1 Macro and Micro Determinants of Democratic Support in Cross-National Contexts

Macro and Micro Determinants of Democratic Support in Cross-National Contexts

Daniel Tope

Katherine Meyer

Cheryl Sowash

Department of Sociology The Ohio State University Columbus, Ohio 43210

Keywords: support for democracy, religion, civic engagement, world values survey

*This research was supported by the National Science Foundation under Grant SES- 0300072. Direct correspondence to Katherine Meyer, [email protected].

1 Macro and Micro Determinants of Democratic Support in Cross-National Contexts

Abstract

Research on popular support for democracy demonstrates the importance of national structures, legacies and international processes, e.g., globalization, religious predominance, regime instability and political freedom. It also treats micro-level explanations, e.g., individuals’ religious beliefs and practices, civic engagement and personal characteristics. However, macro-level and micro-level sources of democratic support are not often considered simultaneously.

Using multilevel analysis, this paper examines the importance of religion at both the national level and individual level in predicting citizens’ support for democracy, and it also considers the importance of other variables. Using data from 46 nations in the

2000 World Values Survey and elsewhere, we found that individuals who were religiously committed, engaged in organizations and politics, and of advantaged social statuses were supportive of democracy; those desiring a blending of religion and politics were not. Characteristics of individuals’ nations of residence mattered too; those from globalized nations without a Communist legacy favored democracy. (150 words)

2 Macro and Micro Determinants of Democratic Support in Cross-National Contexts

Scholars typically advance the argument that various social, cultural, and economic conditions constitute environments that are either conducive to democracy or not (e.g., Lipset 1959, 1994;

Barro 1999; Dalton and Ong 2002). Juergensmeyer 1995, Fish 2002, and Patterson 2004 among others have pointed out that religious beliefs have especially important impacts on national political arrangements. Numerous analysts have explored the association between the predominant religions of nation states and their systems of governance (Weber 1934; Carmines and Layman 1997; Inglehart 1999; Inglehart and Welzel 2003). Debates over whether or not

Islam is amenable to democratic development also receive important attention in the popular media as well as in scholarly circles (see Wilson Quarterly Spring 2004; Time 2004; Newsweek

2004; Tessler 2003; Fish 2002; Dawisha 2004). Of particular concern has been the capacity of predominantly Muslim societies to support, build, and maintain a functioning democratic political system.

Religion, however, is not the only socio-cultural condition influencing political governance. A plethora of research demonstrates the impact of cross-national processes, such as globalization, the general well-being of nations’ populations, the sturdiness of the economy and the pattern of its distribution, and nations’ histories and political legacies. These macro-level, structural characteristics of nations impact not only their systems of government but also form the context in which citizens develop and sustain opinions about various forms of government, such as democracy.

Since citizen support is an essential ingredient of democracy, research questions about the association between religion and forms of government are often examined at a micro level.

How do individuals’ religious beliefs and practices, especially if they are Islamic, inform their views about governance?

1 Micro-level socio-cultural conditions, other than religious beliefs and practices, also influence individuals’ attitudes towards democratic or other political systems. Scholars studying attitudes routinely acknowledge the importance of socio-economic and other status characteristics, e.g., gender. Also, civic engagement is often discussed as a force for sustaining a democratic form of government and for nurturing and developing attitudes that favor democracy among individual citizens, but debates continue about its importance.

Since this paper tackles the question: “how important is religion in predicting citizens’ support for democracy,” investigation involves developing a model that systematically considers the issues presented above. First, given that social, economic and political characteristics of nation states serve as reference points or contexts for individuals, what is the connection between how citizens feel about democracy and their nations’ global linkages, standards of living and histories of revolution and repression? Second, how important is the prevalence of a particular religion, such as Islam, to citizens’ attitudes? Also, is the predominant religious affiliation of a nation state more important other macro-level structural characteristics? Third, how do individuals’ own lives figure in to their opinions about democracy? Do their personal religious beliefs and practices matter? What about their civic engagement and social statuses? Is their religiosity more important to their attitudes than the other aspects of their existence? Finally, what is relatively more important to individuals’ support for democracy – their personal statuses, civic engagement and religious beliefs and practices or the structural and religious context of the nation states in which they reside?

To address these questions, we employed data from the 1999-2002 wave of the World

Values Survey (WVS), a representative study of over 80 societies incorporating almost 80% of the world’s population. The analysis presented here relies on a sample of 46 nations, resulting in

72,251 individual surveys. We analyzed the data using multilevel linear mixed models in order to address the proportion of variance explained by macro-level indicators versus micro-level indicators.

