Journal of European Integration History Revue D

JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION HISTORY

REVUE D’HISTOIRE DE L’INTÉGRATION EUROPÉENNE

ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR GESCHICHTE DER EUROPÄISCHEN INTEGRATION

edited by the Groupe de liaison des professeurs d’histoire contemporaine auprès de la Commission européenne

2000, Volume 6, Number 2

The Liaison Committee of Historians came into being in 1982 as a result of an important international symposium, that the Commission had organized in Luxembourg in order to launch historical research on European integration. It consists of historians of the European Union member countries, who have specialized in contemporary history. The Liaison Committee: – gathers and conveys information about works on European history after the Second World War; – advises the European Union in the matter of scientific projects to be carried through. Thus, the Liaison Committee was commissioned to make publicly available the archives of the Community institutions; – enables researchers to make better use of the archival sources; – promotes scientific meetings in order to get an update of the acquired knowledge and to stimulate new research: six research conferences have been organized and their proceedings published, a seventh conference will take place in Essen (Germany). The Journal of European History – Revue d’histoire de l’intégration européenne – Zeitschrift für Geschichte der europäischen Integration is totally in line with the preoccupations of the Liaison Com- mittee. Being the first journal of history to deal exclusively with the history of European Integration, the Journal intends to offer the increasing number of young historians devoting their research to contemporary Europe, a permanent forum. At the same time, the Liaison Committee publishes the Newsletter of the European Community Liaison Committee of Historians and of the Jean Monnet Chairs in History of European Integration. The Newsletter publishes in particular an important current bibliography of theses and dissertations, books and articles dealing with European integration and presents the syllabuses of research institutes and centres in the field of European history. The Liaison Committee is supported by the European Commission and works completely independently and according to the historians’ critical method.

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Le Groupe de liaison des professeurs d’histoire auprès de la Commission des Communautés européennes s’est constitué en 1982 à la suite d’un grand colloque que la Commission avait orga- nisé à Luxembourg pour lancer la recherche historique sur la construction européenne. Il regroupe des professeurs d’université des pays membres de l’Union européenne, spécialistes d’histoire contemporaine. Le Groupe de liaison a pour mission: – de diffuser l’information sur les travaux portant sur l’histoire de l’Europe après la Seconde Guerre mondiale; – de conseiller l’Union européenne sur les actions scientifiques à entreprendre avec son appui; ainsi le Groupe de liaison a assuré une mission concernant la mise à la disposition du public des archives des institutions communautaires; – d’aider à une meilleure utilisation par les chercheurs des moyens de recherche mis à leur disposition (archives, sources orales...); – d’encourager des rencontres scientifiques afin de faire le point sur les connaissances acquises et de susciter de nouvelles recherches: six grands colloques ont été organisés et leurs actes publiés, un septième colloque aura lieu à Essen (RFA). L’édition du Journal of European Integration History – Revue d’histoire de l’intégration européenne – Zeitschrift für Geschichte der europäischen Integration se situe dans le droit fil des préoccupations du Groupe de liaison. Première revue d’histoire à se consacrer exclusivement à l’histoire de la construction européenne, le Journal se propose de fournir un forum permanent au nombre croissant de jeunes historiens vouant leurs recherches à l’Europe contemporaine. Parallèlement le Groupe de liaison édite la Lettre d’information du Groupe de liaison des professeurs d’histoire auprès de la Commission européenne et du réseau des Chaires Jean Monnet en histoire de l’Intégration. La Lettre d’information publie notamment une importante bibliographie cou- rante des thèses et mémoires, livres et articles consacrés à la construction européenne et présente les programmes des instituts et centres de recherche en matière d’histoire européenne. Le Groupe de liaison bénéficie du soutien de la Commission européenne. Ses colloques et publications se font en toute indépendance et conformément à la méthode critique qui est celle des historiens.

JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION HISTORY

REVUE D’HISTOIRE DE L’INTÉGRATION EUROPÉENNE

ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR GESCHICHTE DER EUROPÄISCHEN INTEGRATION

2000, Volume 6, Number 2 Marc TRACHTENBERG, coordinator

Hommage à Raymond Poidevin (1928 – 2000) ...... 5 Marc TRACHTENBERG America and Europe, 1950-1974...... 7 Marc TRACHTENBERG, Christopher GEHRZ America, Europe, and German Rearmament, August-September 1950 ...... 9 Paul M. PITMAN «Un Général qui s’appelle Eisenhower»: Atlantic Crisis and the Origins of the European Economic Community ...... 37 Francis J. GAVIN, Erin MAHAN Hegemony or Vulnerability? Giscard, Ball, and the 1962 Gold Standstill Proposal ...... 61 Hubert ZIMMERMANN Western Europe and the American Challenge: Conflict and Cooperation in Technology and Monetary Policy, 1965-1973 ...... 85 Georges-Henri SOUTOU Le Président Pompidou et les relations entre les Etats-Unis et l'Europe...... 111 Book reviews – Comptes rendus – Buchbesprechungen...... 147 Abstracts – Résumés – Zusammenfassungen...... 167 Contributors - Auteurs - Autoren...... 175 Books received – Livres reçus – Eingegangene Bücher...... 177

Beilagenhinweis: Dieser Ausgabe liegt ein Prospekt der Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft bei. Wir bitten freundlichst um Beachtung.

Editorial notice Articles for inclusion in this journal may be submitted at any time. The editorial board will then arrange for the article to be refereed. Articles should not be longer than 6000 words, footnotes included. They may be in English, French or German. Articles submitted to the Journal should be original contributions and not be submitted to any other publication at the same time as to the Journal of European Integration History. Authors should retain a copy of their article. The publisher and editors cannot accept responsibility for loss of or damage to author’s typescripts or disks. The accuracy of, and views expressed in articles and reviews are the sole responsibility of the authors. Authors should ensure that typescripts conform with the journal style. Prospective contributors should obtain further guidelines from the Editorial Secretariat. Articles, reviews, communications relating to articles and books for review should be sent to the Editorial Secretariat.

Citation The Journal of European Integration History may be cited as follows: JEIH, (Year)/(Number), (Page).

ISSN 0947-9511 © 2000 NOMOS Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden and the Groupe de liaison des professeurs d’histoire contemporaine auprès de la Commission européenne. Printed in Germany. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior permission of the publishers.

5 Hommage à Raymond Poidevin (1928 – 2000)

La Revue d'histoire de l'intégration européenne est en deuil: Raymond Poidevin, l'un des membres les plus éminents de son comité de rédaction, nous a quittés en juin dernier. La communauté des historiens spécialistes des relations internationales reconnaissait en lui une personnalité particulièrement attachante, par l'étendue de ses connaissances, l'ampleur de ses travaux, sa rigueur scientifique, ses grandes qualités humaines, son autorité morale, son sens des responsabilités, sa conscience professionnelle jamais en défaut, dans son enseignement, dans le suivi des jeunes chercheurs travaillant sous sa direction, dans la conception et l'animation de programmes de recherche, dans ses activités au sein de nombreux comités, commis- sions, institutions qui avaient sollicité son concours. Raymond Poidevin faisait partie du groupe d'historiens rassemblés depuis 1973 par Jean-Baptiste Duroselle et Jacques Freymond, autour de la revue Relations internationales, pour développer et approfondir les conceptions de Pierre Renouvin sur le renouvellement de l'histoire des relations internationales. Par ses recherches, ses publications, les colloques qu'il organisait, ceux auxquels il participait activement, par la place qu'il tenait dans de nombreuses instances scientifiques, Raymond Poide- vin s'était imposé comme une autorité incontournable pour l'histoire contemporaine de l'Allemagne, des relations franco-allemandes, de la construction européenne. Né en 1928 dans une commune du Haut-Rhin, il doit avec sa famille se réfugier en 1940 dans la région parisienne, et poursuit des études d'histoire à la Sorbonne. Il occupe plusieurs postes dans l'enseignement secondaire, passe en 1957 l'agrégation d'histoire. Attaché de recherche au CNRS puis assistant à la Faculté des Lettres de Strasbourg, il se consacre à la préparation, sous la direction de Pierre Renouvin, d'une thèse de doctorat ès-lettres sur Les relations économiques et financières entre la France et l'Allemagne de 1898 à 1914, soutenue en Sorbonne et publiée en 1969 chez Armand Colin, travail monumental qui demeure aujourd'hui un ouvrage de référence indispensable. C'est aux Archives de Potsdam, où nous travaillions l'un et l'autre pour préparer notre thèse, thèses dirigées par Pierre Renouvin, que nous avons fait connaissance, en août 1961, et de ce moment date une amitié qui n'a fait que se renforcer au fil des années. Sa thèse soutenue, Raymond Poidevin est nommé à l'Université de Metz, où il est l'un des fondateurs et le premier doyen de la Faculté des Lettres; il y exerce jusqu'en 1980 les fonctions de professeur d'histoire contemporaine et de directeur du Centre de Recherches Relations internationales, centre qu'il a créé en 1971 et qui acquiert vite la notoriété par ses activités et ses publications (actes de colloques, thèses de doctorat, collection Travaux et Recherches). A partir de 1980, Raymond Poidevin professe à l'Université de Strasbourg III; il y dirige le Centre de recherches d'histoire des relations internationales et le troi- sième cycle Histoire contemporaine, anime de nombreux séminaires. Année après année il forme une longue cohorte de jeunes historiens qui resteront marqués par

6 l'ampleur de ses connaissances, ses dons pédagogiques, sa rigueur scientifique, l'attention qu'il leur portait dans le suivi de leurs travaux. Comme le montrent ses nombreuses publications - la liste en figure dans son dernier ouvrage, Péripéties franco-allemandes (Euroclio; Peter Lang, 1995), qui rassemble vingt-six de ses principaux articles - ainsi que les recherches collectives et manifestations scientifiques qu'il a suscitées ou auxquelles il participait activement, Raymond Poidevin était un grand spécialiste de l'Allemagne contemporaine et des relations franco-allemandes. Son apport est reconnu comme essentiel, car en dépouillant une quantité impressionnante de fonds d'archives en France et en Alle- magne, il a exploré de nouveaux domaines, renouvelé nos connaissances, ouvert des perspectives neuves. Mais la relation franco-allemande s'inscrit dans le cadre plus vaste de l'Europe occidentale. Dans les années 1970, Raymond Poidevin avait organisé des colloques sur les relations de la France avec la Belgique, le Luxembourg, la Suisse. En entre- prenant sa grande biographie de Robert Schuman, homme d'Etat, publiée en 1986, il avait placé l'étude des rapports franco-allemands au cœur de l'histoire de la construction européenne qui est devenue, à côté du franco-allemand, son autre domaine de prédilection. Son enseignement et les recherches qu'il dirigeait à l'Université de Strasbourg III avaient d'ailleurs pour cadre l'Institut des hautes études européennes de cette université. Parmi ses œuvres majeures, citons son Histoire de la Haute Autorité de la CECA, publiée chez Bruylant en 1993, et écrite en collaboration avec Dirk Spierenburg. Une grande leçon que nous lègue Raymond Poidevin, c'est que la recherche scientifique est inséparable des contacts humains, de la constitution de réseaux rassem- blant des historiens de divers pays, lieux d'échanges, de discussions, de confronta- tions de points de vue, d'enrichissement mutuel. Il est l'un des fondateurs du Groupe de liaison des historiens auprès des Communautés, créé en 1982, et l'organisateur, à Strasbourg en 1984, du premier de la série des colloques internationaux de ce groupe. Un autre projet qui lui tenait à cœur, était de rassembler dans un organisme permanent des professeurs et chercheurs français et allemands, pour une meilleurs connaissance et compréhension réciproques de l'histoire contemporaine des deux pays. Sa ténacité, jointe à celle du professeur Josef Becker, a été récompensée: en 1987 s'est constitué le Comité franco-allemand de recherches sur l'histoire de la France et de l'Allemagne aux XIXe et XXe siècles, dont il suivait de près les activités. Raymond Poidevin est devenu professeur émérite en octobre 1993. Cela ne signifiait pas pour lui la retraite, car il a continué de diriger de jeunes chercheurs, d'animer des recherches collectives, de participer aux réunions et colloques des instances dont il était membre, un membre actif, respecté, et dont les avis faisaient autorité. En France comme à l'étranger, il avait tissé un dense réseau d'amitiés et de relations. Tous seront durablement marqués par son magistère scientifique, ses qua- lités morales, son sens des responsabilités. Pierre Guillen Professeur émérite à l'Université de Grenoble II

7 America and Europe 1950 – 1974

Marc Trachtenberg

The ﬁve articles appearing in this issue of the Journal deal with U.S.-European relations in the quarter-century from 1950 to 1974. For the Europeans at that time, the relationship with America was obviously of fundamental importance: the “America factor” played a far-reaching role in shaping their policies, and indeed in shaping their relations with each other. The United States was the protector of Western Europe; the freedom of Europe, it was generally believed, depended on American military power. But a relationship of dependence was always a source of unease: how could Europe depend so heavily on a non-European power, no matter how well-intentioned, for the defense of its most vital interests? Wouldn’t it make sense for the European countries to come together as a political unit – for Europe to organize itself, so that Europe would not be so dependent on America? This problem was of absolutely fundamental importance; the “America factor” was thus bound to play a major role in the history of European integration. But the particular role it played turned on the speciﬁc policies the U.S. government pursued, and those policies, it turns out, had a profound effect on what was going on within Europe. The articles presented here were all written independently of each other; there was no overall agenda that laid out the themes the various authors were to develop. It is therefore striking that practically all the authors stress the way dissatisfaction with America affected – one is tempted to say, lay at the heart of – the European integration process. Paul Pitman, for example, stresses the way dissatisfaction with the United States had been building up in many areas – political, economic and strategic – in the mid-1950s; he argues that those feelings played a key role in the process that led to the Treaties of Rome. Hubert Zimmer- mann and Georges-Henri Soutou both emphasize the impact of America’s rather cavalier monetary policy during the Nixon period on the European integration process at that time. And the article Christopher Gehrz and I wrote discusses the way in which a bare-knuckled American policy in late 1950 led the French and the Germans to see that they had major interests in common, interests somewhat distinct from those of the United States; what this episode suggested was that by coming together, the Europeans might be able to provide something of a counterweight to American power within the Western alliance. Perhaps the most fundamental point to emerge from this series of articles is that there is a real story to U.S.-European relations during this period: the basic structure of U.S.-European relations was not set in concrete in the late 1940s; what we think of as fundamental policies were by no means sacrosanct; attitudes could shift dramatically, and far-reaching changes of policies could rarely be ruled out. As Francis Gavin and Erin Mahan show, for example, the Kennedy administration was

8 Marc Trachtenberg by no means committed to the Bretton Woods monetary regime as a fundamental element of a U.S.-dominated system, but was instead inclined to view Bretton Woods as a kind of albatross; it was far more open to fundamental change in this key area than people have generally recognized. They also show how, during the Kennedy period, the French government (or at least the French minister of finance) was not out to destroy this dollar-based monetary system, this supposed symbol of American hegemony, but was instead quite interested in shoring up the system and pursuing a policy of monetary cooperation with the United States. And Soutou, in an article drawing on new French and American archival sources, shows how different both the Pompidou and the Nixon-Kissinger policies were from the policies that had preceded them. Perhaps the most remarkable finding here was how far things had moved during the Pompidou-Nixon period in the area of nuclear weapons cooperation – a very important development that reflected fundamental shifts in basic political thinking in both countries. One might think, given the many books and articles that have been published on U.S.-European relations during the Cold War period, that not much remains to be said on the subject. But taken as a whole, what these articles show is how misleading that sort of assumption can be. Archival research, even on the early Cold War, can still yield important new insights; and work on the later period, especially the early 1970s, can profoundly reshape our understanding of what was going on. And with the opening in recent years of important new archival sources on both sides of the Atlantic, one can safely predict that we will be learning a good deal more about the subject in the near future.

9 America, Europe and German Rearmament, August-September 1950

Marc Trachtenberg, Christopher Gehrz

In September 1950, U.S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson met in New York with the British foreign secretary, Ernest Bevin, and the French foreign minister, Robert Schuman. Acheson had an important announcement to make. The United States, he declared, was prepared to “take a step never before taken in history”. The American government was willing to send “substantial forces” to Europe. The American combat force would be part of a collective force with a unified command structure, a force which would ultimately be capable of defending Western Europe on the ground. But the Americans were willing to take this step only if the European allies, for their part, were prepared to do what was necessary to “make this defense of Europe a success”. And his government, he said, had come to the conclusion that the whole effort could not succeed without a German military contribution. So if the NATO allies wanted the American troops, they would have to accept the idea of German rearmament – and they would have to accept it right away. The U.S. government, he insisted, needed to “have an answer now on the possible use of German forces” in the defense of Western Europe.1 The position Acheson took at the New York Conference was of quite extraordinary historical importance. The American government was finally committing itself to building an effective defense of Western Europe and to playing a central role in the military system that was to be set up. But the Americans were also trying to lay down the law to their European allies: the U.S. government wanted to force them to go along with a policy that made them very uneasy. It was not, of course, that the Europeans disliked the whole package Acheson was now proposing. They knew that an effective defense of Western Europe would have to be based on Amer- ican power and therefore welcomed much of the American plan. The offer of a major American troop presence in Europe, the proposal to set up a strong NATO military system, the suggestion that an American general would be sent over as NATO commander – all this was in itself music to their ears. The problem lay with the final part of Acheson's proposal, the part relating to German rearmament, and even here the issue had more to do with timing than with ultimate objectives. The allied governments were not against the very idea of German rearmament. Of all the NATO allies, the French were the most reluctant at this point to accede to Acheson's demands. But Schuman was not dead set against German rearmament as a matter of principle.2 He in fact now admitted that it was “illogical for us to defend Western Europe, including Germany, without contributions from Germany”.3 The French government, he told Acheson, was “not irrevo-

1. Minutes of foreign ministers' meetings, September 12-13, 1950, U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States [FRUS], 1950, vol.3, Washington: GPO, 1977, pp.1192, 1208. 2. This claim is somewhat at variance with the conventional wisdom on this point. See, for example, L. MARTIN, The American Decision to Rearm Germany, in: H. STEIN (ed.), American Civil-Military Decisions: A Book of Case Studies, University of Alabama Press, Birmingham, 1963, p.658: “To the end of the New York meetings, however, the French representative refused to accept even the principle of German rearmament”. But the real story is not nearly that simple. 3. Foreign ministers' private meeting, September 12, 1950, FRUS 1950, 3:1200.

10 Marc Trachtenberg, Christopher Gehrz cably opposed to German participation” in the NATO army. Indeed, he thought it was likely that “some day” Germany would join the Western defense force.4 The problem from Schuman's point of view was that Acheson wanted to move too quickly. The Americans were insisting on immediate and open acceptance of the principle of German rearmament. But Schuman could go along with the U.S. plan, he said, only if this were kept secret. It was politically impossible for him to accept the plan publicly at that point.5 Only a minority in France, he pointed out, appreciated “the importance of Germany in Western defense”.6 The French public could probably be brought along and would ultimately accept the idea of a German defense contribution, but only if the West moved ahead more cautiously – only if a strong European defense system had been built up ﬁrst. Domestic politics was not the only reason why Schuman took this line. The east-west military balance was perhaps an even more fundamental factor. In late 1950 the Western powers were just beginning to rearm. In military terms, they felt they could scarcely hold their own in a war with Russia. General Omar Bradley, the Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff [JCS], for example, thought in Novem- ber 1950 that if war broke out, the United States might well lose. The Soviets, on the other hand, seemed to be getting ready for a war: the sense was that they were poised on the brink and might be tempted to strike before the West built up its power. In such circumstances, people like Schuman asked, was it wise to move ahead with the rearmament of Germany, something the Russians were bound to ﬁnd highly provocative? Rather than risk war now, at a time of Western weakness, didn't it make sense to put off the decision until after the West had rearmed itself and would thus be better able to withstand the shock?7

4. Acheson to Truman and Acting Secretary, September 16, 1950, ibid., pp.312-313. 5. Acheson-Schuman meeting, September 12, 1950, and meeting of British, French and American foreign ministers and high commissioners, September 14, 1950, ibid., pp.287, 299-300. 6. Acheson-Schuman meeting, September 12, 1950, ibid., pp.287-288. 7. Schuman and Bevin in meeting of British, French and American foreign ministers and high commissioners, September 14, 1950, ibid., pp.296-297. This fear of provoking a Soviet attack had been an important element in French policy since early 1948. The concern at that time was that the Russians would interpret movement toward the establishment of a West German state as a major step toward German rearmament, which, it was felt, might provoke preventive military action. See, for example, Chauvel to Bonnet, March 18 and May 19, 1948, Bonnet Papers, vol.1, and Massigli to Foreign Ministry, May 3, 1948, Massigli Papers, vol.67, both French Foreign Ministry Archives [FFMA], Paris. In 1950, this factor continued to play a fundamental role in French policy on the issue, even before the German rearmament question was pushed to the top of the agenda by the events in Korea in June. See, for example, a Quai d'Orsay memorandum from April 1950, published in H. MÖLLER and K. HILDEBRAND, Die Bundesrepublik Deutschland und Frankreich: Dokumente 1949-1963, vol.1, K.G. Saur, Munich, 1997, p.376: “Nous pouvons nous attendre à ce que les Américains posent le problème d'une contribution allemande éventuelle à l'armement des puissances occidentales. Un programme de ce genre ne pourra être accepté par nous que dans la mesure où il ne constituerait pas une provocation vis-à-vis de l'U.R.S.S”. On these issues in general, and for the Bradley quotation in particular, see the discussion in M. TRACHTENBERG, A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement, 1945-1963, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1999, pp.96-100, 111-112; and in M. TRACHTENBERG, History and Strategy, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1991, pp.118-127, 130-131.

America, Europe and German Rearmament 11

These were perfectly reasonable arguments, and were in fact supported by the U.S. government's own assessments of the risk of war with Russia at the time. The U.S. High Commissioner in Germany, John McCloy, thought, for example, in June 1950 that “the rearmament of Germany would undoubtedly speed up any Soviet schedule for any possible future action in Germany and would, no doubt, be regarded by [the Soviets] as sufﬁciently provocative to warrant extreme counter- measures”.8 In December, the CIA concluded that the USSR would “seriously consider going to war whenever it becomes convinced that progress toward complete Western German rearmament”, along with the rearmament of NATO as a whole, had reached the point where it could not be “arrested by other methods”.9 It was of course possible that the Soviets might choose to live with a rearmed Germany, especially if there continued to be major limits on German power, but certain groups within the U.S. government – Army intelligence, for example – believed that if the West moved ahead in this area, it was more likely “that the Soviets would decide on resort to military action rather than make the required adjustment”.10 So if even American ofﬁcials were worried about what a decision to rearm Germany might lead to, it is not hard to understand why the Europeans, and especially the French, were so disturbed by the U.S. proposal. The NATO allies would have to accept the whole package, Acheson told them. They would have to agree, publicly and immediately, to the rearmament of Germany. They would have to go along with what they honestly viewed as a very provocative policy vis-à-vis Russia and risk war at a time when no effective defense was in place – either that, Acheson said, or the Americans would simply not defend them. The fact that the U.S. government had chosen to deal so roughly with its allies had one very important effect: it helped bring France and Germany together. It helped bring about a certain change in perspective – a change in the way the Europeans viewed America and thus in the way they viewed each other. Up to this point, the French, for example, had tended to think of the policy of “building Europe” in essentially manipulative and instrumental terms. It was, to use Raymond Poidevin's phrase, a way “to seduce and to control” Germany.11 But now the idea was beginning to take hold that the Europeans – that is, the continental West Europeans – were all in the same boat in strategic terms. The Europeans had interests of their own – interests that overlapped with, but which were in important ways distinct from those of the United States. The fact that the Americans could adopt a highly provocative policy toward Russia, with scant regard for European interests, meant that the Europeans could not afford to be too dependent on the United States. Yes, there had to be a strong counterweight to Soviet power in Europe, and yes, that counterweight had to rest largely on

8. McCloy to Acheson, June 13, 1950, President's Secretary's Files [PSF], box 178, Germany, folder 2, Harry S Truman Library [HSTL], Independence, Missouri. 9. “Probable Soviet Reactions to a Remilitarization of Western Germany”, NIE 17, December 27, 1950, both in PSF/253/HSTL. 10. “Soviet Courses of Action with Respect to Germany”, NIE 4, January 29, 1951, PSF/253/HSTL. 11. R. POIDEVIN, Robert Schuman, Homme d'État: 1886-1963, Imprimerie Nationale, Paris, 1986, p.220.

12 Marc Trachtenberg, Christopher Gehrz

American power. The American presence in Europe was obviously essential and an American combat force would have to be the heart of an effective NATO defense system. But there needed to be some counterweight to American power within the Atlantic alliance. And given the fact that Britain held herself aloof from Europe, that counterweight had to be built on a real understanding between France and Germany. We do not want to overstate the argument here. This sort of thinking was just beginning to take shape in 1950 and things obviously had a long way to go.12 But the importance of what was going on at the time should not be underestimated either. The line Acheson took at the New York Conference was quite extraordinary, and what was at stake was of enormous importance. The events of late 1950 were therefore bound to make a profound impression. They were bound to lead many Europeans to begin thinking more seriously about the importance of coming together as a unit in order to give Europe more of a voice in setting the policy of the West as a whole. Consider, for example, the reaction of the German chancellor, Konrad Adenauer, to the American plan. Shortly after the New York Conference, Adenauer had his top advisor, Herbert Blankenhorn, tell Armand Bérard, the French deputy high commissioner in Germany, that he did not want Germany to simply provide forces for an American army – that is, an army in which the Americans would have all the power. The two men soon met again and Blankenhorn returned to the charge. “With great emphasis”, Bérard wrote, Blankenhorn “repeated what he had already told me a couple of weeks ago, namely, how desirable it was that an initiative come from the French side. Germany did not want to take her place in an American army”. “If France”, Blankenhorn continued, “proposed the creation of a European army under allied command, an army whose supreme commander might even be a Frenchman”, his government “would support that solution”.13 Bérard's comment on this is worth quoting at length: “The chancellor is being honest when he says he is worried that what the German [military] contribution will boil down to is simply German forces in an American army. He is afraid that his country will end up providing foot soldiers and shock troops for an anti-Communist offensive force that the United States might build in Europe. People in our own country are worried about the same sort of thing. Ade- nauer is asking for a French initiative that would head off this American solution, which he fears. I think he is sincere in all this, just as sincere as he was, and still is, in

12. For the best study of the subject, see G.-H. SOUTOU, L'Alliance incertaine: Les rapports politico-stratégiques franco-allemands, 1954-1996, Fayard, Paris, 1996. Soutou begins his story in 1954, which, as he points out (for example, on p.22), is when a real bilateral Franco-German strategic relationship began. This is true enough; the point here is simply that the thinking had begun to take shape a number of years earlier. 13. “Puis, avec beaucoup d’insistance, il [Blankenhorn] m’a répété ce qu’il m’avait dit il y a une quinzaine de jours déjà, combien il paraissait désirable au Chancelier qu’une initiative vînt du côté français. L’Allemagne ne voulait pas prendre sa place dans une armée américaine. Si la France proposait la création d’une armée européenne sous commandement allié, dont le chef suprême pourrait même être un Français, le gouvernement fédéral se rallierait à cette solution”. Bérard to Foreign Ministry, mid-October 1950, series “Europe 1949-55”, subseries “Allemagne”, volume 70, folio 7, French Foreign Ministry Archives, Paris.

America, Europe and German Rearmament 13

his support for the Schuman Plan [for a coal and steel community in Western Europe]. He believes that the problems of Western Europe have to be resolved on a Franco-German basis, the military problem as well as the economic problems”.14 The important point here was that France and Germany had major interests in common, not just vis-à-vis Russia, but vis-à-vis America as well. There was, Bérard noted, “a certain parallelism between the position of France and that of West Germany with regard to the defense of the West. Both of them are concerned above all with making sure that they are not invaded and that their territory does not serve as a battleground; they both feel very strongly that the West should hold back from provoking the Soviets, before a Western force, worthy of the name, has been set up”.15 To go from that point to the conclusion that the Europeans had to act more as a strategic unit – that European integration had to be real, and not just a device to keep Germany from becoming a problem – did not require any great leap of the imagination. Reading these and related documents, one thus has the sense of a new way of thinking beginning to take shape – of French leaders rubbing their eyes and waking up to the fact that they and the Germans had more in common than they had perhaps realized, of an important threshold being crossed, of France and Germany just starting to think of themselves as a strategic unit. And if this kind of thinking was beginning to emerge, it was in large part in reaction to the heavy-handed way in which the U.S. government had chosen to deal with its European allies in September 1950. But had the American government, in any real sense, actually chosen to deal with the allies in that way? It is commonly argued that the policy that Acheson pursued in September

14. “Le Chancelier dit vrai quand il affirme son souci d’éviter que la contribution allemande se traduise par une participation à une armée américaine. Il redoute que son pays n’ait à fournir l’infanterie et les troupes de choc d’une force offensive anti-communiste que les Etats-Unis mettraient sur pied en Europe. Les mêmes préoccupations existent dans notre opinion en ce qui concerne notre pays. M. Adenauer sollicite une initiative française qui écarte la menace de cette solution américaine qu’il redoute. Je considère qu’il est sincère dans l’expression de ce souhait, comme il l’a été et comme il le reste dans son adhésion au Plan Schuman. Il croit à une solution franco-allemande des problèmes qui se posent à l’Europe Occidentale, du problème militaire comme des problèmes économiques”. Bérard’s next sentence is also worth noting, because it shows how French officials were already thinking in terms of balancing between Germany and America within the Western alliance: “Ce n’est pas à dire que l’on doive concevoir une armée occidentale dont les Américains seraient exclus et dont Français et Allemands fourniraient les forces principales. Pareille solution risquerait un jour de nous contraindre à nous battre, sinon pour le roi de Prusse, du moins pour la reconquête de la Prusse”. Bérard to Foreign Ministry, October 17, 1950, Europe 1949-55, Alle- magne, vol.70, ff.16-17, French Foreign Ministry archives. These documents shed light not only on the beginnings of European integration (and on the origins of the EDC project in particular), but also on the evolution of Franco-German relations. Adenauer, for example, is often portrayed as pursuing a very pro-American policy at this point; the standard view is that his attitude toward France at this time was relatively cool. Note the tone, for example, of the discussion in H.-P. SCHWARZ, Adenauer: Der Auf- stieg, 1876-1952, 3rd ed., Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, Stuttgart, 1986, p.836. But it is clear from these French sources that the roots of his later policy were already in place in 1950. 15. “Il existe une analogie certaine entre la position de la France et celle de l’Allemagne Fédérale concernant la défense de l’Occident. L’une et l’autre ont le souci d’écarter à tout prix de leur territoire la possibilité d’une invasion et d’éviter de servir de champ de bataille; elles sont préoccupées de s’abstenir de toute provocation à l’égard des Soviétiques, avant que ne soit constituée une force occidentale véritablement digne de ce nom”. Bérard to Foreign Ministry, October 17, 1950 (as in n. 14).

14 Marc Trachtenberg, Christopher Gehrz

1950 is not to be understood as a choice freely made at the top political level, but is rather to be seen as the outcome of a bureaucratic dispute in which Acheson ultimately had to give way to pressure from the Pentagon.16 The State Department, according to this argument, understood the need for an effective defense of Western Europe; now, following the outbreak of the Korean War in June, the need for action was obvious. It therefore wanted to begin building an effective defense by sending an American combat force over to Europe. But this gave the military authorities the leverage they needed to achieve their “long-standing objective of German rearmament”.17 They were willing, they now said, to go along with the plan to send over the U.S. combat divisions, but only as part of a “package": the JCS “wanted categorical assurances that they could count on German assistance in the shape they desired and that they would be able to make an immediate start on raising and equipping the German units"; they insisted that the offer to deploy the U.S. force “be made strictly conditional upon iron-clad commitments by the Europeans to their own contributions, and in particular, upon unequivocal acceptance of an immediate start on German rearmament in a form technically acceptable to American strategists”.18 The State Department, the argument runs, resisted the Pentagon's efforts to bring the German rearmament question to a head in such a blunt and high-handed way. The two sides debated the issue for about two weeks in late August, but the “Pentagon stood united and unmovable”. Acheson, according to his own widely-accepted account, “agreed with their strategic purpose”, but “thought their tactics murderous”.19 At the end of August, however, Acheson had reluctantly decided that he had to give way. He had earlier felt that insisting on the inclusion of Germany at the outset “would delay and complicate the whole enterprise”, and that a more ﬂexible approach made more sense, but, by his own account, he was almost totally isolated within the government and therefore had no choice but to back off from that position. “I was right”, he said, “but I was nearly alone”.20 Most of the State Department, and even the president himself, seemed to be on the other side. So somewhat against his better judgment, he accepted what he later recognized as a mistaken policy.21 He accepted not only the “package” approach – that is, as one scholar put it, a formula which “tied German rearmament to the State Department package much more rigidly than the State Department had

16. See, for example, MARTIN, Decision to Rearm Germany, pp.656-657; R. McGEEHAN, The German Rearmament Question: American Diplomacy and European Defense after World War II, University of Illinois Press, Urbana, 1971, pp.41, 47; D. McLELLAN, Dean Acheson: The State Department Years, Dodd, Mead, New York, 1976, pp.328-329; J. CHACE, Acheson: The Secretary of State Who Created the American World, Simon and Schuster, New York, 1998, p.324; D. C. LARGE, Germans to the Front: West German Rearmament in the Adenauer Era, University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 1996, pp.84-85; S. DOCKRILL, Britain's Policy for West German Rearmament, 1950-1955, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1991, pp.32-33. 17. McLELLAN, Acheson, p.328. 18. MARTIN, American Decision to Rearm Germany, p.656. 19. D. ACHESON, Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department, Norton, New York, 1969, p.438; McLELLAN, Acheson, p.329; McGEEHAN, German Rearmament Question, p.41. 20. D. ACHESON, Present at the Creation, p.438. 21. Ibid., p.440; D. ACHESON, Sketches from Life of Men I Have Known, Harper, New York, 1961, pp.26, 41; McGEEHAN, German Rearmament Question, p.41.

America, Europe and German Rearmament 15 intended”22 – but a plan that would allow Germany to rearm on a national basis, which was also very much at variance with what the State Department had originally wanted.23 But this was the only way he could get the Pentagon to accept the rest of the plan. If all this is true – if the American government just stumbled into the policy it pursued in September 1950, if the policy, that is, is to be understood essentially as the outcome of a bureaucratic process – then the episode might not tell us much about how the American government, at the top political level, dealt with its Euro- pean allies. But if that standard interpretation is not accurate, then the story might tell us something fundamental about the nature of America’s European policy, and indeed about the nature of U.S.-European relations in general. The goal here, therefore, is to examine this interpretation of what happened in August and September 1950 in the light of the evidence. But is there any point, one might wonder, to conducting an analysis of this sort? If so many scholars who looked into the issue all reached essentially the same conclusion, that conclusion, one might reasonably assume, is probably correct. There is, however, a basic problem with this assumption: the standard interpretation rests on a very narrow eviden- tiary base. It rests, to a quite extraordinary extent, on Acheson's own account and on scholarly accounts that depend heavily on Acheson's story.24 A self-serving account, however, should never be taken at face value; given the importance of the issue, the standard interpretation really needs to be tested against the evidence. And a good deal of archival evidence has become available since Acheson's memoirs and the ﬁrst scholarly accounts were published. But what light does this new material throw on the issue?

22. MARTIN, American Decision to Rearm Germany, p.657. 23. McGEEHAN, German Rearmament Question, p.41. This aspect of the argument is emphasized in T. SCHWARTZ, America's Germany: John J. McCloy and the Federal Republic of Germany, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1991, p.134. 24. The two published accounts Acheson gave – Present at the Creation, pp.437-440, and Sketches from Life, pp.25-27, 41-43 -are cited frequently in the historical literature relating to this issue. Scholars sometimes also relied on information Acheson provided in personal interviews. See Martin, Decision to Rearm Germany, p.665, and McLELLAN, Acheson, p.viii. Other sources are sometimes cited, but this additional evidence turns out upon examination to be quite weak. McLel- lan, for example, cites a memorandum of a conversation between Acheson and JCS Chairman Bradley on August 30 from the Acheson Papers at the Truman Library as supporting his contention that Acheson had at this point “given in to the military point of view” (p. 329). But according to the archivists at the Truman Library, no such document exists in that collection. The press accounts cited in n. 41 in the Martin article also do not prove the point they are meant to support. They are cited to back up the claim that the JCS was insisting on including German rearmament in the package, but the picture they give is that the German rearmament issue was a relatively minor issue (“only an incidental part of a much larger American program”) and that the U.S. government had not embraced the package concept (“Acheson has not definitely made it a condition without which the United States would refuse to send troops to Europe”). Western Europe (editorial), in: Wash- ington Post, August 31, 1950, p.8, and Schuman Got Little Warning on U.S. Plans, in: Washington Post, September 17, 1950, p.10.

16 Marc Trachtenberg, Christopher Gehrz

German Rearmament: On What Basis?

The State and Defense departments did not see eye-to-eye on the German rearmament question in mid-1950. On that point, the standard interpretation is indeed correct. But the differences between the two departments were not nearly as great as they sometimes seemed, and the area of disagreement had virtually disappeared by the time the New York Conference met in early September. The military authorities had favored German rearmament since 1947. On May 2, 1950, they had officially called for the “early rearming of Western Germany”, and had formally reiterated this call on June 8. But the State Department had taken a very different line and on July 3 had flatly rejected the idea that the time had come to press for German rearmament.25 It was not that top State Department officials felt that Germany could never be rearmed. Acheson himself had noted, even in 1949, that one could not “have any sort of security in Western Europe without using German power”.26 But until mid-1950, it was thought for a variety of reasons that it would be unwise to press the issue. In July 1950, however, a major shift took place in State Department thinking. Acheson told President Truman at the end of that month that the issue now was not whether Germany should be “brought into the general defensive plan”, but rather how this could be done without undermining America's other basic policy goals in Europe. He pointed out that the State Department was thinking in terms of a “Euro- pean army or a North Atlantic army"; that force would include German troops, but the German units “would not be subject to the orders of Bonn.”27 A whole series of key State Department officials, both in Washington and in the major embassies abroad, had, in fact, come to the conclusion at about this time that some kind of international army that included German troops would have to be created, and Acheson's own thinking was fully in line with this emerging consensus.28 This shift in State Department thinking is not to be viewed in bureaucratic politics terms as an attempt by the State Department to reach some kind of compromise with the JCS on the German rearmament issue. It was instead a quite straightforward consequence of the outbreak of the Korean War in June. As Acheson later noted, after the North Korean attack:

25. "Extracts of Views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with Respect to Western Policy toward Germany,” NSC 71, June 8, 1950, and “Views of the Department of State on the Rearmament of Western Ger- many,” NSC 71/1, July 3, 1950, in FRUS 1950, 4:686-687, 691-695. 26. Policy Planning Staff meeting, October 18, 1949, Records of the Policy Planning Staff, 1947-53, box 32, RG 59, U.S. National Archives [USNA], College Park, Maryland. 27. Acheson memo of meeting with Truman, July 31, 1950, FRUS 1950, 4:702-703. President Truman had earlier opposed the JCS call for German rearmament. See Truman to Acheson, June 16, 1950, ibid., pp.688-689. 28. Bruce to Acheson, July 28, 1950; Acheson-Truman meeting, July 31, 1950; McCloy to Acheson, August 3, 1950; Douglas to Acheson, August 8, 1950; Kirk to Acheson, August 9, 1950; in FRUS 1950, 3:157, 167-168, 181-182, 190-193.

America, Europe and German Rearmament 17

“We and everybody else in Europe and the United States took a new look at the Ger- man problem. It seemed to us that it was now clear that Germany had to take a part in the defense of Europe; it seemed clear that the idea that we had had before that this would work out through a process of evolution wasn't adequate – there wasn't time, the evolution had to be helped along by action. It was quite clear by this time, as a result of the staff talks in NATO, that the Western Union idea of defense on the Rhine was quite impractical and foolish, and that if you were going to have any defense at all, it had to be in the realm of forward strategy, which was as far east in Germany as possible. This made it absolutely clear that Germany had to be connected with defense, not merely through military formations, but emotionally and politically, because if the battle was going to be fought in Germany it meant that the German people had to be on our side, and enthusiastically so”. The U.S. government “immediately went to work” on “this German matter” – at least as soon as it could, given the need to deal, in July especially, with even more urgent problems relating to the Korean War.29 So there was now a certain sense of urgency: an effective defense of Western Europe had to be put in place and, indeed, put in place rather quickly. It was obvious from the start that this would “require real contributions of German resources and men”. But the German contribution could not take the form of a German national army; the Germans could not be allowed to build a military force able to operate independently. The only way the Germans could make their defense contribution was thus to create some kind of international army that included German forces – but forces not able to conduct military operations on their own.30 A plan based on this fundamental concept was worked out by a key State Department official, Henry Byroade, at the beginning of August. Byroade, the Director of the State Department's Bureau of German Affairs, discussed his ideas with the Army staff officers most directly concerned with these issues on August 3. (The Army, for obvious reasons, took the lead in setting policy on this issue for the military establishment as a whole). Those officers were pleased by the fact that the State Department now appeared “to be looking with favor toward the controlled rearmament of Western Germany”; they “felt that great progress had been achieved on the question of German rearmament, since both the State Department and the Department of Defense are now attempting to work out a suitable plan which would make possible a German contribution to the defense of Western Europe”.

29. Princeton Seminar, pp.910-911, 921, Acheson Papers, HSTL. Soon after he left office, Acheson and some of his former collaborators got together at Princeton to discuss what had happened during the Truman administration; tapes were made of those discussions and a transcript was prepared. Microfilm copies of the transcript of this “Princeton Seminar”, as it was called, are available at a number of university libraries in the United States. But the microfilm is often illegible and the best source is the original transcript at the Truman Library. All the references from this source cited here come from the transcript of October 11, 1953 discussion. 30. See the sources cited in n. 28 above, esp. pp.157, 181 (for the quotation), 190, 193.

18 Marc Trachtenberg, Christopher Gehrz

These Army officers had in fact just come up with their own plan for a “controlled rearmament of Germany”.31 There were, however, major differences between the two plans, or so it seemed to both sides at the time. The Byroade plan called for the establishment of a highly integrated “European Army”; that army would include practically all the Western military forces – American and German as well as West European – stationed in Europe; it would have a “General Staff of truly international character”, and a single commander, an American general, with “complete jurisdiction” over the whole army. The force would have as much of an international flavor as possible. The goal, Byroade said, was to apply the Schuman Plan concept to the military field; the aim was to enable the Germans to contribute to the defense of the West, without at the same time becoming too independent – that is, without getting a national army of their own.32 The Army, on the other hand, was not in favor of setting up a highly integrated “European Army”. The Army staff did not call explicitly for a “German national army”, but key officers did seem to feel that any plan the U.S. government came up with would need to “appeal to the nationalistic tendencies of the German people”. The Army plan, moreover, called for “controlled rearmament”, but the officers who drafted it were reluctant to state formally what the “nature of the controls” would be. In short, the State Department called for a truly international force, while the military authorities, it seemed, wanted a less highly integrated force composed of national armies. The two plans, in Byroade's view, were “miles apart”. Or as the Army staff put it: the State Department proposal would reduce the “military sovereignty status” of the European countries down “to the level of Germany in order to secure her contribution”, while the Army proposed “to raise Germany's status” to the level of the NATO allies.33 So there was clearly a major difference of opinion on this issue at this point – at least at the level of rhetoric. But in practical terms were the two sides really so far apart? The great goal of the State Department was to make sure that there was no new German national army – that is, an army capable of independent action, and

31. The Byroade Plan, “An Approach to the Formation of a 'European Army'”, was drafted on August 3; the text is included in Byroade to McCloy, August 4, 1950, 740.5/8-350, Department of State Central Files [DSCF], RG 59, USNA. For the record of Byroade's talks with the Army officers on August 3, see Memorandum for General Schuyler, August 5, 1950, Army Operations General Dec- imal File 1950-51, box 21, file G-3 091 Germany TS, Sec 1c, Case 12, Book II, RG 319, USNA. For the Army plan, see “Staff Study: Rearmament of Western Germany”, August 2, 1950, and Bolté Memorandum for General Gruenther on Rearmament of Germany, August 10, 1950 (con- taining a systematic comparison of the State and Army plans), both in same file in RG 319. 32. Byroade meeting with Army staff officers, August 3, 1950, in: Memorandum for General Schuyler, August 5, 1950, and Army “Staff Study: Rearmament of Western Germany”, August 2, 1950, both in Army Operations General Decimal File 1950-51, box 21, file G-3 091 Germany TS, Sec 1c, Case 12, Book II, RG 319, USNA. “An Approach to the Formation of a ‘European Army’”, in Byroade to McCloy, August 3, 1950, 740.5/8-350, DSCF, RG 59, USNA. 33. Army “Staff Study: Rearmament of Western Germany”, August 2, 1950; Byroade meeting with Army staff officers, August 3, 1950 (document dated August 5); Bolté to Gruenther, August 10, 1950 (with attached “Comparison of Plans”); all in Army Operations General Decimal File 1950-51, box 21, file G-3 091 Germany TS, Sec 1c, Case 12, Book II, RG 319, USNA.

America, Europe and German Rearmament 19 thus able to support an independent foreign policy. The military authorities understood the point, and it was for this reason that they, from the start, favored the “controlled” rearmament of Germany. And when one examines the sorts of controls they had in mind, and when one notes that certain key military controls in their plan would apply to Germany alone, it becomes obvious – the rhetoric notwithstanding – that military leaders had no intention of giving the Federal Republic the same “military sovereignty status” as the NATO allies. In the Byroade plan, not just allied headquarters, but also ﬁeld army and corps headquarters were to be “international"; in the plan worked out by the ofﬁcers in the Pentagon, “Army and Corps should be national”, except that the Germans would be “allowed none”. In both plans, the Germans would contribute only ground forces, and not air or naval forces; in both plans there would be German divisions, but no larger purely German units; in both plans, the German forces would be under allied control; in both plans, the Germans would not be allowed to manufacture certain kinds of weapons (“heavy ordnance, etc.”); and both plans implied German participation in NATO.34 The real difference thus had to do not with Germany but with how the NATO forces were to be treated. Byroade was not too explicit about this part of the proposal, but his plan called for virtually all the allied forces in Europe to be integrated into the proposed European defense force. There would be no distinct British, French or even American army on the continent, only an international army with a single commander served by an integrated international staff. The U.S. military authorities did not like this proposal at all, even though the whole force would have an American general as its commander. Byroade, it seemed to them, wanted to go too far in pushing the allies down to the German level; the Chiefs also felt that something that radical was not essential, and that instead of creating an entirely new institution, the “European Defense Force”, it made more sense to build on the one basic institution that had already been created: the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Both NATO and the Western Union military organization set up by the Brussels Treaty of 1948 were already in existence; to create a new international force would “tend to complicate an already confusing structure”.35 And there was no point in doing so, because NATO itself could provide the necessary degree of integration; a German force integrated into the NATO system – especially a strengthened NATO system--would be incapable of independent action.

34. Bolté to Gruenther, August 10, 1950 (with attached “Comparison of Plans”), Army Operations General Decimal File 1950-51, box 21, file G-3 091 Germany TS, Sec 1c, Case 12, Book II, RG 319, USNA. See also Byroade meeting with Army staff officers, August 3, 1950, Memorandum for General Schuyler, August 5, same file in RG 319, and, for the Byroade plan, see Byroade to McCloy, August 3, 1950, 740.5/8-350, DSCF, RG 59, USNA. 35. Byroade meeting with Army staff officers, August 3, 1950, in Memorandum for General Schuyler, August 5, 1950, and Army “Staff Study: Rearmament of Western Germany”, August 2, 1950, both in Army Operations General Decimal File 1950-51, box 21, file G-3 091 Germany TS, Sec 1c, Case 12, Book II, RG 319, USNA.

20 Marc Trachtenberg, Christopher Gehrz

This logic was quite compelling. It did not matter if the international force was called EDF or NATO. The name was not important. What really mattered was whether you had an international structure within which the Germans could make their contribution, but which at the same time would prevent them from becoming too independent. And if an institution that had already been created – that is, NATO – could achieve that result, then so much the better.36 Even Byroade himself, who by his own account was quite conservative on these issues in comparison with other State Department officials, was quick to see the point. His original plan, in any event, had not really been put forward as a practical proposal; his aim there had been to sketch out a “theoretical solution from which one could work backwards” with an eye to working out a “compromise between the theoretical and what is already in existence”. So when a top Army officer explained to him on August 10 how NATO could do the trick, he at least temporarily dropped his objections and basically accepted their approach: he agreed that “German divisions, organized as such, might well be integrated into the NATO forces as now planned, provided only an American commander for these forces were set up in the near future”. The differences between the two departments were clearly narrowing. Indeed, it turned out that Byroade's earlier objection to the Army plan had “stemmed entirely from a misunderstanding of terms”. Byroade had thought that when Army officers referred to “controlled rearmament”, they had in mind only a “limitation on numbers and types of divisions”. When he was told that the Army “also contemplated as part of the control a very definite limit as to the types and quantities of materiel and equipment which Germany should manufacture, Byroade said he was in complete accord”.37 By the end of the month, it seemed that a full consensus had been reached. For Acheson, far more than for Byroade, only the core issue was really important. For him, it was not a problem that the Germans would have a national army in an administrative sense – that is, that they would recruit their own troops, pay them, provide them with uniforms, and so on. The only important thing was to make sure that things did not go too far – that the “old German power”, as Acheson put it, was

36. The idea that NATO could do it – that one did not need to create a new institution but could rely on a strong NATO structure to solve this whole complex of problems – reemerged in 1954 as the European Defense Community project was collapsing and people were looking for alternatives. The military authorities, especially the NATO commander, General Alfred Gruenther, played a key role at that point in pushing for the NATO solution; see M. TRACHTENBERG, Constructed Peace, p.127. But they were drawing on basic thinking that had taken shape in 1950. At that time, both Gruenther – then Deputy Army Chief of Staff for Plans – and General Schuyler, another top Army officer who would end up as Gruenther's Chief of Staff in 1954, were already pressing for the NATO solution. 37. Byroade to McCloy, August 4, 1950, FRUS 1950, 3:183-184; Bolté to Gruenther, July 25, 1950 (account of Byroade's meeting with Schuyler the previous day), and memorandum of Byroade-Schuyler-Gerhardt meeting, August 10, 1950, in Army Operations General Decimal File 1950-51, box 21, file G-3 091 Germany TS, Sec 1c, Case 12, Books I and II, RG 319, USNA.

America, Europe and German Rearmament 21 not resurrected.38 If an arrangement could guarantee that, he was prepared to be quite ﬂexible on the secondary issues. Acheson was certainly not going to go to the wall to defend those parts of the Byroade concept that would tend to strip the NATO forces, including the American force in Europe, of their national character. Acheson had an important meeting with JCS Chairman Bradley on August 30 to work things out, and he discussed that meeting with his principal advisors later that morning. He did not complain that the military wanted to go too far toward creating a German national army; his real complaint was that the JCS was “confused” and had somehow gotten the idea that the State Department position was more extreme than it really was. The Pentagon's own position, Acheson thought, was just not clear enough: “he did not know what was meant by 'national basis' and 'controlled status'”.39 But the military authorities were now willing to be more accommodating on this point and were prepared to state more explicitly what they meant by those terms. This represented a certain shift from the line they had taken at the beginning of the month. In early August, they had preferred not to outline formally the sorts of controls they had in mind.40 But by the end of the month, the Army leadership had concluded that it needed to be more forthcoming. This was because President Truman had intervened in these discussions on August 26. On that day, he had asked the two departments to come up with a common policy on the whole complex of issues relating to European defense and West German rearmament. Given the president's action, a simple rejection of the Byroade plan was no longer a viable option. Leading military ofﬁcers now felt that they needed to come up with a more “positive approach” to the problem. A “Plan for the Development of West German Security Forces” was quickly worked out and approved by the Army leadership at the beginning of September. That plan spelled out the controls the military had long favored: the NATO organization would be strengthened; Germany would not be allowed to have an air force or a navy; the largest German unit would be the division; there would be no German general staff; German industry would be permitted to provide only light weapons and equipment. The military authorities were thus not pressing for the creation of a German national force that would have the same status as the British army or the French army or

38. Acheson-Nitze-Byroade-Perkins meeting, August 30, 1950, Official Conversations and Meetings of Dean Acheson (1949-1953), University Publications of America microfilm, reel 3. 39. Ibid. The references are probably to various JCS documents from this period that contained these terms. See, for example, JCS 2124/18 of September 1, 1950, p.162, in CCS 092 Germany (5-4-49), JCS Geographic File for 1948-50, RG 218, USNA. 40. See the Army “Staff Study: Rearmament of Western Germany”, August 2, 1950, paragraph 8, Army Operations General Decimal File 1950-51, box 21, file G-3 091 Germany TS, Sec 1c, Case 12, Book II, RG 319, USNA.

22 Marc Trachtenberg, Christopher Gehrz the American army. Indeed, by the beginning of September, there was no fundamental difference between their position and that of Acheson on this issue.41

The Origins of the Package Plan

So the State Department and the Pentagon had clashed in August 1950 on the question of German rearmament. That conflict had focused on the question of the extent to which the German force would be organized on a “national” basis – or, to look at the issue from the other side, the degree of military integration needed to keep Germany from having a capability for independent action. But by the end of the month that conflict had essentially been resolved. Misunderstandings had been cleared up and differences had been ironed out. There would be a German military contribution, both departments agreed, but no German national army. The German force would be fully integrated into the NATO force; the German force would not be able to operate independently. This was all Acheson really required, and the JCS had never really asked for anything more by way of a German national force. But even if the conflict had been sharper, even if the Pentagon had been intransigent on this issue, and even if the State Department had capitulated to the JCS on this question, all this would in itself tell us very little about the most important issue we are concerned with here: the question of the origins of the “package plan”. This was essentially a separate issue. The American government, at the New York Conference in mid-September, demanded that the NATO allies agree, immediately and publicly, to the rearmament of West Germany; if they refused to accept that demand, the Americans would not send over the combat divisions and would not send over an American general as NATO commander. Everything was tied together into a single package, and it was presented to the allies on a “take it or leave it” basis. It was this policy, this tactic, that created the whole problem in September 1950.

41. Gruenther to Davis, Duncan and Edwards, September 1, 1950, enclosing the “Plan for the Devel- opment of West German Security Forces”. The plan had been worked out “pursuant to verbal instructions” Gruenther had given General Schuyler on August 31; the feeling in military circles was that after the president's letter, the JCS needed to take a more accommodating line in their discussions with the State Department than they had taken thus far. Gruenther, Bolté and Army Chief of Staff Collins were briefed on the plan on September 1, Collins approved it, and it was officially presented to the JCS that same day. Miller memorandum for record, September 1, 1950, Bolté to Collins on Rearmament of Western Germany, August 31, 1950, and Ware to JCS Secretary, Sep- tember 1, 1950. All in Army Operations General Decimal File 1950-51, box 21, file G-3 091 Ger- many TS, Sec 1c, Case 12, Book II, RG 319, USNA. The old conventional argument – laid out, for example, in McGEEHAN, German Rearmament Question, p. 41 – was that the U.S. government, by early September, had decided to press for a German national army “with no particular control arrangement other than that which would have resulted simply by virtue of the German troops being under NATO command and without their own general staff”. But this, it turns out, was incor- rect: the controls the Army was now calling for were quite far-reaching.

America, Europe and German Rearmament 23

How exactly did the issue of German rearmament get tied to the question of sending over American combat divisions and to appointing an American general as NATO commander? The standard view is that the JCS was responsible for the package plan. The military authorities, it is commonly argued, simply refused to accept the deployment of the American combat force unless the Europeans, for their part, agreed to the rearmament of West Germany. Acheson supposedly thought these tactics “murderous” and tried hard to get the Pentagon to change its mind. But the JCS was intransigent, this argument runs, and to get the troops sent, Acheson gave way in the end and reluctantly accepted the tactic the military leadership had insisted on.42 But does this basic interpretation hold up in the light of the archival evidence now available? First of all, did the military push throughout August for the package approach? The military leaders certainly felt that a German military contribution was essential. The West European NATO allies, in their view, could not generate enough military force by themselves to provide for an effective defense; German troops were obviously necessary for that purpose; German rearmament was therefore seen as a “vital element” of an effective defense policy.43 The military authorities also supported the idea of beeﬁng up the U.S. military presence in Europe and of sending over an American general as NATO commander.44 But the key point to note here is that these were treated as essentially separate issues. Military leaders did not say (at least not in any of the documents that we have seen) that U.S. troops should be sent only if the allies accepted German rearmament. They did not say that the way to press for German rearmament was to tell the allies that unless they went along with the American plan, the U.S. combat divisions would be kept at home. Indeed, in the formal policy documents on the defense of Europe, the JCS did not make the German rearmament issue its top priority. The Chiefs instead tended to play it down. The basic JCS view in those documents was that NATO Europe – the “European signatories” of the North Atlantic Treaty – needed to “provide the balance of the forces required for the initial defense” over and above what the United States was prepared to supply.45 West Germany, which at this time, of course, was not a member of NATO, was not even mentioned in this context. What this suggests

42. See especially McLELLAN, Acheson, pp.328-330; MARTIN, Decision to Rearm Germany, pp.656-657; and ACHESON, Present at the Creation, pp.437-438, 440 43. See, for example, Joint Strategic Survey Committee report on Rearmament of Western Germany, July 27, 1950, JCS 2124/11, JCS Geographic File for 1948-50, 092 Germany (5-4-49), RG 218, USNA. 44. Bolté to Collins, August 28, 1950, Army Operations General Decimal File 1950-51, box 20, file G-3 091 Germany TS, Sec 1, RG 319, USNA. Note also the initial draft that the military had prepared of a joint reply to the president's “Eight Questions” letter, given in JCS 2116/28 of September 6, 1950. The original draft, according to another document, was given to the State Department on September 1. See Bolté to Collins, September 2, 1950. Both documents are in Army Operations General Decimal File 1950-51, box 21, file G-3 091 Germany TS, Sec 1c, Case 12, Books II and (for the September 6 document) III, RG 319, USNA. 45. This key phrase found its way into a whole series of major documents in early September. See ap- pendix to memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, “United States Views on Measures for the Defense of Western Europe”, JCS 2073/61, September 3, 1950, JCS Geographic File for 1948-50, Box 25, RG 218, USNA. The same document, after being approved by the Secretary of Defense, was forwarded to the State Department on September 12 and appears in FRUS 1950 3:291-293. A very similar phrase was included in NSC 82; see FRUS 1950 3:274.

