Brian Martin, Justice Ignited, chapter 10 (author’s prepublication version)

10 Abu Ghraib by Truda Gray and Brian Martin

In April 2004, photos of torture and abuse at government disowned what it called the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq were broadcast, “abuse” at Abu Ghraib, sociological and causing revulsion and anger throughout the historical studies have looked at the continui- world. Abu Ghraib had been a notorious ties of U.S. government practice, showing that prison during the regime of Saddam Hussein, the conditions for such behavior lay in policies but the photos showed something different: going back decades.4 this time it was U.S. soldiers who were the The very words “Abu Ghraib” have now perpetrators. Their own photos revealed gro- become shorthand for the torture scandal. tesque rituals in which prisoners were sexually Understanding the policy background of the humiliated, terrorized with dogs, and brutally events is important, especially because most restrained, accompanied by grinning and ap- media reports treat the events at Abu Ghraib parently shameless prison guards. The U.S. out of context. Here, though, we examine a government had claimed the conquest of Iraq different facet of Abu Ghraib: the tactics used was a liberation from tyranny, but this graphic by perpetrators and opponents to stifle or material suggested the new rulers were not express outrage over torture and abuse. living up to their espoused principles. In the following sections, we examine in The revelations about Abu Ghraib seriously turn each of the five areas of contention damaged the reputation of the United States. contained in the backfire model. In the conclu- Polls in Arab countries showed that support sion, we sum up the implications of this for the U.S. occupation declined at a greater analysis for understanding responses to torture rate than usual, with most respondents believ- and abuse. ing Abu Ghraib was typical of a wider Given the huge volume of material about problem and that most U.S. people behaved Abu Ghraib, our examination is not intended like the prison guards.1 In the United States, to be comprehensive: rather than try to present polls revealed an increase in opposition to the every possible example in each of the five war generally.2 The Abu Ghraib story triggered a torrent of commentary as different groups tried to make 4. Jennifer K. Harbury, Truth, Torture, and the sense of what had happened or to shape public American Way: The History and Conse- perceptions of the events.3 While the U.S. quences of U.S. Involvement in Torture (Boston: Beacon Press, 2005); Gregory Hooks and Clayton Mosher, “Outrages against 1. Michael Hirsh, “Grim Numbers,” News- Personal Dignity: Rationalizing Abuse and week, 15 June 2004. Torture in the War on Terror,” Social Forces 83 (2005): 1627–45; Alfred W. McCoy, 2. John Ritter, “Poll: War Opposition Up amid “Cruel Science: CIA Torture & U.S. Foreign Iraqi Abuse Scandal,” USA Today, 10 May Policy,” New England Journal of Public 2004. Policy 19 (2005): 209–62; Alfred W. McCoy, 3. Lila Rajiva, The Language of Empire: Abu A Question of Torture: CIA Interrogation, Ghraib and the American Media (New York: from the Cold War to the War on Terror (New Monthly Review Press, 2005). York: Metropolitan, 2006).