2 Guided by existing literature (e.g., Skocpol and Fiorina 1999; Barro and McCleary 2003;

Putnam 2000; Inglehart and Norris 2003; Tessler 2003; Smith 2003; and others), we developed five conceptual categories relevant to examining citizen support for democratic ideals. The categories included macro-level national structural arrangements, a nation’s predominant religion, individual levels of religiosity, and citizens’ degree of engagement in various networks, as well as a category for personal characteristics.

Major contributions of this research are that it is a cross-national study, and it considers both macro and micro-level influences on citizen support for democracy. In particular, variations in religious orientation and/or practice are treated at both the individual and national levels. Also, because religious cultures do not operate in isolation, this study incorporates other hypotheses related to democratic support. At the structural level, the importance of predominant national religious cultures is analyzed controlling for the impact of other macro-level structural arrangements, such as legacies of political stability, globalization, and levels of freedom. At the individual level, the significance of religious beliefs and practices are viewed in light of citizens’ engagement in social networks and their statuses.

NATIONAL STRUCTURAL ARRANGMENTS

Research on support for democracy, using either the World Values Survey data or other sources, has advanced the identification of many components and dynamics involved in the process.

Although social structure and institutions are often under-represented, some research has demonstrated the importance of national political structures, including the stability of regimes and their histories. For example, several surveys focused on the processes of democracy, such as years of uninterrupted democracy (Al-Braizat 2002), and democratic transitions (Dalton 1994;

Evans and Whitefield 1995; Siemie ska 2002) that impacted support for democracy. Lamounier and de Souza (2002) studied party and electoral systems in Brazil and their association with attitudes toward democracy. Rose (2001) examined preferences for non-democratic regimes, such as communist rule, military rule, or strongman rule.

3 Since such research demonstrated that both the structures of political regimes and their longevity and stability influenced citizen attitudes, we examined the impact of Communist legacies and adverse regime changes. For the latter, we used data from the State Failure Task

Force (see State Failure website http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/stfail/index.htm>) that included a broad range of comparative information on partial and total state failures between 1955 and

2001 in independent countries with populations greater than 500,000. Since a Communist legacy and/or a history of adverse regime change could inculcate citizens with caution and a sense of uncertainty, we expected that individuals residing in nations with those characteristics would be less likely to support democracy.

Research has also examined the impact of the general well-being of the population on support for democracy. Booth and Richard (1996) employed 1990s public opinion data from six

Central American nations and reported the significance of the standard of living, perceptions of repression by governing regimes, education and per capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP).

Dalton and Ong (2002) and Dalton and Shin (2004) used the Freedom House index and found an association between support for democracy and social modernization (education, income, urbanization), social capital (interpersonal trust), and authority patterns (respect for parental and other authority). Hoeft (2003) found a negative association between percent Muslim and the

Freedom House Index. Al-Braizat (2002) compared Arab/Muslim and non-Arab/Islamic societies and demonstrated the importance of national levels of development as measured by the U.N.

Human Development index and the political opportunity structure to citizens’ support for democracy; Islam was not an important explanatory variable. Countries’ level of development predicted individuals’ opinions about the importance of strong leadership and democratic governance in conjunction with other more individualized characteristics, such as respondents’ religiosity.

4 In keeping with the research on the importance of political and social standards of living, we expected that countries’ levels of human development (HDI) and democracy (Freedom House index) would positively predict support for democracy.

We also expected countries’ position in the globalized world to matter. Unlike some measures of globalization, the Kearney index we employ includes more than indicators of economic globalization. Political engagement, transportation, communication and cultural diffusion also constitute the index. As global networks increase opportunities for the cross- national flow of people, products, and information it is likely that the idea of democracy will spread. We hypothesize that citizens in a highly globalized nation will exhibit stronger support for democracy than those living in less globalized ones.

In short, we expected that the Kearney Globalization index, together with regime stability and regime legacies, the Human Development index, and the Freedom House index would represent important contexts in which individuals’ support for democracy was either maintained and developed or reduced to lesser importance.

Although the previously mentioned scholarly work documenting the effect of social and political contexts and cross-national indices influenced our choice of national level variables affecting support for democracy, we departed from its use of a single structural variable in models and employed multi-level analysis so that the effect of several structural variables and individual- level variables could be tested simultaneously.

