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Directive on Competition Law 2 Behaviour in Competition Contents Behaviour in Competition Directive on Competition Law 2 Behaviour in Competition Contents I Introduction 2 1. Statement 2 2. Purpose 3 3. Application of Competition Law 4 3.1 EU Competition Law 4 3.2 US Antitrust Law 4 3.3 National Competition Laws 5 4. Responsibility of the Employees 5 5. Consequences of Violations 5 I I Agreements and Coordinated Practices Eliminating or Restricting Competition 7 1. Horizontal Agreements 7 1.1 Prices and Conditions of Supply 8 1.2 Market Allocation 8 1.3 Boycotts 9 1.4 Joint Ventures 9 1.5 Trade Associations 9 2. Vertical Agreements 10 2.1 Resale Prices 10 2.2 Exclusivity 11 2.3 Export Bans/Parallel Trade 11 2.4 Non-Compete Clause 12 2.5 Patent, Trademark, Copyright 12 2.6 Improvements and New Applications 13 2.7 Supply Agreements 14 I I I Abuse of a Dominant Position 15 1. Discrimination/Different Sales Conditions 16 2. Imposing Exclusive/Excessive Purchase Commitments on Customers 17 3. Rebates 17 3.1 Fidelity Rebates 17 3.2 Target Rebates 17 3.3 Aggregated Rebates 18 4. Unfair or Predatory Pricing 18 5. Tying and Bundling 18 5.1 Tying 18 5.2 Bundling 19 6. Refusal to Sell 19 IV Guidelines on Tenders 20 1. Tender Law Regulations 20 2. Competition Law Requirements 21 3. Integrity in Business 21 V Intracorporate Agreements 22 VI Merger Control 23 Annex 24 2 Introduction I Introduction 1. Statement The maintenance of high ethical standards in adhering to national and interna- tional laws is one of the fundamental Roche Corporate Principles. As a company with worldwide business activities, Roche is determined to adhere to the applicable laws and regulations in force in the various countries where it operates, as well as to implement high standards of integrity in business transac- tions. Such laws, regulations and standards include EU competition law, US antitrust law and other applicable local competition laws. Competition laws – also referred to as antitrust laws – are designed to protect competition. They prohibit business behaviour which has the objective or the effect of preventing, restricting or distorting competition.1 It is the belief of the management that even in the absence of such laws, the interest of the Company, its shareholders, its employees and other stakeholders are best served by the principles of free market economy and fair competition. For these reasons, it is the policy of the Company to comply strictly, in all respects, with competition laws. Roche supports all efforts to promote and protect competition, including the legitimate protection of intellectual property and marketing rights. Roche respects the legitimate undertakings of its competitors, including generic and biosimilar manufacturers. However, it is expected that they comply with applicable laws, regulations and industry codes. Roche does not tolerate misleading claims which disparage its products, and protects its products and interests against unfair competition. Following these principles, fair and correct behaviour in competition is mandatory for every employee. Roche is aware that sometimes it is difficult for employees to understand the requirements of the competition laws in the various countries where Roche does business. In fact, in many cases the law itself is not entirely clear. Therefore, Roche encourages every employee to seek the counsel of the legal department regarding any specific antitrust or competition question that comes up. As always, you may also use the various speak-up options (Line Management, the local Compliance Officer, the Chief Compliance Officer, available local help and advice resources or the Roche Group Code of Conduct Help & Advice Line) to address questions regarding compliance with competition laws.2 Similarly, Roche employees who believe in good faith that the Roche Group Code of Conduct has been violated are expected to speak up by using the available speak up options.3 1 See p. 29 of the Roche Group Code of Conduct. 2 See p. 14 of the Roche Group Code of Conduct. 3 See p. 15 of the Roche Group Code of Conduct. Behaviour in Competition 3 The Directive “Behaviour in Competition” is part of the comprehensive Roche Competition Law Compliance Program which also includes other elements, such as antitrust audits, mock dawn raids, general training on competition laws, a compliance podcast as well as an antitrust questionnaire for self-testing.4 In addition, we have developed an eLearning program called “RoCLID” (Roche Competition Law Interactive Dialogues), which is mandatory for all Roche employees worldwide who are faced with competition issues in their business activities. You will find a link to this e-learning program on the Group Legal Department website. 