DOCUMENT RESUME
ED 102 634 CS 501 002 AUTHOR Freeman, Douglas N. TITLE Free Speech within the Nixon Administration. PUB DATE Dec 74 NOTE 22p.; Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Speech Communication Association (Chicago, December, 1974)
EDRS PRICE MF-$0.76 HC-$1.58 PLUS POSTAGE DESCRIPTORS Communication (Thought Transfer); Decision Making; *Freedom of Speech; *Government Role; Higher Education; *Leadership Styles; *Policy Formation IDENTIFIERS *Nixon (Richard)
ABSTRACT This paper examines the freedom of government officials to critically evaluate public policies and FITograms during the Nixon Administration, and surveys the role of free speechin effective intragovernmental decision making and in PresidentNixon's style of leadership. It argues that freedom of expression was significantly restricted within the Nixon Administration duringthe formulation of both domestic and foreign policy. (Author) *ft WI, Da IPARTMENT Of HIALTN, EDUCATt0014w1ILFARE NATIONAL 14STrTUTI OF EDUCATION THIS DOCUMENT 14AS BEEN REPRO DuCED EXACTLY AS RECEIVED FROM Tp4E PERSON OR ORGANIZATION OR iGiN AT ING IT POINTS Of VIEW OP OPINIONS STATED DO NOT NECESSARILY REPRE f reN SENT OFFICIAL NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF EDUCATION POSITION OR POLICY %1C) rJ
e--4 wc:a FREE SPEECH WITUIN THE NIXON ADMINISTRATION
Douglas N. Freeman Department of Speech Communication PERMISSION TO REPRODUCE THIS COPY. University of Illinois RIGHTED MATERIA1. HAS BEEN GPANTED BY Douglas N. Freeman
_ . TO ERIC AND ORGANIZATIONS OPERATING UNDER AGREEMENTS WITH THE NATIONAL I. STITUTE OF EUOCATiO'4 FURTHER REPRO- DUCTION OUTSIDE TI4E ERIC SYSTEM C,IE 01.1tRES PERMISSIO": OFTHE COPYRIGHT ABSTRACT OWNER
This paper examines freedom of governmentofficials to criti-
cally evaluate public policies and programsduring the Nixon Administra-
tion, and surveys the role of free speechin effective intragovernmental
decision-making and President Nixon's style ofleadership. It argues
that freedom of expression wassignificantly restricted, within theNixon
Administration during the formulation of bothdomestic and foreign policy.
A paper presented at the
1974 Speech Communication AssociationConvention
Chicago; December 2$, 1974 In his first Inaugural AddressRichard Nixon asked Americans to
"lower their voices" and aid his effort to"bring us together."During the next few years the Nixon Administrationenlarged its popular support by polarizing the "silent majority" fromdissenters who were labelled an
"effete corps of impudent snobs," or "garbage" or"rotten apples," or
"a cancer."1Leading government officials launchedrhetorical attacks on
"radical-liberals" who were in turn admonished to"stop shouting."
When Washington, D. c., police arrested some12,000 persons during
the May Day (1971) demonstrations againstthe Vietnam war, Attorney
General John Mitchell and otheradministration officials endorsedth
tactics as a good example for the rest of thenation tofollow.2 However,
it did seem strange to some observersthat the chief law enforcement that an officer of our country was praisingmassive illegal arrests, and
administration which had pledged to "bring ustogether" was advocating
repression of dissent by denying the rightof free expression to thousands
of peaceful protesters.