Abu Ghraib 91 areas, we select a range of illustrations of the spoke openly with journalists and others.7 techniques. Further investigations and revela- Human rights groups are active in collecting tions about Abu Ghraib will take place, testimony about abuses in prisons.8 throwing new light onto the tactics used to However, evidence gleaned from prisoners contain or express outrage. Indeed, further received relatively little attention in the mass investigations and revelations will be part of media, being especially rare in the U.S. media. the ongoing struggle over the significance of For example, in 2003 there were reports of Abu Ghraib. This struggle is likely to continue torture at numerous U.S. foreign prisons, but for years and even decades after the events they did not reach the media threshold for a themselves. major story in the U.S. media.9 Prior to April 2004, most reporting about Cover-up and Exposure human rights abuses in U.S. foreign prisons was framed by the perspective of the U.S. Cover-up at Abu Ghraib is best understood in government: official reassurances were re- the context of cover-up at all U.S. prisons in ported without much critical commentary, and the “war on terror.” U.S. authorities have the issue of torture received little attention. sought to cover up as much as possible of their Evidence of torture in these foreign prisons activities at prisons in Guantánamo Bay, was not sufficient to move coverage from elite Afghanistan, Iraq, and other countries in- framing to event-driven framing.10 In effect, volved in their rendition policy. Furthermore, the mass media aided in a de facto cover-up. they hold some prisoners at secret locations: The Abu Ghraib photos were the key to even the existence of these prisoners is kept breaking through the media’s usual orientation secret. The prisons at Guantánamo, Afghani- to government framing. Suddenly the treat- stan, and Iraq are physically remote from the ment of prisoners was a huge story. Even so, United States, and off limits to journalists. the mass media did not report everything they These basic features of the prisons are enough could have. Only some photos were published. to indicate the centrality of secrecy to their Many of those published were cropped so they operation. One of the few groups permitted access to these U.S. prisons is the International Com- 7. David Rose, Guantánamo: The War on mittee of the Red Cross (ICRC). However, Human Rights (New York: New Press, 2004). U.S. authorities tried to stop ICRC spot visits 8. Human Rights Watch, The Road to Abu 5 to Abu Ghraib. They also held some “ghost” Ghraib (New York: Human Rights Watch, 6 detainees in secret, away from the ICRC. 2004). These measures limited public awareness of prison abuses, but could not stop all informa- 9. Rajiva, Language of Empire; “Report of the tion leaking out. Prisoners, after their release, International Committee of the Red Cross could tell about their ordeals. For example, (ICRC) on the Treatment by the Coalition British citizens imprisoned at Guantánamo Forces of Prisoners of War and Other were all released at the request of the British Protected Person by the Geneva Conventions government and subsequently many of them in Iraq During Arrest, Internment and Interro- gation,” in The Torture Papers: The Road to Abu Ghraib, ed. Karen J. Greenberg and Joshua L. Dratel (Cambridge: Cambridge 5. Mark Danner, Torture and Truth: America, University Press, 2004), 383–404. Abu Ghraib, and the War on Terror (New 10. Elite and event-driven framing were dis- York: New York Review Books, 2004), 216. cussed in chapter 5, drawing on Regina G. 6. Josh White, “U.S. Generals in Iraq Were Lawrence, The Politics of Force: Media and Told of Abuse Early, Inquiry Finds,” the Construction of Police Brutality (Berkeley: Washington Post, 1 December 2004: A01. University of California Press, 2000).

92 Justice Ignited did not show the presence of other U.S. Abu Ghraib. The report by Major General personnel and thus did not reveal wider Antonio M. Taguba15 on treatment of prisoners official involvement in the actions.11 at Abu Ghraib was extremely damaging to the CBS’s 60 Minutes II, having obtained the U.S. military. Authorities tried various means photos, delayed broadcasting them at the to limit its circulation. Defense Under Secre- request of the Pentagon. It required the im- tary Douglas Feith banned discussion of the pending publication of Seymour Hersh’s story Taguba report within the Pentagon itself, about Abu Ghraib in The New Yorker to prod despite it being widely available. After the CBS into action. After Hersh’s story and report was leaked and reported by the media, accompanying photos were published, all Feith warned staff not to read or even mention major U.S. newspapers followed.12 De facto it. The report itself was classified secret by the cover-up can sometimes occur when major Defense Department. When the report was outlets do not want to rock the boat, but there sent to Congress, one-third of its 6,000 pages is a countervailing pressure: the desire to break were missing — supposedly due to an “over- a major story. Therefore, investigative jour- sight.”16 nalists and courageous editors, by breaking Although the Pentagon has formidable through usual mass-media orientation to elite powers to control information, in this case its perspectives, play a central role in the expo- efforts were insufficient. It is worth noting the sure of injustice. many players and activities in the communica- With the publication of the photos, the tion process leading to exposure. In the early primary methods of cover-up had failed stages, the ICRC and human rights groups dramatically and the U.S. government had to were able to gather information from ex- resort to rearguard actions to limit the damage. prisoners and other sources to produce In