24 Marc Trachtenberg, Christopher Gehrz is that the military leadership was not pounding its fist on the table on the German rearmament question. The German issue was important, of course, but the choice of this kind of phrasing suggests that the Chiefs were prepared to deal with it in a relatively reasonable, gradual, businesslike way. What about the State Department? How did it feel about the package approach? Did it agree to the inclusion of German rearmament in the package because this was the only way to get the Pentagon to go along with its plan to send additional troops to Europe? Some scholars suggest that this was the case, but the real picture is rather different.46 The outbreak of the Korean War was the key development here, and State Department officials understood from the start that if Europe was to be defended, a German force of some sort would be required. As McCloy wrote Acheson on August 3: “to defend Western Europe effectively will obviously require real contributions of German resources and men”.47 This was simply the conventional wisdom at the time: neither McCloy nor anyone else in the State Department needed the JCS to remind them that an effective defense meant a German military contribution. But they were also dead set against the idea of allowing the Germans to build up an army of their own – a national army, able to operate independently and thus capable of supporting an independent foreign policy. It followed that some kind of international force would have to be created: the Germans could make their contribution, an effective force could be built up, but there would be no risk of a German national army. The whole concept of a multinational force – of military integration, of a unified command structure, of a single supreme commander supported by an international staff – was thus rooted in an attempt to deal with the question of German rearmament. It was not as though the thinking about the defense of Western Europe and the shape of the NATO military system had developed on its own, and that it was only later that the German rearmament issue had been linked to it by the JCS for bargaining purposes. The fundamental idea that the different elements in the equation – the U.S. divisions, the unified command structure, the forces provided by NATO Europe, and the German contribution – were all closely interrelated and needed to be dealt with as parts of a unified policy thus developed naturally and organically as the basic thinking about the defense of Europe took shape in mid-1950. This idea – in a sense, the basic idea behind the package concept – took hold quite early in August 1950, and it was the State Department that took the lead in pressing for this kind of approach. The Byroade plan, for example, explicitly tied all these different elements together: in this plan, which in mid-August became a kind of official State Department plan, German units could be created if and only if they were integrated into an allied force with an American commander.48

46. See, for example, McLELLAN, Acheson, p.328. 47. McCloy to Acheson, August 3, 1950, FRUS 1950, 3:181. 48. Byroade-Schuyler-Gerhardt meeting, August 10, 1950, Army Operations General Decimal File 1950-51, box 21, file G-3 091 Germany TS, Sec 1c, Case 12, Book II, RG 319, USNA. For the final Byroade plan, and for its adoption as the official State Department position, see Matthews to Burns, August 16, 1950, with enclosure, FRUS 1950, 3:211-219. America, Europe and German Rearmament 25

The State Department was thus the driving force behind this kind of approach. For the entire month of August, its ofﬁcials pressed for a uniﬁed policy. But the military authorities, because of their dislike for the Byroade plan, tended to drag their feet in this area.49 The State Department, in frustration, and aware that a policy needed to be worked out before the NATO ministers met in mid-September, then got the president to intervene. On August 26 (as noted above), Truman asked the two departments, State and Defense, to come up with a common policy. He laid out a series of eight questions that the two departments were to answer by September 1, a deadline that was later extended to September 6.50 The “Eight Questions” document was actually drafted in the State Department by two of Acheson's closest advisors. The State Department goal, in getting Truman to sign it, was to prod the Pentagon into accepting a common plan.51 The tactic worked. Military leaders understood that the Eight Questions document was based on the State Department plan.52 Given the president's intervention (again, as noted above), they now felt they could no longer simply “disregard” that plan, but instead needed to take a more accommodating and “positive” line.53 The military authorities now drafted a document which, they felt, might serve as a basis for a joint reply to the president. That draft was given to the State Depart-

49. See, for example, P. NITZE, with A. SMITH and S. REARDEN, From Hiroshima to Glasnost: At the Center of Decision, Grove Weidenfeld, New York, 1989, p.123; and Princeton Seminar, p.914. Note also the tone of Secretary of Defense Johnson's initial reply to State Department letter asking for comments on the August 16 Byroade plan: Johnson to Acheson, August 17, 1950, FRUS 1950, 3:226-227. 50. Truman to Acheson and Johnson, August 26, 1950, FRUS 1950, 3:250-251. 51. Draft memo by Nitze and Byroade, August 25, 1950, Records of the Policy Planning Staff, Country and Area File, Box 28, RG 59, USNA. Some scholars – Martin, for example, in The Decision to Rearm Germany, p.659 – portray the JCS as “prodding” the State Department to take “prompt diplomatic action”. And Acheson, in Present at the Creation (p.428), also portrays himself as having been pushed forward, especially by pressure from the president, and actually cites the “Eight Questions” document in this context. But in reality – and not just at this point, but throughout this episode – it was the State Department that was pushing things forward, and it was Truman who followed Acheson's lead. The president, for example, had been against German rearmament when the JCS had pressed for it in June. But when Acheson told him on July 31 that it no longer was a question of whether Germany should be rearmed, that the real issue now was how it was to be done, and that the State Department was thinking in terms of creating “a European army or a North Atlantic army”, Truman immediately “expressed his strong approval” of this whole line of thought. Truman to Acheson, June 16, 1950 (two documents), and Acheson-Truman meeting, July 31, 1950, FRUS 1950, 4:688, 702. 52. Bolté to Collins, August 28, 1950: “The questions listed in the President's letter are apparently based upon the State Department's proposal for the establishment of a European defense force”. Army Operations General Decimal File 1950-51, box 20, file G-3 091 Germany TS, Sec 1, RG 319, USNA. The point was clear from the text of the letter. The two departments were not simply asked, for example, to consider what, if anything, should be done on the German rearmament question; they were asked instead to consider whether the U.S. government was prepared to support “the concept of a European defense force, including German participation on other than a national basis” – which was not exactly a neutral way of putting the issue. Truman to Acheson and Johnson, August 26, 1950, FRUS 1950, 3:250. 53. Bolté to Collins, August 31, 1950, and Gruenther to Davis, Duncan and Edwards, September 1, 1950, enclosing the “Plan for the Development of West German Security Forces”, both in Army Operations General Decimal File 1950-51, box 21, file G-3 091 Germany TS, Sec 1c, Case 12, Book II, RG 319, USNA. 26 Marc Trachtenberg, Christopher Gehrz ment on September 1; Acheson had been shown a preliminary version a couple of days earlier.54 Events now moved quickly. In a few days of intensive talks, a joint reply acceptable to both departments was worked out. The final document was approved by the president and circulated to top officials as NSC 82 on September 11, a day before the New York Conference was due to begin.55 This period from August 26 through September 8 – from the Eight Questions letter to the joint reply – is thus the most important phase of this whole episode, and the evidence relating to this period needs to be examined with particular care. Does it support the view that the military insisted on the package approach and that the State Department opposed it, but gave in reluctantly at the end? By far the most important document bearing on these issues is the record of a meeting Acheson had on August 30 with his three top advisors in this area, the three officials who, in fact, were conducting the negotiations with the Defense De- partment: Byroade, Assistant Secretary for European Affairs Perkins, and Paul Nitze, head of the State Department's Policy Planning Staff. Acheson (as noted in the previous section) had just met with JCS Chairman Bradley earlier that morning. He had also just seen the draft reply the JCS had prepared to the president's Eight Questions letter. At the meeting with his advisors, Acheson discussed the JCS draft section by section and found most of it acceptable. The few small problems he had with it did not involve any issue of principle. At no point did Acheson complain about, or even comment on, any insistence on the part of the military that all the elements in the program were to be tied together in a single package. The conclusion to be drawn from this is absolutely fundamental for the purposes of the analysis here: if the JCS had been insisting on the package concept and if Acheson and the State Department had been opposed to that concept, it is scarcely conceivable that the issue would not have come up at this meeting. Nor is it very likely that a conflict over the package issue developed suddenly over the next few days. Nitze's recollection (in 1953) was that following the Acheson-Bradley meeting things moved very quickly.56 He says nothing about a dispute over the package question suddenly emerging at that point, and it is in fact highly unlikely that things could have moved so quickly if a serious dispute had developed. Indeed, Perkins and Nitze spoke in those 1953 discussions of the common policy document – the document that later became NSC 82 – as though it essentially reflected their views, and which, through great efforts on their part, they had finally managed to get the military authorities to accept. “We had great difficulty”, Perkins recalled, “in finally getting the Pentagon to sign on to the common policy”.57 Nitze agreed: he remembered going over to the Pentagon after Acheson had worked “this thing” out with General Bradley on August 30, and “we trotted out the specific

54. Bolté to Collins, September 2, 1950, Army Operations General Decimal File 1950-51, box 21, file G-3 091 Germany TS, Sec 1c, Case 12, Book II, RG 319, USNA; Acheson-Nitze-Byroade-Perkins meeting, August 30, 1950, cited in n. 38 above. 55. Acheson and Johnson to Truman, September 8, 1950, FRUS 1950, 3:273-278. 56. Princeton Seminar, pp.920-921. 57. Princeton Seminar, p.914. America, Europe and German Rearmament 27 piece of paper which spelled out the package proposal with the Pentagon people and got their agreement to this document”.58 It was scarcely as though the State Department was going along with the package plan reluctantly or against its better judgment. An analysis of the drafting history points to the same general conclusion. The passage in NSC 82 that served as the basis for the package policy – indeed, the only passage in the document that called for such a policy – was part of the answer to the sixth question: “We recommend that an American national be appointed now as Chief of Staff and eventually as a Supreme Commander for the European defense force but only upon the request of the European nations and upon their assurance that they will provide sufficient forces, including adequate German units, to constitute a command reasonably capable of fulfilling its responsibilities”.59 That final document was based on the draft the JCS had turned over on September 1; the key phrase “including adequate German units” did not appear in the original JCS draft.60 It scarcely stands to reason that the military authorities, having decided to be cooperative, would harden their position in the course of their talks with State Department representatives, above all if State Department officials had argued strongly against an intransigent policy. None of this means, of course, that the JCS was opposed to including a call for German rearmament in the package. This was in their view a goal that the U.S. government obviously had to pursue. But this does not mean that the Chiefs were going to try to dictate negotiating tactics to the State Department – that they were going to insist on a diplomatic strategy that Acheson and his top advisors rejected. State Department officials, in fact, did not really blame the JCS for what had happened at the New York Conference. Nitze, for example, although he said in 1953 that the Chiefs would not agree to send additional forces until they got assurances from the British and the French about a German military contribution, did not actually hold them primarily responsible for the confrontation with the Europeans in mid-September.61 He pointed out at that time that the German rearmament issue could have been dealt with very differently. The issue, he said, could have been presented “to the British and French in a way which emphasized the supreme commander and the American commitment”; the “question of German participation” could have been “put in a lower cate- gory and kind of weaved in gradually”.62 Nitze did not blame the JCS for vetoing that approach. In his view, the real responsibility lay elsewhere. “We were fouled up on

58. Princeton Seminar, p.914. 59. NSC 82, FRUS 1950, 3:276. 60. See JCS 2116/28, September 6, 1950, which gives the final draft and shows changes from the earlier draft; Army Operations General Decimal File 1950-51, box 21, file G-3 091 Germany TS, Sec 1c, Case 12, Book III, RG 319, USNA. For another copy, see JCS to Johnson, September 5, 1950, Records of the Administrative Secretary, Correspondence Control Section Decimal File: July to Dec 1950, CD 091.7 (Europe), box 175, RG 330, USNA. 61. Princeton Seminar, p. 915. 62. Princeton Seminar, p. 916. 28 Marc Trachtenberg, Christopher Gehrz this”, he said, by press leaks primarily coming from McCloy, “who agreed entirely with the tactical importance of doing it the other way” – that is, of dealing with the German rearmament issue head on.63 But Acheson was not fundamentally opposed to the blunt approach, and (contrary to his later disclaimers) he himself, on balance, thought that the U.S. government had chosen the right course of action at the time. Would it have been better, he asked in that same discussion, to have opted for quiet talks with the British and the French, when a plan had just been worked out, when a NATO foreign ministers' meeting was about to be held, and when the issue was being “talked about everywhere”? “It seemed to me then”, he said, “and it seems to me now, that we did the right thing”.64 And indeed, in his reports to Truman from the New York Conference, Acheson gave no sign that he was pursuing the package plan strategy reluctantly or against his better judgment. He gave no sign that he was looking for a way to soften the general line and deal with the allies in a more conciliatory manner. He explained to the president on September 15 how he had laid out the American demands, how he had discussed the issue “with the gloves off”, how he had “blown” some of the allies' objections to the American plan “out of the water”, and how it might well be a question of “whose nerve lasts longer”. He was clearly pleased with his own performance and was not at all unhappy about the line he had taken.65 As one of its top ofﬁcials pointed out at the time, the State Department was conducting a “hard-hitting kind of operation” in this area – and was proud of it.66

63. Princeton Seminar, p. 916; see also p.912. The archival evidence confirms the point that McCloy favored a very tough line at this time. See especially the handwritten letter from McCloy to Ache- son, September 20, 1950, in the Acheson Papers, Memoranda of Conversations, September 1950, HSTL. A high French official, McCloy reported, had just “referred again to the delicacy of French opinion” on the German rearmament issue. “I think the time has come”, he wrote, “to tell these people that there is other opinion to deal with and that U.S. opinion is getting damn delicate itself. If there should be an incursion in January and U.S. troops should get pushed around without Ger- man troops to help them because of a French reluctance to face facts, I shudder to think how indel- icate U.S. opinion would suddenly become”. 64. Princeton Seminar, p.913. 65. Acheson to Truman, September 15, 1950, FRUS 1950, 3:1229-31. For more information relating to the part of the story from the New York Conference on, see C. GEHRZ, Dean Acheson, the JCS, and the 'Single Package': American Policy on German Rearmament, 1950. Diplomacy and State- craft (forthcoming). 66. Under Secretary Webb, in telephone conversation with Acheson, September 27, 1950, Acheson Papers (Lot File 53D 444), box 13, RG 59, USNA. Webb was comparing the State Department “operation” with the way the Defense Department under Marshall was handling the issue. America, Europe and German Rearmament 29

Dean Acheson: The Man and the Statesman

There is one final set of considerations that needs to be taken into account in an assessment of U.S. policy in September 1950, and this has to do with what we know about Acheson in general – about the sort of person he was and the kind of policy he favored throughout his career. Was he the type of leader who believed in compromise, especially with America's most important allies, and was inclined to take a relatively moderate and cautious line? Or was he, as General Bradley later called him, an “uncompromising hawk”, aggressive both in terms of his goals and his tactics?67 The great bulk of the evidence points in the latter direction.68 In 1950 in particular, he tended to take a very hard line. He was in favor of a rollback policy at that time. This was the real meaning of NSC 68, an important policy document with which Acheson was closely associated.69 American scholars generally tend to portray U.S. policy as essentially defensive and status quo-oriented, and NSC 68 is commonly interpreted as simply a “strategy of containment”.70 But the aggressive thrust of this document is clear from its own text: NSC 68 called explicitly for a “policy of calculated and gradual coercion”; the aim of that policy was to “check and roll back the Kremlin's drive for world domination”. The whole goal at that time, as Nitze recalled in 1954, was to “lay the basis”, through massive rearmament, for a policy of “taking increased risks of general war” in order to achieve “a satisfactory solution” of America's problems with Russia while the Soviet nuclear stockpile “was still small”.71 This extraordinary aggressiveness was not out of character for Acheson, and its wellspring was not simply anti-Communism or extreme distrust of the Soviet Un- ion. His general hawkishness can in fact be traced back to the summer of 1941, when, as a mid-level State Department official, he played a major role in shaping the policy that put the United States on a collision course with Japan. Acheson was one of a handful of officials who helped engineer the oil embargo in mid-1941 – a

67. O. BRADLEY and C. BLAIR, A General's Life, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983, p.519. 68. The idea that Acheson was an exceptionally aggressive statesman is scarcely the consensus view. American writers tend to treat Acheson rather gently, but this, we think, is to be understood in essentially political terms. Acheson's reputation profited enormously from the fact that during his period in office he had been the target of a great deal of ill-informed criticism from right-wing Republicans; Richard Nixon's famous reference at the time to the “Acheson College of Cowardly Communist Containment” is a good case in point. And with enemies like that, it was not hard to find friends--among liberal academics, at any rate. 69. M. TRACHTENBERG, History and Strategy, pp.109-110. 70. See, for example, E. MAY (ed.), American Cold War Strategy: Interpreting NSC 68, St. Martin's, New York, 1993, and J. L. GADDIS, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy, Oxford University Press, Oxford and New York, 1982, chapter 4. 71. NSC 68, April 7, 1950, FRUS 1950, 1:253, 255, 284; Nitze quoted in M. TRACHTENBERG, History and Strategy, p.112n. Nitze, the principal author of NSC 68, was quite close to Acheson throughout this period. See, for example, D. CALLAHAN, Dangerous Capabilities: Paul Nitze and the Cold War, HarperCollins, New York, 1990, pp.95-96, 155, and S. TALBOTT, The Master of the Game: Paul Nitze and the Nuclear Peace, Knopf, New York, 1988, p.51. 30 Marc Trachtenberg, Christopher Gehrz development that led directly to a sharp crisis in U.S.-Japanese relations and ultimately to the attack on Pearl Harbor in December.72 His aggressiveness was also apparent in the early 1960s. During the Berlin and Cuban missile crises especially, he pushed for very tough policies. In 1963, he even called (in a talk to the Institute for Strategic Studies) for what amounted to a policy of armed intervention in East Germany.73 When he was attacked for taking this line, he lashed out at his critics: “Call me anything you like, but don't call me a fool; everybody knows I'm not a fool”. “I will not say that Mr. Acheson is a fool”, one of his critics replied. “I will only say that he is completely and utterly reckless”.74 Acheson often sneered at those he viewed as soft and indecisive. After Eisen- hower took ofﬁce in 1953, Acheson complained repeatedly to Truman about the “weakness” of the new administration.75 After the Democrats returned to power in 1961, President Kennedy allowed Acheson to play a major role in the making of American policy, but Acheson viewed the young president with barely-concealed contempt. The Kennedy administration, in his view, was weak, indecisive, and ob- sessed with appearances.76 He even criticized the administration in public, going so far at one point that he was virtually forced to apologize.77

72. See J. UTLEY, Upstairs, Downstairs at Foggy Bottom: Oil Exports and Japan, 1940-41, in: Pro- logue, vol.8 (Spring 1976), pp.17-28; J. UTLEY, Going to War with Japan, University of Tennes- see Press, Knoxville, 1985, pp.153-156, 180; I. ANDERSON, The 1941 de facto Embargo on Oil to Japan: A Bureaucratic Reflex, in: Pacific Historical Review, vol.44 (1975), pp.201-231; and I. ANDERSON, The Standard Vacuum Oil Company and United States East Asian Policy, 1933-1941, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1975. 73. Acheson speech at annual meeting of the Institute of Strategic Studies, September 1963, in Adelphi Paper No. 5, The Evolution of NATO. See also D. BRINKLEY, Dean Acheson: The Cold War Years, 1953-71, New Haven: Yale University Press, p.153. Note also Acheson's comment in 1961 about the need for the sort of forces which would enable the western powers to intervene in the event, for example, of a new uprising in Hungary: Acheson-de Gaulle meeting, April 20, 1961, Documents diplomatiques français, 1961, vol.1, p.494. 74. B. BRODIE, War and Politics, Macmillan, New York, 1973, p.402. The critic in question was the former Defense Minister in the Macmillan government, Harold Watkinson. 75. See, for example, Acheson to Truman, May 28, 1953, box 30, folder 391, and Acheson memorandum of conversation, June 23, 1953, box 68, folder 172, in Acheson Papers, Sterling Library, Yale University, New Haven, Connecticut. Note also Nitze's complaint at the very end of the Truman period that the U.S. government had adopted for a purely defensive policy. America, he was afraid, was in danger of becoming “a sort of hedge-hog, unattractive to attack, but basically not very wor- risome over a period of time beyond our immediate position”. Nitze to Acheson, January 12, 1953, FRUS 1952-54, 2:59. 76. See especially Acheson to Truman, June 24, July 14, August 4, and September 21, 1961, Acheson Papers, Box 166, Acheson-Truman Correspondence, 1961, Sterling Library, Yale University; some extracts are quoted in M. TRACHTENBERG, History and Strategy, p.230. See also M. BE- SCHLOSS, The Crisis Years: Kennedy and Khrushchev, 1960-1963, Edward Burlingame, New York, 1991, p.410; and H. CATUDAL, Kennedy and the Berlin Wall Crisis: A Study in U.S. De- cision-Making, Berlin-Verlag, Berlin, 1980, p.182n. 77. W. ISAACSON and E. THOMAS, The Wise Men: Six Friends and the World They Made, Simon and Schuster, New York, 1986, pp.612-613; see also BRINKLEY, Acheson, pp.138. America, Europe and German Rearmament 31

At another point, he practically told the president to his face that he was indecisive. Kennedy had asked Acheson to look into the balance of payments problem, and in early 1963 he presented his report to the president. It was a “very strong, vivid, Achesonian presentation. And the President thanked him and said, ‘Well, we have to think about that'. Acheson said, 'There's nothing to think about, Mr. President. All you have to do is decide. Here it is, and why don't you decide’”? Kennedy turned red, and then broke up the meeting. He was furious. “It's a long time before Dean Acheson's going to be here again,” he remarked to an aide.78 As for Acheson, he continued to criticize Kennedy as weak and indecisive, even after Kennedy's death.79 Acheson treated President Johnson the same way he had treated President Kennedy. When he met with Johnson in 1965, he was so irritated by the president's whining and indecisiveness that he “blew [his] top” and told him to his face that all the trouble America was having in Europe “came about because under him and Kennedy there had been no American leadership at all. The idea that the Europeans could come to their own conclusion had led to an unchallenged de Gaulle”.80 These stories reveal a lot about Acheson. A man who could deal with presidents that way was not the type of person who would allow himself to be pushed around by mere military ofﬁcers on an issue of central political importance – above all at a time when he was at the height of his power and had the full conﬁdence of President Truman. Nor was he the type who would be understanding if he thought allied leaders were reluctant to face up to fundamental problems and make the really tough decisions. Acheson, in fact, did not believe in taking a soft line with the allies or in treating them as full partners. In 1961, he played the key role in shaping the new Kennedy administration's policy on NATO issues; the goal of that policy was to get the Euro- peans “out of the nuclear business” (as people said at the time) – that is, to concentrate power, and especially nuclear power, in American hands.81 Acheson, moreover, was not the sort of statesman who viewed consultation and compromise as ends in themselves. At one point during the Berlin crisis in 1961, he complained that the U.S. had been trying too hard to reach agreement with the Europeans. The U.S. government did not need to coordinate policy with the allies, he said, “we need to tell them”.82 “We must not be too delicate”, he said at another point, “about being vigorous in our leadership”. It was America’s job, practically

78. Carl Kaysen oral history interview, July 11, 1966, p. 85, John F. Kennedy Library, Boston. We are grateful to Frank Gavin for providing this reference. 79. See, for example, BRINKLEY, Acheson, pp.174, 202. 80. Acheson to Truman, July 10, 1965, in D. ACHESON, Among Friends: Personal Letters of Dean Acheson, ed. D. McLELLAN and D. ACHESON, Dodd, Mead, New York, 1980, p.273. 81. See M. TRACHTENBERG, Constructed Peace, pp.304-311. Acheson, however, deliberately gave the Europeans a very different impression. Note especially his discussion of the issue in an April 20, 1961, meeting with de Gaulle, and especially his reference to a system which “permettrait à l'Europe de prendre sa décision en matière nucléaire”. Documents diplomatiques français, 1961, vol.1, p.495. 82. White House meeting, October 20, 1961, FRUS 1961-63, 14:518-519. Emphasis in original. 32 Marc Trachtenberg, Christopher Gehrz

America's duty, to lay down the law to the allies. The United States – and he actually used this phrase – was “the greatest imperial power the world has ever seen”.83 “In the ﬁnal analysis” he told McGeorge Bundy, “the United States [is] the locomo- tive at the head of mankind, and the rest of the world is the caboose”.84 American interests were fundamental; European concerns were of purely secondary importance. Paul Nitze, who was very close to Acheson throughout this period, made the point quite explicitly in 1954. The “primary goal”, he said, was the “preservation of the United States and the continuation of a 'salutary' world environment"; the “avoidance of war” was of secondary importance. “Even if war were to destroy the world as we know it today, still the US must win that war deci- sively”. He then again stressed the point that “the preservation of the US” was “the overriding goal, not the fate of our allies”.85 People like Nitze and Acheson were thus not inclined to take European interests too seriously or to deal with the Europeans on a basis of mutual respect. And Ache- son himself was clearly not the kind of person who would have found it difﬁcult to deal roughly with the allies in September 1950.

The Meaning of the Story

The goal here was to test a particular interpretation of what happened in the late summer of 1950. According to that interpretation, the military authorities had essentially forced the package plan on Acheson, who had accepted it reluctantly, and only after a struggle. The basic conclusion here is that that interpretation simply does not stand up in the light of the evidence from late 1950 and in the light of what we know about Acheson in general. The policy the U.S. government pursued at the New York Conference is not to be understood as a more or less accidental by-product of a bureaucratic dispute in Washington. The way Acheson dealt with the allies at the New York conference – the bare-knuckled tactics he pursued, the way he tried to lay down the law to the Europeans, the way he dismissed their most fundamental concerns out of hand – has to be seen as deliberate: he knew what he was doing, and he had not been forced by the Pentagon to proceed in that way. There is certainly no evidence that he thought those tactics were “murderous”: he did not give way on this point after a long battle; he never complained at the time

83. Quoted in F. COSTGIOLA, LBJ, Germany and the 'End of the Cold War', in: W. COHEN and N. TUCKER (eds.), Lyndon Johnson Confronts the World: American Foreign Policy, 1963-1968, Cambridge University Press, New York, 1994, p.195. Acheson was complaining about what he viewed as Johnson's weak response to de Gaulle's decision in 1966 to take France out of the NATO military organization. 84. BRINKLEY, Acheson, p.133. 85. Notes of Council on Foreign Relations Study Group on Nuclear Weapons and U.S. Foreign Policy, November 8, 1954, meeting, p.12, Hanson Baldwin Papers, box 125, folder 23, Yale University Library. Emphasis in original. America, Europe and German Rearmament 33 about the military's (alleged) insistence on this strategy; he never raised the issue with Truman or expressed misgivings about the policy as he was carrying it out. Does this mean that the Acheson interpretation was a complete fabrication? The truth is probably not quite that simple. For Acheson, as for many people in public life, honesty was not the top priority, and he was fully capable of deliberately misleading the public on these issues.86 But that in itself does not mean that the Acheson story about the package plan was manufactured out of whole cloth. Indeed, in a certain sense at least, there was probably some basis to the story. After all, the military authorities were willing to send over the American troops only if the Europe- an allies agreed to provide the balance of the forces needed to make an effective defense possible, and the JCS did believe that German forces would be needed for that purpose. So in that sense, from the military point of view, German rearmament was certainly a vital part of the package. But this was at the level of fundamental objectives, not at the level of tactics, and the basic JCS view was consistent with a relatively soft negotiating strategy: if the State Department (to paraphrase Nitze) had called for emphasizing the U.S. troop commitment and only then gradually “weaving in” the question of a German defense contribution, it is hard to believe that the JCS would have objected. But an agreement on the part of the JCS that all the elements of the problem were interconnected could be interpreted as a call for presenting the allies with a single package: the basic policy could be interpreted as translating directly into a particular negotiating strategy. The basic military point of view, in other words, could serve as cover – that is, as a kind of license for pursuing the sort of negotiating policy State Department ofﬁcials considered essential at this point.87 The fact that the military view could be interpreted (or misinterpreted) in this way – whether deliberately or not is not the issue here – made it easier for Acheson and his advisors to do what they probably really wanted to do in any case. This is all quite speculative, of course, and there is really not enough evidence to get to the bottom of this particular issue. But these uncertainties should not be allowed to obscure the facts that the documents are able to establish. And one thing, at least, is very clear: the State Department did not ﬁght the military over the package plan. If Acheson actually thought the tactics the U.S. government adopted were “murderous”, he certainly had a very odd way of showing it. Why is this story important? Partly because it shows how easy it is for scholars to get taken in by self-serving memoir accounts, and thus how crucial it is to test claims against the archival evidence; partly because of what it tells us about civil-military rela-

86. An account Acheson gave in 1952, implying that the issue emerged only in the course of the New York meeting, was particularly misleading. For the quotation and a discussion pointing out how inaccurate that account was, see McGEEHAN, German Rearmament Question, pp.48-49. 87. This point is suggested by the structure of the discussion of this issue in the Princeton Seminar: after establishing the basic point that the Pentagon had insisted on the package plan and was thus responsible for what happened in September (pp. 911, 915), Acheson and Nitze then felt free to ease up and talk about how the real reason why the German rearmament issue could not have been played down and “kind of weaved in gradually” had to do not with the JCS but rather with what McCloy was doing (p.916). They then went on to say that McCloy, in fact, probably performed a service in forcing people to face the issue then and there (pp.922-925). 34 Marc Trachtenberg, Christopher Gehrz tions in the United States, about the willingness and ability of the military leadership to impose its views on issues of great political importance, and about the validity of the bureaucratic politics theory of policy-making in general; but mainly because of the light it throws on the political meaning of what happened in September 1950. The American government did not just stumble along and adopt a policy against its better judgment because of pressure from the military; the package policy was adopted quite deliberately; and that fact has a certain bearing on how American policy toward Europe during the early Cold War period is to be interpreted. There has been a certain tendency in recent years to idealize U.S.-European relations during the Cold War period. The argument is that the NATO system worked because, no matter how lopsided power relations were, the Americans did not simply insist on running the show. Instinctively the democratic countries dealt with the problems that arose in their relations with each other the same way they dealt with domestic issues: not through coercion, but through persuasion and compromise, “by cutting deals instead of imposing wills”.88 The democratic habit of compromise, of give and take, was the bedrock upon which the Atlantic Alliance was built. The Americans treated their allies with respect, and this, it is said, was one major reason why the Europeans were able to live with a system that rested so heavily on American power.89 The story of how the U.S. government managed the German rearmament issue in late 1950 suggests that things were not quite so simple. The Americans were capable of dealing rather roughly with their European allies, even on issues of absolutely central political importance. If the package plan story tells us nothing else, it certainly tells us that. And the fact that the Americans were capable of treating their allies that way had a certain bearing on how many people, especially in Europe, thought about core political issues. In 1880, after a remarkable electoral campaign, William Gladstone was swept back into ofﬁce as prime minister of Great Britain. Gladstone, in that campaign, had laid out a series of principles on which British foreign policy was to be based; one fundamental aim was “to cultivate to the utmost the concert of Europe”. Five years later, Gladstone's policy lay in ruins. He had managed to alienate every other major power in Europe – even France and Germany had come together in 1884 in a short-lived anti-British entente – and in 1885 his government fell from power. The Gladstone government had achieved its “long desired 'Concert of Europe'” all right, Lord Salisbury noted bitterly at the time. It had succeeded in “uniting the continent of Europe – against England”.90 The parallel with American policy during the early Cold War period is striking. The U.S. government very much wanted the European countries to come together as a political unit, and support for European uniﬁcation was one of the basic tenets of American

88. J. L. GADDIS, We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History, Clarendon, Oxford, 1997, p.201. 89. GADDIS, We Now Know, pp.199-203, 288-289. 90. R.W. SETON-WATSON, Britain in Europe, 1789-1914, Cambridge University Press, Cam- bridge, 1938, p.547; Lady G. CECIL, Life of Robert Marquis of Salisbury, vol.3, Hodder and Stoughton, London, 1931, p.136. America, Europe and German Rearmament 35 foreign policy in this period.91 But it was not American preaching that led the Europe- ans to cooperate with each other and begin to form themselves into a bloc. The United States played an important role in the European integration process, but America had an impact mainly because of the kind of policy she pursued – a policy which, on occasion, did not pay due regard to the most basic interests of the European allies. Acheson's policy in late 1950 is perhaps the most important case in point. Acheson was pressing for a course of action that would have greatly increased the risk of war at a time when Western Europe was particularly vulnerable. The U.S. government could treat its allies like that – it could pursue a policy that might well have led to total disaster for Europe – only because the United States was so much stronger than any single European country. It followed that there had to be a counterweight to American power within the Western alliance, a counterweight based on the sense that the Europeans had major strategic interests in common and that those interests were distinct from those of the United States. The events of late 1950 helped push the Europeans – especially the French and the Germans – to that conclusion: it helped get them to see why they had to put their differences aside and come together as a kind of strategic unit. This episode thus plays an important role in the history of European integration, and indeed in the history of the Western alliance as a whole. Marc Trachtenberg University of Pennsylvania

Christopher Gehrz Yale University

91. See especially G. LUNDESTAD, “Empire” by Integration: The United States and European In- tegration, 1945-1997, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1998, and P. MELANDRI, Les Etats-Unis face à l'unification de l'Europe, 1945-1954, A. Pedone, Paris, 1980. Note also an important series of interpretative articles on the subject by K. SCHWABE: Die Vereinigten Staaten und die eu- ropäische Integration: Alternativen der amerikanischen Außenpolitik, in: G. TRAUSCH (ed.), Die europäische Integration vom Schuman-Plan bis zu den Verträgen von Rom, Nomos, Baden-Baden, 1993; The United States and European Integration, in: C. WURM (ed.), Western Europe and Ger- many: The Beginnings of European Integration, 1945-1969, Berg, Oxford, 1995; and Atlantic Partnership and European Integration: American-European Policies and the German Problem, 1947-1969, in: G. LUNDESTAD (ed.), No End to Alliance: The United States and Western Eu- rope: Past, Present and Future, St. Martin's, New York, 1998. The Challenges of Pluriculturality in Europe

European integration has primarily been driven by rational Schriften des thinking and a functional dynamic. In this process of Zentrum für Europäische Integrationsforschung Center for European Integration Studies uniting Europe politically and economically the question of Susanne Baier-Allen/Ljubomir ¨uc•i´c (eds.) how this unity can be sustained beyond functionalism has The Challenges of gained increasing importance given the cultural diversity Pluriculturality in Europe of an enlarging Europe.

The authors assembled in this volume are addressing this in cooperation with Europe House Zagreb question from the perspective of EU member states, aspiring member countries, and European organisations. The common thread that runs throughout this book is the recognition that the unity of Europe does not lie simply in the further deepening of existing structures, but in the diversity of identities and cultural pluralism.

Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft Baden-Baden Published in the series Schriften des Zentrum für Euro- päische Integrationsforschung (ZEI), this book is a timely Susanne Baier-Allen/ ˇ contribution to the ongoing debate on European identity Ljubomir Cuˇci´c (eds.) The Challenges of and the challenges cultural diversity throws forth. Pluriculturality in Europe in cooperation with Europe House Table of Contents Zagreb Introduction: Pluriculturality – Concepts and Challenges • 2000, 212 Seiten, geb., Pluriculturality and the Challenges for Europe • Pluri- 78,– DM, 569,– öS, 71,– sFr, ISBN 3-7890-6729-6 culturality – Dealing with Diversity • Pluriculturality and (Schriften des Zentrum für Europäische the Danger of Social Pathology • Pluriculturality and its Integrationsforschung (ZEI), Bd. 24) Educational Consequences • Conclusion: Pluriculturality – New Directions

NOMOS Verlagsgesellschaft 76520 Baden-Baden · Fax (07221) 2104-27 http://www.nomos.de

“Un Général qui s’appelle Eisenhower”: Atlantic Crisis and the Origins of the European Economic Community1

Paul M. Pitman

In January 1957 the French government staged a parliamentary debate to build support for its conduct of the negotiations on the common market (or European Economic Community [EEC]). Referring to the Suez Crisis, which had unfolded over the previous months, one speaker who favored the common market sardonic- ally thanked Egyptian Colonel Gamal Abdul Nasser and Soviet Marshal Nikolai Bulganin for helping the West Europeans understand need for unity. In response, a leftist deputy shouted “is there not also a General named Eisenhower” (N’y a-t-il pas aussi un général qui s’appelle Eisenhower)? Indeed, in the winter of 1956-57, many in France felt that tensions with the country’s allies had contributed more than conﬂicts with its enemies to the impetus behind economic integration.2 Already during the summer and fall of 1956, observers of the European scene had noted that dissatisfaction with Atlantic ties had helped revive the European movement. In October, Janet Flanner, Paris correspondent for the New Yorker, had written in her diary that the Europeans appeared to be moving together not only because of the challenge from Egypt but also because of frustration with America: “Secretary Dulles’ … semi-idealistic press remarks that good might even come of the Suez difﬁculties if they stimulated European federation brought a grim smile from French politicians. It is true that lately there has been revived talk on the continent about a united Europe, but the feeling of union unfortunately seems to be founded largely on a common dislike of Mr. Dulles”.3 Then in early November, the spectacular climax of the Suez Crisis, along with the bloody suppression of the Hungarian revolution, highlighted Europe’s weakness in a world dominated by the two superpowers and demonstrated the unreliability of the Brit- ish and the Americans. Publicists and politicians alike argued that one of the main les- sons of Suez was that the European governments should unite their forces in the EEC. But did Suez really tip the balance towards the formation of a six-country customs union instead of alternate designs for the European economic order? For decades, the idea that one of the results of the Suez Crisis was the establishment of the common market has been received wisdom. First expounded in authoritative contemporary analyses, the link between the Suez Crisis and the common market has

1. This article originated as a presentation at the June 1996 meeting of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations in Boulder, Colorado. I thank James Ellison, Douglas Forsyth, Lawrence Kaplan, Lorenza Sebesta, Hubert Zimmermann, and two anonymous reviewers for helpful suggestions. 2. Journal officiel, Assemblée nationale, Débats, 17 January 1957, p.107. 3. J. FLANNER, Paris Journal, 1944-1965, Atheneum, New York, 1965, p.324.

38 Paul M. Pitman become a regular element in general histories of postwar international relations.4 And in the first archive-based account of the negotiation of the EEC treaty, which was based primarily on the papers of the German delegation to the EEC talks as well as oral history interviews, Hanns Jürgen Küsters claims that, by prompting the French government’s realization that geopolitical imperatives required that it drop its long-standing objections to the common market, the Suez Crisis opened the way for the conclusion of the EEC Treaty.5 A more recent contribution by Küsters bald- ly states that “the successful outcome of the EEC negotiations was an historical accident, initiated by Nasser’s Suez crisis in November 1956”.6 In the most fruitful challenge to such views, Alan Milward and his students have argued that Suez hardly mattered for the EEC negotiations. This was not to say that geopolitics was always irrelevant to the evolution of the European economic order. French efforts to contain West Germany’s industrial potential and military revival had shaped earlier integration schemes such as the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and the European Defense Community (EDC).7 But Europe’s security problems had mostly been settled in October 1954, when the Paris Accords sanctioned German rearmament within an Atlantic framework. From this point on, the only re- maining “security” concern relevant to European integration was how to guide West Germany’s industrial exports into channels that would benefit social and economic advance throughout Western Europe. According to Milward and his associates, after the winter of 1954-55 it was not geopolitical factors but the political and economic imperatives of the postwar social settlements that accounted for decisions to pursue economic integration. They have traced the process by which the customs union treaty emerged logically (but not inevitably) from debates on the future of the European economic order that began in the early postwar years and came to focus on a customs union in the early 1950s. Decisions about economic integration did not result from mere historical accidents. Rather, national negotiating positions reflected long-term economic choices made by top elected officials and high-level bureaucrats, who sought export-led growth, technical modernization, full employment, and social

4. See for example A. GROSSER, Suez, Hungary and European Integration, International Organi- zation, 11(1957), pp.470-480; D. REYNOLDS, One World Indivisible: A Global History Since 1945, The Global Century, Paul Kennedy (ed.), Norton, New York, 2000, pp.128-129. 5. See H. J. KÜSTERS, Fondements de la communauté économique europénne, Office des publications officielles des Communautés européennes and Ed. Labor, Brussels, 1990, esp. pp.211-216, 356; this is an updated edition of Küsters’ original study, Die Gründung der Europäischen Wirt- schaftsgemeinschaft, Nomos, Baden-Baden, 1982. In a parallel study on Euratom, Peter Weile- mann also underlined the importance of the Suez Crisis for French policy. See P. WEILEMANN, Die Anfänge der Europäischen Atomgemeinschaft: Zur Gründungsgeschichte von EURATOM. 1955-57, Nomos, Baden-Baden, 1983, p.131. 6. H. J. KÜSTERS, West Germany’s Foreign Policy in Western Europe, 1949-1957: The Art of the Possible, in: C. WURM (ed.) Western Europe and Germany: The Beginnings of European Inte- gration, Berg, Providence, 1995, p.69. 7. See A. S. MILWARD, The Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1945-51, University of California Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1984, ch.12; F. LYNCH, Resolving the Paradox of the Monnet Plan: National and International Planning in French Reconstruction, in: Economic History Review, 2nd ser., 37, no.2 (May 1984), pp.229-243.

Atlantic Crisis and the Origins of the European Economic Community 39 welfare through controlled trade liberalization. More fundamentally, foreign economic policy-making reflected the new postwar determination to pursue economic and social goals that would strengthen political coalitions that included the organized working class, farmers, and the lower middle class.8 As for the supposed influence of the Suez Crisis on French policy, Frances Lynch’s trenchant account shows that Par- is’s crucial decision to endorse the common market came in early September 1956 – at a time when the French were still formulating the plan to seize the Suez Canal with their British and Israeli partners, two months before the humiliations that supposedly swung France’s governing class behind the European cause. Instead of Suez, Lynch points to the British proposal for a Free Trade Area, which strengthened the view in France that the country could not depend on existing arrangements to protect French interests.9 Recent work in political science has likewise tended to de-emphasize geopolitics. Andrew Moravcsik, for example, argues that commercial interest, as articu- lated by major producer groups, was the main factor that drove the integration process in the 1950s; in his analysis, “geopolitical ideology” and “security externalities” were only influential at the margin.10 What role did geopolitical considerations in fact play in the process leading to the establishment of the EEC? This article deals with the question by examining the long-term policy developments that shaped the French and German decisions to establish the common market. Instead of arguing that either economic goals or strategic ambitions were the primary drivers of foreign economic policy in the mid-1950s, it attempts to show how both sets of concerns acted together to shape policy-making in both France and Germany. The first section sets the stage: it analyzes the politics of European trading and monetary arrangements, surveying the forces behind alternative regional designs. The basic point here is that as late as the summer of 1956, the future of the common market plan, and more generally, the form that European integration was likely to take, remained anything but certain. The second section analyzes the role of geopolitical considerations well before Suez. The focus in that section will be on continental responses to Atlantic strategic developments in the mid-1950s, especially on the implications of the nuclearization of Atlantic strategy. The basic point here is that the security issue had by no means been resolved by late 1954: policy-makers in France and Germany began to explore the possibility of a European nuclear force, independent of the United States, very

8. A. S. MILWARD, The European Rescue of the Nation-State, 2d. ed., Routledge, London and New York, 2000; idem, The Springs of Integration, and The Social Bases of Monetary Union?, in: P. GOWAN and P. ANDERSON (ed.), The Question of Europe, Verso, London and New York, 1997, pp.5-20, 149-161; A. S. MILWARD, et al., The Frontier of National Sovereignty: History and Theory, 1945-1992, Routledge, London and New York, 1993. 9. F. LYNCH, Restoring France: The Road to Integration, in: A.S. MILWARD (et al.), The Frontier of National Sovereignty, esp. pp.59-60, 86. For another argument that Suez had little effect on the negotiation of the Rome Treaties, see W. LOTH, Vertragsverhandlungen bei abklingender Europ- abegeisterung: eine zeitgeschichtliche Einordnung, in: Integration, 3(1987), esp. pp.110-111, 113. 10. See A. MORAVCSIK, The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1998, ch.2; cf. H. ZIMMERMANN’S review of The Choice for Europe, in: Journal of European Integration History, 2(1999), pp.142-145.

40 Paul M. Pitman early on. The third section retraces the French and German decisions to establish the common market in the fall and winter of 1956. It argues that the Suez Crisis, which both symbolized and deepened tensions between the continental powers and the “Anglo-Saxons”, triggered the establishment of the common market; but the key decisions were not taken in a vacuum: long-term policy goals played a fundamental role in determining what happened during this crucial phase of the European integration process.

The Politics of European Trade

Until January 1959, when the common market treaty came into effect, Europe’s trade was regulated through intergovernmental cooperative arrangements, the most important of which were sponsored by the Organisation for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC). The OEEC trading system rested on two main pillars, gradual trade “liberalization”, i.e., the removal of quantitative restrictions (but not tariffs) on imports from other OEEC countries, and the more important European Payments Union (EPU), which arranged multilateral settlement of bilateral payments imbalances between the same countries. By making trade with the rest of the world, especially the United States, less attractive, the OEEC countries had constructed a discriminatory trading system that embraced more than half of the free world’s trade, including that of the West European countries, the members of the Sterling Area, and the various elements of the Franc Zone. This framework had nurtured Western Europe’s economic miracle, the trade-driven growth that had low- ered unemployment while accommodating increases in both wages and workplace democracy. But the solidarities and disputes that emerged in this structure would shape the debate over Europe’s economic future.11 Starting in early 1950s, as the European economy emerged from the rearmament boom sparked by the Korean War, discontent with the perceived shortcomings of the OEEC system stimulated discussions of the future of the region’s economic order. While existing structures continued to provide an indispensable framework for the European political economy, many on both sides of the Atlantic saw them as temporary expedients whose continued functioning threatened the realization of their long-term goals. On the continent, the Dutch government put forward plans for a customs union that would give the smaller countries access to the markets in France, Germany and the United Kingdom, which were still shielded by high tariffs. At the same time, the British government began to campaign vigorously for the restoration of currency convertibility, as a way not only to revive Sterling’s prewar

11. For the OEEC background to the process of European integration, see especially R. T. GRIF- FITHS, The European Integration Experience, 1945-58, in: K. MIDDLEMAS (et al.), Orchestrat- ing Europe: the Informal Politics of European Union, 1973-95, Fontana, London, 1995, ch.1; idem, ed., Explorations in OEEC History, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Develop- ment, Paris, 1997.

Atlantic Crisis and the Origins of the European Economic Community 41 role as a reserve currency, in particular for the Commonwealth countries, but also to block the emergence of a customs union on the Continent. In contrast, the French cabinets of this period opposed both regional tariff reductions and convertibility, favoring instead a customs union with the Franc zone buttressed by bilateral commercial agreements with France’s major trading partners, especially West Germany.12 The West European governments faced choices between three contending visions of the future of the region’s economic order: the further consolidation of the European market centered on the six ECSC countries; a liberalized free-world market in which currencies would be freely convertible; or a reconstitution of the French and British colonial economic blocs. As a result of the teleological bias in the academic literature, accounts of these debates have focused almost exclusively on the emergence of the common market and ignored support for Atlantic or imperial alternatives. Although there have been attempts to argue that the Free Trade Area stood some chance of adoption, no study has attempted to weigh political support across Europe for the other main alternatives under discussion. For the purposes of this article, it suffices to note that all three alternatives were taken seriously enough to influence policy in both France and Germany. In the 1950s European policy-makers still paid special attention to signals from Washington. Like its Democratic predecessor, the Eisenhower Administration, which took office in January 1953, stoutly backed the formation of a West Europe- an political and economic bloc capable of anchoring Germany to the West and countering Soviet influence on the continent.13 But the new administration sought to cut military spending and foreign aid in order to protect America’s long-term economic health and civic vitality, which it identified with decentralized government and a competitive market order. The administration also sought to direct a greater share of US aid to the Third World, where Soviet economic initiatives increasingly appeared to threaten Western influence. These considerations, which inspired the famous “New Look” in military strategy, also drove efforts to take a new approach to economic relations with the Allies. But just as the Eisenhower administration would end up maintaining its ground forces in Europe, it would also continue to give European economic unification priority over a world-wide liberal mar-

12. See P. M. PITMAN III, France’s European Choices: The Political Economy of European Integra- tion in the 1950s, Ph.D. diss., Columbia University, New York, 1997, ch.1; W. ASBEEK BRUSSE, Tariffs, Trade and European Integration, 1947-1957: From Study Group to Common Market, St. Martin’s Press, New York, 1997. 13. G. LUNDESTAD, “Empire” by Integration: The United States and European Integration, 1945-1997, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1998, ch.4-5.

42 Paul M. Pitman ket order.14 However, the mixed messages that emerged from the Washington policy process cast serious doubt on America’s willingness to tolerate continued European discrimination against imports from the dollar zone. Ironically, the impact of rumors about political battles in the administration and Congress may have been more signiﬁcant than the United States government’s steadfast policies. In the summer of 1953 Eisenhower sponsored the ﬁrst serious review of foreign economic policy since the debate on the Marshall Plan. Published in early 1954, the report of the bipartisan Commission on Foreign Economic Policy (CFEP) declared that it was time to end the Marshall Plan settlement – which had always been seen as a temporary expedient – under which the Europeans had come to trade more intensively with each other but systematically discriminated against imports from the United States despite receiving substantial economic aid. The CFEP called for a return to something like the Bretton Woods program of multilateral trade and currency convertibility. Logically enough, it also accepted that in order to overcome the world-wide dollar shortage which had blocked progress towards liberalizing international trade and payments, the Ameri- can market should be opened to imports from the rest of the free world economies. Likewise, the government should encourage increased private direct investment instead of continuing to provide foreign aid.15 The Eisenhower Administration endorsed the CFEP’s call for “Trade, not Aid”. But the American government failed to follow through either at home or abroad. The President made considerable efforts to convince Congress to reduce quota and tariff barriers that excluded European products from the American market, but the victorious commander on the European Front in World War II was no match for home-grown protectionism. And despite public endorsements of convertibility, Washington repeatedly put off the magic day when currencies would be exchanged freely.16 Likewise, although much aid was redirected towards developing countries, the Administration continued to provide massive amounts of military and economic assistance to the Europeans – it seemed necessary, inter alia, to push the Germans to rearm quickly and to encourage the French to meet their NATO obligations despite the drain imposed by the war in Algeria.

14. On the Eisenhower Administration’s grand strategy and its domestic rationales, see especially M. TRACHTENBERG, A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement, 1945-1963, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1999, pp.147-156; J. L. GADDIS, Strategies of Contain- ment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1982, ch.5; R. GRIFFITH, Dwight D. Eisenhower and the Corporate Common- wealth, in: American Historical Review, 87(1982), pp.87-122; A. L. FRIEDBERG, In the Shadow of the Garrison State: America’s Anti-Statism and its Cold War Strategy, Princeton Studies in In- ternational History and Politics and Princeton Studies in American Politics: Historical, Internation- al, and Comparative Perspectives, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2000, ch.2-3. 15. F. ROMERO, Interdependence and Integration in American Eyes: From the Marshall Plan to Currency Convertibility, in: A.S. MILWARD (et al.), The Frontier of National Sovereignty, op.cit., pp.155-181; COUNCIL ON FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICY, Report to the President and Congress, United States Government Printing Office, Washington, 1954. 16. See B. I. KAUFMAN, Trade and Aid: Eisenhower’s Foreign Economic Policy, 1953-1961, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1982, ch.2-3; F. ROMERO, Interdependence and Integra- tion …, op.cit., pp.160-165.

Atlantic Crisis and the Origins of the European Economic Community 43

Although its policy came under fire from the Treasury, Congress, and the public, the Eisenhower Administration was clearly willing to live with European trade preferences in the interest of achieving the greater strategic goal of building a second great power mass within the West capable of resisting the Soviet threat. In 1955 and 1956 American diplomacy focused on supporting the proposal for a six-power European Atomic Energy Community (or Euratom), which appeared to offer a way to channel continental nuclear ambitions into a supranational framework. It paid relatively little attention to the common market negotiations, presumably because most observers expected protectionist forces in France to block economic integration. Still, Washington quietly backed the formation of a six-member customs union, hoping it would adopt a liberal external policy. American analysts did note the danger that the common market might form a protectionist trade bloc, especially if French preferences determined its external stance, but many hoped that increased intra-European trade would allow the weaker economies to modern- ize and eventually drop their opposition to freer trade with North America. Certain- ly the common market offered a better way to tie German industry to the West than an OEEC-wide Free Trade Area such as that proposed by the British. For the British scheme would have lead to even greater losses for American exporters without deepening Europe’s political integration. Thus, although American policy-makers often declared their interest in a more liberal world economic system, this had no real effect on Washington’s actual policy towards further economic integration on the Continent. But America’s continued diplomatic support for European unification did not carry as much weight on the Continent as the mixed signals that regularly emerged from Washington policy debates. There is room here for just one example, drawn from the realm of monetary politics. The Americans repeatedly declined to pony up the cash needed to back British plans to make the pound convertible. Such an action would have set off a chain reaction leading to the dissolution of the EPU and thus a cut in credits to France that would force the Fourth Republic to choose between improvements in social welfare, investments in industry and paying for the war in Algeria.17 Although French policy-makers were no doubt relieved each time a convertibility plan was vetoed, they continued to hear rumors of secret negotiations between Brit- ish and American Treasury officials.18 Given that the Americans had frozen aid payments to the French as a punishment for the rejection of the European Defense Community, who could say what they might do in some later fight?19

17. See MILWARD, European Rescue of the Nation-State, op.cit., pp.383-420; P. M. PITMAN, The French Crisis and the Dissolution of the European Payments Union, 1956-58, in: R. T. GRIFFITHS (ed.), Explorations in OEEC History, pp.219-27. 18. Cf. O. Wormser, Note a.s. convertibilité de la livre, 19 January 1953, Ministère des affaires étrangères [MAE], Paris, Direction économique, Service de coopération économique [DECE] 197; idem, Note pour l’Ambassadeur, Secrétaire général, a.s. nouvelles perspectives dans le domaine de la coopération économique et financière internationale, 4 May 1954, DECE 197. 19. On American attempts to apply financial pressure see I. M. WALL, The United States and the Making of Postwar France, 1945-1954, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1991, pp.286-295.

44 Paul M. Pitman

The Eisenhower Administration’s grand strategy called for the establishment of a six-power common market, which would provide the economic underpinnings for a “united Europe as a third great force in the world”.20 In contrast, successive Brit- ish governments stubbornly opposed the consolidation of “Little Europe”, because it would threaten the United Kingdom’s economic and political standing in the world by undermining the City of London’s role as a financial center, weakening the Commonwealth’s already attenuated trading ties with the British Isles, and increasing the danger that France and Germany would become America’s primary political partners, thereby reducing the chances that Washington would continue to aid Britain’s “independent” atomic forces.21 However, as events would show, neither the British nor their allies and clients on the Continent were in a position to stop integration projects backed by Paris and Bonn. And American support and British weakness meant that the only real question was whether the differences between the French and German visions of the New Europe could be overcome. The French government’s policy on economic integration reflected the requirements of its modernization plans, its commitment to the welfare state, and its ambitions for the reconstitution of the empire. Thus the proposal for the ECSC was designed to guarantee the success of the Monnet Plan; the EDC met the needs of the French aircraft and elec- tronics industries; and the Green Pool grew out of the decision to aim for permanent agricultural surpluses. More broadly, the policy-making community in Paris opposed the classical view that trade should lead to further specialization in those products in which each country enjoyed a comparative advantage. Instead, the French sought to negotiate political agreements to fix a favorable structure for key industries before trade controls were lifted. Given that France’s advanced social legislation put the country at a disad- vantage in export markets, French leaders also made the harmonization of regulations on collective bargaining, paid vacations, women’s wages, and social welfare a condition for their acceptance of a new trading system. Moreover, to compensate for the loss of direct political control over its empire, the French sought to reformulate the trade and monetary links between the members of the “Union française” which would then join the European community as a unit. This arrangement promised to increase France’s weight in Europe and, so the argument went, Europe’s role in world politics.22 West German attitudes towards the European economic order balanced liberal ideological preferences against the need to guarantee economic ties with Germany’s main trading partners, France and the Benelux countries. Earlier accounts of the Federal Republic’s policy on the common market emphasized that the country’s trading interests extended well beyond the Six and that industry, represented by

20. Eisenhower quoted in M. TRACHTENBERG, A Constructed Peace, op.cit., p.150. 21. See J.R.V ELLISON, Threatening Europe: Britain and the creation of the European Community, Macmillan and St. Martin’s, London and New York, 2000. 22. This account of French policy follows Frances Lynch’s pathbreaking analysis, supplemented by the results of my own research on military-industrial and imperial projects. See F. LYNCH, France and the International Economy: From Vichy to the Treaty of Rome, Routledge Explorations in Economic History, 5, Routledge, London and New York, 1997; and M. PITMAN, France’s Euro- pean Choices.

Atlantic Crisis and the Origins of the European Economic Community 45

Professor Ludwig Erhard, the Minister of Economics, supported an OEEC-wide Free Trade Area while waiting for the restoration of currency convertibility. How- ever, many business leaders remained skeptical about their prospects in the world market, preferring the security of established trade ties with their closest neigh- bors.23 A striking example of this attitude emerges in the Foreign Ministry’s refuta- tion of an attack on the common market issued by the Economics Ministry: “The Foreign Ministry does not completely share the Economics Ministry’s plan for economic conquest of the world, because such a rash … thrust in free space must eventually reach its limits, whether in an economic downturn or another type of shock. At that point, the only thing that will be left will be whatever has been politically organized, namely the community of the Six (or Seven if Great Britain joins); otherwise Germany’s economic expansion will fall in on itself”.24 The competent German authorities, including the central bank, quietly protected the trading arrangements that had grown up since 1949, and especially the special economic relationship with Germany’s largest trading partner, France.25 Of course, both industry representatives and government officials agreed on opposing French proposals to harmonize wages and benefits, which would eliminate what many saw as key sources of Germany’s export competitiveness. Thus even while supporting the common market scheme, Bonn’s negotiators fought Paris’s specific demands regarding social policy, agricultural imports, and subsidies to France’s imperial dependencies. At the same time, the conflicts within the German policy-making community meant that, when it came time to decide whether to go ahead with the common market, Chancellor Konrad Ade- nauer would be able to impose his own preferences, which by all accounts were colored more by geopolitical thinking than by economic arguments.26 The first year and a half of the common market negotiations demonstrated the conflict between French and German visions for Europe’s economic future. In the fall and winter of 1954, the Dutch had renewed the push for a customs union, in part out of fear of the consequences of the confidential Franco-German trade agreement that accompanied the Paris Accords. In May 1955, once the Federal Republic

23. See T. RHEINISCH, Europäische Integration und industrielles Interesse: Die deutsche Industrie und die Gründung der Europäischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft, in: Beihefte der Vierteljahrschrift für Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte, no.152, Franz Steiner Verlag, Stuttgart, 1999. 24. “Gemeinsamer Markt”, 4 October 1956, 210-225-30-01/1208/56, Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amts [PAAA], Bonn, Büro Staatssekretär 155, vol.2. For further explication of this document, see W. ABELSHAUSER, “Integration à la carte”. The Primacy of Politics and the Economic Integration of Western Europe in the 1950s, in: S. MARTIN (ed.), The Construction of Europe: Essays in Honour of Emile Noël, Kluwer Academic Publications, Dordrecht, 1994, pp.17-18. 25. See the superb study by M. DICKHAUS, Die Bundesbank im westeuropäischen Wiederaufbau. Die internationale Währungspolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 1948 bis 1958, in: Schrift- enreihe der Vierteljahreshefte für Zeitgeschichte, , Oldenbourg, Munich, vol.72(1996). 26. On Bonn’s European policy, see H. J. KÜSTERS, Der Streit um Kompetenzen und Konzeptionen deutscher Europapolitik, 1949-1958, in: W. BÜHRER, L. HERBST, and H. SOWADE (ed.), Vom Marshallplan zur EWG. Die Eingliederung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland in die westliche Welt, Oldenbourg, Munich, 1990, pp.335-370; for Adenauer’s dominant role in West German foreign policy, see G. NIEDHART, Außenpolitik in der Ära Adenauer, in: A. SCHILDT and A. SYWOTTEK (ed.) Modernisierung im Wiederaufbau, Dietz, Bonn, 1993, pp.805-818.

46 Paul M. Pitman had formally joined NATO, the Dutch common market proposal, combined with a French proposal for an atomic energy pool, kicked off a new set of negotiations on six-power integration, the so-called relance européenne. But over the summer, the common market initiative got off to such a rocky start that the Dutch submitted further trade liberalization proposals to both the OEEC and the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs.27 The main sticking point in the common market talks was German opposition to French demands. The French delegation’s only real interest was in Euratom – it did not even receive instructions regarding the customs union until early October, shortly before the negotiations had to be suspended because the Edgar Faure government decided to call new elections.28 The Mollet government, which took power following parliamentary elections in January 1956, supported European integration much more strongly than any cabinet since early 1952 (when the first “Europeanist coalition” in the National Assembly collapsed). Its leading members had impeccable Europeanist credentials, and many scholars have accepted their later claims to have secretly planned to push through the common market treaty from the moment they entered office.29 But during the spring of 1956, Socialist influence in internal debates resulted in a negotiating position that threatened to block the common market negotiations once and for all. France’s new position did not just strengthen earlier calls for the harmonization of labor regulations and social policy, which was only to be expected given the Mollet government’s center-left orientation. The French now made a push for common macroeconomic policies and long-term industrial plans. In effect, the French now sought to use the common market to lock in expansionist Keynesian policies and sectoral planning throughout continental Europe.30 For the government in Bonn, Paris’s new position, which directly challenged the principles of Germany’s soziale Marktwirtschaft, was simply unacceptable. As soon as the French delegation presented its new position in Brussels, the common market

27. On Dutch policy see R. T. GRIFFITHS, The Beyen Plan, and The Common Market, in: R. T. GRIFFITHS (ed.), The Netherlands and the Integration of Europe, 1945-1957, NEHA, Amsterdam, 1990, pp.165-182 and 183-208. 28. See Letter, Pinay to Félix Gaillard, chief of the French Delegation to the Intergovernmental Com- mittee, 12 July 1955, enclosing “Instructions pour la Délégation”, Archives nationales, Paris [AN]: Secrétariat général du comité interministériel pour les questions de coopération économique européenne [SGCI], Box 121.9; O. Wormser, “Note pour le Président [Pinay],” 10 October 1955, MAE: Office Files of Oliver Wormser, Directeur des affaires économiques et financières [DE] 11; L’Instauration d’un marché commun en Europe, in: Le Monde, 13 October 1955. 29. For example, see Moravcsik’s accounts of the Mollet government’s European policy, which depend almost exclusively on evidence from memoirs and interviews. See A. MORAVCSIK, Why the Euro- pean Community Strengthens the State: Domestic Politics and International Cooperation, Harvard University Center for European Studies Working Paper, no. 52, CES, Cambridge, ca. 1994, pp.30-36, and the more cautious version in idem, The Choice for Europe, pp.103-122, 137-150. 30. Curiously enough, although the thrust of the internal French debate appeared in the press, previous accounts have ignored the significance of the resulting negotiating position. Key archival sources include: “Projet de mémorandum du gouvernement français sur l’établissement d’un marché commun (deuxième rédaction)”, A. Savary Papers, Fondation nationale des sciences politiques, Paris, SV 19; Présidence du Conseil, “Résumé des décisions du comité interministériel du lundi, 28 mai 1956”, 28 May 1956, SGCI 121.9.

Atlantic Crisis and the Origins of the European Economic Community 47 negotiations deadlocked. France’s new dirigist design made it less likely than ever that a customs union would come into being. What would have happened if the conﬂict between the French and German plans for the European economy had not been overcome? It is unlikely that the British government would have pursued the Free Trade Area seriously, because London’s main goal was to avoid being shut out from the EEC. Trade could have continued to expand within the OEEC framework, with whatever neo-imperial ex- tensions the French and the British were able to cultivate. And there probably would have been further progress towards convertibility, presumably through “hardening” settlement terms in the EPU. But it seems likely that the German government would have backed emergency credits to France whenever a pinch came, both to safeguard its main trading interests and for more general political reasons.31 In short, without the emergence of a new understanding between the French and German governments, it would have been unlikely that “Little Europe” would have emerged as a deﬁned economic bloc.

