Cabinet C: Total Defence
Military Defence: Managing Manpower Shortage
Psychological Defence: Managing Social Challenges 1
Table of Content
Table of Content 2
MILITARY DEFENCE 4
Introduction 4
Historical Overview 5 1st Generation (1960s to early 1980s): 5 2nd generation (Early 1980s to late 1990s): 6
Current Situation 8 Shift away from a manpower-based military: 8 Bolstering the SAF’s cyber defences: 8 Female conscription: 9 Revising deployment and recruitment policies: 10 Recruiting and training cyber-security specialists: 10
Current Constraints 11 Military strength getting compromised by female conscription 11 Maintaining a commitment and resolve to defend Singapore 12
Increased vulnerability to cyberattacks 13
Questions for Discussion 13
Bibliography 14
PSYCHOLOGICAL DEFENCE 16
Introduction 16
Historical Overview 16
Current Situation 19 Complacent mindset towards terrorism 19 Rising threat of information warfare 20
Current Considerations 24 Simulated terror attacks 24 Select Committee on Deliberate Online Falsehoods and POFMA 26 Ensuring no community feels marginalised 28 Internal Security Act 28
Current Constraints 29 Deep, underlying reasons for complacency against terrorism 29
2 False information difficult to identify in the share-first and crowded online world 30 Extremist groups harnessing the Internet 31
Questions for Discussion 32
Bibliography 33 Annex A 35 Annex B 36
3 MILITARY DEFENCE
Introduction
By 1971, British troops had completely withdrawn from Singapore - leaving the nation almost defenseless in the face of several security and economic threats. The Singapore Armed Forces
(SAF) was merely in their infancy and had a long way to go in building up their own defence capabilities. Moreover, the removal of British troops had also affected at least 20% of Singapore's
GDP during the period, hence slowing down economic growth as well.
As such, in order to better protect its national borders and preserve its sovereign status as a nation, Singapore eventually tripled its military spending and embarked on military cooperation with other countries like Israel and was a member of the Five Power Defence Arrangement (with
Britain, Australia, New Zealand and Malaysia), effectively replacing the Anglo-Malayan defence agreement (Lim, 2017). Meanwhile, Britain granted economic and military aid such as a soft loan of £50 million, to help with operating air-defence systems and training of military staff (Turnbull,
2009). These new initiatives were implemented in order to safeguard Singapore’s sovereignty, and bolster its military competencies in light of the British withdrawal, and its new status as an independent nation.
4 Historical Overview
1st Generation (1960s to early 1980s):
In 1967, the Singapore Armed Forces was therefore established under the jurisdiction of the
Ministry of Defence, in order for Singapore to grow its military capabilities, and safeguard its own borders. This was also in conjunction with the earlier National Service Act enacted on 15 March
1967 which would enable Singapore's defence needs to be better met through compulsory conscription of Singaporean males ("National Service Obligation", n.d.). Since then, military defence has become a cornerstone of Singapore's Total Defence framework. The following section helps trace the various milestone developments of the Singapore Armed Forces and helps capture specific agenda that have shifted over the years.
The first phase of Singapore’s build-up of its military defence capabilities was through the process of conscription. Singapore had only 1000 soldiers at the time of independence. To build up a substantial military force, it emulated Israeli and Swiss conscription models. Nearly 9000 males became the first batch of the NS conscription model. The NS (amendment) Act was passed on
15 March 1967 (Singapore, 2015).
After the British military pulled out, Singapore enlisted the help of Israel covertly to build a larger and economically efficient defence force. As an extremely young country, Singapore desperately needed assistance in building up its defence. It saw itself as a little country surrounded by neighbours which were not necessarily friendly to Singapore’s interests. In many ways, Israel was facing a “similar” situation in the Middle East, as the only Jewish nation surrounded by Arab neighbours. Moreover, during this period, Israel was the only country to provide assistance in establishing the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF).
5 Following Singapore's separation from Malaysia in August 1965, Singapore established full diplomatic relations with Israel. The Singaporean government modelled the country's armed forces, including its national service programme, after the Israeli Defense Forces. From 1966,
Israeli military advisers were brought in to train the Singaporean military. Israel also supplied
Singapore with military hardware including tanks and missiles (Ollie, 2016).
2nd generation (Early 1980s to late 1990s):
By the 1967s, Singapore had built up sufficient military know-how, and was supported by regular and conscripted armed forces personnel. Its military defence agenda therefore also grew more comprehensive in this context, as Singapore took on a "dual approach" in its defence policies - based on the principles of Deterrence and Diplomacy.