These are only two isolated instanceswhich are frequently cited
by those who feel that freedom of speech wasrestricted by the policies
and practices of the NixonAdministration. The purpose of this paperis
not to re-open that question butrather to address an issuewhich has been
largely ignored: the extent to which freedom of speech wasrestricted 3 within the Nixon Administration. This paper argues that domesticand the foreign policy decision-making wereimpaired because dissent within 4 governmental bureaucracy was suppressed. - 2
FREEDOM OF SPEECH
Freedom of speech, including theright to criticize the opinions, proposals, and policies of those in power,is a fundamental principleof our governmental system. Professor of Law at the Universityof California,
Berkeley, Robert M. O'Neil observes that"at one time men assumedthat
the state had power either to prevent or topunish all speech --oral or written--that was critical of the establishedorder, or dangerous or
offensive or for some other reason not tothe liking of the ruling
First Amendment stands as powers. . . . Butin the United States, the the liberty of a theoretical bulwarkagainst such encroachments upon
5 expression.*
Freedom of speech is a shared valuein our society. We generally rights believe that restrictions on freeexpression deny basic inalienable
and are philosophicallyobjectionable. Although typically justified on signifi- the basis of such abstract principles,freedom of expression has
cant instrumental or practicalvalue as well.The democratic ideal
assumes that wisdom isdiscovered in the marketplaceof ideas through
popular consensus. Every individual's opinionis equally needed; thus,
the right of free and fullexpression must be assured toinsure optimally
effective policy making.Professor of Speech at theUniversity of
Wisconsin, R. R. Allen concludes that thedemocratic method of decision-
making results in the "best" judgments.
The democratic dream envisions anation in which public decisions occur only after all alternativeshave been presented, understood, and evaluated. It involves a
4 commitment to popular debate as a meansof reaching decisions. It affirms that every opinion maycontribute to the public search for truth. It is an idea that when ideas "knock heads" the best idea willwin popular is to occur, support. . . . If such a clash of opinions citizens must feel free to speak. The first amendment to the C9nstitution of the UnitedStates guarantees such freedom.
These same principles of democraticdecision-making and freedom of speech are essential for effectiveintragovernmental deliberations.
The communication of ideas, information,and opinions during the formu- lation of policy is an important factorinfluencing the quality of decisions. Policy and program discussion depend on anatmosphere and structure which guarantees and encouragesdebate, critical analysis,and free expression of opinion. If group decision-making is tobe effective,
"all members should be allowed the rightof self-expression without hiddenthreats."7 "In a successful group no memberwithholds information
because be is frightened, anxious, ordisgusted."8 Groups, such as
government bureaucracies or policyplanning councils, tend toreach
:ratter judgments if free expressionis protected. "Groups in which free
morounication is maximized are generally moreaccurate in theirjudgments."9
While free and open expression may berecognized as an important
ingredient in effective decision-making, inpractice it is difficult to
establish a governmental structure andatmosphere which encourages 10 criticism and dissent. In his recent book,Victims of Grounthink,
Irving L. Janis suggests that several foreignpolicy fiascoes (such as
the Bay of Pigs during Kennedy'sadministration, and Vietnam escalation
during the Johnson administration) weredue to factors whidh restricted
the give-and-take of argumentand free expression of criticaljudgments. Restricted free speech during policymaking discussions is notunique to the Nixon administration,but has handicapped previousadministrations made govern- as well. It is clear that if thewisest decisions are to be policies as well ment officials must feel free todisagree with existing as those beingconsidered as alternatives. Moreover, policy makers deliberations. should be encouraged to express theircriticism during policy
Unless these conditions of free speech areguaranteed within the
is governmental bureaucracy, thelikelihood of wise decision-making significantly attenuated.
RICHARD NIXON'S STYLE OPLEADERSHIP
influence the A President's personalityand style of leadership patterns of communicationwhich develop in thegovernmental machinery. did not want In September, 1968, RichardNixon told the nation that he
a government of"yes-men."
It's time once again we had an openadministration--open to ideas from the people, and openin its communication with the people--anadministration of open doors, open eyes and open minds. . . . Only if we have an administra- tion broadly enough basedphilosophically to insure a true ferment of ideas, and toinvite an interplay of the best minds in America, can we be sureof getting the best and most penetratingideas.11
Unfortunately, freedom of expressionwithin the Nixon Adminis-
President tration did not materialize. Political analysts suggest that
Nixon's personality forced theappointment of advisors andgovernmental
officials who were intenselycommitted to the President andhis policies.