The Debate over European Defense

As noted above, recent accounts of the origins of the common market have tended to start with the proposition that the key security issues that had divided the Western nations during the ﬁrst postwar decade were settled when West Germany joined NATO. In fact, intra-alliance arguments remained as lively as ever after May 1955. The Western powers were still divided over defense for one simple reason with many complicated consequences: the nuclearization of NATO strategy. The other problems that had troubled Atlantic relations since the late 1940s, such as burden-sharing, controls over armament levels, or competition over the production of technologically advanced armaments, never simply went away. They persisted, but the implications of the various solutions proposed for them changed, often with dramatic practical results. And all of these problems came to a head at once in the summer and fall of 1956, primarily because of a sharp controversy caused by Anglo-American plans to substitute atomic weapons for troops stationed in Germany. In retrospect, disputes over European defense can be seen as a long struggle to reach a compromise around sensible Atlanticist policies that effectively meshed NATO’s conventional “shield” and its atomic “sword”. But in the mid-1950s, West- ern capitals had just begun to struggle with basic political choices imposed by the spread of atomic weapons, and the conclusions of these debates were anything but foregone. On the continent, it seemed that three distinct strategic options were still open. The ﬁrst option, known as “forward defense”, called for stopping any Soviet attack in Central Europe as far east as possible, preferably along the West German

31. Compare P. PITMAN, The French Crisis and the Dissolution of the European Payments Union, 1956-58. 48 Paul M. Pitman border. While forward defense remained official NATO doctrine, skeptical Europe- ans perceived signs that the United States and the United Kingdom wished to revert to a second option, the “peripheral strategy”, according to which the Western powers would allow Soviet forces to overrun most of the Continent before trying to reconquer whatever was left after a month of armored operations accompanied by nuclear strikes.32 The European allies tended to feel that economic concerns (for the British, the defense of Sterling and Commonwealth economic ties; for the Americans, the need to roll back the garrison state) drove the efforts at strategic revision and conventional retrenchment. In response to the threat that the “maritime powers” would withdraw their ground forces or decouple their deterrent forces from the Central Front, some continental strategists favored a third option: the establishment of a “Eurafrican” bloc, armed with an autonomous nuclear deterrent and able to draw on the depth offered by France’s North African territories.33 The important point to note here is that the broad directions European strategy could pursue in the mid-1950s – forward defense, peripheral strategy, or Eurafrican coalition – roughly corresponded to the three alternate schemes for regional trade and monetary relations that were under consideration in policy circles at the same time. Washington’s commitment to “forward defense” was far from certain in the mid-1950s. As part of its grand strategy, the Eisenhower administration tried to foster the consolidation of a European power base that would allow a reduction in America’s efforts to defend the Old World. But the main policy pursued by the Americans, the deployment of large numbers of tactical nuclear weapons in West- ern Europe along with schemes for “sharing” control of these weapons, ironically made it more difficult to withdraw US troops.34 In the end, despite the attractive- ness of British strategic proposals and the pull of isolationism, the Eisenhower Administration did maintain established force levels in Europe.35 At the same time, as in economic affairs, it may have been not so much official American policy as

32. For the terms “forward defense” and “peripheral strategy,” see M. TRACHTENBERG, History and Strategy, Princeton Studies in International History and Politics, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1991, pp.153-160. 33. On the development of the Eurafrican idea in postwar strategic thought, see C. D’ABZAC-EPEZY and P. VIAL, In Search of a European Consciousness: French Military Elites and the Idea of Europe, 1947-54, in: A. DEIGHTON (ed.), Building Postwar Europe: National Decision-Makers and European Institutions, 1948-63, St. Martin’s Press for St. Antony’s College, London, 1995, pp.1-19. 34. See M. TRACHTENBERG, History and Strategy, op.cit., pp.160-168. 35. The best account of Atlantic strategic affairs in the 1950s is M. TRACHTENBERG, A Constructed Peace, op.cit., ch.4-6. National perspectives appear in J. MELISSEN, The Struggle for Nuclear Part- nership: Britain, the United States and the Making of an Ambiguous Alliance, 1952-1959, Styx Pub- lications, Groningen, 1993; and I. CLARK, Nuclear Diplomacy and the Special Relationship, Clarendon, Oxford, 1994; G. H. SOUTOU, L’Alliance incertaine: les rapports politico-stratégiques franco-allemands, 1954-1996, Fayard, Paris, 1996, ch.2-3; B. THOß, Der Beitritt der Bundesrepub- lik Deutschland zur WEU und NATO im Spannungsfeld von Blockbildung und Entspannung (1954-1956), in: MILITÄRGESCHICHTLICHES FORSCHUNGSAMT (ed.), Die NATO-Option, vol.3 of Anfänge westdeutscher Sicherheitspolitik, 1945-1956, Oldenbourg, Munich, 1993, pp.1-234. Atlantic Crisis and the Origins of the European Economic Community 49 continental fears based on unsubstantiated but plausible rumors about Pentagon priorities that gave the biggest push to Franco-German understanding. The French response to the nuclearization of Atlantic strategy was straightforward. To defend the Metropole, to have a say in Western strategy, France needed to field an independent nuclear force. But to build a deterrent force, the French needed technical, industrial and financial assistance. Given that the British and the Americans refused to help, the French turned to West Germany. In sum, the nuclearization of NATO strategy led the French to spearhead efforts to build a European bomb.36 Although France’s strategists had been grappling with the implications of nuclear weapons for over a decade, it was in August and September 1954 – just before and after the French parliament’s vote to reject the European Defense Community – that the country’s military authorities and political leaders first drew conclusions about the need for continental nuclear cooperation. The ideas that emerged in these months are worth reviewing, for they provided much of the strategic impetus behind Paris’s European policies down to the end of the Fourth Republic, if not beyond. And the development of France’s policy towards cooperation in atomic energy shows that, rather than opposing European integration, military leaders often pointed the way. The debate opened in response to a draft “Possibilities Plan”, put forward by Gen- eral Alfred Gruenther, NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR). The “Possibilities Plan” provided the basis for the Alliance’s new strategic doctrine, which the NATO Council would formally adopt as MC-48 in December 1954.37 In a hard-hitting response to Gruenther’s plan, France’s representative in NATO’s Stand- ing Group, General Jean Valluy, laid down a line that appears to have swayed the country’s political leadership.38 Valluy first pointed out that Gruenther assumed that any war fought in Europe would be decided quickly by a brief but intense atomic exchange. If the Central Front could be held during the crucial early days of a conflict, the West’s overall superiority in strategic weapons would prevail. Thus NATO’s chances for victory depended as never before on blocking Soviet efforts to launch rapid air strikes against tactical nuclear forces in Western Europe. To meet this challenge, Gruenther’s new strategy called for “unconditional and instantaneous” atomic strikes that would destroy Soviet nuclear weapons on the ground. Provided they could be shielded from air strikes, the Central Front’s “covering forces”, armed with tactical atomic weapons, stood a good chance of repelling a Soviet ground assault.

36. On the Fourth Republic’s atomic policy, see M. VAÏSSE, Le choix atomique de la France (1945-1958), in: Vingtième Siècle, no.36 (December 1992), pp.21-30 and D. MONGIN, La Bombe atomique française, 1945-1958, Bruylant and Librarie générale de droit et de jurisprudence, Brus- sels and Paris, 1997), esp. pt.4. An account of Paris’s quest for partners appears in P. PITMAN, France’s European Choices,op.cit., ch.6. 37. On MC-48 see M. TRACHTENBERG, La Formation du système de défense occidentale: Les Etats-Unis, la France, et MC-48, in: M. VAÏSSE, P. MÉLANDRI and F. BOZO (ed.), La France et l’OTAN, Editions complexe, Brussels, 1996, pp.115-27. 38. Letter, Valluy to Guillaume, No. 542/DFGP/TS, “Plan de possibilitées”, 13 August 1954, Papers of P. Mendès France, Institut Pierre Mendès France, Box CED 2. For further material on the “possibilities plan”, see other documents in the same box, including H[ervé] A[lphand], “Note pour le Président [Mendès]”, 14 August 1954. 50 Paul M. Pitman

According to Valluy, the new NATO strategy would cause a major transformation in France’s strategic situation. Forward defense of Western Europe, previously “affirmed somewhat academically”, had not only become a technical necessity, it would soon be a practical possibility. But as a key staging ground for NATO’s atomic attacks, Western Europe would also become a primary target for Soviet nuclear strikes. France’s ground forces would have to prepare for operations in an atomic environment, while France’s future nuclear forces would need to coordinate operations with the United States Strategic Air Command. Whatever the military and budgetary implications, the new strategy’s key difficulty was political. In order to preempt Soviet atomic strikes, it would be necessary to authorize NATO to launch attacks at the earliest possible moment. But the predelegation of authority to initiate atomic strikes, presumably to SACEUR, threatened to leave Europe’s defense in the hands of an American general. For Valluy, the consequences were clear: “The defense of the West, now concentrated around atomic weapons, will depend entirely on America’s will. The only corrective for this subordination would be the constitution by the European nations of an atomic arsenal that would allow them to intervene with their own forces in such a new war and consequently resume a key role in the leadership of the coalition”.39 In sum, NATO’s adoption of a nuclear strategy did not simply mean that France had to adapt its conventional forces and acquire atomic weapons. It also meant that France, in association with its continental allies, needed to build and deploy a Euro- pean deterrent force. During the fall of 1954, the French high command amplified Valluy’s message. For example, in a response to a Foreign Ministry proposal for an armaments pool that would replace the industrial side of the EDC, the top military aide to Defense Minister Emmanuel Temple, General Jacques Faure (one of the leaders of the coterie of military officers who had openly campaigned against the European Army plan), argued that imposing restrictions on the German arms industry would only benefit British and American producers. Instead, within an Atlantic framework and preferably with British participation, France should produce atomic weapons with Germany in “secure” zones such as French North Africa.40 What did France’s military leaders actually have in mind? The political implications of their proposals are clear: a European deterrent force, developed under French control on the basis of German industrial potential, could at once improve Europe’s standing within the Atlantic Alliance and anchor the American nuclear guarantee. But despite their generous Europeanist rhetoric, it is unclear how far the French intended to go in sharing control of the force with the Germans. Perhaps French leaders had not as yet reached any firm conclusions in this fundamental area. During the fall and winter of 1954, the French government cautiously acted on the proposals for a European deterrent put forward by the military. In September,

39. This quotation appears on pp.5-6 in the letter cited above. 40. J. Faure, “Fiche”, ca. 12 September 1954, DE 10. Atlantic Crisis and the Origins of the European Economic Community 51 the Comité de défense nationale, France’s highest authority in military matters, debated the expense of a national deterrent force and the possibility that six-power atomic cooperation might help France pay for atomic weapons.41 In the spring of 1955, the government sought German assistance in constructing an isotopic separation plant to produce the enriched uranium needed for the French bomb program. But the Germans, still waiting to join NATO, choose not to respond to French over- tures at this time. The French then pursued the same goals as part of the Euratom negotiations, the real focus of which was an isotopic separation plant.42 Once again, Paris’s main problem was to overcome opposition within the Bonn government. Although the German Foreign Ministry stood behind the Euratom initiative, the minister responsible for atomic energy, Franz-Josef Strauß did not. Backed by industrial interests, Strauß strongly opposed key elements of the plan such as supranational controls and monopoly ownership of fissile materials, favoring instead direct ties with British and American industry.43 In July 1956 the Euratom talks became even more difficult as a result of the debates in the French Parliament, during which the Mollet government affirmed that Euratom would not interfere with France’s still officially unacknowledged efforts to produce atomic weapons. In Bonn, this raised once again the fear that France’s European policy sought to limit Germany’s military options. Although the Germans had worried about the nuclearization of NATO strategy for some time, the Bonn government did not directly address its political consequences until the summer and fall of 1956.44 In June 1956, German worries were stimulated when the British, determined to reduce the largest drain on the balance of payments by withdrawing troops from Germany, proposed that NATO develop a new Political Directive to endorse a further reliance on nuclear weapons.45 Then in July the New York Times reported plans supposedly under consideration by Admiral Arthur W. Radford, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to reduce conventional forces and withdraw troops from Germany.46

41. This account follows the version of the minutes published by Roger Wybot, one of the principals in the “affaire des fuites”, a scandal sparked by press reports of leaks from the Comité de défense nationale. Facsimile of “Procès-verbal du Comité de défense nationale”, 10 September 1954, in: P. BERNERT, Roger Wybot et la bataille pour la DST, Presses de la Cité, Paris, 1975, annex. 42. P. GUILLEN, La France et la négociation du traité d’Euratom, in: Relations internationales, 44(Winter 1985), pp.391-412. 43. P. FISCHER, Atomenergie und staatliches Interesse: die Anfänge der Atompolitik in der Bun- desrepublik Deutschland. 1949-1955, Internationale Politik und Sicherheit, Bd.30, Nuclear Histo- ry Program, 3, Nomos, Baden-Baden, 1994, pp.201-223, 274-282. 44. For the development of West German policy on atomic energy and nuclear weapons see P. FISCHER, Die Reaktion der Bundesregierung auf die Nuklearisierung der westlichen Verteidigung (1952-1958), in: Mil- itärgeschichtliche Mitteilungen 52(1993), pp.105-132; idem., Atomenergie und staatliches Interesse; A. F. GABLINK, Strategische Planungen in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 1955-1967: Politische Kon- trolle oder militärische Notwendigkeit?, Internationale Politik und Sicherheit, Bd.30, Nuclear History Pro- gram, 5, Nomos, Baden-Baden, 1996; and H.-P. SCHWARZ, Der Staatsmann, vol.2 of Adenauer, Deut- sche Verlags-Anstalt, Stuttgart, 1991; reprint, Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, Munich, 1994. 45. See Record of Dulles-Makins Talks, 29 June 1956, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-57, 4, pp.84-88; Record of Dulles-Makins Talks, 13 July 1956, ibid., 4, pp.89-90; Letter, Eden to Eisenhower, 18 July 1956, ibid., 4, pp.90-92. 46. Radford Terms New Arms Vital to Service Cuts, New York Times, 14 July 1956. 52 Paul M. Pitman

News of the “Radford Plan” had tremendous repercussions in Bonn. Leading German politicians, not least Chancellor Adenauer, expressed fears that the maritime powers might abandon their allies on the continent. The controversy came at a particularly awkward time, just days after the government had defended the need for eighteen months’ military service before a skeptical Bundestag. The so-called Radford Crisis generated huge tensions in the relations between Bonn and Washington. It also provided a political excuse for a thoroughgoing reconsideration of the Federal Republic’s rearmament plans. West Germany’s political leadership acted as if it had suddenly grasped the practical implications of the strategic situation they had accepted by joining NATO. In the cabinet discussion on 20 July 1956 ministers agreed that the Federal Republic should seek to increase its influence in NATO in order to pressure its allies to maintain conventional force levels. Chancellor Adenauer stated that if Western strategy continued to switch over to nuclear weapons the Federal Republic would have to reconsider its 1954 renun- ciation of the production of atomic, bacterial and chemical weapons. And Strauß told the cabinet that “today a nation that does not produce atomic weapons itself is déclassé”.47 Of course, the West German government never openly admitted its interest in atomic weapons. But during the fall of 1956, the dynamic new defense minister, Strauß, oversaw the shift from large conscript forces towards a smaller, more professional military capable of deploying tactical nuclear weapons.48 The tensions between Washington and Bonn provided an opening for those within the French government who sought backing for a “European” deterrent. The French arranged for a high-ranking German representative, General Adolf Heusinger, to present his government’s response to the Radford Plan at a special meeting of NATO’s Standing Group. During the meeting, Heusinger first noted that press cover- age of the Radford Plan weakened public support for NATO and threatened his government’s efforts to raise troops. He then discussed the importance of strong “shield” forces, stressing the danger that NATO might lose a “small” conventional war if the British and Americans withdrew significant forces from Germany. Supporting the French war effort in Algeria, Heusinger also referred to the importance of holding North Africa as NATO’s southern flank. The French member of the Standing Group, General Valluy, strongly backed Heusinger’s criticisms of Anglo-American proposals to depend on atomic forces to defend Europe. He also attacked the United States’ policy of withholding nuclear technology from its continental Allies.49

47. See Gespräche über Rüstungsbeschränkungen in den USA und England, 20 July 1956, in: F. P. KAHLENBERG (ed.), comp. U. HÜLLBÜSCH, Die Kabinettsprotokolle der Bundesregierung, vol.9, 1956, Oldenbourg, Munich, 1998, pp.484-89. The passage cited from Adenauer appears on p.486, that from Strauß on p.487. Compare the further discussion of the same themes, “Rad- ford-Plan”, 26 July 1956, in: Kabinettsprotokolle 1956, pp.501-502. 48. For a fine survey of the Umrüstung crisis, see Ch. GREINER, Die militärische Eingliederung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland in die WEU und die NATO. 1954 bis 1957, in: MILITÄR- GESCHICHTLICHES FORSCHUNGSAMT (ed.), Die NATO-Option, vol.3 of Anfänge westdeutscher Sicherheitspolitik, 1945-1956, Oldenbourg, Munich, 1993, pp.707-786. 49. “Aufzeichnung über die Sitzung der Standing Group am Freitag, den 27.7.56, 10.30 Uhr”, Bundes- archiv Militärarchiv (BAMA), Freiburg, BW 17/37, ff.84-87. Atlantic Crisis and the Origins of the European Economic Community 53

In a subsequent private talk between Valluy and Heusinger, at which a number of other French and German ofﬁcers were present, the fundamental compatibility between French and German views became evident. Valluy stressed that the West European continental powers should unite their forces in order to avoid complete dependence on the Anglo-Saxons. In particular, as the two strongest European powers, France and Germany needed to cooperate to break the Anglo-American nuclear monopoly. Valluy also emphasized the signiﬁcance of North Africa for Europe’s defense – a point that Heusinger had included in his presentation to the Standing Group. In the course of their conversation, the two generals also discov- ered that they shared similar views on a wide range of operational and command problems in NATO.50 France’s support for Germany in NATO debates, along with Valluy’s discreet approach regarding atomic weapons, may have encouraged the Bonn authorities to reconsider the Mollet government’s repeated efforts to revive bilateral cooperation in the production of conventional armaments.51 At any rate, in the summer of 1956, just at the time when the common market talks had reached an impasse over German opposition to French proposals regarding industrial planning, welfare policy and labor relations, French and German strategists were discovering that they shared not only reasonable fears regarding Anglo-American tendencies to revert to a peripheral strategy but also an interest in establishing a Eurafrican defense bloc.

Atlantic Crisis and European Market

The Suez Crisis, which began when the Egyptian government nationalized the Suez Canal in July 1956 and ended with a failed Anglo-French attempt to retake the canal by force, produced intense tensions between the United States and its main European allies. Recent historical studies have provided a detailed picture of the crisis itself, although its effects on international and transnational relations remain

50. Heusinger, “Aufzeichnung über ein Gespräch mit General Valluy von der Standing Group und Mr. Allan Dulles vom CIA”, BW 17/37, ff.93-96. (Note that Heusinger met Valluy and Dulles sepa- rately.) For an account of this exchange that draws on additional classified German sources, see G. von GERSDORFF, Westeuropäische Verteidigungskooperation und atlantische Bündnis- präferenz: Wege westdeutscher Zielsetzungen, 1949-1958, in: Aus der Ohnmacht zur Bündnis- macht: Das Machtproblem in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 1945-1960, F. KNIPPING and K.-J. MÜLLER (ed.), Ferdinand Schöningh, Paderborn, Munich, Vienna and Zürich, 1995, p.227. 51. In April and September the Mollet government put forward memoranda calling for intensive Fran- co-German collaboration in the armaments sector. See Documents diplomatiques français [DDF] 1956, 2, p.394, n.2; “Mémorandum”, 25 September 1956, DDF 1956, 3, pp.201-202. 54 Paul M. Pitman to be explored.52 For the purposes of this essay, it suffices to note that it was not Moscow’s threats of atomic reprisals but Washington’s moves against Sterling that convinced the British government to abandon its French (and Israeli) partners in the middle of an otherwise successful military operation. French and German leaders reacted to Soviet threats, American sabotage, and British withdrawal with bitter anger at Great Britain’s fecklessness and dark speculations regarding the possibility that the two superpowers might find condominium mutually beneficial.53 As Chan- cellor Adenauer reportedly said during his visit to French Premier Guy Mollet at the turning point in the crisis on 6 November, the only way the European powers could play a decisive role in world affairs would be to build Europe. No doubt seeking to play on French resentment towards the English and the Americans, the Chan- cellor added, “Europe will be your revenge”.54 The German statesman’s remarks apparently hit the mark. But what did such geopolitical perspectives have to do with mundane negotiations on European trade? Conclusive documentary evidence shows that the basic decisions on the common market and Euratom were taken in September and October 1956, well before the high point of the Suez Crisis in early November. One could argue, with scholars such as Milward, that geopolitical factors in general, and Suez in particular, did not count for much in these decisions. I submit that a review of the full range of French and German foreign policy-making shows that a number of overlapping disputes over both economic and security issues, several of which came to a head as Paris and Bonn were reformulating their European strategies, provide a better explanation for the new diplomatic alignment that resulted in the negotiation of the common market treaty. Suez triggered sharp political reactions, but these reactions were not the fundamental cause of the political shift in Europe that occurred in the fall of 1956. Poli- cy-makers in Paris and Bonn interpreted the perfidious behavior of the “maritime” powers in light of years of bruising fights over international economic relations, Atlantic strategy and policy towards the Third World. Suez certainly did not change continental views of Atlantic ties; rather it symbolized their complaints about the

52. Unfortunately, most recent studies concentrate almost exclusively on Anglo-American relations. While these are easy to research, they are not the only significant sides of the affair. Representative works include K. KYLE, Suez, Weidenfeld and Nicholson, London, 1992; D. KUNZ, The Eco- nomic Diplomacy of the Suez Crisis, University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 1991; and T. RISSE-KAPPEN, Cooperation Among Democracies: The European Influence on U.S. Foreign Policy, in: Princeton Studies in International History and Politics, Princeton University Press, Prin- ceton, 1995, ch.4. For efforts at broader approaches, see B. MCCAULEY, Hungary and Suez, 1956: The Limits of Soviet and American Power, in: Journal of Contemporary History,16(1981), pp.777-800 and W. (eds.), Das internationale Krisenjahr, 1956: Polen, Ungarn, Suez, in: Beiträge zur Militärgeschichte, 48, Oldenbourg, Munich, 1999). 53. See “Procès-verbal des entretiens franco-allemands [6 November 1956]”, DDF 1956, 3, pp.234-237. 54. Ch. PINEAU, 1956, Suez, Robert Laffont, Paris, 1976, p.91. Compare the account of this meeting in W. G. GREWE, Rückblenden, 1976-1951, Propyläen, Frankfurt am Main, Berlin, Vienna, 1979, pp.283-290. Atlantic Crisis and the Origins of the European Economic Community 55

“Anglo-Saxons” and strengthened their existing determination to lessen the continent’s strategic and economic dependence on the United States. British and Ameri- can stalling over Suez no doubt played some role, but other developments such as the transnational repercussions of the war in Algeria, rumors about convertibility, the Free Trade Area proposal, and the controversy about revising NATO strategy clearly weighed more heavily in France’s acceptance of a liberal customs union and Germany’s support for the “European” bomb program.55 This is not the place for a full account of the domestic and international bargains that resulted in the formation of the European Communities.56 But a brief overview of the shifts in French and German policy towards Europe in the late summer and early fall of 1956 can illustrate how the crisis in Atlantic relations cleared the way for the consolidation of Little Europe. The Mollet Government was run by “good Europeans”, but they failed to pursue their designs for the regional economic order until early September 1956, when they quietly accepted the principle of liberal trade integration and dropped their earlier demands regarding industrial planning and demand management. In subsequent interministerial negotiations, the French elaborated further demands regarding subsidies for imperial development, agriculture, and safeguard clauses designed to make the treaty acceptable to producer groups and parliament.57 France’s negotiating partners sometimes interpreted these new demands as fresh evidence that Paris might never be ready to accept the common market. But in France, a page had been turned. What accounts for the French decision to reverse course on Europe at this particular time? Although many factors may be adduced, the decisive cause was the realignment in domestic politics that resulted from the war in Algeria.58 The Social- ist-led government’s vigorous prosecution of the war destroyed the center-left alignment that had emerged from the January 1956 elections and led to the reconstitution of the “Europeanist coalition” in parliament, which included the main center and right parties.59 The Mollet government’s intransigent stand in Algeria also fed into ongoing conﬂicts in NATO over policy towards the Third World and brought new tensions with Washington.60 Ironically, what critics termed “Nation-

55. See W. HEINEMANN, 1956 als das Krisenjahr der NATO, in: W. HEINEMANN and N. WIGGERSHAUS, op.cit., pp.615-637. 56. Further detail appears in P. PITMAN, France’s European Choices, op.cit., ch.8. 57. This process is well-documented in SGCI 122.21. 58. For more detail, see P.PITMAN, France’s European Choices, op.cit., pp.304-320; compare the late R. GIRAULT’S stimulating essay, La France entre l’Europe et l’Afrique, in: E. SERRA (ed.), Il Rilancio dell’Europa e i trattati di Roma, Nomos, Baden-Baden, 1989, pp.351-378. 59. For these political developments, see J. CHAPSAL, La Vie politique en France, ch.15; J.-P. RIOUX, L’Expansion et l’impuissance, 1952-58, vol.2 of La France de la Quatrième République, rev. ed., Ed. du Seuil, Paris, 1983, pp.117-127; G. ELGEY, La République des tourmentes, 1954-1959, in: Histoire de la IVe République, pt.3 , Fayard, Paris, 1992, pp.407-456. 60. See W. HEINEMANN, 1956 als das Krisenjahr …, op.cit., p.616 and, more generally, M. CONNELLY, Taking Off the Cold War Lens: Visions of North-South Conflict during the Algerian War for Independence, in: American Historical Review, 105(2000), pp.739-769. 56 Paul M. Pitman al-molletisme”, the socialist government’s play for nationalist support, opened the way for economic liberals such as Foreign Minister Christian Pineau and economist Robert Marjolin, acting in accord with organized business and the farming lobby, to seize the initiative on the common market. The Mollet government’s decision to put the empire and Europe ahead of socialism coincided with a renewed push for military cooperation with West Germany, which won additional support from the conservatives, including Gaullists such as Defense Minister Maurice Bourgès-Maunoury who had earlier sponsored the Euratom proposal.61 As always, for the pro-European government in Paris the key question was how to line up support from Bonn. After putting forward his government’s new line in Brussels, European Affairs Minister Maurice Faure travelled to Berlin and Bonn to present his case to German ministers. In talks with German Foreign Minister Heinrich von Brentano, Faure linked progress in European integration to Franco-German armaments collaboration. He apparently surprised von Brentano by suggesting that Euratom might also be extended to military uses of atomic energy. Faure also noted that the French would not oppose German acquisition of tactical nuclear weapons.62 In short, Faure was suggesting that cooperation with France would help, rather than hinder, German efforts to acquire atomic weapons. Meanwhile, in the run-up to the Suez operation, Mollet apparently attempted to reinforce ties with London before settling on rapprochement with Bonn. In a meeting with British Prime Minister Anthony Eden, the French Premier proposed reviving Jean Monnet’s June 1940 proposal to merge the British Commonwealth and the French Union.63 But during a visit to Bonn at the end of September, he agreed with Adenauer about the need for European uniﬁcation and cited the danger that the An- glo-Saxons would return to the “peripheral strategy”. Mollet argued for Fran- co-German cooperation both in completing the negotiations on the EEC and Euratom, the success of which would encourage British participation in European affairs, and in reviving armaments cooperation. Based on this exchange, it appears that France’s policy-makers, long aware of London’s lack of support for French policies in Europe and now frustrated by London’s dithering preparations for the Suez invasion, had decided to bet on the Franco-German axis. Adenauer closed the conversation by noting that his government would weigh France’s proposals re-

61. Although Bourgès pursued a career as a Radical party politician, he maintained significant links with the Gaullists. See P. MARCUS, Maurice Bourgès-Maunoury: un républicain indivisible, Doctoral thesis, Ecole pratique des hautes études, 1992; Année politique, 1956, Presses universi- taires de France, Paris, 1957, pp.69, and 71. 62. Earlier accounts of these talks have followed the published French records, which censor Faure’s key comments on atomic weapons. See “Conversation entre M. Maurice Faure et M. Erhard à Ber- lin, le 16 septembre 1956”, DDF 1956, 2, pp.384-387; T, Bonn to Paris, 17 September 1956, DDF 1956, 2, pp.387-388; “Conversation entre MM. Maurice Faure, von Brentano et Hallstein, lundi 17 septembre, à 16 heures”, DDF 1956, 2, pp.392-394; “Conversation entre MM. Faure, le chancelier Adenauer et Hallstein, lundi 17 septembre, à 17 h. 15”, DDF 1956, 2, pp.395-396; Bouverat, “Aufzeichnung [on Faure-von Brentano-Hallstein talks, 17 September 1956]”, 19 September 1956, PAAA: Abt. 2, bd.922. 63. See the extensive documentation in Public Record Office, Kew: PREM 11/1352. Atlantic Crisis and the Origins of the European Economic Community 57 garding military cooperation in deciding on the directives for its representatives to the talks on Euratom and the common market.64 Paris’s campaign for German support soon paid off. Chancellor Adenauer followed the EEC and Euratom negotiations closely, staunchly supporting “Little Europe” against those such as Economics Minister Ludwig Erhard who argued that Germany should pursue a new economic Weltpolitik.65 In public, the Chancellor continued to stress the need for full British participation in European affairs,66 but in government deliberations on the EEC and Euratom he strongly backed entente with France. Even scholars who argue that the common market was established primarily as an extension of domestic economic policy or in the pursuit of commercial advantage have acknowledged that the German stance on Europe reﬂected geopolitical considerations.67 But they have not noted that the West German discussions of the EEC and Euratom really turned on two issues: Europe’s place in the Atlantic Alliance and questions of nuclear strategy. First, the Europeans needed to unite in order to maintain support from the Americans and attract participation from the British. Thus Adenauer argued in early October that if the Europeans did not conclude the EEC and Euratom treaties quickly, American isolationism might gain the upper hand; when an economic downturn came, Washington might decide it could no longer bear the burden of European defense.68 Second, Europe rather than NATO might be the best way for Germany to regain the right to produce atomic weapons. As the Chancellor put it to a cabinet meeting on 19 December 1956,

64. Telegram, Paris to Représentants diplomatiques de la France à l’étranger, 2 October 1956, DDF 1956, 2, pp.493-496; Carstens, “Kurzprotokoll über die Besprechungen zwischen dem Herrn Bun- deskanzler, dem Herrn Bundesminister des Auswärtigen und dem Herrn Staatssekretär des Aus- wärtigen Amtes und dem Herrn französischen Aussenminister und Staatssekretär Faure am 29. September 1956”, 1 October 1956, PAAA: Abt.2, bd.VS-3666. I wish to take this occasion to thank the archivists who helped process my request to declassify this document. 65. In addition to D. KOERFER’S classic account of the Adenauer-Erhard feud, Kampf ums Kanzler- amt: Erhard und Adenauer, Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, Stuttgart, 1988, see H. J. KÜSTERS, Ade- nauers Europapolitik in der Gründungsphase der europäischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft, in: Vier- teljahreshefte für Zeitgeschichte, 42(1994), pp.646-673 and U. ENDERS, Integration oder Kooperation? Ludwig Erhard und Frantz Etzel im Streit über die Politik der europäischen Zusam- menarbeit, 1954-1956, in: Vierteljahreshefte für Zeitgeschichte, 45(1997), pp.143-171; B. THOß, Die Doppelkrise von Suez und Budapest in ihren Auswirkungen auf Adenauers Sicherheits- und Europapolitik. 1956/57, in: Das internationale Krisenjahr, 1956, op.cit., pp.573-588. 66. Cf. Adenauer’s 25 September 1956 speech to the Grandes conférences catholiques in Brussels, in: H.-P. SCHWARZ, (ed.), Konrad Adenauer. Reden, 1917-1967: Eine Auswahl, Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, Stuttgart, 1975, pp.327-332. 67. See, e.g., A. S. MILWARD, European Rescue of the Nation-State, op.cit., p.201; F. LYNCH, Restoring France, op.cit., p.84; A. MORAVCSIK, Choice for Europe, op.cit., pp.90-95, 136. 68. “Weiterentwicklung Europas”, 3 October 1956, Kabinettsprotokolle 1956, p.610. Adenauer’s argument responded to the same press conference that Janet Flanner had commented on in her diary (see note 3 above). See also Adenauer’s 19 December 1956 comments on British and American disengagement from NATO, “Tagung des Atlantikrates in Paris”, 19 December 1956, Kabinetts- protokolle 1956, p.776. 58 Paul M. Pitman

“Europe will have a longer life than NATO. It is now necessary to push ahead with the unification of Europe and to produce atomic weapons in the Federal Republic”.69 The basic message was clear: the weakness of transatlantic ties required the inten- sification of European economic and military cooperation. The strategic issues and the economic issues were thus very tightly bound up with each other. The showdown over Bonn’s European policy came on 5 October 1956. Adenauer imposed acceptance of a negotiating position that took account of the main French demands, overriding opposition from Economics Minister Erhard and Atomic Energy Minister Siegfried Balke. In one of his many efforts to block the common market, Erhard suggested that the six-power talks should be postponed pending further consultations with the British regarding the Free Trade Area. The Chancellor, seconded by the representative of the Foreign Ministry, opposed any delay on the grounds that the British were only interested in the Free Trade Area because of the danger that they would be excluded from the common market. Led by the Chancellor, the cabinet rejected Erhard’s objections one after the other. When the discussion turned to Euratom, Balke argued that the atomic energy community would represent more of a sacrifice than an advantage for the Germans. Ade- nauer’s response, as recorded in the cabinet minutes, was unequivocal: “[The Chancellor] wanted to use Euratom as the quickest way to gain the option to produce nuclear weapons”. This was just the sort of possibility that the French had been hinting at since the summer. Adenauer further argued that Euratom would be worthwhile even though Ger- many would not be able to catch up with the French lead in research for some time.70 Despite decisions by the French and Germans to favor six-power integration, the negotiations on the EEC and Euratom continued to face difficulties. Indeed, the October Paris Foreign Ministers conference reached an impasse because the French and German representatives were unable to reach a workable compromise on harmonization of social policies and ownership of fissile materials. Mollet and Adenauer overcame this deadlock during a meeting held in Paris on 6 November, at the high point of the Suez Crisis. The French dropped their demand that regulations on overtime pay be harmonized in exchange for the right to invoke safeguard clauses on behalf of industries harmed by competition from countries with longer work weeks. And the Germans finally accepted the idea that Euratom would enjoy a monopoly over fissile materials unless the community was unable to provide

69. Adenauer cited in Ch. GREINER, Die Bundesrepublik Deutschland als “Machtfaktor” in der NATO, 1954-57, in: Aus der Ohnmacht zur Bündnismacht, op.cit., p.210. Note that a more recently published version of the 19 December 1956 cabinet minutes replaces the reference to producing atomic weapons with an euphemism. See “Tagung des Atlantikrates in Paris”, 19 December 1956, Kabinettsprotokolle 1956, p.775. 70. “Gemeinsamer Markt und Euratom”, 5 October 1956, Kabinettsprotokolle 1956, pp.620-629. The quote from Adenauer appears on page 626. Further details on the cabinet debate appear in “Ergeb- nisprotokoll über die Ressortsbesprechung im Auswärtigen Amt am 6. Oktober über die Probleme des Gemeinsamen Marktes und Euratom”, Bundesarchiv [BA], Koblenz, B 138/722. Atlantic Crisis and the Origins of the European Economic Community 59 sufﬁcient supplies, in which case member states would be authorized to make purchases from third parties.71 Negotiating over the heads of their European partners, the two governments formulated a compromise settlement on the main outstanding issues, a settlement that found its way almost unchanged into the Treaties of Rome. At the same moment, the Germans also agreed to French proposals regarding closer cooperation in weapons development, under WEU auspices if possible, on a bilateral basis if necessary.72

Conclusions

The Suez Crisis did matter for the negotiations leading to the establishment of the European Communities, but only as a trigger, not as a fundamental cause. The special circumstances of the Suez Crisis spurred the decision by the leaders of France and Germany to cooperate in establishing European structures that would form an autonomous zone of economic policy and strengthen the continent’s influence in Atlantic Affairs. Suez also pushed public and parliamentary opinion in both Paris and Bonn towards European integration as an alternative to Atlantic cooperation, making it possible to strike a deal with little worry about the domestic repudiation that had proven fatal for the EDC. But the package deal agreed by the French and Germans in November 1956 – a liberal customs union flanked by sectoral agreements for agriculture, imperial development and, last but not least, strategic industries – represented a compromise between long-term French and German policy goals. The reorganization of the European economic order was thus the result not just of a single incident, no matter how dramatic, but of persistent tensions within the Atlantic system acting upon domestic economic policy processes. Continental perspectives on European integration reflected the experience of years of disputes with the “Anglo-Saxon” powers within NATO. Fundamental questions regarding the durability of Atlantic economic ties and the reliability of extended deterrence pushed the French and German governments towards a new strategic and economic partnership well before Colonel Nasser announced the nationalization of the Suez Canal. As part of its grand strategy, Washington consistently supported the unification of Europe, but it was not that policy that brought the Europeans together. If the Americans played a role in the integration process, they did so by pursuing other national goals in ways that led to the feeling that, as Chancellor Adenauer put it in November 1956, Europe needed to “unite against America”.73

71. Adenauer and Mollet approved a package deal on the EEC and Euratom that had been hammered out by Robert Marjolin and Karl Carstens. The secondary literature contains several versions of what the deal supposedly included; for the actual text of the agreement, see Enclosure to Letter, Adenauer to Balke, 7 November 1956, BA: B 138/723. 72. Ariane Illig, “Aufzeichnung”, 9 November 1956, PAAA: Büro Staatssekretär, Bd.278; [Jean François-Poncet], “Note à l’attention de M. Jurgensen”, 20 November 1956, MAE: Europe, Généralités, 1945-60, dossier 185. 73. See “Procès-verbal des entretiens franco-allemands [6 November 1956]”, DDF 1956, 3, p.235. OSCE Yearbook 1999

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61 Hegemony or Vulnerability? Giscard, Ball, and the 1962 Gold Standstill Proposal

Francis J. Gavin, Erin Mahan

What was the character of America’s international monetary relations with Europe during the early 1960’s, and how were they related to the larger power political questions of the day? There is a standard interpretation of this question. During this pre-Vietnam war period, the argument runs, the United States strove to maintain hegemonic power vis-à-vis Western Europe “based on the role of the dollar in the international monetary system and on the extension of its nuclear deterrent to include its allies”.1 Since this economic dominance resulted from the structure and rules of the Bretton Woods monetary system, the Americans had no interest in reforming arrangements that were “a prerequisite for continued American global hegemony”.2 “Because it was interested in preserving the privileges it derived from the operation of the Bretton Woods regime”, the United States would not “condone a structural reform” of the system that threatened “the continued preeminence of the dollar”.3 And while most of “America’s allies acquiesced in a hegemonic system that accorded the United States special privileges to act abroad unilaterally to promote U.S. interests”, the French did not.4 The Fifth Republic government, led by Charles de Gaulle, deeply resented the privileges they believed the system con- ferred upon the American dollar and actively exploited America’s balance of payments position in an attempt to force the United States to abandon the Bretton Woods system. The United States, the conventional wisdom holds, was able to

1. R. GILPIN, The Political Economy of International Monetary Relations, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1987, p.134. 2. D. KUNZ, Butter and Guns: America’s Cold War Economic Diplomacy, The Free Press, New York, 1997, p.99. For similar interpretations, see W. BORDEN, Defending Hegemony: American Foreign Economic Policy, in: T. PATERSON (ed.), Kennedy’s Quest for Victory: American For- eign Policy, 1961-1963, Oxford University Press, New York, 1989, pp.83-85; D. CALLEO, The Imperious Economy, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1982, p.23; D. CALLEO, Beyond American Hegemony: The Future of the Western Alliance, Basic Books, New York,1987, p.13, 44-52; F. COSTIGLIOLA, The Pursuit of Atlantic Community: Nuclear Arms, Dollars, and Berlin, in: PATERSON (ed.), pp.24-56; P. KENNEDY, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000, Random House, New York, 1987, p.434. For interpretations that see Kennedy’s monetary policy as a conservative approach designed to maintain the privileged place the dollar held in the postwar “capitalist world-system”, see Bor- den, p.57-62, 84; D. CALLEO and B. ROWLAND, America and the World Political Economy: Atlantic Dreams and National Realities, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1973, pp.88-89; J. ODELL, U.S. International Monetary Policy: Markets, Power, and Ideas as a Source of Change, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1982, p.88; S. STRANGE, International Monetary Rela- tions, Oxford University Press, London, 1976, p.82, 207. 3. J. GOWA, Closing the Gold Window: Domestic Politics and the End of Bretton Woods, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1983, p.52. 4. B. COHEN, Organizing the World’s Money: The Political Economy of Dominance and Depend- ence, Basic Books, New York, 1977, p.97.

62 Francis J. Gavin, Erin Mahan thwart this French effort, until the American deficit ballooned in the late 1960’s and early 1970’s as a result of massive “guns and butter” inflation.5 The real story is rather different. American policymakers had no great love for the Bretton Woods system. It was associated in their minds not with American hegemony, but with American vulnerability. The United States was running a payments deficit; the Europeans were in effect financing that deficit and were thus enabling the Americans to live beyond their means. But the Americans did not view this as a source of strength: the growing European dollar balances, which, under the rules of the system, could be cashed in for gold at any time, were a kind of sword of Damocles hanging over their heads. The U.S. government felt vulnerable and it did not like it. Kennedy feared that if the system was not reformed, then the Europeans might come to the conclusion that “my God, this is the time … if everyone wants gold we’re all going to be ruined because there is not enough gold to go around”.6 The most surprising fact to emerge from French and American documents is that for a brief period in 1962, the French appeared willing to help the United States out of its monetary difficulties. Instead of hostility towards the dollar, Minis- ter of Finance Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, was, for a time, cooperative. Inspired by Giscard’s hints of support, Under-secretary of State George Ball and key members of the Council of Economic Advisors (CEA) crafted a monetary plan that would have essentially ended Bretton Woods while providing the Americans with time and protection to end their balance of payments deficits. The key provision of this plan was a gold standstill agreement, whereby the European surplus countries would agree to hold US deficit dollars and formally limit their gold purchases from the American Treasury. In return, the United States would move aggressively to end its balance of payments deficit. At the end of the agreement (likely to be two years), a new international monetary arrangement would be negotiated with the Europeans. Surprisingly, many within the Kennedy administration were willing to sacrifice the central role of the dollar and its “seigneuriage” privileges in any new system, a position that would have had much appeal for the Europeans. While elements of the administration were enthusiastic about Giscard’s hints and Ball’s plan, the more financially orthodox members from the Department of

5. It is quite true that by 1965, de Gaulle claimed the system allowed for “l’hégémonie américaine”. See Press Conference, February 4, 1965, from Charles DE GAULLE, Discours et messages, vol. 4, Pour l’effort, Août 1962-Décembre 1965, Omnibus/Plon, Paris, 1993; see also R. ARON, La République Impériale, Calmann Levy, Paris, 1973; G.H. SOUTOU, L’alliance incertaine: Les rapports politico-stratégiques franco-allemands, 1954-1996, Fayard, Paris, 1996, p.287. But the key point that this article makes is that the views of 1965 were not the basis for French policy in 1962, which is implied in J. LACOUTURE, De Gaulle: The Ruler, 1945-1970, W.W. Norton, New York, 1992, p.380-82. Most French scholarly interpretations about de Gaulle’s criticisms against the dollar begin with the mid-1960s. For a significant but brief exception, see H. BOURGUINAT, Le général de Gaulle et la réforme du système monétaire international: la contestation manquée de l’hégémonie du dollar, in: De Gaulle en son siècle, vol. 3, Paris, 1992, pp.110-118. 6. Discussion between President John F. Kennedy, William McChesney Martin, Chairman of the Federal Reserve and Theodore Sorensen – August 16, 1962, 5:50-6:32 p.m., tape 13, President’s Office Files, John F. Kennedy Presidential Library, Boston MA.

Hegemony or Vulnerability? 63

Treasury and the Federal Reserve vehemently opposed the arrangement. Given the poor state of Franco-American political relations in the summer of 1962, the Presi- dent was himself unsure of French motives, and in the end formal negotiations never began. Was Giscard’s offer a missed opportunity? U.S. officials at the time were perplexed and scholars since then have neglected it entirely. The analysis here will be broken down into three parts. The first section will provide a brief overview of the monetary problems that plagued the Kennedy administration and the efforts in 1961 and the first half of 1962 to solve them. It will also explore the motivations for France’s international monetary policy in the early 1960’s. The second section will deal with Giscard’s visit to the United States in July 1962. The final section will explore the furious debate within the Kennedy administration over the French finance minister’s seemingly cooperative statements during his visit, and investigate why nothing came of Giscard’s apparent willingness to help ease the dollar and gold outflow problem.

American and French Monetary Policy

Most historians and political scientists identify Richard Nixon as “the destroyer of Bretton Woods”.7 In reality, however, the Bretton Woods system was inherently unstable and began experiencing potentially fatal difficulties as early as the late 1950’s. Economists now recognize that the system lacked an effective mechanism to adjust and settle the inevitable payments imbalances caused by shifting real currency values arising from differential national monetary policies and savings rates.8 Post- war policymakers eschewed the two most effective means of adjustment –“flexible” exchange rates and a pure gold standard - on principle. Mindful of the competitive devaluations during the 1930’s, they believed that flexible exchange rates - where the relative value of currencies is determined by purchases and sales in an open market - were erratic, allowed destabilizing capital flows, and gave far too much control over the economy to bankers and speculators.9 A pure gold standard, which required states with a payments deficit to transfer gold, was seen as no better. In a country that lost gold, the domestic monetary base would be decreased and aggregate domestic

7. KUNZ, Butter and Guns, p.192. 8. Excellent discussions of these questions can be found in R. COOPER, The International Monetary System: Essays in World Economics, MA: The MIT Press, Cambridge, 1987, and P. de GRAUWE, International Money: Post-War Trends and Theories, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1989. 9. P. VOLCKER and T. GYOHTEN, Changing Fortunes: The World’s Money and the Threat to American Leadership, Random House, New York, 1992, p.7-8.

64 Francis J. Gavin, Erin Mahan demand would shrink. Imports would fall, exports would rise, and the payments would balance. But the cost was deflation.10 In an era where full employment and robust social spending were promised, it was politically inconceivable that national governments would accept a process that depressed national income and led to unemployment in order to balance international payments.11 At the time, however, American and European policymakers were less concerned with the flaws of the Bretton Woods adjustment mechanism per se and instead focused on the growing outflow of dollars and gold from the United States as the biggest problem in the system. A whole series of factors – including the move to current account convertibility by the Europeans and the foreign exchange cost of America’s NATO commitments – had dangerously enlarged the American balance of payments deficit in 1959 and 1960. Many observers worried that the large deficit could lead to a crisis of confidence in the dollar and spark a mass conversion into gold, rendering the dollar unusable as a reserve currency and in the process destroying a large portion of the world’s liquidity. This problem had come to be known as the “Triffin Dilemma”, after the Yale economist Robert Triffin published a book highlighting the confidence problem in his 1960 book, Gold and the Dollar Crisis.12 Fearing the potential dangers, political and economic, of a ballooning deficit and gold outflow, the new Kennedy administration pursued an aggressive strategy to correct the problem.13 Political allies, particularly the Federal Republic of Ger- many, were pressured to spend surplus dollars purchasing military equipment made in the United States. Trade liberalization became a key element of the administration’s foreign policy. The federal budget was scrutinized for ways to reduce U.S. government expenditures abroad. Most importantly, the Undersecretary of the Treasury for International Monetary Affairs, Robert Roosa, negotiated a whole series of “ad hoc” arrangements to defend the dollar and limit the flow of gold from the US Treasury. Currency swap arrangements and standby borrowing arrange-

10. See B. EICHENGREEN, Globalizing Capital: A History of the International Monetary System, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1996, pp.7-44. In practice, gold inflows and outflows were often “sterilized” under the gold standard, which just meant that gold was added or subtracted from the national treasuries without changing the domestic monetary base. But even with some sterili- zation, the gold standard was nowhere near as stable as was once thought. See G. GALLAROTTI, The Anatomy of an International Monetary Regime, Oxford University Press, New York, 1995. For the economic and political volatility of the “gold standard” during the late 19th and early 20th century, and the American propensity to “sterilize” gold flows, see M. FRIEDMAN and A. SCHWARTZ, A Monetary History of the United States, 1867-1960, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1963, pp.89-188; see also M. FRIEDMAN, Money Mischief: Episodes in Monetary His- tory, Harcourt Brace, New York, 1994, especially the essays The Crime of 1873 and William Jen- nings Bryan and the Cyanide Process. 11. See especially D.E. MOGGRIDGE, Keynes: An Economist’s Biography, Routledge, London, 1992. 12. R. TRIFFIN, Gold and the Dollar Crisis: The Future of Convertibility, CT: Yale University Press, New Haven, 1960. 13. See T. SORENSEN, Kennedy, Harper and Row, New York, 1965, p.406. See also J.K. Galbraith’s letter to the President from October 1960, in his Letters to Kennedy, Harvard University Press, Har- vard, 1998, pp.29-31.

Hegemony or Vulnerability? 65 ments were implemented that allowed deficit countries to stave off attacks on their currencies.14 The most important currency arrangement was the gold pool, a consortium of industrial nations who intervened in the London gold markets whenever the price of the dollar seemed threatened. Roosa’s efforts were quite successful in limiting the amount of gold purchased by central bankers holding US dollars. But the administration’s efforts to reduce the overall payments deficit were far less successful, which was a source of great frustration to President Kennedy, as this exposed the Achilles heel of America’s international monetary policy. If the surplus countries of Europe – namely France and West Germany – cooperated with the United States by limiting their gold purchases, then the dollar could be protected. But if this cooperation collapsed for either political or economic reasons, then the countries holding surplus dollars would have enormous leverage over the Uni- ted States. “I know everyone thinks I worry about this too much” he told advisor Ted Sorensen. But the balance of payments was like “a club that de Gaulle and all the others hang over my head”. In a crisis, Kennedy complained, they could cash in all their dollars, and then “where are we”?15 This meant that France’s attitude on international monetary issues was critical. As with all questions of French policy, the first place to look was the attitude of the President, Charles de Gaulle. In the late 1950s and early 1960s, de Gaulle merely posed the overall framework for French economic policy. He realized that military power required economic strength. During this period, when the United States began experiencing balance-of-payment difficulties, France was enjoying an economic miracle of financial stability, industrial progress, and an annual growth rate of four and a half percent. The Fourth Republic had already done the groundwork for the upward surge in the economy when de Gaulle came to power, but prosperity had often been marred by monetary crises.16 In December 1958, de Gaulle appointed a group of economic experts under Jacques Rueff, magistrate for the European Coal and Steel Community and a previous minister of finance, who drew up the plans that put the French economic house in order. The successful reforms, however, were carried out at political cost. Implemented by two successive finance ministers, Antoine Pinay and Wilfrid Baumgartner, the program was based on a formula of austerity and strict financial and monetary orthodoxy. Measures included higher taxes, a devaluation of the franc by seventeen and a half percent, strict budgetary policy,

14. The swap arrangements were standby credit lines that allowed participants to draw on other participants currencies in order to defend their own exchange rates. The increased IMF credit was arranged through a procedure called the General Arrangements to Borrow, which were negotiated at the end of 1961. While connected to the IMF, these arrangements were unique in that they gave the lending countries some discretion over the size and use of the loans. For an excellent discussion of these innovations, see H. JAMES, International Monetary Cooperation Since Bretton Woods, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1998, pp.159-165. 15. R. REEVES, President Kennedy: Profile of Power, Touchstone, New York, 1993, p.431. 16. W. HITCHCOCK, France Restored: Cold War Diplomacy and the Quest for Leadership in Europe, 1944-1954, University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 1998, pp.12-71. See, also, R. KUISEL, Capitalism and the State in Modern France: Renovation and Economic Management in the Twentieth Century, Cambridge University Press, New York, 1981.

66 Francis J. Gavin, Erin Mahan removal of the automatic tying of wages to a cost-of-living index, and reduced government subsidies. Selective liberalization of trade allowed more foreign goods into the country. The currency was replaced with a new franc, worth a hundred of the old variety. And in the years that followed, the French government restricted the growth of credit in order to slow inflation. This practice of encadrement du crédit, however, discouraged investment because it limited industry’s access to capital. The finance ministry also imposed a coefficient de trésorerie that required banks to hold thirty percent or more of their assets in treasury bonds or medium-term re-discountable credits.17 In the spring of 1961 Rueff began his eight-year campaign against what he saw as the subtle and insidious effects of the U.S. balance-of-payments deficit on the French economy. Rueff and many French officials, including French Prime Minister Michel Debré, believed that the United States relied on “easy money” and an expansionary monetary policy that exported inflation abroad to countries such as France. They also believed that a major consequence of the U.S. capital outflow was encouragement of American investment in the French economy.18 Gaullist officials held what Robert Solomon has described as a “schizophrenic view” toward multinational investment. On the one hand, French officials sought such investment because they welcomed the technological advances and influx of capital. On the other hand, they wished to see more national, and less foreign, investment in the French economy and wanted the EEC to adopt a common policy toward multinational investment. They also urged the United States to change its tax code to eliminate deferrals on taxation of overseas facilities. What the French government resented was the development of U.S. monetary “seigneuriage” that allowed the buying of European companies with dollars.19 Rueff had little patience with U.S. complaints about bearing the burden of Cold War security commitments. Before the Rueff plan in December 1958, many French politicians blamed the weakness of the French franc on the draining wars in Algeria and Indochina. Even though le fardeau algérien continued, the French franc became one of the world’s strongest currencies after the Bank of France stopped increasing its domestic money supply. Rueff argued that U.S. foreign economic and military aid programs were a small proportion of GNP, hardly an intolerable burden. A practitioner of strict fiscal and monetary orthodoxy, he believed that a sharp increase in discount rate would eliminate the U.S. deficit overnight, as the French government did in 1958. The French government planned to raise its discount rate to four percent and the coefficient de trésorerie to thirty-six percent to combat its own inflationary cycle.20

17. S. BERSTEIN, The Republic of de Gaulle, 1958-1969, translated by P. MORRIS, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, U.K., 1993, pp.101-124; LORIAUX, France after Hegemony: Inter- national Change and Financial Reform, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY, pp.168-174. 18. See, generally, J. RUEFF, Balance of Payments: Proposals for the Resolution of the most Pressing World Economic Problem of our Time, trans. by J. CLÉMENT, Macmillan Co., New York, 1967. See, also, F. BOURRICAUD and P. SALIN, Présence de Jacques Rueff, Plon, Paris, 1989, pp.243-314. 19. R. SOLOMON, The International Monetary System, 1945-1981 (New York, 1982), p.54. J. LEE, Kennedy, Johnson, and the Dilemma of Multinational Corporations: American Foreign Economic Policy in the 1960s, in: Essays in Economic and Business History 14, 1996, p.322. 20. Rueff to Wilfrid Baumgartner, 26 June 1961, papers of Wilfred Baumgartner, box 3BA34, folder DR 7, FNSP, Paris.

Hegemony or Vulnerability? 67

In a series of lengthy letters to de Gaulle, published in Le Monde in early June 1961, Rueff encouraged the French president to take measures that would end the dollar’s role as an international reserve currency. He implored de Gaulle to bypass Parliament and invoke the presidential emergency powers provided by the Constitution of the Fifth Republic so that he could pursue polices which might force the devaluation of the dollar. Rueff considered the gold exchange standard a “prodigious collective error that allowed the United States to avoid the consequences of its economic profligacy”. His views resonated with the nationalistic de Gaulle, who longed to abolish the privileges of the dollar and sterling as reserve currencies within the Bretton Woods system. Rueff also began to urge conversion of France’s dollar reserves into gold as an indication of displeasure with U.S. abuses of the reserve-currency system, which accelerated French inflation.21 Rueff’s views were shared by several high-ranking French officials close to de Gaulle. Foreign Minister Couve de Murville, an inspecteur des finances who had worked with Rueff at the Ministry of Finance between 1936 and 1939, echoed his polemic against the hegemony of the dollar. Étienne Burin des Roziers, who became secretary general of Élysée in the spring of 1962, was also well placed to begin shaping de Gaulle’s outlook on international monetary relations.22 Olivier Wormser, director general of economic affairs at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, argued that Kennedy and Harold Macmillan’s strong desire to stabilize the pound and the dollar was connected to Britain’s bid to join the Common Market. America’s international monetary policy was a convenient target for France’s complaints about the relationship between Britain’s application for the EEC and “Anglo-Saxon” balance-of-payments difficulties.23 The Ministry of Finance, however, did not share these views during the early 1960s. The Ministry was a bastion of “Atlanticism” that believed in cooperating with the United States. Wilfrid Baumgartner resisted the insistence of Rueff’s coterie on ending the use of the dollar as a reserve currency. Baumgartner had that quaint sense of gratitude toward the United States for its help to France under the Marshall Plan that was becoming increasingly out-of-fashion in Gaullist France. He had also developed a close professional and personal friendship with Douglas Dillon during his ambassadorship to France under President Dwight D. Eisenhower. Baumgartner and Dillon often began their letters with the salutation “dear friend”.24

21. Jacques Rueff to Charles de Gaulle, 5 May 1961, papers of Wilfrid Baumgartner, box 3BA34, folder Dr 5, Fondation des sciences politiques, Paris, France. For Rueff’s articles, see, Un danger pour l’occident: Le Gold-Exchanges standard, in: Le Monde, 27 June 1961; Deux Pyramides du crédit sur le stock d’or des Etats-Unis, ibid., 23 June 1961; and Comment sortir du système?, ibid., 29 June 1961. 22. On French bureaucratic schism, see, Entretien biographique de Claude Pierre-Brossolette, interview 4, 32-33, Comité pour l’histoire économique et financière de la France, Ministère de l’Écon- omie, des Finances, et d’Industrie, Paris France. 23. Note, Olivier Wormser, 30 May 1961, Baumgartner papers, box 3BA48, folder Dr 2. See also C. W. Sanders (British Board of Trade), “Points for Meeting”, 26 June 1961, FO 371/158179, Public Records Office, Kew, England. 24. See, for example, Douglas Dillon to Baumgartner, 4 May 1961, Archives de Baumgartner, box 3BA48, folder Dr 1. On Baumgartner’s attitude toward cooperating with the United States, see, Entretien biographique de Claude Pierre-Brossolette, number 4, 23, Comité pour l’histoire économique et financière de la France.

