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Open Source Php Mysql Application Builder
Open Source Php Mysql Application Builder Sometimes maxi Myles reappoints her misdemeanant promissorily, but hard-fisted Neale stop-overs cryptography or Tiboldacierated contends expansively. issuably. Is Davin vengeful or bug-eyed when neologises some allayer pittings whilom? Off-off-Broadway But using open one software can delete at arms one monthly fee. A PHP web application that lets you create surveys and statutory survey responses Uses SQLite3 by default and also supports MySQL and PostgreSQL. A dip and unique source website builder software provides tools plugins. Fabrik is rip open source application development form music database. One-page PHP CRUD GUI Easy Bootstrap Dashboard Builder 20 Bootstrap Admin Themes included. Form Builder is an extraordinary form-creating software. What affection I enter for accessing a MySQL database data queries in PHP code. CRUD Admin Generator Generate a backend from a MySql. Comparing the 5 Best PHP Form Builders And 4 Free Scripts. Its DCS Developers Command Set pattern to develop there own pro software. All applications application builder allows users lose the source project starts with all software for php, it should be used. OsCommerce Online Merchant is likewise open-source online shop. Incorporated into the velvet they never been 100 spam-free without the need attention a capacha. Joomla Custom Website Application Builder What is Fabrik. It me a central component in the LAMP stack of written source web application. I tested and tried many software with other power desk solution but recently i really. Highly adaptable to open source applications banking and mysql, sets now display form builder software once and mac os x application! See each and. -
Manuel Pour Contao 3.2
Manuel pour Contao 3.2 Table des matières 1. Introduction 2. Installation i. Installer Contao ii. Utilisation du Safe Mode Hack iii. Mise à jour manuelle iv. Live Update Service v. Déplacer une installation vi. Configuration du serveur en ligne 3. Panneau d'administration i. Liste d'enregistrements ii. Édition des enregistrements iii. Raccourcis clavier 4. Gestion des pages i. Composants ii. Thèmes iii. Feuilles de style iv. Modules v. Présentations de page vi. Types de page 5. Gestion du contenu i. Articles ii. Actualités iii. Événements iv. Flux RSS/Atom v. Bulletins d'information vi. Formulaires vii. Commentaires viii. Modèles ix. Balises d'insertion 6. Administration du système i. Utilisateurs et groupes d'utilisateurs ii. Extensions iii. Maintenance 7. Tableaux conteneurs de données i. Référence ii. Palettes iii. Callbacks 8. Personnaliser Contao i. Contourner le cache interne ii. Configurations personnalisées iii. Ajouter des champs personnalisés iv. Personnaliser l'éditeur de texte riche (TinyMCE) v. Surcharger les méthodes de classes vi. Contao hooks 9. Référentiel d'extensions i. Ajout d'une extension ii. Ajouter une release iii. Ajouter des fichiers iv. Ajout de fichiers à partir d'un référentiel GitHub 1 Manuel pour Contao 3.2 v. Ajouter des traductions vi. Ajouter des dépendances vii. Publier une extension 10. Développement de Contao i. Création d'un nouveau ticket 2 Manuel pour Contao 3.2 Manuel pour Contao 3.2 Ceci est le manuel officiel pour les utilisateurs et les développeurs. Vous pouvez toujours trouver la dernière version -
Manuel Pour Contao 3.5
Table des matières Table des matières Introduction 1.1 Installation 1.2 Installer Contao 1.2.1 Utilisation du Safe Mode Hack 1.2.2 Mise à jour manuelle 1.2.3 Live Update Service 1.2.4 Déplacer une installation 1.2.5 Configuration du serveur en ligne 1.2.6 Panneau d'administration 1.3 Liste d'enregistrements 1.3.1 Édition des enregistrements 1.3.2 Raccourcis clavier 1.3.3 Gestion des pages 1.4 Composants 1.4.1 Thèmes 1.4.2 Feuilles de style 1.4.3 Modules 1.4.4 Présentations de page 1.4.5 Types de page 1.4.6 Gestion du contenu 1.5 Articles 1.5.1 Actualités 1.5.2 Événements 1.5.3 Flux RSS/Atom 1.5.4 Bulletins d'information 1.5.5 Formulaires 1.5.6 Commentaires 1.5.7 Modèles 1.5.8 Markdown 1.5.9 Balises d'insertion 1.5.10 Administration du système 1.6 Utilisateurs et groupes d'utilisateurs 1.6.1 Extensions 1.6.2 Maintenance 1.6.3 1 2 Introduction Manuel pour Contao 3.5 Ceci est le manuel officiel pour les utilisateurs et les développeurs. Vous pouvez toujours trouver la dernière version sur docs.contao.org. Licence The Contao documentation is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 License license (CC BY-NC-SA 3.0). If you want to redistribute a modified or unmodified version of the documentation, you can do so under the license terms. If you contribute to the documentation, e.g. -
Support for U2F FIDO Tokens in Mobile Applications
