Immigration Reform During the Great Society
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WHOM WE SHALL WELCOME: IMMIGRATION REFORM DURING THE GREAT SOCIETY Dustin McLochlin A Dissertation Submitted to the Graduate College of Bowling Green State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY August 2014 Committee: Amílcar Challú, Advisor Christopher J. Frey Graduate Faculty Representative Stephen Ortiz Vibha Bhalla Timothy Messer-Kruse © 2014 Dustin McLochlin All Rights Reserved iii ABSTRACT Amílcar Challú, Advisor This work examines the economic debate over the passage of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 and the end of the bracero program. Although the United States was still experiencing the post-World War II economic boom in the 1960s, the John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson administrations became increasingly concerned with poverty. Through the assistance of a friendly Congress, Kennedy and Johnson signed legislation designed to provide opportunities for employment for the nation’s impoverished and unemployed. As unemployment numbers dropped, geographical pockets of unemployment remained high. Yet, business needs for skilled workers persisted. Economic planners and policymakers viewed immigration as a means to meet business needs and strengthen the American economy by removing nation-based quotas and favoring occupational skills and innovation in the immigration code. However, reform detractors successfully altered the final wording of the bill away from its initial intentions, putting more emphasis on family reunification and unintentionally opening immigration increasingly to Latin America and Asia. Despite Congress’s altering of the bill and the subsequent unintended consequences, my dissertation seeks to reorient the focus of the study of this piece of legislation on what Congress initially intended. By investigating War on Poverty legislation, I argue that policymakers viewed immigration reform in the 1960s as a means to further the economic planning of this decade. By studying these intentions, I hope to shed light on the economic debate surrounding immigration reform today. iv To Brixton Charles McLochlin: Although you considerably slowed my progress on this dissertation, I will always cherish that time since I received the gift of seeing you grow and watching the world through your eyes. v ACKNOWLEDGMENTS My first and most heartfelt acknowledgement must go to my wife Kimberly, who willingly stuck with me throughout this process. If it were not for her support, I would never have made it to this point. It is important to recognize my two advisors and committee members. First, I thank Dr. Stephen Ortiz, who, despite moving to Binghamton University before I even defended my topic, vowed to see my dissertation to its completion. I also thank Dr. Amílcar Challú for providing me with an ear throughout the entirety of my graduate school life. Thank you, as well, to the rest of my committee: Dr. Vibha Bhalla, Dr. Timothy Messer-Kruse, and Dr. Christopher Frey. Thank you to those of my family who have been most supportive throughout the process: to my mother who read (and responded to!) my anxiety-infused text messages, and to my father- in-law and mother-in-law whose visits were a welcome respite from the writing and research process. I also wish to thank the faculty, staff, and my colleagues at Bowling Green State University who were active in either providing insight into my work, taking interest in my professional development, or at least providing a welcome diversion: Tina Thomas, DeeDee Wentland, Dr. Scott Martin, Dr. Ruth Wallis Herndon, Dr. Michael Brooks, Dr. Rebecca Mancuso, Dr. Walter Grunden, Andy Van Camp, Dr. Jay Perry, Ian Mladjov, Matt Caire, and Dr. Michael Carver. A final thank you must go to Dr. Allen Safianow. Thank you Allen for seeing something in me even as a freshman. You saw me through my undergraduate years, saw me off to graduate school, and managed to stay active in my academic development ever since. I cannot thank you enough for being an inspiration and a mentor. vi TABLE OF CONTENTS Page INTRODUCTION…………………...…………………………………….………………… 1 CHAPTER I. INDUSTRIALIZING THE FIELDS………...…………….………………….. 18 The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952……………………………….……….. 46 CHAPTER II. FROM JOB PROGRAMS TO POVERTY PROGRAMS……...…………... 59 CHAPTER III. PERMANENT WORKERS, PERMANENT RESIDENTS…...…….…….. 85 CHAPTER IV. SKILLED IMMIGRANTS, UNSKILLED AMERICANS……...…….….... 121 CHAPTER V. THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE QUESTION…………...……………….... 154 EPILOGUE. BEYOND 1965…………………………………...…………………………... 183 vii LIST OF FIGURES Figure Page 1 Immigration and Income ............................................................................................ 