68 Francis J. Gavin, Erin Mahan

During his tenure as finance minister, Baumgartner managed to mute Rueff’s influence. Before 1962, France was one of the few European countries that did not convert the bulk of its dollar reserves into gold. In 1961, the United States sold no gold to France but 970 million dollars of gold to other countries.25 And although Baumgartner refused to capitulate to the Kennedy administration’s demands for expanding international liquidity, he participated in Roosa’s ad hoc measures, including swap arrangements and a gold pool, which temporarily eased the recurring monetary crises.26 In December 1961, shortly after the creation of the gold pool, Baumgartner announced his resignation, effective the following month. Finance officials recall that even though he was not forced per se to retire, he felt too old to fight the political battles emerging within the French government over international monetary relations. To the Americans, his retirement suggested that the halcyon days of Franco-American financial cooperation might be over.27

U.S. Fears and French Motives

Indeed, in May 1962, it seemed that the French might be considering a policy of putting pressure on the dollar for political reasons. Douglas Dillon told the President that a Bank of France ofﬁcial made a statement “which could indicate possible difﬁculties ahead with France. He said that it must be realized that France’s dollar holdings represented a political as well as an economic problem”. One of President Kennedy’s great fears was that a nation or group of nations might exploit American monetary vulnerability for their own political purposes. If the French, alone or in collaboration with other surplus countries, decided to cash in all of their surplus dollars, they could run down the American gold supply. Irregardless of any economic motives, a French-led bloc might believe their larger political objectives were worth the cost. The United States might be forced to take politically unpopular measures in order to prevent a complete monetary meltdown, such as trade and capital controls, troop withdrawals, or an embarrassing devaluation or even a suspension of dollar-gold convertibility.28 A widely circulated State Department memo summarized an article that appeared in The Statist warning of a possible attack on the dollar by the French. President de Gaulle was “fully prepared to play [the] diplomatic trump card he holds in form of substantial

25. For Baumgartner’s reaction to Rueff’s views, see, for example, Baumgartner to Rueff, letter, 27 June 1961, papers of Baumgartner, box 3BA34, folder Dr 7. For figures on French conversion of gold, see “Tableau des transactions en or des Etats-Unis avec les pays étrangers”, given by BOUR- GUINAT, Le général de Gaulle et la réforme du Système monétaire international: la contestation manquée de l’hégémonie du dollar, in: De Gaulle en son siècle, p.125. 26. R. TRIFFIN, The World Money Maze: National Currencies in International Payments, p.249. See also, C. COOMBS, The Arena of International Finance, Wiley Press, New York, 1976, pp.61-62. 27. Entretien biographique de Claude Pierre-Brossolette, number 4, 18-22. 28. Dillon, Memo for the President, May 25, 1962, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies: Treasury , Box 289, JFKL. Hegemony or Vulnerability? 69

French holdings of dollars”. In other words, if U.S policy towards Europe clashed with French interests, de Gaulle would pressure Kennedy by continuing to purchase gold from the United States.29 The article went on to say that unless France were accepted as an equal power, “he would not hesitate to make himself felt by resorting to devices liable to cause grave embarrassment to the United States”.30 What made this scenario even more alarming was the possibility that the increasingly strong Franco-German bloc was looking to weaken the U.S. grip on Western policy. It was no secret that both de Gaulle and West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer were apprehensive about elements of the Kennedy administration’s military and political policy in Europe. If both France and Germany colla- borated on monetary policy, they could use their considerable supply of dollars to initiate a crippling gold crisis. Without the help of the two largest surplus countries, the U.S. might find it impossible to defend the dollar. This bloc could force the Americans to end negotiations with the Soviets over Berlin, or bring about a change in American military policy toward Europe. Maybe the French could bargain for technology to advance their nuclear ambitions. A French-led bloc could also have considerable say in designing a new international monetary mechanism on its own terms. Were Kennedy’s fears exaggerated? Franco-American relations had become so strained that the president’s advisers believed the possibility of a French-inspired monetary attack could not be ruled out. In mid-May 1962, the extent of this strain, and the linkage between military and monetary policy, was revealed in a provocative discussion between President Kennedy and the French Minister of State for Cultural Affairs, André Malraux.31 Kennedy complained that France was delaying the United Kingdom’s entry into the Common Market. According to Kennedy, the U.S. supported the application, despite the negative impact U.K. entry would have on the American payments deficit, because it would serve the far more important purpose of creating a Franco-British counterweight to the Germans in the EEC. Kennedy declared that if the French preferred “a Europe without Great Britain and independent of the United States”, it would create a situation in which America was bearing the enormous costs of defending Europe without any voice. If that were the case, Kennedy would bring the troops home and save $1.3 billion, an amount which “would just about meet our balance of payments deficit”.32 When de Gaulle learned the details of Kennedy’s conversations with Malraux, the French leader dismissed the possibility that the U.S. could withdraw from Europe, since America recognized that it would be lost if Western Europe were

29. Jones to State Department, June 13, 1962, UPA, POF, Treasury, 25. 30. Ibid., p.1 31. Memo of Meeting between the President, Ambassador Hervé Alphand, André Malraux, and McGeorge Bundy, May 11, 1962, FRUS, 1961-63, vol.XIII, pp.695-701. 32. The whole tone of this meeting calls into question the idea that Kennedy wanted to create a Pax Americana regardless of cost. “The goal of U.S. policy was to support and sustain nations which desired independence. If France wanted to lead a Europe independent from the United States, then Kennedy “like nothing better than to leave Europe”. Ibid., p.697. 70 Francis J. Gavin, Erin Mahan conquered.33 De Gaulle accused the U.S. of dictating to its allies a line of policy that was undermining its leadership. He claimed that by entering into negotiations with the Soviets over Berlin and by publicly stating that France should not have an atomic force, the administration risked a breakdown in the alliance. Given the climate of mistrust, U.S. officials initially suspected a veiled threat when French finance minister Valéry Giscard d’Estaing reminded them that only cooperation 2on a grand scale” could help the Americans with their dollar drain and prevent a speculative attack.34 Giscard claimed that the United States could not handle a real run on the dollar by itself, even with the help of the IMF. Only with the collaboration of those European central banks that held large quantities of dollars could such a run be handled. What was Giscard proposing? He would not say, and the Americans did not want to appear weak by asking. Although the American deficit had decreased, gold purchases had increased, and the dollar market was weak. Giscard’s hints fed into the administration’s suspicions of French intentions, and combined with worsening gold outflow figures to stimulate a massive inter-governmental effort to develop plans to meet a monetary crisis. Responding to rumors of French blackmail over the dollar, Undersecretary of State George Ball sent a memo to President Kennedy recommending that the administration take preemptive action in an upcoming meeting with Giscard. “I am seriously concerned about the tendency of our allies to view the present world financial problem as a case solely of dollar weakness rather than as a common problem for the Atlantic partnership …”.35 It was time to move away from the position that the payments deficit was a narrow, technical problem to be negotiated between Treasury and European central bankers, whose views Ball described as “pre-Herbert Hoover”.36 In its efforts to move towards payments equilibrium and arrest the gold outflow, American policy was increasingly “reminiscent of Dr. Schacht” - that is, of the series of bilateral deals and clearing arrangements that the Nazi government had negotiated in the mid-1930s. Unless an explicit link was made between American military policy and the balance of payments, the U.S. would be vulnerable to “blackmail” by the Europeans. Ball believed it was time for fundamental multilateral systemic reform of the Bretton Woods edifice and not simply more ad hoc measures, even if that meant overruling the objections of the Treasury department. Would France cooperate? Before Giscard’s July 1962 visit, contact between Kennedy administration officials and the finance minister had sent mixed signals. In May 1962, faced with an economic slump at home, Kennedy marveled at the performance of the French economy and considered transposing aspects of French dirigisme to the United States. The president sent Walter Heller and James Tobin of

33. Gavin to the State Department, May 28, 1962, FRUS, 1961-63, vol.XIII, pp.705-707. 34. Gavin to Rusk, July 12, 1962, UPA, NSF, W. Europe, France. See also Heller, Memo to the President, July 16, 1962, UPA, POF, CEA, 9. 35. Ball, Memo for the President, “Visit of French Finance Minister”, July 18, 1962, UPA, NSF, W. Europe, France. 36. Ibid., p.2. Hegemony or Vulnerability? 71 the Council of Economic Advisers to Paris where they met with Giscard and finance ministry officials for a study of the French economic planning process. Heller and Tobin concluded that France and other West European economies grew faster than the United States for multiple reasons. These included consistently higher levels of demand, a higher level of government investment, greater reinvest- ment of business earnings, a larger body of skilled labor, higher levels of capital formation, technology, productivity, and smaller defense expenditure.37 To generate interest in economic planning within the United States, Kennedy arranged for French officials to speak to labor and business groups. The financial counselor of the French embassy, for example, gave addresses touting his country’s economic plan as a successful path to increased growth.38 Heller and Tobin’s study of French economic planning was also undertaken to convince Gaullist officials that Kennedy was serious about making the U.S. economy sound so that they would be less worried about the devaluation of the dollar and less inclined to convert France’s dollar reserves into gold. Bundy told Heller before his departure for Paris that “in the current state of Franco-American relations, any friendly contact is a good thing”.39 Although Heller and Tobin had established a good rapport with Giscard during their Paris trip, the finance minister’s attitude toward U.S. investment in the French economy worried Ball. On several occasions, Giscard complained that American investment in France was leading to the loss of control over key segments of the economy. Without specifying what, he had implied that “measures might be taken by the French government to establish safeguards against such a possibility”.40 The French government wanted to pressure the Kennedy administration to dissuade American companies from investing in the French economy. However, the Ministry of the Economy had no intention to exert that pressure by moving against the dollar.41

37. Conversation between Giscard d’Estaing and James Tobin, 1 June 1962, Heller papers, reel 24: European budget study file. For Heller’s study of French economic planning, see, e.g., Heller, “Capital Budgeting Experience in Five European Countries”, May 1962, Walter Heller papers, reel 21: Budget (federal) file; and memorandum, Bundy to Heller, 14 May 1962, ibid., reel 24: European budget study file. 38. Remarks by René Larre (Financial advisor at French embassy, Washington) at a meeting of the AFL-CIO Research Directors, Washington, D.C., 15 May 1962, Fonds trésor: Tome 15, Relations bilaterales avec les Etats-Unis, B 10917, folder: balance des paiements, Archives économiques et financières, Ministère de l’Economie et des Finances, Savigny-le-Temple, France. Giscard’s own writings extol the benefits of economic planning. See, for example, “The Management of the Econ- omy and Social Development” and “The New Growth” in: V. GISCARD D’ESTAING, French Democracy, Doubleday, New York, 1977, pp.75-92. 39. Memorandum, Bundy to Heller, 14 May 1962, Heller papers, reel 24; file European budget study. For French perception of Kennedy’s motives, see Jacques Rueff to Philip Cortney, 31 May 1962, ibid., Ribicoff file. 40. Jacques Reinstein (Minister-Counselor, U.S. Embassy Paris), circular telegram, 29 June 1962, RG 84, France, box 64, folder: Investment of Capital. 41. See, for example, Larre to Giscard, “Investissements des Etats-Unis à l’étranger”, 18 May 1962, Fonds Trésor: Vol.15, Relations bilatérales avec les Etats-Unis B10915, folder: Politique financière, 1958-1965, Archives économiques et financières. See, generally, J.J. SERVAN SCHREIBER, The American Challenge, trans. by R. Steel, New York, 1968. 72 Francis J. Gavin, Erin Mahan

The young finance minister, who combined technocratic skill with political savvy, tried to navigate a difficult middle course between de Gaulle’s increasing anti-Americanism and Atlantic monetary cooperation.42 Like his predecessor, Giscard did not share de Gaulle’s animosity toward the United States. Giscard felt that it was in France’s national interest to stabilize the international monetary situation. The May stock market crash in the United States had worried the French finance minister. If the U.S. deficit persisted or worsened, the Kennedy administration might devalue the dollar, which would decrease the value of France’s foreign exchange reserves and make dollar exports more competitive in Europe. According to de Lattre’s memoirs, his subordinates, namely Claude Pierre-Brossolette, André de Lattre and Pierre Esteva, practiced guerrilla tactics to combat Rueff’s influence on French foreign economic policies.43 At the same time, however, Giscard was politically ambitious and dutiful towards de Gaulle. André de Lattre, who worked closely with him at the Ministry of Finance, recalls that “il obéissait”. For Giscard, obeying meant converting dollar reserves into gold at the rate of seventy percent. In the first quarter of 1962, France converted forty-five million dollars worth of gold, and in the second quarter, that amount increased to ninety-seven and a half million dollars. He also saw to it that France repaid its post-World War II debt of 211 million dollars.44 Giscard recognized that de Gaulle regarded the U.S.-dominated IMF as an “alien and objectionable organization”. The French government preferred to deal with international monetary problems within the framework of the Organization of European Cooperation and Development [OECD]. This preference had been evident even in 1961: the Kennedy administration had got the message that the French might not be willing to cooperate on monetary stabilization “except perhaps through a restricted OECD undertaking outside of the IMF”.45 It was not that Giscard, in adopting this approach, was trying to pursue a relatively “pro-American” policy for political reasons. He may have been willing to cooperate with the United States, but his basic idea was that “cooperation” could

42. J.R. FEARS, France in the Giscard Presidency, London, 1981, pp.1-18. See, also, Entretien biographique de Claude Pierre-Brossolette, interview 5, p.28. 43. For Giscard’s views on the Bretton Woods system, see, for example, Giscard, Speech before the National Assembly, 17 May 1962, sur le projet de loi relatif au renforcement des ressources du FMI, Direction des Affaires économiques et financières, papiers directeurs: Olivier Wormser, vol.63: 388-404. On French concerns about the U.S. stock market crash, see Note d’information, René Larre (Conseiller financier, Embassy in Washington), 15 June 1962, Fonds Trésor: Vol.15, Relations bilatérales avec les Etats-Unis, cote B10915, folder: Budget, 1956-1965. On Giscard’s delicate balancing act, see de LATTRE, Servir aux finances, 150. 44. For figures on French dollar conversion, see United States Net Monetary Gold Transactions with Foreign Countries and International Institutions, 1 January 1962-30 June 1962, Fonds Trésor: Vol.15, Relations bilatérales avec les Etats-Unis, cote B10915, folder: Budget, 1956-1965. On debt repay- ment, see Note pour le ministre, 3 July 1962, Direction des Affaires économiques et financières, papiers directeurs: Olivier Wormser, vol.119: 252. 45. Memorandum, Walter Heller to President Kennedy, 16 May 1961, Heller papers, Heller/JFK 1960-1964 series, box 5, folder: memos to JFK, 5/61, JFKL. Couve had met with Heller at the first meeting of the expanded OECD and had conveyed de Gaulle’s disdain of the IMF. Hegemony or Vulnerability? 73 not be a one-way street. In exchange for French cooperation, the Americans would have to accept certain limits on their freedom of action - a kind of “surveillance multilatérale”.46 Among other things, Giscard calculated that using Working Group 3 within the OECD instead of the IMF would give the French government a platform to criticize an overly expansionist U.S. domestic budget, which he identified as the primary cause of the American payments deficit.47 Although Giscard’s visit to Washington in late July 1962 was at President Kennedy’s request, the timing was propitious. De Gaulle was personally preoccupied with strategic issues and strengthening the Franco-German entente. After meeting with Adenauer in early July, de Gaulle was trying to persuade the chancellor that their two nations should develop formal lines of cooperation, a courtship that had began in 1958 and would culminate in January 1963 with the signing of the Franco-German Treaty of Friendship.48 De Gaulle and Adenauer also were preoccupied with the resignation of Supreme Allied Commander of Europe Lauris Norstad.49 Rueff later obtained great influence on de Gaulle’s economic philosophy. But without an official capacity to implement policy and with de Gaulle immersed in defense issues, Giscard had a relatively free hand to negotiate with the United States during the summer of 1962. To the Kennedy administration’s surprise, Giscard was in a cooperative mood when he visited Washington. Furthermore, he wanted any arrangements to be conducted with minimal publicity because it would strengthen his hand and not draw de Gaulle’s attention.50 On July 20 and 21, 1962, Giscard met alone with Kennedy and later with Ball, Bundy, and Tobin. The president and these advisers conveyed their concern over the deficit and gold outflow, and their desire to “manage” these issues on the “political” level. Ball said the administration did not have any formal plan, but felt that in principle some sort of political agreement should be reached to stabilize payments

46. André de Lattre, Servir aux finances (Paris: Comité pour l’histoire économique et financière de la France, 1999), p.150. 47. Maurice Perouse (Directeur du Trésor) to Giscard d’Estaing, Compte-rendu de la 8ème réunion du Groupe de Travail No.3 du Comité de politique économique de l’O.C.E.D., 16-17 April at Château de la Muette, Fonds 9: Institutions Financières Internationales, cote B54754. 48. De Gaulle to Adenauer, Secrétariat général, Entretiens et messages, 1956-1966, 15 July 1962, 16: 218-219. For a concise summary of the Franco-German rapprochement, see P. MAILLARD, De Gaulle et l’Allemagne: le rêve inachevé, Plon, Paris, 1990, pp.169-202. 49. For de Gaulle’s preoccupation with Norstad’s resignation, see Le général Norstad serait démis- sionnaire, in: Le Monde, 21 July 1962, p.1. De Gaulle met with Norstad’s named successor, Lyman Lemnitzer on July 23, 1962, and criticized US nuclear policy within NATO. See, Entretien de Gaulle-Lemnitzer, 23 July 1962, Secrétariat général, Entretiens et messages, 1956-1966, 16: 206-209, Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Paris, France. 50. H. ALPHAND, L’étonnement d’être, p. 381. See, also, Entretien biographique de Alain Prate, entretien 4, Comité pour l’histoire économique et financière de la France. Rueff’s other strong ally, Foreign Minister Maurice Couve de Murville, was also preoccupied with strategic issues. While Giscard was in Washington, Couve was in Geneva for talks with the Soviets on Laos and Berlin. See, Entretien Couve-Gromyko in Geneva, 21 July 1962, Secrétariat général, Entretiens et messages, 1956-1966, 16: 179-181. Dinner of the four ministers of foreign affairs in Geneva, 21 July 1962, Secrétariat général, Entretiens et messages, 1956-1966, 16: 190-195. 74 Francis J. Gavin, Erin Mahan among the major industrial countries. A multilateral, political solution to this issue would not only squelch calls for protectionism in the U.S., it would also demonstrate the solidarity of the Atlantic partnership. What the U.S. had in mind, Ball said, was an agreement regarding the ratio of gold to dollar holdings.51 The administration was surprised when the French finance minister agreed with most of what the Americans said about the problem and appeared to want little in return. Even so, Giscard tried to explain that the President should be as irked at the British, who, before 1962, converted more dollars into gold than France. As long as other European countries continued to convert their reserve dollars, France would feel compelled to follow suit. Giscard declared that the key was to avoid any unilateral action by either side. He thought that it was important for the creditor countries to establish a common payments policy while the U.S. reduced its payments deficit. Such an agreement might suspend gold takings and establish fixed reserve ratios. France was certainly willing to hold its dollars for a time, as long as others agreed as well. He thought the U.K. might protest, but even they might cooperate, given their desire to join the Common Market.52 The administration was delighted that Giscard appeared to understand American difficulties. Giscard’s statements alleviated the fear of a Franco-German monetary bloc. A French-led initiative to reform the payments system would save the U.S. the embarrassment of continued ad hoc measures that made the U.S. look weak. In order to be prepared for such negotiation, the administration launched an enormous effort to study and debate exactly what form an international monetary agreement should take. An inter-departmental committee on the balance of payments was created, and a “gold budget” established.53 Giscard was hopeful that he could convince de Gaulle to accept a gold standstill arrangement because it could potentially meet the general’s long-term objective of curbing the hegemony of the dollar. The indications that he received from Ball suggested that after a two-year grace period, the G-10 nations could modify or con- struct a new international financial structure . Giscard did not intend to end the use of the dollar as a reserve currency. But he hoped to give the franc a place in a broadened monetary scheme that used additional currencies as reserves. He wished to establish a unité de réserve composite (CRU), which would be tied to gold. The

51. No record of Giscard’s meeting with Kennedy alone has been found in either U.S. or French archives. Kennedy mentions some of the points he discussed in a later meeting with Federal Reserve Chairman William Martin. Discussion between President John F. Kennedy, William McChesney Martin, Chairman of the Federal Reserve and Theodore Sorensen – August 16, 1962, 5:50-6:32 p.m., tape 13, Presidential Recording, International Monetary Relations, Presidents Office Files, JFKL, Tran- scribed by F.J. Gavin. For the meeting with multiple participants, see memcon, “Payments Arrange- ments Among the Atlantic Community”, July 20, 1962, FRUS, 1961-63, vol.XIII, p.733. And memcon (luncheon meeting), 21 July 1962, JFK NSF, reel 2: pp.154-155. 52. Ibid. 53. Memo, the President for the Secretary of the Treasury and Administrator, Aid, June 20, 1962, UPA, POF, Treasury, 25; Memo, Bundy for the President , June 22, 1962, UPA, POF, Treasury, 25; Memo, the President for the Secretary of the Treasury, June 22, 1962, UPA, POF, Treasury, 25. Hegemony or Vulnerability? 75 creation of a CRU would address French concerns of curbing global inﬂation while meeting demands for expanded international liquidity.54

The Debate over Monetary Reform within the Kennedy Administration

From the discussions with Giscard, the Kennedy administration hoped that there was now an opportunity to solve the gold outflow problem within a political, multilateral context. Giscard seemed to accept the need for a standstill agreement to give the U.S. time to bring its payments into equilibrium and begin systemic reform of the international financial system. The Treasury held over $16 billion of gold, but legally $12 billion was required to back domestic currency. There was much talk about rescinding the laws behind the domestic cover, and the Federal Reserve could take certain actions in a crisis that would release the gold without legislative action. But Congress would want a protracted debate on the issue, and that debate might upset the markets and might quite possibly set off another gold crisis. More important than the gold cover issue was the supply of dollars held by surplus countries, both officially and in private hands. These liabilities totaled over $20 billion, which could be turned in at any time. While this was more than the gold supply backing them, it was not, by the historical standards of gold-exchange regimes, a dangerous ratio. Interest rate policy and central bank cooperation could handle any run on the dollar. But if this cooperation were not forthcoming, then the dollar liabilities were a loaded gun aimed at the American gold supply. If a Franco-German bloc formed, these overhang dollars could be used to expose Amer- ican monetary weakness, and perhaps force political concessions. Therefore, it was important to take the opportunity afforded by Giscard’s suggestions to create a mechanism to prevent a large American gold outflow. Encouraged by the French finance minister’s cooperative spirit, Kennedy’s closest advisers began considering dramatic departures from traditional monetary policy to solve this problem. Gold guarantees, gold standstill agreements, and raising the dollar price of gold, either in concert with others or unilaterally, were all debated. The Department of State even prepared a draft memo for the President’s use should he want to end the American policy of redeeming gold on demand.55 Carl Kaysen sent Kennedy an essay by J. M. Keynes proposing an international payments system that dispensed with gold altogether. Kaysen wrote the President:

54. In September 1962, Giscard began talking about a CRU, a proposal which was debated intermit- tently until 1965. See, for example, LORAIX, France after Hegemony, pp.185-186. See, also, S. COHEN and M.–C. SMOUTE, La politique de Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, Fondation des sciences politiques, Paris, 1985, pp.146-148; and BOURGUINAT, Le général de Gaulle et la réforme du système monétaire international: la contestation manquée de l’hégémonie du dollar, in: De Gaulle en son siècle, pp.116-117. 55. Memo, Coppock to Johnson, August 1, 1962, DDC 1993. 76 Francis J. Gavin, Erin Mahan

“The great attention paid to gold is another myth ….As you said of the Alliance for Progress, those who oppose reform may get revolution”.56 Perhaps the most discussed proposal was from George Ball. In his memo to the President, “A Fresh Approach to the Gold Problem”, Ball maintained that the problem was at heart about politics, not economics.57 Unfortunately, claimed Ball, few people in Europe, Wall Street, or even the U.S. Treasury department understood this. For them, the gold outflow and payments deficit were signs of American profligacy, correctable through deflationary policies at home and massive cuts in military aid expenditures abroad. By pursuing Roosa’s policy of “improvised expedients” and taking the posture of supplicants seeking credits, offsets, and debt pre-payments, the administration created a picture of weakness that eroded Ameri- ca’s authority and bargaining power with the Europeans. Ball warned “this is no way to run the government of any nation - much less to exercise the leadership of the Free World”.58 Ball argued that the answer to this problem was simple. The strength of the dollar should not be dependent on the “daily whims of private and official ‘confidence’ but to a structure of long-run reciprocal assurances by governments”. The Europe- ans must be made to understand that such an agreement was in their best interest as well as ours. The Europeans, Ball claimed, would be just as hurt by a dollar crisis as the U.S. More importantly, they must recognize that the continued American defense of Europe is dependent upon safeguarding the dollar.59 Without such reforms, President Kennedy would be forced to take aggressive, unilateral action to improve the balance of payments, such as withdrawing American troops from Europe or imposing controls on capital and restrictions on tourism. Ball argued that such policies would not be in America’s interest. Instead, Ball advocated a multilateral agreement at the political level, which would “insulate ourselves from the danger of excessive gold losses while we are working, by less costly measures that will, over a reasonable period of time restore equilibrium”. If the latter policy was not pursued, the U.S. would continue to be vulnerable to the ‘confidence’ game. More importantly, as long as the current rules were maintained, the U.S. would remain “subject to the blackmail of any government that wants to employ its dollar reserves as political weapons against us”.60 Ball told the President if the United States were to “become more heavily involved in Southeast Asia” the “West Coast of South America” or the “Congo”, the Europe-

56. Memo, Kaysen to the President, July 6, 1962, FRUS, 1961-63, vol.IX, p.138. 57. Memo, Ball to the President, “A Fresh Approach to the Gold Problem”, July 24, 1962, the Papers of George W. Ball, Box #15b, “Memorandum to the President on the Gold Problem”, Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University. 58. Ibid., pp.4-5. 59. Ibid., p.5. Ball argued that “what we must tell our European allies is, therefore, clear enough: if we are to continue to carry our heavy share of the Free world burdens we can do so only under the conditions where our exertions in the common cause do not imperil the dollar and in fact, the whole international payments system. To create those conditions is the first and most urgent task for the Atlantic partnership”. 60. Ibid., p.10. Hegemony or Vulnerability? 77 ans might be tempted to “exploit our own problems, NATO’s difficulties, and our own problem with the gold flight for political purposes”.61 A multilateral gold standstill arrangement would limit America’s vulnerability to this kind of pressure. Why would the Europeans agree to such a plan? Ball hinted that the United States could exploit its own political leverage. “Central bankers may regard our expenditures to defend the Free World as a form of sin”, he argued, “but the political leaders of our Western allies do not”.62 Ball provided a general outline of a temporary arrangement to stop the gold outflow. Its provisions included a massive increase in Treasury swaps with foreign central banks, a long-term loan with a consortium of European allies, large withdrawals from the IMF, and fixed gold ratios for central bank portfolios. The U.S. would have to redistribute some of its gold and perhaps guarantee dollar holdings in gold. Ultimately, Ball believed the U.S. should seek a “thorough-going” revision of the Bretton Woods system, “multilateralizing” responsibility for the creation of liquidity as Giscard indicated during his visit. The Undersecretary of State was fully prepared to sacrifice the “hegemonic” role of the dollar if a new system reduced America’s vulnerability. The key to any plan was getting the Europeans to maintain the same or a smaller proportion of their reserves in gold. James Tobin of the Council of Economic Ad- visers (CEA) produced a plan to accomplish this.63 To meet Giscard’s demand for similar conversion policies among the European nations, Tobin suggested that the leading industrial countries determine a uniform ratio of gold to foreign exchange to which all countries would have to adhere. This would require countries with gold in excess of this ratio to sell a part of their gold for foreign exchange. Instead of only using the dollar and sterling as reserve currencies, the currencies of all participating countries (assumed to be the Paris Club) would be equally acceptable. That provision would satisfy French demands that the franc be treated as a reserve currency on par with the dollar. Each country would provide a gold guarantee for their currency against devaluation. Tobin laid out several different ways this could be done, but they would all involve the U.S. selling gold for foreign exchange and retiring dollar liabilities. Some European countries would also have to sell or buy gold. Over time, the non-gold component of reserves would decrease, and the currencies of the participating countries would increasingly share the burden borne solely by the dollar. Removing the wide variations in gold ratios would make the international monetary mechanism more predictable and manageable. The President was keenly interested in these plans, and commissioned a small, inter-departmental group from State, the CEA, and Treasury to come up with an outline of an interim international monetary agreement based on Ball’s and Tobin’s ideas. The group produced a plan that focused on protecting the American gold supply and

61. Presidential Recording, Tape 14, August 20, 1962: 4:00-5:30, International Monetary Relations, Presidents Office Files, JFKL, Transcribed by F.J. Gavin. 62. Ball, “A Fresh Approach to the Gold Problem”, p.14. 63. James Tobin, “A Gold Agreement Proposal”, July 24, 1962, Acheson Papers, State Department and White Adviser, Report to the President on the Balance of Payments, 2-25-63, HSTL. 78 Francis J. Gavin, Erin Mahan strengthening the dollar. The report claimed that cyclical forces would combine with measures already taken to bring America’s balance of payments into equilibrium within a few years. The heart of the plan was a proposed standstill agreement between the ten members of the Paris Club and Switzerland whereby the participants would agree not to convert the official dollar balances they held at the start of the agreement into gold. In order to accommodate increases in the dollar balances of the participants over the two years of the plan, $10 billion would be mobilized from a variety of financial sources. This would include $1 billion of American gold sales, a massive $5 billion drawing on the IMF, $2.5 billion in swaps and direct borrowings from Europe, and up to $1.5 billion in forward exchange operations taken by the Treasury department.64 The purpose of this agreement was two-fold: to get the countries of Western Europe to “extend more credit to the U.S. than they might voluntarily” and to dampen speculative attacks on the dollar. Even with the plan in place, there were all sorts of potential difficulties. The two years had to be used to eliminate the “basic” deficit, and there would certainly be large-scale reshuffling and uncertainty when the arrangement ended. To make the plan work, it had to be acceptable to the Euro- peans, and in fact, had to be initiated by the Europeans, so that it did not look like an act of American weakness. The report did not suggest how the Europeans could be brought to accept let alone propose such a plan. Walter Heller, the CEA chair, was extremely enthusiastic about the inter-departmental plan. It would “eliminate the whims and prejudices of currency speculators and bankers from the making of U.S. policy”.65 The administration could end the basic deficit in an orderly way, without deflation or drastic cuts in programs crucial to American foreign policy. An international interim agreement would give the U.S. far more protection than the techniques used by the Treasury department, which were employed on a “secret, day-to-day, piecemeal, ad hoc basis”.66 An interim agreement would also give world leaders time to scrap the Bretton Woods regime and come up with a world payments system which defended all currencies against speculative attack, internationalized the burdens of providing international money, and provided for an orderly increase in liquidity. Carl Kaysen, the National Security Council officer responsible for international monetary affairs, and Kermit Gordon, a member of the Council of Economic Advisers, went so far as to argue that devaluation could remain a potentially profitable action to the United States, even after the guarantee was paid off.67 Douglas Dillon was infuriated by these analyses. In a cover memo to a report written by Henry Fowler, Dillon claimed that Ball’s interim reserve scheme was

64. Memo for the President, “An Interim International Monetary Arrangement”, August 9, 1962, Acheson Papers, State Department and White Adviser, Report to the President on the Balance of Payments, 2-25-63, HSTL. 65. Memo, Heller to the President, “Why we need an interim international monetary agreement”, August 9, 1962, FRUS, 1961-1963, vol.IX, p.139. 66. Ibid., p.140. 67. Carl Kaysen and Kermit Gordon, Memo for the President, “Gold Guarantees”, July 18, 1962, UPA, POF, Treasury, 25. Hegemony or Vulnerability? 79 simply a reflection of the State Department’s “reluctance to squarely tackle the more difficult but fundamentally necessary job of obtaining a more adequate sharing of the burden by our European friends”.68 The Treasury Department argued that Ball was treating the symptom, the gold outflow, and not the disease, the continuing balance of payments deficit. The interim reserve scheme would give a green light to “loosen up” on all the disciplines that the administration had established to cure the payments imbalance. Fowler agreed that international balance of payments discussions should be raised to the highest political level, but the focus should be on increased burden sharing within NATO, not reserve composition. The U.S. balance of payments would never move to equilibrium until the Europeans started paying a greater share of NATO’s military costs.69 Dillon was even more caustic in his attack on the interim agreement, despite the fact that a Treasury representative, John Leddy, had helped write the report. In essence, the actions proposed would close the gold window for $7.9 billion of official dollar balances, an abandonment of traditional gold policy similar in scope to the U.S. devaluation of 1933.70 The Kennedy administration would be reneging on its promise not to change its gold policy, which would shake private financial markets and scare those countries not participating in the agreement. Dillon believed that using the word “stand-still”, would evoke memories of the German standstill agreement of 1931, an event associated with the world economic collapse. A formal gold standstill arrangement would mean that “it would no longer be sensible” to “expect foreign monetary authorities to continue to hold dollars as an international reserve currency”, thereby eliminating the “important substantive advantages” the United States enjoyed under the Bretton Woods system.71 The plan assumed that the Euro- peans would agree to such a scheme, an idea Dillon found preposterous despite Giscard’s cooperation. The Secretary of the Treasury found an ally in Federal Reserve Board Chairman William Martin, who said the plan for a standstill monetary agreement would “hit world financial markets as a declaration of U.S. in- solvency and a submission to receivers to salvage”.72

68. Dillon, Memo for the President, August 7, 1962, Acheson Papers, State Department and White Adviser, Report to the President on the Balance of Payments, 2-25-63, HSTL. 69. Fowler, Memo for Dillon, “The Need to Couple High Level Political Negotiations for more Equi- table Burden Sharing Designed to Correct the U.S. Balance of Payments with any Political Nego- tiations for Interim Arrangements Designed to Defend U.S. Gold Reserves”, August 7, 1962, Acheson Papers, State Department and White Adviser, Report to the President on the Balance of Payments, 2-25-63. These memos indicated that the Treasury department had no idea how important the American troops stationed in West Germany were to the stability and security of Europe. 70. Appraisal of Problems in the Proposal for an ‘Interim Monetary Arrangement’, August 16, 1962, (no author given but included with a cover letter to Ball from W, N. Turpin, Dillon’s Special Assistant), Acheson Papers, State Department and White Adviser, Report to the President on the Balance of Payments, 2-25-63. 71. Ibid., p.4-5. 72. William McChesney Martin, Jr., Chairman of the Board of Governors, Federal Reserve System, “Commentary on ‘An Interim International Monetary Arrangement’, Presented by Chairman Martin”, UPA, POF, Treasury, 25, p.1. 80 Francis J. Gavin, Erin Mahan

Dillon also forwarded a report by his Under-Secretary, Robert Roosa, to rebut the charge that Treasury’s actions had been ad hoc. Roosa argued that the agreements that had been reached in the past two years between the U.S. and its allies had been very successful. It had not been a policy of ad hoc expedients, as many had claimed, but a well thought out and innovative plan to strengthen the Bretton Woods system. It only appeared ad hoc because many of the discussions held between financial officials were secretive. But the global payments system was much better prepared to absorb the shocks of any future financial disturbance. The gold pool, swap agreements, forward exchange operations, and increased IMF borrowing privileges prepared the U.S. to meet any attack on the dollar. According to Roosa, some of the ideas being discussed, both inside and outside the administration, were foolish. Devaluation, gold guarantees or a gold standstill would damage or destroy a world payments system that had greatly benefited the U.S. and its allies.73 Dillon believed these policies more appropriate for the currency of a third-world country, not the U.S. and publicly tried to sabotage the idea. Kaysen was infuriated when Dillon testified before the Joint Economic Committee on Au- gust 17 and called gold guarantees a “dangerous experiment”. The Secretary of the Treasury called them “a poor idea and not to be seriously considered”. Dillon also ruled out changing the value of the dollar. McGeorge Bundy was worried that Dillon’s public statements would preclude the changes in international monetary policy that they were considering.74 Surprisingly, the reformers were unconcerned about Dillon’s contention that the United States might lose the benefits of “seigneuriage” in a new international monetary system. During a meeting on August 20, 1962, Ball told the President that “we’re not persuaded that it is at all vital to the United States that we do return to a situation in which the dollar would be the principal reserve currency …. We can see many disadvantages as well as advantages”. Kennedy appeared to agree with Ball’s analysis. “I see the advantages to the Western world to have a reserve currency, and therefore it’s an advantage to us as part of the Western world, but what is the national, narrow advantage”? When Dillon tried to spell out these benefits, Kaysen pointedly asked “you wouldn’t describe this as an advantage right now, would you Doug”?75 The President seemed to side with the reformers against Dillon. Kennedy argued that now was the time to negotiate a monetary agreement with the Europeans because “we have much more political strength with them now then we’ll probably have two years from now”. The Europeans “are much more dependent upon us militarily than they might be” before they “get together” to organize their own defense.76 The administration had to

73. Roosa, “The New Convertible Gold-Dollar System”, and Roosa, “International Liquidity”. 74. Bundy to Kaysen, August 21, 1962, NSF, Departments and Agencies, Treasury, 6/62 - 4/63, 289, JFKL. Bundy asked Kaysen “Is Doug Dillon pinning us to his position by such public statements"? 75. Presidential Recording, Tape 14, August 20, 1962: 4:00-5:30, International Monetary Relations, Presidents Office Files, JFKL, Transcribed by F.J. Gavin. 76. Presidential Recording, Tape 11, August 10, 1962: 11:20 – 12:30 p.m., International Monetary Relations, Presidents Office Files, JFKL, Transcribed by F.J. Gavin. Hegemony or Vulnerability? 81 get the Europeans to agree that for “a two year period that they’re not going to ask” for gold while “our balance of payments situation improves and while we work on other arrangements”.77 The President concluded that the administration should “pursue” the gold standstill arrangement, “because I think this is really the area where we may be able to make some progress”. Kennedy wanted the Europeans to agree that “they are all going to go easy on the taking of gold”.78 Kennedy dispatched Assistant Secretary of State C. Griffith Johnson and Assistant Secretary of the Treasury John Leddy to sound out the possibilities of a European initiative to limit foreign purchases of U.S. gold and to strengthen the international monetary system. Kennedy suggested that an acceptable arrangement would be for the Common Market countries and the U.K. each set an absolute target for gold holdings, as opposed to a ratio, which could be controversial and might involve increasing the amount of gold held by certain countries. Another solution would be to limit the amount of gold taken from the U.S. to a small percentage, perhaps thirty percent, of the overall payments deficit. But regardless of the plan, Kennedy insisted that it should look like a vol- untary European initiative. Any evidence of U.S. pressure could shake the confidence of financial markets and lead to a run on American gold.79 Giscard appeared ready to negotiate. While always wary of the British and any “deals” between les Anglo-Saxons that excluded France, he did invite the G-10 finance ministers to participate in discussions at the upcoming IMF/World Bank meeting. Anxious to maneuver without arousing de Gaulle’s intervention, he asked the G-10 ministers to limit accompanying officials to two persons and to conduct their meetings without publicity.80 But even with these precautions, Giscard and the Americans found it hard to engage in serious negotiations. For example, when Led- dy and Johnson asked Giscard what British Chancellor of Exchequer Maudling’s thoughts were on the subject, Giscard replied that “the two were in agreement that there should be high level secret discussions of the subject”.81 Giscard did not tell Johnson and Leddy what the “subject” actually was. Was it the hoped for initiative to limit gold takings? Giscard would not say, and the American representatives thought it imprudent to ask. Later, British representatives asked the Americans what Giscard had said, and after being told, observed that “the whole affair was mysterious”. ”.The next day, French officials said the same thing! President Kennedy was scheduled to speak to the central bankers and finance ministers of the G-10 at the IMF/World Bank meeting. The purpose of the meeting was to tell the Europeans that the underlying cause of the American deficit was its disproportionate share of Western military and aid expenditures. This group had

77. Tape 14, August 20, 1962. 78. Ibid. 79. Memo, President for the Secretary of the Treasury, The Under Secretary of State, and Chairman of the CEA, August 24, 1962, NSF, Department and Agencies, Treasury, 6/62 - 4/63/ 289, JFKL. 80. Giscard d’Estaing to the finance ministers of the Group of 10, 12 September 1962, Direction des Affaires économiques et financières, papiers directeurs: Olivier Wormser, vol.132: 347-350. 81. Memo from Dillon and Ball to the President, September 12, 1962, with attachment, Memo for Dillon and Ball from Johnson and Leddy, September 10, 1962, FRUS, 1961-63, vol.IX, p.146. 82 Francis J. Gavin, Erin Mahan heard this message many times before, but the meeting would give the President the chance, as Kaysen put it, to “give them a real feeling of how central it is to your thinking. This is something that you can convey directly in a way no one else can”.82 Kaysen urged the President to tell his audience that the administration recognized the fact that “there is more than one way the system might evolve in relation to the central role of the dollar, and we do not foreclose consideration of alternative schemes of improvement for the payments system”.83 In other words, the U.S. was not wedded to the Bretton Woods system and its supposed privileges. A better system could be created that reflected the new economic strength of the Europeans. This new system would give the Europeans an “expanded role in the international monetary system”.84 But could the administration act without the hoped for French or European initiative suggested by Giscard? Dillon thought Kaysen’s strategy was far too risky. “A statement by you that we are prepared to study new ideas and welcome new initiatives would in all probability be misinterpreted … as indicating a lack of confidence on your part in our ability to handle our balance of payments problem within the framework of the existing monetary system. This could have dangerous and immediate effects this fall”.85 Without a formal proposal from the French, Kennedy’s speech was closer to Dillon’s than Kaysen’s approach, hinting that the administration was open to international monetary discussions but offering no concrete American plans. The American team adopted this position because of the fear that “open pressure on the French might lead them to think that political questions could be successfully interjected”.86 The momentum for monetary reform subsided considerably after the IMF meeting. In the weeks ahead, the Kennedy administration’s attention turned to the far more pressing matter of Soviet missiles in Cuba. By the time Kennedy returned to the dollar and gold outflow issue, America’s political relations with France had deteriorated markedly.87 It no longer seemed that monetary cooperation was in the cards. Kennedy again feared that a Franco-German political bloc would use its surplus dollars to compel changes in America’s political strategies in Europe.88

82. Memo, Kaysen to the President, September 18, 1962, FRUS, 1961-63, vol.IX, p.149. 83. Ibid., p.149. 84. Ibid., p.149. 85. Memo, Dillon to Kennedy, September 18, 1962, FRUS, 1961-63, vol.IX, p.152. 86. Ibid., p.146-147. 87. For details of the post-Nassau Franco-German revolt, see M. TRACHTENBERG, A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement, 1945-1963, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1999, pp.355-379. 88. For these fears in 1963, see F. GAVIN, The Gold Battles within the Cold War: American Monetary Policy and the Defense of Europe, 1960-1963, in: Diplomatic History, forthcoming. Hegemony or Vulnerability? 83

Conclusion

France’s international monetary policy was, at least through 1962, far more cooperative than the conventional wisdom holds. But this cooperative spirit was not to last. Without assurances that other European nations would restrict “hoarding” of gold, the French government began increasing its conversion of dollars. For each of the first two quarters of 1963, the sale of U.S. gold to France was $101.1 million dollars.89 More importantly, after 1962, Rueff and others who were against monetary cooperation with the Americans increased their influence with de Gaulle. In February 1965, de Gaulle launched his famous attack on the dollar and its privileges within the international monetary system. By January 1966, Giscard’s influence had waned considerably and de Gaulle, who had come to view him as insubordinate, forced him to resign. Ironically, during the same period official American attitudes towards American monetary reform became less timid. In 1962, the financially orthodox members of his administration successfully slowed any bold American move towards international monetary reform. But by 1963 and beyond, American officials became far more interested in a whole-scale restructuring of the system. This striking shift in American foreign economic policy was made evident in a speech Lyndon B. John- son’s Secretary of the Treasury, Henry Fowler, gave before the Virginia Bar Asso- ciation on July 10, 1965. “I am privileged to tell you this evening that the President has authorized me to announce that the United States now stands prepared to attend and participate in an international monetary conference which would consider what steps we might jointly take to secure substantial improvements in international monetary arrangements”.90 The Treasury Department, which three years earlier had gone to great lengths to suppress any program of monetary reform, now warmly embraced it. But with France and the United States in vehement disagreement over how to change the global payments system, meaningful change was elusive. This Franco-American monetary dispute during the 1960’s created a legacy of bitterness between the two countries that lasted well beyond the collapse of the Bretton Woods system in August 1971. It is quite possible that this enmity might have been avoided if the Kennedy administration had embraced Giscard’s cooperative suggestions during the summer of 1962, or if Giscard had offered a less vague proposal to reform international monetary relations. In the long run, these disagreements may not have mattered, because the Bretton Woods system was inherently flawed and not fixable. Given the explosion of international capital flows during the 1960’s, market determined exchange rates were probably inevitable. But it is important to note that the Kennedy administration was not wedded

89. United States Net Monetary Gold Transactions with Foreign Countries and International Institu- tions, 1 Jan. 1963-30 June 1963, Fonds Trésor, Vol.19, Relations monétaires - Etats-Unis, 1962-1978, cote Z9984, folder: Transactions d’or monétaire avec l’étranger. 90. "Remarks by the Honorable Henry H. Fowler, Secretary of the Treasury, before the Virginia State Bar Association at the Homestead, Hot Springs, Virginia, Saturday, July 10, 1965, 6:00 p.m.”, Pa- pers of Francis Bator, box 7, LBJ Library, p.10. 84 Francis J. Gavin, Erin Mahan to the Bretton Woods system and felt more vulnerable than hegemonic under its rules. While they were not sure what they wanted exactly, key officials, including President Kennedy, were willing to contemplate fundamental changes to the system, even if this meant sacrificing the dollar’s central role in the global payments system. What is perhaps even more surprising is that the French were not monolithically determined to oppose the Americans in this area in the early 1960’s. Even de Gaulle was open to options that went beyond a pure gold standard, as long as the “exorbitant privileges” of the dollar were curtailed.91 In the end, to characterize America and France’s attitudes towards the Bretton Woods system in terms of hegemony or empire is a vast over- simplification. There were ambiguities and contradictions in policies on both sides of the Atlantic, as both sides struggled to understand how to pursue their narrower national interests without precipitating a worldwide monetary calamity. The story behind the gold standstill forces us to reconsider not just Franco-American relations, but also the often misunderstood relationship between international monetary policy and transatlantic political developments during the “crucial decade” of the 1960s.

91. See G. GRIN, L’évolution du système monétaire international dans les années 1960: les positions des économistes Robert Triffin et Jacques Rueff, in Relations Internationales, no. 100, winter 1999, p.389.

85 Western Europe and the American Challenge: Conﬂict and Cooperation in Technology and Monetary Policy, 1965-1973

Hubert Zimmermann

I. Disenchantment and Déﬁ1

During his brief presidency, John F. Kennedy spent almost as much time in Western Europe as his two immediate successors combined. His tours through European capitals invariably drew cheering crowds and created a lasting image in which the American leader incorporated not only the American dream but also the inclusion of Europe in a transatlantic community which was symbolised by modernity, technological progress and economic prosperity. Lyndon B. Johnson and Richard Nixon rarely went to Europe, and if they did so, the reception was often cool. Fre- quently they were greeted by protesters. When Kennedy affirmed in a ringing speech in Philadelphia on Independence Day 1962 that America was “prepared to discuss with a United Europe the ways and means of forming a concrete Atlantic partnership, a mutually beneficial partnership between the new union now emerging in Europe and the old American union founded here 173 years ago”, politicians all over Europe (except for France) congratulated the president.2 Henry A. Kiss- inger’s grandiose pronouncement of a “Year of Europe” in 1973 was mostly met with disbelief and scorn.3 Certainly, personality goes a long way in explaining such a difference; however, the contrast also denotes a dramatic change in European attitudes towards the United States. Of course, serious European-American conflicts also existed during the Kennedy administration, but they paled in comparison with the mutual disenchantment of the 1970s. How is this shift to be explained? Many analysts assume that it was a consequence of basic structural change, that is the re-emergence of a Europe which was more inclined and able to pursue its own interests, even if this resulted in a conflict with the U.S. Additionally, they point to an alleged American decline. Such an interpretation justifies Nixon’s and Kissinger’s assertive policy towards Europe as a defensive reaction.4 Other commentators stress the impact of more specific reasons such as LBJ’s and Nixon’s mistakes in handling their allies,5 the consequences of Vietnam or the American neglect of Europe in favour of great power diplomacy

1. For comments and helpful suggestions I would like to thank M. Trachtenberg, G. Schmidt and L. Sebesta. 2. Kennedy, Public Papers (thereafter: PP), 1962, p.538. 3. Text of the speech, in: Department of State Bulletin, I/1973, pp.593-598. For the European reaction see, R. E. POWASKI, The Entangling Alliance. The U.S. and European Security, 1950-1993, Westport, 1994, pp.102-104. 4. C. HACKE, Die Ära Nixon-Kissinger, Stuttgart, 1983, pp.178-179. 5. J.R. SCHAETZEL, The Unhinged Alliance, New York, 1975.

86 Hubert Zimmermann with the Soviet Union and China.6 The argument here is not that these factors were unimportant, but rather that such interpretations do not adequately capture the essence of what was going on in European-American relations at that time. The early 1970s were a period of major reshuffling in the relations between the Western countries. The cards were re-mixed and the rules of the game were reformulated. These changes become very clear when one shifts one’s emphasis away from the usual concentration on the ‘high politics’ of defense and grand strategy to the supposed ‘low politics’ of monetary relations and technology. Structural change in those two fields, and the way it was handled in Europe and the U.S., was decisive for the shifting power relations of the 1970s and beyond. These fields are not merely to be considered as of secondary importance, that is, as epiphenomena which reflected what went on at the high political level7; on the contrary, these processes often led to major political reorientations, such as the Europeanisation of French and British foreign policies in the late 1960s or the dissolution of transatlantic cooperation at the same time. Different methods in the way monetary and technological issues were handled and intensified cooperation in these two fields might have led to a qualitatively different relationship between the United States and the economically re-emerging Europe. There might even have been a direct trade-off between the two realms, as Washington struggled with a dollar deficit and the Europeans worried about their technological dependence. In 1966, for example, the Italian foreign minister Fanfani presented the idea of a technological Marshall plan in which European payments for American advanced technology would have wiped out a substantial part of the American balance of payments deficit.8 How- ever, neither transatlantic monetary nor technological cooperation advanced after 1966; things in fact moved in exactly the opposite direction. The closing of the gold-window by Nixon in August 1971 signalled the end of the so-called Bretton Woods monetary system. Already in the mid-1960s, the system had balanced on the verge of collapse. European and American views on monetary affairs diverged increasingly, and when, at the European summit in The Hague at the end of 1969, the EC-countries decided to embark on the road to a common currency, this was a clear sign that they strove for more independence from the dollar and that the transatlantic monetary system was about to be abolished. How and why did Ameri- cans and Europeans allow the system to disintegrate? The publication of Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber’ s best-seller Le Défi améric- ain (Paris 1967) was another event which stands as a symbol for a fundamental

6. ”Western Europe had to remain an ally because its safety and prosperity provided the United States with essential trump cards in dealing with the USSR, but even this suggested that an end-in-itself had become a tool”. S. HOFFMANN, Uneven Allies, in: D. LANDES (ed.), Critical Choices for Americans, VIII: Western Europe, Lexington, 1977, p.64. 7. See for example: S. HERSH, The Price of Power, New York, 1985; S. BROWN, The Crises of Power, New York, 1979; R.S. LITWAK, Détente and the Nixon Doctrine, Cambridge, 1984. 8. Aufzeichnung des Ministerialdirigenten Meyer-Lindenberg: Italienische Initiative für internationale Zusammenarbeit auf dem Gebiet der Technologie, 29.9.1966; Politisches Archiv – Auswärti- ges Amt (thereafter: PA-AA), I A 6/83.

Western Europe and the American Challenge 87 change in transatlantic relations. Servan-Schreiber urged European politicians to react vigorously to American technological superiority; otherwise Europe would soon be completely dependent on the U.S. in the most advanced fields of modern technology. He proposed that the Europeans join their national programs in an attempt to match American pre-eminence. However, was it not more rational for European nations to collaborate with the powerful partner across the Atlantic and to benefit from technological spin-off? And yet, at the end of the 1960s, all European countries exhibited a clear preference for European programmes. What had happened to Kennedy’s vision of transatlantic interdependence? I argue that the lost chances in monetary and technological relations were the results of con- scious policy decisions which signalled the end of a specific framework of transatlantic partnership based on cooperation and produced a new quality for mutual relations, now based on competition. This had major consequences beyond the 1970s. One of the most important of those was a new impetus to European integration. The American challenge in the monetary and technological field helped to reinforce Europe’s identity. Or in other words, the assertive American policy in the late 1960s, culminating in the Nixon-Kissinger period, had the same kind of effect on the European unification process as the hegemonic U.S. policy in the early 1950s.9

II. The Erosion of the Transatlantic Partnership

a) Changing Patterns of Transatlantic Monetary Policy The central features of the post-war monetary order in the Western world, usually called Bretton Woods system10, are well-known: the core role of the dollar to the value of which the other currencies participating in the system were pegged; the dollar-gold link which provided a guarantee of the dollar’s value and was coupled with the promise that other nations could cash in their surplus dollars for $35/ounce at the U.S. treasury; institutionalised cooperation among the major industrial economies to keep exchange rates stable and shield their domestic economies from the impact of unexpected movements in ﬁnancial markets. Less well-known is the strongly political character of this system. It was based on an unintended ‘bargain’ between Europe and the USA.11 Whereas in the 1950s the U.S. proﬁted from the

9. On the latter argument, see the article by M. TRACHTENBERG and C. GEHRZ in this issue. 10. In fact, the monetary system of the post-war period differed in important aspects, particularly regarding the core role of the dollar, from what had been agreed at Bretton Woods. See: R.I. MCKINNON, The Rules of the Game: International Money in Historical Perspective, in: Journal of Economic Literature, March 1993, pp.1–44. 11. On the notion of a bargain, see also: B. COHEN, The Revolution in Atlantic Economic Relations: A Bargain Comes Unstuck, in: W. HANRIEDER (ed.), The U.S. and Western Europe, Cambridge, 1974, pp.116-118. A very good discussion of these links is H. van B. CLEVELAND, The Atlantic Idea and its European Rivals, New York et al., 1966, pp.72-87.

88 Hubert Zimmermann reserve role of the dollar insofar as it allowed the Americans to finance its huge Cold War effort without having to worry about its external balance, Europe acquired credit for the huge post-war investment needed to re-build its industries. The resulting American balance of payments deficits were no problem as long as the Europeans had an economic interest in accumulating surplus dollars. This situation changed in the late 1950s and a serious problem emerged. If the Europeans transferred back to the U.S. treasury the surplus dollars which accrued to them (due to an undiminished American military presence in Europe, growing investments by U.S. industries in the Common Market and a diminishing American trade surplus), the American dollar gold exchange guarantee, and with it confidence in the dollar as the world’s core currency, would soon be undermined. A real reversal of American deficits, however, would have required from the U.S. government such unpalatable policies as a retrenchment of the military effort in Europe, limitations on U.S. investments or restrictive trade policies. Only very few politicians in Europe wanted to provoke such reactions. They still agreed with the basic thrust of American economic and security policies. Therefore, they acceded to American requests to prolong the ‘bargain’ by continuing to hold surplus dollars. This cooperation, however, rested on two conditions: that the Americans, as issuer of the reserve currency, managed their domestic economy and their external commitments in a way which would not undermine the dollar’s value, and that there was a large degree of agreement on basic economic and political goals among the partners on both sides of the Atlantic. The American commitment to get their balance of payments under control required difficult negotiations with their partners and costly interventions in currency markets. However, the advantages of the system were considered large enough to offset the inconvenience of regular consultation. On the burden and benefits of having a reserve currency, Secretary of Treasury Dillon wrote to Kennedy: “To date, foreign countries and their nationals acquired nearly $20 billion in dollar accounts. This is, in effect, a demand loan to us of $20 billion which has allowed us to pursue policies over the years that would have been utterly impossible had not the dollar been a key currency”.12 In a discussion with the president, undersecretary of Treasury Robert V. Roosa was even more explicit when he emphasised that the role of the dollar made “it possible for us to, year in and year out, and apart from situations that get completely out of whack such as we’ve had year in and year out, to finance every deficit we may run very readily, because you have the world accustomed to holding dollars. When you run behind for a year you don’t have to negotiate a credit, they just hold dollars”.13 Of course, the U.S. government shared with the Europeans a major interest in preserving the dollar-consuming security commitment in Europe, though certainly not for eternity and in a size it considered excessive. However, as long as the Europeans supported the dollar there would be no immediate need to change this situation. This

12. Memorandum of 11.2.1963; FRUS 1961-3, IX, p.164. 13. John F. Kennedy Library, Tape No.14, Meeting on International Monetary Relations, 20.8.1962.

Western Europe and the American Challenge 89 was the background of those numerous multilateral initiatives which were taken by the major industrial countries (including France)14 in the early 1960s to shore up the system. Proposals by the European Commission (1962) or by French finance minister Giscard d’ Estaing for a European currency (1964) were either ignored or dismissed as completely unrealistic.15 Both the German and the French government made no secret of their disapproval for such plans, and Giscard even lost his post in 1966. Thus, the working of the international monetary system still rested on a basic political understanding among the countries of the transatlantic alliance. However, the policy of ‘peripheral defences’ for the dollar, which was devised by the Kennedy administration,16 did not resolve the problem. In the mid-1960s, it became increasingly difficult to keep the balance of payments deficits under control. The first reason for this was Vietnam. In February 1965, President Johnson or- dered the bombing of North Vietnam. In July of the same year he decided that an additional contingent of 50.000 men would be sent to South East Asia. The War was americanised and continued to absorb more and more of the government’s attention in the years that followed. America’s European allies reacted with alarm to this development. They had great doubts about the theory that the new Cold War border lay in South East Asia and feared that the conflict diverted American energies away from Europe which to them still was the principal theatre of the East-West conflict.17 Therefore they were rather dismissive when the Americans called for direct help on the battlefield, especially since the war proved to be extremely unpopular not only with the European governments but also with the electorate. Even the country which publicly supported the Vietnam War most emphatically did not react to a strong call by the Johnson government for direct help.18 Asked by LBJ in January 1966 what contribution Germany had made, Secretary of Defence Robert McNamara grumbled: “Not a damn thing except a hospital ship”, – although the Americans had made strong efforts to get at least a token contingent of combat troops.19 The U.S. government soon realised that direct European involvement was out of the question. However, that led them to insist with growing vigour on co-operation in international monetary policy. The war effort had led to a sharp increase in military expenditure abroad (which had always been a major factor in American balance of payments deficits).20 Even more detrimental to the external balance was Johnson’s

14. See the article by F. GAVIN and E. MAHAN in this issue. 15. K. DYSON and K. FEATHERSTONE, The Road to Maastricht. Negotiating Economic and Monetary Union, Oxford, 1999, pp.101-102; 274-276. 16. On this policy, by one of its principal architects: R. ROOSA, The Dollar & World Liquidity, New York, 1967. 17. A. GROSSER, The Western Alliance. European-American Relations since 1945, London, 1980, pp.237-243. 18. U.S. Aide-Memoire to the FRG, 6.7.1964, G. McGhee Papers (Georgetown University), 1988 add., Box 1. 19. FRUS 1964-68, II, Telephone Conversation Johnson – McNamara, 17.1.1966, p.80. 20. For figures see: C.E. SHEPLER and L.G. CAMPBELL, United States Defense Expenditure Abroad, in: Survey of Current Business, December 1969, p.44.

90 Hubert Zimmermann unwillingness to increase taxes in order to neutralise rising public expenditure in con- nection with the war and the Great Society programs. Thus, inflation started to undermine the dollar. Paul Volcker, Nixon’s undersecretary of the Treasury for Monetary Affairs, later wrote that Vietnam “was the period when inflation really gained momentum in the United States and threatened to spread to Europe too, and if we wer- en’t willing to finance the war properly, then maybe we shouldn’t have fought it at all”.21 Another serious problem for the monetary system was the seed of discord the war planted in the Atlantic Alliance at a crucial moment. Confronted with Europe’s unwillingness to extend direct support in Vietnam, the U.S. government in private and Congress in public increasingly questioned the continuation of America’s troop commitment in Europe.22 The basic common political understanding among Europeans and Americans was coming unstuck. Furthermore, there was the ‘de Gaulle problem’. In February 1965, the French president in his campaign against American domination had thrown down the gauntlet in the monetary field. He denounced the transatlantic monetary system as an unfair deal, which allowed America to finance its external commitments and to buy up European industries by simply printing dollars. Therefore he invited all industrial countries to follow France and exchange all of their dollars for gold in order to bring the system down.23 Nobody followed his example, but the impression that America was not doing enough to bring its own house in order and thus end- angering the international monetary system was widespread in Europe. In 1965, the Americans realised that it was not possible to save the post-war international monetary structure by small piecemeal steps, especially because they knew that Vietnam was wrecking U.S. external balances for the foreseeable future to a degree which better remained hidden to the public.24 A comprehensive reform was necessary. A major political issue relating to this reform was how such a new system would accommodate the call of a resurgent Europe for a greater voice in the creation and management of international reserves. This would have been an extremely contested issue even in times of a perfectly working alliance. The growing distrust about future U.S. policy in Vietnam and the suspicion voiced in many quarters that Washington was financing the war by printing dollars made that task even more difficult. Secretary of Treasury Henry Fowler had the ingenious idea of proposing a standstill agreement as long as the Vietnam conflict was going on: “I propose that we give serious consideration to asking the key dollar-holding nations (…) to pledge not to convert dollars they presently hold and not to convert any additional dollars [emphasis in original] that may accrue to them as long as the Vietnam struggle continues. To accomplish this, we will have to state in the strongest possible terms that: 1. We most emphatically do intend to bring our balance of payments into equilibrium. 2. The Vietnam War, with its attendant direct and indirect balance of payments costs, has made it difficult for us to do this as soon as we hoped.

21. P. VOLCKER and T. GYOOHTEN, Changing Fortunes, New York, 1992, p.62. 22. P. WILLIAMS, The Senate and U.S. Troops in Europe, New York, 1985. 23. C. DE GAULLE, Discours et Messages, vol. 4, Paris, 1970, p.332. 24. FRUS 1964-68, VIII, Memorandum by Fowler to Johnson, 10.5.1966, pp.269-270.

Western Europe and the American Challenge 91

But we will do it. 3. We are bearing virtually the entire burden of the Vietnam conflict. We view this as commitment on behalf of all free nations. We do not ask others to see it this way, but we do ask that they not act in a manner that will prevent us from meeting our commitments and/or destroy the international financial institutions that are such a vital part of the world we are attempting to defend”.25 This meant that Europe would have to continue extending credit to the U.S., and would have to forego its principal element of control over America’s management of its reserve currency. Instead it was asked to trust to an unbinding promise that the Americans would manage to control their deficits in a way which avoided a breakdown of the system. There is no evidence that a formal proposal along these lines was made in early 1966 but the Americans left no doubt that this was the policy they expected their allies to follow. Indeed, hardly eight months later, a core country had to decide whether it would sign such a temporary limitation of its monetary authority. In the context of negotiations about the cost of American troops in Germany, the U.S. side proposed that the Federal Republic sign a pledge not to exchange dollars for gold. Since the early 1960s it had been one of the most important mechanisms of monetary help for the U.S. that Bonn, in the so-called ‘offset’ agreements, bought American weapons to offset the foreign exchange losses occasioned by the U.S. military presence in the FRG.26 When the German government decided in 1966 that it no longer needed to buy American weapons, this practice ran into enormous difficulties. Relentless pressure by LBJ and McNamara to continue ‘offset’ , and the serious threat of American troop withdrawal, played a considerable role in chancellor Erhard’s fall from power in October 1966. The trilateral negotiations at the beginning of 1967 (which included the United Kingdom, which also had a major balance of payments problem linked politically to the British troop presence in Germany) essentially concerned the question of whether the transatlantic bargain in which the Americans provided military security and the Germans monetary support would be reaffirmed once more. Due to the overriding importance of American military protection, the German government pressed Bundesbank president Blessing to agree to what the Americans were asking for; he reluctantly went along with government policy, and in the so-called Blessing letter, the Bundesbank pledged to continue supporting the dollar.27 This episode of brinkmanship doubtlessly created deep resentment in Germany, as later remarks by Blessing show. Blessing stated that he rather should have started cashing in dollars for gold at that time, until the U.S. Treasury was driven to desperation.28 The ministers in the German cabinet were unanimous in their critique of Washington’s monetary policy; however, they also agreed that the French policy

25. Ibid., pp.274–275. 26. For a detailed history of these agreements see: H. ZIMMERMANN, Money and Security. Mone- tary Policy and Troops in Germany’s Relations to the U.S. and the United Kingdom, 1955-71, Cambridge, 2001 (forthcoming). 27. Aufzeichnung des Ministerialdirektors Harkort, 6.3.1967, PA-AA, B 150/1967. 28. L. BRAWAND, Wohin steuert die deutsche Wirtschaft?, München, 1971, p.61.

