President Franklin D. Roosevelt and Prime Minister Winston Churchill in garden of presidential villa during Casablanca Conference, French Morocco, January 1943 (U.S. Navy, U.S. National Archives and Records Administration) Don’t Shoot the Messenger Demosthenes, Churchill, and the Consensus Delusion By Michael P. Ferguson Every war is ironic because every war is worse than expected. —PAUL FUSSELL, THE GREAT WAR AND MODERN MEMORY n 1937, as Adolf Hitler’s infantry “heavily armed” to have an effective divisions skyrocketed in violation world system.1 His colleagues echoed of the Versailles Treaty, a member the notion, insisting “Hitler’s dictator- I 2 First Lieutenant Michael P. Ferguson, USA, is Aide of the House of Commons defended ship is gradually breaking down.” de Camp to the Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations and Intelligence, Allied Joint Force Command– England’s ongoing disarmament policy, Such comments were not the result Brunssum, Netherlands. claiming one does not need to be of ignorance, but rather a consensual 78 Features / Demosthenes, Churchill, and the Consensus Delusion JFQ 90, 3rd Quarter 2018 blindness. They were emblematic of spared no pejorative as they struggled in Greece, but Demosthenes’ gripe years of political rhetoric that dismissed for more than a decade to rouse their was not with standards of living; it was as warmongering the premonitions of lethargic nations to arms, with none with Athenian strategy and government Winston S. Churchill, despite over- other than Aristotle branding Dem- finances.10 whelming evidence to the contrary.3 In osthenes a “mischievous demagogue” Churchill’s doubts regarding Hitler’s the face of such resistance, Churchill at for the suspicious eye with which he peaceful intentions were equally well one time compared himself to Demos- viewed Philip II.6 Churchill received founded. By 1938, only 5 years after thenes of Athens (fourth-century BCE similar treatment when, as early as Hitler assumed the chancellorship, orator and statesman, 384–322 BCE) 1924, he expressed concern over the the German army had swollen from 7 and Hitler to his Macedonian antago- political winds in postwar Germany.7 infantry divisions to a staggering 46, in nist, King Philip II (382–336 BCE).4 While this article deals with these two contrast to England’s 6.11 Moreover, An overview of these two figures figures specifically for their remarkable British and American agents in Germany reveals how Demosthenes struggled similarities and millennia of separation, had reported the widespread killing of with remarkably similar challenges that, they are not historical outliers. In fact, Jews, communists, and social democrats, much like Churchill, pushed him to the the practice of deriding those with as well as the creation of concentra- fringe of his nation’s political paradigm. farsightedness in defense matters is well tion camps capable of housing up to Sadly, the stories of Demosthenes and established in the Western world, and 5,000 prisoners each.12 Despite these Churchill (D&C) are the bookends to a can be observed, for instance, in the reports, and Germany’s flagrant viola- long and ignoble history of marginalizing Seven Years’ War, the American Revolu- tions of the Versailles Treaty, members the bearer of bad news, or shooting the tion, throughout the Cold War, and of Parliament followed Prime Minister messenger, that endures into the 21st even into the war on terror.8 Neville Chamberlain’s lead by ignoring century. John Lewis Gaddis touched on These “blind spots” usually appear Churchill’s admonitions, doubling down this phenomenon regarding the history in the wake of protracted or debilitat- on disarmament, and capitulating to of surprise attacks on the United States in ing wars, or during periods of economic Hitler’s demands.13 his 2003 Harvard Press piece, Surprise, instability when offensive military ac- An examination of the speeches and Security, and the American Experience. tion—or the maintenance of a robust writings of D&C reveals a consistency In it, Gaddis offers a noteworthy maxim: defense—are less palatable to populations in messaging that generally highlights “The means of confronting danger do beleaguered by war and economic de- three flaws: a systemic neglect of military not disqualify themselves from consider- pression. Athens and Great Britain met readiness, a government consumed by ation solely on the basis of the uneasiness these conditions. What was it, though, domestic issues and hollow rhetoric, and they produce.”5 Indeed, the clairvoyant that alarmed D&C to such an extent distrust between allies resulting from a fail- yet disturbing insights of D&C under- that their peers branded them warmon- ure to meet mutual obligations. The crux standably made many of their colleagues gers? The accusation appears farcical of D&C’s crusade was to develop lines uneasy, and the expressions of this uneasi- considering the circumstances but was of effort that addressed these three flaws ness were