Military deterrence consists of ensuring an efficient and competent defence force. The 2nd generation saw a “shift from a "poisonous shrimp" to a "porcupine" strategy, which aims to inflict intolerable costs on potential enemies and outlast attackers in the event of a conflict.” (Mustafa,
2014). Singapore has ensured this through building a proficient military through military acquisitions of newer technology and participating in regional security measures. Singapore acquired Super Puma helicopters in 1983 and in 1990, added F-16 Fighting Falcon jets to its fleet.
Meanwhile Singapore had begun conducting annual bilateral military exercises with the United
States (DSO Singapore, n.d.).
Singapore also defends itself through building strong diplomatic ties with other countries. The pillar of defence diplomacy is built by establishing strong and friendly ties, through extensive interactions and cooperation, with defence establishments and armed forces in the region and around the world. Singapore plays its part as a responsible member of the international
6 community by helping to uphold and shape a regional and international system in which all countries abide by international rules and norms. Singapore keenly understands that small states
(such as itself) can survive and thrive only in a world where sovereignty is respected and where interactions between states are governed by the rule of law and therefore invests heavily in efforts to forge strong diplomatic relations with other nations.
Through cooperation in defence, Singapore ensures that friendly ties are maintained. It further projects itself as a responsible member of the global community by providing disaster relief and helping in counter-terrorism missions. SAF’s provision of humanitarian aid started in 1970, when a 47-man team was sent to provide humanitarian assistance to East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) when it was hit by a devastating cyclone. Ever since, the Singapore Government has actively provided humanitarian aid to various countries. In both Iraq and Afghanistan, it has actively contributed to multinational reconstruction efforts (MINDEF Portal). In 2018, two Republic of
Singapore Air Force C-130 aircraft with humanitarian supplies and equipment were sent to
Indonesia after the earthquake and tsunami hit Sulawesi (CNA, 2018). Singapore constantly reiterates itself through these missions as a non-assertive and peaceful country, to build cordial and diplomatic relations with other nations so as to ensure that the security of Singapore is not compromised.
7 Current Situation
Shift away from a manpower-based military:
Changes in the country’s demography has eventually led to lesser men serving in the army. With a birth rate of 1.14, well below the replacement rate of 2.1, the country’s population has long been on a decline (Sin, 2019). In fact, by 2030, SAF will see a one-third reduction in manpower and it is said that by 2065, the male NS-age cohort will be below 50% of its current size (Ho, 2015).
The demographic change is already leading to a manpower crunch whereby soldiers are being appointed with more roles and responsibilities. For example, full-time NSFs are operating unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) which was previously only done by regulars (Lim, 2019). When
NSFs begin undertaking roles which were previously only done by more highly skilled regulars, the issue of safety is inevitably brought up. An incident that shook the nation recently was the death of NS reservist and actor Aloysius Pang, which was a result of a security mishap (Mahmud,
2019). When less experienced NSFs are trained for more difficult roles, their safety could be at risk of being compromised. Ensuring the safety of NSFs in this potentially dangerous context will be one of the greatest challenges the SAF will need to overcome in the future.
Bolstering the SAF’s cyber defences:
Meanwhile, the rise in “hybrid” threats has led to an increased focus on the cyber domains.
Singapore is leveraging on cutting-edge technology (Artificial Intelligence (AI), data analytics, robotics, etc.) in all areas of defence. However, this increasing reliance on technology may also simultaneously increase the nation’s vulnerability to cyberattacks. According to the Ministry of
Health and Ministry of Communications and Information, 1.5 million Singhealth’s patients’ non- medical data was stolen in 2018. Among those affected was Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong and
8 several other ministers. After this incident, Singapore continues to face cyberattacks. Carbon
Black Inc, a U.S-based cybersecurity company released a report, showing that 96% of
Singaporean companies faced data breaches from October 2018 to October 2019 (Youjin, 2019).
Representatives should consider how Singapore’s military can better guard itself, and Singapore, against the rise of such threats.
Female conscription:
The topic of female conscription into the army has long been a debate as some believe that female conscription should only be considered as a “last resort” or that female manpower can be better or more easily utilised in other areas of total defence such as civil defence, or health institutions.
Moreover, the government claims that female conscription should only be considered for demographic reasons rather than “to maintain equity”, meaning only national needs can serve as the rationale for such a solution to be implemented (Ho, 2015). On the social spectrum, less than
25% of surveyed women had supported the conscription of females into NS (Ho, 2015), revealing an inherent aversion towards the idea of female soldiers amongst females themselves. On the other hand, female conscription is a norm in some countries such as Singapore’s very own military counterpart, Israel, whereby 30% of the Israeli Defence Forces comprise of females.