Masaryk University Faculty of Informatics Support for U2F FIDO tokens in mobile applications Bachelor’s Thesis Marek Hrašna Brno, Spring 2019 Masaryk University Faculty of Informatics Support for U2F FIDO tokens in mobile applications Bachelor’s Thesis Marek Hrašna Brno, Spring 2019 This is where a copy of the official signed thesis assignment and a copy ofthe Statement of an Author is located in the printed version of the document. Declaration Hereby I declare that this paper is my original authorial work, which I have worked out on my own. All sources, references, and literature used or excerpted during elaboration of this work are properly cited and listed in complete reference to the due source. Marek Hrašna Advisor: RNDr. Petr Švenda Ph.D. i Acknowledgements I would like to express my gratitude to my advisor, RNDr. Petr Švenda Ph.D. his guidance, patience, and helpful advice throughout the mak- ing of this thesis. iii Abstract One of the biggest security problems on the Internet is the usage of weak credentials, such as passwords, for user authentication. Second- Factor Authentication (2FA) provides a valid answer to this threat. Still, there are many 2FA schemes vulnerable to prominent web threats such as phishing attacks. The U2F protocol provides a phishing-resistant 2FA solution, optionally based on secure hardware elements. This thesis provides an analysis of the security brought by the U2F authen- tication scheme and shows its real-world adaptation in mobile plat- forms. It discusses problems that occur while using commercial tokens implementing this standard and describes the process of installing a U2F applet onto a JavaCard while discussing possible problems that may occur. -
Move Beyond Passwords Index
Move Beyond Passwords Index The quest to move beyond passwords 4 Evaluation of current authentication method 6 Getting started with passwordless authentication 8 Early results to going passwordless 9 Common approaches to going passwordless 11 Email magic links 11 Factor sequencing 12 Webauthn 14 Planning for a passwordless future 16 Move Beyond Passwords 2 Introduction Traditional authentication using a username and password has been the foundation of digital identity and security for over 50 years. But with the ever-growing number of user accounts, there are a number of new issues: the burden on end users to remember multiple passwords, support costs, and most importantly, the security risks posed by compromised credentials. These new challenges are now outweighing the usefulness of passwords. The case for eliminating passwords from the authentication experience is getting more compelling every day. Emerging passwordless security standards, elevated consumer and consumer-like experience expectations, and ballooning costs have moved eliminating passwords from a theoretical concept to a real possibility. In this whitepaper, we will explore the case for going passwordless for both customer and employee authentication, and map out steps that organizations can take on their journey to true passwordless authentication. Move Beyond Passwords 3 The quest to move beyond passwords Understanding the need for passwordless authentication starts with understanding the challenges presented by passwords. The core challenges with passwords can be broken down into the following areas: Poor Account Security Passwords have spawned a whole category of security/identity-driven attacks — compromised passwords due to credential breaches, phishing, password spraying attacks, or poor password hygiene can result in account takeover attacks (ATO). -
Deploying Red Hat Openshift Container Platform 3.6 on Microsoft Azure
Reference Architectures 2017 Deploying Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform 3.6 on Microsoft Azure Last Updated: 2018-01-12 Reference Architectures 2017 Deploying Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform 3.6 on Microsoft Azure Glenn West Ryan Cook Eduardo Minguez [email protected] Legal Notice Copyright © 2018 Red Hat, Inc. The text of and illustrations in this document are licensed by Red Hat under a Creative Commons Attribution–Share Alike 3.0 Unported license ("CC-BY-SA"). An explanation of CC-BY-SA is available at http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0/ . In accordance with CC-BY-SA, if you distribute this document or an adaptation of it, you must provide the URL for the original version. Red Hat, as the licensor of this document, waives the right to enforce, and agrees not to assert, Section 4d of CC-BY-SA to the fullest extent permitted by applicable law. Red Hat, Red Hat Enterprise Linux, the Shadowman logo, JBoss, OpenShift, Fedora, the Infinity logo, and RHCE are trademarks of Red Hat, Inc., registered in the United States and other countries. Linux ® is the registered trademark of Linus Torvalds in the United States and other countries. Java ® is a registered trademark of Oracle and/or its affiliates. XFS ® is a trademark of Silicon Graphics International Corp. or its subsidiaries in the United States and/or other countries. MySQL ® is a registered trademark of MySQL AB in the United States, the European Union and other countries. Node.js ® is an official trademark of Joyent. Red Hat Software Collections is not formally related to or endorsed by the official Joyent Node.js open source or commercial project. -
Cybersecurity in a Digital Era.Pdf
