to gas revenues and, in 2014, this percentage was down to 6,4% (Notten, 2015). After the severe earthquake of 2012, the gas production was not limited immediately, but under societal and political pressure, the gas production was limited from 2013 onwards. I will get back this decision in the chapter on justice as recognition.

It is evident that gas extraction is an important component of the Dutch economy when it comes to the national budget; however, gas extraction is not a labor-intensive industry (Notten, 2015). This means that since the discovery of the gas field in Groningen, employment associated with gas extraction has not grown very much. Moreover, the labor income quote in gas extraction – meaning the proportion of income costs against the total generated profit of gas extraction – is around 4% compared to an average of 43% in the Netherlands in general (Notten, 2015: 13). This means that compared to other sectors, labor costs of gas production are 4% of the price, while in other sectors the average labor costs are 43% of the price. In other words, the profits generated through gas extraction goes mostly to the State and the NAM, while the local labor pool gets a relatively small share of the profits. This

28 means that the revenues are not evenly distributed, the international operating firms and the Dutch State receive the biggest share while local employees receive a relatively small share.

Economic Structure Enhancement Fund (FES) (1995 – 2010) The FES was established in 1995 with the intention to save a part of the gas revenues and to invest them into infrastructure projects to improve the economic structure of the Netherlands (Wet Fonds economische structuurversterking, 1995). Economic structure refers to transport infrastructure such as (rail)roads and harbors, but also to ‘technology-, telecommunication- and knowledge infrastructure’ (idem: article 3). In its lifetime (1995 to 2010) the total budget of the FES was €33 billion, which is 78% financed by gas revenues while the rest comes from the sales of state participations and savings on interest charges, (Verhulst et al, 2014). These are activities on the financial market conducted by states in order to generate income with other means than tax regulations. State participations can be seen as shares in company in which the State invests, and these shares can be sold on the financial market. When an individual buys shares of the State, it lends money to the State, these shares are called obligations. An interest is calculated to cover the risk for the lender and make it interesting for someone to lend money to the State. When the interest rate on State obligations decreases, the interest for the State to pay will decrease as well. As a result, the State can save on the interest charges and in this context, this money is used to invest in the FES.

To be funded by the FES, a project had to be of national interest and had to enhance the economic structure which is referred to above. For example, 80% of the FES was used to finance infrastructure projects such as the Amsterdam Ring Road, the High-Speed Line from Schiphol Airport to Belgium, and the Betuweline from the Rotterdam Harbour to Germany (Verhulst et al., 2014). The FES did not directly fund a specific project, but a ministry (e.g. the then Ministry of Transport and Water, now Infrastructure and the Environment) could add financial means of the FES to a budget of a project. It was up to the ministries to account the expenses in annual reports.

There were also plans for a High-Speed Line from Amsterdam to Hamburg, Germany, via Groningen, to be financed by the FES, but it was decided in 2007 that the plan would not be executed. The reasons for the abandonment of the plan were the high costs and expected low advantages (Centraal Planbureau, 2006). As a compensation, the province of Groningen received a fund from which local (building and infrastructure) projects were financed. There is € 2,6 billion in the fund, which is to be invested in the development in the Northern economy, as well as the accessibility of the Northern provinces (Province of Groningen, n.d.). According to a law professor of the University of Groningen, it is not bad per se to do investments in other parts of the country, but Groningen did not benefit much from these investments:

‘Die Zuiderzeelijn is toen niet doorgegaan en toen was er wat geld over en dat is weer naar het Groninger Forum gegaan. Nou goed, daar is voor een deel natuurlijk aardgasgeld mee gemoeid. Dat geldt ook voor allerlei andere projecten, de zee beveiliging in Zeeland, ontzettend veel grote projecten zijn ervan gefinancierd, de Betuwelijn, de tunnel in Maastricht. Daar zijn veel dingen van betaald. Wat op zich zelf ook prima is, je moet gewoon investeringen doen in je land. Maar de regio zelf heeft daar niet bijzonder veel van geprofiteerd.’ (interviewee 11)

‘The Zuiderzeelijn did not go on and then there was some money left and it went to the Groninger Forum [a cultural center]. Well, there is a lot of natural gas money involved. This also applies to all kinds of other projects, the sea security in Zeeland, a huge number of large projects were financed, the Betuwelijn, the tunnel in Maastricht. There are many things being paid from the gas revenues. What in itself is fine, you just have to do investments in your country. But the region itself has not benefited much from that.’ (interviewee 11, own translation)

In 2006, the now abolished Institute for Research of Government Expenditures (IOO) published a report showing that only 1% of the FES was used in the three northern provinces of the Netherlands, while 88% of the fund was invested in the three western provinces (IOO, 2006). When confronted with this figure, the mayor of Loppersum, responded:

‘Je kunt wel zeggen dat is maar 1% geweest in het kader van investeringen in infrastructuur, maar we moeten ook met elkaar eerlijk zijn dat de economische motor van Nederland draait in het Westen.’ (interviewee 13)

‘You can say that only 1% of the fund has been invested in infrastructure, but we must also be honest that the economic engine of the Netherlands is running in the West.’ (interviewee 13, own translation)

His colleague in Slochteren said that if the government had been investing more in the North in the first place, there would more economic activity in Groningen and consequently more FES- investments in infrastructure would be possible (interviewee 1). This is related to the main argument of this chapter, namely that the revenues of gas extraction are not evenly distributed across the country, while the risks of gas production are carried by local residents in Groningen. However, a critical note can be placed at this statement, since the unemployment rates are highest in Groningen and population shrinkage is an problem which is also present in the region (CBS, 2016a), it can be asked whether such large investments will be helpful to ‘uplift’ the region when there are already many socio-economic problems present, without even considering the problems with earthquakes.

Commission Langman In 1997, a commission chaired by Harrie Langman, former Minister of Economic Affairs, who had claimed in the 1970s that there was not a relationship between gas extraction and ground movement, presented a report arguing that the northern provinces should receive more money from the national budget to invest in the local economic structure (Commissie Langman, 1997). One of the arguments for this was that a fair share of the revenues of the gas produced in Groningen should be invested in the region where it was extracted. As a Minister of Economic Affairs, he already advocated that economic policy should be focused more on the development of regions other than only ‘the West’ and this resulted in a spread of the government services (e.g. part of Statistics Netherlands to Limburg and the Agency Telecom to Groningen) (Herderscheê, 2016). This was also the main argument of the report that his commission presented (Commissie Langman, 1997)

Several interviewees mention the ‘Langmangelden’ (Langman monies) as an improvement of Groningen’s economy (e.g interviewee 1 and 3). However, more should be invested in the Northern provinces to boost the economy and employment. The mayor of Slochteren comments on that:

‘Kijk wat het Rijk zelf heeft gedaan met de spreiding van de rijksdiensten, dat is ook zo'n mooie noodgreep. We hebben het Kaskade in Groningen, daar zitten nog een paar van die instellingen. Maar in verhouding is dat natuurlijk heel weinig geweest en veel van die rijksdiensten gaan weer naar Den Haag toe. In een tijd waarin je eigenlijk veel makkelijker op een afstand met elkaar kan communiceren door digitale technieken.’ (interviewee 1)

‘Look at what the State did with the spread of public services, which is also a nice makeshift. We have the Kaskade in Groningen, there are some of these institutions. But in relation to that, of course, that has been very little and many of these public services go back to The Hague. At a time when you can easily communicate with each other at distance through digital techniques.’ (interviewee 1, own translation)

What he means is that place and space in the digital era are of less relevance than it used to be, so for a national department it does not really matter where it is located.

Conclusion This chapter has demonstrated that the distribution of the costs and revenues of gas extraction in Groningen are not evenly distributed across time, space and place. In the history of gas extraction, most revenues have been used in the national budget and, in this way, very little has been invested in Groningen. On the other hand, people in Groningen have also benefit from the welfare state through education and healthcare. Yet the economy in Groningen is not the most dynamic in the country, so if the State would have invested more in the region, there would be more economic activity, according to local and provincial administrators (interviewees 1, 4 and 13). More economic activity would lead

to better employment opportunities and should therefore improve the region as a whole. Since the regional policies of Langman and his continuing plea for regional focus in his 1997 report, a lot already has been invested in Groningen. Still unemployment rates remain high and population shrinkage is an issue as well. Added to these socio-economic problems is the issue of soil subsidence and earthquakes, which together make cause a vicious circle downwards. In the last chapter, I will present some recommendations how the situation could be improved. In the light of distribution across space and place, it is evident that local residents in Groningen carry the risks of earthquakes and soil subsidence, as well as resulting damages on their property, while the whole country profits from the gas revenues. In the words of the mayor of Slochteren:

‘Het is prima dat Nederland volop heeft geprofiteerd van het Groninger gas, dan vervolgens staat er ook tegenover, dat is een kwestie van nationaal fatsoen, dat je het hier netjes regelt.’ (interviewee 1)

‘It’s great that the Netherlands has benefited from the Groningen gas, and then it is a matter of national decency things will be taken care of in a fair way.’ (interviewee 1, own translation)

Present (2012 – now): recognition?

Introduction The second pillar of energy justice is the notion of justice as recognition (Sovacool & Dworkin, 2015). Prior to working on a solution for an improvement of justice, the injustice of unfair distribution of costs and risks related to gas extraction needs to be recognized. In the case of Groningen, the relationship between gas extraction and soil subsidence and earthquakes – as well as the resulting physical damage to properties – needs to be recognized in order to achieve a certain level of compensation for the damage. Since the beginning of gas extraction in Groningen, several scientific and unscientific claims have been made about the risks of gas extraction (Meiborg, 1963; BOA, 1993). It was only in 2012, when a severe earthquake of 3.6 on Richter scale happened in Huizinge, municipality of Loppersum, that the relationship between earthquakes and gas extraction was finally being recognized. The data collected in the field showed that residents and administrators consider the Huizinge earthquake as a tipping point in the process of recognizing the damages caused by gas extraction-related earthquakes. In this chapter, I will give an overview of the consequences of and the developments since the Huizinge earthquake. Moreover, I will give an overview of claims that have been made in the past about the relationship between gas extraction and soil subsidence and/or earthquakes. The sub question to be answered is: are the risks resulting from gas extraction being recognized by the NAM and the State?