92 Hubert Zimmermann was not viable.29 Therefore, they stuck to the transatlantic bargain in the hope that a quiet reform of the monetary system might still be in the cards.30 Frustrated by American policy as well as by the rigidity of the French position, the Germans developed an increasing penchant for unilateral action in the monetary field. Frustration with the U.S. also ran high in other European countries but, apart from France, cooperation with the Americans was still the preferred option.31 The British were completely wedded to the defence of the pound as a reserve currency and this caused an increasing dependence on American monetary support.32 The smaller industrial states were closely linked either to the U.S. or to England in security or economic terms, and in any case were too weak to advocate an alternative monetary system. Despite the increasingly tense situation on currency questions from late 1967 onward, the Johnson administration did not start a vigorous and acceptable programme for international monetary reform.33 Waiting out the Vietnam War and the corresponding inflation was the strategy, always in the hope that the Europeans would continue to play the game. During the trilateral negotiations, presidential advisor Francis Bator outlined the thrust of the American policy at the end of the Johnson-administration: “There is no hope for any sort of new 100 % military offset deal with the Germans. How- ever, we may be able to get them to agree to financial steps which would be far more val- uable. Specifically: – that they will not use their dollars, old or new, to buy gold; – that they will join us in pushing the other Europeans, ex-France, to agree to the same sort of rules; – to support us against France in negotiations on longer-range monetary reform; – to neutralise the military imbalance by buying and holding securities which would count against our balance of payments deficit. If we can also get the Italians, Dutch and the Bel- gians, as well as the U.K., Canada, Japan, to play by such rules we will have negotiated the world onto a dollar standard. It will mean recognition of the fact that, for the time being, the U.S. must necessarily play banker of the world …”.34 The consequence of such a step was that “… we will no longer need to worry about reasonable balance of payments deficits. This arrangement will not give us an unlimited printing press. But as long as we run our economy as responsible as in the past few years, it will permit us to live with

29. Auszüge aus dem Protokoll der Kabinettssitzung vom 27. März 1969, PA-AA, IIIA1/611. In early 1967, the German government discussed the possibility of supporting de Gaulle’s call for a change in the price of gold as expressed in dollars and very guardedly informed the French that they were not dead set against consideration of such a step. The Blessing letter prevented this policy from being further explored. See: Wirtschaftsminister Schiller an Kanzler Kiesinger, 12.1.1967, PA-AA, IIIA1/180. 30. AA Aufzeichnung zur Internationalen Währungspolitik, 5.2.1969, PA-AA, IIIA5/610. 31. Finanzminister Dahlgrün to Außenminister Schröder: Ergebnis des EG-Finanzministertreffens am 20./21. Juni 1966, 7.7.1966, ibid. 32. H. ZIMMERMANN, The Sour Fruits of Victory: Sterling and Security in Anglo-German Relations during the 1950s and 1960s, in: Contemporary European History, 2/2000, pp. 225-43. 33. R.M. COLLINS, The Economic Crisis of 1968 and the Waning of the American Century, in: Amer- ican Historical Review, April 1996, pp.396-422. 34. Bator to President: U.S. Position in the Trilateral Negotiations, 23.2.1967, LBJL, Bator Papers, Box 4.

Western Europe and the American Challenge 93

moderate deficits indefinitely. It will be the ideal transition arrangement until Joe Fowler’s major liquidity reform goes into effect”.35 The actual transformation of the system to a pure dollar standard happened in March 1968 when, after a heavy wave of gold speculation, the major industrial countries decided to split up the gold market in an official and a private market. Belgium, Germany, Britain, Italy, the Netherlands and Switzerland agreed to no longer demand gold from the U.S. The transatlantic system was on the brink of collapse because the Europeans were increasingly relegated to a policy of merely reacting to what the U.S. was doing; Europe was unable to play a major role in the co-management of the system, a role which corresponded to its economic weight. The hopes of saving the system concentrated on the liquidity reform which Bator had mentioned. These talks had been initiated in 1965, and were to result in the so-called Special Drawing Rights, a form of reserve currency which was to relieve the pressure on the dollar.36 However, the conflict between Europe and the U.S. regarding decisions about the new reserve medium and voting rights in the IMF impeded any fast progress. Washington refused to accord Europe a veto right on the new reserve medium, fearing that this would give France the ability to block any American initiative.37 Essentially, the U.S. was not ready to give up the role of the banker of the world, as long as the Europeans had no means to force them to do so. When the SDR agreement was finally signed in 1968, the result amounted to much less than a real overhaul of the system. Thus in 1968, the transatlantic monetary bargain was in deep trouble and the Europeans began to look for alternatives. Certainly, their internal divisions, and particularly the uncompromising position of France, had played a big role in the failure of reform. Still, the major responsibility lay with the U.S. Less by deliberate action than by neglect and due to the inflexibility caused by the Vietnam War, the Johnson administration had allowed the system to disintegrate almost to a point of no return. The year 1969, however, seemed to open the prospect of a fresh start. A new president, Nixon, was installed in January; in April, the main adversary of the transatlantic monetary system, de Gaulle, left the stage. The core question now was how the reform of the monetary system (or the transition to a new system) would be managed: in a cooperative manner or in a way which was setting both sides on a collision course?

b) A Transatlantic Technological Community?

The Grand Design of a European-American transatlantic community contained the notion of progressiveness which in the 1960s was clearly associated with the ﬁeld of high technology. It is therefore quite striking how limited the actual extent of

35. Bator to President, 8.3.1967, LBJL, NSF, NSC Histories: Trilaterals, Box 50. 36. On these negotiations: S. COHEN, International Monetary Reform 1964-1969, London, 1977. 37. Embassy Washington to AA, 27.6.1967, PA-AA, B 150/1967.

94 Hubert Zimmermann technological cooperation between Europe and America was at the end of the decade and beyond. What were the reasons? Probably the most sensitive issue in transatlantic relations of the 1960s was the problem of European participation in American nuclear planning and its access to advanced U.S. nuclear weapons. The debate concerned not only questions of national power and international security. It was in its essence also a contest for access to the most prestigious technology of the time. In the second half of the century nuclear technology was seen as the key for the wealth of nations. America’s top position in every aspect of this technology was a core element of its pre-eminence in international political life. As a result, Washington’s partners depended on American decisions on the most vital questions of their national existence. No wonder, that this situation caused deep apprehensions, even during the honeymoon years of the alliance. The attempt by countries such as Britain, France, Germany or Italy to forge deals with the U.S. in order to close this yawning technological gap was at the core of the nuclear debate in the alliance.38 During Eisenhower’ s presidency, nuclear cooperation with the allies was encouraged by the government. Collaboration with the United Kingdom was in any case well developed, though beset with misunderstandings on both sides.39 The British attempt to preserve its nuclear autonomy led, however, to increasing dependence on American technology, particularly regarding launchers. Nuclear sharing with France, Germany and the smaller members of the alliance was a much more contested issue, although the Eisenhower administration was ready in principle to move forward in this area, too.40 Doubts in the State Department about the wisdom of a policy supporting several independent nuclear capabilities, particularly if this meant German access to atomic weapons, led to the proposal of a nuclear force assigned to NATO. Negotiations about what would later be called the Multi- lateral Force (MLF) were begun in 1960; the U.S. goal was ultimately to give a united Europe a nuclear force under its own control. The American readiness to share know-how and resources also included the civil uses of nuclear energy. Eisenhower’s Atoms for Peace program of 1953 was an ambitious proposal for the controlled dissemination of know-how regarding the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.41 In 1958, the U.S. signed an agreement with EURATOM (the newly founded Euro- pean organisation for collaboration in nuclear research), which ensured the supply of American enriched uranium for European reactors. However, there was a little snag to this deal: most of those reactors were built under American licence and depended on American supply of uranium. For this reason France, which developed

38. On this well-covered topic: B. HEUSER, NATO, Britain, France and the FRG. Nuclear Strategies & Forces for Europe, London, 1998; M. TRACHTENBERG, History & Strategy, Princeton, 1991. 39. In 1958, both countries signed an agreement for ‘Cooperation on the Uses of Atomic Energy for Mutual Defence’. Cmnd. 537, HMSO 1958. 40. This whole story is extensively analysed by M. TRACHTENBERG, A Constructed Peace, Princ- eton, 1999, particularly chapters V and VI. 41. J. MANZIONE, Amusing and Amazing and Practical and Military: The Legacy of Scientific Inter- nationalism in American Foreign Policy, 1945-1963, in: Diplomatic History, 24/2000, pp.47-49.

Western Europe and the American Challenge 95 its own line of reactors based on natural uranium, saw no use in this agreement and soon came to consider EURATOM a failure.42 This was an early instance of the mix of political rivalry, commercial interest and industrial competition which was to plague transatlantic technological cooperation all through the 1960s. With the advent of the Kennedy administration a decisive policy change occurred: the readiness in principle of the U.S. to share civil and military nuclear technology was slowly reversed. The risks of nuclear proliferation, especially to Germany which propagated an anti-Status-Quo policy towards the Eastern bloc, were deemed too high. Initially, Kennedy and McNamara were not sure about the wisdom of a strict non-proliferation policy because of its corrosive effect on the alliance43 and because the sale of hardware might bring in considerable economic benefit, for example balance of payments gains.44 In effect, the above-mentioned offset agreements with Germany were to a large extent a deal trading German monetary help for the sale of U.S. advanced military technology. Nuclear weapons were excluded despite discreet German requests.45 Finally, however, in 1964, non-proliferation became official government policy.46 What was ruled out included “exchanges of information and technology between the governments, sale of equipment, joint research and development activities, and exchanges between industrial and commercial organisations …”.47 The shift in policy that started in 1961 had a very negative effect on cooperation in a number of other fields, as the U.S. ambassador in Paris, Gavin, explained in a letter to Kennedy: “France will spend at least $700 million to build a gaseous diffusion plant which will produce enriched uranium by 1965. We sell enriched uranium to the United King- dom. We have failed to give France any assistance in building a nuclear submarine despite secretary Dulles’ offer to do so to de Gaulle in 1958. We are asking France to help us in redressing our balance of payments by making more military purchases in the United States, but we will not sell the very items France wants because they are associated with modern weapons systems”.48 Gavin cited the danger that this pattern of non-cooperation might spill over to the whole economic field. The subsequent American decision to refuse the sale of an

42. R. GILPIN, France in the Age of the Scientific State, Princeton, 1968, p.406. 43. The famous Nassau meeting in December 1962 resulted in an offer of U.S. nuclear help to both the U.K. and France. For the key documents see: FRUS 1961-63, XIII. However, due to deep doubts within the American administration about this policy and de Gaulle’s press conference of 13 Janu- ary 1963, in which he openly challenged the U.S., this option was not carried through. 44. See for example the discussion among JFK, McNamara, Rusk and Bundy on April 16, 1962; FRUS 1961-63, XIII, pp.377-80. 45. For German interest in advanced rocket technology and nuclear warheads: H. ZIMMERMANN, F.J. Strauß und der deutsch-amerikanische Währungskonflikt, in: Vierteljahreshefte für Zeitges- chichte, 47/1999, pp.63-67. 46. M. TRACHTENBERG, Constructed Peace, p.307-308. 47. Declassified Documents Reference System (thereafter: DDRS), 1999, Doc. 2312, National Security Action Memorandum 294: U.S. Nuclear and Strategic Delivery System Assistance to France, 20.4.1964. 48. FRUS 1961-63, XIII, Gavin to JFK, 9.3.1962, p. 687. Gavin was promptly rebuffed by the Depart- ment of State. See: ibid., Ball to Gavin, 14.3.1962, p.688.

96 Hubert Zimmermann advanced computer system which might have helped France’s nuclear programme made the new American policy very obvious.49 Though this policy was directed mainly against France, the other members of the Alliance received no better treatment. In early 1965, a government committee, chaired by former Deputy Secretary of Defense Gilpatric, recommended in a classified report to tie the strings attached to all exports related to nuclear technology even tighter.50 The MLF receded more and more into the background and was kept alive only by the need to assuage Germany. The long-term objective was to force even the British out of the nuclear business, or at least getting a NATO cover for its atomic arsenal. Soon the Americans started negotiations with the Soviet Union to implement this restrictive policy on a global level. The nuclear test ban treaty of August 1963 was the first step. However, far more important was the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) of 1968. Non-nuclear members of the alliance realised that this treaty was destined to keep them permanently out of the nuclear weapons business. But apart from the political aspects of the possession of nuclear weapons – a key element of the question for hard-liners in Germany not willing to give up the idea of a national nuclear capability–another serious issue was technology. Would the NPT also in- hibit the spread of nuclear technology in the civil field? Would it endanger at some later point the continuation of the 1958 agreement between EURATOM and the United States which presently ran until 1975?51 This turned out to be one of the major worries of countries such as Germany and Italy which were completely dependent on American deliveries of enriched uranium. Very quickly, these countries started to look for alternatives. Thus, in this key technological area, the NATO allies had turned away from real collaboration during the 1960s. This situation was to spill over into other fields. An important case in point is the development of advanced military technology. The priority the Pentagon under McNamara accorded to the sale of military equipment for balance of payments reasons impeded every possibility of large-scale technological cooperation between the U.S. and Europe. The huge project of the F-104G Starfighter, the principal fighter of the Alliance built from 1959 on under American

49. On this and other episodes illustrating the restrictive policy of the American government vis-à-vis France, see: E.A. KOLODZIEJ, French International Policy under De Gaulle and Pompidou. The Politics of Grandeur, Ithaca, 1974, pp.79-82. 50. NEW YORK TIMES, 12.2.1965. This policy was emphasised in a programmatic article by the Di- rector of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency who argued for a “more widespread, and stricter, application of controls to the traffic in fissionable material and to the technology which may be useful either for peaceful or military purposes”; see: W. C. FOSTER, New Directions in Arms Control, in: Foreign Affairs, 43/1965, p.592. 51. On these doubts: Akten zur Auswärtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (thereafter: AAPD) 1967, bearb, J. KLÖCKLER et.al., III, Doc. 419, Kiesinger to LBJ, 7.12.1967, pp.1606-1607; AAPD 1968, bearb. M. LINDEMANN/M. PETER, I, Doc. 140, Aufzeichnung von Ministerialdirektor Ruete: NPT; Belieferung von EURATOM mit spaltbarem Material, 24.4.1968, pp.508-509; see also: AAPD 1968/II, Doc. 242, Gespräch zwischen Außenminister Brandt und dem italienischen Außenminister Medici, 1.8.1968, p.946. Western Europe and the American Challenge 97 licence by a group of European countries, found no successor in the 1960s.52 On the contrary, the American policy was to “move promptly to make sure that Euro- pean countries place orders now for U.S. manufactured equipment, rather than make plans to meet their needs from their own production or from other foreign sources”.53 The sales offensive was mainly directed towards Germany, the most important arms market of the 1960s. In effect, German armed forces became increasingly dependent on U.S. weapons. The need to continue the offset agreements sharply curtailed German funds for shared weapons developments with other partners.54 Despite the enormous amounts involved in these deals, no successful joint German-American project was agreed to. The only significant project, the joint development of a main battle tank for the 1970s (agreed in 1964), was stopped in 1970 due to the mutual lack of funds and interest.55 This was no exception: there were no major American collaboration projects with other allies either. The commercial interest of the arms industry and the Pentagon, as well as the lack of political initiative in the U.S. government, were the major factors in the conspicuous absence of American proposals. Apart from nuclear weapons, space technology was the most prestigious field of scientific exploits in the 1960s. Again, collaboration between European and Ameri- can programmes was extremely sketchy. Although the Europeans had set up a Eu- ropean Space Research Organisation (ESRO) in 1962,56 it was the Soviet Union to which, in September 1963, in a speech before the UN General Assembly, Kennedy proposed a joint effort in space research, – with few practical consequences.57 In meetings of LBJ with the German chancellor in 1965 and 1966, the desirability of joint projects in space research was given prominent mention; however, this clearly derived from American hopes to explore new ways of offsetting the foreign exchange cost of American troops in Europe, and thus the idea was not pursued when it became clear that the prospects of commercial and monetary benefit for the U.S. were small.58 The close links between the nuclear and the space programme limited the available options anyway.59 American restrictions on the export of key technol-

52. The missile systems "Hawk" (1959-1965) and "Sidewinder" (1960-1965) were further European constructions licensed from the Americans; H.O. SEYDEL and H.G. KANNO, Die Rüstung, in: K. CARSTENS, D. MAHNCKE (eds.), Westeuropäische Verteidigungskooperation, München, 1972, p.163. 53. Dillon to Kennedy, 13.5.1963, John F. Kennedy Library, Presidential Office Files: Treasury, Box 90. 54. Aufzeichnung des Ministerialdirektors Ruete, 15.9.1964, PA-AA, B 150/1964. This was explicitly in U.S. interest. See: National Archives, RG 59, DEF 19US-WGER, DOS/DOD Message to Bonn Embassy, 15.7.1963. 55. H.O. SEYDEL, H.G. KANNO, op.cit., p.205. 56. An archive-based history of the European space effort is J. KRIGE, A. RUSSO, Europe in Space, 1960-1973, Nordwijk, 1994. 57. E. SKOLNIKOFF, Science, Technology, and American Foreign Policy, Cambridge 1967, pp.23-41. For documents on the history of this initiative see: FRUS 1964-68, XXXIV, Doc. 21-62. 58. AAPD 1965, bearb. M. PETER, H. ROSENBACH, II, Doc. 466, Conversation LBJ/Erhard, 20.12.1965, pp.1925-1927; LBJL, NSF, NSC Histories, Box 51, Treasury Background Paper: Tri- lateral talks, 5.11.1966. 59. FRUS 1964-68, XXXIV, Memorandum for the Record: Space Cooperation, 23.3.1966, esp. fn. 3, p.85. 98 Hubert Zimmermann ogies meant that offers by the Johnson administration to expand its cooperation with ELDO were received rather coolly in Europe.60 These examples are representative of the general trend. In 1966, during several OECD meetings, the Europeans took up the question of the widening technological gap between America and Europe. Their delegates lamented the American policy with regard to technological exports and expressed the hope that this policy would be revised so that a kind of transatlantic technological community might develop. Italy took a much publicised initiative at NATO and proposed a technological Mar- shall Plan.61 However, these attempts came to naught. The Americans replied that only “if Europe [was] prepared [to] make progress in economic integration, Kennedy round and on monetary reform,” could progress could be made “in their obtaining new technology”.62 This policy was reaffirmed at the top-level of the State Department: “… a technological subsidy would, I think, be doubtful wisdom, since it might serve to perpetuate bad European practices. Moreover, a substantial part of our favourable trade balance with the world depends on our technological superiority and we should not give it away for nothing”.63 In a 1967 memorandum for the National Security Council this position was re-affirmed: “We cannot afford to see our international strength reduced further through continued deficits (…). Correction of this balance of payments gap between North America and Western Europe is of much greater importance than a reduction of the ‘technological gap’ which would work in the reverse direction, enlarging the existing imbalance between the two areas (…). Thus, we should not encourage the strengthening of Europe, and especially that of the EEC, until the EEC demonstrates that it can carry out the responsibilities of a surplus area wisely and co-operatively”.64 The strains in the transatlantic monetary system spilt over to the area of technological cooperation impeding progress in this field. An additional problem was the different relationship between state and industry in U.S. and European society. The decade-long struggle about the organisation of Intelsat, a world-wide regulatory regime for telecommunication by satellites, is a good example. Founded on American initiative in 1964, Intelsat was managed in its first years by a private American company (Comsat), created specifically for this purpose by the U.S. government. However, the Europeans were apprehensive that Intelsat would make the creation of European satellites very difficult because it was so closely linked with industrial interests. In fact, Intelsat orders for the construction of satellites and their components went almost exclusively to American firms.

60. L. SEBESTA, The Availability of American Launchers and Europe’ s Decision ‘to go it alone’ , in: ESA History Study Reports, 18/1996, p.21. 61. Aufzeichnung Meyer-Lindenberg, 29.9.1966; Deutsche Vertretung bei der NATO an AA, 7.12.1966, both in: PA-AA, I A 6/83. For an analysis of this initiative see: L. SEBESTA, Un Nuovo Strumento Politico per gli Anni 60. Il Technological Gap nelle Relazioni Euro-Americane, in: Nuova Civiltà delle Macchine, XVII, 3/1999, pp.11-23. 62. FRUS 1964-8, XXXIV, Telegram from the Embassy in France to Department of State, 14.1.1966, p.2. 63. Ibid., Ball to Rusk, 6.6.1966, p.3. 64. Memorandum on U.S.-European Relations, 23.5.1967, LBJL, National Security Files, NSC Meetings, Box 2. Western Europe and the American Challenge 99

This, of course, tended to enlarge the already existing technological gap in this field.65 The Europeans demanded that Comsat would be replaced by an intergovernmental body in which Europeans and Americans had equal voting rights. The Americans, however, refused to accede to this request. This reflected the American approach to the management of high technology in which government agencies (usually the Pentagon) provided initiative as well as start-up funds, and later on became the main clients. However, the development, control, and marketing of high technology products was left to private firms whereas in Europe the links between the government and (often state-owned) firms were much closer, particularly in high-tech sectors. American firms were not eager to strengthen potential competi- tors by collaborating with them. Thus, a mix of competitive strategies, commercial considerations, the American balance of payments situation, and finally the feeling that the U.S. did not have much to gain from extended cooperation with small countries was responsible for the lack of American interest in the development of a technological community with the Europeans. Kennedy, in his Philadelphia speech, had spoken of a United Europe as a possible partner of the U.S. In the technological field, this possibility seemed rather remote as long as France and Britain pursued an expensive strategy of privileging national programmes. However, already in the mid-1960s the tide was turning against national autonomy – but also against cooperation with the United States. Faced by America’s unresponsiveness and by the escalating cost of their national champions in high technology, one European country after the other turned to an alternative solution to the technological problem: European cooperation, directed explicitly against American superiority.

III. The American Challenge and the Reafﬁrmation of Europe

a) The Hague Summit 1969 and the Plan for a European Monetary Union A sigh of relief was audible all through Europe when Richard Nixon took over from LBJ. It was expected that the new president would end the fatal involvement in Vietnam and that he would restore Europe to its former central place in Ameri- can diplomacy. In fact, the start of the new administration was auspicious. Right after his inauguration, Nixon announced that he intended to improve relations with Europe. He mentioned in particular technological questions.66 In February 1969, he toured European capitals with the message that the new administration would ﬁght against Congressional initiatives for a reduction of the American military commit-

65. W. UNGERER, Satellitenprobleme und Intelsat-Verhandlungen, in: Außenpolitik, 2/1970, pp.78-79. 66. AAPD 1969 (bearb. F. EIBL, H. ZIMMERMANN), I, Doc. 47, Pauls (Ambassador in Washing- ton) to AA, 6.2.1969, p.157. 100 Hubert Zimmermann ment in Europe. He also announced that he was ready to talk with the Europeans about their complaints in the monetary area.67 However, these positive signs were illusory. As it turned out, with the departure of the Johnson administration the still undecided contest within the U.S. government between advocates of the transatlantic community and those who opted for a more unilateral policy was won by the latter. A major diplomatic effort to restore the privileged partnership with Europe was not part of the new administration’s strategic concept. Nixon’s core objective was to regain for America its freedom of action in the pursuit of its national interests instead of getting entangled in a more interdependent transatlantic community. The United States would cease to assume unnecessary responsibilities, pursue great power diplomacy and leave it to regional powers to sort out regional problems.68 Europe, in particular, should concentrate on its own internal problems. This part of Kissinger’s "Year of Europe" speech was particularly galling for the Europeans.69 It explains why Germany’ s Ostpolitik – in its essence a reformulation of Germany’ s national goals and an attempt to gain freedom of manoeuvre for the Federal Republic – was regarded very sceptically by Washington. East-West diplomacy was the prerogative of the U.S. Other countries were “welcome to participate” in the East-West dialogue,70 but they should not play the role of initiators. Already in November 1969, one month after Brandt had been elected chancellor, the American government was telling the Germans that “things are happening too fast” and that there was widespread disquiet in Washing- ton regarding the activities of the new government.71 For Nixon, Europe was but one element in a global balance of power, and not necessarily a privileged partner. If American interests conﬂicted with those of Eu- rope, America would use its full weight instead of embarking on long tortuous negotiations with an often discordant chorus of Europeans. The Nixon administration also did not receive with enthusiasm the re-afﬁrmation of the European community which was to be so strongly accentuated in the second half of 1969. The immediate worry was that Europe would develop into a protectionist bloc, comprising not only the Six but, by concluding a series of preferential agreements with African and Asian countries, extending beyond the borders of Europe.72 Certainly, the Europe- ans were still important allies insofar as they were vital to counterbalance the Soviets (after Nixon’s China trip this function was reduced too). Beyond East-West politics, the Europeans were simply regarded as rivals. The Nixon doctrine’s emphasis on the future unwillingness of America to shoulder “every burden” spilt over

67. Ibid., Doc. 81, Gespräch zwischen Nixon und Kiesinger, 26.2.1969, p.286. 68. This was the essence of the so-called Nixon doctrine, announced by the President at a news conference on Guam on 25.7.1969. See: PP Nixon 1969, p.549. 69. Kissinger himself later doubted the wisdom of this assertion; H. KISSINGER, Years of Upheaval, London, 1982, pp.151-156. 70. H. KISSINGER, The Year of Europe, in: Department of State Bulletin, I/1973, p.598. 71. AAPD 1969/II, Doc. 377, Aufzeichnung des Ministerialdirektors Ruete, 27.11.1969, p.1339. 72. Botschaft Washington an AA: U.S. Haltung zur Entwicklung der EG, 25.11.1969, PA-AA, I A 2/ 1440. Western Europe and the American Challenge 101 to the monetary and technological field. Since Kennedy’s times the support of the monetary system had been portrayed by American governments and the Congress as a burden they were assuming for the benefit of the Western World. The consequence of the new policy was that this support was to be stopped and that in case the Europeans had a problem with the resulting dollar glut it was their responsibility to develop remedies. Similarly, if they had a problem with their technological in- feriority, it was their task to reform their industrial structures in order to become competitive. The new policy was nowhere more visible than in the monetary field, a former crown jewel of transatlantic co-operation. The core objective was to regain national autonomy in monetary policy, if necessary by flagrant unilateral action.73 Nixon was not interested in multilateral negotiations in the framework of the Bretton Woods institutions. His Secretary of Treasury Connally was fundamentally of the opinion: Foreigners are out to screw us. Our job is to screw them first.74 A recently declassified 1971 letter of Connally to Nixon shows the basic outlook. He warned that “there is a strong element of thinking within Europe that would take advantage of weakness or clum- siness on our part to promote the Common Market not as a partner but as a rival economic bloc, competing vigorously with the dollar and reducing or shutting out, as best it can, U.S. economic influence from a considerable portion of the world”.75 At the same time he exhorted Nixon to put pressure on chancellor Brandt during his forthcoming visit; Brandt was to be told “that the continuation of Germany’s present policy of holding dollars and not buying gold is absolutely fundamental to US-FRG relations …”.76 This recommendation was particularly delicate in so far as the U.S. were already preparing for a step which would undoubtedly reduce the European dollar reserves quite drastically in their value:

“If things come to the pass of a U.S. suspension of gold sales and purchases, we should do all we can – both substantively and cosmetically – to make it appear that other governments have forced the action on us. We want to portray suspension as a last resort and to present a public image of a cool-headed government responding to ill-conceived, self-defeating actions of others”.77 Things came to that pass three months later, when, on 15 August 1971, Nixon, without any consultation with the allies, closed the dollar-gold-window and imposed a 10% surtax on all U.S. imports. The transatlantic monetary system was dead, and this caused growing rifts in the alliance and a rapid loss in the control of states over financial markets. This was not inevitable; it was caused in the first place by the absence of the political will of its core country to preserve the system or to manage a cooperative transition to a new international financial structure, and

73. H.R. NAU, The Myth of America’s Decline, Oxford, 1990, pp.160-164. 74. H. JAMES, International Monetary Cooperation since Bretton Woods, Washington, 1986, pp.209-210. 75. The letter is dated 8.6.1971; DDRS 1999, Doc. 385. 76. Ibid., Doc. 378, Connally Memorandum for the President, 12.6.1971. 77. Ibid., Doc. 2317, Arthur F. Burns to Nixon, 19.5.1971. 102 Hubert Zimmermann maybe in the second place by the inability of Europe during the 1960s to reach a common stance which might have forced the U.S. to reconsider its policy.78 At that time, the Europeans had embarked on the long road towards European monetary integration. At the Hague Summit Meeting in December 1969, the EC member countries announced their intention to create a common European currency.79 At the same meeting, they invited the United Kingdom to join the community. By accepting the invitation, London also accepted the goal of monetary union. The Hague declaration was a sensational and unexpected leap forward in the history of European integration. It has to be recalled that in 1967/68 the UK still stuck to the world role of sterling, France showed no signs of abandoning its policy of monetary autonomy, and Germany was torn between the continued defence of the dollar-gold-system and a more nationalist monetary policy. The explanation for the rapid reorientation is to be found in the American monetary challenge. By taking an attitude of benign neglect towards the dollar glut the U.S. was reneging on the essential condition of the transatlantic bargain and permitted a freeing of ﬁnancial markets which turned out to be extremely disruptive to European domestic economies. It also undermined any attempt to pursue a policy of national monetary autonomy in Europe. The increasing mobility of capital and the absence of a political will and activity on a world-wide level to control the corresponding effects made autonomous policies increasingly costly for the Europeans. The most spectacular expression of the futility of national monetary autonomy was the Bonn monetary conference of 1968. Prior to the meeting, massive speculative capital ﬂed from Britain and France and moved to Germany. Faced by a drastic loss of their reserves, employed in order to defend the exchange value of their currencies, both France and Britain massively demanded a revaluation of the DM. Prime minister Wilson called in the German ambassador, Herbert Blankenhorn, in the middle of the night to impress on him the need for an immediate action by the FRG.80 The French were no less outspoken. In May 1968, student and workers unrest had undermined the French currency. In November, French reserves were reduced to about 50% of their value before the crisis.81 Most of the speculative money went to Germany which according to France for no legitimate reason stuck to an undervalued currency. On 9 November 1968, prime minister Couve de Murville, in a letter to chancellor Kiesinger, warned the German government of the consequences of continued inactivity:

78. One of the most active participants in the monetary negotiations of these years, Bundesbank vice- president Emminger, said in a speech he gave in Basle on 16.6.1973: “There can be no doubt that had all the major countries pursued appropriate policies and fully lived up to the rules of the game the system or for that matter, any system – would have functioned well”. O. EMMINGER, Vertei- digung der DM, Frankfurt, 1980, p. 228. 79. Bulletin des Presse- und Informationsamts der Bundesregierung 148, 4.12.1969, pp.1262-1263. 80. AAPD 1968/II, Doc. 385, Botschafter Blankenhorn, London, an Brandt, 20.11.1968, pp.1498-1500. 81. KOLODZIEJ, French International Policy, pp.206-207. Western Europe and the American Challenge 103

“[La France] ne peut pas voir sans de grandes appréhensions le maintien d’ un pareil état des choses. Les mesures extrêmes qu’ elle serait appelée à prendre si celui-ci se perpétuait auraient naturellement de graves conséquences, notamment pour ses partenaires immédiats. Le gouvernement français s’ est gardé de mettre en cause dans cette grave affaire la responsabilité de la République fédérale”.82 Despite this pressure and the fact that at the Bonn conference the U.S. joined the chorus of the demanders, the FRG was not willing to take the requested step. By speculating on the necessity of a French franc devaluation, finance minister Strauss even ignited new speculation against the battered French currency. The pride of de Gaulle rendered it impossible for him to accept defeat, and, after the conference, he refused to devalue. However, this heroic act could hardly hide the fact that the monetary conference had clearly demonstrated the failure of de Gaulle’ s policy. The idea of national autonomy had been severely undermined, and the reverberations of the austerity measures which now were adopted to enable France to sustain the franc had a huge impact on many areas of French policy. This also included France’ s ambitious technological programmes. In 1969 the French balance of payments remained at the mercy of the Bonn government which was pursuing an increasingly unilateral monetary policy. Even cautious remarks by German politicians regarding the DM-Franc exchange rate sparked speculation against the French currency, and the protests by the French ambassador in Bonn had an increasing air of helplessness.83 The French realised that they had not only been unable to dethrone the dollar, but ended up in a situation in which they were at the mercy of German decisions (or non-decisions), at least as long as both countries pursued a policy of monetary autonomy. In addition, the monetary turmoil threatened to destroy the Common Agricultural Policy, one of the core objectives of France’s European policy. This realisation paved the way for the acceptance of the European solution which became government policy after de Gaulle stepped back in April 1969. It was pushed in particular by Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, who became finance minister in the new French government of Georges Pompidou.84 The question was whether the Germans now would finally abandon the transatlantic system and their new unilateral strategy, and agree to the Europe- anisation of their stable currency. Once more, the Bonn monetary conference played a central role in this context. It made very clear that a monetary policy based mainly on narrow considerations of the Federal Republic’s national interests would lead to an increasing alienation of its most important partners. Furthermore, successive speculative waves in 1969 had shown that the pursuit of an anti-inflationary policy under conditions of increased capital mobility and rapidly decreasing political control of financial markets was extremely difficult. And finally, the French devaluation of August 1969 and the German revaluation two months later threatened to lead to the disintegration of one

82. AAPD 1969/I, Doc. 13, fn. 9. 83. Ibid., Doc. 147, Gespräch zwischen Kiesinger und Botschafter Seydoux, 7.5.1969, pp.559-562. 84. Von Braun (Ambassador in Paris) to AA: Zukünftige französische Währungspolitik, 24.7.1969, PA-AA, III A 1/612. 104 Hubert Zimmermann of the most important pillars of German foreign policy, the EC. Although the Bundesbank and large parts of the governmental bureaucracy still hoped for a reform of the transatlantic system, the political leadership considered the chances for such a reform increasingly sceptically, particularly in view of the passivity of the Nixon team in international monetary policy. The key figure in this context is Willy Brandt. His most important project was Ostpolitik which had been conceptualised already in detail in the Auswärtiges Amt where Brandt had been minister until he became chancellor. The concept was based on a long-range perspective leading to the reduction of the influence of the superpowers in Europe.85 However, the goal was not German unilateralism. A strengthening of European institutions, which would be widened to include Britain, was an essential complement to Ostpolitik. The new government in France and its proposal for a summit of the EC heads of government in late 1969 opened a realistic chance for a huge step forward in this field before formal talks of the Brandt government with the Eastern countries had even started. Trading British EC-membership for large concessions to France in the agricultural domain assured the success of the summit and ended the long stagnation of the EC during the previous years. Howev- er, Brandt also was looking for a project which would provide Europe with a positive incentive for deeper integration. Virtually days before the Hague Summit began, Brandt seized on the idea of a European monetary union which also found the approval of Pompidou.86 Under the chairmanship of the prime minister of Luxem- bourg, Pierre Werner, a high-level committee began to work on the steps which were necessary to achieve this ambitious project. It presented its final report already one year later. In the form of the Werner Plan the EC countries disassociated themselves from the reform of the transatlantic system as the final goal of their international monetary policy. The difficulties which lay ahead on the way towards a European currency were certainly underestimated at the time; however, the idea was there and although almost thirty years passed until it was implemented, monetary union was to remain the ultimate objective of European monetary policy. It was no accident that the final declaration of the Hague summit also contained a paragraph on technological cooperation, although it did not have the symbolic and political significance of the monetary project. Disillusionment with the Ameri- cans and the huge costs of the attempt to develop national capabilities in high technology forced the Europeans to seriously consider the European road.

85. AAPD 1968/II, Doc. 207, Aufzeichnung des Ministerialdirektors Bahr, 27.6.1968, pp.796-814. 86. The genesis of this step is difficult to reconstruct. The suggestion by A. WILKENS that a proposal by Jean Monnet in November 1969 had caused this sudden initiative is hard to believe. See: West- politik, Ostpolitik and the Project of Economic and Monetary Union, in: Journal of European In- tegration History, 1/1999, p.81. The Economics Ministry at that time had already presented plans for a monetary union in stages which later formed the German negotiating position. See: PA-AA, Joint Memorandum by AA/Ministry of Economics: Preparatory Meeting for Hague Summit, 14.11.1969. Western Europe and the American Challenge 105

b) Towards a European High-Tech Community?

We have seen how initiatives for a closer and more systematic collaboration of European countries with the United States failed. However, by the late 1960s, it also became clear that in most fields of advanced technology single European states had no chance to compete successfully with America. This quickly developed into a major political topic. On 5 July 1966, the former German defence minister Franz-Josef Strauß wrote a long letter to chancellor Erhard in which he decried the extent of American investment in advanced sectors of European industry. He was also critical of the fact that the Federal Republic was buying most of its modern weaponry in America, thus undermining any chance for successful European cooperation in this field. According to Strauß, American technological superiority in all important sectors, backed by a cheap dollar which allowed U.S. firms to buy up European industries, threatened “to turn Europe into an intellectual and scientific vacuum”.87 It was no surprise that one year later, Strauß also wrote the foreword to the German edition of Servan-Schreiber’ s best-seller Le Défi américain, in which the author made a passionate call for European collaboration in the face of Ameri- can technological and managerial superiority. Otherwise, Europe would decline to the status of an American colony. Servan-Schreiber’s major example was the fate of the European computer industry which was about to be completely dominated by the Americans.88 The book was a huge success and European governments which had been thinking along the same lines quickly took up the call. As early as 1964, the French government had commissioned a report which came to similar conclusions.89 France proposed the creation of an intergovernmental European body which was to explore possibilities for technological cooperation. The EC Council set up a high level working group, the Maréchal group. The Ger- man foreign ministry noted with satisfaction that with this initiative Europe had embarked on a new field of common activity.90 However, it soon turned out that ultimately de Gaulle’ s France clearly preferred national strategies for the most prom- ising technologies. Another problem which impeded every progress in this committee was that the conflict between France and the other five member states about U.K. membership in the EC spilt over. Britain still had the most advanced technological sector of all European countries and it was hard to imagine how Europe could confront the American challenge without its potential. However, de Gaulle did not bend. He suspected that proposals to include Britain in European technological projects were just strategies to get it into the EC by the backdoor, and that the British would ultimately prefer American offers if those were forthcoming.91 In

87. PA-AA, II A 7/1191. 88. J.J. SERVAN-SCHREIBER, Le Défi américain, chapter 14. Written in a similar vein, and also very influential, was the analysis by C. LAYTON, European Advanced Technology. A Programme for Integration, London, 1969. 89. ”Recherche Scientifique et Indépendance”, Le Progrès Scientifique, 1.9.1964. 90. AAPD 1968/I, AA Memorandum, 3.11.1967, p.277, fn.19. 91. AAPD 1969/I, Doc. 100, Conversation De Gaulle – Kiesinger, 13.3.1969, p.371. 106 Hubert Zimmermann

February 1968, the Dutch blocked further deliberations in the Maréchal group which had achieved almost no results.92 The British for their part had given clear signs that they were interested in Euro- pean cooperation. In November 1966, prime minister Harold Wilson proposed “to create a new technological community to pool with Europe the enormous technological inventiveness of Britain and other European countries, to enable Europe on a competitive basis to become more self-reliant and neither dependent on imports nor dominated from outside, but basing itself on the creation of competitive indige- nous European industries”.93 He repeated this proposal, which was enthusiastically backed by the smaller European countries, frequently in the following months, echoing Servan-Schreiber: “… there is no future for Europe, or for Britain, if we allow American industry, and American business so to dominate the strategic growth industries of our individual countries, that they, and not we, are able to determine the pace and direction of Europe’ s industrial advance (…) this is the road not to partnership but to an industrial helotry”.94 Britain until then had pursued a policy which privileged national technological independence and, if this was not possible, collaboration with the Americans (a strategy followed by almost all European governments until 1968/69).95 The few projects it had undertaken with European countries such as the construction of the supersonic aircraft ‘Concorde’ and the ﬁghter ‘Jaguar’ with France had been rather frustrating experiences. A series of defeats on world markets for British products which were in competition with American developments led to a re-orientation of this policy. Instances in which the United States for commercial reasons refused to sell the U.K. advanced technology cast additional doubt on the special relationship.96 Furthermore, a long series of failures with national developments of high technology tools led the U.K. to abandon the strategy of national autarchy. In 1965, the government approved the Plowden report on the British aircraft industry, which recommended that Britain should abandon its attempt to pursue an independent aeronautic programme and that it should instead collaborate with the rest of Europe in this area.97 The major reason for the new openness towards Europe, however, was that the U.K. considered its technological expertise a major bargaining chip in its campaign to enter the European Communities.98 This strategy failed. Yet, even after de Gaulle had made clear in late 1967 that he was not prepared to admit Brit- ain into the Community, the idea of intensiﬁed technological cooperation with the

92. AAPD 1968/I, Doc. 135, fn. 10, p.486. 93. See: Into Europe with Industry’s Help, in: THE TIMES, 15.11.1966, p.1. 94. Speech in the Guildhall, London, 13.11.1967, PRO, PREM 13/1851. 95. H. NAU, Collective Responses to R&D problems in Western Europe: 1955-1958 and 1968-1973, in: International Organisation, 29/1975, pp.632-636. See also: AAPD 1967/I, Doc. 8, Conversa- tion of Brandt with the Italian Foreign Minister Fanfani, 5.1.1967, pp.39-40. 96. R. GILPIN, France, p.53. 97. Report of the Committee of Inquiry into the Aircraft Industry, Cmnd. 2853, HMSO 1965. 98. Burke-Trend to Wilson, 27.2.1968, PRO, PREM 13/1851; S. SCHRAFSTETTER, Die dritte Atommacht, München, 1999, pp.200-202. Western Europe and the American Challenge 107 rest of the EC was pursued.99 A series of important projects were initiated. Among the most significant of those were the planned construction of a gas centrifuge for the production of enriched uranium and the development of a Multiple Role Com- bat Aircraft (MRCA). The former project was a consequence of European doubts regarding the long-term supply of European civil nuclear plants with enriched uranium from the U.S. Already in April 1967, the German government had approached London for a solution to this problem. Would the British government be interested in the construction of a European enrichment plant?100 Germany was particularly keen on such a project because, first, the development of a domestic enrichment capacity was too expensive, second, previous French offers had led to nothing because the enrichment plant at Pierrelatte was too closely involved with the Force de Frappe and, most importantly, the complete dependence on U.S. deliveries had to be reduced.101 In July 1968, the U.K. proposed a trilateral working group for the development of a uranium enrichment plant which should also include the Nether- lands.102 In November 1969, the three countries reached an agreement. Negotia- tions regarding the participation of Italy and Belgium started. All participants considered the project as “of an economic, technological and political importance (…) comparable to EURATOM”.103 France was initially very critical of these proposals. When de Gaulle was in Washington for Eisenhower’s funeral in 1969, he explicitly referred to the project in his talks with Nixon and warned that it might help Germany to get closer to the nuclear club.104 This attitude changed only with the re-orientation of French policy after the General had left the stage. A similar pattern developed regarding the second project, the MRCA. In 1968, a group of European countries (reduced in the end to Britain, Germany and Italy) agreed to jointly develop a European fighter as replacement for the Starfighter.105 The project was extremely ambitious and plagued by conflicts about the final con- figuration as well as unexpected cost explosion. Nonetheless, the governments stuck to it until completion. Once more, the French made it clear that they did not approve of these projects, mainly because they were developing a similar aircraft which they hoped to sell to other European countries.106 The French mistrust of Britain, however, was not unfounded because Britain’ s commitment to joint European projects remained ambiguous. In April 1968, for ex-

99. AAPD 1967/III, Doc. 449, Gespräch Brandt mit dem britischen Botschafter Roberts, 28.12.1967, p.1713. 100. AAPD 1967/II, Doc. 126, Gespräch Brandt mit dem britischen Außenminister Brown, 13.4.1967, p.584. 101. Aufzeichnung des Ministerialdirektors Frank, 28.4.1967, PA-AA, I A 6/72. 102. AAPD 1968/II, Doc. 220, Aufzeichnung des Ministerialdirigenten von Staden, 12.7.1968, p.868. 103. R. LOOSCH, Kernenergie und internationale Zusammenarbeit, in: Aussenpolitik, 7/1969, p.395. 104. H. KISSINGER, White House Years, p.384. French Foreign Minister Debré voiced the same suspicions to the German ambassador in Paris, von Braun; AAPD 1969/I, Doc. 133, von Braun to Brandt, 24.4.1969, pp.515-516. 105. AAPD 1969/I, Doc. 408, Aufzeichnung VLR I Behrends, p.1456. 106. Ibid., Doc. 69, Arnold (Ambassador to the Netherlands) to AA, 20.2.1969, p.238. 108 Hubert Zimmermann ample, the United Kingdom suspended payments for the European Launcher Development Organisation (ELDO), founded in the early 1960s with the aim of developing a launcher for European satellites.107 This was a hard blow for the Euro- pean space effort because Britain had been the most important contributor. The whole project entered a deep crisis. After the lunar landing in 1969, the Americans invited the Europeans to participate in the development of a reusable space trans- portation system (the later Shuttle). However, they refused to guarantee the availability of American launching facilities for satellites which were not operated within the framework of Intelsat.108 Again, commercial interest impeded transatlantic cooperation from the very start. This wedded the Europeans together, and they carried on with their own launcher development. In the mid-1970s, Britain which due to close connections of British firms to ELDO had never been completely excluded, officially rejoined the effort. In 1979, the first European rocket, ‘Ariane’, was launched into the orbit, and it became a serious competitor for the American space shuttle. The development of a European jet-liner, Airbus, also showed Britain’ s initial ambiguity. In 1967, it had signed an agreement with France and the FRG for the development of an alternative to the almost complete U.S. dominance on civil aircraft markets. Already in 1968, Britain cancelled its participation. Once more, France and Germany laboured on, carrying the project to final success (together with Britain which re-entered in 1979). All these projects share three characteristics. First, they were explicitly directed against U.S. dominance. Second, they demonstrated the great difficulty of reconcil- ing notions of national autonomy with the necessity of collective projects, particularly in the first years. In 1968 and early 1969, the MRCA, Airbus and ELDO were all in deep crisis, and it is only due to the reaffirmation of European cooperation in 1969/70 that they survived despite those great difficulties. Third, all of these projects were in the end successful. Thus, the late 1960s and early 1970s was a decisive period for European collaboration. It was not only those intergovernmental projects which were given a new vigour. Collaboration on community level also received renewed impetus. The Maréchal group was reactivated and in November 1971 a programme for ‘Cooperation in Science and Technology’ (COST) was adopted which was to coordinate joint European projects and eventually trans- cended the narrow confines of the EC. On the whole, the course of technological and monetary cooperation in the transatlantic alliance exhibited a similar pattern. European countries had three basic options (transatlantic cooperation, national autonomy, Europeanisation) whereas the United States had the choice between the first two possibilities. The analysis has shown a clear trend in American policy towards increasing autonomy in the period studied here. The Europeans, for their part, moved away from a policy of favoring transatlantic and national solutions toward a marked preference for European collaboration.

107. J. KRIGE, A. RUSSO, L. SEBESTA, A Brief History of the ESA, in: J. KRIGE, L. GUZZETTI (eds), History of European Scientific and Technological Cooperation, Luxembourg, 1997, pp.199-200. 108. Ibid., p.202. Western Europe and the American Challenge 109

IV. The Price of Disunity

In 1973, in an edited volume on the foreign policy of the Nixon administration, Robert Osgood predicted a process which, as this article has shown, had already been completed: “If the United States abandons its role, it will probably be by neglect rather than design; and it will result in the erosion of the present structure of relationships, not in the construction of another”.109 What has been argued here is that in the field of monetary policy a framework of transatlantic cooperation consisting of a series of tacit rules and common assump- tions about how mutual problems were to be tackled, came unstuck. Regarding technology, after timid efforts during the Eisenhower period, such a framework did not even develop and no major initiatives were undertaken in the 1960s and early 1970s despite the fact that it was a time of enormous technological advance. Whereas during the 1960s the Europeans gradually came to appreciate the role technological and monetary collaboration might play in fostering a closer relationship between their countries and in enhancing competitiveness as well as their domestic economic welfare, the United States decided it would be better off pursuing a more independent policy, renouncing – not in theory, but in practice – the concept of a close transatlantic partnership. The reasons were manifold. The most important one was that the United States, battered by Vietnam and its balance of payments deficits, perceived itself in a kind of decline and saw in the preservation of its national autonomy to the largest degree possible the best way to reverse this trend. Certainly, dealing with a disunited Europe was a difficult problem for American diplomacy. Privileged relations with single European countries such as they existed with Britain and as they were wished by General de Gaulle, were extremely divisive for the alliance. How- ever, a more determined effort, particularly after de Gaulle had left, might have prevented the mutual disenchantment of the early 1970s. Thus, around 1969, in monetary as well as in technological matters, a transatlantic outlook was replaced by a Europe-centered view in most European countries. The result of the American challenge was highlighted by the decisions of the European summit in The Hague in December 1969. European, not transatlantic, cooperation was given top priority in the future. Of course, this was a muddy process with count- less setbacks, and numerous attempts during the 1970s to assert once more the autonomy of national governments or to strike new bargains with the United States which still had a lot to offer, most importantly military security. In a short-term perspective the Europeanization of the late 1960s and early 1970s even may seem a failure, particularly regarding the fate of the plans for monetary union. However, the ultimate objective of European cooperation remained paramount for a huge part of the political establishment (with the exception of the U.K.) and for public imagination. In this sense, the years 1965 to 1973 were decisive for the future course of Europe and the

109. R.E. OSGOOD et.al, Retreat from Empire? The First Nixon Administration, Baltimore/London, 1973, p.18. 110 Hubert Zimmermann

American challenge did play a very considerable role in this process. It is probably instructive to speculate what would have happened had the United States been more willing to pursue real collaboration with Europe in the 1960s. Maybe the European Union we know now would not have come into existence. Hubert Zimmermann Ruhr-Universität Bochum

111 Le Président Pompidou et les relations entre les Etats-Unis et l’Europe

Georges-Henri Soutou

Depuis l’organisation de la solidarité occidentale et les débuts de la politique d’unification européenne dans les années 1947-1950, une structure essentielle de la politique extérieure française était déterminée par le triangle constitué entre l’Europe occidentale, les Etats-Unis et la France. Afin de rétablir son rôle international malgré la défaite de 1940 et la rupture de la deuxième guerre mondiale, Paris devait à la fois prendre la tête de l’Europe occidentale et maintenir des relations bilatérales étroites avec les Etats-Unis. Il y avait un lien dialectique entre les deux orientations, dans la mesure où la France aurait plus de poids face à l’Amérique si elle se présentait avec l’appui de l’Europe occidentale, et dans la mesure où son leadership sur l’Europe occidentale serait plus facile à faire accepter si elle bénéficiait d’une relation privilégiée avec les Etats-Unis. En outre cette position, à l’intersection de l’ensemble atlantique et de l’ensemble européen, serait celle qui permettrait le mieux à la France de maintenir son rôle mondial et de discuter avec les Américains des problèmes hors zone OTAN qui la concernaient particulièrement (Afrique, Moyen-Orient, Asie). Elle permettrait égale- ment d’échapper aux inconvénients ressentis à Paris dès les années 50 d’une intégration atlantique trop étroite (pour les dirigeants français le modèle à imiter fut longtemps la relation spéciale anglo-américaine et le but à atteindre la constitution d’une sorte de directoire à trois de l’Alliance). D’autre part il y avait les très importantes questions d’armements et de hautes technologies, nucléaires et autres: c’est toujours en priorité avec les Etats-Unis que dans ces domaines la France a souhaité coopérer, pour des raisons d’efficacité évidentes. Cette orientation fut celle de la IVe République.1 Ce fut celle du Général de Gaulle jusqu’en 1962, contrairement à ce que l’on pense souvent.2 Certes de Gaulle s’en écarta ensuite, mais son successeur Georges Pompidou devait y revenir de façon massive. Le triangle France-Europe-Etats-Unis devait même jouer pour lui un rôle absolument déterminant et se situe au cœur de sa politique étrangère. Il est essentiel de comprendre que la politique extérieure du Président Pompi- dou, et en particulier sa politique américaine, se trouvaient dans l’ombre portée du général de Gaulle et soumises à une vérification constante de leur «orthodoxie»,

1. G.-H. SOUTOU, La France et l’Alliance atlantique de 1949 à 1954, in: Cahiers du Centre d’Etudes d’Histoire de la Défense, 3(1997). 2. G.-H. SOUTOU, L’Alliance incertaine. Les rapports politico-stratégiques franco-allemands, 1954-1996, Paris, Fayard, 1996.

112 Georges-Henri Soutou jusqu’au sein de l’administration et du gouvernement.3 C’était un domaine particu- lièrement sensible, où le nouveau Président ne pouvait introduire de nouvelles orientations qu’avec prudence; lui-même restait d’ailleurs profondément gaullien en matière de politique extérieure, plus sans doute qu’on ne l’a cru souvent à l’épo- que. Or il faut bien mesurer à quel point, à partir de 1963-1964, le général de Gaulle avait poussé la rupture avec les Etats-Unis: la conférence de presse du 14 janvier 1963, la querelle de la MLF en 1964, la crise de la Chaise vide en 1965, le départ du commandement intégré de l’OTAN en 1966 avaient manifesté très clairement que pour le Général l’Europe devrait se développer sur tous les plans (écono- mique mais aussi politique et stratégique) indépendamment des Etats-Unis, et non pas en coopération avec eux comme cela avait été le cas pour les dirigeants de la IVe République.4 On ne sait pas en général que lors de sa visite à Moscou en juin 1966 de Gaulle accepta le principe d’une conférence européenne de sécurité sans les Etats-Unis, ce qui revenait à vouloir construire un nouveau système de sécurité européen sur la base d’une entente franco-soviétique et sans Washington, confor- mément d’ailleurs aux conceptions internationales d’ensemble du Général dans cette période.5 D’autre part dès le 24 janvier 1967 le Général, par une «Instruction personnelle et secrète», fixait le cadre de la programmation militaire pour la décen- nie 1970-1980: alors qu’auparavant la défense de la France était conçue «dans le cadre de l’Alliance atlantique», elle serait désormais établie en fonction du «triple caractère d’ubiquité, d’instantanéité et de totalité» du péril, sans qu’il ne soit plus question d’une alliance privilégiée.6 C’était la stratégie dite «tous azimuts», qui fut annoncée par le général Ailleret, chef d’état-major des Armées, dans un article de la Revue de Défense Nationale de décembre 1967. Elle fut confirmée par une allo- cution prononcée par le Général devant le Centre des Hautes Etudes Militaires, le 27 janvier 1968.7 C’était évidemment la fin de toute velléité de collaboration straté- gique et nucléaire franco-américaine, comme de Gaulle en avait pourtant évoqué la possibilité à différentes reprises entre 1958 et 1962. Avant de parvenir à la Présidence en 1969, Georges Pompidou (Premier ministre de 1962 à 1968) était incontestablement gaulliste en matière internationale, mais déjà avec de très sérieuses nuances, également en ce qui concernait les Etats-Unis. On pourrait parler d’un gaullisme pragmatique, rationalisé. Certes, il avait été très hostile aux accords de Nassau et à la MLF, deux des grandes pierres

3. Pour la politique extérieure de Georges Pompidou et ses rapports avec les Américains cf. E. ROUSSEL, Georges Pompidou, Paris, JC Lattès, 1994; Georges Pompidou et l’Europe, Bruxelles, Complexe, 1995, en particulier la contribution de P. MELANDRI, Une relation très spéciale: la France, les Etats-Unis et l’Année de l’Europe, 1973-1974; sur la collaboration militaire franco-américaine à l’époque de Pompidou cf. P. MELANDRI, Aux origines de la coopération nucléaire franco-américaine, in: La France et l’Ato- me, Bruxelles, Bruylant, 1994. On utilisera évidemment les mémoires essentiels de H. KISSINGER, Whi- te House Years et Years of Upheaval, Boston, Littel, Brown and Cy, 1979 et 1982, et de M. JOBERT, Mé- moires d’avenir et L’autre regard, Paris, Grasset, 1974 et 1976. 4. G.-H. SOUTOU, L’Alliance incertaine, op.cit. 5. Ibid. et archives privées. 6. Archives nationales, 5AG2/1040. 7. Institut Charles de Gaulle, L’aventure de la Bombe, Paris, Plon, 1985, pp. 210-211.

Le Président Pompidou et les relations entre les Etats-Unis et l’Europe 113 d’achoppement des relations franco-américaines dans ces années.8 Certes, il souhaitait que l’Europe reste indépendante des Etats-Unis et il redoutait la perspective d’un rapprochement américano-soviétique aux dépens de l’Europe, comme il le déclara au journaliste américain C. L. Sulzberger le 23 janvier 1968, annonçant le thème très gaulliste qu’il reprendra souvent comme Président de la République, celui du danger d’un «condominium américano-soviétique» sur l’Europe.9 Mais en même temps il se disait prêt à envisager des relations beaucoup plus positives avec Washington, y compris sur le plan économique, et dans une conversation avec C. L. Sulzberger le 21 octobre 1965, il exposa à propos de l’OTAN un point de vue beaucoup plus modéré que celui que de Gaulle devait imposer en 1966.10 En accédant à la Présidence en juin 1969, Georges Pompidou était décidé à la fois à maintenir l’héritage de la politique gaulliste et à le faire évoluer de façon à le débarrasser de ce qu’il considérait comme des éléments tenant trop à la personna- lité très forte et parfois impulsive du Général, et à tenir compte des moyens réels de la France, afin de pouvoir ainsi ancrer le gaullisme dans la durée. Citons ici une lettre du nouveau président à Philippe de Saint Robert le 10 juin 1969: «… Mon ambition est d’essayer de fonder sur des réalités solides, économiques, sociales, humaines, la poursuite d’une certaine politique qui ne se soutenait jusqu’ici que grâce au prestige d’un homme».11 D’autre part la candidature présidentielle de Georges Pompidou, qui n’avait pas la stature historique du Général, et ensuite son action politique comme chef de l’Etat reposaient sur la notion de «majorité présidentielle», allant au-delà des gaullistes et comprenant les Républicains indépendants et les Centristes du CDP. Or ces deux derniers groupes ne partageaient absolument pas l’anti-américanisme fré- quent dans les milieux gaullistes. Aussi du point de vue de la politique intérieure (surtout après le choc des événements de mai 1968 et l’occupation de la Tchécoslo- vaquie en août, qui avaient ravivé l’opposition au communisme et à l’URSS) un recentrage par rapport à Washington était donc nécessaire. Or celui-ci fut facilité dans la mesure où en 1969, après l’arrivée au pouvoir du Président Nixon et avant même la démission de De Gaulle en avril, les rapports franco-américains s’étaient subitement améliorés. La visite de Nixon en France fin février se passa bien, même si, sur le fond, le Général n’abandonna rien de ses thèses habituelles.12 Malgré tout les diplomates américains à Paris, d’après leurs contacts au Quai d’Orsay, perce- vaient une inflexion de la politique française, déçue par les Soviétiques et désireuse d’améliorer les relations avec les Etats-Unis.13 Le Président Nixon décidait même

8. A. PEYREFITTE, C’était de Gaulle, T.I., Paris, de Fallois/Fayard, 1994, p.339, et C. L. SULZ- BERGER, An Age of Mediocrity, New-York, Macmillan, 1993, p.133 (un témoignage particuliè- rement utile). 9. SULZBERGER, op.cit., p.406. 10. Ibid., pp. 216-217. 11. P. de SAINT ROBERT, Le secret des jours, Paris, JC Lattès, 1995, p.33. 12. Cf. H. KISSINGER, White House Years, op.cit., pp.106-111. 13. Télé. de l’ambassade américaine à Paris du 3 avril 1969 et note de Sonnenfeldt pour Kissinger du 8 avril, National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC [National Security Council] CF [Country Files]/674/France vol.I.

114 Georges-Henri Soutou le 15 avril de faire étudier tous les aspects d’une éventuelle coopération militaire bilatérale avec la France et d’en évaluer la possibilité sans a priori si les Français le demandaient.14 Le Département d’Etat et Nixon s’attendaient à la poursuite de cette amélioration à la suite de la démission du Général le 28 avril, ainsi qu’à un rapprochement, au moins sur le plan pratique, entre la France et l’OTAN.15 Il est vrai que Kissinger était pour sa part moins optimiste, craignant la montée de l’inﬂuence de la Gauche sur la politique extérieure française.16

Les premiers contacts entre le Président Pompidou et les Etats-Unis.

Les premiers contacts de Georges Pompidou, devenu Président, avec les Américains furent dans l’ensemble positifs. Il reçut l’ambassadeur Shriver le 23 juillet 1969 et lui tint un langage qui tranchait nettement sur la période précédente: il reconnaissait comme une évidence que l’Europe avait besoin de la couverture stratégique américaine et que la France avait besoin de l’Alliance atlantique; la politique militaire française d’indépendance nationale n’était pas tournée contre l’Amérique mais pouvait faciliter un certain allégement des charges des Etats-Unis en Europe ainsi que favoriser leur politique de détente avec l’Est. Une entente était également possible dans le domaine économique, en particulier en matière agricole, le Président français laissant même entendre qu’il serait disposé à revoir la politique agricole commune européenne pour revenir à des prix plus compatibles avec ceux du marché mondial et plus conformes aux intérêts américains et aux intérêts bien compris de la France (c’était en effet la RFA qui avait exigé des prix élevés pour le blé, pas Paris).17 D’autre part Pompidou n’était pas par principe hostile aux investissements américains en France (grande différence par rapport à la période précédente); il faudrait seulement attendre que l’industrie électrique et électronique française soient d’abord restructurées.18 Michel Jobert, secrétaire général de l’Elysée, déclara le 6 novembre à Shriver que Georges Pompidou était très content de pouvoir améliorer les rapports franco-américains. Il donna comme raison la crainte d’un renouveau du nationa- lisme allemand et le souci d’un appui américain pour contrebalancer cette menace.19 Je ne suis pas du tout convaincu que le Président, dont la politique allemande était beaucoup plus complexe, était sur ce dernier point exactement sur la même longueur d’onde et voyait les choses de façon aussi simpliste,20 mais les res-

14. Note de Kissinger du 15 avril approuvée par le Président et note de Kissinger pour le Secrétaire d’Etat le 22 avril, NSC CF/674/France vol.II. 15. Note de Martin Hillenbrand (Assistant Secretary for European Affairs) du 29 avril et lettre de Kissinger du 3 mai lui transmettant les félicitations de Nixon, NSC CF/674/France vol.II. 16. Note de Kissinger pour Nixon du 28 avril, ibid. 17. Compte-rendu de l’entretien avec Shriver, le 23 juillet 1969, AN, 5AG2/1022. 18. Entretien Pompidou-Rogers le 8 décembre 1969, 5AG2/1022. 19. NPM, NSC CF/676/France, vol.IV. 20. G.-H. SOUTOU, L’attitude de Georges Pompidou face à l’Allemagne, in: Georges Pompidou et l’Europe.