Long before the Watergate casebroke, Richard J. Whalen, a conservativeintellectual who had worked forNixon in the preconvention stage of the1968 campaign, was putting
6 up alarm nignals about theWhite House. . s . They [Presidential advisors) were sober,industrious, efficient and almost completely unaware of awider world and a larger politics than they had known. . . Nixon's own insecurity caused him to need the protectionof men willing to do whatever he wished.12 White Many of the Watergate revelationsindicate the degree to which
House advisors were committed toRichard Nixon. ; sr, for example,
John Dean's description of Bob Haldeman'schief assistant GordonStrachan.
"Strachan is as tough as nails.He can go in and stonewall,and say,
'I don't know anything about what you aretalking about.' He has already done it twice you know, ininterviews. . . Itis a personal loyalty told. to him. Re doesn't want it any other way. He didn't have to be
He didn't have to beasked."13
The Nixon Administration graduallydeveloped a "secretive" style
of governing which was characterizedby closed channels ofcommunication
rather than by free expressionof opinion. Decisions were made by a
handful of key advisors withoutCongressional consultation orconsidera- Nixon tion of alternative points of view. Time magazine wrote that the
Administration showed a great capacityfor self-deoeption, and astrange
isolation from reality.White House advisors were arrogantfor years with 14 the Congress, the bureaucracy, andthe press. "The President's closest
advisors were revealed [after Watergate) asamoral men who considered
themselves above the lawinwhat they conceived to betheir service to 15 Richard Nirmn."
David Broder of the Washington Postdescribed Nixon's style of
leadership as a "private presidency."Decision-makingpower wastaken
from Congress, the Cabinet,and the governmental bureaucracy,and was
centralized at the White House.
7 and Nixon chose to conduct hisgovernment, his politics essentially private, all his publicresponsibilities in an staff he entrusted covert fashion. The key members of the and with his work were those menwhose sole commitment advancement of sole experience inpublic life was the Richard Nixon. . . . 16 his political Nixon surrounded 'Ilmselfwith advisors who shared House. This philosophy; he centrali. decision-making at the White discussion withinthe process effectivelydestroyed free debate and the Congress,governmental administration.White House officials saw their "game plan" agencies, the Cabinet, and anyonewho disagreed with
as an enemy. department Mr. Donald K. Freeman,chief of the psychiatry the Nixon team to at the Universityof Chicago, compared analogy in light of a professionalfootball team--an apt . "It President Nixon's fascinationwith the sport, . dignity in becomes impossible tolose; there can be no aids distrusted the losing." . . .Many Presidential political processes -- Congress,the courts and the federal bureaucracybecausethey thought aconservative, Republican program would befound unacceptable tothose groups.17 political opponents became The full extent ofNixon's paranoia regarding documented White apparent during the recentimpeachment hearings which and other governmental House plans to use theInternal Revenue Service
agencies against political"enemies."18 insight into the The Senate Watergateheartngs provided unique the administration's style of governing..Particularly revealing was as a language employed by Nixonadvisors. Government was portrayed liason men as"conduits," giant machine with"inputs" of information, policy formulation processesas and Haldeman'sdescription of the goal of a machinerather than as a a "zero defectsystem." Viewing government Is
8 collection of people seemed to remove persoral responsibility. Euphe- misms such as "surreptitious entry" for burglary,"increments in the form of currency" rather than payoffs, and"my statement is.inoperative" or
"I mis-spoke myself" instead of saying I waslying, diminished the sense of moral responsibility.Constant references to "team players,""ball games," "coming aboard," and "not fouling up thegameplan" suggest the 19 importance attached to loyalty and teammork.
Richard Nixon's style of leadership placed apremium on telling
the President exactly what he wanted tohear. Decision-making authority
WAS concentrated in a few White Houseadvisors who were committed toNixon
and his policies. Outside criticism and alternative points ofview were
shut off and free speech within theadministration was virtually pre-empted.