Soil subsidence and the water boards The gas field in Groningen is located between 2700 and 3500 meters below ground and with a surface area of around 900 km2 (Nederlandse Aardolie Maatschappij, n.d.). According to the NAM, the gas is stored under pressure and under a high-quality layer of sandstone, which makes extraction relatively easy since, in short, there only needs to be drilled a hole in the sandstone, and the gas will flow out (idem). However, recent technical articles have shown that when gas is extracted, the pressure of the field will decrease and the earth layers above will subside (e.g., Fokker & Van Thienen-Visser, 2016; Juez-Larré et al, 2016). Schenk and Timmer, who wrote a book commissioned by the NAM on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the discovery of the gas field, stated that ‘from the beginning of the gas extraction, NAM had realized that this phenomenon [soil subsidence] could occur’ (Schenk & Timmer, 2009: 97, own translation). Schenk and Timmer quote a 1971 report by the NAM, which said that ‘gas extraction would cause a gradual occurrence of dish-shaped soil subsidence’ (idem: 97, own translation). In other words, the NAM was aware of the risks on soil subsidence when gas was extracted.

To cover the consequences of soil subsidence on ground water levels, the NAM established a fund to finance water pump stations. In 1983, the NAM, the province of Groningen, the water boards and the port authority of Delfzijl signed an agreement that the NAM would monitor soil subsidence, make

33 public five-year prognoses, and be willing to cover the costs for stronger dykes and water pump stations (Schenk & Timmer, 2009). NAM’s most recent prognosis of soil subsidence can be found in map 2 on the next page. This fund was already mentioned in the previous chapter as a redistribution of revenues, but it can also be seen as recognition of the NAM that the gas extraction activities do have influence on ground movement and resulting risks around dykes and groundwater levels. According to a former employee of one of the two water boards in Groningen,

‘(…) daar is dus toen ook een fonds voor opgericht en is toen 690 miljoen gulden ingestopt en dat potje is er nog steeds’ (interviewee 5)

‘the NAM invested an amount of 690 million guilders in the fund and this fund is still exists.’ (interviewee 5: own translation)

It was, however, not easy to receive finance for a water pump station, since

‘als wij bij het waterschap een besluit namen om in het kader bodemdaling moet daar en daar een gemaal komen. Allemaal onderzoeken moesten ook twee drie keer. Want dan was er een commissie en dat waren ook allemaal techneuten en die stelden alles ter discussie, maar dan ook alles. Dus dat waren ook al procedures van jaren voordat er een keer een besluit werd genomen of daar wel of niet een gemaal kon komen.’ (interviewee 5)

‘if we as a water board decided that because of soil subsidence somewhere a water pump station had to be placed, it took some years to convince the NAM about the need for a specific station at a specific location, and most of the times two or three investigations had to be conducted. That had to do with the fact that in such a commission mostly technical people were members, those people question everything.’ (interviewee 5: own translation)

In conclusion, the NAM did seem to recognize its responsibility for soil subsidence since it established a fund for strengthening dykes and building pumping stations. However, according to the quote above, it was only after several years of procedures and calculations that a fund was assigned for a water pump station. We will see that this happens in the same way in the case of individual households, where individual home-owner must prove that the damage is caused by earthquakes, though this can be a long-term project which causes a lot of stress and anger. I will come back to this point in the section on the damage protocol.

Map 2 Prognosis soil subsidence in 2080, retrieved from (NAM, 2015a)

Selection of claims by others As was already mentioned in the previous chapter on distributive justice, Member of Parliament Jan Terlouw already in 1971 claimed the relationship between soil subsidence and earthquakes. This was, however, not taken seriously publicly, though the NAM did establish a fund to cover the consequences of soil subsidence.

In 1986, human geographer Meent van der Sluis was working on his dissertation on the spatial aspects of energy generation in the Netherlands when an earthquake happened (Havermans, 2015). He was convinced that the earthquakes in the North of the Netherlands are caused by gas extraction, but the NAM did not recognize this. According to his widow, in an interview with the newspaper Trouw, the NAM called him a Don Quixote and ‘only a high school geography teacher’, so he could not have known what he was talking about (Havermans, 2015). Many years later, in 2013, the then Director of the NAM, Frank Duut, gave an interview in the local newspaper Dagblad van het Noorden in which he agreed with Van der Sluis on the relationship between gas extraction and earthquakes, but Duut called the underlying theory of the claim nonsense (Hamersvelt, 2013). The theory of Van der Sluis was based on so called ‘S-vibrations’, which travel from Slochteren to a wider area and cause earthquakes. This theory has never been accepted or proven (BOA, 1993; Fokker & Van Thienen- Visser, 2016; Juez-Larré et al, 2016).

Between 1986 and 1993, 24 minor earthquakes took place ranging from 1.4 to 2.8 on Richter scale (BOA, 1993). These events prompted the Ministries of Economic Affairs, and Transport and Water to instruct many parties – including Royal Netherlands Meteorological Institute (KNMI), Technical University Delft, State Supervision on the Mines, NAM, and the Free University Amsterdam – to conduct a multidisciplinary investigation on the relationship between gas extraction and earthquakes. The report was written by the ‘Begeleidingscommissie Onderzoek Aardbevingen’ or Guidance Committee on Earthquake Research, this commission was formed by a combination of the above- mentioned actors. (BOA, 1993). The research lasted two years and the most important conclusions were the following: there is a relationship between gas extraction and earthquakes, namely that gas extraction can trigger earthquakes in underground faults which are already under pressure. However, such an earthquake can only have a maximum magnitude of about 3 on Richter scale. About the damages caused by earthquakes, the following was said:

‘De uitkomsten van het multidisciplinaire onderzoek geven aan, dat als gevolg van de maximaal te verwachten aardbeving, zelfs in het ongunstigste geval, slechts een kleine kans bestaat op lichte schade in een beperkt gebied rond het epicentrum’ (BOA, 1993: 67).

‘The results of the multidisciplinary study indicate that, as a result of the maximum earthquake even under most unfavorable conditions, there is only a small chance of slight damage occurring in a limited area around the epicenter’ (BOA, 1993: 67).

In other words, only under certain conditions – i.e. place-specific build-up of earth layers – can gas extraction cause earthquakes. However, the frequency and magnitude are not such that there is cause for any concern in the North of the Netherlands (BOA, 1993).

In hindsight, it is of course easy to judge critically such a report which was conducted by reputable parties since today, there is strong scientific evidence proving the relationship between gas extraction and earthquakes (e.g., Spetzler & Dost, 2016). The authors of the 1993 report recommended setting up a seismic observation network in the North of the Netherlands to monitor seismic activity in the ground and to be able to quantify earthquakes (BOA, 1993). However, the historical evidence shows that the NAM was content with the outcomes of the report, as it was scientifically proven by independent scientists, showing that there was only a minor relationship between earthquakes and gas extraction, and that if earthquakes were to happen, they would be of a small magnitude. As a result, the gas extraction remained more or less the same, as can been in figure 1.

In the lawsuit that the Groninger Bodem Beweging is currently bringing, the Court of Justice of Arnhem-Leeuwarden commanded the prosecution to look into all the minutes and reports of NAM’s highest management from the year 1993 onwards (Gerechtshof Arnhem-Leeuwarden, 2017). The rationale behind this that:

“Door de vertegenwoordigers van beklaagde [NAM] is in raadkamer erkend dat rond 1993 duidelijk werd dat er een relatie lag tussen het winnen van gas en het ontstaan van aardbevingen” (Gerechtshof Arnhem-Leeuwarden, 2017: section 15).

“By the representatives of accused [NAM] acknowledged in the council chamber that around 1993 it became clear that there was a relationship between gas extraction and the occurrence of earthquakes” (Gerechtshof Arnhem-Leeuwarden, 2017: section 15).

In other words, the NAM knew that their activities led to movements in the ground. The question to be answered is: why did the NAM not change or stop its activities in the Groningen gas field? According to the president of the Groninger Bodem Beweging, even at the highest level of the government, premier Ruud Lubbers (1982 – 1994) said:

‘het gaat een keer krakken, maar wanneer weten we niet.’ (interviewee 14)

‘it is going to crack some time, but when we do not know’ (interviewee 14: own translation)

The president acknowledged that he has heard this story from others but he was not able to check it. It does, however, along with the BOA report, give the impression that the relationship between gas extraction and earthquakes was longer known than publicly acknowledged. If the relationship was publicly acknowledged, the gas extraction in Groningen should have been reduced. It was, however, in both the State’s and NAM’s financial interest to continue gas extraction.

Despite the hopeful conclusion of the BOA that only minor earthquakes could occur, there have been earthquakes of a higher magnitude which have caused damage to houses. Therefore, in 2001, the then Minister of Economic Affairs Jorritsma established the Technische Commissie Bodembeweging (Technical Commission Ground Movement, TCBB), which was tasked to advise the minister on the relationship between ground movement and mining activities (Instellingsbesluit Technische commissie bodembeweging, 2001). Moreover, the TCBB was tasked to advise residents and businesses on damages attributed to mining, as well as to start a technical investigation and eventually advise the mining company (in this case the NAM) on the compensation that should be offered (TCBB, 2016). Residents can then go to the TCBB as they do not agree with the advice on the damage on their house offered by the Commissie Bodemdaling (Commission Soil Subsidence). The Commissie Bodemdaling is the original institute for residents to go to if he or she believes that damage on his or her house is caused by an earthquake resulting from gas extraction. (Nationaal Coördinator Groningen, n.d.). Half of the members of the Commissie Bodemdaling, including alternate members, are assigned by the NAM and a quarter of the current commission are former employees of the NAM (Commissie Bodemdaling, n.d.). According to journalist Goos de Boer, it is

37 therefore understandable that people can have their doubts about the objectivity and independence of the Commissie Bodemdaling (Boer, 2015).

