Diagnosing Distortion in Source Reporting: Lessons for Humint Reliability from Other Fields
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DIAGNOSING DISTORTION IN SOURCE REPORTING: LESSONS FOR HUMINT RELIABILITY FROM OTHER FIELDS GEORGE P. NOBLE, JR. A Thesis Submitted to the Faculty of Mercyhurst College In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for The Degree of MASTER OF SCIENCE IN APPLIED INTELLIGENCE DEPARTMENT OF INTELLIGENCE STUDIES MERCYHURST COLLEGE ERIE, PENNSYLVANIA MARCH 2009 DEPARTMENT OF INTELLIGENCE STUDIES MERCYHURST COLLEGE ERIE, PENNSYLVANIA DIAGNOSING DISTORTION IN SOURCE REPORTING: LESSONS FOR HUMINT RELIABILITY FROM OTHER FIELDS A Thesis Submitted to the Faculty of Mercyhurst College In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for The Degree of MASTER OF SCIENCE IN APPLIED INTELLIGENCE Submitted By: GEORGE P. NOBLE, JR. Certificate of Approval: _____________________________________ Stephen Marrin Assistant Professor Department of Intelligence Studies _____________________________________ William Welch Instructor Department of Intelligence Studies _____________________________________ Phillip J. Belfiore Vice President Office of Academic Affairs March 2009 Copyright © 2009 by George P. Noble, Jr. All rights reserved. iii DEDICATION This work is dedicated to my dear friend and colleague Nancy Calzaretta, who taught me most everything I know about the handling of sensitive source information. iv ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I would like to thank Allen Bostdorff for his encouragement and ideas. I would also like to thank my primary reader, Stephen Marrin, for his adroit direction and many hours of wise counsel. Finally, I am grateful to my family and my employer for allowing me this time for dedicated study and reflection on the field of intelligence. v ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS Diagnosing Distortion in Source Reporting: Lessons for HUMINT Reliability from Other Fields By George P. Noble, Jr. Master of Science in Applied Intelligence Mercyhurst College, 2009 Assistant Professor Stephen Marrin, Chair The views expressed in this thesis do not necessarily represent the views of the FBI. This paper explores how source reporting can be distorted at each stage of the human intelligence (HUMINT) process within the United States Intelligence Community (USIC) and how that distortion may impact perceptions of source reliability. It first explores the many, sometimes conflicting, meanings of reliability, seeking useful descriptions from other fields to bolster the definition within intelligence. The paper continues with a look at the HUMINT process, followed by detailed discussions of the potential for distortion of source reporting by and between the source, collector, analyst, and editor, again looking at other fields for contributions to understanding. It concludes with observations and recommendations. The target audience includes the USIC, especially the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), which both rely heavily on HUMINT collection. Social scientists, journalists, and legal scholars may be interested in the discussion of reliability and how their fields compare with intelligence. vi TABLE OF CONTENTS Page COPYRIGHT PAGE………………………………………………………………. iii DEDICATION…………………………………………………………………...... iv ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS……………………………………………………...... v ABSTRACT……………………………………………………………………...... vi TABLE OF CONTENTS………………………………………………………….. vii LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS…………………………………………………....... x CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION……………………………………...... 1 2 LITERATURE REVIEW………………………………... 3 3 PROCEDURES….……………………………………..... 8 4 RESULTS………………………………………………... 10 The HUMINT Process…………………………………… 10 The HUMINT Source……………………………………. 18 The HUMINT Collector…………………………………. 29 The Editor………………………………………………... 56 5 CONCLUSION……….………………………………….. 61 Recommendations………………………………………... 65 Conclusions………………………………………………. 67 BIBLIOGRAPHY…………………………………………………………………. 68 APPENDICES……………………………………………………………………... 74 Appendix A………………………………………………. 75 Appendix B………………………………………………. 77 Appendix C………………………………………………. 78 Appendix D………………………………………………. 79 Appendix E………………………………………………. 80 Appendix F………………………………………………. 