The detrimental impact of Nixon's styleof leadership on domesticand
foreign policy decision-making is analyzedin the following section.
FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND DOMESTIC POLICY FORMULATION
Presidential Advisors
President Nixon's style of governingdiscouraged and often pre-empted
free expression of alternative points ofview from major components of
policy formation, such as government agencies,the Cabinet, and Congress.
The only remaining opportunity for freeexpression in the Nixon Adminis-
tration existed among the small group of White Houseadvisors. However,
the selection of Presidential advisorswho were in almost complete agree-
ment with the Nixon politicalideology limited the range of viewsthat
would be considered.More importantly, advisors whodemonstrated lndepen-
9 gie - 8 -
or dence of thought and sought to expresstheir views were terminated became so frustrated thatthey resigned. Moynihan, who The experience of HarvardProfessor Daniel Patrick illustrates therestraints was Nixon's principaldomestic affairs advisor,
imposed on free speech withinthe administration. the I'd always thought of Dick as twopeople- -the good and bad Nixon--the one I liked wasthe one who was opento was ideas and persuasion. The one that made me nervous the one who isolated himselfand retreated intoformulas. As it happened the WhiteHouse that evolvedbrought out the badNixon." months before Moynihan left the White Housein 1970, just a few
also gave up. Hess had another domestic affairsadvisor, Steve Hess, been a close student written Nixon's campaignbiography in 1968 and had this way: of Nixon for many years. He explained hisvoluntary departure proposition that youwin "As a Republican liberal,I naturally work on the all."21 some and you lose some. I found I was losingthem expressed criticism When Secretary of InteriorWalter Nickel openly Department officials were of Nixon's policies, heand several Interior
abruptly dismissed.
He [Rickel] was fired onNovember 25, 1970. Within hours Nickel's depart- one of Haldeman'saides had descended on ment with a purgelist. Ha summoned six ofthe department's follows: highest officials andaddressed each of them as the "We want your resignation,and we want you out of *22 building by five o'clock. primarily Walter Rickel and Daniel P.Moynihan left or were fired lino." Perhaps the moat obvious because they spoke outagainst the team Administration was the example of inhibited freespeech within the Nixon The administration firing of Special WatergateProsecutor Archibald Cox.
iQ inde- then moved to appoint a new prosecutorwho "would not be quite so pendent.*
Moynihan, Hess, Hickol, and Cox arenot typical White House
advisors tailored theirviews advisors. The vast majority of Presidential ideology. to conform with administrationpolicy and President Nixon's
Freedom of e2sec..JI within the administration waseffectively limited to a discussion of views consistent with thePresident's existing beliefs, atmosphere opinions, and policies.H. R. Haldeman describedthe process and of policy discussion in the WhiteHouse as follows'
We started out trying to keeppolitical coloration as much as possible out of policyand hiring matters.How- ever, we realize thatthese things make for varietyin decision-making, and so within reasonablelimits we have tried to keep a spread of opinion onthe staff, so that no one is to the leftof the President at his mostliberal or to the right of thePresident at his mostconservative. best to smke sure . . . Ehrlichman, Kissinger and I do our all points of view are placedbefore the President.We is a real danger do . . . act as ascreen, because there of some advocate of an idearushing in to the President and actually . . if that person is allowed to do so, manages to convince(him; in a burst of emotion o- 24 argument . . .
Presidential Commissions important The National Advisory Commissionhas recently become an
element in the formulation ofnational policy. President Johnson well as appointed a National Commission onObscenity and Pornography, as and freedom one on Marijvapna and DrugAbuse. The objective deliberation
of expression allowed thesenational fact-finding teams wassubsequently the restricted by the Nixonadministration. When it was rumored that "Vice Obscenity Commission would recommendliberalized censorship laws,
President Agnew spoke for theAdministration. 'As long as Richard Nixon
11 -10- 25 is President, Main Street is not going toturn into Smut Alley.'"