PREDOMINANT RELIGIONS

The role of religion in the establishment and maintenance of systems of governance has a long tradition in the social sciences, beginning at least with Max Weber (1934) who observed that political arrangements often have elective affinities with other aspects of national culture. More recently, scholars have studied the association between the predominant religious affiliation of nations and their political structures, such as the rights and freedoms accorded to citizens, the independence of judicial and legislative bodies and citizens’ participation in routine procedures

5 for replacing leaders (Hassouna 2001; Burstein 1998; McAdam 1982). Such research sometimes posited that democratic structures were in place either weakly or barely in nations that were predominantly Muslim or predominantly Catholic prior to World War II or predominantly

Catholic in post 1989 Eastern and Central Europe (Fukuyama 2001; Huntington 1991, 1996;

Karpov 1999; Lipset 1994; Kedourie 1994). Others disagreed (Esposito and Voll 1996; Filali-

Ansary 1999) and the debate continues.

In this body of literature that theorizes and tests the association between religion and macro-level, democratic structures, scholars make careful distinctions regarding which aspect of democracy they studied. However, popular discourse in the media and elsewhere often fails to capture nuanced findings. For example, rigorous analyses by Barro (1999) of whether or not

Islam’s predominance in a nation predicted high scores on the Freedom House Index that measures the rights and liberties accorded to citizens becomes simplified in reports suggesting

“Muslim countries don’t support democracy.” While accurate to a point, such simplification overlooks the complexity of a concept like democracy and assumes that governmental assurance of constitutional rights exhausts the meaning of democracy.

Public opinion, particularly people’s views about governance, is an important component of democracy because citizens’ support for any form of government is critical to its legitimacy and long-term stability. Thus, examining the association between religion and democracy requires studying not only the structural outcomes of religion as was done in the research cited above.

Citizens’ attitudes towards democracy also require attention. And people’s opinions vary even in nations where a large proportion of the population identifies with the predominant religion. As

Woodward (2001) noted, religious people are culturally diverse; for example, Muslim’s commitment to Islamic law, pluralism and democratic rights varies.

Multi-level statistical analysis makes it possible to examine the association between individuals’ varied views towards democracy and macro-level indicators of the religious affiliation of nations. Barro has developed a usable, though debated, measure of religious

6 affiliation from data drawn from the World Christian Encyclopedia (Barrett 1982), and Barrett,

Kurian and Johnson (2001) utilized it effectively in numerous considerations of national religious contexts (Barro 1999; McCleary and Barro 2003; Barro and McCleary 2004). We view these contexts as important in shaping and maintaining individuals’ opinions about democracy. With findings about the association between predominant religions and democratic structures in mind, our hypothesis links macro-level religion predominance with people’s attitudes. We expect that citizens from predominantly Muslim nations favor democracy less than those from nations where other religions predominate.

INDIVIDUALS’ RELIGIOUS BELIEFS AND PRACTICES

Scholars routinely examine the association between individuals’ religious beliefs, identities, and practices and their attitudes toward democracy. They make distinctions among different aspects of beliefs, such as individuals’ theological orthodoxy, their adherence to particular moral teachings and principles, and the importance of religion in the scheme of life. They examine individuals’ beliefs about the inter-connection of religion and politics. And they distinguish among different practices, such as observance of rites and rituals, church-synagogue-mosque attendance, the rearing of future generations, etc.

1.) Religious devoutness

In work relevant to the international focus of this paper, Patterson’s (2004) study of political attitudes in Argentina and Chile found that religious intensity or devoutness rather than religious affiliation influenced democratic values. Using Afrobarometer data from 1999 to 2001,

Africa Action’s (2002) briefing paper reported findings from Mali, Nigeria, Tanzania and Uganda

(n=10,159; 45% Muslims, 54% non-Muslims). About 70% of both Muslims and non-Muslims agreed that “democracy is preferable to any other form of government,” and were satisfied with

“the way democracy works.” Both groups equally supported having a competitive multiparty electoral system.

7 Karpov (1999) utilized data from the 1993 Polish General Social Survey (N = 1,649) and studied political tolerance, an attitudinal component of democratic governance. He found that religious commitment, i.e., the importance of religion, strength of beliefs and firmness of belief in an afterlife, was only weakly and indirectly connected with intolerance of atheists and communists.