Le Président Pompidou et les relations entre les Etats-Unis et l’Europe 115 ponsables américains étaient satisfaits du changement d’atmosphère dans les relations entre les deux pays.21 Indiquons au passage, sans pouvoir nous étendre ici, que les Français apportè- rent sous Pompidou une aide diplomatique appréciable aux Américains à propos de la guerre du Vietnam, en particulier dans la phase finale en 1972, et se montrèrent dans ce domaine nettement plus coopératifs que dans la période précédente, ce qui correspondait à un changement d’attitude considérable.22 En outre Pompidou nomma en 1970 comme directeur du SDECE (le service secret) Alexandre de Marenches, dont les amitiés américaines étaient connues et qui collabora étroite- ment avec la CIA et les autres services occidentaux.23 Cela dit, il y avait évidemment des désaccords entre les deux capitales, que nous allons d’ailleurs retrouver tout au long de ce récit. Tout d’abord les questions monétaires (eurodollars et déficit de la balance américaine des paiements) qui allaient poser des problèmes entre les Etats-Unis et l’Europe dès lors que l’on vou- drait mettre sur pied une union monétaire européenne. Egalement les négociations stratégiques américano-soviétiques, qui risquaient de réduire la garantie nucléaire américaine à l’Europe et de conduire Washington et Moscou à considérer les puissances nucléaires tierces comme des facteurs de déstabilisation, à contrôler en cas de crise. D’autre part Paris était hostile à la proposition faite par l’Alliance atlantique fin 1969, proposition à laquelle tenait les Américains, d’une conférence sur la réduction équilibrée des forces en Europe. Outre que la France était par principe hostile à toute négociation «de bloc à bloc» (on retrouvait là un élément essentiel du gaullisme) Georges Pompidou craignait que cela ne conduise à aggraver le désé- quilibre entre forces conventionnelles et n’aboutisse à une sorte de neutralisation de l’Europe. En revanche Paris était favorable à la réunion d’une conférence sur la sécurité en Europe (vieille proposition soviétique renouvelée en mars 1969) d’une part parce ce que l’on ne pourrait pas toujours s’opposer à la volonté de détente de la plupart des pays européens, d’autre part par ce que cela permettrait à des pays comme la Pologne ou la Roumanie de retrouver une petite marge de manœuvre. Sur ce projet de conférence les Américains étaient beaucoup plus réticents. Néan- moins Paris était tout à fait disposée à causer, à renouer avec Washington un dialogue approfondi sur toute ces questions.24 D’autre part on remarquera que les réti- cences françaises à l’égard de la politique américaine portaient essentiellement sur les points qui risquaient d’affaiblir la cohésion occidentale face à l’URSS, ce qui était évidemment nouveau. Et en particulier pour Pompidou, à la différence de De

21. Cf. par exemple la conversation entre le Secrétaire d’Etat Rogers et André Fontaine du Monde, le 15 décembre 1969, NPM, NSC CF/676/France vol.IV. 22. H. FROMENT-MEURICE, Vu du Quai. Mémoires 1945-1983, Fayard, 1998, pp.321 ss; entretien Kissinger-Maurice Schumann le 22 septembre 1972, note de Kissinger pour Nixon à propos d’un entretien entre le général Walters et Pompidou du 30 octobre 1972, NSC CF/679/France vol.X. 23. C. OCKRENT, Comte de Marenches, Dans le secret des princes, Paris, Stock, 1986, pp.100 ss. 24. Entretien Pompidou-Rogers du 8 décembre 1969, AN 5AG2/1022 et RG59/67-69/Box 2103; notes de Jean-Bernard Raimond, conseiller diplomatique à l’Elysée, pour le Président des 18 novembre 1969 et 21 janvier 1970, 5AG2/1041.

116 Georges-Henri Soutou

Gaulle, les Etats-Unis participeraient «naturellement» à une conférence sur la sécu- rité en Europe: il reconnaissait, point capital, qu’ils n’étaient pas «étrangers aux problèmes européens».25 C’est dans le domaine des questions de défense que le dégel par rapport à la période parut d’emblée le plus marqué. En particulier les Français exprimèrent tout de suite et au plus haut niveau le souhait de renouer des contacts bilatéraux avec Washington sur les questions militaires et la coopération en matière d’armements.26 Cela suscita immédiatement l’attention et l’intérêt du Président Nixon et de Henry Kissinger et déclencha tout un processus de réflexion à Washington.27 Kissinger en résuma les conclusions pour le Président le 23 février 1970, juste avant la visite de Pompidou. Il conseillait d’écarter d’emblée toutes les questions théologiques concernant l’intégration atlantique, d’accepter la position particulière de la France dans l’Alliance et de s’engager dans un rapprochement pragmatique. Les domaines de coopération, dans la mesure où les Français seraient intéressés, pourraient con- cerner une planification en commun ou coordonnée des objectifs des forces straté- giques; une planification du même genre pour les forces nucléaires tactiques, étant donné que la France allait disposer bientôt de telles forces; la question de la coopé- ration en matière d’armes nucléaires et de missiles était plus complexe, à cause du Congrès, mais si les Français en faisaient la demande on pouvait indiquer que l’on était prêt à l’envisager, sur des points spécifiques.28 En revanche d’autres secteurs de l’administration, comme par exemple le Département de la Défense, étaient beaucoup plus réticents.29

La visite de Pompidou aux Etats-Unis en février 1970.

On sait que la visite de Georges Pompidou aux Etats-Unis en février 1970 fut mar- quée par de vifs incidents à Chicago, le 28 février, avec des manifestations protes- tant contre la décision française de vendre des armes à la Libye.30 Pourtant les aver- tissements n’avaient pas manqué;31 à mon avis l’Elysée et Georges Pompidou ont

25. Lettre de Pompidou à Nixon du 1er juillet 1972, AN, 5AG2/1021. 26. Déclarations de Pompidou à Shriver le 23 juillet 1969, AN, 5AG2/1022, et propos de Beaumar- chais, directeur politique au Quai d’Orsay, le 29 juillet, à Shriver, National Archives, RG59, Sub- ject-Numeric Files 67-69/Box 2103. Déclarations de Michel Jobert, le secrétaire général de l’Ely- sée, le 6 novembre, télé. de l’ambassade à Paris du 8 novembre, NPM, NSC CF/676/France vol.IV. Note de Michel Debré, ministre de la Défense, pour Pompidou en février 1970, 5AG2/1021. 27. Memorandum of conversation, 27 juin 1969, NPM, NSC CF/675/France vol.III. 28. NPM, NSC CF/916/France-Pompidou Visit February 1970. 29. Mémorandum pour le Président du Secrétaire à la Défense adjoint David Packard le 12 février 1970, conseillant de réclamer aux Français le paiement des frais occasionnés par le départ des forces américaines en 1966-1967, le droit d’utiliser les installations réalisées par l’OTAN en France (comme les oléoducs) en cas de crise et mettant en garde contre les transferts de technologie élec- tronique au profit des Français, NPM, NSC CF/676/France vol.V. 30. Récit très complet du voyage dans E. ROUSSEL, op.cit., pp.349-367. 31. Cf. le dossier du voyage, 5AG2/1022.

Le Président Pompidou et les relations entre les Etats-Unis et l’Europe 117

été victimes d’abord de l’incompréhension du fait qu’aux Etats-Unis la sécurité et l’ordre public dépendent des autorités municipales et que le voyage devait donc aussi être préparé de ce point de vue au niveau local; or le dossier montre que si les consuls à New York et à San Francisco furent très actifs dans ce domaine, celui de Chicago le fut apparemment moins. D’autre part il est clair que Georges Pompidou n’avait pas mesuré la gravité des passions soulevées dans la communauté juive américaine par l’affaire des ventes d’armes à la Libye; il n’accepta que très peu de demandes d’audience d’organisations ou de personnalités juives américaines, il refusa, malgré la suggestion de l’un de ses conseillers, de prononcer une déclara- tion générale rétablissant l’équilibre en faveur d’Israël;32 en fait Pompidou, comme il le déclara à des représentants d’organisations juives à San Francisco le 27 février, estimait qu’il fallait distinguer soigneusement entre Israël en tant qu’Etat et la question du judaïsme; selon lui Israël n’avait de chance de régler ses problèmes de sécurité que lorsqu’il se considérerait comme un Etat parmi les autres Etats du Moyen-Orient et non plus comme une «communauté religieuse».33 Mais ce langage, à l’époque, n’avait aucune chance d’être entendu. Or en fait Pompidou, tout en poursuivant et même en développant la «politique arabe» de son prédécesseur, avait fait évoluer la position française sur deux points importants par rapport à la période antérieure: dès le 29 juin 1969 il s’était déclaré prêt à abandonner l’embargo intégral sur les armes à destination d’Israël décidé par Paris le 1er janvier 1969 et à revenir à l’embargo sélectif proclamé en 1967, et donc à fournir à Israël des pièces de rechange pour les armement déjà vendus, ce qui fut fait.34 D’autre part il avait accepté (grande rupture avec le Général!) que les Etats-Unis et l’URSS commencent à explorer de façon bilatérale la possibilité d’une solution au Moyen-Orient, reconnaissant explicitement le rôle des Etats-Unis comme protec- teur d’Israël.35 Il s’agissait donc en partie d’un malentendu. Les témoins et acteurs de l’époque furent partagés sur la question de savoir si ces incidents durcirent la position de Georges Pompidou envers les Etats-Unis et inﬂuencèrent ou non sa politique envers eux par la suite.36 A mon avis ce ne fut pas le cas: les rapports franco-américains dépendaient de facteurs structurels et non pas accidentels. Les entretiens des 24 et 26 février avec Nixon en particulier furent positifs: les deux hommes tombèrent en gros d’accord sur l’évolution des relations internationales vers un système multipolaire (Etats-Unis, URSS, Europe occidentale, Chine, Japon), sur la prudence à observer à l’égard de l’URSS, sur l’importance de ne pas isoler la Chine, sur la nécessité de demander aux Allemands d’informer très exactement leurs partenaires occidentaux de l’évolution de l’Ostpolitik.37 Nixon reconnut la volonté française

32. Annotations sur une note de Jean-Louis Lucet du 11 février 1970, 5AG2/1022. 33. Cité par E. ROUSSEL, op.cit., pp.362-364. 34. Annotation sur une note du 29 juin 1969 et ensemble du dossier, 5AG2/1040. 35. Entretien avec Shriver le 23 juillet 1969. 36. Cf. ROUSSEL, op.cit., pp.366-367. 37. Dans ses entretiens privés après la rencontre Nixon se déclarait fort satisfait, cf. SULZBERGER, op.cit., pp.614-615.

118 Georges-Henri Soutou d’indépendance. Le plus intéressant fut que les deux hommes abordèrent carrément les questions militaires: ils se déclarèrent d’accord pour autoriser des conversations confidentielles bilatérales entre militaires des deux pays à propos de leur coopéra- tion dans le cadre de l’OTAN, mais en dehors des structures intégrées, et éventuel- lement pour préparer des plans en commun; Pompidou était disposé à étendre les accords Ailleret-Lemnitzer de 1967 à toute la Ière Armée et pas seulement aux divisions stationnées en Allemagne; il était prêt à ranimer le «comité directeur» établi entre les deux pays en 1962 pour discuter de la coopération dans le domaine des armements conventionnels; il suggéra que la France pourrait souhaiter deux ou trois ans plus tard élargir cette coopération au domaine nucléaire, quand entreraient en service ses sous-marins lanceurs d’engins et ses armes nucléaires tactiques. Les deux hommes confirmèrent que de telles conversations ne remettraient nullement en cause la liberté de décision des deux pays en cas de crise. Ils établirent d’autre part des lignes de communication confidentielles entre eux: Kissinger et Jobert pour les questions civiles, les généraux Goodpaster (commandant les forces améri- caines en Europe et SACEUR) et Fourquet (Chef d’état-major des Armées) pour les questions militaires.38 On peut considérer que les dégâts de la période 1963-1968 étaient en voie d’être réparés; en outre, implicitement, Nixon avait reconnu à la France le même rôle international et le même type de relation intime avec Washington que pour la Grande-Bretagne, ce qui était une très ancienne revendication française.

L’évolution des rapports franco-américains en 1970-1971.

On était d’accord à Paris et à Washington en 1970-1971 pour considérer que, glo- balement, les relations franco-américaines évoluaient favorablement, en particulier sur les questions européennes.39 On était d’accord pour suivre avec vigilance l’Ost- politik de Willy Brandt; les craintes à ce sujet ne concernaient pas la résurgence d’un danger allemand que l’on estimait de part et d’autre dépassé, mais l’éventua- lité de concessions excessives de la RFA à l’URSS. Comme le dit Kissinger à l’ambassadeur à Washington Charles Lucet le 13 avril 1970, on craignait que Brandt ne lâche aux Russes «des choses essentielles»;40 s’il devait y avoir un accord entre l’Est et l’Ouest, poursuivait Kissinger, «il serait fait entre les Etats-Unis et l’URSS et non pas entre les Allemands et l’URSS», ce qui rejoignait une préoccupation constante à Paris. En effet à Paris on soutenait l’Ostpolitik dans sa première phase, telle que Bonn l’afﬁchait, celle qui conduisait à la signature de traités avec les pays de l’Est reconnaissant de fait la division de l’Allemagne et les

38. E. ROUSSEL, op.cit., pp.350 ss. 39. Mémorandum de Kissinger pour le Président le 11 novembre 1970, avant la rencontre de celui-ci avec Pompidou, à l’occasion des funérailles du général De Gaulle, et mémorandum de Kissinger pour Nixon du 25 janvier 1971, NPM, NSC CF/677/France vol.VII. 40. Lettre de Lucet à Maurice Schumann du 14 avril 1970, 5AG2/1021.

Le Président Pompidou et les relations entre les Etats-Unis et l’Europe 119 frontières de 1945. Mais on se méfiait beaucoup des arrière-pensées ultérieures de Bonn, que l’on soupçonnait d’être prêt à rechercher la réunification de l’Allemagne dans un nouveau système de sécurité européen qui aurait en fait reposé sur un accord germano-soviétique. Car Georges Pompidou était très satisfait de voir l’Ost- politik conforter dans un premier temps la division de l’Allemagne. Mais il redoutait un deuxième temps éventuel, celui d’un rapprochement en profondeur entre l’Allemagne et Moscou en échange de la réunification, situation qui bouleverserait les conditions de la sécurité de la France. Paris s’en tenait depuis les années 50 au concept de la «double sécurité»: la sécurité de la France à l’égard de l’Allemagne serait assurée par la division de cette dernière, la sécurité de la France envers l’URSS serait assurée par l’alliance avec les Etats-Unis mais aussi par l’intégration étroite de la RFA à l’Europe occidentale et à tout l’Occident. En 1966, à l’occasion de son voyage à Moscou et parce qu’il était déçu du peu de suites réelles du traité franco-allemand de janvier 1963, De Gaulle avait envisagé quelque chose de diffé- rent: un nouvel ordre de sécurité en Europe reposant fondamentalement sur une entente franco-soviétique pour contrôler l’Allemagne et marginalisant l’Amérique. Pompidou était revenu sur ce point à quelque chose de plus classique et de plus compatible, dans sa vision géopolitique de l’avenir de l’Allemagne, de l’URSS et de l’Europe, avec de bons rapports franco-américains.41 D’autre part au cours de son voyage en URSS en octobre 1970, le Président Pompidou résista à Brejnev qui voulait l’amener à répéter les propos tenus à Mos- cou par le Général en 1966 «en faveur d’une élimination progressive de l’influence des Etats-Unis en Europe». Certes, l’Europe devrait pouvoir se «dégager de l’influence des Etats-Unis» et «être pleinement l’Europe», mais l’influence de l’Amérique sur le Continent découlait de la menace militaire soviétique et de la nécessité de contrer celle-ci avec la puissance militaire américaine et l’Alliance atlantique. Seule une véritable détente permettrait de sortir de cette situation, mais la responsabilité en incombait d’abord à l’URSS. En outre il n’était pas question de remplacer ce que Pompidou se refusait à qualifier pour son compte de «tutelle amé- ricaine» par une «tutelle soviétique».42 On voit que sur cette question absolument centrale à propos du triangle Paris-Washington-Moscou la position de Pompidou était très différente de celle de De Gaulle, même si lui aussi souhaitait l’émergence d’une «Europe européenne». Le Président s’en expliqua dans une conversation fort significative avec le journaliste américain Cyrus Sulzberger le 1er décembre 1970: «La base de ma réflexion est que la France se rapproche des Etats-Unis dans la mesure où la supériorité des Etats-Unis par rapport à la Russie diminue. C’est pourquoi ma politique est moins anti-américaine dans son expression que celle de De Gaulle, parce qu’il ressentait fortement la supériorité américaine sur l’Union soviéti- que et d’autres pays et estimait qu’il devait s’y opposer».43 On constate également, et là aussi c’était nouveau, que Georges Pompidou était désireux d’un contact approfondi avec Washington à propos des points de tension

41. G.-H. SOUTOU, L’attitude de Georges Pompidou …, op.cit. 42. Compte-rendu de l’entretien Pompidou-Brejnev du 13 octobre 1970, 5AG2/1018. 43. SULZBERGER, op.cit., p.690.

120 Georges-Henri Soutou en Europe, par exemple à propos des menaces éventuelles soviétiques sur la Rou- manie et la Yougoslavie, qui préoccupaient fort les Occidentaux en 1971.44 Les Soviétiques s’en rendaient d’ailleurs compte, qui régulièrement soupçonnaient les Français de s’écarter de la ligne d’"indépendance» de De Gaulle.45 A la fin de l’année 1970, le seul véritable problème entre les deux pays était la question monétaire internationale. En décembre la France reprit ses achats d’or et les Français recommencèrent leurs critiques contre l’inflation américaine et la politique monétaire et économique américaine et son impact négatif sur l’Europe.46 En revanche sur le plan militaire les choses évoluaient favorablement. Dès le 10 mars 1970, à la suite de la visite du Président français, Nixon approuvait, sur les conseils de Kissinger, toute une série de décisions: le général Goodpaster était autorisé à explorer avec le général Fourquet toutes les possibilités pratiques d’amé- liorer la coopération avec les forces françaises, y compris en ce qui concernait les armes nucléaires tactiques et les forces navales, ainsi que la possibilité de coordonner les plans de frappe des forces stratégiques respectives, tout en respectant le refus français de revenir à l’intégration atlantique et étant entendu que la décision finale dépendrait d’un accord entre Nixon et Pompidou; le comité franco-américain sur les armements conventionnels créé en 1962, mais en sommeil depuis 1966, serait réactivé; on étudierait la possibilité de venir en aide aux Français pour leurs programmes de missiles; on mettrait entre parenthèses une décision de l’administration Johnson en 1964 (NSAM 294) qui interdisait toute aide aux Français concernant les armes nucléaires et les missiles.47 Il ne faut pas penser que tout le monde à Washington était aussi prêt à renouer la collaboration militaire avec les Français que Nixon et Kissinger. Le Secrétaire à la Défense Melvin Laird répondit à Kissinger le 2 avril 1970 de façon apparemment positive mais en fait très réservée à propos des programmes de missiles. Il soulignait les difficultés possibles avec le Congrès et des répercussions possibles sur les négociations SALT avec les Soviétiques. En outre, selon Laird, les échanges éven- tuels «ne devraient fournir aucune accélération significative aux capacités françai- ses», ce qui en réduisait évidemment l’intérêt! En outre il fallait exiger en contrepartie que les Français acceptent de participer à l’étude stratégique que l’OTAN avait commencée à propos des années 70.48 Or c’était ce genre de participation à l’OTAN que les Français justement récusaient dans leur crainte constante d’être ramenés indirectement à l’intégration qu’ils avaient quittée en 1966. Comme le

44. Annotation de Georges Pompidou sur un télégramme du 26 juillet 1971, 5AG2/1041; cf. un dossier complet sur les possibilités d’intervention soviétique en Yougoslavie, le 21 février 1972, 5AG2/ 1040. 45. Cf. par exemple l’entretien entre l’ambassadeur à Paris Zorine et Michel Debré, ministre de la Dé- fense, le 16 janvier 1971, 5AG2/1018. 46. Mémorandum de Fred Bergsten pour Kissinger sur les achats d’or par la France le 10 décembre 1970, et série de documents sur des entretiens d’Hervé Alphand, secrétaire général du Quai d’Orsay, à Washington, en particulier avec Kissinger, les 10 et 11 décembre, NPM, NSC CF/677/ France vol.VII. 47. NPM, NSC CF/676/France vol.V. 48. NPM, NSC CF/676/France vol.VI.

Le Président Pompidou et les relations entre les Etats-Unis et l’Europe 121 nota Georges Pompidou le 24 avril, Paris était prêt à s’entretenir sur un plan bilaté- ral avec les Américains sur les questions de défense et de sécurité des années 70, mais pas dans un cadre OTAN multilatéral.49 On ne pouvait pas mieux illustrer le souci français constant d’une situation privilégiée à Washington, d’un rôle de charnière entre l’Amérique et l’Europe, à l’instar de la Grande-Bretagne, comme je l’ai souligné au début de cette étude. Kissinger préféra aller de l’avant sans trop tenir compte des restrictions de Laird. Il décida le 24 avril 1970 d’envoyer à Paris pour des conversations explora- toires John Foster, secrétaire adjoint à la Défense, chargé des questions d’armement. Celui-ci reçut pour instructions de tenir certes compte des préoccupations de Laird à l’égard du secret, du Congrès, des SALT, mais on soulignait que le Président voulait aider les Français; en outre Foster ne devait pas laisser croire à ses interlocuteurs que l’assistance américaine dépendrait d’un rapprochement de la France avec l’OTAN.50 Kissinger (et Nixon) avaient parfaitement compris qu’il fallait écarter tout préalable théologique concernant l’Alliance. Dès l’été 1970 les choses avaient pris tournure: le général Goodpaster avait eu de premiers entretiens avec le général Fourquet; on avait progressé dans le domaine de la planification de la coopération en cas de guerre avec les forces françaises en Allemagne, même si les Français n’étaient pas encore disposés à parler de leurs (futures) armes nucléaires tactiques; le secrétaire adjoint à la Défense John Foster avait eu une première conversation privée avec le délégué ministériel à l’Armement Jean Blancard sur les souhaits des Français concernant les missiles. (Parallèlement on constatait que les échanges scientifiques de toute nature entre la France et les Etats-Unis se multipliaient: ils dépassaient ce qui existait avec tout autre pays).51 Le 3 août 1970, Sonnenfeldt fit remarquer à Kissinger que jusque-là on avait pro- cédé au coup par coup: il fallait désormais systématiser les choses, disposer d’une doctrine présidentielle, créer à Washington un groupe de coordination pour les échanges avec les Français, prendre d’autre part une série de décisions de fond: voulait-on soutenir l’effort stratégique des Français et donc annuler la décision de l’administration Johnson d’avril 1964? Quel serait alors la répercussion de cette assistance sur les SALT? Les arguments et la présentation de ceux-ci par Sonnen- feldt impliquaient que pour lui il était souhaitable de soutenir l’effort français, ne serait-ce que parce qu’il serait nécessaire de coordonner entre l’OTAN et Paris l’emploi des forces nucléaires tactiques en Europe le cas échéant, sous peine de conséquences catastrophiques pour l’OTAN; que les forces françaises ne seraient pas suffisamment importantes pour compromettre vraiment les SALT; que le mieux serait sans doute que l’assistance américaine intervienne dans le cadre d’un effort nucléaire et stratégique commun à la France et à la Grande-Bretagne, comme les dirigeants britanniques le suggéraient.52

49. 5AG2/1041. 50. Note de Sonnenfeldt pour Kissinger du 23 juin 1970, NPM, NSC CF/677/France vol.VI. 51. Note de Sonnefeldt pour Kissinger du 11 décembre 1970, NPM, NSC CF/677/France vol.VII. 52. NPM, NSC CF/677/France vol.VI.

122 Georges-Henri Soutou

Les réflexions se poursuivirent durant les mois suivants et jusqu’en mars 1971 entre le NSC et les Départements d’Etat et de la Défense dans le cadre d’un groupe ad hoc chargé de la préparation du NSSM 100 (National Security Study Memoran- dum) sur les relations militaires avec la France. Elles furent très difficiles, à cause des réticences des militaires à toute concession à la France tant qu’elle n’aurait pas rejoint, au moins en pratique, le commandement intégré de l’OTAN, également à cause des réticences prévisibles du Congrès, et elles exigèrent l’engagement sans faille de Kissinger.53 Un souci important à Washington était d’éviter, en développant la coopération bilatérale avec les Français, de risquer des réactions négatives de la part d’autres membres de l’Alliance atlantique (évidemment en particulier de la RFA) qui affaibliraient l’unité de l’OTAN.54 Finalement on aboutit fin mars à des recom- mandations assez limitées, qui furent entérinées par Nixon (NSDM 103 et 104) et communiquées aux Français: un certain assouplissement en ce qui concernait les cal- culateurs très puissants, indispensables pour l’étude des armes nucléaires; en matière de missiles, une aide limitée aux questions liées à la fiabilité des composants des systèmes existants et à l’exclusion des domaines qui pourraient améliorer la précision des fusées françaises (les demandes de Paris portaient également sur ce dernier point); en matière nucléaire, on se contenterait de reprendre les échanges interrompus en 1963 sur la sûreté des armes nucléaires (procédures et systèmes).55 Sur la base de ces décisions l’ambassadeur Watson remit le 5 mai 1971 aux Français un mémorandum proposant l’ouverture de conversations pour la technologie des missiles, la sécurité des armes nucléaires et les ordinateurs de grande puissance.56 En conséquence John Foster rencontra à Paris Jean Blancard, le 12 mai 1971. Ils parlèrent des missiles et Blancard fut tout à fait d’accord pour que les échanges portent uniquement sur la fiabilité des systèmes existants: sa priorité était en effet de faire fonctionner correctement les systèmes en cours de développement, qui apparemment rencontraient certains problèmes, et non pas de demander aux Américains de l’aider à mettre au point une génération de missiles plus avancés. Sur ces bases l’accord se fit pour une nouvelle rencontre le 15 juin.57 Au cours de celle-ci Foster remit à Blancard un projet d’accord pour des échanges sur les missiles et la sûreté des armes nucléaires. Le 22 juillet, Blancard fut autorisé à signer cet accord et à commencer des discussions dans les deux domaines prévus. On remarquera que cet accord allait en fait plus loin que ce qui avait été décidé à Washington au départ: il concernait également les domaines du guidage et de la précision des missiles ainsi que le durcissement des charges nucléaires (face aux défenses anti-missiles à base d’ogives nucléaires correspondant au système ABM soviétique Galosh), même si ces domaines étaient soumis à des conditions limitatives particu-

53. Note de Sonnenfeldt pour Kissinger du 9 janvier 1971, NPM NSC CF/677/France vol.VII. 54. Note de Kissinger pour Nixon du 25 janvier 1970, ibid. 55. Note de Kissinger pour le Président du 25 mars 1971, ibid., et note de Kissinger pour le Secrétaire d’Etat et le Secrétaire à la Défense du 15 avril 1971, NPM, NSC CF/678/France vol.VIII. 56. Note de Michel Debré, ministre de la Défense, pour Pompidou, début 1972, 5AG2/1040. 57. Lettre de David Packard, secrétaire d’Etat à la Défense adjoint, à Kissinger, du 25 mai 1971, NPM, NSC CF/678/France vol.VIII.

Le Président Pompidou et les relations entre les Etats-Unis et l’Europe 123 lières.58 On a l’impression que certains à Washington voulaient aller un peu plus loin que ce que comportait le consensus minimum réalisé au sein de l’administration. Blancard eut de nouveaux entretiens avec Foster à Washington en novembre 1971. Le 12, celui-ci lui écrivait pour proposer l’ouverture de discussions sur la sécurité des armes nucléaires. Cependant le souci d’indépendance poussait Paris également à mettre de son côté de strictes limites aux échanges: il s’agissait uniquement d’améliorer la fiabi- lité et les capacités des missiles existants, en réalisant des gains de temps et d’argent sur les programmes; mais en aucun cas il ne fallait que les conversations permettent aux Américains de se faire une idée de la valeur opérationnelle des engins français ni des modalités de contrôle des missiles et des têtes nucléaires et des réseaux de commandement gouvernementaux. En outre, il ne fallait en aucun cas que les Américains puissent dire aux Soviétiques qu’ils contrôlaient technique- ment l’effort français. En fait, la prudence américaine, quoique pour des raisons différentes, rejoignait la prudence française, liée aux préoccupations permanentes d’indépendance nationale.59 D’autre part, si les conversations Goodpaster-Fourquet sur la coordination des plans d’emploi des Forces françaises avec celles de l’OTAN et la modernisation des accords Ailleret-Lemnitzer de 1967 se poursuivaient (une nouvelle rencontre avait eu lieu le 27 janvier 1971) elles ne signifiaient nullement un retour de Paris au commandement intégré et gardaient un caractère hypothétique et non automatique: la liberté de décision de la France en cas de conflit restait entière. Enfin on ne souhaitait pas à Paris évoquer tout de suite pour ces discussions le passage du cadre des seules FFA à celui de l’ensemble de la Ière Armée, car cela aurait posé de façon «prématurée» le problème du Pluton et des conditions d’emploi des armes tactiques françaises.60

Les limites de Paris en matière de coopération militaire: Hardware oui, Software non!

En effet en matière stratégique et nucléaire on était disposé à Paris à parler avec les Américains des matériels (et encore avec les réserves que nous venons de voir), c’est-à-dire du Hardware, mais pas des conceptions d’emploi des armes nucléaires (le Software). On n’était pas prêt non plus à remettre en cause la décision de 1966 concernant le départ de la France de l’organisation intégrée de l’OTAN. Par exemple un conseil de Défense à l’Elysée le 26 février 1971, après une discussion appro- fondie et même vive entre toutes les administrations concernées, décida d’en rester à la décision française de 1967 concernant les oléoducs construits par l’OTAN sur le territoire français: en temps de paix Paris acceptait que ces oléoducs continuent à ravitailler les forces de l’OTAN en Allemagne, mais en temps de guerre, la France

58. Note de Debré à Pompidou du début 1972 déjà citée. 59. 5AG2/1040. 60. Note de Debré à Pompidou du début 1972 déjà citée.

124 Georges-Henri Soutou réservait sa liberté de décision. Cette affaire apparemment technique posait tout le problème de l’interprétation de l’article V du Pacte atlantique: Paris réaffirmait en fait sa volonté de conserver sa totale liberté d’action, même pour une action d’assistance (la mise à disposition des oléoducs) qui n’impliquait pas une participation armée au conflit, ce qui était une lecture très restrictive de l’article V, contestée d’ailleurs sur le plan juridique par certains diplomates français. Pompidou maintenait donc l’interprétation française la plus stricte de la liberté d’appréciation et de décision de la France en cas de crise.61 Or, outre bien sûr ses implications générales pour la position de la France envers l’OTAN (le refus maintenu de toute automati- cité dans l’engagement des forces françaises), cette affaire contrariait beaucoup les Américains: ils considéraient en effet que cette question (ainsi que celle de la mise à disposition de l’ensemble des moyens logistiques français en cas de guerre) était la conséquence la plus grave du retrait français de 1966 et ils espéraient bien que le rapprochement militaire avec Paris permettrait, dans un deuxième temps, de revenir sur ce problème.62 D’autre part certains responsables français (comme François de Rose, représen- tant de la France auprès de l’OTAN) estimaient que l’évolution de la stratégie amé- ricaine (de plus en plus réticente à l’égard de l’emploi des armes nucléaires straté- giques mais aussi tactiques et de plus en plus soucieuse d’alléger la présence militaire des Etats-Unis en Europe et de voir les Européens accroître leur effort dans le domaine conventionnel) devrait conduire Paris à rechercher un dialogue avec Washington sur la doctrine d’emploi des armes nucléaires et en particulier sur les armes nucléaires tactiques françaises, comme les fusées tactiques Pluton dont l’entrée en service était prévue pour 1973-1974 et qui poseraient un problème de coordination avec les armes tactiques de l’OTAN.63 Mais Georges Pompidou s’y refusa absolument: la France devait marquer clairement son «indépendance», toute perspective de conversations avec Washington sur les doctrines d’emploi nucléaires éveillait sa «plus grande méfiance"64 car les Américains «chercheraient à nous atti- rer dans une discussion sur nos rapports avec eux dans le domaine de la défense et de l’arme nucléaire».65 Quant aux Plutons, alors qu’en 1970 on avait prévu de les stationner avec les Forces françaises en Allemagne (le cœur fissile restant stocké en temps normal en France), on s’orientait dès le début de 1971 vers un stationnement en France: cela réduirait les problèmes avec les Allemands, qui commençaient à s’inquiéter des cibles et modalités d’emploi de ces engins de 120 kilomètres de portée seulement, et cela préserverait davantage la liberté de décision de Paris dans l’engagement des forces françaises et retarderait la (difficile) discussion avec les Américains sur la doctrine d’emploi de ces armes.66

61. Cf. tout le dossier dans 5AG2/1041. 62. Note de Sonnenfeldt pour Kissinger du 3 août 1970; NPM, NSC CF/677/France vol.VI. 63. Notes de François de Rose des 1er février et 22 septembre 1971, 5AG2/1041. 64. Annotation de Pompidou sur la note de François de Rose du 22 septembre 1971, ibid. 65. Annotation sur une note de Jean-Bernard Raimond du 28 janvier 1971, ibid. 66. Note de l’état-major particulier du Président, 22 février 1971, ibid. Le Président Pompidou et les relations entre les Etats-Unis et l’Europe 125

Georges Pompidou et les perspectives de négociations militaires avec les Soviétiques (SALT et MBFR).

Georges Pompidou maintenait donc le dogme gaulliste de l’indépendance nationale, malgré son rapprochement militaire avec Washington. Mais nous allons voir que son souci d’indépendance rompait avec certaines des arrière-pensées du Général et se situait dans un contexte différent. On va voir apparaître en particulier dans le domaine des négociations militaires avec Moscou (SALT et MBFR) des divergences de vues avec Washington qui iraient s’aggravant surtout à partir de 1972-1973, mais dans une perspective qui n’était que partiellement gaulliste et qui répondait d’abord au souci de maintenir la cohésion stratégique entre l’Europe et les Etats-Unis face à l’URSS, ce qui n’était pas la conception fondamentale du Général. Tout d’abord à partir de 1971 Paris prit conscience du fait qu’un accord améri- cano-soviétique sur les armements stratégiques devenait probable. Il fallait être très attentif quant aux conséquences d’un tel accord pour la France, en particulier quant à la valeur politique et militaire de sa propre force nucléaire dans le nouveau contexte stratégique et quant à d’éventuelles pressions de la part des Américains et des Soviétiques pour la prise en compte, explicite ou implicite, des forces nucléaires françaises dans le décompte des arsenaux en présence.67 Mais si les SALT inspiraient à Paris de la méfiance, les MBFR suscitaient un rejet absolu. On craignait qu’elles ne conduisent à un retrait des troupes américaines stationnées en Europe (crainte constante à Paris à l’époque de Pompidou) et à une neutralisation de l’Europe centrale permettant à l’URSS d’exercer des pressions politiques permanentes sur l’Europe, ce qui n’était pas une vue «gaulliste» des choses.68 On craignait qu’elle ne rende impossible une option que Pompidou ne voulait pas écarter a priori pour l’avenir, celle d’une défense européenne.69 Mais surtout la grande inquiétude de Georges Pompidou était que les MBFR, à cause des tendances au désengagement que l’on prêtait à Washington, ne conduisent à une évacuation des forces étrangères des deux Allemagne; ce fait, couplé avec les perspectives de réu- nification contenues dans l’Ostpolitik, conduirait rapidement à l’ascension d’une Allemagne réunifiée, libre de ses mouvements et dotée sans doute de l’arme nucléaire.70 Pour Pompidou en effet si l’Occident, et en particulier les Américains, ne veillaient pas à canaliser l’Ostpolitik et étaient imprudents dans les négociations de désarmement avec l’URSS, de deux choses l’une: ou bien la RFA finirait par tomber sous l’influence soviétique, ou bien l’Allemagne réunifiée reprendrait un rôle international indépendant, y compris un rôle nucléaire. Dans les deux cas ce serait désastreux pour la France. Ce n’était pas la même position, on le voit, que de Gaulle, qui estimait que la France pourrait contrôler l’Allemagne par un accord implicite avec l’URSS et en établissant avec elle un nouveau système de sécurité en

67. Annotation de Georges Pompidou du 13 mai 1971, 5AG2/1041. 68. Note de Jean-Bernard Raimond pour Pompidou le 8 octobre 1971, 5AG2/1018. 69. Note de Jean-Louis Lucet pour le Président du 12 janvier 1972, 5AG2/1041. 70. Conversation de Pompidou avec Brejnev le 29 octobre 1971, 5AG2/1018, et confidence de Pom- pidou au journaliste André Fontaine, citée par E. ROUSSEL, op.cit., p.394. 126 Georges-Henri Soutou

Europe, dans lequel les Américains ne joueraient plus qu’un rôle périphérique.71 Les deux hommes se rejoignaient dans le refus de la réuniﬁcation de l’Allemagne (comme la plupart des hommes politiques français), mais Pompidou concevait la question allemande dans un contexte beaucoup plus «occidental» et méﬁant à l’égard de l’URSS que de Gaulle.

Le sommet des Açores (décembre 1971) et ses suites décevantes.

Le sommet des Açores entre Nixon et Pompidou en décembre 1971 se déroula dans un contexte international bouleversé par le «choc Nixon": l’annonce de la visite du Président américain à Pékin, le 15 juillet, et la suspension de la convertibilité du dollar, le 15 août. Si Paris saluait la décision américaine concernant la Chine, qui paraissait justifier a posteriori la reconnaissance de Pékin par la France en 1964 et dont l’intérêt géopolitique paraissait évident,72 si les négociations militaires se poursuivaient efficacement, trois grands sujets de mésentente existaient alors entre les deux capitales: les questions monétaires; la conférence sur la sécurité en Europe que souhaitait Paris mais à laquelle Washington était toujours opposée; les MBFR, pour les- quelles les positions étaient inverses.73 Il n’est pas question d’entrer ici dans le détail des conversations complexes qu’eurent Pompidou, Nixon et Kissinger les 13 et 14 décembre.74 Le Président français avait sollicité ce sommet, auquel il se présenta un peu comme le porte-parole de l’Europe. Toute la stratégie de Pompidou, acceptée apparemment par Nixon et Kissinger, consista à placer le problème monétaire, essentiel à ses yeux d’ancien banquier qui s’était fixé comme première tâche de moderni- ser la France et de l’inscrire pleinement dans l’économie mondiale, dans le cadre plus large de la solidarité politique occidentale: «la France est un pays occidental et donc, aussi bien pour des raisons de sentiments historiques, elle est déterminée à maintenir l’alliance et l’amitié avec les Etats-Unis». On est là au cœur de la politique extérieure pompidolienne: la France voulait développer la Communauté économique euro- péenne et l’influencer de façon décisive, mais dans une collaboration raisonnable et équilibrée avec Washington, collaboration dont elle serait d’ailleurs le point de passage privilégié, et non pas dans une rivalité avec l’Amérique qui ne pouvait que conduire à l’échec, car personne alors en Europe ne suivrait Paris. On tomba d’accord assez facilement sur les questions politiques: nécessité de la Détente, mais prudence indispensable à l’égard de l’URSS et aussi de l’Ostpolitik, nécessité du maintien des forces américaines en Europe malgré les pressions du Congrès, intérêt du rapprochement sino-américain. Sur le plan monétaire les négo-

71. G.-H. SOUTOU, L’Alliance incertaine, op.cit., pp.301-305. 72. Note d’Henri Froment-Meurice, directeur d’Asie au Quai d’Orsay, du 19 juillet 1971, 5AG2/1021. 73. Note de Raimond pour Pompidou le 7 décembre 1971, 5AG2/1022. 74. Les comptes-rendus s’en trouvent aux AN, 5AG2/1022; ils ont été reproduits dans E. ROUSSEL, op.cit., pp.464 ss., et dans W. BURR (éd.), The Kissinger Transcripts, New York, The New Press, 1998, pp.33 ss. Le Président Pompidou et les relations entre les Etats-Unis et l’Europe 127 ciations furent très difficiles, mais on aboutit à un compromis: le dollar serait déva- lué (étant donné que la balance commerciale française avec les Etats-Unis était déficitaire de 50%, c’était pour Paris une concession importante) mais on reviendrait à un système de parités fixes entre les monnaies, dont les valeurs seraient réa- justées mais désormais défendues, ce qui était pour la France une revendication essentielle, liée au maintien de son équilibre économique interne et également au problème très délicat du rapport entre le franc et le mark allemand. En outre par un accord secret les Américains s’engageaient à terme à revenir à la convertibilité du dollar, ce qui était évidemment capital si on voulait réellement revenir définitive- ment à un système de parités fixes et que les Etats-Unis contribuent effectivement au fonctionnement du nouveau système. Mais en fait Washington ne tint que partiellement ses engagements: l’accord dit du Smithsonian du 18 décembre 1971, destiné à faire entrer dans les faits les décisions des Açores, décidait bien une modi- fication des parités (le dollar était dévalué de 7,9%, la livre et le franc conservaient leur valeur antérieure et étaient donc de fait réévalués de 8,57% par rapport au dollar, le mark était réévalué de 13,58% par rapport à sa parité d’avant le 5 mai et ces- sait de flotter, le yen était réévalué de 16,88%). Mais le dollar restait inconvertible et les Américains ne prenaient aucun engagement de défendre la nouvelle parité de leur monnaie. Le maintien de celle-ci supposait donc que les autres banques centrales fussent disposées à acquérir des quantités illimitées de dollars. L’accord du Smithsonian était donc très fragile. Le flottement du dollar était inévitable désor- mais, car à partir du moment où Washington avait proclamé l’inconvertibilité du dollar, la dévaluation de celui-ci par rapport à l’or n’avait plus de sens. Et d’ailleurs dès 1972, avec le flottement de la livre, l’accord du Smithsonian montrait ses limites. Une nouvelle crise éclata en février 1973 et provoqua une dévaluation supplé- mentaire de 10% du dollar, avant d’aboutir le 16 mars à la décision historique de flottement conjoint des monnaies européennes par rapport au dollar: c’était l’abandon de fait du système de Bretton Woods et des parités fixes (même «ajustables» comme on essaya un temps de le dire pour tenter de réduire l’importance du désac- cord entre Français et Américains) avant leur abandon officiel à la conférence de la Jamaïque en janvier 1976. Les Américains étaient arrivés à l’objectif que certains de leurs responsables en tout cas s’étaient fixé depuis 1971: débarrassés des con- traintes d’un système de parités fixes, les Etats-Unis pouvaient désormais laisser évoluer le dollar en fonction de leurs intérêts commerciaux, tout en conservant le bénéfice d’une monnaie transnationale, c’est-à-dire la possibilité de ne pas corriger le déficit chronique de leur balance des comptes sans même devoir limiter leurs exportations de capitaux.75 Les thèses monétaires égoïstes du secrétaire au Trésor John Connally l’avaient donc emporté sur celles de Kissinger, qui estimait que le maintien de la solidarité occidentale devait être, pour des raisons politiques, la con- sidération prioritaire. C’était un très profond bouleversement dans la politique sui- vie par les Américains depuis 1947: désormais, sur un point essentiel, les intérêts

75. Sur ces questions le meilleur récit reste celui de J. DENIZET, Le Dollar, Paris, Fayard, 1985. 128 Georges-Henri Soutou strictement nationaux des Etats-Unis prenaient le pas sur leurs responsabilités comme chef de file du Monde libre.76 L’échec en fait de la conférence des Açores était un échec pour la conception pompidolienne d’une Europe conduite par la France et collaborant sur un pied d’égalité avec l’Amérique, dans une bonne entente occidentale. Pompidou, qui s’était montré plus accommodant en matière monétaire que de Gaulle, en était conscient; il écrivit à Nixon le 4 février 1972 que les Etats-Unis ne tenaient pas les engagements pris: «Lors de nos entretiens des Açores, j’avais bien compris qu’il ne pouvait pas être question de la convertibilité intégrale de votre monnaie (c’est-à-dire le retour à la converti- bilité en or, la thèse française antérieure), mais je m’étais permis de vous indiquer que si vous acceptiez de contrôler les mouvements de capitaux, de mettre au point un sys- tème permettant de consolider les balances dollar et aussi de défendre votre monnaie en l’échangeant, le cas échéant, contre d’autres devises, les balances dollar mises à part, cela signifiait pratiquement une convertibilité de monnaie à monnaie».77 Or dans le rapport qui accompagnait le message adressé au Congrès le 27 janvier 1972 par Nixon, il «était fait état d’un accord croissant en faveur d’une plus grande flexibilité des changes. Ceci ne paraît pas conforme aux engagements que nous avions pris vous et moi». En outre Washington n’avait pris aucune mesure pour le con- trôle des mouvements de capitaux, question essentielle aux yeux des Français qui reprochaient aux Américains, grâce au rôle international du dollar, de continuer à racheter des entreprises européennes malgré le déficit de leur balance des comptes et sans contre-valeur réelle. On remarque, point capital, que Pompidou n’exigeait pas le retour à l’or, comme l’avait fait de Gaulle en 1965, ce qui ouvrait la voie à un compromis. Mais Nixon répondit de façon parfaitement vague le 16 février. Revenant sur cet échange le 28 mars 1973 et à la lumière de ce qui s’était passé ensuite, Jean-René Bernard, qui suivait les questions financières internationales à l’Elysée, notait: «ces documents montrent que les Américains ne considèrent pas qu’ils aient réellement pris des engagements monétaires sérieux aux Açores».78 Cette conviction à laquelle Paris était parvenue devait selon moi beaucoup contribuer à la détérioration des rapports franco-américains que l’on constate à partir de 1973. On était en effet parfaitement conscient à Paris de ce que l’accord du Smithso- nian avait de fragile et de provisoire. Un conseil restreint eut lieu le 7 février 1972 sur les questions monétaires. Valéry Giscard d’Estaing exposa la situation: ou bien on faisait fonctionner vaille que vaille l’accord du Smithsonian, ou bien on profite- rait de la crise pour franchir une nouvelle étape dans la voie de l’Union économi- que et monétaire européenne. Pompidou exprima avec beaucoup de force sa préfé- rence pour la deuxième solution, car la première reviendrait à «admettre que les

76. R. S. LITWAK, Détente and the Nixon Doctrine, Cambridge UP, 1984, pp.136-137; W. BUNDY, A Tangled Web. The Making of Foreign Policy in the Nixon Presidency, Tauris, Londres, 1998, pp.261-269; J. DENIZET, Le Dollar. Histoire du système monétaire international depuis 1945, Paris, Fayard, 1985, pp.109-125. 77. 5AG2/1021. 78. Ibid. Le Président Pompidou et les relations entre les Etats-Unis et l’Europe 129

Etats-Unis dirigent la politique économique et monétaire mondiale». Il faudrait mettre les Allemands au pied du mur, ils ne pourraient pas aller contre l’Europe malgré leur propension à suivre les Etats-Unis.79 Mais à partir de ce moment-là Pompidou avait franchi un pas décisif: finalement, pour résister à l’emprise du dollar, un accord européen était plus important que de forcer la monnaie américaine à rester dans le cadre de parités fixes. Ce retournement conceptuel ouvrait la voie à l’accord monétaire européen de 1973 (flottement conjoint des monnaies européen- nes par rapport au dollar). D’une façon plus générale, la question monétaire allait être l’un des facteurs essentiels du recadrage de la politique américaine de Pompidou à partir de 1973, cherchant désormais moins à servir d’intermédiaire privilégié entre les Etats-Unis et l’Europe et davantage à regrouper l’Europe pour contrebalancer la prépotence américaine, ce qui était un certain retour au gaullisme. L’ambassade américaine à Paris pour sa part constatait dès septembre 1972 les dégâts que les questions moné- taires produisaient dans les relations franco-américaines et sentait cette réorienta- tion européenne de la politique française.80

Les rapports militaires et politico-stratégiques franco-américains en 1972.

Malgré la forte déception due à l’échec du sommet des Açores, sur le plan militaire et politico-stratégique les rapports franco-américains continuèrent à se développer en 1972. Le 11 mars, Debré écrivait à Pompidou à quel point il était satisfait des conversations Foster-Blancard: les renseignements techniques américains étaient du plus haut intérêt: «Nous sommes en droit de considérer que les dirigeants américains entendent nous fournir une aide très précieuse, c’est-à-dire qu’ils estiment de leur intérêt de soutenir et d’améliorer le développement de notre force nucléaire. Il n’a été question, en aucune façon, de la moindre contrepartie».81 Il est clair que les Américains allaient en fait plus loin que ce que comportaient les décisions ofﬁciellement arrêtées à Washington. Les 7 et 12 juillet Debré eut une série de conversations à Washington avec Kis- singer, Laird et Nixon.82 Ces conversations se déroulèrent de façon particulière- ment positive et dénotèrent une réelle intimité. Debré demanda des informations sur les radars et les défenses ABM des Soviétiques, point essentiel pour la capacité de pénétration de la Force de frappe française; Kissinger promit de les lui faire parvenir directement si les services administratifs et les départements ministériels con- cernés refusaient de le faire, ce qui conﬁrme l’impression déjà soulignée selon

79. 5AG2/1011. 80. Télé. de Paris du 20 septembre 1972, RG 59/Num 70-73/Box 2278. 81. 5AG2/1040. 82. Compte-rendu du 11 juillet 1972, NPM, NSC CF/678/France vol.IX, et lettre de Debré à Pompidou du 13 juillet, 5AG2/1040. 130 Georges-Henri Soutou laquelle le conseiller du Président était prêt à aller plus loin que le consensus prudent au sein de l’administration. Laird s’engagea à interpréter de façon libérale la loi MacMahon sur le secret atomique après la réélection de Nixon en novembre. A la suite de ces entretiens, en septembre, le général Walters, directeur adjoint de la CIA, devait avoir un entretien avec Debré pour lui fournir les informations deman- dées sur les défenses ABM soviétiques, ce qui impliquait des renseignements extrê- mement conﬁdentiels et hautement techniques obtenus par les services américains et leurs moyens d’observation.83 Paris était en revanche plus inquiet à propos des accords SALT du mois de mai 1972 et de leurs implications possibles pour la France. Le 13 juin, le Président français se demanda devant Gromyko, le ministre des Affaires étrangères soviétique, si les accords SALT «ne correspondaient pas plus ou moins à une espèce de volonté d’établir un condominium sur le reste du monde». Ce thème du condominium devait revenir fréquemment par la suite.84 En outre la France risquait d’être au moins indirectement impliquée pour ses propres forces nucléaires. Le 9 juin, Nixon avait écrit à Pompidou pour lui relater son voyage à Moscou et évoquer les SALT. Les Soviétiques avaient exigé de pouvoir augmen- ter le nombre de leurs sous-marins nucléaires si la France et la Grande-Bretagne dépas- saient leur total programmé de neuf SNLE (quatre britanniques et cinq français; il était fortement question d’un sixième SLNE français, pour pouvoir en avoir toujours au moins deux à la mer). Nixon s’était absolument refusé à admettre cette exigence, mais il ne cachait pas que Moscou y reviendrait lors de la prochaine phase des négociations et qu’il faudrait que Paris et Washington se concertent à ce sujet. Pompidou répondit le 1er juillet d’une façon qui soulignait la très grande prudence de la France sur ce point.85 Un autre point qui préoccupait beaucoup les Français était un projet de traité, d’origine soviétique, par lequel les Etats-Unis et l’URSS s’engageraient mutuellement à ne pas utiliser l’un contre l’autre l’arme nucléaire. Les Américains n’étaient évidemment pas disposés à accepter quelque chose qui contredisait totalement la stratégie de l’OTAN, mais ils ne pensaient pas pouvoir répondre de façon purement négative, car ils ne voulaient pas compromettre la ligne de détente que poursuivait Brejnev malgré, à leur avis, des oppositions au sein du Politburo.86 Cela inquiéta beaucoup les Français, qui estimaient que l’Occident devait se réserver la possibi- lité de l’emploi du nucléaire en premier, ainsi qu’un autre point du projet de traité soviétique qui prévoyait que les deux pays «s’efforceraient de prévenir les situations où l’action de tiers pourrait les amener à une collision nucléaire», ce qui risquait d’impliquer indirectement la France et annonçait le thème du «condominium» qui allait prendre une telle importance l’année suivante.87 Pompidou devait exprimer ces inquiétudes à l’occasion d’une visite de Henry Kissinger, le 15 septembre 1972, qui l’assura que les Etats-Unis n’accepteraient de signer qu’une

83. Note de Sonnenfeldt pour Kissinger du 7 septembre 1972, NPM, NSC CF/HAK Office Files/24. 84. Compte-rendu de l’entretien dans 5AG2/1018. 85. 5AG2/1021. 86. Conversation de Kissinger avec l’ambassadeur de France le 7 septembre 1972 et note du 3 septembre, NPM, NSC CF/HAK Office Files/Box 24. 87. Note de Raimond pour Pompidou du 12 septembre, 5AG2/1021. Le Président Pompidou et les relations entre les Etats-Unis et l’Europe 131 déclaration très générale visant l’interdiction de l’emploi de la force militaire contre tout pays.88 D’autre part Paris maintenait bien entendu son opposition résolue aux MBFR et était préoccupée de constater que Washington, sous la pression du Congrès et de l’opinion, était de plus en plus disposée à envisager des réductions de forces en Europe.89 Paris continuait à refuser toute participation aux négociations, même indirectes. Washington était début 1973 consciente du fait que si les relations bilatérales franco-américaines étaient bonnes et les meilleures depuis longtemps, avec en particulier une disparition de l’anti-américanisme officiel et dans les médias contrôlés par le gouvernement, il existait d’importantes divergences de vues sur certains problèmes multilatéraux. En particulier les négociations SALT et MBFR ainsi que la préparation de la Conférence sur la sécurité et la coopération en Europe (CSCE), les Français, comme nous l’avons vu, étant réticents quant aux SALT et aux MBFR et plus ardents que les Américains pour la CSCE. Mais on avait à Washington identifié les trois grandes zones de conflit qui allaient effectivement marquer les années 1973-1974: les questions monétaires; la protection des intérêts économiques européens (y compris la PAC et les accords particuliers avec l’Afrique) face aux demandes américaines de libéralisa- tion du commerce international; et surtout la volonté américaine de structurer les relations entre les Etats-Unis et l’Europe occidentale de façon à

«permettre de discuter de façon globale et étroitement intégrée toutes les questions - de sécurité, politiques, monétaires, commerciales et concernant les investissements - qui regroupent l’ensemble de nos intérêts en Europe».90 Or c’était bien à une telle structuration transatlantique, autour d’un programme américain, que Paris allait s’opposer avec tant de force en 1973-1974. De leur côté les Etats-Unis étaient très décidés à résoudre en 1973 les questions internationales pendantes: en particulier la poursuite de la détente avec les Soviétiques et l’établis- sement avec eux d’une relation bilatérale stable et durable, et la nouvelle déﬁnition de leurs rapports avec l’Europe. Ils étaient également fermement décidés à amener la France à accepter ces objectifs, ou alors à l’empêcher de les contrecarrer.91 Le clash avec Paris était dès lors programmé.

88. E. ROUSSEL, op.cit., pp.524-528. 89. Entretien Debré-Kissinger du 7 juillet 1972, déjà cité, et annotation de Pompidou du 28 décembre 1972, 5AG2/1041. 90. Télé. de synthèse très important de l’ambassade américaine à Paris du 1er janvier 1973, RG 59/ 70-73/Box 2278. 91. Ibid., le télégramme du 1er janvier étant très clair à ce sujet. 132 Georges-Henri Soutou

La conférence de Reykjavik (31 mai et 1er juin 1973).