this, cover-up continued to be a key tactic. damning reports. There were two key roles in After the mass media published photos, this aspect of exposure: credible witnesses and U.S. officials tried to get them to stop, arguing credible groups to document and communicate among other things that it was unpatriotic and their stories. endangered U.S. troops.13 They prevented The photos played a crucial role in expo- hundreds of photos and videos from being sure. They were made possible by cheap circulated.14 The photos were thus the focus of digital technology and the willingness of a continuing struggle over cover-up and soldiers to capture their own behavior in exposure, a struggle that continues today, images: their treatment of the prisoners given that some of the most graphic images appeared to be an occasion for boasting rather have never been broadcast. than for being ashamed. This insensitivity to A parallel struggle over cover-up and expo- what would cause outrage, and thus what sure took place over textual materials about needed to be covered up to prevent it, laid the

11. Susan Sontag, “Regarding the Torture of 15. Antonio M. Taguba, “Article 15–6 Investi- Others,” New York Times, 23 May 2004. gation of the 800th Military Police Brigade (The Taguba Report),” in Danner, Torture and 12. David Remnick, “Introduction,” in Truth, 279–328; also in Greenberg and Dratel, Seymour M. Hersh, Chain of Command: The Torture Papers, 405–556; also in W. Frederick Road from 9/11 to Abu Ghraib (London: Allen Zimmerman, ed., Basic Documents about the Lane, 2004), xviii. Treatment of the Detainees at Guantánamo 13. Sontag, “Regarding the Torture of Others.” and Abu Ghraib (Ann Arbor, MI: Nimble 14. Matt Welch, “The Pentagon’s Secret Books, 2004), 1–38. Stash: Why We’ll Never See the Second 16. Michael Hirsh and John Barry “The Abu Round of Abu Ghraib Photos,” Reason, 36(11) Ghraib Scandal Cover-Up?” Newsweek, 7 June (2005): 18–19. 2004, p. 34. Abu Ghraib 93 foundation for a scandal of enormous propor- To sum up, the key elements in cover-up — tions. (In principle, someone opposed to what both successful and less successful — were: was occurring might have taken photos in isolation, namely preventing outsiders access order to expose it, but this apparently did not to the prisons or to information about them; take place at Abu Ghraib.) conventional media framing oriented to elite The next stage in the communication chain perspectives; and censorship. The key ele- was Joseph M. Darby, a soldier not involved ments in exposure were: witness reports and with abuse. Asking for information about a information-gathering by concerned groups; shooting incident, he was given, by Charles A. vivid, damning images; soldiers willing to Graner, Jr., two CDs that Darby found filled report on and to genuinely investigate evi- with disturbing images of prisoners. After dence of wrongdoing; people willing to leak confronting Graner, Darby gave the CDs to the the information; journalists and editors willing Army’s Criminal Investigation Command. The to run the story. story might still have remained dormant except for the willingness of individuals in Devaluation and Validation CID to take the issue seriously and instigate an investigation. Major General Taguba also In all U.S.-run prisons outside the United played a key role. States, devaluation occurred through labeling. Then there was journalist Seymour Hersh, The very designation “war on terror” implies who broke the story in The New Yorker.17 prisoners are “the enemy” — the opponents in (Hersh had also played a key role 35 years the so-called war — and terrorists. Further, earlier in breaking the story of the My Lai calling those held “detainees” suggests even massacre during the Vietnam war.) Hersh fewer protections than referring to them as relied on many anonymous informants who prisoners. gave him confidential information and leaked International law, such as the Geneva documents to him. Hersh and his supportive Conventions, provides formal protection for editors and colleagues at The New Yorker — prisoners. For prisoners in Afghanistan and including fact-checkers — gave the story Guantánamo Bay, the U.S. government sufficient credibility to break any remaining adopted a new label, “unlawful combatants” reluctance of the mainstream media to cover (or “enemy combatants”) arguing that the the story. Geneva Conventions did not apply because al Key Abu Ghraib photos have become so Qaeda was not a conventional army. This line familiar that they now serve as symbols of of argument has been contested by legal abuse. This makes it hard to realize that they scholars; the point here is that, in relation to might never have been revealed or that the international norms for treating prisoners, the story might have remained on the back pages. new label signified a further devaluation of The prominence of the Abu Ghraib story is the those designated. The term “unlawful combat- contingent outcome of a struggle over cover- ants” was also used in Iraq, even though the up and exposure. Some months later, a brief original justifications for using it did not apply story appeared reporting that photos had also there. been taken at Bagram prison in Afghanistan, Devaluation is far easier when the target is but in the wake of the Abu Ghraib scandal a faceless abstraction. By restricting access to these had been destroyed. It is likely many the prisons, the U.S. administration helped other atrocities, similar to Abu Ghraib, have maintain the image of a cruel, malevolent, occurred but remain hidden. ruthless enemy who deserved no rights. Isolation of those imprisoned thus served both as cover-up and devaluation. Most of those arrested were presented as alien to European- 17. Hersh, Chain of Command, incorporates Americans: from another culture, adherents to stories from The New Yorker.