Similarly, while the Shafer Commission onMarijuana and Drug Abuse was deliberating, President Nixon publicly statedthat a recommendation of reduced penalties for possession ofmarijuana would be unacceptable.
Thus, the administration would listen only toproposals consistent with their pre-existing beliefs. Once again free speech withinthe Nixon
Administration was inhibited.
Administration Relations with Congress
The Nixon Administration was isolatedfrom expressions of
Congressional opinion: with the exceptionof occasional consultation with conservative Republican Congressmenwho were staunch Nixonsupporters.
White House hostility toward Congress wasparticularly evidentregarding of the impoundment of appropriatedfunds and the frequent invocation
Executive privilege during Congressionalinvestigations.
Nixon has threatened to carry Executiveimpoundment of funds voted by Congress to furtherlengths than any previous President. And until he had to reversehimself a few weeks ago, he wasasserting fantastic cis :as of "Executive privilege" to give his meniamunity from testifying before Congne!gs aboutanything he chose to have them silentabout.41
The Nixon Administration initiallyfrustrated Congressional
expression of opinion by hoardingdecision-making authority andconsulting
with only a few friendly Congressmen. When Congress attempted tospeak
by establishing priorities withappropriationandspendinglevels, the
President impounded the funds: Congressional investigations werealso
handicapped by widespread use ofExecutive privilege.Senator Sam Ervin,
Chairman of the Watergate Committee,expressed the feelings of many
12 Congressmen concerning relations with theNimIn Administration and
Executive privilege.
Divine right went out with the AmericanRevolution and doesn't belong to White House aides. "What meat do they eat that makes them grow so great?"I am not willing to elevate them to a positionabove the great mass of the American people. I don't think we have any such thing as royalty or nobility that exemptsthem. I'm not going to let anybody come down atnight like Nicodemus and whisper something in my ear that no one else can hear. That is not executive privilege. It is executivepoppycock.27
The President attempted to improverelations with Congress, not
by seeking out Congressionalviewpoints, but rather by publicrelations
tactics. "At one point they [the President'scongressional liaison staff]
were issued buttons reading'I Care About Congress.
Watergate
"As long ago as the sixteenth century,Niccola Machiavelli ob-
served, 'The first impression that one getsof a ruler and his brains is
from seeing the men about him.' By this yardstick, RichardNixon . . . 29 was not a very brainyPresident." The underlying cause of Watergate
may well be the personalcharacteristics of the White Houseadvisors and
the style of government thatevolved. The isolated absosphere of secret
and closed decision-making wasfostered by the selection ofadvisors
deeply committed to Richard Nixon andhis philosophy of government. A
prime example is Charles "Chuck" Colson,whose White House title was
indeed, Specilt1 Counsel to the President. "Colson, a very rugged character
was o-ne quoted as saying: 'I would walk over my grandmotherif necessary 30 [for Richard Nixon)." During informal conversation withJohn Dean,
13 - 12 -
President Nixon commented on the loyalty ofChuck Colson. "Thcl [our
Democratic friends) think I have peoplecapable of it [the Watergate 31 break-in]. And they are correct, 41.n thatColson would do anything."
This feeling of loyalty and "teamspirit" pervaded the adminis-
enemies, tration. Those who opposed the Nixon "gameplan" were seen as
and the White House became isolatedfrom other points ofview and immune
to criticism.