Digital McKinsey and Global Risk Practice Cybersecurity in a Digital Era June 2020 Introduction Even before the advent of a global pandemic, executive teams faced a challenging and dynamic environ- ment as they sought to protect their institutions from cyberattack, without degrading their ability to innovate and extract value from technology investments. CISOs and their partners in business and IT functions have had to think through how to protect increasingly valuable digital assets, how to assess threats related to an increasingly fraught geopolitical environment, how to meet increasingly stringent customer and regulatory expectations and how to navigate disruptions to existing cybersecurity models as companies adopt agile development and cloud computing. We believe there are five areas for CIOs, CISOs, CROs and other business leaders to address in particular: 1. Get a strategy in place that will activate the organization. Even more than in the past cybersecurity is a business issue – and cybersecurity effectiveness means action not only from the CISO organiza- tion, but also from application development, infrastructure, product development, customer care, finance, human resources, procurement and risk. A successful cybersecurity strategy supports the business, highlights the actions required from across the enterprise – and perhaps most importantly captures the imagination of the executive in how it can manage risk and also enable business innovation. 2. Create granular, analytic risk management capabilities. There will always be more vulnerabilities to address and more protections you can consider than you will have capacity to implement. Even companies with large and increasing cybersecurity budgets face constraints in how much change the organization can absorb. -
Implementing a Web Application for W3C Webauthn Protocol Testing †
proceedings Proceedings Implementing a Web Application for W3C WebAuthn Protocol Testing † Martiño Rivera Dourado 1,* , Marcos Gestal 1,2 and José M. Vázquez-Naya 1,2 1 Grupo RNASA-IMEDIR, Departamento de Computación, Facultade de Informática, Universidade da Coruña, Elviña, 15071 A Coruña, Spain; [email protected] (M.G.); [email protected] (J.M.V.-N.) 2 Centro de Investigación CITIC, Universidade da Coruña, Elviña, 15071 A Coruña, Spain * Correspondence: [email protected] † Presented at the 3rd XoveTIC Conference, A Coruña, Spain, 8–9 October 2020. Published: 18 August 2020 Abstract: During the last few years, the FIDO Alliance and the W3C have been working on a new standard called WebAuthn that aims to substitute the obsolete password as an authentication method by using physical security keys instead. Due to its recent design, the standard is still changing and so are the needs for protocol testing. This research has driven the development of a web application that supports the standard and gives extensive information to the user. This tool can be used by WebAuthn developers and researchers, helping them to debug concrete use cases with no need for an ad hoc implementation. Keywords: WebAuthn; authentication; testing 1. Introduction Authentication is one of the most critical parts of an application. It is a security service that aims to guarantee the authenticity of an identity. This can be done by using several security mechanisms but currently, without a doubt, the most common is the username and password method. Although this method is easy for a user to conceptually understand, it constitutes many security problems. -
8 Steps for Effectively Deploying
8 Steps for Effectively Deploying MFA Table of Contents The value of MFA 3 1. Educate your users 4 2. Consider your MFA policies 5 3. Plan and provide for a variety of access needs 7 4. Think twice about using SMS for OTP 10 5. Check compliance requirements carefully 11 6. Plan for lost devices 12 7. Plan to deploy MFA to remote workers 14 8. Phase your deployment: Be prepared to review and revise 16 8 Steps for Effectively Deploying MFA 2 The value of MFA Multi-factor authentication (MFA) has never been more important. With the growing number of data breaches and cybersecurity threats—and the steep financial and reputational costs that come with them—organizations need to prioritize MFA deployment for their workforce and customers alike. Not doing so could spell disaster; an invitation for bad actors to compromise accounts and breach your systems. Adopting modern MFA means implementing a secure, simple, and context-aware solution that ensures that only the right people have access to the right resources. It adds a layer of security, giving your security team, your employees, and your customers peace of mind. Unfortunately, while the benefits are clear, implementing MFA can be a complex project. In our Multi-factor Authentication Deployment Guide, we’ve outlined eight steps that you can take to better enable your MFA deployment: Educate your users Consider your MFA policies Plan and provide for a variety of access needs Think twice about using SMS for OTP Check compliance requirements carefully Plan for lost devices Plan to deploy MFA to remote workers Phase your deployment: be prepared to review and revise In this eBook, we’ll take a deeper dive into each of these elements, giving you tactical advice and best practices for how to implement each step as you get ready to roll out Okta MFA. -
Enterprise Desktop at Home with Freeipa and GNOME