55 2 Immigration and Unemployment ............................................................................... 56 1 INTRODUCTION In 2011, John Harold, a farmer from western Colorado, made the decision to stop recruiting H-2A workers1 and focus, instead, on employing local laborers who had been hit hard by the United States’ deteriorating economic climate. According to Harold, not even six hours passed before he realized that he had made a mistake. Domestic workers, he claimed, were not willing to do the work required. Kerry Mattics, another farmer, agreed. Despite his promise of a $10.50 an hour wage, local laborers were not willing to work in the fields. “They wanted that $10.50 an hour without doing very much,” Mattics said, “I know people with college degrees, working for the school system and only making 11 bucks.” According to these farmers’ experiences, local labor could not supply what they needed to meet market demands, requiring that they rely on the H-2A program to harvest their fields.2 Although Mattics argued that local laborers were not willing to do an unskilled job for roughly the same pay as college educated workers in the field of education, and therefore concluded that domestic workers simply will not perform agricultural duties, there might be larger problems at play. Why would domestic workers want to do a difficult job, skilled or unskilled, if the pay does not meet the arduous nature of the job? And, if farmers can simply ignore the perhaps unrealistic expectations of domestic workers, then why concern themselves with recruiting a domestic workforce? Governmental officials have dealt with these questions by attempting to regulate the labor recruitment process in American agriculture. Policies require farmers to make an effort at recruiting workers in three states before being eligible for H-2A workers. But this is often 1 The H-2A program arose out of the McCarran-Walter Act. It provided special visas to individuals desiring to temporarily come to the United States as agricultural laborers. 2 Kirk Johnson, “Hiring Locally for Farm Work is No Cure-All” in The New York Times. October 5, 2011. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/05/us/farmers-strain-to-hire-american-workers-in-place-of-migrant- labor.html?_r=1&emc=tnt&tntemail1=y 2 merely an initial hurdle for farmers to jump simply to recruit the foreign workers that they planned on recruiting from the beginning. This is not necessarily a malevolent act. According to Dawn D. Thilmany, professor of agricultural economics at Colorado State University, the only way to prove that domestic labor is not available is to “literally have a field left unharvested.” Thus, farmers must take on a big risk if they make the decision to forgo the recruitment of foreign workers.3 This same story that played out in the 2010s resembles problems that have existed throughout the twentieth century. But in the 1960s, policymakers attempted to put an end to this conundrum through terminating the bracero program and reforming the immigration code. Combining the end of this temporary labor importation system with the passage of the (Hart- Celler) Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) of 1965, Congress moved to reform agricultural labor and to bolster all sectors of the nation’s economy. By reorienting the nation’s immigration system toward skilled laborers and depriving farmers of access to foreign migrants, Congress and the Lyndon B. Johnson administration believed that farmers would have to raise wages and better working conditions in order to attract the low-skilled domestic laborers they needed. And, by favoring skilled laborers and innovators through the new immigration reform, Congress and the administration believed that businesses would benefit and the economy would remain strong. Although this effort did not meet its intended goals, this moment in history informs us of how governmental officials viewed an important piece of legislation that has had vast consequences on America today. ***** This dissertation investigates economic concerns like these by linking the passage of the INA of 1965 with the concomitant War on Poverty and the demise of the bracero program. It 3 Ibid. 3 focuses on the evolution of War on Poverty planning during the Lyndon B. Johnson administration, and how this connects to congressional debate over the demise of the bracero program and the passage of the INA of 1965. Economic planning with the War on Poverty provides us with a lens to understand the macroeconomic orthodoxy of the 1960s and how it dictated the terms of debate over these two immigration reforms. This dissertation argues that this economic planning provided a hinge upon which the immigration reform debate swayed. It is only by understanding how policymakers viewed the economic situation in the United States that we can gain an understanding of why Congress constructed