ON BEING WITH OTHERS ‘Glendinning’s is a highly original approach, one that draws responsibly from both the analytic and continental traditions to present an important alternative to the usual epistemological approach to the problem of other minds. The argument is a forceful and coherent one that not only shows the usefulness of bringing continental and analytic perspectives together on a problem of fundamental significance but also points towards avenues for future work on similar “hard cases” in philosophy. I enjoyed reading On Being With Others and found I learned a good deal from the author’s way of posing the problem of other minds.’ Steve Crowell, Rice University ‘On Being With Others picks an unwavering and controlled line through a mass of difficult material. It is highly thought-provoking and opens up a lot of areas of investigation. It will attract a lot of attention and generate much discussion – this is the way I think that philosophy should be going. It makes Heidegger and Derrida intelligible to an analytic audience without losing their distinctive “flavour”; it treats analytic literature sensitively but without getting bogged down in the fine detail. I liked this book very much.’ Jane Howarth‚ University of Lancaster ON BEING WITH OTHERS Heidegger – Derrida – Wittgenstein Simon Glendinning London and New York First published 1998 by Routledge 11 New Fetter Lane‚ London EC4P 4EE Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada by Routledge 29 West 35th Street‚ New York‚ NY 10001 This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2001. © 1998 Simon Glendinning All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic‚ mechanical‚ or other means‚ now known or hereafter invented‚ including photocopying and recording‚ or in any information storage or retrieval system‚ without permission in writing from the publishers. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Glendinning‚ Simon On Being With Others: Heidegger‚ Derrida, Wittgenstein / Simon Glendinning Includes bibliographical references and index. 1. Other minds (Theory of knowledge) I. Title. BD213.G57 1996 121’.2—dc21 97-24111 ISBN 0–415–17123–7 (hbk) ISBN 0–415–17124–5 (pbk) ISBN 0-203-00364-0 Master e-book ISBN ISBN 0-203-17466-6 (Glassbook Format) CONTENTS Preface vii Abbreviations ix Introduction 1 1 The threat of scepticism 7 Introduction 7 A sceptical argument 11 The subject of scepticism 19 2 Reframing scepticism I: J. L. Austin 24 Introduction 24 Austin and the problem of other minds 25 Austin and the metaphysical legacy of Frege’s philosophy 33 3 Reframing scepticism II: Heidegger 43 Introduction 43 Heidegger and the tradition 44 Heidegger’s analysis of Dasein 50 Splitting the phenomenon of being-with 56 Conclusion 60 4 The human animal 61 Introduction 61 The being of animals 62 The spirit of the lion 70 5Philosophy and the ideal of exactness 76 Introduction 76 Derrida and the affirmation of dissemination 77 Wittgenstein and the Augustinian picture of language 83 v CONTENTS 6 Rules and events of language 93 Introduction 93 The phenomenon of language 94 The limits of calculability 99 7 Communication and iterability 107 Introduction 107 Repetitions of the same 108 Writing and communication 115 Transforming the traditional model of communication 120 8 Reading the other 128 Introduction 128 Criteria and other minds 129 McDowell on other minds 136 On being with others 140 Closing remarks 148 Notes 153 Bibliography 164 Index 169 vi PREFACE In 1986, I found a copy of Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations in a box in the loft at my father’s house. My eldest brother had had enough of it, it seems. Five years later I was still reading it. For about two years after that‚ however, I found it hard to pick up at all‚ and it was in fact readings of Heidegger’s Being and Time and Derrida’s Limited Inc that rediscovered it for me. That rediscovery is what this book‚ in a formal way‚ recites. As a result of this personal history‚ academic friends tell me that ‘the central and distinctive characteristic of my work’ is the way in which it bridges the current gulf between analytical philosophy and Continental philosophy. I might continue: this pretty much guarantees that some readers will think my work insufficiently analytical and others insufficiently Continental. So‚ to take a crude example‚ some readers of this book might worry about the omission of detailed treatments of the standard approaches to the problem of other minds – the argument from analogy and the argument from best explanation; other readers might be equally concerned that it omits detailed readings of the thought of Levinas or Merleau-Ponty. To such complaints I could simply and honestly reply that this book is not