Numerous other scholars, such as Rose (2002) studying Central Asia; Tessler (2002) examining Algeria, Egypt, Morocco and Palestine; Meyer, Rizzo and Ali (1998) focusing on

Kuwait; and al-Braizat (2002) utilizing World Values Survey 2000 data also did not find that being Muslim, adhering to Islamic beliefs, or being devoted to religion discouraged support for democracy. Thus, we expected that World Value Survey respondents who are religiously devout would be supportive of democracy.

2.) Structural integration of religion and politics

We expected that those who favor a blending of Church and state, i.e., a governmental integration of religion and politics, would be less supportive of democracy. Research by various scholars led to this hypothesis. For example, Karpov (1999) reported that the small proportion of

Polish respondents who wanted the Catholic Church to be a powerful political entity were intolerant of groups that opposed the Church. Africa Action (2002) reported that 63% of non- practicing Nigerian Muslims wanted a religious legal system, unlike weekly mosque goers who preferred that “Nigeria be a secular state: it should have one, non-religious legal system that applies to all people.” Other research, such as Barro and McCleary (2004), Smith (1996; 2000),

Meyer, Rizzo and Ali (2001), demonstrated that when individuals think that religion and politics should be united in structures of governance, they tend not to support democracy.

3.) Church attendance

While some scholars focusing on the importance of civic engagement to support for democracy either consider church attendance as a form of civic engagement or ignore it entirely, those who do religious research often separate it out for analysis. Although Smith (2003), Putnam

8 (2000) and others demonstrate the association between church attendance and other forms of participation in the local communities, there remains empirical evidence that attending church is not the same as joining voluntary associations. For example, in research not presented here, we found that attending church, mosque, synagogue, etc. was not strongly correlated with belonging to organizations or being politically active.

Kept separately, church attendance influences support for democracy. For example, in

Poland, Karpov found that those who attended church frequently were more tolerant than others.

Africa Action (2002) reports that when respondents were asked about mosque attendance, (e.g.,

“apart from weddings and funerals, how often do you attend religious services”), the more often

Muslims attended prayer meetings, the more supportive they were of democracy. These and similar findings support the prediction that attendance at religious services predicts democratic support.

In sum, we expect that religion works differently at the macro and micro levels of analysis. Looking at national predominant religions, we expect that certain ones, such as

Islam and Catholicism, may deter democratic support. When individuals’ religious beliefs and practices are taken into account, more nuanced outcomes are anticipated. Individuals who are religiously devout and attend their places of worship most likely support democracy; whereas those who believe that state structures should blend religion and politics would not.

CIVIC ENGAGEMENT AND NETWORKS

In his classic work, Democracy in America, De Tocqueville placed noteworthy emphasis on the importance of associationalism, saying that the right of association was as “inalienable in its nature as the right of personal liberty” ([1832] 1956:98). De Tocqueville was struck by the proliferation of associations observed in the United States, which led him to ask whether this was

9 an accident or if there was a necessary connection between the principle of association and equality. This was his answer:

Amongst democratic nations…all the citizens are independent and feeble; they can do hardly anything by themselves, and none of them can oblige his fellow men to lend him their assistance. They all, therefore, become powerless, if they do not learn voluntarily to help each other. If men living in democratic countries had no right and no inclination to associate for political purposes, their independence would be in great jeopardy (1956: 199).

While De Tocqueville’s observations underscored the importance of civil society in a democracy, more recently, Putnam examined the internal and external effects of social capital on democracy. Externally, volunteer associations allow participants to express their interests and concerns to the government while protecting themselves against political abuses. Internally, networks and associations not only “instill in their members habits of cooperation and public- spiritedness, as well as the practical skills necessary to partake in public life,” but also provide a

“community bond” that keeps extremist groups from targeting isolated and untethered individuals

(Putnam 2000: 338). Additionally, Putnam described voluntary associations as “schools for democracy” where social and civic skills, such as learning how to speak in public, run a meeting, letter writing, organize projects, and debate issues, are learned with civility (338).

Other scholars have found that civic engagement through organizations was an important predictor of democracy. Rice and Feldman (1997) included measures of civic engagement and organizational membership in their analysis of European and American attitudes towards democracy. Siemie ska (2002) studied the generational differences of newer and established democracies with attention to the different types of voluntary organizations, sports clubs, and churches. In one of the few comparative studies of the structural context of civic engagement,

Schofer and Fourcade-Gourinchas (2001) analyzed the variation between nations in voluntary association membership.