Currently, females can also opt to join the SAF Volunteer Corps (SAFVC) besides the regular NS conscription. More recently, there has been a greater emphasis on effectively training the females of the country to step up alongside their male counterparts through initiatives such as the women- only boot camps to expose women to army life, with MediaCorp TV shows often broadcasting the experience of such training programmes (Aripin, 2018). There have also been broad considerations for training equivalent to reservist training to be conducted during educational transition periods such as holidays for female students.
9 Revising deployment and recruitment policies:
There is also a dire need for a recruitment system which will maximise each and every NSF’s potential to cope with the shrinking numbers of NSFs.
Some efforts that have already been taken with regards to this matter include more effectual deployment and recruitment strategies. These currently consist of pre-enlistees indicating their preferred vocations or interests to increase their sense of ownership in NS (Ng, 2016). In addition, as of 2014, there has been efforts made towards more appropriate matching of existing skills with the roles assigned. For instance, an enlistee with a nursing diploma being deployed as a combat medic (Lim, 2019). Recruiting pre-enlistees into vocations that match their interests and skills and deploying NSFs for more challenging roles are two steps that the SAF has taken to maximise every NSF’s potential.
Moreover, in 2014, SAF released its plans to hire an additional of 1,100 full-time trainers to ensure
NSF are better prepared for combat and are well-versed with safety guidelines (Jianyue, 2014).
Representatives should consider what other, better, revisions to existing recruitment and deployment policies can and should be made.
Recruiting and training cyber-security specialists:
The Ministry of Defence (Mindef) is on a recruitment hunt for cyber-security specialists whose mission will be to bolster its cyber defences. It has also set up a new cyber training school that will conduct courses for such specialised personnel and also help improve cyber hygiene for servicemen and employees across the ministry and the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF). Mindef said it hopes to recruit some 300 personnel to perform specialised operational roles in areas such
10 as cyber incident response, monitoring of computer networks, and testing for security weaknesses in IT infrastructure and applications. However, recruiting, training and deploying so many personnel into the brand-new field of cyber-security is an immense challenge in itself. There are sure to be much room for improvements in the solutions Mindef is currently exploring and perhaps even alternative ways to go about recruiting and training cyber-security specialists that Mindef has not explored yet, which representatives should thoroughly discuss (Mindef, n.d.).
Current Constraints
Military strength getting compromised by female conscription
With regards to female conscription, due to lower National Physical Fitness Award (NAPHA) benchmarks and lesser emphasis on building physical strength throughout school, females may not be ready for National Service at the age of 18. This further builds on the concern that many have - can females also be conscripted into NS together with their male counterparts without eroding the emphasis placed on physical aptitude and strength.
Furthermore, as there is a general disinclination towards NS amongst females, any policy regarding female conscription or volunteerism into the military also needs to be properly rationalized and implemented to prevent backlash. In addition, female conscription or too much emphasis on females volunteering their time in the military can also lead to an economic trade- off for Singapore, and place a strain on the economy that has a high female labour participation rate as women enter the workforce earlier than their male peers in the same cohort. Such trends could be affected should the emphasis for females shift towards defence-related areas instead.
As such, perhaps expanding the role of volunteer corps like the SAF volunteer corp (SAFVC) to better work with the SAF might be a more viable option (Cheong, 2017).
11 Maintaining a commitment and resolve to defend Singapore
The need for a strong defence is reiterated in one of the five National Education (NE) messages,
“We must ourselves defend Singapore”. No one else is responsible for our security and well-being and thus it is paramount that Singapore society remains in support of NS (The Straits Times,
2017).
As the general public perceives the threats faced by the nation becoming less, there is also the risk that Singaporeans de-prioritize defence as a key national concern. In countries like
Switzerland and Taiwan, public sentiment towards conscription has changed for the worse. In
Singapore, support for NS is still very high, with a 2013 Institute of Policy Studies survey reporting that 98% of Singaporeans believe that NS is crucial for national security (The Straits Times, 2017).
However, to maintain the current high level of support, representatives should examine what factors - besides a drop in threat perception - can undermine this vital institution. National Service, if not taken seriously by citizens, becomes next to useless. It is essential yet becoming increasingly difficult to maintain high public support for National Service.
To maintain citizens’ support of NS, Mindef has taken several steps. Mindef is well aware of the importance of keeping NS equitable. The authorities come down hard on draft dodgers to show that people cannot get away with gaming the system. It has allowed those who enlist from
November this year to indicate their preferences in vocations. This will no doubt help give full- time national servicemen (NSFs) and NSmen a more meaningful experience in the military and maximise their contributions. It will also decrease cynicism that some feel towards serving NS because they are not gainfully employed during their two years in uniform (The Straits Times,
2017).