Haldeman and Ehrlichman were openlydescribed by pressmen and politicians of bothparties alike, as "the twoGermans." The isolation of the Presidenthimself was attributed to the construction of a"Berlin wall" round him by his two closest aides.32
commu- The Nixon Administration wasalso characterized by written
nication and complex bureaucraticreporting arrangements. The business
of government was conducted bymemorandum and an absence offace-to-face
contact. isolation The personal characteristicsof Presidential advisors,
from alternative points of view,intense commitment to theNixon ideology,
the importance attached to teamloyalty, contempt forpotential enemies, all and restricted channels ofcommunications within the White House, are
factors contributing to theplanning, execution and subsequentcover-up
of Watergate and relatedincidents. Perhaps more importantly, these same
factors caused a repression of freeexpression of opinion withinthe
Nixon Administration. These restraints on freedomof speech exerted untold
influence on all domestic iolicydeliberations conducted during the
Nixon Administration.
14 - 13 -
FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND FOREIGN POLICY FORMULATION
The Nixon Administration, the press,and the American people have all agreed that Richard Nixon's majortriumphs were in the area of foreign policy. However, freedom of speech wasrestricted within the administration during the formulation of foreignpolicy, and both within akad outside the administration once a policy wasestablished.
Early in Mr. Nixon's first term, thePresident's foreign affairs advisor Henry Kissinger had virtuallytaken personal charge ofAmerican few White House foreign policy. Decisions were made by Kissinger and a advisors with little or no consultationwith established organs of and the foreign policy formulation. Secretary of State William Rogers experienced career men in the State Departmentbureaucracy were effectively bypassed.
Nixon's first foreign affairs crisis wasstudent reaction to the participated in a invasion of Cambodia in May, 1970. Over 100 colleges
nationwide student strike. The presidents of thirty-sevencolleges and
universities urgently requested a meetingwith President Nixon.
Dr. Allen (U. S. Commissionerof Education) went to the White House to urge Moynihan andEhrlichman to recommend such a meeting. They disagreed; arguing that the university administrators had been presumptuousand arrogant in their demands."This is not the way you treat a President " said Moynihan. . . .Nixon turned down the request.53
Throughout Nixon's first term,administration spokesmendiscouraged dissent was un- free speech concerning theVietnam war by suggesting that
patriotic.
15 -14-
Aide H. R. ("Bob") In a Today showinterview, Presidential opponents favored Haldeman charged thatNixon's Democratic critics of the installing a Communistregime in Saigon/ "con- President's Vietnam proposals,said Haldeman, were of the United sciously aiding andabetting the enemy States."34 freelom of speechis the The most obvious exampleof restricted during foreignpolicy decision- failure to consideralternative positions Nixon wasorganizing his making conferences.When President-elect recognized the importanceof free governmental machineryin late 1965, he expression during policyformulation. of viewpoints I am one wholikes to get a broad range at the present expressed and Dr.Kissinger is setting up to it that the time a very excitingprocedure for seeing what he wants President of the U. S.does not just hear for White House to hear, which isalways a temptation staffers.35 opinion which Nixon Unfortunately, the wide rangeof critical administration be- initially sought nevermaterialized. In fact, as the options, overt attemptswere madeto came committed tospecific policy A prime exampleis the administra- suppress alternativepoints of view. branch of the CIAwhich tion's reaction to reportsof the Intelligence
criticized Nixon'sViewnam policy. Kissinger and finally The branch of theCIA that irritated the Directorate ofIntelligence. the President was of Staffed by highlyeducated analysts,the Directorate sifting intelli- Intelligence was lhargedwith the task of sources, andproviding gence, fromboth open and covert countries. objective estimates ofdevelopments in other the academic In outlook they wereperhaps closer to community than they wereto theircloak-and-dagger CIA's analyst- brethren in Plans. . . .On Vietnam, the evaluators had for many yearsprovided theGovernment's moat pessimisticstream ofadvice. . . . When Nixon came to power,the CIA's analyst- complexity evaluators were stillmired in a gloomy that about Vietnam. In the serviceof a White House - 15 -
prized the value of positivethinking, this was not an attitude calculated to winfriends or even influence official policy which, under pressureof the Nixon- Kissinger grand design, beganseeking ways of making the war "winnable." . . . Nixon wanted his analysisuncluttered by "irrelevant" detail. As time went by,this need was met by researchers onKissinger's rapidly expanding NSC staff in the form of"National Security Study Memoranda." Over a hundred of these paperswere produced during Nixon's first termand they came to supplant the CIA'sestimates as the analyticalbasis for presidentialdecision-making.36
In December 1971, during theIndia-Pakistan crisis,Kissinger
while publicly main- and Nixon formulated apro-Pakistar foreign policy ordered by Nixon taining a stance of neutrality. The pro-Pakistan tilt to and Kissinger in secret meetings wasopposed by U. S. Ambassador officials," and was contradicted India KennethKeating,37 State Department 39 freedom of expression was by CIA intelligence. nqain in this instance, discussions Kissinger washarsh with restricted. During policy planning equilibrium, and those who thought the U. S.should maintain diplomatic President's name. he intimidated potentialdissenters by invoking the tried to be fair. 'Kissinger bristled withimpatience at the men who
thebureaucracy should putoutthe right . . . 'The President says either 40During the India- statements on this, or theWhite House will do it.'" decisions on unwilling Pakistan crisis, Kissingerand Nixon forced policy
officials without fullyconsidering alternativepolicy options.