costly. nevertheless a facet of conventional wis- that, in their eyes, would be catastrophic As the joint force continues to hone dom in both cases. to national defense if not rectified. its strategies in an increasingly complex In the age of Demosthenes, Philip II global security environment, contextual- developed a reputation for entering cities An Archaic State of Disrepair izing the legacies of D&C might assist as a liberator, only to consume the gov- D&C understood well the horrors decisionmakers in their effort to envision ernment from the inside and eventually of war and the necessity of a strong and offset threats evolving beyond the ho- enslave its people.9 For much of the mid- defense. Both of them wore the rizon of conventional wisdom. In pursuit fourth century BCE, Philip conquered uniform—Demosthenes as a young navy of that end, it is necessary to first explore various city-states surrounding Athens, all captain and Churchill as a cavalry officer the oft misused term warmonger before the while assuring the Athenian popular who saw combat in the Boer Wars. But delving into the common grievances of assembly, or ecclesia, that his imperi- their experience was no match for a these two historic figures, and extracting alistic designs excluded Athens itself. disarmament consensus. Neville Cham- lessons germane to more recent chal- Demosthenes remained understandably berlain’s pre–World War II gutting lenges, such as the threat posed by Iran. skeptical, but his fellow statesmen in- of England’s military capabilities is vested heavily in Philip’s empty promises. renowned. Having denied the air force Warmongers and In the meantime, members of the ecclesia requested aircraft and the navy much Mischievous Demagogues defunded the Athenian navy, employed needed ships, he also left the army in History has been kind to its prescient unreliable mercenaries in ground wars, an “archaic state” of disrepair.14 Even thinkers in defense. Their contempo- and disengaged from foreign investments after Hitler declared himself supreme raries, on the other hand, were not to avoid military entanglements. Athens ruler and cannibalized all German press often so accommodating. D&C were was a shining beacon of social progress agencies in 1935, England continued JFQ 90, 3rd Quarter 2018 Ferguson 79 its disarmament the following month, Platitudes and Unrealities turn allowed Philip to accrue power.29 In recommending an additional £340,000 Despite the charges leveled against them his Third Philippic speech in 341 BCE, reduction in air assets after the by their political opponents, D&C were Demosthenes described what is now £700,000 reduction the previous year.15 advocates of de-escalation who sup- recognized as the Gray Zone, which While Chamberlain’s misadventures in ported diplomatic engagements when- created the apparition of peace between government remain legendary, lesser ever possible, so they could hardly be Macedonia and Athens: “This is what known are the policies of his Athenian considered warmongers in the classical Philip has bought with all his lavish expen- doppelganger, Eubulus, who gutted sense.23 They simply pressed for a resur- diture: that he is at war with you, but you Athens’ stratiotic (military) fund and gence in military readiness and a reas- are not at war with him!”30 Demosthenes endorsed isolationist policies at a time surance of support for their allies, but understood that as Philip uttered words when Philip was expanding his influence even these measured proposals were too of peace between 344 and 342, he was in rapidly in neighboring states.16 hawkish in the eyes of their colleagues. fact setting the conditions for war.31 Both In the History of the Peloponnesian Churchill often vented his frustrations D&C came to the conclusion that only a War, Thucydides describes how fifth- and with this stubbornness, at one time grand alliance could rescue their nations fourth-century BCE Athens had come proclaiming, “There is such a horror of from their current stupor. to place more emphasis on grand archi- war . that any declaration or public tecture and metropolitan development speech against armaments, although it Left to Face Their Fate Alone than military might.17 He also notes that consisted only of platitudes and unreali- Athens, Sparta, and Thebes, the leading Athenians were the first of the Greek ties, has always been applauded.”24 Greek states at the time, were weakened states to “lay down their arms and switch One might excuse Churchill’s abrasive by years of infighting and fragile alli- to a more relaxed and gracious way of character upon assuming the monumental ances that forced Athenian generals to life.”18 As a result, Athens grew over- task of righting these wrongs when, for plunder allied territory to field their confident in its naval prowess and reliant more than a decade, his colleagues chided armies.32 When barbarians attacked on mercenaries to achieve its military him as a madman for simply making Athens and Sparta in the fifth century, objectives.