2. Purpose The purpose of the Directive “Behaviour in Competition” is to explain the basic provisions of antitrust and competition laws, in particular the provisions as applied in the European Union. The Directive is designed to make both management and employees aware of the basic rules, and how these rules affect their business behaviour in making commercial decisions. This Directive cannot cover all facts and circumstances that an employee may encounter in his or her business activities. Accordingly, it is strongly recommended and expected that in every case of doubt or in any instance where an employee has a question as to whether a particular course of action is appropriate or not, he or she should contact the legal department for advice. The Directive “Behaviour in Competition” is designed to provide each employee with enough information about the competition laws to recognise situations that require legal advice and to know how to obtain it. I did not know it was illegal will not be accepted as an excuse by the competition authorities. Where you believe, in good faith, there is a violation of applicable competition laws and regulations, you should report the matter promptly to your line manager, the legal department, the local Compliance Officer or the Chief Compliance Officer. The Roche Group SpeakUp Line is an additional channel for all of us to make a report when we in good faith believe that competition laws are violated. The Roche Group SpeakUp Line is managed by an external company, independent from Roche. If you wish to do so, you can report anonymously. Details of the Roche Group SpeakUp Line can be found either in the Roche Group Code of Conduct or on the Roche intranet.5 If you believe in good faith that in connection with a business where Roche is involved someone has done, is doing or may be about to do something that violates the provisions regarding competition laws, speak up by using the available speak up channels. 4 These documents can be found on the Roche intranet (website of Group Legal Department). 5 See p. 15 of the Roche Group Code of Conduct. 4 Introduction 3. Application of Competition Law The best economic and social results are achieved in an environment of free competition. Accordingly, competition laws prohibit unreasonable restraints on competition and acts of monopolisation. Because of the worldwide business activity of Roche, all employees, regardless of their place of business, must comply with EC Competition Law, US antitrust laws, and any other applicable local competition laws, where the intended business transaction affects these territories. Competition laws must be observed by all players in the market around the world. 3.1 EU Competition Law The principal provisions of EU competition law are set forth in Articles 101 and 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU, formerly Articles 81 and 82 ECT) – as stated in the Annex. More detailed legal provisions are laid down in various Commission regulations and directives. EU competition law applies to all companies and individuals doing business within the Member States or which may affect trade between the Member States of the European Economic Area (EEA) regardless of whether these companies are established in one of these countries or not. 3.2 US Antitrust Law US antitrust law is set forth in four principal federal statutes: the Sherman Act, the Clayton Act, the Federal Trade Commission Act and the Robinson Patman Act. In addition, the Company may be bound by the antitrust laws of the various states within the United States in which the Company does business. US antitrust law applies to all companies and individuals doing business in the United States or affecting US commerce.6 6 For further information and guidance on US antitrust law see the US Pharma Code of Conduct, the DIA Code of Business Conduct and related documents. Behaviour in Competition 5 3.3 National Competition Laws There are national competition laws to be considered when doing business in the corresponding country. These national competition laws are generally similar to EU competition law and/or US antitrust law. You should contact the legal department with any questions regarding the applicability of local law. 4. Responsibility of the Employees Compliance with competition laws is the responsibility of every employee. Roche employees are forbidden to engage in practices that violate competition laws. Each employee is responsible for acquiring a sufficient understanding of competition laws to recognise situations that may involve competition law issues. Where there is any question of whether a current business practice or a commercial decision might be in conflict with competition laws, each employee must consult the legal department. Compliance with competition laws is the responsibility of every employee. If you are in doubt, seek advice. If you believe in good faith that a competition law has been violated, you are expected to speak up using the available speak up channels. 5. Consequences of Violations Violations of competition laws may result in serious penalties and never pays off! The European Commission may impose fines up to 10% of the annual worldwide respective group turnover of the undertakings involved.
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