Thus, even in the area offoreign policy, the NixonAdministration
made decisionswithout inhibited free speech.Kissinger and Nixon often foreign policy ex- consulting or fully consideringthe opinions of other which contradicted plots within the government. Intelligence estimates
17 - 16 -
established policy were ignored. On one occasion Kissinger "went sofar as to scrawl 'piece ofcrap' on a CIA Vietnamreport."41 Nixon and
Kissinger established their own intelligence systemin order to avoid information or opinions inconsistent with establishedpolicies. Expres-
sion of alternative points of view both inside thegovernment, and in the
country as a whole, was restricted by the NixonAdministration.
CONCLUSION
An American citizen's fundamentalright of free speech--to
intellectually disagree with the policies of thosein power and to verbally
express that criticism--is asimportant to those who are directlyinvolved
in governmental policy as it is to citizens whoinfluence national policy
less directly. Government service should notnecessitate the voluntary
surrender of First Amendment rights.Perhaps equally important, freedom
of expression is instrumental to achievingoptimally effective decision -
making. Thus, institutional arrangements whichrestrict the right of
free and open expression of all points ofview during policy deliberations
must be avoided.
Freedom of expression was significantlyrestricted within the
Nixon Administration. Some of the factors which resultedin the suppres-
sion of alternative policy options werethe President's style of leader-
ship, the selection of advisors who shared hispolitical ideology and were
committed to him personally, the centralization ofdecision-making
authority at the White House, and theisolation of policy makers from
Congress, the press, the governmentalbureaucracy, and public opinion. - 17 -
during dis- Freedom of speech within theadministration was restricted cussions concerning both domesticand foreign policies. is Freedom of speech withingovernmental policy deliberations philosophically essential to guarantee anindividual's right of free
within decision-making expression. Equally important, freedom of speech organizations is essential to stimulate awide range of programoptions and help insure the best possiblepolicy. - 18 - BEST COPY mar
Notes
polarization, 1. For an analysis of theNixon-Agnew rhetoric of "Nixon, Agnew, and the see Andrew A. Ring andFloyd Douglas Anderson, 'Silent Majority': A Case Study in theRhetoric of Polarization," "Spiro," Western Speech, 25 (Fall, 1971),243-55; and Frank Trippett, Look, 35 (Sept. 7, 1971), 29. Tactics," 2. Fred P. Graham, "MitchellPraises Capital's The New York Times, May 11, 1971, sec.1, pp. 1, 20. speech with- 3. A major problem inanalyzing restrictions of free first-hand in the Nixon Administration isthe absence of objective, investigating recent policy makingdiscussions resources. The researcher (such as David Broder, must rely onsecond-hand reports of journalists and Lewis Chester) John Maclean, Rowland Evans,Robert Novak, Jack Anderson Later revisions and news reports (such asTime, and The New YorkTimes). from published of this paper have