94 Justice Ignited a different religion, from a different ethnic them. In a rare news-page reference to social group — and generally presented as inferior. science experimentation, the 1971 prison The prisoners at Abu Ghraib were given a simulation run by Philip Zimbardo and col- variety of negative labels: terrorists, insur- leagues at Stanford University was described. gents, rebels, towelheads, suspects. U.S. In this pioneering and eye-opening study, U.S. Senator Inhofe stated, “you know they’re not male university students were randomly there for traffic violations.”18 allocated the roles of prisoner or guard in a Challenging devaluation, human rights simulated prison. The experiment was termi- groups proceed on the assumption that all nated after less than a week because partici- humans have intrinsic rights. Those who pants had dangerously adopted behaviors promote the application of international law corresponding to their roles.19 The implication are in essence arguing the same: the prisoners of this study is that ordinary members of the are humans like anyone else and deserve the U.S. public can become abusive in an envi- same rights. ronment that sanctions or encourages such Abstract argument and information can help behavior: hence, the Abu Ghraib guards were validate targets of attack, but far more power- responding to their circumstances. What is ful is humanization through stories and striking is how seldom such an analysis is images. Some of the prisoners at Guantánamo applied to behavior at conventional prisons or were citizens of countries such as Australia, to the behavior of terrorists. Britain, and Germany. Journalists were able to In summary, prisoners at Abu Ghraib were write stories about them using photos, quotes devalued by being categorized as enemies in from relatives and friends, and comments from the war on terror (and hence implicitly as lawyers. This personalized these individuals terrorists), by being placed in the new classifi- and, in the eyes of many, made their treatment cation of unlawful combatant that allegedly seem more worthy of concern. exempted them from human rights protections, The photos from Abu Ghraib made the by being seen as undesirably alien in race and prisoners seem much more real: they were religion, and by remaining abstractions flesh-and-blood people and no longer abstrac- through prevention of personal contact. These tions. In many of the photos, prisoners’ heads techniques of devaluation were countered by were covered or their faces not presented, civilizing human rights discourses, by infor- thereby limiting identification with the vic- mation about the innocence of many prisoners, tims. Photos showing the faces of prisoners by personal stories of some prisoners, and were especially powerful in awakening most of all by the photos showing real people. empathy, such as the image of a terrified Iraqi prisoner face to face with an aggressive attack Interpretation Struggles dog. Many photos showed prisoners in humili- ating poses, which in general would not be In relation to Abu Ghraib, reinterpretation was considered positive imagery — compared for minimal prior to the publication of the photos, example to photos of a graduation, wedding, but arguments proliferated subsequently.20 The or family gathering — but nevertheless this instinctive response of many observers was offered a greater opportunity for identification that the actions at Abu Ghraib were disgusting and validation than abstract labels. and deplorable. The task of those seeking to At the same time, the beaming faces of U.S. minimize the damage from these exposures prison guards were conspicuous in many was difficult, but followed a predictable pat- photos. Some articles included attempts to explain their actions, though seldom to justify 19. Philip G. Zimbardo, “Stanford Prison Experiment,” http://www.prisonexp.org/ (ac- 18. Quoted in Sontag, “Regarding the Torture cessed 29 June 2006) of Others.” 20. Rajiva, Language of Empire. Abu Ghraib 95 tern. We look briefly at the key interpretation ating without any encouragement by superiors. techniques used by U.S. officials. Pentagon officials said it was a matter of In a few cases, events were relabeled into individual misconduct, of lack of discipline. nonexistence: some of the deaths at Abu The dominant government line served to Ghraib, and other prisons, were said to be due blame aberrant individuals and to distance the to natural causes, despite evidence of physical government itself from any responsibility. But abuse.21 this was challenged by rival interpretations. A key form of redefinition was to say the Some of the soldiers involved, such as Charles actions at Abu Ghraib did not constitute Graner, Jr. and Lynndie England, said they torture. Memos within the U.S. government were only following orders. argued that many of the techniques used in Those who gave a more structural explana- interrogation should not be classified as tion of Abu Ghraib referred to reports of torture.22 So far as most human rights legal similar treatment occurring in Afghanistan, experts were concerned, these reclassifications Guantánamo, other prisons in Iraq, and else- did not conform to international