intended to present a descriptive survey of the central arguments from the analytical and/or Continental traditions. But what that answer would conceal is the fact that this work does not aim to ‘bridge the current gulf’ either. Of course‚ given the current gulf‚ the fact that my work ignores it is bound to give the impression that it aims to bridge it. I don’t intend here to go into why I think the division deserves ignoring. Suffice it to say that what I have found characteristic about my work is that it only gets along at all by getting along without it. Thus‚ my readings of the philosophers who figure in this book are constantly‚ and of course I hope responsibly‚ informed by each other. For example, the treatment of ‘Wittgensteinian criteria’ with which this book concludes develops from and out of the examination of Heidegger and Derrida which precedes it. I think that this sheds new light on Wittgenstein’s position. As I have indicated‚ however‚ my first encounter with both Heidegger and Derrida was‚ in fact‚ subsequent to devouring and repeated readings of Wittgenstein. This historical ordering perhaps explains what some will consider to be an ‘under-reading’ of Heidegger’s and perhaps vii PREFACE especially of Derrida’s work. There may be some justice to this concern. I am particularly aware that my take (or at least my currently printable take) on Derrida’s work focuses on what one might roughly call its ‘theoretical’ content – its demonstrations and arguments. And I am aware that this falls short of the riches of his extraordinary writings. But perhaps this narrowness on my part can reap some unintended rewards. For my considered view is that there are at least two sorts of top-notch nonsense connected to Derrida’s work‚ nonsense for which he is not‚ or should not be held‚ personally responsible. The first appears as the upshot of partial and selective readings. Passages are cited as a badge of radicalism or of theoretical mastery. Motifs of ‘deconstruction’; the ‘reversal and displacement’ of traditional binary oppositions‚ the aim at ‘effective intervention’, the broad notion of a ‘text’, the sometimes barely parsable sentences . all this has been pounced on like sweets from a jar. Or, perhaps, people have failed to see the jar for the sweets. This is the situation recognisable in (but not ‘everywhere in’) literary studies today. And it is faintly embarrassing. The second sort of nonsense arises as the upshot not of partial or selective reading but of simple non-reading. Here one is happy to make do with free-floating opinions, confident that deconstruction is mere bonnet-polishing, cant dressed up as serious thought. Everyone knows, it will be said, that deconstruction is charlatanry, obscure sophistry. And so everyone knows that it is not worth spending (wasting) time actually reading it. This is the situation recognisable in (but not ‘everywhere in’) English-speaking philosophy today. And‚ strictly speaking‚ it is worse than embarrassing: it is a disgrace. One of my hopes in writing the Derrida sections of this book is that I can make a contribution to setting the records straighter on the (yes‚ not- very-straight) paths of Derrida’s thought. I think some will feel that the resulting reading of Derrida is insufficiently rich. That’s almost certainly right. Full stop. As I say‚ I hope I have not been unfairly unfaithful to any of the writers who enter this book’s embrace. But I know, too, that, quite late in the day, I found a story to tell and that it is not entirely theirs. Many people not mentioned (or not mentioned much) in this book have helped me a great deal in finding this. While they shouldn’t take the blame for what I have done either‚ I am particularly grateful to Anita Avramides‚ Matthew Bell‚ Max de Gaynesford‚ John Hyman‚ Stephen Law‚ Marie McGinn‚ Alan Montefiore‚ Stephen Mulhall‚ Jennie Walmsley and my former colleagues at the University of Kent at Canterbury. All of these people‚ and many others too‚ have been helpfully there at various stages and in various ways during the development of this book. I dedicate it‚ however, to those who were there first: my father, Nigel, my mother, Victoria, my three big brothers, Paul, Hugo and Matthew; and to the cats and dogs who were there with us too. S.B.G. London, October 1997 viii ABBREVIATIONS AC Baker, G. P. and Hacker, P. M. S. (1983) Analytical Commentary on the ‘Philosophical Investigations’: Wittgenstein: Meaning and Understanding, vol. I, Basil Blackwell, Oxford. AL Derrida, Jacques (1992) Acts of Literature, Routledge, London and New York. B B Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1969) The Blue and Brown Books, Basil Blackwell, Oxford. BT Heidegger, Martin (1962) Being and Time, trans.