Naval War College Review Volume 55 Article 18 Number 3 Summer

2002 Waiting for Dead Men’s Shoes:Origins and Development of the U.S. Navy’s OfficerPersonnel System, 1793–1941 James Barber

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Recommended Citation Barber, James (2002) "Waiting for Dead Men’s Shoes:Origins and Development of the U.S. Navy’s OfficerPersonnel System, 1793–1941," Naval War College Review: Vol. 55 : No. 3 , Article 18. Available at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol55/iss3/18

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insufficient research and a tendency to until now, with Chisholm’s impressive conflate fleet exercises with strategic work. planning. Chisholm’s intent goes well beyond a his- Nonetheless, and while the background torical recounting of events. His stated material that makes up a significant por- aim is “to explore how institutions are tion of this study is not always reliable, the created and elaborated, to assess the use- book is of value to the specialist for the fulness of the problem-solving concep- fresh perspective it offers on the Royal tion of decision for so doing, and to Navy’s response to the operational chal- relate the previously untold story of the lenges of the interwar period. origins and development of the U.S. Navy’s personnel system.” Chis- CHRISTOPHER BELL Naval War College holm believes that the problems faced by the Navy’s officer personnel system par- allel in many ways those faced by other large-scale organizations. He is at least as interested in process as he is in outcome,

Chisholm, Donald. Waiting for Dead Men’s Shoes: and he draws with impressive scholarship Origins and Development of the U.S. Navy’s Officer upon multiple disciplines, including not Personnel System, 1793–1941. Palo Alto, Calif.: only history but political science, sociol- Stanford Univ. Press, 2001. 883pp. $125 ogy, strategic management, foreign pol- Donald Chisholm has provided us with icy, and public administration. Although an important book. It is the first compre- Chisholm’s vehicle is the detailed study hensive history of the development of the of naval officer personnel management, U.S. Navy’s officer personnel system. he uses that as a means of studying orga- Others have provided portions of the pic- nizational management in a broader con- ture; Christopher McKee’s A Gentlemanly text. In this he is successful. Extensively and Honorable Profession: The Creation of researched in primary sources and thor- the U.S. Naval Officer Corps, 1794–1815 is oughly documented, his book is a major an excellent treatment of the early years. contribution to organizational theory. But the Royal Navy, from which many The author’s intended audience is the American practices derive, is more thor- community of naval officers—past, pres- oughly covered. Extensive coverage of the ent, and future—congressional scholars, Royal Navy is to be found in Michael and students of American political devel- Lewis’s British Ships and British Seamen opment. However, an even wider audi- (1940); The Navy of Britain: A Historical ence will appreciate this study for its Portrait (1948); A Social History of the insights into institutional problem solv- Navy, 1793–1815 (1960); and The Navy ing, modification, and growth. However, in Transition, 1814–1864: A Social History even a comprehensive study such as this (1965). William Laird Clowe’s magiste- must set its limits. To make things man- rial seven-volume The Royal Navy: A His- ageable, Chisholm chose to omit the staff tory from the Earliest Times to the Present corps and Marine Corps, the development (1897), although dated, remains impres- of the reserves, the creation and modifica- sive. Yet no one has provided for the U.S. tions of the Naval Academy curriculum, Navy books of such depth and coverage and the enlisted personnel system.

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2002 1 Naval War College Review, Vol. 55 [2002], No. 3, Art. 18