However, not all research findings supported the positive impact of civic engagement.

Encarnación (2001), in his study of Spain, challenged the assumption that civil society is either a

10 prerequisite or a requirement for a country transitioning from dictatorship to democracy and that caution should be taken in relating civil society to the actual formation of democracy.

Encarnación contended that while civil society was desperately lacking in Spain during its transition to democracy, political systems and institutions, and their historical legacies, mattered considerably in the structuring of preferences, interests, and values that foster social capital.

Although Dalton and Ong (2002) found little effect of group membership on democratic values, they pointed out the uniqueness of the East Asian region where economic reform and modernization did not correspond to political reform.

In his report on social capital and grassroots democracy in Russia, Christopher Marsh

(2002) divided the notion of civic commitment into several categories: the number of civic organizations (as a measure of civic involvement), participation in referenda and elections (as a measure of civic engagement), and the availability of print media (a measure of civic interest) as indicators of social capital to explain its effects on regional democratization. Marsh found that the relative levels of social capital in each region explained the variation of grassroots democracy in

Russia’s regions, and emphasized that social capital includes not only organizational membership but also political participation and interest in politics, variables employed in our study.

Following Marsh’s lead, we regarded civic commitment to involve more than organizational membership and derived hypotheses from research on political participation and interest in politics. Regarding political participation, Welsh (1996), Booth and Richard (1996), and Inglehart and Norris (2003) found that it was positively associated with democratic norms in

Malaysia, Central America, and nine Western and Muslim societies, respectively. Regarding interest in politics, Booth and Richard reported that respondents who were informed about politics favored democracy more than others.

In sum, although several studies did not find that organizational membership produced democratic sentiment, they appeared as exceptions. Consequently, we expected that individuals

11 that are politically active, involved in political discussions, and members of voluntary organizations would support democracy.

We explored at the micro level some implications of the work of Demerath (2001) in his analysis of the negative outcomes of connections between religion and politics at the national level. Demerath established that such connections correspond to unrest, violence and anti- democratic sentiment. We expected that individuals who favored a blending of national politics and religion, and were politically active, would not favor democracy. Though small in number, activists with these sentiments are perceived as extremely important in international terrorist activities.

PERSONAL TRAITS

The final conceptual category included a number of general individual-level control variables that are routinely used in research on democratic attitudes: occupation, education and income. Gender was also included though its relationship to democratic attitudes has been found to vary by country. We expected that those of higher socioeconomic status would favor democracy; perhaps those of higher social status (men) would respond similarly.

Analysis

Incorporating both micro and macro-level indicators, we adopted two techniques that take into account the nature of our data. We employed multilevel linear mixed-models for dealing with multi-level data structures (Hamilton 2003; Singer 1998). Multiple random imputations were used to deal with missing data (Allison 2001).1 The primary advantage of the approach we used is the consideration that citizens are nested within nations (Kreft and De Leeuw 1998). This allowed us to examine the proportion of variance explained by macro-level indicators versus the proportion of variance explained by micro-level indicators. A number of analysts have argued

1 Multiple imputation (MI) techniques are among the best tools researchers have to contend with missing data. MI tends to produce estimates that are consistent, asymptotically efficient, and asymptotically normal (Allison 2001:27). We used a standard approach whereby the SAS proc mi procedure creates 5 separate models and then combines them via the mi analyze procedure into a single model.

12 that this sort of modeling provides more consistent standard errors for hierarchical data structures than do more traditional approaches such as OLS (Bryk and Raudenbush 1992; Allison 2001;

Hox 2002).

FINDINGS

Some national structural arrangements mattered to citizens’ support for democracy. Citizens from globalized nations viewed democracy very positively; however, individuals’ well-being in terms of their nations’ political rights, liberties and human development had no impact or intermittent impact across models. Nations’ histories mattered to some extent: having a legacy of Communism negatively and persistently decreased enthusiasm for democracy, although experiencing adverse regime changes had little bearing.

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Contrary to what some popular as well as academic discourse suggests, we found that a nation’s predominant religion did not significantly impact individuals’ support for democracy. In particular, we did not find that citizens from predominantly Muslim nations favored democracy less than those from nations where other religions predominate. Arguments suggesting that predominantly Muslim societies are inimical to democracy were not buttressed by our findings.