August, 2012: Earthquake of 3.6 on Richter scale in Huizinge, Loppersum At 22.31 on the 16th of August, 2012, an earthquake of a magnitude of 3.6 on Richter scale happened at the depth of three-kilometers in Huizinge, municipality of Loppersum (KNMI, 2013). According to journalist Mike Tomale, author of the book Bevingen (2015), as well as many of the interviewees (interviewees 1, 2, 3, 4, 10 and 15), this event was a tipping point in the history of earthquakes in Groningen. The Huizinge earthquake was felt by people across the whole province of Groningen (KNMI, 2013) and led to the first ‘gas debate’ in the Lower House of Parliament. Residents of Groningen felt that they would finally be taken seriously, but according to the mayor of Loppersum, this was not the case (interviewee 13). Moreover, the gas production was not being reduced, and worse still, the gas production was increased (see bar chart). In January 2013, Minister Henk Kamp went to Loppersum to talk to administrators and residents. In the visit, he acknowledged that residents are no longer safe in their houses, but that gas production could not be reduced. According to the mayor of Loppersum:

‘En toen de minister dat vertelde van, eigenlijk bent u niet meer veilig in uw eigen huis. Nou, dat is een rare boodschap. Mayor: “En wat gaat u dan doen, minister?” Henk Kamp: “Nou, ik ga eerst eens 14 onderzoeken doen.” Mayor: “Maar er is toch iets aan de hand en er ligt een advies om zo veel mogelijk de productie te beperken? Dat zei het Staatstoezicht op de Mijnen, het komt niet goed met het Groninger veld, minister, we moeten ingrijpen, minister wat gaat u doen?” HK: “Ik ga eerst eens 14 onderzoeken doen, daar doe ik een jaar over.” Mayor: “Maar doet u dan niets aan die productie?” HK: “Nee, want ik moet eerst weten of het echt zo is.” De minister ging hier weg, in januari 2013, en we hadden week op week op week op week zware bevingen.’ (interviewee 13)

‘And then the minister said, actually you’re not safe in your own house anymore. Well, that is a strange message. Mayor: “And what are you going to do, minster? Henk Kamp: “Well, I will first do 14 investigations.” Mayor: “But something is going on and there is an advice to reduce the gas production as much as possible? That was said by the State Supervision on the Mines, it is not good at the Groningen field. Minister, we must intervene, what are you going to do, minister?” HK: “I will first do 14 investigations, and I’ll do that for a year.”

Mayor: “But do not you do anything about the production?” HK: “No, I first need to know if it really is true.” The minister left here, in January 2013, and we had severe quakes week by week by week by week.’ (interviewee 13, own translation)

As can be seen in figure 1 gas extraction was increased in 2013. Why was it not reduced after the severe earthquake of Huizinge? The mayor of Loppersum refers to a public hearing which he attended at the Parliament where the director of GasTerra was invited to explain why the production was not reduced (interviewee 13). The director made clear that there was a 10-year contract in which production was agreed upon. The final year of the contract happened to be 2013 and the 53 billion cubic meters fitted exactly in this last year (Tweede Kamer, 2016). When gas production in the municipality of Loppersum was eventually stopped in 2014, ‘it was suddenly quiet’ (‘ineens was het stil’, interviewee 13, own translation).

Figure 1: bar chart gas production from the last 25 years. Source: NAM, 2017b

Since 2012-2013, gas extraction has been decreasing every year. On the one hand, this might relate to the fact that, over the last years, average winter temperatures have not been very low (KNMI, 2017), so not much gas was needed to heat Dutch houses. However, it is more likely that gas extraction has been reduced because of the political and societal pressure to do so. The president of the Groninger Bodem Beweging , notes:

‘Je ziet ook dat de politiek de afgelopen jaren echt is gaan schuiven. We hadden begin 2015 een demonstratie in Groningen met als leus: terug naar 30 [kuub]. Wij willen wel naar 0, maar dat leek toen absoluut onhaalbaar. Dus dan gingen we pragmatisch op 30 zitten. Moet je nagaan, nu zitten we op zeg maar 20. Dat moet naar 0 hoor.’ (interviewee 14)

‘You also see that politics has really shifted in the recent years. At the beginning of 2015, we had a demonstration: back to 30 [cubic meters]. We want to go to 0, but that seemed absolutely impossible. So then we went to 30 pragmatically. Look at that, now we are at around 20. But it has to go to 0.’ (interviewee 14, own translation)

According to Rijnhout (2017), the earthquakes in Groningen were taken seriously in national politics only in 2013. Since then, both the State (RTVNoord, 2015a) and the NAM (RTVNoord, 2015b) have publicly offered their excuses to the people of Groningen on why the problems have been ignored for so long. In 2016, Shell and ExxonMobil offered their excuses as well (RTVNoord, 2016). However, the gas extraction levels only decreased by a little every year. In early 2015, Minister Kamp decided that gas extraction had to be limited to 39,4 billion cubic meters (Kamp, 2015). However, both provincial and municipal administrators and individual residents together successfully contested this decision at the Council of State. The Council of State found that Kamp did not justify sufficiently why gas extraction could not be limited more and that in the decision residents’ safety was not taken into account, consequently it ruled that the gas extraction for the time being had to be limited to 27 billion cubic meters per year (Raad van State, 2015). In late 2015, Minister Henk Kamp finally decided officially that gas extraction had to be reduced dramatically to decrease the Netherlands’ dependency on the gas (Rijksoverheid, 2015).

In conclusion, the government of the Netherlands has for a long time not been willing to reduce gas extraction in Groningen. Claims of the dangers of gas extraction have been ignored and in the first interdisciplinary report of 1993 (BOA), it was concluded that the probability of severe earthquakes and resulting damages were very low. Even in the 2012, Bosatlas van de energie (Bosatlas of energy), it was stated that the changes in incidences of heavy earthquakes were very low, and damages to houses would only be minor (Leenaers, 2012). After the Huizinge earthquake, the hopeful prognoses proved to be wrong, but why was it so difficult to turn off the gas tap? The president of the Groninger Bodem Beweging thinks that the Dutch State is addicted to gas:

‘Als je dingen realiseert als een sociale welvaartsstaat, die kosten die lopen door. In die zin ben je verslaafd aan die gasinkomsten, die moeten dan doorlopen. En dat verslavingsaspect had er nooit in gemogen.’ (interviewee 14)

‘If you realize things like a social welfare state, those costs are going on. In that sense, you are addicted to the gas revenues, which should then go on. And that aspect of addiction should have never been in it.’ (interviewee 14: own translation)

In other words, the Dutch State needs the gas to finance its expenditures. According to the Dutch Court of Audit, in the whole history of gas extraction in Groningen, the annual revenues for the State ranged from 10% to 20% of the national budget (Verhulst et al., 2014).

National Coordinator Groningen In June 2015 former Queen's Commissioner of Groningen Hans Alders was appointed to be the National Coordinator Groningen (NCG). The idea of a National Coordinator came from both municipal and provincial administrators of Groningen. The rationale was that it was more efficient to have one person to defend the interests of the people in Groningen, than if several mayors and aldermen would act on their own. The NCG has the task to chair the negotiations for the new damage settlement protocol (next chapter) and to coordinate the monumental task of inspecting and possibly strengthening all the buildings in the province of Groningen. In other words, the NCG has the mission to execute the Meerjarenprogramma Aardbevingsbestending en Kansrijk Groningen (Multiannual plan earthquake resistant and promising Groningen).

The NCG is appointed by the Minister of Economic Affairs Henk Kamp (Instellingsbesluit Nationaal Coördinator Groningen, 2015). It is necessary to be legally be appointed by the Minister in order to have the authority to make decisions for example concerning the implementation of the multiannual plan or the negotiations on the new damage settlement protocol (interviewee 8). The National Coordinator is both a person, Hans Alders, and an institution which has currently around 150 employees. Although the idea of the establishment of a National Coordinator was originally coined by the regional administrators, some of feel that the strings between the NCG and the Minister of Economic Affairs are too tight, which, by some, results in distrust in the Hans Alders (interviewee 13). However, according to an official of the NCG, the Minister does not give orders to the NCG and the Minister does not have to approve decisions taken by the NCG (interviewee 8). The official of the NCG adds that there is an emotional side and a rational side to the dossier of the NCG. On the one hand, it can be explained clearly that Economic Affairs and the NCG are separate institutions, and in a rule of law, an institution such as the NCG needs to be appointed by a minister. In practice, it would not matter which minister appoints the NCG. On the other hand, people that have lost their confidence in the Minister of Economic Affairs, argue that the NCG is just another official of the Ministry of Economic Affairs. All the more because, ‘the NCG is just another club with three letters’ (interviewee 8, own translation).

Livability fund In 2015, the NAM started its program on livability. Part of the NCG’s multiannual program is the branch of Kansrijk Groningen (Promising Groningen) in which is aimed to improve the region’s livability trough projects. These projects are financed by means of the Leefbaarheidsfonds (Livability fund) of the NAM. The projects range from solar panels on canteens of local sports clubs to playgrounds in villages and contributions to local art and music festivals (interviewees 2, 5, 10 and 12). The fund is meant for people and associations present in areas that cope with the effects of gas extraction, and interested organizations can apply for funding up to €10,000.

Since the fund is established in 2015 and it is financed by the NAM to contribute to the improvement of the affected livability in the region, it can be argued that the fund works as a compensation scheme. All relevant interviewees agree that it is relatively easy to apply for funding, and that the NAM does not influence the way the funding is spent (interviewees 2, 5, 10 and 12). However, the interviewees do not consider funding of the livability fund to be compensating for the experienced misery in the region. Misery entails damage to one’s house which leads to a decreased property value and the difficulty to receive compensation for this damage, and the immaterial damage such as stress, caused by the way people feel that they are treated by both the NAM and the State. Finance from the livability fund is considered to be ‘just a Band-Aid’ (interviewee 2, own translation) or ‘shiny rocks and sticks’ (interviewee 10, own translation). The provincial executive responsible for the earthquake dossier calls this livability fund a way of ‘green washing’ (interviewee 4). In other words, receivers of finance are content with the finance itself, but it does not compensate for the damage done to the Groningen society (Interviewee 4).

Damage protocol The NAM also finally recognized their responsibility in the damaged houses of residents, and in 2015, the Centrum Veilig Wonen (Center Safe Living, CVW) was founded. This organization as founded to settle damage claims from residents. The procedures followed by the CVW are experienced by residents to be frustrating and some have even mentioned the prevalence of legal inequality. Before I come back to that, I will first explain the damage protocol.

When a resident finds out the house is damaged, for example a crack in the wall, and expects it to be caused by earthquakes, the damage can be reported to the CVW. The CVW will send an inspector, or team of experts, which will investigate the house in order to find out if the crack is caused by an earthquake. The experts will make a report in which it is concluded if the crack is caused by an earthquake or by a lack of maintenance. If the resident does not agree with the outcomes of the report, for example if the resident is sure that the crack was not there before an earthquake happened, he can hire a contra-expert at the CVW’s expense. Again, a team of contra-experts will come to the house and will write a report. It might happen that the expert and the contra-expert have conflicting opinions

42 on the causes of the crack in the wall. In that case, an independent arbiter, a retired judge, will look at the case and the reports of the expert and contra-expert, and will judge whether the NAM is liable for the cracks in the house. Depending on the outcome, the NAM will pay for the repairs. See also appendix 3 for a scheme of the relevant actors in the damage settlement protocol.