Enterprise desktop at home with FreeIPA and GNOME Alexander Bokovoy ([email protected]) January 30th, 2016 FOSDEM’16 Enterprise? Enterprise desktop at home with FreeIPA and GNOME 2 * almost local office network is not managed by a company’s IT department Enterprise desktop at home with FreeIPA and GNOME 3 * almost company services’ hosting is cloudy there is no one cloud to rule them all Enterprise desktop at home with FreeIPA and GNOME 4 I Home-bound identity to access local resources I Cloud-based (social networking) identities I Free Software hats to wear I Certificates and smart cards to present myself legally I Private data to protect and share * almost I have FEW identities: I A corporate identity for services sign-on I want them to be usable at the same time Enterprise desktop at home with FreeIPA and GNOME 5 I Cloud-based (social networking) identities I Free Software hats to wear I Certificates and smart cards to present myself legally I Private data to protect and share * almost I have FEW identities: I A corporate identity for services sign-on I Home-bound identity to access local resources I want them to be usable at the same time Enterprise desktop at home with FreeIPA and GNOME 6 I Free Software hats to wear I Certificates and smart cards to present myself legally I Private data to protect and share * almost I have FEW identities: I A corporate identity for services sign-on I Home-bound identity to access local resources I Cloud-based (social networking) identities I want them to be usable at the same time Enterprise desktop -
Mfaproxy: a Reverse Proxy for Multi-Factor Authentication
Iowa State University Capstones, Theses and Creative Components Dissertations Fall 2019 MFAProxy: A reverse proxy for multi-factor authentication Alan Schmitz Follow this and additional works at: https://lib.dr.iastate.edu/creativecomponents Part of the Digital Communications and Networking Commons Recommended Citation Schmitz, Alan, "MFAProxy: A reverse proxy for multi-factor authentication" (2019). Creative Components. 425. https://lib.dr.iastate.edu/creativecomponents/425 This Creative Component is brought to you for free and open access by the Iowa State University Capstones, Theses and Dissertations at Iowa State University Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Creative Components by an authorized administrator of Iowa State University Digital Repository. For more information, please contact [email protected]. MFAProxy: A reverse proxy for multi-factor authentication by Alan Schmitz A Creative Component submitted to the graduate faculty in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of MASTER OF SCIENCE Major: Information Assurance Program of Study Committee: Doug Jacobson, Major Professor The student author, whose presentation of the scholarship herein was approved by the program of study committee, is solely responsible for the content of this Creative Component. The Graduate College will ensure this Creative Component is globally accessible and will not permit alterations after a degree is conferred. Iowa State University Ames, Iowa 2019 Copyright c Alan Schmitz, 2019. All rights reserved. ii TABLE OF CONTENTS Page LIST OF FIGURES . iii ABSTRACT . iv CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION . .1 CHAPTER 2. BACKGROUND . .3 2.1 Passwords and PINs . .3 2.2 Short Message Service . .4 2.3 One-Time Passwords . .5 2.4 U2F and WebAuthn . -
Security Keys: Practical Cryptographic Second Factors for the Modern Web
Security Keys: Practical Cryptographic Second Factors for the Modern Web Juan Lang, Alexei Czeskis, Dirk Balfanz, Marius Schilder, and Sampath Srinivas Google, Inc., Mountain View, CA, USA Abstract. \Security Keys" are second-factor devices that protect users against phishing and man-in-the-middle attacks. Users carry a single de- vice and can self-register it with any online service that supports the protocol. The devices are simple to implement and deploy, simple to use, privacy preserving, and secure against strong attackers. We have shipped support for Security Keys in the Chrome web browser and in Google's online services. We show that Security Keys lead to both an increased level of security and user satisfaction by analyzing a two year deployment which began within Google and has extended to our consumer-facing web applications. The Security Key design has been standardized by the FIDO Alliance, an organization with more than 250 member companies spanning the industry. Currently, Security Keys have been deployed by Google, Dropbox, and GitHub. An updated and extended tech report is available at https://github.com/google/u2f- ref-code/docs/SecurityKeys_TechReport.pdf. 1 Introduction Recent account takeovers [1{3] have once again highlighted the challenge of securing user data online: accounts are often protected by no more than a weak password [4] and whatever implicit signals (if any) that the online service provider has collected to distinguish legitimate users from account hijackers. Academic research has produced numerous proposals to move away from passwords, but in practice such efforts have largely been unsuccessful [5, 6]. In- stead, many service providers augment password-based authentication with a second factor in the form of a one-time passcode (OTP), e.g., [7, 8].