Even though residing in globalized nations without Communist legacies engendered positive views about democracy, only a small percentage (6%-8%) of baseline variance was explained by the structural components of nation states. The beliefs, activities and social statuses of individuals demonstrated much greater impact on citizens’ opinions about governance. That said, however, individuals from former Communist nations probably experienced some dissonance between their current experiences and beliefs and the actual daily consequences of their nations’ former governing structure. Eastern European nations did not enjoy a smooth democratic transition and the data suggested that democratic support in this region is less than overwhelming.

13 The attributes of individuals’ lives, i.e., their religious beliefs and practices, civic engagement and networks and personal statuses, made a great deal of difference to their views.

Religious orientations especially influenced citizens’ political opinions. Devoted and committed people favored democracy; whether or not they attended religious services made no measurable difference. Believing in the importance of blending religion and politics curbed any enthusiasm for democracy.

Politically engaged citizens exhibited strong support for democracy, unless they favored a blending of religion and the state. We found that belonging to organizations, being politically active and discussing politics with others positively influenced people’s attitudes. So did being male and occupying higher social statuses.

In sum, high status, civically engaged and religiously dedicated citizens, especially men, who resided in nations that are well-integrated into the global structure of today’s world and that lack a Communist past were enthusiastic about democracy as a form of government. The other side of the findings revealed that people, especially men, who shared these same attributes, believed in the importance of a religious state and were activists, were not keen on democracy.2

DISCUSSION

The cross-national multi-level analysis presented here demonstrated that nations and their experiences mattered and provided a context in which citizens’ opinions about politics can be explored. Although democratic ideals have broad support across the globe, nations’ ties with other societies and the legacies of their regimes contributed to variations in adherence to those ideals.

Religion per se did not appear to be a hindrance to democratic sentiment. Even though much literature suggests that Islam is a barrier to democracy’s global spread, our study illustrated that the idea of democracy resonated strongly with citizens in predominantly Islamic nations as

2 We also tested for a cross-level interaction between residing in a predominantly Muslim nation and supporting a religious state and found no significant impact on support for democracy.

14 well as elsewhere. Predominantly Islamic nations, or the citizens residing therein, were no less- likely to support democracy and were, in subsequent analysis, significantly more likely than predominantly Catholic nations to evidence democratic support.3 As discussed at the level of the nation-state, the predominance of Islam did not seem to be less antithetic to endorsing democracy.

Religiously dedicated citizens expressed positive views toward democracy, regardless of whether or not they attended church. However, if citizens were both devoted to a religion and supportive of blending religion and politics, their views about democracy could go either way. If they were activists and favored a fusion of religion and politics (1% of our sample), their views toward democracy were negative.

3 Results not reported here.

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19 Table 1. Restricted Maximum Likelihood Estimates from Multilevel Regression Predicting Citizen Support for Democracy (N=72,251 in 46 Nations). Model 1 (intercept Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 only) National Structural Arrangements Low Political & Civil Rights .033* .027 .032* .028 .027 Adverse Regime Change -.097 -.056 -.060 -.056 -.053 Globalization .004*** .004*** .004*** .003** .003** Human Development Index -.075 .030 -.008 -.008 -.034 Communist Legacy -.159*** -.102** -.109** -.100** -.090*

Predominant Religions Muslim .103 .080 .110 .110 Catholic -.026 -.038 -.018 -.020 Eastern Religions -.044 -.061 -.045 -.040 Jewish .293 .252 .260 .294 Orthodox -.084 -.080 -.061 -.080

Religiosity Religious Orientation .005** .010*** .012*** Church Attendance .008 .008 .010 Blend Religion & Politics -.066*** -.050*** -.044***

Engagement/Networks Political Activism .107*** .100*** Activism * Blend Religion & Politics -.020*** -.020*** Discuss Politics .052*** .040*** Organizational Memberships .020*** .010**

Individual Traits Gender .008** White Collar .050*** Education .032*** Income .030***

Intercept 1.75*** 1.663*** 1.75*** 1.642*** 1.558***

Random Variance Components Between Nations .012*** .010*** .010*** .009*** .009*** Within Nations .146*** .146*** .1441*** .141*** .140***

Percentage of Baseline Variance Explained Between Nations 12% 8% 6% 6% 6% 6% Within Nations 88% 92% 94% 94% 94% 94%

*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001 (two-tailed tests); Results are unstandardized coefficients and standard errors are in parentheses. Protestant is the comparison group.