In the early days of the CVW, it settled complex damages as well. Since September 2016, these cases are managed by the National Coordinator Groningen (NCG). Settlement of complex damages were transferred from the CVW to the NCG, because the NCG is considered to have an independent position in the process, and can more efficiently assist residents with complex damage (Nationaal Coördinator Groningen, 2016b). There are several reasons why a case can be labeled as complex. According to an official at the NCG:

‘Dat kan zijn dat er meerdere oorzaken van schade zijn, bijvoorbeeld er is zoutwinning en er is gaswinning. Of er is iets met de waterschappen aan de hand en dan heb je al meer partijen, dat kan al een reden zijn. Het kan zijn dat er allerlei factoren zijn, de bewoner is niet in staat om zelf dingen nog te doen, het is niet alleen zijn huis maar de context gaat ook meetellen, het zit misschien financiële problematiek omheen. Dus we kijken eigenlijk breder dan alleen de scheur.’ (interviewee 8)

‘It can be that there are numerous causes of damage, for example there is salt extraction and gas extraction. Or there is something going on with the water boards and you have to deal with more parties, that could be a reason. It could be that there a several factors, a resident is not capable of doing things for himself, it’s not just his home but the context also matters, maybe financial problems. So we actually look further than just the crack in the wall’ (interviewee 8: own translation)

The role of the NCG is to mediate between the affected resident and the NAM. It does so with a mandate from the resident and his case manager, who can help by placing some phone calls if he has not heard from the NAM recently. Eventually, his case manager can prepare a mediation proposal to attempt to settle the case satisfactorily for both parties.

The procedure at the CVW seems to be quite fair. Nevertheless, many residents with damages feel that they are not treated correctly and really have to fight for a decent compensation. One of the reasons for that is often because the resident and expert do not agree on a minor detail. According to the mayor of Slochteren, who tells about a situation which is exemplary for a lot of situations:

‘Kijk we hebben een schade, en we zijn het er niet mee eens [met de uitkomst]. Er zit 1000 euro tussen: lokale aannemers zeggen het kost 4000 en de NAM/CVW zegt het kost maximaal 3000, [daarmee] is het ook wel mee betaald. Je komt er niet uit, er komt een contra-expert bij

die kost 3500 om dat te gaan doen. Vervolgens kom je er nog niet uit, dan ga je naar de arbiter toe. Die kost ook nog eens 10000. Dus kortom, zonder dat je een oplossing hebt voor die scheur kost het al 13500.’ (interviewee 1)

‘Look, we have damage, but we don’t agree [with the outcome]. There is a gap of €1000: local contractors say it costs €4000 and the NAM/CVW says it costs €3000 maximum, that must be sufficient. You can’t figure it out, and a contra-expert comes and he costs €3500. Then you still can’t figure it out, so you go to the arbiter. He costs another €10000. So in short, without having a solution, the crack already costs €13500.’ (interviewee 1, own translation)

During the fieldwork, I often heard similar stories. In the quote above, it seems that it is mostly a disagreement on financial compensation. However, one can imagine that this causes stress and frustration for the residents. The Court in Assen ruled that this also needs to be taken into account, this will be discusses in the section on court cases. The mayor of Slochteren uses the phrase NAM/CVW when he means CVW. The reason for that is that NAM founded CVW to manage the damage settlements, and that the strings between NAM and CVW are tight, or at least are expected to be tight. For example, a law professor of the University of Groningen notes that:

‘(…) je weet niet precies hoe het CVW werkt. Op welke basis dat is, en welke afspraken er met de NAM zijn gemaakt. Tussen deze partijen bestond er een geheim contract. Dat is wel belangrijk want je weet nu natuurlijk niet de criteria waarmee zo'n club opereert. Dat is niet transparant’. (interviewee 11)

‘(…) you do not know exactly how the CVW functions. On basis is that, and which agreement were made with the NAM. Between these two parties there was a secret contract. That is important because now you do not know the criteria with which such a club operates. That is not transparent’ (interviewee 11: own translation)

Across the region, the way in which the CVW and NAM functions in the damage settlement was considered to be unfair. The NAM is liable for the damage caused by its activities, but it also assigns the compensation. In other words, NAM is wearing two hats: of the ‘judge’ who assigns the damage, and of the liable actors who causes the damage. This is endorsed by a journalist of the local newspaper Dagblad van het Noorden: ‘een slager die zijn eigen vlees keurt’, (to mark your own paper) and by the provincial executive: ‘wie betaalt, bepaalt’ (he who pays the piper calls the tune). The role of the CVW and its way of doing business is not accepted anymore. On the 31st of March 2017, the NAM withdrew from the damage settlement and the National Coordinator Groningen took over (Bokkum, 2017). A new settlement protocol is now to be made by provinces and municipalities

(administrative representatives), the Groninger Bodem Beweging, and the Groninger Gasberaad (societal representatives), under the guidance of the NCG. I will come back to this in the last chapter.

Court cases If someone does not agree with the outcome of the damage settlement and still finds that he has been treated unjustly, a resident can always bring the case to court. However, to fight a multinational company like Shell or ExxonMobil, it is an unequal battle. In the words of the provincial executive:

‘Een multinational heeft macht, middelen, tijd om zich tegen een individu te verdedigen en dat hebben mensen niet.’ (interviewee 4)

‘A multinational has power, means and time to defend itself against an individual, but people don’t have that.’ (interviewee 4, own translation)

Still, several cases have been brought to court by individuals organized in associations or foundations. One example was already mentioned, and that was the successful contest of Kamp’s Gasbesluit of early 2015 at the Council of State, which led to a reduction of gas extraction in late 2015 (Raad van State, 2015). Individual households together with local and provincial administrators were not only well organized and represented their own interests, but also represented the interests of all affected residents in the province. In this section, I will discuss three other cases which have been brought to court.

In 2009, the Groninger Bodem Beweging was established to ‘raise the interests of members who suffer (financially and/or emotionally) caused by the direct and indirect consequences of gas extraction in the Groningen gas field’ (GBB, 2015). According to the president of the GBB the association has 3600 members, which are all households, so actually there are more members (interviewee 14). The current case of the GBB is about a criminal prosecution of the board of directors of the NAM because the GBB believes that the directors can be held liable for the damages done to houses in the earthquake zone (Rechtbank Noord-Nederland, 2017b) The GBB is represented by top lawyer Gerard Spong and via the Court of Justice Arnhem-Leeuwarden, where the judge enforced that prosecutors must investigate all the minutes and reports produced by the directors of the NAM from the year 1993 onwards (idem). As already mentioned, this year was chosen because it was known then that gas extraction could lead to earthquakes, despite the NAM continuing gas extraction. The president of the GBB cites Spong when reflecting on the outcome of the case, where he thinks that there is an 80% chance of winning, but it will take a lot of time:

‘Ze [het OM] kunnen dus, en daar zijn we wel bang voor, jaren gaan traineren. Het OM heeft er natuurlijk geen zin in. Het probleem is natuurlijk, als je de NAM dagvaard, hoe gaat de

NAM zich verdedigen? (…) Ze zullen zeggen dat ze in opdracht van de Staat handelen. En daar heeft de Staat geen zin in dat dat voor de rechter komt want dan worden ze medeverantwoordelijk. Het OM heeft het bewust niet gedaan, de Staat aanklagen, want er was allerlei jurisprudentie over dat dat heel moeilijk is. Dus vandaar de NAM en de NAM zal de Staat er wel bijhalen.’ (interviewee 14)

‘So, they [the prosecution] can, and we are afraid of that, drag their feet for years. Of course, the prosecution does not feel like it. The problem is, of course, if you assign the NAM, how will the NAM defend itself? (…) They will say they act on behalf of the State. And the State does not feel like it will come to a judge, because they will be co-responsible. The prosecution deliberately did not charge the State, because there is a lot of jurisprudence which learns that [charging the State] is very difficult that that is very hard. So that is why the NAM will call the State.’ (interviewee 14, own translation)

In other words, justice for the residents affected by earthquakes might be achieved, but it will not be easy and fast.

Another collective which contested the NAM is the Stichting Waardevermindering door Aardbevingen in Groningen (Foundation Depreciation by Earthquakes in Groningen, Stichting WAG). According to the statutes of the Stichting WAG, the foundation’s goal is to:

‘Defend the interests of the participants, in the broadest sense of the word, including determination of the damage resulting from the depreciation of their immovable property, suffered by the participants through the gas extraction by the NAM and/or the acting or failing by the NAM/State, which has resulted in soil subsidence and/or earthquakes’ (Stichting WAG, 2013, own translation).

Together with twelve housing corporations, Stichting WAG contested the NAM for depreciation of property values of around 100,000 houses in the earthquake zone in 2015 (Stichting WAG, n.d.). The court ruled that the NAM must compensate for the depreciation of values in Groningen, even if there are no physical damages or the house has not yet been sold (Rechtbank Noord-Nederland, 2015). The NAM appealed the ruling and this case is currently pending (NAM, 2015b)

In 2015, the Stichting WAG also contested the NAM for immaterial damages caused by earthquakes. Immaterial damages include the stress and destruction of enjoyment of living. Two years later, the court ruled that the NAM is responsible for the immaterial damage and must compensate for this damage (Rechtbank Noord-Nederland, 2017a). This is a so-called principle statement, which means that with this ruling, individuals can file for a compensation for their immaterial damage. Again, the NAM appealed and the case is pending.

Conclusion This chapter has showed that since the Huizinge earthquake of 2012, much has happened in terms of the recognition of the relationship between gas extraction and soil subsidence and earthquakes, and resulting compensation. The State and the NAM publicly offered their apologies for the way residents in Groningen have been treated, specifically for the fact that safety consideration have not been taken into account in decisions on gas extraction. Nevertheless, the attitudes of both the NAM and State are experienced to be non-corporative, because it takes a lot of energy and time for individuals and associations to achieve justice in terms of compensation for their damaged properties. Even if the relationship between gas extraction, earthquakes and resulting damage to properties is recognized by the NAM, it does not mean that a decent compensation will follow since the damage settlement procedures are extensive and cost a lot of energy. Moreover, individuals are being placed against subsidiary of a multinational oil company, which means that there is an imbalance in power, energy and financial means in order to have a fair trial. The question is now, what will happen in the future? Will local administrators and residents have a say in the process of a new damage settlement protocol and how will the big task of strengthening every single house in the earthquake zone be governed? I will try to answer these questions in the next chapter.