laws on where. They also referred to a history of policy torture. development and application of interrogation U.S. government officials never used the techniques that portrayed Abu Ghraib as a word torture but instead referred to “abuse” logical outcome rather than as an anomalous and “humiliation.” The mass media mostly incident.24 followed the government’s terminology, so the Following revelations that something bad prevailing term became “abuse.” This linguis- had happened, the next question was who or tically reinterpreted the events as far less what to blame. As indicated, the main candi- serious than would be suggested by “torture.” dates were the individual soldiers, and possi- There were other euphemistic descriptions of bly the line of command and top policy- what had occurred, such as “setting condi- makers. But there was also another possibility: tions” or “loosening up” for interrogation. blame those who revealed the abuse, including One of the central issues involving interpre- the media and even the general public. George tation was whether Abu Ghraib was an Bush said he was sorry for the damage to the isolated incident or represented a common- image of the United States and Donald place and pervasive practice. The government Rumsfeld said the photos would tarnish the pushed the isolated-incident explanation, say- reputation of U.S. troops, evincing more ing the photos portrayed the actions of a few concern about damage to U.S. interests than rogue guards in just one prison block. U.S. about damage to Abu Ghraib prisoners.25 Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld de- To sum up, the meaning of the Abu Ghraib clared it was “an exceptional, isolated” case.23 photos was not self-evident but rather the Responsibility for this isolated incident was subject of an ongoing struggle. A few com- sheeted home to a few lower-level troops. mentators said the matter was not all that These perpetrators were said not to be repre- serious.26 Those who wanted to minimize the sentative of the Army, of the United States, or of the country’s “true nature.” Only the lower 24. Harbury, Truth, Torture, and the American ranks were blamed: they were said to be oper- Way; Hersh, Chain of Command; Hooks and Mosher, “Outrages against Personal Dignity”; McCoy, “Cruel Science”; McCoy, A Question 21. Human Rights Watch, Road to Abu of Torture. Ghraib, 28–29. 25. Robert Plummer, “US Powerless to Halt 22. Danner, Torture and Truth; Greenberg and Iraq Net Images,” BBC News, 8 May 2004. Dratel, Torture Papers. 26. Dick Meyer, “Rush: MPs Just ‘Blowing 23. Human Rights Watch, Road to Abu Off Steam’,” Against the Grain (CBS News), Ghraib, 1. 6 May 2004.

96 Justice Ignited seriousness of the events referred to “abuse” strong recommendation was one thing; acting rather than “torture.” They blamed a few on it is another. A strong recommendation deviant troops who were said to be misbehav- suggests the system is working to deal with its ing in a single cell block. own problems, but this may be an illusion The contrary interpretation was that Abu when implementation is piecemeal, purely Ghraib revealed torture that had become symbolic, or nonexistent. tolerated or even encouraged by high-level There were some hard-hitting reports, but policies, and which represented the tip of an their impact was muted by their internal iceberg of atrocities. nature. The Taguba report was a courageous treatment; its major impact, though, was the Official Channels result of being leaked to the media and providing authoritative support for what was The Abu Ghraib exposures led to numerous apparent in the photos. inquiries, including at least ten general inquir- It is worth noting the sorts of inquiries that ies plus more than a hundred individual were not carried out. There were no well- investigations.27 Most of these were by the funded independent inquiries and no televised U.S. military itself, with all the limitations of hearings — and no prosecutions for war internal inquiries, including limited public crimes. To our knowledge, there were no access to the proceedings and findings. In the inquiries to determine whether and which case of a significant investigation by George Iraqis held at Abu Ghraib had been mistakenly R. Fay,28 military procedure did not allow the or falsely detained, or to determine whether to inquiry to hold anyone accountable above the offer anyone compensation for ill-treatment. level of the investigating officer, in Fay’s case There were accusations made against many Major General, and the same sort of restriction soldiers, but many were not punished judi- applied to several other investigations.29 cially, with over 70% of official actions being The inquiries varied in the depth of their administrative punishment.31 Brigadier Gen- analysis and the breadth of their recommenda- eral Janis Karpinski, commander of the Abu tions. Some, such as the report by James R. Ghraib prison at the time, was relieved of her Schlesinger,30 said responsibility for Abu command, but all other officers were cleared Ghraib went all the way to the top. But a and no civilian policy-makers were even charged. No one was charged with torture or war crimes. Some charges were dropped, but 27. Seymour Hersh, “The Unknown Un- only a few soldiers were sentenced. From knowns of the Abu Ghraib Scandal,” media stories, it would have been easy to gain Guardian, 21 May 2005. the impression of a flurry of prosecutions. 