Au printemps 1973 les choses avaient évolué comme l’envisageait Washington au début de l’année: le 23 avril Kissinger avait annoncé «l’année de l’Europe», au cours de laquelle les relations transatlantiques devraient être redéﬁnies autour d’une nouvelle Charte de l’Atlantique.92 Notons ici que Pompidou fut indirectement à l’origine de cette initiative: Kissinger en eut l’idée à la suite de l’une de ses conversations avec lui et d’une interview du Président français à James Reston du New York Times suggérant d’instaurer des consultations occidentales «au plus haut niveau». Mais la façon très maladroite dont Kissinger mena cette initiative, et ses arrière-pensées, qui furent parfaitement comprises à Paris, conduisirent à une crise majeure avec la France.93 Pendant ce temps les Américains préparaient avec les Soviétiques l’accord «sur la prévention d’une guerre nucléaire» que Brejnev devait venir signer en Californie le 22 juin. D’autre part, comme il en avait été convenu entre Kissinger et les Sovié- tiques en septembre 1972, des négociations sur la sécurité en Europe avaient com- mencé à Helsinki le 22 novembre, tandis que les MBFR avaient commencé à Vienne le 30 janvier 1973. En juillet les ministres des Affaires étrangères devaient se retrouver à Helsinki pour une CSCE préparatoire. Le système international était en pleine ébullition. Georges Pompidou et Michel Jobert, devenu ministre des Affaires étrangères au mois d’avril et très gaulliste d’inspiration, s’inquiétaient de cette évolution: les Améri- cains n’allaient-ils pas s’entendre avec l’URSS aux dépens de l’Europe? Le 23 avril, Kissinger avait parlé de l’Europe comme «d’un ensemble régional» aux intérêts limités. Washington ne voulait-elle pas s’octroyer un véritable leadership, sous couvert de structurer les relations transatlantiques et de les «globaliser», en reliant par un évident mar- chandage questions économiques (où Washington était demandeur) et questions de sécurité (où c’étaient les Européens)? Jean-Bernard Raimond, le conseiller diplomatique de Pompidou, qualiﬁait le discours de Kissinger de «texte impérieux, qui exprime fondamentalement la volonté de puissance des Etats-Unis», qui rappelait le discours de Kennedy à Philadelphie le 4 juillet 1962. Le danger était que les partenaires européens de la France seraient tentés: «leur préférence allait à un monde atlantique à direction américaine».94 Quant à Jacques Kosciusko-Morizet, l’ambassadeur à Washington, il s’inquiétait de l’accord en cours de négociation entre Américains et Soviétiques sur la guerre nucléaire: il risquait de conduire à la dénucléarisation de l’Europe, «les Améri- cains cherchant en fait à écarter tout usage de l’arme nucléaire, tandis que les Russes s’appliquaient à dénucléariser et à neutraliser l’Europe occidentale, en la coupant des Etats-Unis et en démantelant le système de l’Alliance atlantique».95 Début mai Jean-Bernard Raimond partageait ses craintes et allait même au-delà: le «renforcement

92. Sur la problématique de l’«Année de l’Europe» dans les rapports franco-américains, cf. P. MELANDRI, Une relation très spéciale …, op.cit. 93. W. BUNDY, A Tangled Web, op.cit., pp.415-419. 94. Note du 3 mai 1973 pour Pompidou, 5AG2/1021. 95. Lettre de Kosciusko-Morizet à Jobert du 4 mai 1973, 5AG2/1021. Le Président Pompidou et les relations entre les Etats-Unis et l’Europe 133 de la coopération entre l’URSS et les Etats-Unis» remettait en cause «l’équilibre politique mondial», et pouvait aboutir «au dessaisissement politique des puissances tierces». Il conseillait au Président de prendre une initiative politique majeure en direction des partenaires européens pour amorcer une discussion de fond avec les Etats-Unis.96 Ces craintes au sujet de ce que l’on allait appeler de plus en plus couramment le «condominium américano-soviétique» (expression également utilisée parfois par Georges Pompidou, on l’a vu, mais qui dans son esprit était tournée au moins autant contre l’URSS que contre les Etats-Unis) n’étaient pas les seules: les fonc- tionnaires français relevaient les questions monétaires, le refus américain de se sou- mettre à la moindre discipline dans ce domaine, et ils continuaient à croire possible le retour à l’or; on prenait note du Nixon Round et en particulier de la volonté de Washington de remettre en cause la PAC; d’autre part on soulignait la détermina- tion des Américains, évidente dès le message de Nixon sur l’énergie du 18 avril et devant les tensions croissantes sur le marché international des hydrocarbures dès avant la guerre du Kippour, à regrouper les pays consommateurs en face des producteurs, ce qui paraissait très dangereux.97 Cela dit, les responsables français paraissaient divisés quant à la conduite à tenir sur les questions monétaires et économiques. L’ambassade à Washington recommandait la négociation et suggérait des compromis possibles.98 D’autres, comme Olivier Wormser, gouverneur général de la Banque de France, pensaient qu’il fallait rester ferme: les Etats-Unis eux-mêmes reviendraient un jour à l’or comme base du système monétaire international.99 On a vu que Georges Pompidou pour sa part ne partageait pas cette illusion. Une conversation très importante entre Kissinger et Pompidou le 18 mai allait permettre de préciser les choses et d’éliminer certains malentendus en prévision du sommet prévu à Reykjavik à la ﬁn du mois.100 Dans cet entretien, à mon avis le plus ouvert et le plus important qui ait jamais eu lieu entre Pompidou et un respon- sable américain, Pompidou se montra accommodant: à propos de «l’année de l’Europe», il n’était pas choqué par la notion exposée par Kissinger le 23 avril de l’Europe comme puissance régionale (en y comprenant toutefois la Méditerranée et l’Afrique), il n’était pas contre le fait de parler de l’ensemble des problèmes entre Européens et Américains et donc d’établir un cadre politique pour la discussion des problèmes économiques transatlantiques (la «globalisation» des problèmes) ce qui correspondait au projet de la nouvelle charte de l’Atlantique. Il était prêt à parler du blé au prochain sommet franco-américain de Reykjavik et à proposer une entente entre les pays exportateurs de céréales; il faudrait certes parler du système moné- taire international, on ne pouvait pas en rester là où on en était, mais visiblement il serait sur ce point aussi fort pragmatique. Il fut ferme sur un point: il ne devait pas

96. Note Raimond pour Pompidou du 10 mai 1973, 5AG2/1021. 97. Dossier envoyé par Kosciusko-Morizet à Jobert le 11 mai, 5AG2/1023. 98. Ibid. 99. Note d’Olivier Wormser du 10 mai (le retour à l’or ne serait pas plus difficile pour Washington que d’aller voir Mao!), 5AG2/1023. 100. 5AG2/1022. 134 Georges-Henri Soutou

être question de mêler le Royaume-Uni en tiers aux conversations militaires bilaté- rales franco-américaines. Et il posa une excellente question à propos du prochain accord américano-soviétique sur la guerre nucléaire: le problème n’était pas tant le risque d’une guerre que d’une progression soviétique en-dessous du seuil d’une guerre, comme en Tchécoslovaquie en 1968, comme peut-être en Yougoslavie à la mort de Tito ou en Chine à la mort de Mao. «Brejnev (est) un homme sympathique et bon vivant mais qu’il n’est pas facile d’arrêter quand il avance (…). Y a-t-il une tactique américaine pour arrêter une avance soviétique camouflée, sans recours à la force, mais comme un torrent progressiste"? Il mit également son interlocuteur en garde contre une éventuelle tentation de choisir l’URSS contre la Chine. Kissinger répondit en dévoilant la stratégie réelle des Etats-Unis: il ne s’agissait pas du tout d’établir un condominium américano-soviétique ou de choisir Moscou au détriment de la Chine, mais il s’agissait de soutenir Pékin contre l’URSS pour empêcher celle-ci d’écraser la Chine, ce qui lui permettrait ensuite de «finlandiser» l’Europe et d’isoler les Etats-Unis. Mais, pour empêcher que le rapprochement américano-chinois qui devait aller s’approfondissant dans les années suivantes ne serve de prétexte à une attaque soviétique contre la Chine, il fallait parallèlement poursuivre la Détente avec Moscou, afin «de gagner du temps, de paralyser l’URSS». La stratégie américaine était «peut-être complexe, mais elle n’était pas stupide; (elle n’était) pas un abandon à l’URSS, mais une tentative pour la prendre dans des rets». Disons ici que l’explication que donnait Kissinger de la politique américaine rejoignait tout à fait le contenu de ses conversations avec les Chinois à l’époque.101 Une Europe forte, ajoutait Kissinger, où la France jouerait «un rôle de pivot» (et non pas une Allemagne trop sensible aux pressions soviétiques), convenait dans ce contexte très bien aux Etats-Unis qui étaient prêts à aider Paris à accroître ses capa- cités militaires. Il souligna que l’on n’avait jamais été aussi franc avec un dirigeant étranger. Georges Pompidou répondit en soulignant l’importance de ces déclara- tions et en assurant «qu’il y réfléchirait beaucoup». Le fait que Kissinger ait été sincère le 18 mai avec le Président français et ait vraiment envisagé un grand accord euro-américain politique et économique dans lequel la France jouerait un rôle essentiel me paraît totalement confirmé par les documents internes de la Maison Blanche en vue du sommet de Reykjavik. Outre la stratégie fondamentale envers la Chine et l’URSS que nous avons vue, ces documents soulignent l’importance d’une relance des relations transatlantiques pour lut- ter contre les courants isolationnistes de part et d’autre de l’Atlantique. (Rappelons ici que l’administration américaine était très inquiète d’un amendement du sénateur Mansfield qui proposait de réduire de 75.000 à 100.000 hommes les effectifs amé- ricains en Europe). Il faudrait commencer par constituer un groupe informel de haut niveau entre les Etats-Unis, la Grande-Bretagne, la France et la RFA qui débroussaillerait les principaux problèmes politiques et économiques. Kissinger,

101. Cf. par exemple le meeting de Kissinger avec Mao le 12 novembre 1973, in: W. BURR, op.cit., pp.179-199. Le Président Pompidou et les relations entre les Etats-Unis et l’Europe 135 après sa conversation du 18 mai, estimait que Georges Pompidou, avec les élec- tions du mois de mars derrière lui, avec un nouveau gouvernement formé d’hommes à lui et débarrassé du poids des gaullistes de stricte observance serait certes un partenaire difficile mais pragmatique et prêt à un accord sur ces bases à condition que celui-ci ne remette pas en cause l’autonomie de la politique française et l’émer- gence d’une «personnalité européenne». On pourrait faciliter l’adhésion française en proposant de développer la collaboration en matière militaire et dans les hautes technologies (en particulier les réacteurs d’avions).102 A la suite des explications apportées par Kissinger le 18 mai, une certaine détente se produisit, en tout cas à l’Elysée (où Edouard Balladur avait remplacé Michel Jobert comme secrétaire général). Le prochain accord soviéto-américain apparaissait désormais surtout inutile, voire dangereux dans la mesure où il donne- rait des possibilités de manœuvre à l’URSS en-dessous du seuil d’une guerre, ce qu’elle savait faire par tous les moyens de la stratégie indirecte et avec l’appui des partis communistes et des mouvements révolutionnaires. Mais on ne le considérait pas comme un instrument d’une volonté américaine de puissance: il apparaissait plutôt comme contraire aux intérêts bien compris des Etats-Unis. Quant à «l’année de l’Europe» et la Charte transatlantique, il fallait éviter de se laisser réintégrer par ce biais dans les structures intégrées de l’OTAN, mais on pouvait accepter la «déclaration de principes» qu’avait proposée Kissinger le 23 avril.103 Le Quai d’Orsay avec en particulier Michel Jobert me paraît être resté beaucoup plus raide, soutenu en cela par une partie de la presse et des milieux gaullistes qui voyaient dans l’évolution de Washington la confirmation des analyses gaullistes sur l’impérialisme américain.104 A partir du printemps 1973 Georges Pompidou rece- vait donc des conseils assez contradictoires à propos de l’attitude à tenir face aux Américains. Toutes ces questions étaient à l’époque extraordinairement chargées de passion et il n’est pas toujours facile de savoir quelle position le Président, en outre gravement malade, prenait quant à lui. Le Président français lui-même paraissait intéressé par les propos de Kissinger. Il rencontra Heath le 21 mai. Dans cet entretien Pompidou se montra désireux d’un accord avec les Américains, qu’il estimait possible. Visiblement, après les explications fournies par Kissinger il n’était pas aussi pessimiste que certains de ses colla- borateurs. L’essentiel à ses yeux était que les Etats-Unis ne pouvaient pas se permettre de se désintéresser de la sécurité de l’Europe. En même temps il était clair qu’il n’accepterait pas n’importe quoi de leur part. Pompidou et Heath, tout en étant conscients de la contribution indispensable des Etats-Unis à la défense de l’Europe et tout en ne pensant pas que le sénateur Mansfield parviendrait à imposer un retrait des troupes américaines en Europe, évoquèrent néanmoins la possibilité de collaborer pour la prochaine génération de leurs systèmes nucléaires stratégi-

102. Note de Kissinger pour le Président Nixon avant Reykjavik, NPM/NSC CF/949/Pompidou-Nixon Meeting. 103. Deux notes de Raimond pour Pompidou des 18 et 29 mai 1973, 5AG2/1021. 104. Cf. les mémoires caractéristiques de P. de SAINT ROBERT, Le secret des jours, Paris, JC Lattès, 1995. 136 Georges-Henri Soutou ques, à l’horizon 1985.105 Pompidou était cependant très prudent: plutôt que comme quelque chose de dores et déjà décidé, il considérait la collaboration franco-britannique dans ce domaine comme une option que l’on explorerait de plus près le moment venu, quand il faudrait définir la génération suivante d’armements,.106 On présente en général le sommet de Reykjavik comme un échec. Ceci me paraît excessif et je voudrais en donner un bilan plus nuancé. Certes, ce sommet donna surtout lieu à un large échange de vues, tournant d’ailleurs un peu en rond, sur les questions internationales. Certes, on ne progressa pas sur les questions monétaires. Pom- pidou devait d’ailleurs écrire à Nixon le 25 juin pour essayer de relancer la question, insistant sur la nécessité de la lutte contre l’inflation, de la défense des nouvelles pari- tés définies en mars 1973, du contrôle des mouvements de capitaux à court terme. En ce qui concerne le problème de l’or, Pompidou pensait débloquer la situation en permettant aux banques centrales d’acheter ou de vendre de l’or sur le marché libre, ce qui aurait mis fin au prix parfaitement devenu théorique de 35 dollars l’once d’or (rappelons qu’un double marché de l’or existait depuis 1968, un marché libre et un système d’échanges entre banques centrales au taux officiel de 35 dollars l’once). Mais cela revenait quand même à reconnaître un rôle éminent à l’or comme instrument de réserve, cela favorisait la France (qui avait de considérables réserves d’or), l’Afrique du Sud et l’URSS, cela pénalisait les pays européens qui avaient gardé leurs réserves en dollars. Il n’y avait aucune chance pour que Washington accepte. Nixon répondit d’ailleurs le 6 août de façon parfaitement évasive.107 On notera que Pompi- dou était là en recul par rapport au sommet des Açores, où l’on n’avait pas posé le problème de l’or, et en recul par rapport aux positions françaises de 1967-1969, épo- que à laquelle Paris avait été prête à imaginer un système monétaire international qui ne reposerait pas sur l’or, à condition d’être structuré, discipliné et rééquilibré par rapport au dollar.108 On constate là (nous en verrons d’autres exemples) un certain retour à une version plus dure du gaullisme. En ce qui concerne la Charte de l’Atlantique, ce fut un demi-échec. Pompidou se montra beaucoup plus réservé que le 18 mai, refusant en particulier la proposition américaine d’une préparation confidentielle à quatre.109 En fait Pompidou insista pour que la préparation de la Charte se déroula d’abord au moyen de conversations bilatérales et non pas dans un cadre multilatéral trop proche à ses yeux de l’OTAN. Cependant les conversations se poursuivirent, comme nous le verrons, entre Kissinger (devenu Secrétaire d’Etat en août) et Michel Jobert; ce n’était pas le blocage. Ajoutons que le Président, en fonction des équilibres complexes de sa

105. E. ROUSSEL, op.cit., pp.548-549. 106. Lettre de Pompidou à Heath du 29 juin 1973, 5AG2/1040. 107. 5AG2/1021. 108. Cf. mes remarques dans R. ARON, Les articles de politique internationale dans Le Figaro de 1947 à 1977, Tome III, Les Crises (février 1965 à avril 1977), présentation et notes par G.-H. SOUTOU, Paris, Editions de Fallois, 1997, pp.29-31. 109. Les comptes-rendus se trouvent dans 5AG2/1023. Cf. E. ROUSSEL, op.cit., pp.549-571. Le Président Pompidou et les relations entre les Etats-Unis et l’Europe 137 majorité, devait sans doute beaucoup plus tenir compte des positions très négatives des milieux gaullistes intransigeants que ne le pensait Kissinger. En revanche le sommet fut un franc succès pour les questions militaires: Pompi- dou déclara à la presse à la suite des entretiens qu’il était partisan du maintien des troupes américaines en Europe (ce qui correspondait à sa conviction profonde et confortait le Président Nixon face au sénateur Mansfield, mais qui était un engagement public nouveau pour la Ve République!). En outre, mais cela resta bien sûr absolument secret, ce qui contribua sans doute à l’impression d’échec du sommet, on se mit d’accord (au cours d’un troisième entretien spécialement consacré à cette question)110 pour étendre les conversations sur les armements aux questions tou- chant les armes nucléaires proprement dites, c’est-à-dire le saint des saints, au-delà des informations sur la technologie des missiles et les capacités ABM des Soviéti- ques auxquelles s’étaient limités les échanges jusque-là. «J’accepte donc volontiers que nos experts se rendent à Washington et que l’échange s’accélère», déclara Pompidou. Kissinger centraliserait du côté américain ces conversations. Il est tout à fait évident que pour les Américains l’offre de développer la collaboration militaire franco-américaine était destinée aussi à faciliter l’acceptation par Paris de l’ensemble du programme que nous avons vu: les Français auraient en effet la certitude de bénéficier, en matière politico-stratégique, de la même position privilégiée que les Britanniques dans le grand ensemble euro-atlantique qui correspondait à la vision de Nixon et Kissinger.111 Il n’y manquait pas non plus l’assurance, répétée à Reykjavik, que les Etats-Unis ne laisseraient pas la RFA acquérir l’arme nucléaire, sujet qui préoccupait beaucoup Georges Pompidou. Celui-ci com- prit parfaitement la signification des offres américaines et annonça qu’il ne se laisserait pas faire facilement: «Naturellement, notre principe, compte tenu surtout des progrès que nous commen- çons à faire dans le domaine de la défense, est de ne pas vendre notre âme pour un plat de lentilles, quelle que soit la qualité de celles-ci».112

Finalement Pompidou refuse le «plat de lentilles»: le blocage des conversations militaires.

Conformément à la décision prise à Reykavik, des conversations d’ordre militaire eurent lieu lors de deux voyages aux Etats-Unis de Robert Galley, ministre de la Défense, et de Jean Blancard, ﬁn juillet et ﬁn août 1973.113 Les Français demandè- rent d’étendre les conversations, jusque-là strictement limitées aux problèmes des missiles français existants et à l’état des défenses ABM soviétiques, on l’a vu, aux

110. Le 1er juin à 10 heures, 5AG2/1023. 111. Voir la note de Kissinger pour Nixon avant Reykjavik, déjà citée. 112. Troisième entretien, le 1er juin à 10 heures, déjà cité. 113. Comptes-rendus de deux entretiens avec Kissinger, le secrétaire à la Défense Schlesinger et le gé- néral Walters, les 27 juillet et 31 août, 5AG2/1040. 138 Georges-Henri Soutou futurs systèmes de missiles encore en développement et aux armes nucléaires proprement dites. Tout en reconnaissant que les échanges déjà réalisés avaient été très précieux pour améliorer la fiabilité des fusées françaises et prendre conscience de la fragilité des armes nucléaires en service face aux contre-mesures soviétiques, les Français souhaitaient désormais une aide pour la mise au point de la nouvelle géné- ration: missiles à têtes multiples indépendantes (MIRV), ogives thermonucléaires durcies, ogives tactiques «propres». Comme le déclara Robert Galley, «de nombreuses solutions sont possibles, mais toutes coûteront infiniment de temps et d’argent. Il serait donc très précieux pour les scientifiques et les techniciens fran- çais de savoir quelles de ces voies sont les plus fécondes pour faire progresser les armes stratégiques et les armes tactiques propres». Les Américains se montrèrent en fait assez réticents devant l’ampleur de ces demandes. Ils n’acceptaient pas de parler tout de suite des programmes avancés, comme la fusée M4 prévue pour les années 80, avec une tête MIRVée transportant six ogives thermonucléaires durcies, mais uniquement des programmes en cours ou à échéance rapprochée (années 70). Ils mettaient en doute l’utilité pour la France de posséder des têtes MIRVées, capables d’attaquer à la fois plusieurs objectifs dis- tants les uns des autres, et estimaient que des têtes multiples simples MRV (sans capacité de guidage indépendant pour chaque ogive) devraient lui suffire. En fait ils ne cachèrent pas qu’ils ne voulaient pas encore compliquer la suite des négocia- tions SALT avec Moscou, en cas de révélation de la collaboration franco-améri- caine sur ces armes très déstabilisantes. D’autre part ils insistaient pour que les Français poursuivent leurs expériences sur le site du Nevada (comme les Britanni- ques) et soulignaient la nécessité de disposer d’un système d’alerte face aux pro- grès des Russes, qui à la fin des années 70 disposeraient d’ogives MIRVées et pourraient éliminer d’un seul coup toutes les armes françaises. Or pour les Français ces suggestions ne pouvaient avoir qu’une seule signification: les Américains, en échange de leur assistance technique, souhaitaient malgré tout établir un certain contrôle sur l’effort français (l’offre de procéder aux tests au Nevada et l’allusion à la nécessité d’un dispositif d’alerte anti-missiles qui à l’époque ne pouvait être qu’américain allaient dans ce sens) afin de ne pas compliquer les SALT. Du coup les échanges s’arrêtèrent là, du moins pour l’époque de la présidence Pompidou. Le 20 décembre 1973 Kissinger proposa à Georges Pompidou de les reprendre, mais le Président français se montra parfaitement évasif.114 Même freinage, à la même époque, pour les conversations entre le chef d’état-major des Armées (désormais le général Maurin) et le commandant des forces américaines en Europe, général Goodpaster, pour préparer les conditions de l’engagement du Corps de bataille français aux côtés des alliés. Un Conseil de Défense avait con-

114. Compte-rendu dans 5AG2/1023, publié par E. ROUSSEL, op.cit., p.611. Pour toute cette affaire cf. MELANDRI, Aux origines …, op.cit. Il pose la question de savoir si malgré ce blocage la collaboration ne se poursuivit pas en grand secret, encore du temps du Président Pompidou; les documents français et américains auxquels on a accès maintenant m’amènent à conclure que les échan- ges en matière de missiles et d’ogives nucléaires subirent bien un arrêt, lié également à la dégradation générale des rapports franco-américains à partir de l’été 1973. Le Président Pompidou et les relations entre les Etats-Unis et l’Europe 139

firmé le principe de ces conversations et le Président, dans un premier temps, dési- rait que fût préparé cet engagement éventuel. Pourtant le 30 octobre Georges Pom- pidou fit retarder les conversations prévues, le temps que la situation induite par la guerre du Kippour s’éclaircisse, et imposa une procédure très prudente: contact préliminaire d’information entre Maurin et Goodpaster, contact politique ensuite, et après seulement une «éventuelle» discussion technique. Même prudence à l’occasion de la venue en France en décembre de l’amiral Moorer, président des Joint Chiefs of Staff.115 En fait Georges Pompidou avait durci ses positions en matière stratégique depuis l’été et en revenait à une certaine «orthodoxie gaulliste». J’en veux pour preuve un document dont on connaissait l’existence mais pas le contenu: le fameux «testament stratégique» du Président. Il s’agit d’un texte rédigé par lui le 1er février 1974, dont seuls le Premier ministre Pierre Messmer et le ministre de la Défense Robert Galley reçurent un exemplaire.116 Certes, ce document écartait certaines conceptions extrêmes du texte équivalent précédent, l’Instruction personnelle et secrète de De Gaulle en 1967, comme la défense tous azimuts et l’acquisition de missiles intercontinentaux. Mais sa vision internationale d’ensemble était pessimiste: l’affrontement américano-soviétique persistant, mais en même temps la tendance de Washington et Moscou à s’entendre en dehors des Européens, les poussées imprévisibles ou très calculées mais toujours «impérieuses» de la politique américaine, couplées avec une tendance au repli stratégique au détriment de l’Europe, les problèmes monétaires et ceux de l’énergie, tout cela contribuait à créer «un état permanent d’incertitude et d’inquiétude». Il n’était pas question de revenir à l’intégration atlantique qui obérerait la liberté de décision de la France, même s’il était probable que la France interviendrait le cas échéant aux côtés de l’Alliance, d’autant plus que l’attitude allemande en cas de crise était très incertaine. Une force nucléaire franco-britannique ne représenterait nullement une solution, à cause de l’absence de liberté d’action de la Grande-Bretagne par rapport aux Etats-Unis et des réactions négatives prévisibles de la part de l’Allemagne et de l’URSS. La seule solution restait donc de renforcer la dissuasion nationale fran- çaise: on passerait à six sous-marins nucléaires lanceurs d’engins, au lieu des cinq prévus, on renforcerait l’arme nucléaire tactique, qui donnait toute sa crédibilité à la dissuasion (ceci correspondait à la doctrine de «l’ultime avertissement» exposé dans le Livre blanc sur la Défense de 1972). Le Corps de bataille serait également renforcé; son intervention la plus probable serait en réserve de l’Alliance mais il devrait être engagé avec ses moyens nucléaires (la France refusait une guerre purement conventionnelle en Europe); là aussi, on peut remarquer que la coordination avec l’OTAN, qui avait une doctrine différente de l’emploi des armes nucléaires tactiques, poserait des problèmes difficiles.

115. Deux notes du général Thenoz, chef de l’état-major particulier de l’Elysée, des 30 octobre et 5 dé- cembre 1973, avec annotations du Président, 5AG2/1040. 116. 5AG2/1040. 140 Georges-Henri Soutou

La conclusion du document en conﬁrmait l’inspiration dans l’ensemble très gaullienne (quoique, une fois de plus, d’un gaullisme rationalisé) et conﬁrmait le coup d’arrêt porté aux discussions avec les Américains ou du moins leur freinage: «Nous devons poursuivre cet effort seuls, et sans compromissions, jusqu’au moment où se posera de façon aiguë le problème de l’alerte, encore que les alliés et en particulier les Américains aient tendance à grossir l’importance de ce problème pour les raisons que l’on imagine. Aucune indication sur nos programmes, aucune négociation avec qui que ce soit ne devra être donnée ou entreprise sans mon autorisation personnelle».

La détérioration des rapports politiques avec Washington à partir de l’été 1973.

Ce coup d’arrêt à une coopération militaire bilatérale qui avait commencé de façon prometteuse s’expliquait à mon avis essentiellement pour des raisons de politique générale, comme le laisse d’ailleurs entendre le «testament» du 1er février 1974. Rappelons d’abord que, à l’occasion d’une visite de Brejnev aux Etats-Unis, les deux pays signèrent le 22 juin 1973 un «accord sur la prévention d’une guerre nucléaire"; les deux signataires ne se menaceraient pas mutuellement ni n’utilise- raient la force l’un contre l’autre; ils se consulteraient en cas de danger de guerre nucléaire ou s’il existait un danger qu’un conflit entre deux autres puissances débouche sur une guerre nucléaire. Ce fut ce dernier point surtout qui suscita l’inquiétude de Paris (on se souvient que le 15 septembre 1972 encore Kissinger avait assuré Pompidou que l’accord proposé par Moscou n’aurait qu’une portée très générale; Washington était en effet consciente de la tendance au condominium que recelait la proposition soviétique. Mais en fait les Soviétiques tenaient à un texte plus précis, et lors d’une rencontre avec Brejnev à Moscou début mai 1973 les Américains avaient cédé et accepté que les deux pays se concertent et fassent tout pour prévenir le risque d’une guerre nucléaire découlant d’un conflit entre pays tiers).117 Devant un texte qui allait ainsi beaucoup plus loin que ce qui était prévu au départ, Pompidou vit le danger «d’une sorte de tutelle sur l’Europe», comme il l’écrivit à Nixon le 13 juillet.118 Les soupçons de condominium américano-soviéti- que que son entretien avec Kissinger le 18 mai avait en partie apaisés revenaient en force. D’autant plus que Paris voyait une certaine cohérence inquiétante entre l’accord du 22 juin, les SALT qui conduisaient à une réduction de la garantie nucléaire américaine à l’Europe, les MBFR qui risquaient de donner un droit de regard important à l’URSS en Europe centrale: «Tout se passe comme si Russes et Américains étaient en train de définir les règles d’un jeu mondial dont ils seront les seuls vrais partenaires (…). Chaque superpuissance paraît dans ce cadre accorder à l’autre le droit de réorganiser son propre camp».119

117. H. KISSINGER, Years of Upheaval, op.cit., pp.274-286. 118. 5AG2/1021. 119. Note du ministère des Affaires étrangères du 20 juin 1973, 5AG2/1019. Le Président Pompidou et les relations entre les Etats-Unis et l’Europe 141

Décidément, on revenait à Paris à certains réflexes très «gaullistes». Mais d’autres problèmes vinrent immédiatement se greffer sur celui de l’accord du 22 juin. En particulier le projet américain de «Déclaration commune de principes pour l’Alliance atlantique». Washigton commit là une erreur d’appréciation, estimant que les Français, depuis Reykjavik, étaient d’accord sur le principe et souhaitaient seulement que l’affaire n’apparût pas comme relevant de l’OTAN mais fît l’objet d’une série de conversations bilatérales. (D’une façon générale d’ailleurs, Henry Kissinger avait tendance à penser que les réticences du gouvernement fran- çais à l’égard de l’accord américano-soviétique du 22 juin ou de la Charte de l’Atlantique étaient à l’usage de l’opinion publique, mais ne reflétaient pas la position officielle).120 Pour Paris le problème posé par la Déclaration atlantique n’était cependant pas seulement une question de procédure, mais de fond. Jean-Bernard Raimond souligna pour le Président le 4 juillet 1973 que le projet de déclaration préparé par Kissinger donnait un rôle dirigeant aux Etats-Unis dans tous les domaines dans un grand ensemble atlantique, comportait un retour de fait de la France dans l’OTAN, amènerait la CEE à renoncer «à définir progressivement son autonomie et sa personnalité politique par rapport aux Etats-Unis». Certes, le souci de Kissinger était de maintenir le leadership américain dans une période de bouleversement des relations internationales, mais son projet de Déclaration n’était pas «acceptable». Cependant on ne pouvait pas répondre de façon purement négative, car «le maintien d’une solidarité occidentale nous est nécessaire». La solution pourrait être de présenter un contre-projet français de Déclaration; on pouvait espé- rer en effet qu’une négociation était possible. En effet, les services du Département d’Etat avait préparé un autre projet qui était «assez raisonnable», moins «mauvais» pour la France, que celui de Kissinger. La position américaine n’était peut-être pas figée sur le texte «démesuré» de Kissinger.121 Et de fait Michel Jobert remit un contre-projet français de Déclaration à Quinze le 3 octobre 1973 au Conseil de l’Alliance atlantique, après s’en être entretenu avec Georges Pompidou la veille.122 Le texte français répondait à toutes les préoccupa- tions parisiennes à l’époque: il réaffirmait la nécessité de la solidarité atlantique et du maintien des troupes américaines en Europe, mais il réaffirmait également la nécessité de la dissuasion nucléaire (contre les tendances à la dénucléarisation dont à Paris on soupçonnait les Américains et pour réagir contre une éventuelle dérive des SALT). Il affirmait que les Etats-Unis ne laisserait pas l’Europe être soumise «à une pression extérieure politique ou militaire susceptible d’aliéner sa liberté», ce qui visait bien entendu les conséquences redoutées à Paris de l’accord améri- cano-soviétique du 22 juin (le «condominium»). Il affirmait la «spécificité» de la défense de l’Europe ainsi que la contribution conventionnelle et nucléaire (pour deux d’entre eux) des pays européens de l’Alliance. Cela correspondait à la volonté de faire reconnaître la valeur pour l’Alliance de la Force de frappe et aussi de faire

120. Note de Kissinger pour Nixon du 29 juin 1973, NPM NSC CF/679/France vol.XI. 121. 5AG2/1021. 122. 5AG2/1021. 142 Georges-Henri Soutou prendre en compte, pour l’avenir, l’hypothèse de l’émergence d’une personnalité européenne en matière de défense, comme Michel Jobert devait le faire à l’occasion de son fameux discours devant l’Assemblée de l’UEO le 21 novembre 1973. Soulignons ici que ce contre-projet français fut un grand succès, ce qui fut occulté à l’époque par les crises de l’automne 1973 et de l’hiver 1973-1974, ainsi que par la très médiatisée rivalité entre Kissinger et Jobert (à mon avis trop souli- gnée par Kissinger dans ses mémoires): on le retrouve à peu près tel quel dans les dix premiers articles de la «Déclaration sur les relations atlantiques» qui fut finalement entérinée par le Conseil de l’Alliance, à Ottawa, le 19 juin 1974, après la mort du Président Pompidou. Les Français avaient réussi une brillante opération: d’une part ils avaient fait disparaître le projet à leurs yeux beaucoup plus gênant de Kis- singer. Ils avaient profité de l’occasion pour faire entériner par l’Alliance certaines de leurs thèses essentielles sur la dissuasion nucléaire et sur la détente, et contre le «condominium». Et enfin, ce qui est moins connu, ils avaient réaffirmé la solidarité de l’Alliance alors que depuis le mois de juin 1973 le gouvernement allemand (tout au moins le chancelier Brandt et son ministre des Affaires étrangères Scheel) réflé- chissait à l’émergence d’un nouveau système européen de sécurité permettant de dépasser la division de l’Allemagne et proposait à Paris d’envisager une défense européenne en dehors de l’OTAN.123 On a donc dans cette affaire une quintessence du gaullisme rationalisé de Georges Pompidou: défense sourcilleuse de l’indépen- dance française mais solidarité fondamentale avec les Etats-Unis face à la menace soviétique et au risque d’une dérive neutraliste de la RFA. Bien entendu les Américains perçurent parfaitement les arrière-pensées au fond très gaullistes de Paris, mais ils comprirent que le texte français était le maximum de ce que l’on pouvait espérer et qu’il représentait «l’immense avantage de venir du principal dissident au sein de l’OTAN». Ils décidèrent en fait immédiatement de retirer le projet Kissinger de Déclaration et donc de laisser la voie libre au projet de Jobert.124 Mais le débat avec les Etats-Unis, calmé sur ce point, allait se transporter sur un autre, d’ailleurs connexe, celui du type de rapports à établir entre les Etats-Unis et la CEE. En effet au cours de l’été les Belges et les Allemands, inquiets du blocage de la Charte de l’Atlantique provoqué par les réticences françaises, avait proposé d’élaborer parallèlement un document sur les relations entre la CEE et les Etats-Unis, expliquant d’ailleurs que certains problèmes transatlantiques ne relevaient pas de l’Alliance.125 Les Américains embrassèrent cette idée, pensant en fait pouvoir rattraper par là leur version très exigeante de Charte atlantique à laquelle ils avaient dû renoncer, en faisant pression sur la France dans le cadre des Neuf par l’intermédiaire de ses partenaires européens. En particulier Washington souhaitait que ce document réaffirme «le caractère central de la relation transatlantique» et

123. G.-H. SOUTOU, L’attitude de Georges Pompidou …, op.cit. Je ne peux pas entrer ici dans les dé- tails de la position allemande à l’époque, fort complexe et même contradictoire, prise entre l’atlan- tisme et une tentation neutraliste. Mais ces contradictions mêmes inquiétaient beaucoup Paris. 124. Note de Sonnenfeldt pour Kissinger du 3 octobre 1973, NPM/NSC CF/679/France vol.XI. 125. H. KISSINGER, Years of Upheaval, op.cit., pp.183 ss. Le Président Pompidou et les relations entre les Etats-Unis et l’Europe 143 prévoie une consultation préalable avec les Etats-Unis avant toute décision écono- mique de la CEE.126 Les Français acceptèrent pourtant que l’on préparât une déclaration Etats-Unis-CEE, à condition que parallèlement on mît au point un texte sur «l’iden- tité européenne», afin que celle-ci ne risquât pas de se diluer dans le dialogue transatlantique.127 En effet à l’automne 1973 une relance européenne paraissait à Paris comme le seul moyen de réagir face aux incertitudes de la situation internationale et en particulier face aux ambiguïtés allemandes.128 Dans sa conférence de presse du 27 septembre 1973 Pompidou avait proposé que les chefs d’Etat et de gouvernement se réunissent régulièrement pour traiter de la coopération politique, reprenant probablement une idée de Jean Monnet. Le 31 octobre, à l’issue d’un conseil des ministres consacré à cette question, Pompidou adressa à Brandt une lettre qui préci- sait sa pensée: les chefs d’Etat et de gouvernement devraient se réunir seuls, sans ordre du jour, pour des conversations très ouvertes en vue «d’harmoniser leur attitude dans le cadre de la coopération politique».129 Cette relance devait aboutir au sommet des Neuf à Copenhague les 15 et 16 décembre 1973: ce fut l’ancêtre du Conseil européen des Chefs d’Etat et de gouvernement. A cette occasion on pro- clama une «Déclaration sur l’identité européenne». Le texte réaffirmait «les liens étroits» entre les Neuf et les Etats-Unis et la volonté de développer la coopération avec eux, mais en même temps il réaffirmait, conformément à la thèse française, que les Neuf formaient une «entité distincte et originale». Le document exposait les grandes lignes d’action de l’Europe face aux différents problèmes mondiaux, y compris la détente, le Moyen-Orient, la Chine, le sous-développement, de façon très générale mais en marquant bien que l’Europe n’était pas seulement une puissance régionale. La guerre du Kippour en octobre 1973 et ses conséquences (le choc pétrolier) vinrent comme on le sait compliquer les rapports franco-américains, Paris étant en désaccord avec Washington sur la crise du Moyen-Orient et hostile aux initiatives américaines en vue de constituer un groupe des pays consommateurs de pétrole. Il n’est pas question de s’étendre ici, mais je voudrais souligner que pour les Français l’invitation faite par Nixon le 9 janvier 1974 à une conférence sur les problèmes de l’énergie à Washington était aussi une nouvelle façon de relancer le projet de Déclaration atlantique de Kissinger: elle revenait pour eux en fait à créer sous direction américaine «une communauté Etats-Unis/Europe/Japon». Les conseillers de l’Elysée étaient divisés: certains estimaient que Jobert ne devait pas se rendre à Washington, d’autres qu’il pouvait le faire mais qu’il faudrait se contenter d’échan- ges de vues et en aucun cas n’aboutir à une organisation des pays consommateurs. Finalement, au Conseil des ministres du 6 février, Georges Pompidou suivit les conseils de modération que lui donnait Edouard Balladur et on décida que Jobert se rendrait à la conférence de Washington cinq jours plus tard, mais pour un simple

126. Note de Walter Stoessel pour Kissinger du 5 octobre 1973, RG 59/70-73/Box 2278. 127. Note de Sonnenfeldt pour Kissinger du 20 septembre 1973, NPM/NSC CF/679/France vol.XI. 128. G.-H. SOUTOU, L’attitude de Georges Pompidou …, op.cit. 129. 5AG2/1009. 144 Georges-Henri Soutou

échange de vues. D’autre part on publia une déclaration selon laquelle «la décision du gouvernement ne saurait être interprétée comme impliquant l’accord de la France à la création d’un organisme institutionnalisant l’ensemble des relations politiques et économiques entre un certain nombre de grands pays industriali- sés».130 Il est vrai que la France était à la suite du choc pétrolier en particulière position de faiblesse: le 19 janvier Paris avait dû quitter le serpent monétaire euro- péen créé l’année précédente et annoncer que le franc flotterait pendant six mois.131 C’était un coup sensible porté à la politique européenne de la France, dont la relance, à l’automne 1973, avait paru comme la seule réponse possible aux difficul- tés qui montaient avec Washington mais aussi avec Bonn et Moscou. Au mois de mars 1974 la discussion sur la déclaration Etats-Unis-CEE revint sur le devant de la scène. Washington repartit à la charge pour qu’avant toute déci- sion importante les Neuf consultent les Etats-Unis et que l’on conclue un «arrangement consultatif organique» entre les deux parties. C’était inacceptable pour Paris; Michel Jobert et le directeur politique au Quai d’Orsay François Puaux penchaient vers un refus très ferme, ou tout au plus une acceptation très limitée de consultations au cas par cas, quitte à provoquer une crise. Gabriel Robin, à l’Elysée, conseillait certes de s’entourer de précautions mais de choisir une attitude moins négative. Ce fut l’avis de Pompidou, qui tout en étant partisan de la «fermeté» acceptait «le principe de la consultation».132 Finalement on renonça à la déclaration Etats-Unis-CEE et on se contenta d’en reprendre la substance dans l’article 11 de la Déclaration d’Ottawa de l’Alliance atlantique du 22 juin 1974. Cet article annon- çait une «étroite consultation» entre les partenaires, la prise en compte des événe- ments survenant dans d’autres parties du monde et de l’interaction, dans leurs rapports, entre les questions de sécurité et les questions économiques. C’était ce qui restait de l’ambitieux projet de Kissinger de «globalisation» et de structuration de l’Alliance atlantique, mais sous une forme édulcorée acceptable par Paris. Là aussi, l’accord final n’intervint qu’après la mort de Pompidou mais il avait préparé le compromis en acceptant la notion de consultation transatlantique et en résistant à la tentation de l’escalade qui parfois animait le Quai d’Orsay. Néanmoins, malgré cette solution au problème de la déclaration Etats-Unis-Europe, il est clair que les rapports franco-américains s’étaient détériorés depuis l’été. Mais parallè- lement, on était de plus en plus inquiet à l’Elysée des progrès de la puissance et de l’influence de l’URSS, on constatait la détérioration des rapports avec Moscou, l’accrois- sement des pressions soviétiques sur la France, le fait que les vrais partenaires de l’URSS à l’Ouest étaient désormais les Etats-Unis et la RFA.133 Et pourtant Pompidou, parce qu’il était méfiant à l’égard de la RFA et mécontent des Etats-Unis, restait fixé dans son langage avec les Soviétiques sur des formules d’indépendance et d’équidistance de la France

130. 5AG2/1021, note de Gabriel Robin, successeur de Jean-Bernard Raimond, du 10 janvier pour Bal- ladur, avec des annotation de Balaldur, et annexes. 131. M. JOBERT, Mémoires d’avenir, op.cit., pp.283-287. 132. Notes de Puaux des 19 et 20 mars et de Robin du 28 mars et annotations de Pompidou, 5AG2/1021. 133. Notes de Gabriel Robin des 13 février et 6 mars 1974, 5AG2/1019. Le Président Pompidou et les relations entre les Etats-Unis et l’Europe 145 entre les blocs qui étaient très gaulliennes mais qui indirectement témoignaient d’une certaine impasse de la politique française, d’un certain isolement.134 Le 30 octobre 1973 le Département d’Etat constatait l’éloignement croissant entre Paris et Washington, critiquant en particulier l’attitude de la France dans la crise du Moyen-Orient. Il recensait à l’intention de Kissinger toute une série de «points de pression possibles» sur la France, sans se dissimuler qu’ils étaient d’un maniement délicat, en particulier dans la mesure où Paris pouvait y trouver, auprès de ses partenaires européens, des arguments pour justiﬁer sa politique d’indépen- dance européenne.135 En juin 1974, après la mort de Pompidou, le Département d’Etat résumait l’évolution récente des rapports franco-américains d’une façon abrupte mais pas tout à fait fausse en soulignant leur détérioration depuis le début de 1973, le durcissement de l’attitude de Paris, le regain du néo-gaullisme, la volonté de renforcer l’identité européenne et pour y parvenir une «attitude plus dis- tante et parfois hostile de Pompidou envers les Etats-Unis».136

Conclusion.

Georges Pompidou avait donc recherché une amélioration profonde des relations franco-américaines, dans le cadre d’un ensemble triangulaire Amérique-France-Europe où la France aurait joué un rôle privilégié. En 1970-1971 un grand accord franco-améri- cain dans cette direction, avec des conséquences importantes sur les trois plans, politique, économique et militaire ne paraissait pas, on l’a vu, hors de portée. Nixon en effet était prêt à accepter le gaullisme pragmatique de son partenaire et à considérer la France comme un relais important des Etats-Unis vers l’Europe. Cependant cet accord a échoué (la conférence des Açores de décembre 1971 fut là un tournant essentiel) pour des raisons structurelles: outre la complexité intrinsèque de certains problèmes comme les questions monétaires ou nucléaires, qui ne facilitaient pas les compromis, Pompidou était quand même plus «gaulliste» qu’on ne l’a cru souvent à l’époque, et nullement disposé à faire la moindre concession en matière d’indépendance nationale ou à se rapprocher de l’OTAN au-delà de très étroites limites, ou encore à accepter une accord monétaire international entérinant la supériorité américaine sans contreparties. Quant à Nixon et Kissinger ils étaient certes plus constructifs à l’égard de la France que Kennedy et Johnson, mais, malgré leur vision proclamée d’un monde multipolaire où l’Europe jouerait son rôle, ils ne renonçaient tout de même pas au leadership américain dans le cadre atlantique. Mais il y eut aussi des causes conjoncturelles: les crises de l’automne 1973, et aussi le fait qu’à partir de cette année-là, avec la ﬁn de la guerre du Vietnam et à la suite du bouleversement international dû au choc Nixon de 1971 et aux SALT, les

134. Le compte-rendu de ses entretiens avec Brejnev à Pitsounda les 12 et 13 mars 1974 est à ce sujet très significatif, 5AG2/1019. 135. RG 59/70-73/Box 2278. 136. RG 59/Briefing Books 1958-1976/Box 190. 146 Georges-Henri Soutou

Etats-Unis avaient moins besoin de la France pour faire triompher leurs conceptions en Europe et dans le monde et pouvaient donc se montrer plus exigeants envers elle. Désormais leur politique envers la Chine et l’URSS dominait tout et dans ce bouleversement mondial ils éprouvaient le besoin de contrôler étroitement non seulement l’Alliance atlantique, mais aussi le développement d’une Communauté européenne de plus en plus puissante sur le plan économique et qui commençait à vouloir déve- lopper une identité politique. Tandis que Georges Pompidou, devant les incertitudes internationales et les inquiétudes que lui inspiraient Moscou et Bonn, revenait à une conception plus strictement gaulliste de sa politique extérieure. Cependant Georges Pompidou ne rechercha jamais la rupture avec Washington. Même aux pires moments (automne 1973 et hiver 1973/74) il resta partisan de formules de compromis et se montra moins raide que Michel Jobert. Du coup le rapprochement avec Washington voulu par Pompidou eut des fruits posthumes: la coopération nucléaire reprise par ses successeurs, la déclaration d’Ottawa de juin 1974, les accords Valentin-Ferber du 3 juillet de la même année qui étaient en négociation depuis 1972. Conclus entre le chef de la Ière Armée française et le commandant OTAN Centre-Europe, ces accords élargissaient à toute la Ière Armée, et plus seulement au seul corps d’armée stationné en Allemagne, les accords Aille- ret-Lemnitzer de 1967.137 Les rapports entre la France et l’OTAN restèrent définis par ces textes jusqu’aux années 80. D’autre part il me semble que l’équilibre voulu par Georges Pompidou entre les différents axes de la politique extérieure française, vers Washington, vers Moscou, vers Bonn, vers l’Alliance, vers l’Europe, ainsi que d’une façon générale sa vision d’un gaullisme rationalisé ne rejetant pas le principe de bons rapports avec Washington, mais sur un plan bilatéral et non pas atlantique, ne furent pas profondément remis en cause par ses successeurs avant la fin de la Guerre froide. Jusque dans certains réflexes et certaines formulations typiques de la diplomatie française des années 70 et 80 Georges Pompidou avait imprimé une marque discrète, mais durable. Georges-Henri Soutou Professeur à l’Université de Paris IV Sorbonne

137. F. BOZO, La France et l’OTAN, Paris, Economica, 1914, p.117.

147 Book reviews – Comptes rendus – Buchbesprechungen

Nicholas AYLOTT – Swedish Social Democracy and European Integration. The people’s home on the market. Aldershot: Ashgate, 1999. ISBN 0-7546-1028-4. - 42,50 £.

For a long time it seemed that there could be nothing better in the world than to be a Swedish social democrat. At least that was how it felt like in Sweden. The Swed- ish social democratic party (SAP) enjoyed decades of practically uninterrupted and largely unchallenged reign and in the meantime helped to build the nation’s wealth and welfare into unprecedented heights. While perfecting their own society and helping poorer third world countries to stand on their own feet, Sweden remained aloof of the more troublesome aspects of contemporary Europe. The Cold War was waged elsewhere by somebody else, it seemed, and the process of political integration in Western Europe concerned a group of nations Sweden did not belong to, and was motivated by problems Sweden did not have. In 1989-90 their fortunes changed. For some in the West the end of the Cold War meant that history was over. For the Swedish social democrats history was about to begin. From a position of sceptical detachment, Ingvar Carlsson’s social democratic government suddenly made a U-turn in the fall of 1990 and announced their intention to apply for membership in the European Community (EC). After a narrow victory in the referendum in 1994, Carlsson’s SAP led Sweden into the European Union (EU) in 1995, but subsequently Sweden has experienced difficulties in adapting to its new role. The source of the troubles has mainly been a domestic one. There is no other political party in Sweden, and perhaps in Northern Europe as a whole, that may have felt to the same degree what a divisive issue the question of European integration can be. In 1990, in a matter of months, the SAP became a quarrelling, divided party, its internal discipline having gone, its appeal amongst the electorate being in steep decline and its power-base, the mighty trade unions, in full revolt. Further, the so called Swedish model of welfare society management was heading towards financial and economic turbulence that forced the social democrats into painful introspection. Why should a highly successful political party so completely lose its internal unity and discipline? What is it that makes the politics of European integration so difficult for a party like the SAP? Nicholas Aylott adds to the body of literature that claims that from the point of view of traditional political parties, there is something qualitatively different in the politics of European integration. The way in which political parties represent- ing old societal cleavages find it difficult to come to terms with new ones concerning supranational integration is well illustrated by the Swedish experience. Why SAP should have faced all these difficulties in the 1990s has been a subject of popular myth-making, and with a welcome work like Aylott’s, myth-breaking. Based on surveys conducted in Sweden during the most intense debate before the 1994 referendum, Aylott shows how SAP’s rift over Europe cannot just be explained as a struggle between the party’s right against its left or modernisers

148 Book reviews – Comptes rendus – Buchbesprechungen against traditionalists, even if these factors should not be overlooked. The author also shows how other ’contours of division’, for example ’isolationists v missio- naries’, ’neutralists v supporters of collective security’ are not alone sufficient to explain the rift over Europe. The way in which European integration divided and divides SAP’s activists locally and nationally does not follow a clear cut pattern, and hence explanations for the U-turn in 1990 and the subsequent trouble within the party has to be looked for in the sequel of events unfolding from 1990 onwards. It was as much the way in which the decision to apply for EU-membership was made as much the substance of the decision itself, which eventually became the source of the difficulties. Previous explanations of SAP’s sudden change of heart have stressed the significance of industrial lobbying and in particular external changes such as the end of the Cold War. Aylott’s explanation is based on short term, domestic political factors. In his view, the decision to apply was an act of desperation. Carlsson’s announcement to apply for EC membership was a part of an attempt to manage an acute economic and financial crisis and a response to a political challenge the government faced from the pro-European opposition parties. When Aylott turns his analysis from the climate of opinion and party structures to the events that led to the decision to apply and to the ensuing management of the divided party, the book becomes a contemporary history of the way in which SAP made its historic decision, and what happened afterwards. Methodologically the contemporary history that comprises the latter half of the book is less satisfactory than the treatment of the internal divisions and the intellectual and cultural inherit- ance today’s Swedish social democrats still carry with them, and which influences their attitudes over European integration. The author’s explanation of these events is plausible, but is stated rather than demonstrated. The empirical base of certain key events in the story is too slender to be compensated by the narrative’s analyti- cal and intellectual coherence. Aylott may well be right, but before more empirical evidence is put forward, we simply cannot be sure. A sceptical reader still leaves room for other explanations of Sweden’s EU-decision as well. Juhana Aunesluoma Post-doctoral research fellow Department of Social Science History University of Helsinki

Gérard BOSSUAT, Andreas WILKENS (sous la direction de) – Jean Monnet, l’Europe et les chemins de la Paix. Paris, Publications de la Sorbonne, 1999, 537 p. – ISBN 2-85944-359-2 – 210.00 FF, 32,01 Euro.

Jean Monnet hat in der Geschichtswissenschaft Konjunktur. Zwei große Biographien, eine von François Duchêne 1994 (478 Seiten) und eine andere von Eric Roussel 1996 (1004 Seiten) legen davon ebenso Zeugnis ab wie die vorliegende umfangreiche Dokumentation eines ehrgeizigen französisch-deutschen Kolloquiums mit Historik- ern und Zeitzeugen aus dem Jahre 1997. Daneben hat Andreas Wilkens einen deut-

Book reviews – Comptes rendus – Buchbesprechungen 149 schsprachigen Sammelband herausgegeben. Die Publikationen gelten einem Mann, der in der Geschichte der Nachkriegszeit nach gängigen – „harten“ - Kriterien nur eine Nebenrolle spielte, keine Macht besaß, nie ein wirklich bedeutendes öffentliches Amt innehatte, nicht als Visionär an der Spitze einer politischen Bewegung stand und auch keine einflußreichen programmatischen Schriften verfaßt hat; selbst seine viel zitierten Memoiren sind in großen Teilen von seinem Mitarbeiter François Fontaine geschrieben worden. Und als François Mitterrand 1988 seine Gebeine in das Pan- théon überführen ließ, wußte über die Hälfte der Franzosen nicht, wer zur Ehre des nationalen Altars erhoben wurde, während ein Viertel meinte, es handele sich um einen Maler (Claude Monet). Warum also erregt Jean Monnet das große Interesse der Historiker? Weil, so lautet die These der Herausgeber, bis in die siebziger Jahre kein anderer in der europäischen Einigung stärkere und dauerhaftere Spuren hinterlassen habe als Jean Monnet. In der Tat, die Autoren des Bandes legen eine imponierend aussehende Liste dessen vor, was er angeregt, auf den Weg gebracht oder beeinflußt hat, und sie nehmen dabei zum Fluchtpunkt sein Wirken als geistiger Vater und Geburtshelfer des Schuman-Plans bzw. der Montanunion. Damit ist das Leitthema des Bandes angesprochen, Jean Monnets Platz im europäischen Einigungsprozeß, sein Beitrag zur Umwertung der französisch-deutschen Beziehungen von bitterer Feindschaft zu Freundschaft und hierdurch zur dauerhaften Befriedung Westeuropas. In einem ersten Teil behandeln sechs Aufsätze Jean Monnets Lebensweg zwischen Europa und den USA als Wirtschaftsexperte im öffentlichen Auftrag vom Ersten bis zum Zweiten Weltkrieg. Diese Jahre formten, so schreibt René Girault, den Akteur, der im Jahre 1950 im Alter von dreiundsechzig Jahren die europäische Szene betritt. Es folgen in zwei weiteren Abteilungen vierzehn Untersuchungen zu Jean Monnets europäischem Wirken. Es geht zum einen darum, in welchem Maße er durch seine persönlichen Beziehungen, insbesondere zu Konrad Adenauer, aber auch zu dessen Nachfolgern bis zu Helmut Schmidt die deutsche Europapolitik beeinflußt hat. Zum anderen werden seine spezifischen Beiträge zur europäischen Einigung untersucht. Neben der EGKS gingen ja sowohl die EVG wie die Euratom auf seine Initiativen zurück, bzw. waren seiner von vielen Autoren des Bandes hervorgehobe- nen Fähigkeit zu verdanken, Projekte operationalisierbar zu machen und sie zum richtigen Zeitpunkt verantwortlichen politischen Akteuren in die Hand zu geben. In den sechziger Jahren agierte er für die Erweiterung der Europäischen Wirt- schafts-Gemeinschaft sowie die transatlantische Partnerschaft. Nach de Gaulles Rücktritt ging es ihm darum, das Projekt einer Währungsgemeinschaft auf die euro- päische Agenda zu setzen und ebenso engagierte er sich für die Einrichtung regelmä- ßiger Beratungen zwischen den Staats- und Regierungschefs, die schließlich mit dem 1974 gegründeten „Europäischen Rat“ institutionalisiert wurden. Einige Aufsätze thematisieren den Gegensatz der Europavorstellungen de Gaulles und Monnets, andere die für de Gaulle hochverdächtige atlantische bzw. amerikanische Dimension des Denkens und Handelns von Jean Monnet und seine Fähigkeit, hochrangige amerikanische Freunde für seine europäischen Vorhaben einzuspannen.

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Fast alle Beiträge der kompetenten Autoren stützen sich auf unveröffentlichte Archivalien. Sie präzisieren den Platz Jean Monnets in der Geschichte der europäi- schen Integration. Hinterfragen sie aber wirklich kritisch, vor allem für die Zeit ab 1955, seinen realen politischen Einﬂuß auf die politischen Akteure und die öffent- liche Meinung der Länder, die sich am Einigungsprozeß beteiligten, wie es Girault fordert, und tragen sie so dazu bei, ihn zu entmythologisieren? Einige ehemalige Gefährten Monnets meinten ja. Sie reagierten heftig und warfen den Historikern vor, den noch gegenwärtigen Jean Monnet wie ein Relikt der grauen Vorzeit zu behandeln, oder noch schlimmer, ihn so grausam zu sezieren, daß am Ende nur noch Einzelteile übrig blieben. Hier nun sind wir bei der Legende Jean Monnet, der im persönlichen Umgang, wie z.B. der ehemalige Bundeskanzler Helmut Schmidt bezeugt, eine faszinierende Persönlichkeit gewesen sein muß und viele führende Mitglieder der europäischen Klasse Europas in bemerkenswertem Maße beein- druckt hat. Mit der Legende oder dem Mythos setzen sich die junge Historikerin Elsa Guichaoua und Robert Frank auseinander. Sie diskutieren die Vermarktung Jean Monnets als „Vater Europas“ durch die Vereinigung der Freunde Jean Mon- nets, das Bedürfnis der Streiter der frühen Jahre und der heutigen Baumeister Euro- pas nach einem identitätsstiftenden Vorbild, wenn nicht gar „Heiligen“ der europäi- schen Integration. Dagegen setzen sie die Aufgabe des Historikers, sich nicht zum Gehilfen von Identitätsstiftung zu machen, sondern sich so weit wie möglich der Wahrheit anzunähern. Neben den sonstigen Verdiensten des Bandes lohnt schon allein die Auseinandersetzung zwischen Zeitzeugen und Historikern die Lektüre.

Gerhard Brunn Universität Siegen

Douglas BRINKLEY and Richard T. GRIFFITHS (editors) – John F. Kennedy and Europe. Baton Rouge, Louisiana State University Press, 1999, with a foreword by Theodore Sorensen, ISBN 0-8071-2332-3, pp. XVIII-349. – 44,95 £.

The editors tell us that these essays – and the papers upon which they are based, originally delivered at an October 1992 conference at the European University Institute in Florence – show ”how activist the Kennedy administration’s European policy truly was, how open JFK was to new approaches aimed at further cementing the Atlantic alliance. Kennedy was a true believer in European unity” (p.XVI). The essays actually justify their claims, and illustrate some of the dynamics actuated by JFK’s activism and openness. The problem with the book as such is that it does not really go beyond these rather obvious statements: after all, no one ever seriously claimed that the Kennedy administration was not interested in Europe or was solely focused on crises in the Third World. Nor is the issue of Kennedy’s belief in European unity particularly controversial. A good third of the book deals with the main personalities and their relationships (Alistair Horne on Kennedy and Macmillan; Roger Morgan on Kennedy and Adenauer; John Newhouse on De Gaulle and the Anglo-Saxons; David L. Di Leo

Book reviews – Comptes rendus – Buchbesprechungen 151 on George Ball and the Europeanists in the State Department; Walt W. Rostow on Kennedy’s View of Monnet and Viceversa; Douglas Brinkley on Dean Acheson and Kennedy). While illustrative of ideas and idiosyncrasies, they tend to be rather apologetic but involuntarily end up sketching a JFK who appears as keen on Europe as he is fundamentally unable to respond to De Gaulle’s challenge and ar- ticulate a workable strategy on Euro-American partnership. Another group of essays deals with strategy and NATO issues. Lawrence S. Kaplan recounts the debate on the Multilateral Force. Bernard J. Firestone and Carl Kaysen focus on the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. Bruce R. Kuniholm discusses the issue of the Jupiter missiles in Turkey. Leopoldo Nuti deals with the diplomatic and political implications of the ”opening to the Left” in Italy. José Freire Antunes debates the Kennedy Administration’s relationships with Portugal. Finally, a third batch of essays (by Thomas Zoumaras, Richard Griffiths, Ynze Alkema, and William Diebold jr.) deals with the no less intricate topics of financial, monetary and commercial initiatives to restructure the Atlantic partnership in view of the changing role of Europe in the world economy, and particularly of the growing American balance of payments problem. Both these latter sets of essays present interesting new research that delves into the multiple strands and intricacies of a trans-Atlantic relationship then undergoing major strains and changes. Here the major feature is the interaction between structural continuity and conceptual innovation, and the individual assessments of Kennedy’s various proposals are judiciously balanced. All in all, they highlight the intellectual creativity of the “best and the brightest” as well as the ineffectual character of many policies that remained marred by inconsistencies and could really not come to grips with the challenges they were meant to meet. Specialists dealing with this period and these topics will find many interesting suggestions and research acquisitions in these essays. What the reader will not find is an overall assessment of European policies against the larger background of the Kennedy administration’s problems and strategies. The editors did not attempt to pull the various strands together in a synthetic view, and while left unexplained their choice can perhaps be seen as symptomatic of the inventive but incoherent and elusive character of Kennedy’s approach to Europe. As a conclusion of sorts the reader can thus turn to Stuart Ward’s final essay on Kennedy, Britain and the European Community. It skilfully shows the “difficulties of British and American policymakers in finding a common approach to the problem of De Gaulle and Europe” (p.318), and indicates that the actual course of European integration was primarily set – Kennedy’s belief notwithstanding – by De Gaulle’s ability to frust- rate many of the “fundamental elements of Kennedy’s Grand Design” (p.332).

Federico Romero Professor of North American History Dipartimento discipline storiche Università di Bologna

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Andreas WILKENS (ed.) – Interessen verbinden. Jean Monnet und die europäische Integration der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Bouvier Verlag, Bonn, 1999, 446 p. – ISBN 3-416-02851-1 (HP) – 120,00 DM.

If we are to believe Andrew Moravcsik, then the role of supranational entrepreneurs like Jean Monnet, Walter Hallstein and Jacques Delors in the European integration process has been greatly exaggerated. In his monumental The Choice for Europe (1998) Moravcsik even goes so far as to claim that their efforts tended “to be futile, and redundant, even sometimes counterproductive” (p.8). The contributors to Inter- essen verbinden. Jean Monnet und die europäische Integration would, at least as far as Monnet is concerned, definitely disagree with this verdict. They are convinced, and demonstrate persuasively, that Monnet has played a very effective and crucial role during the first twenty years of the European integration process – especially with respect to the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community and Euratom, the preamble added by the Bundestag to the Franco-German treaty of friendship, and the initiation of the first attempt at economic and monetary union. Interessen verbinden contains sixteen chapters. In addition to thirteen chapters written by different scholars, three chapters are due to Helmut Schmidt, Katherina Focke and Rita Süssmuth. To begin with these three, Schmidt’s chapter contains some observations on Monnet, as well as some reflections on the present state of world politics: the European powers have no choice but to go further down the road to ever closer union. Focke mostly limits herself to recollections of her meetings with Monnet, especially her private visits to the Monnet household in Houjarray. Süssmuth explains that Monnet’s achievements teach us that, although we should never lose sight of our objective, what really matters are the methods to reach it. As far as the scholarly chapters are concerned, Wolf Gruner discusses the evolution of Monnet’s views on the “triad France-Europe-Germany” between 1940 and 1952. Monnet was one of the first leading Frenchmen to see that the realities of post-war politics put an end to the schemes of French Western European dominance based on German subservience elaborated during the war, and to advocate instead an active Franco-German partnership for the construction of a supranational Europe. In a lengthy essay Andreas Wilkens analyses the relationship between Konrad Adenauer and Monnet with respect to the European policy of the Federal Republic 1950–1957. He concludes that Adenauer and Monnet both agreed on the desirability of binding the Federal Republic to the West, but that the former, as opposed to the latter, regarded supranationality as no more than a means to save the German nation state, and did not believe in the “progressive fusion of national sov- ereignties”. Guido Thiemeyer deals with Monnet’s position concerning the plan for a supranational agricultural community propagated by Pierre Pfimlin. Despite the plan’s supranational aspects, Monnet did not embrace it. His only concern was to see to it that this initiative would not interfere with the negotiations on the Schu- man Plan. Hans-Erich Volkmann reports on Adenauer, France and the vicissitudes of the European Defence Community (EDC). The defeat of the EDC in the French Assembly was a severe set-back for both Adenauer and Monnet, but did not lessen their determination to go further on the way of European unification. Michael

Book reviews – Comptes rendus – Buchbesprechungen 153

Hollmann writes about Monnet’s succession as president of the High Authority. Although the West German authorities were in favour of Monnet staying on as president, the French were dead against it. Only at Messina did the Federal Repub- lic give way, and accepted René Mayer as Monnet’s successor. Werner Bührer reports on Monnet’s non-relationship with West German industrialists. The latter never changed their view of Monnet as an “extreme central planner”. Klaus Schwabe compares the American interpretations of Atlantic partnership with that of Monnet. He concludes that both the Americans and Monnet were in fundamental agreement. They disagreed, however, on what was the best way to deter the Soviet Union. Whereas Monnet regarded European unification as the best deterrent, the Americans, and with them the majority of British, French and German politicians, were of the opinion that everything depended on the credibility of their nuclear forces. Wilfried Loth discusses the development of Monnet’s relationship with de Gaulle in the context of the latter’s plans for a political union. Initially, Monnet welcomed de Gaulle’s initiative, notwithstanding its intergovernmental nature, and cooperated with him. Only after the French veto on British EEC membership and the subsequent signing of the Franco-German treaty of friendship, did Monnet turn against the French president. Matthias Schönwald analyses Monnet’s and Hall- stein’s ideas about Europe. According to him the two friends, “with the same anten- na”, disagreed on the role the United Kingdom and the United States could play in European integration. In contrast to Monnet, Hallstein was no firm supporter of British entry, and, fearful of American hegemony, he wanted to keep the Americans at a distance. Matthias Schulz writes about the political friendship between Kurt Birrenbach and Monnet and their role as initiators of the “Atlantic” preamble added to the Franco-German treaty of friendship by the Bundestag. Hanns Jürgen Küsters examines Monnet’s relations with the German chancellors from Adenauer to Schmidt. Monnet was in close contact with Adenauer, and he also established a good relationship with Willy Brandt, but he failed to do so with Kurt Georg Kiesin- ger and Schmidt, while in the case of Ludwig Erhard a relation simply did not exist. Gérard Bossuat, finally, deals with Monnet’s role in the first attempt at Europe- an economic and monetary union in the beginning of the 1970s. After Brandt’s election as chancellor in the autumn of 1969, Monnet was able to convince the former of the necessity of a German initiative in this field. At the summit of The Hague in December, the member states agreed to commission a report on the establishment of an economic and monetary union. However, as a result of the collapse of the Bretton Woods system and the nationalistic reflexes this crisis set free, nothing came of this. It will be evident from my overview, that this volume is rich in information. Many of the contributions are also highly stimulating. I particularly enjoyed the chapters by Wilkens, Thiemeyer, Loth and Bossuat. A few critical remarks may nevertheless be permitted. The first is that Wilkens has not completely succeeded in turning the book into a whole. It remains unclear why the chapters written by the three retired politicians have been included. These offer precious little with respect to the book’s main theme, Monnet and the integration of the Federal Republic in Europe. This remark

154 also applies to Schwabe’s contribution. Several historical episodes are moreover related more than once, and their interpretation varies according to the authors. This would not matter much, if there were cross-references, but unfortunately these are almost non-existent. This is especially annoying where authors discuss Monnet’s relations with Schmidt and Focke, and fail to take notice of their opinions on this matter, as expressed in their own contributions to the volume. My second point of criticism brings me back to Moravcsik’s argument on the role of supranational entrepreneurs. Without exception, the contributors accept the image of Monnet as the “the father of Europe”. As a result, those of them who deal with Monnet’s part in the Rome Treaties, lightly pass over the fact that Monnet did his utmost to torpedo the negotiations on the economic community. Apparently they are not willing to face the fact that, in this case at least, Monnet’s actions were indeed “counterproductive”. Their image of Monnet also prevents them from seeing that the latter’s role in the formulation of the Pleven Plan differed completely from that of the Schuman Plan. This time Monnet was kept under close surveillance by the French cabinet. It also keeps them from noticing that in the Pleven Plan the supranational aspect was subordi- nated to the intergovernmental aspect. No wonder that Monnet, as Adenauer explained to Theodor Heuss, dissociated himself from the plan. Both Wilkens and Küsters note Adenauer’s observation, but they do not attach any value to it. This brings me to my final point of criticism. Insufficient attention is paid to Monnet’s isolated position in France itself. It is only in Focke’s essay that the reader catches a glimpse of the controversy that prevailed in France about both Monnet and his supranational solutions. Focke relates that when she attended the solemn reburial of Monnet’s body in the Panthéon, Monnet’s daughter explained to her that she had given permission, because her father’s interment in the Panthéon was a “posthume Anerkennung für einen Mann, den führende französische Politiker oft abschätzig behandelt, ignoriert oder gar wegen seines übernationalen Denkansatzes als Verräter diffamiert hatten” (p.29). It was actually for a very short time that France saw the creation of supranational European institutions (in which it would participate on an equal footing with the Fed- eral Republic) as a means of securing its position vis-à-vis that same Federal Repub- lic. With the launching of the Schuman Plan in the spring of 1950, supranationality came to the fore in quite a spectacular way; but hardly five months later traditional thinking in intergovernmental terms prevailed once again. The brief burst of suprana- tionalism must be attributed to the surprise tactics used with the launching of the Schuman Plan. Before the French cabinet knew what plan it had accepted, this had already been made public. From then on the French ministers followed all of Monnet’s activities with great suspicion, as they considered him to be the man behind this fait accompli policy. Although some of them had great difficulty with it, the ministers accepted that it was best to let Monnet finish the job. It was, however, out of question that he would get a new one. The French cabinet gratefully acknowledged Monnet’s services as far as the formulation of the Pleven Plan was concerned, but they did not want his involvement in this plan to go any further.