Future: procedural justice

Introduction The third and final pillar of energy justice is procedural justice. Procedural justice refers to who has a say in the process of the distribution of costs and benefits (Sovacool & Dworkin, 2015). Moreover, in order to achieve procedural justice, stakeholders must have access to information and to legal procedures, as well as stakeholders must be represented in regional and national institutions (Jenkins et al., 2016). The previous chapters have demonstrated that the costs and risks are carried mostly by the residents and administrators in Groningen, while the revenues flow to the State and the NAM. There have been several calls for a fairer distribution of the benefits across the country and specifically the region where the gas has been extracted. Moreover, only after more than fifty years, the relationship between gas extraction and earthquakes is now being recognized by the State and the NAM. Although there are several pending cases against the NAM, both residents and administrators can now look at the future of their province. There are two major tasks that need to be addressed in the near future: first, a new damage protocol has to be designed and, second, all the houses in the region need to be strengthened.

In this chapter, I will briefly address the extent that local administrators and residents had a say in the decision-making process on the distribution of the risks and revenues of gas extraction in the past. Afterwards, I will discuss the two tasks of forming a new damage protocol and strengthening all the buildings in the region, and I will specifically discuss to what extent aspects of procedural justice are embedded in the processes. The chapter concludes with a reflection on the present formation of a new cabinet after the Dutch national elections of March 2017. To what extent do both local administrators and residents have a say in procedures concerning the consequences of gas extraction?

Procedural justice in the past and the present The chapter on distributive justice demonstrated that the risks and revenues of gas extraction were uneven distributed across the country. The risks were carried by the people in Groningen, while the revenues flowed to the NAM and the State. In 1963, Willem Meiborg warned about the risks of gas extraction and called for a fairer distribution of the benefits (Meiborg, 1963). In the legal structure of the Gas Buidling (see page 23), the Maatschap Groningen (Partnership Groningen) is the organization which decides how much gas will be extracted from the gas field. In the Maatschap Groningen, the NAM and Energie Beheer Nederland (Energy Management Netherlands, EBN) have an equal say in the decisions concerning gas. EBN is 100% owned by the Dutch State, so in practice the State and the NAM together decide how much gas will be extracted. The Ministry responsible for these decisions is the Ministry of Economic Affairs and its present Minister Henk Kamp.

In the chapter on recognition, I addressed the gaswinningsbesluit of the Minister and how it was successfully contested at the Council of State. Eventually, the final responsibility of decisions on gas extraction lies with the Minister of Economic Affairs, all the more since it is the Minister who gives a concession to the NAM to extract the gas. The president of NAM’s livability fund had this to say about the responsibility of the earthquakes:

‘Dus dan kreeg de NAM de zwarte piet. Maar NAM en Economische Zaken en ExxonMobil en vooral de Staat en de Staat zijn we weer zelf. Dus NAM krijgt nu de zwarte piet, maar je had net zo goed de zwarte piet bij Economische Zaken neer kunnen leggen of bij het Staatstoezicht op de Mijnen.’ (interviewee 12)

‘So the NAM was being bashed. But NAM and Economic Affairs and ExxonMobil and especially the State, and we are the State. So the NAM is being bashed, but you could easily also bash Economic Affairs or the State Supervision on the Mines.’ (interviewee 12, own translation)

“We are the State”, as we elect the government and Members of Parliament (MPs) to represent the citizens of a country. In other words, since the citizens of a country elect their representatives in the Parliament, ideally the MPs represent the will of the people. Generally, the biggest party can form a new government and if that party wants to, for example, extract more gas, it can be argued that this party just follows the election results. Therefore, this decision would be legitimate. However, the parties not in the government, the opposition parties, can also call for a debate to make a Minister account for his or her decisions. According a journalist for the local television and radio station RTVNoord, there have been 43 ‘gas debates’ since the Huizinge earthquake of 2012 (interviewee 7). In these debates, many motions have been adopted, which means that the Parliament tries to adjust decisions of the Minister. For example by calling for a better calling for a better implementation of safety risks of gas extraction in the process of decision-making. However, in practice this proves to be disappointing. As the president of the Groninger Bodem Beweging notes:

‘Moties worden nu kamerbreed aangenomen, zelf de VVD tekent ze. De stemming in de kamer is wel pro-Groningen. Maar heb je eraan als de minister ze naast zich neerlegt?’ (interviewee 14)

‘Motion are being adopted broadly, even the VVD [liberal conservative party of Minister Henk Kamp] signs them. The tendency in the Parliament is pro-Groningen. But what is the use if the Minister ignores them?’ (interviewee 14, own translation)

Since the government has a majority in the Parliament, legally the Minister does not have to take motions into account. Since the earthquake of Huizinge, opposition parties called for debates about

49 gas extraction. According the president of the GBB, this created momentum for change and was experienced in Groningen that the Parliament finally recognized the injustices around gas extraction and that the residents of Groningen were finally being heard (interviewee 14).

Access to information and access to legal procedures Other aspects of procedural justice are access to information and access to legal procedures. Information on the work of the National Coordinator Groningen (NCG) can be accessed via the website of the NCG by anyone. However, it is not clear if all relevant information is on this website. If the president of NAM’s livability fund, and resident in the earthquake region, wants the know something about the general proceedings of the NCG which is not on the website of the NCG, she can easily make a phone call and ask what has been going on (interviewee 8). However, this does not have to mean that this applies for every resident, as other might not have short lines with the authorities. The law professor of the University of Groningen is critical and states that transparency, communication and participation are always mentioned when a new governmental organization is established, but ‘when push comes to shove, they just don’t do it [give information]’ (interviewee 11, own translation).

On the other hand, via the website of the NCG, several organizations can be found that provide information and support for residents, since it is ‘the residents which must be central in the process of damage settlement’ (Nationaal Coordinator Groningen, 2017). On this website, the multi-annual plan of the NCG can be accessed, as well as quarterly reports on the implementations on the plan. However, this encompasses information on the work of the NCG and not on gas extraction. On the website of the Ministry of Economic Affairs, a timeline is presented on the decision of gas extraction; however, this timeline starts in November 2013 and finishes in October 2016 (Ministerie van Economische Zaken, 2016). In other words, no insight is given in decisions prior to November 2013. The implication for procedural justice is the extent to which safety considerations or interests of local residents were taken into account in the past, cannot be assessed easily. All the more because this decisions were made in the Maatschap Groningen, away from the public eye.

In principle, every citizen of the Netherlands has access to legal procedures. This includes residents who do no’t agree with decisions of the Minister on gas extraction, or if a resident holds the NAM liable for damage to their house and want to bring the case to court. But according to the provincial executive responsible of the earthquake dossier this process does not work properly in practice:

(…) wordt ik tegen een grote kapitalistische reus gezet waar ik maar een knokpartij moet gaan hebben en hopen dat ik ooit mijn recht krijg. En ik weet dat die wel wat advocaten uit de Zuidas heeft getrokken, dus de kans waarop ik recht krijg, is wel zo goed als nihil. (interviewee 4)

‘I’m being placed against a big capitalist giant where I just have to go and fight and hope that I ever get my right. And I know that it [the firm] has pulled some lawyers from the Zuidas, so the chance I get my right, is as good as nil.’ (interviewee 4, own translation)

For an individual resident, such a procedure can cost a lot of time, energy, and money when placed against an oil company that is able to hire lawyers that have the expertise and time and money is not an issue. That is why residents organized themselves in an association such as the Groninger Bodem Beweging or in a foundation such as the Stichting WAG. When organized, residents can make a stronger case by combining their cases and work together. Moreover, contributors of the Stichting WAG must pay €100,- to make the foundation financially able to hire a lawyer which has the expertise and energy to represent the residents affiliated by the foundation (Stichting WAG, n.d.)

Furthermore, local governments must ‘continuously fight for their position in court’ (interviewee 1, own translation). The municipalities in Groningen did not agree with Minister Kamp’s Gasbesluit, and via the Council of State, they were proved to be right. It is evident that Minister Kamp is not considered to be on the side of administrators in Groningen. The provincial executive noted that:

‘Ik ervaar de minister, het ministerie als een tegenstander, puur en alleen als tegenstander, op geen enkel vlak als medestander. (…) Alles wat ik bereikt heb, heb ik bereikt in een niet aflatende knokpartij. Het is ook niet een normale bestuurlijke verhouding hoor, het is niet zo dat het een bestuurlijk overleg is waarin we vriendelijke met elkaar zitten te praten. (…) Het heeft geen enkel aspect van wat in Nederland kennen van het poldermodelachtige systematiek van verschillende overheden gaan met elkaar spreken en komen er dan met elkaar uit. Dat is nu totaal niet aan de orde.’ (interviewee 4)

‘I experience the Minister, the Ministry, as an opponent, purely and only as an opponent, on no level as a partner. Everything I have achieved, I achieved in an non-stop rumble. It’s also not a normal administrative relationship, it’s not the case that it’s an administrative consultation in which we are talking friendly. (…) It has no aspect of what we know in the Netherlands as polder-model system of different levels of government talking to each other and together we will get along. That is entirely not the case right now.’ (interviewee 4, own translation)

In other words, he experiences that there exists an imbalance of power between different scales of government. Local administrators, and to a lesser degree provincial administrators, are at the level of government closest to citizens. It therefore can be argued that these administrators can best defend the interest of the local residents, but they experience the national government (i.e. Minister Kamp) to be non-cooperative (interviewee 4 and 13)

Development new damage settlement protocol It was long advocated by local administrators and local social groups such as the Groninger Bodem Beweging that the NAM should not be interfering with the damage settlement, since the NAM would be both liable and be a judge on whether damages are caused by earthquakes. In the end of March 2017, the NAM decided that it will withdraw from the damage settlement. This decision was made after years of political and societal pressure (interviewees 1, 4 and 14). The protocol that was in place at that moment was terminated on the 31th of March and new damage reports are now put on hold. This will be the case until there is a new damage protocol which needs to be ready on the first of July (interviewee 8). An official from the NCG noted:

‘Eigenlijk zou je idealiter als bedrijf willen zeggen we gaan werken aan een nieuw protocol en als het klaar is dan stop ik met de oude en dan gaat direct daarna de nieuwe in werking. De politieke druk en de emoties zijn zo hoog, dat kan hier niet meer. Dus wat wij gezegd hebben, op 1 juli komt er een nieuw protocol, we weten nog niet hoe het eruit komt te zien, maar dat bepalen wij [de NCG] ook niet, dat willen we met de regio het liefst bepalen.’ (interviewee 8)

‘In fact, you would ideally want to say as a company we are going to work on a new protocol and when it’s done, I'll stop with the old one and then start the new one right after that. Political pressure and emotions are so high, that cannot be done anymore. So, as we said, on July 1, there will be a new protocol, we do not know yet how it will look, but we [the NCG] do not determine that, we want to decide with the region.’ (interviewee 8, own translation)

It is now up to the region to design a new and fair damage protocol in which the NAM has no influence anymore. The region is represented by both administrators and residents. Residents are represented by the Groninger Bodem Beweging and the societal steering committee is the Groninger Gasberaad (Groningen Gas Council). The latter actor is a council with representatives from different interest groups, including the foundation Groninger Dorpen (Groningen Villages), a farmer’s organization, a business organization and trade unions (Groninger Gasberaad, 2017). The administrators include local administrators such as mayors, aldermen, and the provincial executive. The council represents the interests of many aspects of the Groningen society, from businesses to farmer and from administrators to residents. As such, the Groninger Gasberaad sits at the table for the negotiations of the new damage settlement protocol. See also appendix 4 for a scheme with the relevant actors concerning the negotiations of the new damage settlement protocol.