28. George R. Fay, “AR 15–6 Investigation of However, due to the large number of disparate the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility and 205th cases, it was difficult to grasp the scale and Military Intelligence Brigade (U),” in Danner, pattern of outcomes. In other words, it would Torture and Truth, 436–579; also in be easy to gain the impression that the system Greenberg and Dratel, Torture Papers, 1018– was working, but exactly how was not clear. 131. Our argument is that the inquiries and trials gave the appearance of providing justice 29. Hirsh and Barry “Abu Ghraib Scandal without providing much substance. One key Cover-Up?” 30. James R. Schlesinger, “Final Report of the Independent Panel to Review DoD Detention 31. Amnesty International, “One Year after Operations (The Schlesinger Report),” in Abu Ghraib, Torture Continues,” 28 April Danner, Torture and Truth, 329–402; also in 2005; Dave Moniz and Tom Squitieri, “U.S. Greenberg and Dratel, Torture Papers, 908– Works to Repair Damage of Abu Ghraib,” 75. USA Today, 27 April 2005. Abu Ghraib 97 impact of the numerous investigations and targeted those at lower levels, thus comple- trials was to dampen public anger. Officials menting the administration’s interpretation seemed to be doing something, though the that Abu Ghraib was an isolated incident complexity, slowness, and technicalities meant involving misconduct by individuals. few could follow the details even of those In summary, in response to damaging procedures in the public domain. This fits the revelations from Abu Ghraib, U.S. officials pattern of other cases in which official launched numerous investigations and prose- channels are used by perpetrators in a way that cutions. Arguably, though, the net effect of dampens outrage. But Abu Ghraib reveals these formal processes was more to dampen another dimension to the failure and facade of public concern than to implement substantive official channels: members of the Bush justice. Furthermore, the U.S. administration administration went to considerable effort to had previously made strenuous efforts to limit ensure that laws could not be used against the vulnerability of officials to prosecution for them. torture and war crimes, in essence trying to In the aftermath of 9/11, key members of ensure it could act with impunity and official the administration wanted to use tougher channels would be toothless. forms of interrogation but were concerned about international law. Their response was to Intimidation and Resistance solicit legal opinions that expanded what was deemed legal interrogation practice short of Just as the attack on Iraq was a process of torture, in effect redefining torture.32 (Most intimidation of the Iraqi people, torture at Abu independent human rights experts condemn Ghraib and elsewhere served to intimidate this.) The U.S. administration admitted the prisoners. Here. though, we focus on the use of Geneva Conventions applied in Iraq, but intimidation against U.S. soldiers and civilians violated them all the same. Although the in relation to Abu Ghraib. designation “unlawful combatant” did not One key target was whistleblowers those apply to the circumstances in Iraq, the prac- who leaked infomration, who could expose tices in prisons in Afghanistan and Guan- wrongdoing at Abu Ghraib to wider audiences. tánamo were imported to Iraq as if it did.33 In this regard, Douglas Feith, U.S. Under Finally, the U.S. government refused to Secretary of Defense, sent a message to support the International Criminal Court, officials warning that leaks of the Taguba making extraordinary efforts to ensure it could report were being investigated with the possi- not try U.S. citizens. President Bush in bility of criminal prosecution. Indeed, Feith particular was exempt from legal scrutiny by was said to have made his office a “ministry of the claim of presidential war powers. These fear.”34 Similarly, Donald Rumsfeld estab- were among the many actions taken well lished what was called a “command climate” before Abu Ghraib to reduce the vulnerability in which bad news was not welcome.35 of U.S. soldiers and both military and civilian Within the U.S. Army, threats of discipli- commanders from independent legal scrutiny. nary action or other penalties were made As a result, the numerous investigations and against soldiers who spoke out. Some of the trials concerning Abu Ghraib took place Army’s investigators seemed to pursue within a legal and policy context in which top whistleblowers with greater eagerness than officials were exempted from challenge, at they did those alleged to have committed least so far as the administration could human rights violations, with threats of manage. The inquiries and trials mainly

34. Hirsh and Barry “Abu Ghraib Scandal 32. Danner, Torture and Truth; Greenberg and Cover-Up?” Dratel, Torture Papers. 35. Evan Thomas, “No Good Defense,” 33. Hersh, Chain of Command. Newsweek, 17 May 2004, p. 24.