12 Increased vulnerability to cyberattacks
An overarching approach towards technological superiority also raises another significant concern of cybersecurity. While the military strives for technological prowess in the face of cyber- attacks on the country’s institutions and sovereignty, the linking of various systems like battle management, command and control as well as surveillance require greater attention to be spent on ensuring the security of these operational systems so as to not fall prey to massive hackings or associated threats. As our military becomes more ‘tech’-based, soldiers will need to have more organisational and operational agility in order to effectively integrate these technologies into current operations and systems while still maintaining the integrity of the country’s military defence. How to train the soldiers to gain those skills, is a topic that requires much discussion.
Questions for Discussion
1. What do you think is the most significant challenge to Singapore’s military defence, and
why?
2. How feasible do you think are current strategies to combat the issues faced in the SAF?
3. How should the military go about strengthening its defences in the unprecedented domain
of cybersecurity?
4. How can the military further adapt to Singapore’s shrinking population base?
5. To what extent should traditional military frameworks and the level of human involvement
be altered when incorporating technology into the SAF?
6. How do we maintain public support for NS and commitment from soldiers?
7. What safety measures need to be undertaken to guarantee the safety of NSFs that are
beginning to take on more challenging roles and responsibilities?
13 Bibliography
Aripin, N. A. (2018, August 16). More than 1,000 apply women-only boot camp for a taste of army life. Retrieved from https://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/singapore/national- service-army-women-only-boot-camp-10622730
Channel NewsAsia (2018). Singapore sends C-130 aircraft to Sulawesi for humanitarian support https://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/singapore/saf-c-130-aircraft-sulawesi- indonesia-humanitarian-eathquake-10953176
Cheong, D. (2017, July 31). As NS turns 50, what is its future? Retrieved from https://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/as-ns-turns-50-what-is-its-future
Chong Zi Liang (2017): Fairness, sense of purpose key to maintaining support for NS https://www.straitstimes.com/opinion/fairness-sense-of-purpose-key-to-maintaining- support-for-ns
DSO National Laboratories. DTC 50 - Aviation Engineering https://www.dso.org.sg/Media/Default/Publications/DTC50%20- %20Aviation%20Engineering.pdf
Koh, E. B. (2019, June 30). SAF to do more with less manpower; set up cyber formation: Dr Ng. Retrieved from https://www.mindef.gov.sg/web/portal/pioneer/article/regular-article- detail/ops-and-training/2019-Q2/30jun19_news1
Liew, M. (2019, November 5). Doing more with less: The Singaporean armed forces prepare for manpower shortages and evolving regional challenges. Retrieved from https://www.aseantoday.com/2019/11/doing-more-with-less-the-singaporean-armed-forces- prepare-for-manpower-shortages-and-evolving-regional-challenges/
Lim, M. Z. (2019, June 1). Five Power Defence Arrangements nations reaffirm commitments on sidelines of Shangri-La Dialogue. Retrieved from https://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/five-power-defence-arrangements-nations-reaffirm- commitment-on-sidelines-of-shangri-la.
Lim, M. Z. (2019, July 1). SAF using NSFs in more roles ahead of manpower crunch. Retrieved from https://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/saf-using-nsfs-in-more-roles-ahead- of-manpower-crunch
National Service Obligation. (n.d.). Retrieved from https://www.mfa.gov.sg/Overseas- Mission/Chennai/Consular-Services/National-Service-Obligation.
14 Ng, J. S. (2016, July 2). SAF will overcome manpower issues through technology: Defence Minister. Retrieved from https://www.asiaone.com/singapore/saf-will-overcome-manpower- issues-through-technology-defence-minister
Number of women recruits in SAF doubled in 2014. (2016, February 11). Retrieved from https://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/number-of-women-recruits-in-saf-doubled-in-2014
Raska, M. (2019, March 19). How will SAF look like after its next incarnation? Retrieved from https://www.todayonline.com/commentary/saf-after-its-next-incarnation
Sin, Y. (2019, July 22). Number of babies born in Singapore drops to 8-year low. Retrieved from https://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/number-of-babies-born-here-drops-to-8-year- low
Tan Chee Wee appointed SAF's first Inspector-General. (2019, February 22). Retrieved from https://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/singapore/tan-chee-wee-saf-appointed-first- inspector-general-mindef-11279264.