81 vii LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS BCE Before the Common Era BND German Intelligence Service CIA Central Intelligence Agency CPUSA Communist Party USA D&D Denial and Deception DCIA Director, Central Intelligence Agency DIA Defense Intelligence Agency DNI Director of National Intelligence FI Foreign Intelligence FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation FCI Foreign Counterintelligence GRU Russian/Soviet Military Intelligence HIS Hostile Intelligence Service HUMINT Human Intelligence INFOSEC Information Security IMINT Imagery Intelligence ISR Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance JAG Judge Advocate General (USAF) KGB Committee for State Security (Soviet) MACE Method for Assessing the Credibility of Evidence MID Military Information Division; Military Intelligence Division (US Army) NTSB National Transportation Safety Board ONI Office of Naval Intelligence OPC Office of Policy Coordination (CIA) OPSEC Operational Security OSS Office of Strategic Services viii RIP Recruitment-in-Place SS Surveillance Specialist (FBI) SSG Special Surveillance Group (FBI) SVR Foreign Intelligence Service (Russian) TECHINT Technical Intelligence US United States USAF US Air Force USIC US Intelligence Community USN US Navy WFO Washington Field Office (FBI) WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction ix 1 INTRODUCTION This paper explores how the routine development of source reporting within the USIC through targeting, acquisition, documentation, evaluation, and exploitation can lead to the deterioration of product reliability wholly unrelated to purposeful deception by sources. The source reliability caveat contained in most reporting and finished intelligence products1 speaks only to the characteristics of the spy, including his/her trustworthiness, competence, accuracy, and duration of service, while failing to address the loss of reliability that emerges in the intelligence process itself. The collector and/or dedicated evaluators use the caveat to sum up their evaluation of the asset’s motives, abilities, access, and the accuracy of his/her actual output. But are there others involved in the HUMINT process who may potentially distort source reporting? Do intelligence agencies misrepresent the reliability of the source reporting they pass through liaison channels to other domestic and foreign agencies? This paper will explore the many, sometimes conflicting, meanings of reliability, seeking useful descriptions from other fields to bolster the definition within intelligence. It will continue with a look at the HUMINT cycle, followed by detailed discussions of the potential for distortion of source reporting by and between the source, collector, analyst, and editor. It concludes with some observations and recommendations. The target audience for this thesis includes the United States Intelligence Community, especially the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), which both rely heavily on HUMINT collection. Social scientists, 1 In the writer’s experience, when an analyst draws from a segment of source reporting for use in certain intelligence products, the analyst inserts a warning notice ahead of the specific text to highlight the sensitivity and reliability of the source of that part of the overall text. A brief end of warning statement lets the reader know that the highlighted text is complete. 2 journalists, and legal scholars may be interested in the discussion of reliability and how their fields compare with intelligence. 3 LITERATURE REVIEW This writer has discovered nothing written specifically on how HUMINT from clandestine sources might be distorted by those who collect, analyze, and publish it. No discussion of human reconnaissance and surveillance intelligence was found in the context of the vulnerability of their data to distortion as they are collected, processed, analyzed, and disseminated. In this age of spy satellites, the literature tends to focus on TECHINT and dismisses human reconnaissance and surveillance as only tangential to HUMINT collection. Richard A. Best, of the Congressional Research Service (CRS), focuses exclusively on TECHINT in his 2005 review of surveillance and reconnaissance.2 No literature was uncovered that outlines a specific HUMINT process and how the reliability of source reporting can be distorted through that process. Such a process would apply the collection, processing, analysis, production, and dissemination nodes of the traditional intelligence cycle. Biographies of Aldrich Ames, Robert Hanssen, John Walker, among others, tell individual stories of espionage but say little about the elements of the intelligence cycle beyond the interaction between source and handler. Even general studies of HUMINT, like Frederick Hitz’s Importance and Future of Espionage,3 focus primarily on operational security (OPSEC) and covert operations. Literature was found on quantitative assessment of human source evidence in intelligence, but it focuses on assessing the source and thus has little applicability to this thesis. In particular, David A. Schum and Jon R. Morris developed the MACE (Method 2 Best, Richard A., Jr. Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) Programs : Issues for Congress, CRS Report for Congress, 22 February 2005. 3 Hitz, Frederick P. “The Importance and Future of Espionage,” in Strategic Intelligence Vol. 2: The Intelligence Cycle, ed. Loch K. Johnson (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger Security International, 2007). 4 for Assessing the Credibility of Evidence) system, which uses Baconian and Bayesian analysis to rate