98 Justice Ignited prosecution made unless the names of whistle- At U.S. prisons other than Abu Ghraib, blowers were revealed.36 After Sergeant Frank secrecy more effectively prevented informa- “Greg” Ford reported, to his commanding tion from reaching wider publics. Some former officers, witnessing torture by fellow soldiers, prisoners told what had happened to them, but he was forcibly removed (“medivaked”) out of the media’s news values prevented this from Iraq on psychiatric grounds, though psychia- becoming a major story. Information from trists subsequently pronounced him fully sane. prisoners failed to have impact because they Other military whistleblowers were treated the were devalued — as terrorists, the enemy, and same way.37 so forth — and because the U.S. government’s Intimidation itself is usually covered up, so interpretation of actions and responsibility was the available evidence is only a sample of what treated as credible. No soldier who witnessed actually occurs. But whatever its scale, intimi- ill-treatment of prisoners at other prisons was dation was insufficient to keep a lid on what able to achieve a high-profile stand in expos- happened at Abu Ghraib, because there were a ing what occurred. number of prisoners, soldiers, investigators, In contrast, the Abu Ghraib photos cut journalists, and publishers who were willing to through all these defenses. Their release broke speak out. Furthermore, many of them have through cover-up, constituting one of those spoken out about intimidation itself, making it exceptional events that challenges usual elite- an additional source of outrage. oriented perspectives. With the images going directly to the public, the photos largely Conclusion surmounted the obstacles of devaluation, reinterpretation, and official channels: viewers In retrospect, it may seem inevitable that the felt they could see and interpret the events well-documented events at Abu Ghraib would themselves, without requiring much explana- lead to public outrage. We have argued, tion. Finally, individuals in the chain through though, that this outcome was never guaran- which the photos reached the public played teed, but rather was the result of a multi- their roles despite the possibility of reprisals. faceted struggle continuing to this day. The Although the photos played a crucial role in contingent nature of the Abu Ghraib struggle turning Abu Ghraib into an international is shown by the parallel cases of prisons in scandal, there has been nothing automatic Afghanistan, Guantánamo, and elsewhere in about the trajectory of the case. As we have Iraq, in which there is evidence of similar outlined, the U.S. administration and military treatment of prisoners but far less public command used a host of techniques to mini- outcry. The crucial difference is the release of mize outrage and direct it towards a few photos from Abu Ghraib, which circumvented soldiers and away from senior officials and the usual processes by which wrongdoers officers. But these efforts were inadequate: the prevent or minimize reactions to their actions. Abu Ghraib events backfired on the U.S. On the other hand, we should not assume the government, causing far more damage than Abu Ghraib scandal, as it has occurred, was any benefit from intelligence gained or the worst possible outcome for the U.S. through intimidation of the Iraqi opposition to government: it is plausible that cover-up, the U.S. occupation. devaluation, and other techniques prevented the scandal being even larger than it has been. Acknowledgements We thank Steve Wright for many valuable comments. 36. Tony Allen-Mills, “Witch-hunt Fears Stall New US Abuse Investigation,” Sunday Times (UK), 2 October 2005. 37. David DeBatto, “Whitewashing Torture?” Salon.com, 8 December 2004.