Book reviews – Comptes rendus – Buchbesprechungen 155

My conclusion that Monnet was already sidetracked in the French struggle for power in the autumn of 1950, means that I believe that there is more to Moravcsik’s argument than the authors of Interessen verbinden probably would care to admit. However, their common blind spot has not prevented them from writing a book that will be enjoyed by everyone interested in the history of European integration.

Robert H. Lieshout University of Nijmegen Nijmegen Centre for German Studies

Fernando GUIRAO – Spain and the Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1945-1957. Challenge and Response. (St. Antony’s Series), Macmillan Press, London, 1998, 240 S. - ISBN 0-333-71078-9. – 45,00£.

Spanien blieb unter der Herrschaft Francos politisch in Europa isoliert. Als einziges westeuropäisches Land war es von der Marshall-Plan-Hilfe ausgeschlossen; es war weder Mitglied der Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) noch in die Europäische Zahlungsunion (EZU) eingebunden, und damit aus dem System zunehmender ökonomischer Verflechtung der westeuropäischen Volkswirt- schaften nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg ausgeschlossen. Die Ursachen und Folgen der Isolierung Spaniens untersucht Fernando Guirao auf der Grundlage umfas- sender Recherchen in spanischen, französischen, britischen und amerikanischen Archiven. Herausgekommen ist eine wirtschaftsgeschichtliche Studie, die auf einer breiten Quellengrundlage die (west)europäische Dimension spanischer Außen- und Außenwirtschaftspolitik untersucht, und zugleich einen anspruchsvollen Beitrag zu einer multilateralen internationalen Geschichtsschreibung liefert. Guirao widerlegt dabei nicht nur eine Reihe gängiger Klischees über die Außenpolitiken der europäischen Staaten und der USA, sondern versteht das spanische Beispiel auch als Fallstudie über Grenzen und Reichweite multilateraler Verflechtungen. Trotz gegenteiliger Verlautbarungen Francos wurde das Prinzip der Autarkie nach 1945 aufgegeben, da sie ökonomisch, politisch und militärisch nicht haltbar war. Die spanische Politik trug der Tatsache Rechnung, daß es traditionell rege Außenhandelsbeziehungen mit den westeuropäischen Ländern und den USA gege- ben hatte. Die politische Ächtung der Diktatur ging nicht unbedingt mit deren wirtschaftlicher Isolierung einher, und sie kann daher auch nicht - wie von der spanischen Propaganda behauptet worden ist - für das geringe wirtschaftliche Wachstum Spaniens verantwortlich gemacht werden. Aber auch das gegenteilige Argument - mangelnde Bereitschaft zu ökonomischer Liberalisierung und ein ausgeprägter Staatsinterventionismus seien verantwortlich gewesen - ist nicht haltbar. Das Ver- hältnis zwischen externen und internen Faktoren zu gewichten, ist ein Ziel der Stu- die. Für eine direkte Einflußnahme Francos auf die Außenwirtschaftspolitik hat Guirao wenig Hinweise gefunden. Vieles spricht dafür, daß er für deren Details kein Interesse zeigte, vielmehr pragmatisch orientierte Fachleute in der Admini- stration eine große Rolle spielten.

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Im ersten Teil seiner Studie nimmt der Autor die unmittelbare Nachkriegszeit in den Blick, in der Spanien wegen der Dollarlücke auf dem europäischen Kontinent zum begehrten Handelspartner avancierte. Der Import wichtiger strategischer Roh- stoffe und Grundnahrungsmittel von der iberischen Halbinsel half den euro- päischen Wirtschaften knappe Devisen zu sparen. Überdies ließ sich eine Lücke füllen, die Deutschland nach dem Zusammenbruch der Handelsbeziehungen mit Spanien gelassen hatte. Ganz pragmatisch standen nationale ökonomische Interes- sen im Vordergrund, die es den Handelspartnern erlaubten, trotz politischer Äch- tung Spaniens partiell ökonomisch zu kooperieren. Dies galt für Frankreich - trotz des Abbruchs diplomatischer Beziehungen und der Schließung der Grenze zu Spanien - und für Großbritannien, dessen Regierungen die ,spanische Frage’ handelspolitisch pragmatisch behandelten. Die politische Ächtung hatte also zunächst keinen tatsächlichen Effekt auf die spanische Wirtschaft. Entsprechend groß waren die Hoffnungen, die Spanien mit der Ankündigung des Marshall-Plans verband, der im zweiten Teil der Studie behandelt wird. Von einer Teilhabe am European Recovery Program (ERP) versprach sich Spanien entgegen gegenteiliger Behauptungen neben wirtschaftlichen Vorteilen auch eine internationale Aufwertung des Regimes. Minutiös setzt sich der Verfasser mit einem vom spanischen Handelsminister ausgearbeiteten detaillierten Import-Pro- gramm auseinander, das vor dem Hintergrund der gewünschten Teilnahme am ERP erstellt wurde. Die zur Rekonstruktion der spanischen Wirtschaft notwendigen Importe lassen Rückschlüsse auf die wirtschaftliche Struktur des Landes zu, deren besondere Deﬁzite erwartungsgemäß auf dem industriellen Sektor und in der Infra- struktur zu ﬁnden waren. Vorhandene Kapazitäten wurden durch einen eklatanten Mangel an Rohstoffen nicht ausgelastet. Das verhinderte Innovation und ökonomi- sche Modernisierung. Die spanische Administration war sich der Untauglichkeit wirtschaftlicher Autarkie durchaus bewußt und signalisierte die Bereitschaft zur Liberalisierung der Wirtschaft des Landes, nicht aber in Politik und Gesellschaft. Den Marshall-Plan nahm Spanien fälschlicherweise als wirtschaftliches, nicht aber als politisches Instrument wahr, das zum engeren Zusammenschluß Westeuropas zur Abwehr des Kommunismus beitragen sollte. Während Portugal in den Mar- shall-Plan einbezogen wurde, war weder in der Truman-Administration noch in den meisten europäischen Staaten eine gleichberechtigte Teilhabe Franco-Spaniens politisch erwünscht. Guirao betrachtet dies als großen Fehler, da die Handelspolitik als Hebel für eine politische Liberalisierung des Systems hätte eingesetzt werden können. Zurecht weist er darauf hin, daß Isolation auf Dauer ein untaugliches Mit- tel der Politik darstellt, da es das isolierte Regime im Innern eher stärkt als schwächt und so dessen Öffnung und seinen Wandel verhindert. Die Ideologisie- rung des Handels als politisches Mittel vor allem durch den Marshall-Plan habe einen pragmatischen Umgang mit Spanien verhindert. À la longue stellte der Ausschluß aus OEEC und EZU ein größeres Handicap für die spanische Wirtschaft dar als die fehlenden ERP-Mittel. Wirtschaftliches Wachstum war auch ohne Marshall-Plan-Hilfe möglich, wenn auch verzögert und unstabil. Der dritte Teil der Untersuchung widmet sich daher den Folgen der Bilate-

Book reviews – Comptes rendus – Buchbesprechungen 157 ralität für die spanische Wirtschaft, die unter den Rahmenbedingungen einer multilateralen Verﬂechtung in Europa strukturelle Benachteiligungen schuf, die die Modernisierung Spaniens verzögerten. Von der EZU, dem ersten multilateralen Zahlungssystem, das die Konvertierbarkeit der europäischen Währungen ermög- lichte und der ökonomischen Entwicklung entscheidende Impulse gab, war der spanische Peso bis 1961 ausgeschlossen. Anders als die EZU-Mitglieder konnte Spanien seine Zahlungsbilanzdeﬁzite - ein Hauptproblem der spanischen Außen- wirtschaft - nicht über dritte Staaten ausgleichen. Einen pragmatischen Umgang mit Franco-Spanien zeigten alle OEEC-Mitgliedstaaten jedoch beim Abschluß bilateraler Handelsabkommen. Sie sahen aber vor allem Agrarexporte vor, die der spanischen Wirtschaft nur geringe Gewinne in harter Währung einbrachten und so die Import-Kapazität auf einem niedrigen Niveau stabilisierten. Eine Beschränkung auf bilaterale Abkommen entsprach zwar nicht dem Kurs der spanischen Regierung. Unter den gegebenen Umständen handelte sie aber so effektiv wie möglich und richtete sich in der Situation ein. Auf diesem Umweg fand bereits in den 50er Jahren eine „Europeanization“ (S.205) der spanischen Wirtschaft statt. Die Isolierung Spaniens war also offensichtlich nicht so ausgeprägt, wie von Guirao an anderer Stelle behauptet. Ob die Einbindung in multilaterale europäische Organisa- tionen aber tatsächlich die politische und gesellschaftliche Liberalisierung befördert hätte, ist daher durchaus zweifelhaft und bleibt letztlich Spekulation. Insgesamt liefert die instruktive Studie einen wesentlichen Beitrag zum Verständnis der Rolle Spaniens im internationalen System nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg.

Dr. Claudia Hiepel Universität-GH Essen Fachbereich 1 - Geschichte

Antonio VARSORI – L’Italia nelle relazioni internazionali dal 1943 al 1992. Bari, Laterza & Figli Spa, 1998, 277 p. - ISBN 88-420-5645-6. - 40.000,00 Lire.

Among the research topics of the post-war international history, Italian foreign policy stays in the background. It keeps arousing interest all the more in the age of interdependence, as further single national pieces combine into the complex picture of international relations. Italy was not one of the major actors still in some cases its role cannot be overlooked. Alas, such interest remains largely frustrated. An important reason is that proper research based on ofﬁcial Italian documents cannot keep pace with that of other Western countries. Because in Italy, in total ignorance of the “thirty years rule”, released sources of the Foreign Ministry hardly cover the middle of the 1950s; after that period, press, secondary sources and foreign archives allow the researcher to follow the visible traces, but leave the decision-making processes and rationales in the shadows. The seizure of documentary sources is all the more damaging in view of the scarcity of private papers and the opaque and complex nature of the topic, which besides may be a further reason for the scarcity of works on Italian post-war foreign policy. Its vanishing clue, so hard

158 to catch and to define, the elusiveness of Italy’s presence in the international setting, are peculiar features that need to be understood. Antonio Varsori’s essay is full of evidence of this variety of elements. The first half of the volume deals in detail with the period 1943-1957, and a second part skims through three and a half decades seeking for main lines, “continuities and change” and tentative findings. It recognises the myths encompassing Italian foreign policy at home - full-heart idealist Europeanism, subordination to the USA, rejection of power projection, and anticolonialism – as well as the anthology of questions, idées reçues and commonplaces currently heard about Italy’s external profile– inconsistency, tours de valse, and opportunism in a merely negative sense. In fact, in Italy the gap between self-awareness and the way it is perceived by others seems deeper than in most other countries. As commonplaces have always some truth in them and myths respond to needs, the author’s effort to call things with their “proper” names makes this a useful book as well for experts as for the general public. For some time historians have argued that Italy’s policy of the late 1940s and 1950s continued on traditional lines. By seeking a place in the Western alliance and in the European construction, Italy behaved during the Cold War as a faithful heir of its ancestors, trying to capitalise on its geopolitical position, with a clear idea of what to seek: equality with the Allies and a regional power status. In the pursuit of national interests within the logic of power politics, Varsori sees a continuity with liberal and fascist nationalism that unveiled in moments such as the founding of the Brussels Pact and the Atlantic Alliance or during the ratification of the EDC Treaty in the attempted “blackmail” over the colonies and Trieste, whilst underlying the whole Italian position all the time. Europeanism was therefore a cool-headed choice: it was designed to render Italy its place among the winners and secure an access to developed economies, but it never overcame the bonds with the US. Ita- ly’s policy therefore was not different from that of the other West European countries, who all devised European integration as the best way to pursue national aims in interdependence, and used their weaknesses as negotiating tools with the US. Paradoxically, this “nationalism” declined when Italy abandoned the strict adher- ence to the double way of Atlanticism-Europeanism. At the beginning of the 1960s, many countries resented the rigidity of bipolarity. But, by seeking a role in the Middle East, in the Mediterranean, by turning towards the Third World and searching for a direct dialogue with Moscow, the emerging political and economic groups of the “center-left” not only expressed the recovered ambitions and means of a regional power, but answered domestic political problems and fuelled a rapidly expanding economy. The overwhelming domestic political conflict and the gap between means and ends are the basic explanations given to the inconsistency often reproached to Italian positions. Capabilities always fell short of ambitions and, in order to satisfy the Left of the coalition government, the Christian Democracy attempted to emulsify deeply diverse ingre- dients. The domestic practice to reconcile opposites and avoid choosing became a model for foreign policy, where Italy sought a mediating role, allowing a many-sided position and dignifying the impossibility to choose. Varsori inserts in the analysis of

Book reviews – Comptes rendus – Buchbesprechungen 159 foreign policy a recent debate over the vanishing of Italy’s national identity in the post-war period. By way of an explanation for the birth of movements and parties re- jecting Italy’s unity in the last decade, many historians and political scientists have argued that, unlike the other European countries, post-war Italy experienced a vanishing of people’s identity with a commonly accepted set of values and shared interests. As for foreign policy, Varsori sees the vanishing of the external national identity appearing during the 1960s, and deepening in the following decade. “In a country deeply condi- tioned by a hard ideological confrontation, the idea of national identity and the need for seeking national interests – weakened during the 1960s – appeared to a majority of the political leadership and opinion makers just like fanciful old style ambitions or reac- tionary attitude” (p.191). As the domestic situation deteriorated, foreign policy appears more and more as a sum of episodes in an increasingly distant international context, sometimes, as mere diplomacy to seek status per se. Italy’s external policy during the 1970s was therefore “often weak and ambiguous” (p.190). The Christian Democracy led by Aldo Moro tried to face the risk of economic and political collapse by seeking an entente with the Communist Party, which was seen as a guarantee of order. Italy became the “sick man of Europe”, relying on, or imprisoned by the “fundamentals” of the European and Atlantic framework: during the nasty period 1973-78 the external dimension merely mirrored the domestic convulsions. The PCI itself, well aware of the limits of Italian sovereignty, reformulated its foreign policy doctrine in order to soften Ameri- can opposition to its accession to power and West-European distrust toward Italy’s economic future. However, too many unknown elements remain in the relations between Italy and its allies that nothing more can be achieved than suspending judgement. Overcoming the 1970s crisis also meant recovering serenity in external relations and a capacity to play a meaningful role in the international system of the “second Cold War”. Again, external conditions, among them the papacy of Karol Woytjla, are acknowledged as having deeply influenced the domestic situation, that in turn produced a new course in foreign policy. During the whole decade, the Communist Party returned to formal, if not always real, opposition and a five-party coalition was in power. For the first time since 1945, leaders from the minor parties, the Republican Party and the Socialist Party, held the Prime Ministry together with key positions such as the Foreign Ministry and the Ministry of Defence. A few persons, Giovanni Spadolini, Lelio Lagorio, Bettino Craxi, Giulio Andreotti, who were holding the keys of foreign policy capitalised on Italy’s ability to face economic and political problems, and opened the way for a recovered role in international affairs. The peacekeeping mission in Lebanon, in particular, appears as a key moment because it reconciled the public opinion with the military as a concept and as a body, but also showed that in the end Italy was not completely a tool in Ameri- can hands. The 1980s appear to be in Varsori’s recollection as the time of the re- birth of a confident and growing country, in striking contradiction with the many dark sides of a political season that ended in the Tangentopoli affair. The process leading to the signing of the Single European Act in the mid 1980s however was a typical example of a too common attitude, when the rare chance to play a visible role was put after domestic preoccupation. In fact, after leading the European

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Council at Milan to launch the intergovernmental conference on the revision of the Treaties of Rome, against the opposition of Britain, Denmark and Greece, in the autumn of 1985 the Craxi-Andreotti couple fought lonely for a federal solution, wasting the newly-won credit in a lost battle mainly for domestic purposes. The same domestic horizon, dominated by the “Clean Hands” process, ob- scured the decline of bipolarity and the tentative emergence of a new international system after 1992. Italy was indeed one of the countries less ready to grasp the need for a reappraisal of a whole set of attitudes and habits. Looking at the Italian case therefore suggests in an extreme way the interdependence between domestic and international spheres and the need for closer insight and deeper analysis.

Elena Calandri Università Degli Studi di Firenze

Susanna SCHRAFSTETTER – Die Dritte Atommacht. Britische Nichtverbreitungspolitik im Dienst von Statussicherung und Deutschlandpolitik, 1952-68. (Schriftenreihe der Vierteljahreshefte für Zeitgeschichte, Band 79), Oldenbourg Verlag, München, 1999, 254 S., ISBN 3-486-64579-X. - 40,00 DM.

Recent test explosions of atomic devices by France, India and Pakistan, the dissolution of the Soviet Union which threatened to create several new nuclear powers, and the endless tug-of-war between the United States and North Korea about the latter’s nuclear arsenal show that nuclear non-proliferation will remain a core issue of international relations in the 21st century. Already before the atomic age actually began, the U.S. and Britain went to great length in order to prevent the diffusion of nuclear know-how and technology. These efforts intensiﬁed when the nuclear club began to grow in the 1950s, and numerous candidates for the possession of nuclear weapons appeared to set into motion a general trend towards a nuclearization of national defences. It was not only the danger of nuclear holocaust, but also the attempt to preserve their privileged status against the have-nots which motivated the start of an active nuclear non-proliferation-policy by Washington, Moscow and London. This was a particularly prominent motive in the activities of the British government, as S. Schrafstetters study of British non-proliferation policy in the 1950s and 1960s forcibly demonstrates. Based on a comprehensive evaluation of archival materials in Britain, Germany and the United States, she conveys the essentially defensive character of this policy, particularly vis-à-vis the economically ascendant Federal Republic. Schrafstetter presents a broad array of compelling evidence which shows that the German question was indeed the “core concern of Britain’s non-proliferation policy” (p.43). When Prime Minister Macmillan enumerated the reasons for Brit- ain’s support of the Test Ban Treaty of 1963 he emphasised that “the most vital of all, more important than stopping contamination of the atmosphere, is stopping the spread of nuclear weapons, especially of course to Germany” (p.76). Questions of status were the dominant consideration behind these statements; the fear that a nuclear Federal Republic might pursue an aggressively revisionist policy towards

Book reviews – Comptes rendus – Buchbesprechungen 161 the East was secondary. The victory of the Labour Party in 1964 elections brought no change in this basic outlook. In the end, this British policy appeared to have been crowned by success; Bonn remained non-nuclear. However, the basic intention behind this strategy, that is to preserve a privileged position among the concert of great powers, failed. Already in the late 1950s, the United Kingdom became technologically dependent on the United States and began to feel the detrimental influence of its nuclear policy on relations with its European neighbours. When London, in the early 1960s, tried to compensate its exclusion from the process of European integration by trading nuclear cooperation for concessions by France, this strategy backfired. De Gaulle’s veto to Britain’s EEC membership in 1963 made that only too obvious. Privileged relations with the U.S. in nuclear matters and a leading role in Europe were mutually exclusive goals. Further- more, bilateral relations with Bonn stagnated during most of the 1960s, and much of this was due to Britain’s nuclear policy, as the ill-fated MLF affair and the protracted negotiations about the Non-Proliferation-Treaty of 1968 show. Ideological attachment to the symbolic insignia of world power informed London’s nuclear diplomacy much more than any rational calculation of an eventual threat to national security. Ultimately, the British strategy was based on a tragic misjudgement because eventually industrial capacity, economic competitiveness and the effects of Eu- ropean integration turned out to be much more powerful assets in the international field than the possession of nuclear weapons which are useful only in the most extra-ordi- nary of circumstances. By its successful sponsorship of the policy of keeping the Feder- al Republic away from the nuclear club, Britain might indeed have rendered even a good service to the Federal Republic which, from the late 1960s onward and despite the protestations of a strong coalition of conservative hard-liners, was concentrating its energies on ultimately more profitable fields of state activity. In her detailed exploration of the NPT-negotiations the author presents one of the first archive-based international histories of this process. She shows succinctly how Britain’s diplomats achieved all their immediate goals in the negotiations; however, due to the basic flaw in the British approach - the idea of cementing great power status by owing a few nuclear weapons more than other countries - this was a futile victory which relegated Britain for a long time to an outsider position in the European region. A demonstration of the often self-defeating nature of great power ideology, the study of Schrafstetter is an important contribution towards a more complete understanding of the dynamics of postwar international history.

Dr. Hubert Zimmermann Fakultät für Sozialwissenschaft Lehrstuhl Internationale Politik Ruhr Universität Bochum

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Eberhard BIRK – Der Funktionswandel der Westeuropäischen Union (WEU) im euro- päischen Integrationsprozeß. Ergon, Würzburg, 1999, 298 p. – ISBN 3-933563-32-1. – 58,00 DM.

In his PhD Eberhard Birk from the University of Augsburg examines the functional change of the Western European Union (WEU) in the process of European integration. So far most publications on WEU were predominantly descriptive. For the most part they were neglecting a structural analysis and the framework necessary to fully understand and assess this institution against its historical background. Birk’s politico-historical analysis approaches WEU by examining the functional change that it underwent up to the present. He does so by assessing underlying interests and events that were fundamental for the creation of the treaties. For that purpose, the author not only analyses the treaties themselves (Dunkirk Treaty; Brussels Pact; modified Brussels Pact in particular) but also takes into account underlying interests of important actors, in particular by evaluating their memoirs (i.e. Konrad Adenauer; Anthony Eden; François Mitterrand). Following the author’s main hypothesis, the adoption of a treaty preceding the creation of an international organisation depends on a primary objective, shared by all partners, which can (but must not necessarily) be followed by one or several secondary objectives. The primary function (Primärfunktion) will be a constant factor as long as it becomes useless or will be replaced by a new primary function (p.39). According to Birk, only by working out these primary objectives in the long run allows an adequate understanding of any international organisation. An important contribution lies in emphasising that WEU’s primary objective, by the time of its creation and for the following three decades, was to control Ger- many’s Bundeswehr in the making, an objective especially pursued by France and eventually accepted by Bonn. Thus, the WEU was if not literally then at least in the spirit of the modified Brussels Pact, more of an intra-oriented “weapons control regime”, set up essentially in order to tame the German army (p.80). In contrast and misleadingly, many historical analyses of the WEU only take into account its current primary function – promoting a European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) – and take this as a criterion for judging its functions then. However, the WEU’s current function only developed by the mid-eighties, when changes in international politics allowed for a change of its primary objective. Due to its relatively strict construction of a mutual assistance formula, expressed in article 5 of the modified Brussels Pact, the WEU has often been said to actually imply a rigid mutual assistance towards its members. In contrast, Birk shows that mutual assistance is not even a secondary function (nor a function at all) of the WEU since it never had military structures independent from NATO to trans- late that obligation into reality. Therefore, the “formula of mutual assistance in article 5 remained without practical meaning” (p.82). In this regard, comparing both institutions and their functions will always be somewhat misleading (pp.41f; pp.73ff; p.103; p.105).

Book reviews – Comptes rendus – Buchbesprechungen 163

Also, Birk convincingly proves that characterising the WEU as the “modified Brussels Pact” is at the least problematic since the content of the initial pact had been changed substantially. The unspoken objective of the Brussels Pact was to create NATO, not anticipating that a WEU might be established at some point. The “modified Brussels Pact", in contrast, was clearly a “weapons control regime", especially by means of the newly established Agency for Arms Control, imposing absolute and relative constraints on its members (p.79ff). The essential function of the WEU appears in the protocols Nr. II - IV of the modified Brussels Pact, aiming at a political control of the German army (p.222). Even if the secondary function(s) (Sekundärfunktionen) are not imperative for the adoption of the treaty, they will allow to master institutionally unanticipated situations and tasks, thus contributing to the stabilisation of an international organisation. In regard to the WEU, its secondary functions made it a relatively successful institution inasmuch as it provided fora for dealing with several divers topics, such as the Saar-question or Great Britain’s interest in coordinating politico-economical issues with members of the European Community (EC) after de Gaulle had denied London admittance to the EC (p.41). The WEU was successful because it could fle- xibly handle various dissimilar issues on the secondary functions level. According to Birk, the current primary function of the WEU – i.e. the development of the ESDI – emerging in the mid-eighties when the Rome Declaration of 1984 and the Hague Platform of 1987 had pinned down WEU to the fields of security and defence (p.125). But how is this turning point to be explained? The ESDI emerged as the new function from the changed framework conditions of security policy in international politics. Especially, frictions among NATO partners on this side and beyond the Atlantic over security issues – SALT and ABM treaties of the seventies; SDI; an increasing bilateralism of the superpowers - accelerated the request of some Europeans (especially the French) for a Security and Defence Identity of their own. Besides, the WEU Parliamentary Assembly played a crucial role in urging for the ESDI since the Assembly constantly stressed the European dimensions of the WEU compared to the more intergovernmental approach of the Council. Birk therefore emphasises not to talk about a “revitalisation” of the WEU during that period, since with a new function – developing the ESDI - something qualitatively different emerged. Instead, one should rather talk of a “political reinterpretation” (p.127) or “qualitatively changed repolitisation” (p.155). The old primary function – arms control - declined by that time down to zero since retaining it would have proven dysfunctional. This meant a change in quality (and not only a gradual change) since the quality of the basis of the agreement had been changed in essence. From that time onward, the WEU became a specialised organisation and its “secondary functions” as a feature of the “old” WEU entirely disappeared (p.127). Concerning its new function Birk comes to the conclusion that the WEU did promote the process of European integration, but could not substantially serve as its catalyst. Presently, after the Eastern enlargement process, the Union’s status is that of a “contractor” (Subunternehmer) under the EU for defence issues. The future function consists in reinforcing its contribution to the ESDI and serving as a mili-

164 tary / politico-military executive organ especially for carrying out the so-called “Petersberg-Missions” for the EU, including the possibility of “out-of-area” operations. Consequently, the WEU will be (or better: is already being) transformed from a political to a military instrument (pp.217-227). Altogether, Birk’s analysis offers a subtle and comprehensive investigation of the WEU’s functional change in the course of time that allows to judge its historical foundations as well as its current role more adequately.

Sebastian Mayer Research Fellow Free University of Berlin

William I. HITCHCOCK – France Restored. Cold War Diplomacy and the Quest for Leadership in Europe, 1944-1954. Chapel Hill/London, The University of North Carolina Press, 1998, 291 S. – ISBN 0-8078-47478-X. – 12,50 £.

Nachdem sich die Forschung über die Anfänge des Kalten Krieges und die Rekonstruk- tion Westeuropas zunächst vor allem auf die Rolle der USA und Großbritanniens konzentriert hatte, rückt seit einigen Jahren Frankreich stärker in den Mittelpunkt des Interesses. Verhielt sich die französische Seite tatsächlich so passiv, kurzsichtig oder destruktiv, wie es die ältere Literatur nahelegt? Oder vermochte sich Frankreich, ungeachtet seiner militärischen und wirtschaftlichen Schwäche, in weit höherem Maße gegen die amerikanische Vormacht zu behaupten als bisher angenommen? Um diese Fragen zu beantworten, zeichnet Hitchcock auf der Grundlage franzö- sischer, britischer und amerikanischer Akten die französische Rekonstruktions-, Europa- und Sicherheitspolitik während der ersten Dekade des Kalten Krieges detailliert nach. Drei Themenkomplexe interessieren ihn dabei ganz besonders: Das „Vermächtnis“ der Vierten Republik, der Beitrag der Vereinigten Staaten zur politischen und wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung Nachkriegseuropas und die Anfänge der europäischen Einigungsbestrebungen. Entgegen früheren Auffassungen zieht er eine insgesamt positive Bilanz der französischen Politik zwischen Kriegsende und der Mitte der 1950er Jahre. Frank- reich habe die Nachkriegsordnung entscheidend geprägt, indem die französische Diplomatie über die Verwendung der Marshallhilfe mitbestimmt, den wirtschaftlichen Wiederaufbau Westdeutschlands eingedämmt, dessen föderalen politischen Aufbau gestärkt und dessen Wiederbewaffnung gebremst, die deutsch-französische Aussöhnung forciert und eine führende Rolle in der westlichen Allianz erobert habe: „Despite the apparent dependence on American aid, French planners were succesful in outlining and pursuing a national strategy that advanced French interests, cleverly skirting and at times adapting to American priorities“ (S.208). Die USA seien auf diese Weise gezwungen worden, auf die Interessen Frankreichs weit stärker Rücksicht zu nehmen, als nach dem Kräfteverhältnis zwischen den beiden Ländern zu erwarten gewesen wäre. Auch die französische Integrationspolitik

Book reviews – Comptes rendus – Buchbesprechungen 165 deutet er in diesem Sinne „as a function of an overall national strategy that sought to enhance the nation’s inﬂuence within Europe and the Atlantic Alliance“ (S.204). Die Geschichte des Kalten Krieges, so könnte man die Ergebnisse der Studie mit John Lewis Gaddis, der ein Vorwort beigesteuert hat, zusammenfassen, verlief wesentlich komplizierter als lange Zeit angenommen: “If there was an American ‚empire by invitation’ in post-World War II Europe, this was one in which the sub- jects instructed als well as invited the emperor” (S.X). Völlig neu ist diese Erkennt- nis allerdings ebensowenig wie die These von der konstruktiven Europa- und Deutschlandpolitik Frankreichs. Nicht zuletzt die deutsche Forschung hat seit Mitte der 1980er Jahre wiederholt auf die maßgebliche Rolle Frankreichs bei der Eingliederung Westdeutschlands in die westliche Gemeinschaft und der Integration Europas hingewiesen. Sich mit dieser Literatur auseinanderzusetzen, hat Hitchcock bedauerlicherweise versäumt – sein Buch hätte davon gewiß proﬁtiert.

Werner Bührer Technische Universität München

167 Abstracts – Résumés – Zusammenfassungen

Marc Trachtenberg, Christopher Gehrz America, Europe, and German Rearmament, August-September 1950

In September 1950, the U.S. government demanded that the NATO allies agree to the rearmament of West Germany openly and immediately. The American government said it would not send over a combat force that could serve as the heart of an effective defence system for the NATO area unless this demand were accepted. This heavy-handed policy is traditionally interpreted as the outcome of a bureaucratic conﬂict within the U.S. government: the military authorities, it is said, would only agree to deploy the troops if the allies agreed to German rearmament, and Secretary of State Acheson reluctantly gave way to the military on this issue. Using a variety of archival sources, this article challenges that view. It concludes that what the U.S. government did in September 1950 has to be understood in political terms: Acheson deliberately decided to take a very tough line with the NATO allies at the time. That policy choice, it is argued, had a major bearing on U.S.-European relations, and had a certain bearing even on the European integration process.

Les Etats-Unis, l’Europe et le réarmement allemand. Critique d’un mythe (août-septembre 1950)

En septembre 1950, le gouvernement des Etats-Unis demande à ses alliés européens de l’alliance atlantique de se rallier ouvertement et immédiatement au réarmement de l’Allemagne fédérale, disant qu’une acceptation du principe constituerait le préalable à l’envoi des troupes américaines de combat destinées à constituer l’épine dorsale de l’OTAN pour la défense en Europe. Cette façon de procéder à la manière forte est traditionnellement présentée comme le résultat d’un conﬂit bureaucratique au sein de l’administration américaine: les autorités militaires auraient subordonné le déploiement de troupes à l’acceptation par les alliés du réarmement allemand, et le secrétaire d’Etat Dean Acheson, malgré lui, aurait emboîté le pas des militaires. C’est ce que le présent article cherche à relativiser. En utilisant diverses sources d’archives, il démontre que l’action de Washington en septembre 1950 doit être envisagée en des termes politiques: Acheson a délibérément décidé d’adopter à l’égard des partenaires de l’OTAN une ligne de conduite assez rude. Ce choix ternissait les relations américano-euro- péennes et avait aussi une certaine incidence sur le processus d’intégration européenne.

Die Vereinigten Staaten, Europa und die deutsche Aufrüstung (August-September 1950): die Kritik eines Mythos

Im September 1950 verlangte die Regierung der Vereinigten Staaten von ihren NATO-Partnern eine offene und sofortige Zustimmung in der Frage der Wiederbewaffung Westdeutschlands. Die Ameri- kaner sagten, sie würden ihre zum Kernstück der Verteidigung Europas aufgestellten Kampftruppen erst dann entsenden, wenn diese Bedingung erfüllt sei. Der schroffe Umgang mit den Alliierten wird gemeinhin als Auswuchs eines bürokratischen Konfliks innerhalb der US-Verwaltung interpretiert: die Spitze der Militärs, sagt man, hätte dem Truppenaufmarsch erst dann zugestimmt, wenn die Alli- ierten sich mit der deutschen Aufrüstung einverstanden erklärt hätten, und Staatssekretär Dean Ache- son habe sich widerwillen diesen Forderungen der Militärs gebeugt. Der vorliegende Artikel bestrei- tet dies. Anhand verschiedener Archivquellen zeigt er, dass Washingtons Vorgehensweise im September 1950 durchaus politisch aufzufassen ist: Acheson hat ganz bewusst eine harte Gangart mit den NATO-Partnern eingelegt. Diese politische Ausrichtung, so wird argumentiert, übte einen bestimmenden Einfluss auf die amerikanisch-europäischen Beziehungen aus; sie hatte auch einen gewissen Einfluss auf den europäischen Integrationsprozess.

168 Abstracts – Résumés – Zusammenfassungen

Paul M. Pitman “Un Général qui s'appelle Eisenhower”: Atlantic Crisis and the Origins of the European Economic Community

This article reconsiders the role of geopolitics in the formation of the European Economic Commu- nity (EEC). Instead of arguing that either economic goals or strategic ambitions were the primary drivers of foreign economic policy in the mid-1950s, it shows how the two sets of concerns acted together to shape policy-making in France and Germany. Fundamental questions regarding the durability of Atlantic economic ties and the reliability of NATO deterrence pushed the French and Ger- man governments toward a new strategic and economic partnership. The reorganization of the Euro- pean economic order was the result not of any single incident such as the Suez Crisis or the Free Trade Area proposal but of persistent tensions within the Atlantic system, which inﬂuenced - but did not determine - domestic economic policy processes.

«Un Général qui s'appelle Eisenhower»: la crise atlantique et les origines de la Communauté Economique Européenne

Le présent article reconsidère le rôle de la géopolitique dans la formation de la Communauté Econo- mique Européenne (CEE). Au lieu d'argumenter que soit des objectifs économiques, soit des ambitions stratégiques eussent été les moteurs primaires de la politique extérieure économique au milieu des années 1950, il montre combien des considérations relevant des deux domaines agissaient conjointement pour façonner les décisions politiques en France et en Allemagne. Des problèmes fondamentaux telles le caractère durable des liens économiques transatlantiques ou la ﬁabilite de la force de dissuasion de l'OTAN incitèrent les gouvernements français et allemand à développer un nouveau partenariat stratégique et économique. La réorganisation de l'ordre économique européen ne résultait nullement d'un incident isolé, à l'exemple de la crise de Suez ou du projet de la Zone de Libre-Echange, mais des tensions persistantes au sein du système atlantique qui, sans être détermi- nantes, inﬂuençaient néanmoins la formulation de la politique économique dans chaque pays.

„Ein General namens Eisenhower“: Die Atlantikkrise und die Anfänge der Europäischen Wirtschaftsgemeinsschaft

Der vorliegende Beitrag analysiert die Geopolitik bei der Entstehung der Europäischen Wirtschafts- gemeinschaft (EWG). Statt zu argumentieren, dass entweder wirtschaftliche Ziele oder strategische Ambitionen die primär treibende Kraft der Außenwirtschaftspolitik in der Mitte der fünfziger Jahre gewesen seien, zeigt der Artikel, wie die beiden erwähnten Bereiche eigentlich zusammenspielten und den Entscheidungsprozess in Frankreich und in Deutschland gestalteten. Grundlegende Fragen wie die Dauerhaftigkeit der atlantischen Wirtschaftsbeziehungen oder die Zuverlässigkeit der NATO Abschreckungsstrategie veranlassten die französische und deutsche Regierungen dazu, eine neue strategische und wirtschaftliche Partnerschaft anzustreben. Die Umwandlung der europäischen Wirt- schaftsordnung wurde keineswegs ausgelöst durch einzelne Ereignisse wie die Suezkrise oder der Vorschlag einer europäischen Freihandelszone, sondern durch die dauerhaften Spannungen im atlantischen System, welche die innere Wirtschaftspolitik zwar nicht bestimmten, aber maßgebend beinﬂussten.

Abstracts – Résumés – Zusammenfassungen 169

Francis J. Gavin, Erin Mahan Hegemony or Vulnerability? Giscard, Ball, and the 1962 Gold Standstill Proposal

What was the character of America's international monetary relations with Europe during the early 1960's, and how were they related to the larger transatlantic political questions of the day? Using newly opened sources on both sides of the Atlantic, this essay challenges the long-held view that the United States was committed to maintaining its "hegemonic power" by propping up the Bretton Woods system. Similarly, the authors undermine the standard belief that French international monetary policy was singularly anti-American in the early 1960’s. New evidence reveals that in 1962, to the great surprise of the Kennedy administration, French Minister of Finance Valéry Giscard d'Estaing offered to help the United States with its balance of payments deficit and gold losses. Inspired by Giscard's hints of support, Undersecretary of State George Ball and key members of the Council of Economic Advisors crafted a monetary plan whose central component was a controversial gold standstill agreement. In return for a European promise to formally limit their gold purchases from the American Treasury, the United States would move aggressively to end its balance of payments deficit. At the end of this arrangement, a new international monetary agreement would be negotiated with the Europeans to replace Bretton Woods. Surprisingly, many within the Kennedy administration were willing to sacrifice the central role of the dollar and its "seigneuriage" privileges in any new system, a position that would have had much appeal for the Europeans. This article investigates the furious debate within the Kennedy administration over the plan and explains why nothing came of Giscard’s apparent willingness to help ease the dollar and gold outflow problem.

Hégémonie ou vulnérabilité? Giscard d'Estaing, Ball, et le Gold Standstill Proposal de 1962

Quelles étaient au début des années 1960 les relations monétaires internationales entretenues par les Américains avec l'Europe; quel était le rapport entre ces questions monétaires et les relations politiques transatlantiques en général? En utilisant des sources récemment ouvertes au public de part et d'autre de l'Atlantique, le présent article défie l'idée longtemps reçue que les Etats-Unis se seraient engagés à sauvegarder leur "puissance hégémonique" en soutenant le système de Bretton Woods. En même temps, les auteurs contestent aussi la vieille croyance que la politique monétaire internationale pratiquée en ces temps-là par la France aurait été particulièrement anti-américaine. Les nouvelles données révèlent qu'en 1962, à la grande surprise de l'administration Kennedy, le ministre français des Finances Valéry Giscard d'Estaing offrait son aide pour juguler le déficit américain de la balance des payements et les sorties d'or. George Ball, le sous-secrétaire d'Etat et d'autres membres influents du Council of Economic Advisors s'inspirèrent alors des suggestions de Giscard pour développer un plan moné- taire controversé dont le point de mire était une "trêve de l'or". En échange de la promesse formelle de limiter leurs achats d'or auprès du Trésor américain, les Européens recevraient des Etats-Unis l'engagement que ceux-ci s'attacheraient sérieusement à couper court au déficit de leur balance des payements. Au terme de cet arrangement, un nouvel accord monétaire international serait négocié avec les Européens afin de remplacer celui de Bretton Woods. Etonnamment beaucoup de monde à l'intérieur de l'administration Kennedy était prêt à sacrifier dans ce nouveau système le rôle central du dollar et ses privilèges de "seigneuriage". En voilà une position qui aurait eu beaucoup d'attrait pour les Européens. Le présent article analyse les débats serrés déclenchés par le plan au sein du staff américain et explique pourquoi finalement il n'est rien sorti de concret de cette apparente bonne volonté giscardienne de contribuer à enrayer l'exode du dollar et de l'or.

Hegemonie oder Schwäche? Giscard d'Estaing, Ball und der Gold Standstill Vorschlag von 1962

Wie gestaltete sich in den frühen sechziger Jahren Amerikas internationale Währungspolitik gegen- über Europa; und wie war diese in das allgemeine Tagesgeschäft der transatlantischen Beziehungen eingebunden? Neue, erst seit geraumer Zeit zugängliche Quellen aus Beständen beiderseits des Atlantik ermöglichen es die herkömmliche Meinung, dass die Vereinigten Staaten ihre hegemoniale

170 Abstracts – Résumés – Zusammenfassungen

Macht durch ein Festhalten am Bretton Wooods System absichern wollten, infrage zu stellen. Genauso bezweifelt der vorliegende Aufsatz auch die Standardvorstellung, Frankreichs internationale Währungspolitik sei damals ganz besonders anti-amerikanisch ausgerichtet gewesen. Neue Erkenntnisse zeigen wie 1962 - zur gro_en Überraschung der Kennedy-Administration - der französische Finanzminister Valéry Giscard d'Estaing den Vereinigten Staaten sein Hilfe anbot, um die Probleme der defizitären Zahlungsbilanz und der Goldausfuhr zu bereinigen. Beflügelt durch Giscards angkündigte Unterstützung, arbeiteten der beigeordnete Staatssekretär George Ball und füh- rende Mitglieder des Council of Economic Advisors einen Plan aus, in dessen Mittelpunkt ein kon- troversiertes Goldstillhalteabkommen stand. Als Gegenleistung für ein ausdrückliches europäisches Versprechen zukünftig Goldeinkäufe in den USA einzuschränken, würden die Amerikaner ihr Defizit der Zahlungsbilanz nun verschärft bekämpfen. Danach sollte ein neues internationales Währungsab- kommen mit den Europäern verhandelt werden. Es würde jenes von Bretton Woods ersetzen. Erstaunlich ist, wie viele Leute der Kennedy-Administration bereit waren die zentrale Rolle des Dol- lars und seine "herrschaftlichen" Privilegien in einem neuen System aufzugeben das den Europäern doch sehr entgegengekommen wäre. Der vorliegende Aufsatz untersucht die heftigen Debatten die der Plan innerhalb der amerikanschen Verwaltung ausgelöst hatte, und erklärt auch warum aus Gis- cards gutem Willen das Problem der Dollar- und Goldausfuhr zu entschärfen nichts wurde.

Abstracts – Résumés – Zusammenfassungen 171

Hubert Zimmermann Western Europe and the American Challenge: Conﬂict and Cooperation in Technology and Monetary Policy, 1965-1973

This survey of transatlantic relations during the 1960s and early 1970s analyses, by concentrating on the ﬁelds of monetary and technology policies, the causes and consequences of the erosion of Euro- pean-American relations in this period. The lacking interest of the United States for an expansion of collaboration in high technology sectors left numerous existing possibilities unexplored. At the same time, an already existing structure of mutual cooperation in monetary policy, the Bretton Woods system, broke down, mainly due to an increasing unilateralism on part of the United States. The most important consequence of these “American challenges” was an intensiﬁcation of European cooperation. The EC summit of The Hague in December 1969 was the most visible expression of this reaction. The decisions to create a monetary union, increase technological cooperation and realise a common foreign and security policy bore witness to this trend.

L’Europe occidentale et le déﬁ américain: conﬂits et coopération dans les domaines de la technologie et de la politique monétaire (1965-1973)

L’analyse des relations transatlantiques dans les domaines de la politique monétaire et technologique au cours des années soixante, début soixante-dix, révèle les causes et conséquences d’une érosion des rapports entre Européens et Américains. Tandis qu’en matière des technologies de pointe les possibil- ités réelles d’une extension de la coopération ne sont pas épuisées, à défaut d’un intérêt de la part des Américains, la coopération déjà existante dans le domaine monétaire, c’est-à-dire le système de Bretton Woods, s’effondre. L’unilatéralisme monétaire croissant des Etats-Unis en est la principale cause. En réaction à ce «déﬁ américain», les Européens intensiﬁent leur coopération intra-commun- autaire. La chose devient particulièrement manifeste à l’occasion du sommet de La Haye (décembre 1969) où sont adoptées les décisions de créer une union monétaire, de pousser la collaboration technologique et de mettre en œuvre une politique étrangère et de sécurité européenne.

Westeuropa und die amerikanische Herausforderung: Rivalität und Zusammenarbeit in den Bereichen Technologie- und Währungspolitik, 1965-1973

Anhand eines Überblicks über die transatlantischen Beziehungen in den Bereichen der Währungs- und Technologiepolitik in den 1960er und frühen 1970er Jahren werden die Ursachen und Folgen der Erosion der europäisch-amerikanischen Beziehungen in diesem Zeitraum analysiert. Während auf dem Gebiet der Hochtechnologien bestehende Möglichkeiten zu einer Ausweitung der Kooperation aufgrund des Desinteresses der USA unterblieben, brach im Währungsbereich eine schon exist- ierende transatlantische Kooperationsstruktur, das Bretton Woods System, zusammen. Die Haupt- ursache dafür war der zunehmende Unilateralismus der USA in der Währungspolitik. Die wichtigste Konsequenz dieser „amerikanischen Herausforderungen“ war die Intensivierung der europäischen Zusammenarbeit. Die EG-Gipfelkonferenz von Den Haag im Dezember 1969, auf der Beschlüsse zur Schaffung einer gemeinsamen Währung, zur verstärkten Zusammenarbeit im Technologiebereich und zur Verwirklichung einer gemeinsamen Aussen- und Sicherheitspolitik gefaßt wurden, war der sichtbarste Ausdruck dieser Reaktion.

172 Abstracts – Résumés – Zusammenfassungen

Georges-Henri Soutou President Pompidou and the relations between the US and Europe

Georges Pompidou aimed at improving Franco-American relations profoundly within the framework of a triangular structure constituted by America, France and Europe, with France occupying a privileged position. An important Franco-American agreement along these lines with far-reaching consequences on the political, economic and military level didn’t seem out of reach in 1970-71. However this agreement failed (the Azores Conference in December 1971 being a decisive turning-point) for structural reasons: besides the intrinsic complexity of certain problems like monetary or nuclear questions that didn’t further compromises, Pompidou who after all was more Gaullist than people used to think at that time was not in the least willing to make the slightest concession in matter of national independence no more than to draw closer to Nato beyond very restricted limits or to accept an international monetary agreement conﬁrming American superiority without compensation. As to Nixon and Kissinger they certainly were more positive towards France than Kennedy and Johnson had been, but despite their proclaiming the vision of a multipolar world in which Europe could play its part, they didn’t nevertheless renounce American leadership within the Atlantic framework. But there were also economic causes considering the crises of autumn 1973 and also due to the fact that from that year, with the end of the Vietnam war and in the aftermath of the international upheaval due to the Nixon shock of 1971 and to SALT, the US depended less on France to make prevail their conceptions in Europe and in the world and were thus in a position to display a more demanding attitude. Georges Pompidou, on the other hand, in view of international uncertainties and anxieties aroused by Moscow and Bonn, switched back to a more strictly Gaullist conception of his foreign policy. Georges Pompidou however never sought the rupture with Washington. Even in the worst moments (autumn 1973 and winter 1973-1974) he continued to advocate compromise solutions. As a result, Pompidou’s efforts to achieve a rapprochement with Washington bore posthumous fruit: nuclear cooperation taken up again by his successors, the Ottawa declaration of June 1974, the Valen- tin-Ferber agreements of the 3d July of the same year regarding cooperation between the 1st Army and Nato. These texts deﬁned the relations between France and Nato up to the 80ies.

Le Président Pompidou et les relations entre les Etats-Unis et l’Europe

Georges Pompidou a recherché une amélioration profonde des relations franco-américaines, dans le cadre d’un ensemble triangulaire Amérique-France-Europe où la France aurait joué un rôle privilégié. En 1970-1971 un grand accord franco-américain dans cette direction, avec des conséquences importantes sur les trois plans, politique, économique, militaire ne paraissait pas hors de portée. Cependant cet accord a échoué (la conférence des Açores de décembre 1971 fut là un tournant essentiel) pour des raisons structurelles: outre la complexité intrinsèque de certains problèmes comme les questions monétaires ou nucléaires, qui ne facilitaient pas les compromis, Pompidou était quand même plus «gaulliste» qu’on ne l’a cru souvent à l’époque, et nullement disposé à faire la moindre concession en matière d’indépendance nationale ou à se rapprocher de l’OTAN au-delà de très étroites limites, ou encore à accepter un accord monétaire international entérinant la supériorité américaine sans contreparties. Quant à Nixon et Kissinger ils étaient certes plus constructifs à l’égard de la France que Kennedy et Johnson, mais, malgré leur vision proclamée d’un monde multipolaire où l’Europe jouerait son rôle, ils ne renonçaient tout de même pas au leadership américain dans le cadre atlantique. Mais il y eut aussi des causes conjoncturelles: les crises de l’automne 1973, et aussi le fait qu’à partir de cette année-là, avec la ﬁn de la guerre du Vietnam et à la suite du bouleversement international dû au choc Nixon de 1971 et aux SALT, les Etats-Unis avaient moins besoin de la France pour faire triompher leurs conceptions en Europe et dans le monde et pouvaient donc se montrer plus exigeants envers elle. Tandis que Georges Pompidou, devant les incertitudes internationales et les inquiétudes que lui inspiraient Moscou et Bonn, revenait à une conception plus strictement gaulliste de sa politique extérieure. Cependant Georges Pompidou ne rechercha jamais la rupture avec Washington. Même aux pires moments (automne 1973 et hiver 1973/74) il resta partisan de formules de compromis. Du coup le rapprochement avec Washington voulu par Pompidou eut des fruits posthumes: la coopération nucléaire reprise par ses successeurs, la déclaration d’Ottawa de juin 1974, les accords Valentin-Ferber du 3 juillet

Abstracts – Résumés – Zusammenfassungen 173 de la même année concernant la coopération entre la 1ère Armée et l’OTAN. Les rapports entre la France et l’OTAN restèrent déﬁnis par ces textes jusqu’aux années 80.

Präsident Pompidou und die amerikanisch-europäischen Beziehungen

Georges Pompidou strebte nach einer Verbesserung der französisch-amerikanischen Beziehungen innerhalb einer Dreieckstruktur Amerika-Frankreich-Europa in dessen Rahmen Paris eine vorrangige Rolle übernommen hätte. Um 1970/71 schien ein derart gestaltetes großes französisch-amerika- nisches Abkommen mit wichtigen politischen, wirtschaftlichen und militärischen Auswirkungen auch tatsächlich möglich. Trotdem scheiterte die Verständigung (die Konferenz auf den Azoren im Dezember 1971 bildet diesbezüglich einen entscheidenden Wendepunkt). Neben der besonderen Komplexität mancher Fragen, insbesondere im währungs– oder nuklearpolitischen Bereich – sie war nicht dazu angetan einen Kompromiss zu fördern – gestaltete sich die letztlich starre Haltung beider Seiten als ausschlaggebend für den Misserfolg. Pompidou war doch weit mehr „gaullistisch“ als man damals glaubte. Er war weder bereit auch nur die geringsten Zugeständnisse in Sachen nationale Unabhängigkeit zu machen, noch eine Annäherung Frankreichs an die Nato über gewisse, sehr eng gezogene Grenzen hinaus zu dulden. Genauso wenig akzeptierte er ein internationales Währungsab- kommen das allzu einseitig die amerikanische Überlegenheit anerkannte. Nixon und Kissinger ihr- erseits waren zwar Frankreich gegenüber konstruktiver gesinnt als Kennedy und Johnson, und trotz- dem waren auch sie nicht bereit die amerikanische Vorherrschaft im atlantischen Bündnis aufzugeben. Daran änderte auch ihre Vison einer multipolaren Weltordnung nichts, in der Europa eine grössere Rolle hätte spielen sollen. Es gab aber auch konjukturbedingte Gründe für den Misserfolg: die Krisen im Herbst 1973 und die allgemein veränderte internationale Lage in Folge des Nixonschocks von 1971, der SALT-Gespräche und der Beendigung des Vietmankrieges. All dies bewirkte dass die USA weniger auf Frankreichs Mitwirkung angewiesen waren, um ihre Vorstellungen in Europa und der Welt durchzusetzen. Französischerseits veranlassten die internationale Unsicherheit und die Beunruhigung über die Moskauer und Bonner Politik Pompidou zu einer streng gaullistisch ausgerichteten Konzeption seiner Außenpolitik zurückzukehren. Georges Pompidou suchte aber nie den offenen Bruch mit Washington. Sogar im Augenblick der schlimmsten Krisen (Herbst 1971; Winter 1973/74) blieb er stets ein Verfechter von Kompromiss- lösungen. Die von ihm gewollte französisch-amerikanische Annäherung trug denn auch ihre Früchte nach seinem Tod: die von seinen Nachfolgern wieder aufgenommene Zusammenarbeit im Nuklear- bereich; die Ottawa-Erklärung vom Juni 1974, die Valentin-Ferber Abkommen vom 3. Juli desselben Jahres über die Zusammenarbeit der 1. Armee mit der NATO. Bis in die achtziger Jahre hinein wurden die Beziehungen zwischen Frankreich und der Nato durch diese Texte festgelegt.

Walter Hallstein-Institut für Europäisches Verfassungsrecht (Hrsg.)

Grundfragen der europäischen Verfassungsentwicklung

Forum Constitutionis Europae – Band 1

Das nationale Verfassungsrecht ist heute nur noch in der Zusammenschau mit den Grundnormen der Europäischen Verträge zu verstehen. In diesem Sammelband analysieren renommierte Verfassungs- und Europarechtler zentrale Fragen der europäischen Verfassungsentwicklung. Ingolf Pernice untersucht die »Constitutional Law Implications for a State Partici- pating in a Process of Regional Integration« und »Die politische Vision von Europa und die notwendigen institutionellen Reformen«. Zu sehr unterschiedli- chen Folgerungen gelangen Paul Kirchhof und Manfred Zuleeg bei ihrer Analyse des Verhältnisses zwischen nationalem Recht und Europarecht. Gerd Wartenberg berichtet über »Praktische Erfahrungen bei der Bund-Länder-Koordinierung in Angelegenheiten der EU«. Die zentrale Frage der Folgen des EU-Beitritts auf die nationale Souveränität analysiert Miroslaw Wyrzykowski in seinem Beitrag »Die Europaklausel der polnischen Verfassung – Souveränität in Gefahr?«. Den Band beschließt Dimitris Tsatsos mit der Entwicklung eines »Prinzip(s) der europäischen Verfassungsverantwortung«.

2000, 147 S., brosch., 58,– DM, 423,– öS, 52,50 sFr, ISBN 3-7890-6591-9 (Schriftenreihe Europäisches Verfassungsrecht, Bd. 4)

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175 Contributors - Auteurs - Autoren

Marc TRACHTENBERG, is a professor of history at the University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia PA, 19104-6228, USA. Website: http://www.history.upenn.edu/trachtenberg Tel: (+ 215) 898-8477 E-mail: [email protected]

Christopher GEHRZ, is a graduate student in the history department at Yale University, New Haven, CT 06520, USA. personal addr.: 15 Beacon Street, Hamden, CT 06514 Tel: (+ 203) 287-9692 E-mail: [email protected]

Paul PITMAN, is a Research Fellow at the Miller Center of Public Affairs at the University of Virginia. personal addr.: P.O. Box 302, Canyon, California 94516, USA. Tel: (+ 925) 376-5176 E-mail: [email protected]

Francis J. GAVIN, is an Assistant Professor of Public Policy at the Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs at the University of Texas at Austin, P.O. Box Y, Austin, Texas, 78713-8925, USA. Website: http://www.utexas.edu/lbj/ Tel: (+) 512-471-5249 Fax: (+) 512-471-1835 E-mail: [email protected]

Erin R. MAHAN, received her Ph.D. in History from the University of Virginia in May 2000. She is an Historian at the U.S. Department of State. E-mail: [email protected]

Georges-Henri SOUTOU, est Professeur à l'Université de Paris IV – Sorbonne, Ecole Doctorale du Monde contemporain, 1, rue Victor Cousin, F-75230 Paris Cedex 05. E-mail: [email protected]

Dr. Hubert ZIMMERMANN, ist wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter am Lehrstuhl für Internationale Politik, Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Postfach 1021, 44780 Bochum. Tel: (0049) 234 3222956 Fax: (0049) 234 3214532 E-mail: [email protected]

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Who's Who in European Integration Studies 2000

Dieses Verzeichnis von Hochschullehrern und Forschern mit European Community Arbeitsschwerpunkt Europäische Integration erscheint seit Studies Association ECSA 1989. In die vorliegende dritte, aktualisierte Ausgabe wurden auf vielfachen Wunsch auch Wissenschaftler aus Nicht-EU- Staaten, die bisher in einem Ergänzungsband zusammengefaßt worden waren, einbezogen. Who’s Who in European Integration Studies

Die Ausgabe 2000 enthält 1138 Eintragungen von Wissen- schaftlern aus insgesamt 33 nationalen Mitgliedsvereinigungen 2000 der European Community Studies Associations (ECSA). Die nach Staaten geordneten Eintragungen enthalten - Namen und Anschrift, - Schwerpunkte in Lehre und Forschung, - institutionelle Zugehörigkeit, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft - wesentliche neuere Publikationen. Baden-Baden

Who's Who in European Ein zweiteiliger Index erleichtert die Nutzung: Im ersten Teil Integration Studies 2000 sind die verzeichneten Wissenschaftler ihren Forschungs- 2000, 372 S., brosch., schwerpunkten zugeordnet, im zweiten Teil nach Disziplinen 48,– DM, 350,– öS, 44,50 sFr, und Ländern aufgelistet. ISBN 3-7890-6938-8 (ECSA-Series • European Community Studies Association – Europe / Dieses einzigartige Verzeichnis soll die Kommunikation Association pour l'Étude des zwischen Wissenschaftlern, auch unterschiedlicher Diszipli- Communautés Européennes) nen, auf dem Gebiet der Europäischen Integration fördern und erleichtern; es ist zudem eine überaus nützliches Handbuch für jeden, der wissenschaftliche Experten zu den verschiedensten Fragen der Europäischen Integration sucht.

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