beensupplemented with references transcripts of White Houseconversations. occurs on 4. The suppression ofdissent surveyed in this paper including two levels: 1) the governmental levelbroadly conceived, leaders, and communi- relations between thePresident and Congressional commissions, the press, cations between Congress,national fact finding level, including and the Executive branch:and 2) the intragovernmental governmental communication between thePresident, White House advisors agencies and bureaus, andthe Cabinet. Responsible Communication 5. Robert M. O'Neil, FreeSpeech: Under Law (Indianapolis:Bobbs-Merrill, 1966), pp. 28-9. in American Society (Columbus, 6. R. R. Allen, et al., Speech Ohio: Charles E. Merrill, 1968), pp.4-5. Communication and the Small Grout 7. Gerald M. Phillips, 67. (Indianapolis: Hobbs - Merrill. 19663, p. Some Sociological 8. Clovis R. Shepherd, SmallGroups: Perspectives (San Francisco: Chandler, 1964), p. 124. York: 9. Paul A. Hare, Handbookof Small Group Research (blew Free Press ot7 Glencoe,1962), p. 389. Houghton 10. Irving L. Janis, Victimsof Groupthink (Boston: Mifflin, 1972). "Nixon Concept 11. Richard M. Nixon, quotedin David S. Broder, 6, 1973, sec. A, of Presidency Led toScandal," Tulsa Daily World, May P. 7.
20 - 19 -
12. Lewis Chester, et al., Watergate: The Full Inside Story (Now York: Ballantine Books, 1973), p. 7.
13. The White House Transcripts: Submission of Recorded Presidential Conversations to the Committee on the Judiciarof the House of Representatives by President Richard Nixon, ed. Gerald Gold (New York: Bantam Books, 1974), pp. 116-17.
14. "Nixon's Nightmare: Fighting to Be Believed," Time, May 14, 1973, p. 17.
15. Ibid.
16. David S. Broder, "Nixon Concept of Presidency Led to Scandal," Tulsa Daily World, May 6# 1973, sec. A, p. 7.
17. John Maclean, "Watergate Tied to Nixon Team's Huge Desire to Win," Chicago Tribune, July 1, 1973, sec. 1, p. 4.
18. White House Transcripts, p. 63.
19. Anthony Sampson, "Washington 'Waterspeak' Fouling Up Game Plan," The News-Gazette (Champaign. Oct. 28, 1973, sec. 6, p. 53. See also, Stefan Kanfer, "Words from Watergate," Time, Aug. 13, 1973, I,. 20.
20. Chester, Watergate, p. 12.
21. Ibid.
22. Ibid.
23. Maclean, "Nixon Team's Desire to Win," p. 4.
24. H. R. Haldeman in Chester, Watergate, p. 4.
25. Gerald Astor, "No Recession in the Skin Trade," Look, June 29, 1971, p. 33.
26. Pedley Donovan, "Time Essay: The Good Uses of the Watergate Affair," Time, May 14, 1973, p. 24.
27. Sam Ervin in Chester, Watergate, p. 255.
28. Chester, Watergate, p. 13.
29. Mid., p. 17.
30. Ibis., p. 16. - 20 -
31. White House Transcripts, p. 91.
32. Chester, Watergate, p. 13.
33. Rowland Evans, Jr. and Robert D. Novak,Nixon in the White 276. House: The Frustration of Power (New York: Random House, 1971), p.
34. "Preparing a Political Fallback Position,"Time, Feb. 21, 1972, p. 9.
35. The Now York Times, Dec. 3, 1968, sec.1, p. 1.
36. Chester, Watergate, pp. 47-48.
37. Jack Anderson and George Clifford,The Anderson Papers (New York: Ballantine Books, 1974), pp. 292-94.
38. Ibid., pp. 308-314.
39. Ibid., p. 287.
40. Ibid., p. 312.
41. Chester, Watergate, p. 45.