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Kripke CV 2019 Short Saul A. Kripke Distinguished Professor in the Programs of Philosophy and Computer Science Saul Kripke Center CUNY Graduate Center 365 Fifth Avenue New York, NY 10016-4309 Office: 212-817-7483 [email protected] Education • B.A., Summa Cum Laude (Mathematics), Harvard University, 1962 Honorary Degrees • Doctor of Humane Letters, honorary degree, University of Nebraska, 1977 • Doctor of Humane Letters, honorary degree, Johns Hopkins University, 1997 • Doctor of Humane Letters, honorary degree, University of Haifa, Israel, 1998 • Doctor of Humane Letters, honorary degree, University of Pennsylvania, 2005 • Doctor of Humane Letters, honorary degree, University of Bucharest, 2011 Positions Prior to B.A. Degree • Lecturer, Yale University, August, 1961 (month of seminars sponsored by Office of Naval Research, Group Psychology Branch) • Lecturer, Mathematics Department Seminar, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1961- 62 Post-Graduate • Society of Fellows, Harvard University, 1963-66 • Lecturer with rank of Assistant Professor, Princeton University (taught Spring terms only, held concurrently with previous position), 1964-66 • Lecturer, Harvard University, 1966-68 • Associate Professor of Philosophy, Rockefeller University, 1966-68 • Professor of Philosophy, Rockefeller University, 1972-76 • McCosh Professor of Philosophy, Princeton University, 1977-98 • Distinguished Professor of Philosophy, Ph.D Program in Philosophy and Ph.D Program in Computer Science, The City University of New York, Graduate Center, 2003-present Concurrent (Secondary) Positions • Lecturer with rank of Associate Professor, Princeton University, 1971-72 • Lecturer with rank of Professor, Princeton University, 1972-76 • Andrew D. White Professor-at-Large, Cornell University, 1977-83 Saul A. Kripke / 2 Visiting Positions • Visiting Associate Professor, Cornell University, Fall 1970 • Visiting Mills Professor, University of California, Berkeley, Winter 1972 • Visiting Professor, University of California, Los Angeles, Spring 1972 • John Locke Lecturer, Oxford University, 1973 (Michaelmas Term) • Visiting Professor, Princeton University, Fall 1974 • Visiting Professor, University of California, Los Angeles, Spring 1975 • Visiting Professor, Princeton University, 1976-77 • Visiting Fellow, All Souls’ College, Oxford University, 1977-78 • Visiting Fellow, Wolfson College, Oxford University, Summer 1981 • Oscar Ewing Research Scholar, Indiana University, 1981-82 • Visiting Fellow, Wolfson College, Oxford University, Summer 1982 • Member of Common Room, Corpus Christi College, Cambridge University, Summer 1983 • Visiting (Adjunct) Professor, University of Connecticut, Storrs, 1985-86 • Visiting Professor, University of Oslo, Oslo, Norway, August 15-22 1991 • Visiting Professor, University of Graz, Austria, June 1993 • Adjunct Professor (unpaid research), University of Connecticut, Storrs, Fall 1993-94 • Visiting Professor, Hebrew University (Jerusalem, Israel), Spring 1999 • Visiting Professor, University of California at Los Angeles, Fall 1999 • Visiting Professor, University of Utrecht, The Netherlands, Winter 2000 • Visiting Professor, Hebrew University (Jerusalem, Israel), Spring 2000 • Visiting Professor, Hebrew University (Jerusalem, Israel), Spring 2001 • Visiting Professor, Ph.D Program in Philosophy, The City University of New York, Graduate Center, Spring and Fall 2002 • Visiting Professor, Ph.D Program in Philosophy, The City University of New York, Graduate Center, Spring 2003 Fellowships and Grants Undergraduate • Detur Prize, 1960 • Phi Beta Kappa (awarded junior year), 1961 • Charles J. Wister Prize (‘senior in mathematics with highest record in the field’) • Palfrey Exhibition (‘most distinguished scholar in the senior class who is the recipient of a stipendiary scholarship’), 1962 Postgraduate • Woodrow Wilson National Fellowship (honorary), 1962 • Fulbright Scholar, 1962-63 • National Science Foundation Grant, Summer 1965 • Santayana Fellowship, Harvard University, Summer 1967 • John Guggenheim Fellow, 1968-69 • John Guggenheim Fellow, 1977-78 • Visiting Fellow, All Souls’ College, Oxford University, 1977-78 2 Saul A. Kripke / 3 • National Science Foundation Grant, 1977-1979 (summers) • Visiting Fellow, Wolfson College, Oxford University, 1981 • Council of Learned Societies Fellow, 1981-82 • Visiting Fellow, Wolfson College, Oxford University, Summer 1982 • National Endowment for the Humanities Fellowship Grant, 1985-86 • National Endowment for the Humanities Fellowship Grant, 1990 • Visiting Fellow, Wolfson College, Oxford University, 1989-90 Other Academic Honors • Fellow, American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1978-present • Corresponding Fellow, British Academy, 1985-present • Howard Behrman Award, 1988 • Fellow, Academia Scientiarum et Artium Europaea, 1993-present • Fellow, Norwegian Academy of Sciences, 2000-present • Schock Prize in Logic and Philosophy, Swedish Academy of Sciences, 2001 • Fellow, American Philosophical Society, 2005-present Publications A. Books 1. Naming and Necessity, Basil Blackwell (Oxford) and Harvard University Press (Cambridge), 1980, 172 pp. 2nd edn. forthcoming with Blackwell (Oxford). 2. Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language, Basil Blackwell (Oxford) and Harvard University Press (Cambridge), 1982, x + 150 pp. 3. Philosophical Troubles. Collected Papers. Volume I, Oxford University Press (New York), 2011. Includes six previously unpublished papers: “A Puzzle About Time and Thought,” “Nozick on Knowledge,” “Two Paradoxes of Knowledge,” “The First Person,” “Vacuous Names and Fictional Entities,” and “Unrestricted Exportation and Some Morals for the Philosophy of Language.” 4. Reference and Existence, Oxford University Press (New York), 2013. 5. Logical Troubles, Oxford University Press (New York), forthcoming. B. Papers and Abstracts 1. “A Completeness Theorem in Modal Logic,” Journal of Symbolic Logic, Vol. 24(1), 1959, pp. 1- 14. 2. “Distinguished Constituents” (abstract), Journal of Symbolic Logic, Vol. 24(4), 1959, p. 323. 3 Saul A. Kripke / 4 3. “Semantical Analysis of Modal Logic” (abstract), Journal of Symbolic Logic, Vol. 24(4), 1959, pp. 323-324. 4. “The Problem of Entailment” (abstract), Journal of Symbolic Logic, Vol. 24(4), 1959, p. 324. 5. “‘Flexible’ Predicates of Formal Number Theory,” Proceedings of the American Mathematical Society, Vol. 13(4), 1962, pp. 647-650. 6. “The Undecidability of Monadic Modal Quantification Theory,” Zeitschrift fur mathematische Logik und Grundlagen der Mathematik, Vol. 8, 1962, pp. 113-116. 7. “Semantical Considerations on Modal Logic,” Acta Philosophica Fennica, Vol. 16, 1963, pp. 83- 94. 8. “Semantical Analysis of Modal Logic I. Normal Propositional Calculi,” Zeitschrift fur mathematische Logik und Grundlagen der Mathematik, Vol. 9, 1963, pp. 67-96. 9. “Transfinite Recursions on Admissible Ordinals, I” (abstract), Journal of Symbolic Logic, Vol. 29(3), 1964, p. 162. 10. “Transfinite Recursions on Admissible Ordinals, II” (abstract), Journal of Symbolic Logic, Vol. 29(3), 1964, p. 162. 11. “Admissible Ordinals and the Analytic Hierarchy” (abstract), Journal of Symbolic Logic, Vol. 29(3), 1964, p. 162. 12. “Semantical Analysis of Modal Logic II. Non-Normal Modal Propositional Calculi,” in The Theory of Models (Proceedings of the 1963 International Symposium at Berkeley), J. W. Addison, L. Henkin, and A. Tarski (eds.), North Holland Publishing Co. (Amsterdam), 1965, pp. 206-220. 13. “Semantical Analysis of Intuitionistic Logic I,” in Formal Systems and Recursive Functions (Proceedings of the Eighth Logic Colloquium at Oxford, July, 1963), J. N. Crossley and M. A. E. Dummett (eds.), North Holland Publishing Co. (Amsterdam), 1963, pp. 92-129. 14. “Transfinite Recursion, Constructible Sets, and Analogues of Cardinals,” in Summaries of Talks Prepared in Connection with the Summer Institute on Axiomatic Set Theory, American Mathematical Society, U.C.L.A. (1967), pp. IV-0-1 through IV-0-12. 15. “On the Application of Boolean-Valued Models to Solutions of Problems in Boolean Algebra,” in Summaries of Talks Prepared in Connection with the Summer Institute on Axiomatic Set Theory, American Mathematical Society, U.C.L.A. (1967), pp. IV-T-1 through IV-T-7. 16. Research Announcement: “Deduction-preserving ‘Recursive Isomorphisms’ between Theories” (with Marian Boykan Pour-El), Bulletin of the American Mathematical Society, Vol. 73, 1967, pp. 145-148. 4 Saul A. Kripke / 5 17. “An Extension of a Theorem of Gaifman-Hales-Solovay,” Fundamenta Mathematicae, Vol. 61, 1967, pp. 29-32. 18. “Deduction-preserving ‘Recursive Isomorphisms’ between Theories” (with Marian Boykan Pour-El), Fundamenta Mathematicae, Vol. 61, 1967, pp. 141-163. 19. “Identity and Necessity,” in Identity and Individuation, Milton K. Munitz (ed.), New York University Press (New York), 1971, pp. 135-164. 20. “Naming and Necessity,” in Semantics of Natural Language, 2nd edn., Donald Davidson and Gilbert Harman (eds.), D. Reidel Publishing Co. (Dordrecht), 1972, pp. 253-355; Addenda pp. 763-769. 21. “Outline of a Theory of Truth,” Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 72(19), 1975, pp. 690-716. 22. “A Theory of Truth I. Preliminary Report” (abstract), Journal of Symbolic Logic, Vol. 41(2), 1976, pp. 556. 23. “A Theory of Truth II. Preliminary Report” (abstract), Journal of Symbolic Logic, Vol. 41(2), 1976, pp. 556-557. 24. “Is There a Problem About Substitutional Quantification?” in Truth and Meaning, Gareth Evans and John McDowell (eds.), Oxford University Press (London), 1976, pp. 325-419. 25. “Speaker’s Reference and
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