BOOK REVIEWS 173

It took almost 150 years to construct the Act of 1916 for the Navy to adopt “selec- naval personnel system that existed at the tion up” as the means for determining beginning of World War II. Chisholm who was to be promoted. Chisholm char- makes clear that this system did not acterizes this decision as “the pivotal come about because of any grand design point in the navy’s history.” The com- but as the result of an infinite series of manders and captains selected in the incremental decisions made to solve twenty years following the passage of the problems as they arose. The three main act were to become the flag officers who motivations behind these decisions were, led the Navy in its greatest test, and finest Chisholm argues, efficiency, equity, and hours, during World War II. economy. “Efficiency” in this sense refers The main features of naval personnel or- to the most economical use of resources, ganization emerged slowly and more closely resembling what might be incrementally. Initially the Navy had only called “effectiveness.” “Equity” is con- two ranks, and ; flag cerned with protecting the rights of offi- ranks were not established until the Civil cers. “Economy” ensures the least War. For many years naval officers’ pay possible cost at all times. First one, then lagged well behind that of Army officers. another of these goals prevailed as the Advancement by seniority resulted in Navy interacted with the administration painfully slow promotion, which resulted and Congress during its periodic expan- in officers overage in grade. For half the sions and contractions. The interaction period covered in this book the Navy had between the Navy and Congress in ad- no means to retire officers. The principle dressing naval personnel problems repre- of selection up was adopted only after sents a major portion of the historical trying a series of other ways to select for action recounted here. Of particular promotion. These included the use of value is the report on congressional naval professional examinations as a screening debates, offering not only the bills that device and the establishment of “pluck- passed but the full flavor of the debates, ing boards” to accomplish “selection including the attempts (both successful out.” None, however, proved satisfactory. and not) to amend them and the argu- Even after accepting selection up, the ments presented. This gives us an idea of Navy still had to figure out how the selec- not only what happened but also of what tion board would work, what criteria might have been. would be used, and the details of fitness The title of the book is taken from the reports. So simple a matter as determin- memoirs of Rear Admiral Yates Stirling, ing the number of officers needed in the Jr.: “With all its faults, and there are various grades took years to organize. many, the Navy has accepted selection One of the great virtues of Chisholm’s because it brings officers to high ranks study is his detailed presentation of how young enough to be at their best. Promo- every problem was addressed, describing tion by seniority, waiting for dead men’s the invariable false starts and unintended shoes, is a sad blow to efficiency, for it consequences that led serendipitously to stifles initiative and offers no incentive.” a stronger institution. Chisholm argues Yet for well over a century, promotion by that organizations cannot rely upon a seniority prevailed. It took until what succession of brilliant leaders: “It is that later came to be called the Line Personnel their rules and procedures—not least

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol55/iss3/18 2 Barber: Waiting for Dead Men’s Shoes:Origins and Development of the U.S.

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those that govern the procurement, edu- tionary War to the six-hundred-ship fleet cation and training, advancement, and of the Cold War, John Lehman brings us placement of their personnel—permit a wonderful episodic view of the U.S. them to operate effectively with normal Navy’s people and ships, and their collec- human beings, and to withstand the oc- tive contribution to the strength and casional individual who proves less than character of the nation they have served. completely competent.” Using both primary and secondary Gratitude is due to Stanford University sources in the and England, Press for publishing this valuable work, Lehman offers an exciting and message- which even at its steep price is unlikely to laden portrait of the American naval return its costs. For a book that will prob- tradition, a portrait that is “deliberately ably be consulted a great deal, however, it selective and subjective.” In short, this is too bad that a sturdier binding was not book is not a typical chronological narra- used. My copy is already beginning to fall tive history of the U.S. Navy but a stimu- apart. lating history of a highly adaptive Chisholm has achieved what he set out to institution. do in fine style. He has provided a com- One of the most intriguing sections is the prehensive history of naval officer per- story of Joshua Humphreys, the “premier sonnel management and at the same time ship-builder” and “the most innovative has shed light on the creation, structure, and revolutionary designer of the age of and problem solving that resulted in the sail.” Humphreys would design several organization we see today. From now on warships for the young republic, all of it will be impossible to write usefully them larger, faster, and more heavily about the history of personnel manage- armed than similar vessels in England or ment without reference to this book. It France. Collectively known today as the promises to be a standard authority. “super frigates,” this group included such storied vessels as Constitution, United JAMES BARBER Captain, U.S. Navy, Retired States, and President. Even Admiral Davidsonville, Horatio Nelson, the preeminent naval leader of his day, is quoted by Lehman as foreseeing “trouble for Britain in those big frigates across the sea”; the trouble of which Nelson warned came during the Lehman, John. On Seas of Glory: Heroic Men, Great War of 1812. Throughout, Lehman con- Ships, and Epic Battles of the American Navy. New tends that, contrary to the views of many York: Free Press, 2001. 436pp. $35 historians, privateering had a significant John Lehman, former secretary of the impact on the outcome of both the Navy and author of Command of the Seas American Revolution and the War of (1988), has with this book produced a 1812. He argues that “the battles of the masterful outline of “the grandeur of the American Revolution were fought on land, American naval tradition.” The truest ex- and independence was won at sea.” This amples of this “grandeur” are “best work does much to reinforce such a view. found in its people, fighting sailors, tech- From the end of the Civil War to the be- nical innovators and inspiring leaders.” ginning of the Spanish-American War, a From John Paul Jones and the Revolu- great deal of technological and strategic

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