During the fieldwork in Groningen, there were some developments around the new damage protocol. In short, it can be said that the process of designing the new protocol is at an impasse, where societal

52 representatives have lost their trust in the Minister of Economic Affairs. In particular, the mayor of Loppersum noted that:

‘Op Goede Vrijdag heef Henk Kamp een brief aan de Tweede Kamer gestuurd waarin werd gesuggereerd dat hij de maatschappelijke partijen achter zich had staan en voorstelde om de arbiter en de contra-expert uit het proces [van schade afhandeling] te halen (…) terwijl we net hadden afgesproken om in een open proces, samen met de maatschappelijke organisaties en de bestuurlijke organisaties, een nieuwe start te maken voor het schadeprotocol. Die brief veroorzaakte nogal wat reuring waarop zowel het Groninger Gasberaad als de Groninger Bodembeweging zeiden: als het zo moet, gaan wij niet aan tafel. Nou en in die impasse zitten wij nu. Diverse mensen doen pogingen om te zorgen dat ze toch weer aan tafel komen, maar zover is het nog niet.’ (interviewee 1)

‘On Good Friday, Henk Kamp sent a letter to the Lower House of Parliament, suggesting that he had the societal parties on his side and proposed to withdraw the arbiter and contra-expert from the process [of the settlement of damage] (…) while we just agreed to an open process, together with civil society organization and government organizations, to make a new start for the damage protocol. That letter caused quite a bit of reckoning on both the Groninger Gasberaad and the Groninger Bodem Beweging: “If it has to go like this, we won’t negotiate anymore.” Now we are in that impasse. Several people try to make them go back to the negotiation table, but we are not there yet.’ (interviewee 1, own translation)

One can imagine that such a letter does not contribute to the restoration of trust. Compared to local governments, residents in Groningen have less trust in the national government (Postmes et al., 2017). Residents feel that their problems have long been ignored by the national government (idem). The provincial executive goes as far to say that ‘trust in national politics is a non-existent phenomenon in Groningen’ (interviewee 4, own translation). Furthermore, the law professor of the University of Groningen noted that:

‘Dat draagt absoluut niet bij aan het vertrouwen. Ook omdat de minister natuurlijk onwaarheden spreekt, hij liegt af en toe gewoon evident, dat zien mensen ook. Je moet gewoon geen onwaarheden spreken, dat je steun hebt – in de laatste brief aan de Tweede Kamer – van maatschappelijke groepen. Die haken één voor één af, dus die heb je niet mee, dus dat moet je ook niet opschrijven dat je die wel mee hebt.’ (interviewee 11)

‘That certainly does not contribute to the trust. Also, because the minister obviously speaks untruths, he sometimes lies obviously, that's what people see too. You just do not speak untruths, like that you have support - in the last letter to the Lower House - of societal groups.

Those drop out one by one, so you don’t have them on your side, so you must not write that you have them on your side.’ (interviewee 11, own translation)

During the fieldwork period, negotiations on the new damage settlement protocol between the different levels of government and the administrative and societal groups were still in an impasse. National Coordinator Hans Alders tried to get the societal groups back to the table, but he did not yet succeed. When asked about boycotting the negotiations, the president of the Groninger Bodem Beweging explained that this decision by the board of the GBB was welcomed by the members (interviewee 14). The National Coordinator must make decisions with public support, so the board and the members of the GBB cannot be ignored (idem). The GBB has around 3600 members, which are mostly households, and according to the president, cancellations only happen because of people moving or deceasing (interviewee 14). The board has a mandate from the members to negotiate the new damage settlement protocol, and can therefore have access to confidential information. This information is only shared with a consultative group which consists of a delegation of members of the GBB. In this sense, not everyone can have open access to information. However, this is not completely necessary, as the president of the GBB noted:

‘Het zou van mij wel mogen, maar op het moment dat je alles gaat delen, dan zal de NCG zeggen dat hij bepaalde stukken niet meer gaat geven. Want ik mag dit nog niet delen, want die zijn vertrouwelijk of die zijn in ontwikkeling. Dus die kan hij [de NCG] niet gaan delen als wij het dan gaan verspreiden. Het Gasberaad is steeds geweest voor openbaar maken van de vergaderingen. Daar ben ik op tegen geweest want dat blokkeert de transparantie. Want dan krijg je stukken waarin de helft is zwart gemaakt of je krijgt de stukken wel, maar dan in een achterkamertje waardoor die dan niet meer in de vergaderingen komen. Dat schiet niet op (…).’ (interviewee 14)

‘It would be fine with me, but if you share everything, the NCG will say that he stops sharing specific documents. Because I cannot share this yet, because those documents are confidential or are still being developed. He [the NCG] cannot share these if we will publicize them. The Gasberaad was always in favor for reveal meetings. I have opposed that because it blocks transparency. Then you will have documents in which half is made illegible or you do receive the documents, but in some back room and the documents will not come to the table during meetings. That does not help (…).’ (interviewee 14, own translation)

In conclusion, procedural justice is achieved when access to information is considered. In this case, residents can receive information on the progress of their case concerning the damage settlement. Moreover, the new damage settlement protocol is currently being designed with the region: both administrative partners and societal partners are at the negotiation table. For the sake of the progress

54 and trust at the negotiation table, not all information is shared with everyone, but residents are being consulted via the GBB. An implication can be that not every affected resident is member of the GBB, so it is not sure if the GBB represents every resident of Groningen. On the other hand, a membership of the GBB is €10,-- per year, so there is only a minor financial constraint not to become a member.

Furthermore, the quarterly reports of the NCG give information on the progress of the whole situation of Groningen, but because of privacy rules do not reflect on individual cases. Access to legal processes is a bit more difficult, and this is related to the fact that an individual resident is placed in court against a multinational oil company that has the financial resources, time, and energy for a long procedure, while generally an individual does not have these resources. To tackle this issue, both residents, and residents and administrators together, organize themselves in foundations and associations to have a stronger stand in court. This way, people share the costs and energy when going to court. This makes a court trial better accessible for individuals, since an individual can connect to an association or a foundation. According to Jenkins et al. (2016), in order to achieve procedural justice it is also important to mobilize local knowledge. In the case of earthquakes, an example of mobilizing knowledge is an online open GIS portal of the Groninger Bodem Beweging where data of the NAM and the KNMI (Royal Netherlands Meteorological Institute) is being implemented in maps and diagrams (Groninger Bodem Beweging, 2017). The data includes physical data of magnitudes and intensity of earthquakes, as well as the location of drilling sites and socioeconomic data of monuments and districts.

Task of strengthening all the buildings in the earthquake area At first sight, the issue of strengthening all the buildings in the earthquake area might seem to be a distributive issue. It is true that the strengthening in a sense will be a redistribution of revenues, since the NAM is going to pay for the operation (interviewee 14), so it will invest in the region. However, this section is in the chapter on procedural justice, since there are procedural issues regarding the strengthening operation. Moreover, the general scope of this chapter is on future developments around the effects of earthquakes.

The surface above the gas field can be considered an area where there is a chance that earthquakes will happen in the future. Although this seismic threat is decreasing because of the limitation of gas extraction, the seismic threat (or hazard) is still existent (Evers, 2016). Map 3 demonstrates that in the darker coloured areas surrounding Loppersum, the greatest risk at seismic activity is present, while lighter coloured areas have a smaller chance of seismic activity. Nevertheless, all houses in the entire area need to be inspected and, when necessary, be strengthened. It is evident that this will be a significant task since, in 2015, the total number of houses was 272,774 (CBS, 2017). Although the proportion of the number of houses that need to be strengthened is not known yet, it can be argued

that eventually almost all houses in the province need to be strengthened, since the hazard map almost entirely encompasses Groningen.

Map 3: seismic hazards in Groningen. Source: Evers, 2016

In the municipality of Slochteren, the process of strengthening villages will happen with consultation of the residents of the village. The coordinator of the portfolio around earthquakes of Slochteren noted that:

‘We zijn bezig met een soort van kaders op te stellen van waar moet het nu eigenlijk allemaal aan voldoen, dat doen we samen met het dorp. Het dorp is zelf ook bezig met een dorpsvisie te creëren, dat gaat dan over maatregelen om het dorp aantrekkelijker te maken enzovoorts. (…) Ze moeten vooral zelf met dingen komen, bottom up. Dat vinden we heel belangrijk. Dat is een wisselwerking.’ (interviewee 1)

‘We are in the process of drawing up a kind of framework for what we really need to do, and we do that together with the village. The village itself is also busy creating a ‘village vision’, which is about measures to make the village more attractive and so forth. (…) They have to come up with things, bottom up. We find that very important. That is an interaction.’ (interviewee 1, own translation)

In Slochteren, discussion evenings are organized by the municipality, during these evenings residents can have a say in the process of strengthening (interviewee 1). Moreover, during the process of strengthening, municipalities attempt to make a virtue of need and create added value to a place. In Slochteren, this is done by connecting the harbour and the town square which should make the village more attractive (interviewee 1). This is considered to be necessary since the region has a shrinking

56 population and high rates of unemployment (CBS, 2016b). On the other hand, a dilemma arises when considering population shrinkage in the region. For example, if a village has fifty houses, should all fifty houses be strengthened knowing that ten will remain empty? Or should forty houses be strengthened? And if so, which households should move to another area? These questions need to be answered in the near future, in consultation with the local residents. At the end of the day, the residents have been carrying the risks of gas extraction and their houses need to be strengthened, so the residents should have a say in the procedures around the strengthening operation. On the other hand, it would be a waste of money if a building is strengthened but will remain empty. These are difficult decisions to be made, and can only be legitimate if taken in consultation with the residents themselves.

An issue related to the task of strengthening is the question of where to locate residents who get their houses strengthened. Since such an operation is likely to last half a year, so called temporarily wisselwoningen (exchange houses) need to be built. The NCG prioritized areas surrounding Huizinge, Loppersum, to be strengthened first. However, it is the municipality’s responsibility to build these wisselwoningen, but the communication between the NCG and a municipality is not always good. Municipal councilor and board member of the local business association noted that:

‘(…) de NCG zegt van per 1 juni moeten wij gaan starten met de bouw van wisselwoningen, want 1 oktober gaan we starten met de versterkingsoperatie. (…) Maar die woningen moeten dus gebouwd worden en de gemeentelijke overheid wordt eigenlijk overvallen door de NCG van jullie moeten dat gaan organiseren. We zeggen dan, wij gaan het faciliteren, alleen daar wordt de ruggespraak met de gemeenteraad en de bewoners wel eens gemist, door het tempo dat de NCG aangeeft.’ (interviewee 9)

‘the NCG says that as of June 1, we must start building wisselwoningen, because October 1, we will start the strengthening operation. (…) But those homes must be built and the municipal government is actually surprised by the NCG: you have to organize that. We then say, we are going to facilitate it, only the consultation of the council and the residents is missed sometimes, because of the pace indicated by the NCG’ (interviewee 9, own translation)

In other words, municipalities do recognize their responsibility to build wisselwoningen, but since it is the ‘territory’ of a municipality, it should be their decision where and when to build these houses. Moreover, a municipality has to give building permits and probably has to change the land-use plan for the assigned location for the houses. This can take a lot of time, which means that the strengthening task can be delayed.

It is likely that strengthening the houses in a village will have a big impact. For example, if a village is divided in two zones, which will be strengthened separately, what will be the implications for the

village? This would mean that half of the residents of a village is away for half a year. What will this mean for a local supermarket which loses half of its clients for a year? Will the owner be compensated for the losses in turnover? What will this mean for other local shop owners who will lose clients as well? Will they still have the financial means to sponsor local sport associations like a soccer club? And what will this mean for a soccer club if half of its volunteers and members are gone for half a year, disregarding the losses in income from local businesses? It are these sort of questions that the residents of villages, planners and local administrators will face and together have to solve in the coming years.

The multi-annual plan of the NCG stated that the local economy must benefit from the task of strengthening. It is aimed that ‘the regional business community (large and small) can take a strong position in the implementation of the multiannual plan’ (Nationaal Coördinator Groningen, 2016a: 92, own translation). In practice, this is experienced to be disappointing. According to a board member of the local business association of Loppersum:

‘We hebben een aantal bouwbedrijven in deze regio, over het algemeen kleinere bouwbedrijven en schilderbedrijven en schadeherstel bedrijven. Die lopen wel tegen het feit aan van waarom mogen alleen de grote jongens de versterkingsoperatie en schadeafhandeling doen en waarom worden wij daar niet veel meer in betrokken? Dat is al een jarenlange discussie.’ (interviewee 9)

‘In this region, there are several construction companies, which are, in general, smaller construction, painting and damage recovery companies. Those companies face the fact of why can only the big boys participate in the task of strengthening and damage recovery, and why are we not more involved in that? That has been a discussion for years now.’ (interviewee 9, own translation)

Since so many houses will have to be strengthened, it can be understood that small local companies do not have the capacity to handle such a big operation. However, according to a board member of the local business association of Loppersum, it would make a big difference if ‘local companies could at least bid for an assignment’ (interviewee 9, own translation).

Despite the local development concerning the damage settlement protocol and the task of strengthening, much depends on the formation of the new national cabinet after the national elections of March 2017. According to several interviewees (interviewees 4, 7, 14 and 15), the outcomes of the formation talks and a resulting new cabinet will be important for future developments concerning the earthquakes causes by gas extraction. During a debate between the national leaders of the political parties in the provincial building in Groningen, all leaders called for a fairer compensation of the affected residents, and, if necessary, a reduction of gas extraction if residents’ safety would be in

danger (RTVNoord, 2017). Also in the programs of the parties, the general tone was that, if necessary, gas extraction should be reduced and the damage settlement should be fairer as well (Braakman & Reijendam, 2017). Questions now to be answered in the process of forming a new cabinet include: should the NCG remain the ministerial responsibility of Economic Affairs, or should he be the responsibility of the Minister of Justice and Security, or should a new ‘Ministry of Energy’ be established? In the words of the provincial executive :

‘Waar ik op hoop, dat er in het regeerakkoord daar [over de schadeafhandeling] goede teksten over komen. Dat ze snappen dat de overheid ook een stap moet maken. Dus dat het bij de NAM weg moet en dat we beweging krijgen dat het richting de overheid gaat en wel op zo'n manier dat er een maatschappelijke aanpak komt, (…) die kijkt naar wat er nodig is in de samenleving wat er nodig is om daar vertrouwen te laten ontstaan. Dan heb je alsnog een mega klus, maar dan heb je misschien een klus die nog een kans van slagen heeft.’ (interviewee 4)

‘What I hope for, it that there will be good texts about it [the damage settlement procedures] in the coalition agreement. That they understand that the government also should take steps. So that it leaves the NAM and goes to the government, in such a way that there is a societal approach, (…) in which is looked at what is needed in the society and what is needed to restore trust. Then we still have a gigantic task, but maybe we’ll have a chance to succeed.’ (interviewee 4, own translation)

In summary, the field data has demonstrated that administrators and residents have little formal influence in gas extraction. Eventually, however, after political and social pressure, gas extraction has been reduced. Residents and administrators can now together with the National Coordinator Groningen design a new damage settlement protocol, which means that in this process there is room for formal influence. Regarding the task of strengthening, in the municipality of Slochteren this is done in consultation with the residents of a village. Individuals can access information regarding earthquakes, damage settlement and the proceedings of the NCG. Moreover, individuals collectively gather and share information via associations such as the Groninger Bodem Beweging.

Conclusion It is evident that administrators and residents do not have a say in the distribution of the revenues and risks of gas extraction. This decision was is by both the State and the NAM in the Maatschap Groningen. Every citizen of the Netherlands, including residents in Groningen, did benefit equally since the revenues from gas extraction have been used for the social welfare state and for investments such as infrastructure projects to generate economic growth. However, ‘it is a matter of national decency things will be taken care of in a fair way’ (interviewee 1, own translation) for the people

affected by earthquakes. Although steps are made in the direction of a bigger say of residents and local administrators in the process of designing a new damage protocol, procedural justice is not achieved yet. There is still much uncertainty concerning the new protocol, as well as uncertainties on what a new government will do to restore trust in Groningen. Moreover, there is a monumental task ahead to inspect and possibly strengthen homes and other buildings in the province. This is a procedural issue, since it will affect people’s lives so they should have access to information to the proceedings of the operation. However, it is the NCG who prioritizes and decides the areas which need to inspected and possibly strengthened first. Yet, the NCG must take decisions with social support so formally the societal partners do have influence on decisions of the NCG (interviewee 14). Information on the proceedings of the NCG can be accessed via the quarterly reports of the NCG. Moreover, at least in the municipality of Slochteren residents are being involved in the process of decision-making around questions of planning and creating added value to the village.

Conclusion and discussion In this thesis, I have attempted to explain the risks and benefits related to gas extraction and its consequences in Groningen from the perspective of energy justice. Before the sub questions will be revisited, I will briefly revisit the three pillars of energy justice first: Distributive justice: how are the risks and benefits of gas extraction being distributed? Justice as recognition: Are the risks resulting from gas extraction being recognized by the NAM and the State? Finally, procedural justice: To what extent do both local administrators and residents have a say in procedures concerning the consequences of gas extraction? In the following section, the pillars of energy justice are revisited.

Distributive justice In the first chapter on distributive justice an overview of the history of gas extraction in Groningen was presented. In the history of gas extraction in Groningen, the risks and benefits were not evenly distributed across the country. While the biggest share of the profits is for the national budget, only a small share is invested in the province of Groningen. Although local administrators and residents do acknowledge that locals benefit from the social welfare state as well, it is experienced to be unfair that while the gas revenues have been very high, it is difficult to receive a fair compensation for damage on properties. The governance structure (the Gas Building, see page 23) around gas extraction is complex and it is difficult to say which actor is responsible for the earthquakes. Decisions on how much gas will be extracted are made in the Maatschap Groningen, in which the State and the NAM both have a 50% say. Therefore, it can be argued that both the State and the NAM are responsible for the earthquakes resulting from gas extraction. That these actors were not eager to acknowledge their responsibility, was demonstrated in the next chapter.

Justice as recognition In the 1970s the NAM established a fund to cover the risks of soil subsidence. This implies that the NAM was aware of the fact that gas extraction is causing movement in the ground. However, when in the 1986 the first earthquake happened and the claim was made that the earthquake was caused by gas extraction, this claim was dismissed as nonsense. Nevertheless, the 1986 earthquake did prompt an interdisciplinary investigation to seismic activity around the gas field. It was, however, concluded that there was no need to worry as earthquakes would only be of minor magnitudes, too low to cause damage to properties and the gas extraction continued. According to the Court of Arnhem- Leeuwarden the NAM did know their activities were causing risks, and it demanded that the minutes and report of the NAM’s board from 1993 onwards should be investigated by the prosecutor. On a household level, it can take a lot of time and energy to receive compensation for damage on one’s home. The damage settlement protocol is considered to be unjust, since the costs of the process, experts, contra-experts and arbiters, in many cases exceed the costs to repair the damage on the home. Moreover, the NAM was at the same time not only liable for the damage as well as the judge to

61 assign the damage via the Centrum Veilig Wonen (Center Safe Living, CVW). This double role was successfully questioned and consequently after political and social pressure, the NAM withdrew from the damage settlement process and the current damage settlement protocol was abandoned.

Procedural justice As a result, a new damage settlement protocol needs to be designed. The negotiations are led by the National Coordinator Groningen (NCG) Hans Alders. Around the negotiation table are administrative representatives of the province and municipalities, as well as representatives from societal groups who represent residents, businesses and farmers. The NCG can only make decisions with social support, so he needs to listen to the wishes of the administrative and societal representatives. In this sense, procedural justice is achieved. Since almost the complete province of Groningen can be considered as earthquake zone, every building needs to be strengthened in order to prevent damage from earthquakes in the future. It is evident that this a monumental task. The NCG prioritized areas which needs to be strengthened first, but municipalities can experience this as top down planning since the strengthening needs to commence soon and building permits must be given. Moreover, local development plans might have to change as exchange houses must be constructed. In other municipalities the task of strengthening is being undertaken in consultation with the local residents. Some difficult questions need to be answered, for example, should every house in a village be strengthened if the population is already shrinking? And what will be the effects of the task of strengthening if half a village will be under construction? Solutions to these questions need to be formulated in the near future in consultation with local residents, in order to be legitimate and have social support.

Discussion Newell and Mulvaney’s argument that “decisions to allocate, use and consume energy (…) are mostly made out of the public eye and rarely in democratic forums” (Newell and Mulvaney, 2013: 135), has proven to be true in the case of gas extraction in Groningen. In the Gas Building, decisions concerning gas extraction are being made by the Maatschap Groningen, a partnership between the NAM and the State (via Energie Beheer Nederland). Although the Lower House of Parliament has tried to influence the decisions of the Minister of Economic Affairs, the Minister responsible for gas extraction, this has proven to be difficult and motions have often been ignored. According to the Dutch Safety Board, residents’ safety has never been taken into account in the decisions on gas extraction (Onderzoeksraad voor Veiligheid, 2014).

Authors such as O’Faurcheallaigh (2014), Argent (2016) and Calvert (2016) have written about the relationship between resource extracting companies and indigenous people. Although the residents of Groningen cannot be considered as indigenous, some similarities can still be seen. The authors argue that the objective of an oil (or gas) company is to extract the resource in the most efficient way, while

ignoring local interests such as residents’ safety or local economic development. This has proven to be the case in Groningen as well. The objective of the NAM was to extract the gas to most efficient way. On the other hand, in 2015 the NAM did establish a fund to improve livability in the region. In that sense, the NAM tries to create added value to the region where it extracts the gas. However, in relation to the earthquakes, this is considered as just a ‘Band-Aid being applied to a gaping wound’ (interviewee 2). O’Faurcheallaigh (2014) attributes the unequal balance of power between local residents and an oil company to the fact that the oil industry is a capital intensive industry, thus have the financial resources to hire the best lawyers which have the expertise, time and energy to make the best deal for the oil company. This is also the case in Groningen (interviewee 4). Residents and administrators are organizing to combine financial resources and energy to have a stronger case in court.

Conclusion In conclusion, the framework of energy justice has proven to be an appropriate tool to analyze the risks and impacts of gas extraction in Groningen. The distribution of risks and revenues has not been fair: revenues flowed to the State and the NAM, while the risks were carried by the residents of Groningen. Moreover, it took a lot of claims, reports and eventually a severe earthquake for the NAM and the State to recognize the unfair distribution of risks and benefits. When an actor recognizes its responsibility, one could expect that a compensation would follow. However, residents and administrators still have to fight for rights in court. Residents and administrators today do have a say in the procedures concerning the design of a new damage protocol, but this has been achieved through continuous political and societal pressure.

Recommendations In the coming years, all houses in the earthquake zone need to inspected and possibly strengthened. It is evident that task will be monumental and radical. This task should be implemented in consultation with local residents. Further research could be done on how this task will work out in practice. All the more because this thesis encompassed the situation in Groningen until May 2017, and after this date, there were more developments. Moreover, a new government is currently being formed. It is likely that the outcome of the formation will have influence on the future of Groningen, the settlement of damages and the task of strengthening. Furthermore, if a new government should decide to reduce gas extraction to zero, this would have implications for the national budget and the government must cut on expenses, ignoring even the consequences for the availability of natural gas to heat houses in winter. Further research on the geopolitical implications of being dependent on imported Russian gas should be conducted. On the other hand, in the light of transition to cleaner modes of energy, abandoning Groningen gas could create momentum for the development alternative uses of energy to heat houses or to cook on. Finally, I recommend that further research must be conducted in five years

63 in order to evaluate the situation from hindsight and find out if administrators and residents feel that justice is achieved.

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Appendices

Appendix 1: Anonymized list of interviewed people

Interviewee number Occupation Interviewee 1 Mayor Slochteren and earthquake coordinator Slochteren Interviewee 2 Representatives Cultural Council Middelstum Interviewee 3 Representative Foundation Groninger Landschap Interviewee 4 Provincial Executive responsible for earthquake dossier Interviewee 5 Board member Tennis Club Middelstum Interviewee 6 Official from GasTerra Interviewee 7 Journalist of local television station RTVNoord Interviewee 8 Official from National Coordinator Groningen Interviewee 9 Representative from business association Loppersum Interviewee 10 Representative Foundation Groninger Dorpen Interviewee 11 Law professor University of Groningen Interviewee 12 President of NAM’s livability fund and representative of Fraeylemaborg Interviewee 13 Mayor Loppersum and earthquake coordinator Loppersum Interviewee 14 Board member of Groninger Bodem Beweging Interviewee 15 Journalist of local newspaper Dagblad van het Noorden

Appendix 2: Timeline most important events from discovery of gas until today 1959 Discovery of a gas field in Kolham, municipality of Slochteren

1963 Start of gas extraction by NAM (Nederlandse Aardolie Maatschappij)

1978 87,8 billion cubic meter gas is extracted, a record amount in the complete history of gas extraction in Groningen

1986 First measured earthquake in Assen, Drenthe. 3,0 on Richter scale

1986 Human geographer and member of Provincial Parliament Meent van der Sluis attributes earthquakes to gas extraction. NAM denies relationship between earthquakes and gas extraction activities.

1990s In Groningen, there is a call to turn off the gas tap and to distribute gas revenues more fairly

1993 BOA report is published

2009, june 50 years of Groningen gas: Queen Beatrix reveals big monument in the shape of a gas molecule in Slochteren

2009, dec Groninger Bodem Beweging (Groningen Ground Movement) is established

2012 Earthquake in Huizinge (Loppersum) of 3,6 on Richter's scale. This event results in hundreds of damage reports, authorities realize that earthquakes can no longer be ignored

2013 Queen's Commissioner Max van der Berg calls for a minimum of 1 billion euros to compensate for the direct and indirect effects of earthquakes in Groningen

2014, jan The Dutch Government decides to close gas extraction sites in Loppersum for 80%. In order to compensate for this reduction, more gas has to be extracted from other locations, this leads to a change of pressures in the whole field which results in a higher risk of earthquakes elsewhere

2014, oct Centrum Veilig Woning (Centre Safe Living, CVW) is established. This organization is responsible for taking care of the damage on houses, but the NAM is still ultimately responsible

2015, jan Dutch Safety Board presents report on the gas extraction. Major conclusion, NAM and State were only interested in gas revenues, and the safety of residents of the area was not taken into account at all.

2015, march Minster of Economic Affairs Henk Kamp apologizes on regional television and recognizes that more attention has to be paid to the safety of residents in Groningen

2015, april Director of the NAM apologizes for the damage caused by earthquakes

2015, may Former queen's commissioner of Groningen Hans Alders will become the National Coordinator Groningen

2015, nov Alders present draft of Meerjarenpogramma Aardbevingsbestendig en Kansrijk Groningen (Multiannual program Earthquake resistant and Promising Groningen). Core concepts: safety first, residents have to be central, an arbiter for disputes about damage will be established.

2015, nov Minster Kamp decides that burden of proof will reversed. The resident does not have to proof that damage is caused by earthquakes, now NAM has to proof that damage is not caused by earthquakes

2015, nov Council of State decides that gas extraction has to be decreased more than already promised by minister Kamp

2016, july The Lower House of Parliament finds that the CVW and NCG have to be more independent from NAM

2016, dec RUG (University of Groningen) starts longitudinal research on people's experiences in the earthquake region

2017, feb Torch procession as a protest against gas policy of government and NAM

2017, march NAM held responsible for immaterial damage, ruled by court in Assen

2017, march NAM withdraws from process of damage settlement

2017, arpil Court Arnhem-Leeuwarden rules that public prosecutor must start a criminal investigation in order to find out why the board of the NAM did not decide to reduce gas extraction after it was the BOA report

2017, april Minister Kamp sends letter to Lower House of Parliament in which he states that he has the societal partners on his side, which is not true

2017, april Groninger Bodem Beweging and Groninger Gasberaad withdraw from negotiations for a new damage protocol with NCG because trust is gone

Appendix 3: Scheme of the relevant actors concerning the current damage settlement protocol

Damage settlement protocol: Nederlandse Aardolie Maatschappij (NAM) situation before 31 March 2017

Centrum Veilig Wonen (CVW) Expert

Arbiter Old damage settlement If conflict protocol

Contra-expert

Resident with damage on house

Can receive help and support of

Onafhankelijke Raadsman Complaints about (Independent NAM, CVW or Counselor) strengthening

Stut-en-steun Support and advise (‘Stanchion and for affected support’) residents

Commissie Bijzondere Situaties Support of (Committee Special residents with Situations) complex situations

Appendix 4: Scheme of the relevant actors concerning the negotiations for a new damage settlement protocol

Damage settlement protocol: Minister of Economic Groninger Bodem Affairs Current situation Beweging (GBB)

Legally appointed Represent

National Coordinator Leads negotiations on Groningen (NCG) Their members: affected residents New damage settlement protocol Called for a (must be ready 1 July 2017 Groninger Gasberaad Provincial (Groningen Gas Council) administrators

Represent

Municipal administrators • Stichting Groninger Dorpen

(Foundation Groningen Villages) • LTO-Noord (agriculture and horticulture organization) • VNO-NCW MKB Noord (employers’ organization small and middle sized Wished to be similar as companies) the old protocol • CNV and FVN (labor unions) (including (contra-) • Monumentenzorg (monumental experts, arbiter and building protectors) support organizations). • Housing corporations Only without influence • SBE (industry harbor Eemshaven) of NAM/CVW. • Natuur & Milieufederatie Groningen (Nature & Environment Federation) • Tenants organization • Churches