Tan, E. (2001, August 22). Singapore Armed Forces Training Institute (SAFTI). Retrieved from https://eresources.nlb.gov.sg/infopedia/articles/SIP_563_2005-01- 25.html?s=military%20defence
15 PSYCHOLOGICAL DEFENCE
Introduction
Total Defence was first initiated in 1984. It served as a campaign which emphasised on the role played by individuals in contributing to making Singapore a safe place. Psychological Defence, one of the six aspects of Total Defence, involves the co-opting of civilians into the nation’s Total
Defence framework by inculcating among Singaporeans, a strong and resilient mindset, especially when faced with uncertainty and adversity. It stresses on the need for Singaporeans to overcome challenges, get back on their feet when affected by adversities and to stand united against threats that undermine Singapore’s collective national interests (Singapore, 2019).
Moreover, in today’s era of rising transnational terrorism, information warfare and the issue of radicialism and extremism, maintaining psychological defense has become more critical than ever. These threats can easily undermine social unity and affect the psychological security of
Singaporean society. The safeguarding of Singapore’s psychological security has therefore become even more important in the context of these new realities.
Historical Overview
One of the threats facing our psychological defence today is the rise in transnational terrorism.
Singapore faced its first terrorist attack in 1974, during the Laju Incident. Two terrorist groups, the
Japanese Red Army, and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine attacked a Shell oil refinery complex on Pulau Bukom. They then hijacked the ferryboat Laju and held the crew
16 members hostage. The threat was eventually put down through timely government intervention and the use of diplomacy (Singapore, 2008). After this incident, Singapore continued to face terrorist threats such as in the Singapore Airlines Flight 117 in 1991 (Han, 2015). The persistence of such terrorist threats clearly signals that Singapore has been a key target for many terrorists.
A terrorist attack has the ability to disrupt social order, instill fear, paralyse society with constant anxiety and paranoia (Grieger, 2006). These impacts would be even more significant for a population as small as Singapore and greatly weaken Psychological Defence. As such, the need to remain steadfast and attentive through building our Psychological Defence is ever so necessary to reduce the risk of a terrorist attack from taking place, and to immediately get back on our feet in the face of a terrorist attack.
Despite this, complacency among the population remains relatively high. According to the Ministry of Home Affairs’ (MHA) 2019 Threat Assessment Report, a survey of around 2,000 Singaporeans conducted in 2018 found that only one in five feels that the terrorism threat is imminent. The results were a clear indication that Singapore’s psychological defence against such threats were not ideal. Instead, the lack of psychological preparedness puts us at a greater risk of such attacks.
Secondly, another threat to psychological defence and resilience that Singapore society faces today, is the risk of radicalization. The rise of the internet and the increased connectivity that we see in society today, has also resulted in vulnerabilities in society becoming more easily exploited.
One of the most dangerous implications of this comes in the form of self-radicalization. In 2007, the first person detained for self-radicalisation under the Internal Security Act (ISA)1 was Abdul
1 ISA allows for the detainment of individuals without trials. According to Mr K. Shanmugam, Minister of Home Affairs, “The ISA allows for preventive detention, the prevention of subversion, the suppression of organised violence against individuals and property in order to ensure internal security.” In the past, ISA was used against communust threats. As of 2007 onwards, ISA has been mainly used against those who have been radicalised and posed as a threat to Singapore. In 2019, it was reported that ISA had received the highest number of self-radicalised detainees since 2012.
17 Basheer Kader. He was a 28-year-old lawyer and lecturer who was heavily influenced by radical articles he found online. This prompted him to make contact with the terrorist group Lashkar-e-
Tayyiba in Pakistan. Such acts of self-radicalization undermine the Singaporean social fabric based on diversity and multi-racial and multi-religious harmony (The Straits Times, 2015).
Subsequently, more people were self-radicalised and detained by the ISA. The number of radicalised individuals on orders under the Internal Security Act was at its highest in 2019 in the last seven years, the Ministry of Home Affairs said, adding that there was a spike in the number of radicalisation cases dealt with from 2015 onwards (K Shanmugam, 2019).
Thirdly, increased connectivity has also resulted in the dissemination of information at an unprecedented rate today. With this, the threat of misinformation spreading and causing unnecessary stress, anxiety and worry amongst Singaporeans has also increased.
In 2017, Singapore Minister of Home Affairs K. Shanmugam brought up the issue of how fake news has become an increasingly prevalent problem. He brought attention to a piece from a website called All Singapore Stuff which published a fake article on how a rooftop on Punggol
Waterway Terraces had collapsed. “The police, civil defence, all had to be mobilised and deployed to investigate the claim. Taxpayers pay the cost for all of this,” he explained (The Online Citizen,
2017).
Hoaxes such as these can have dire consequences domestically, Shanmugam pointed out that the prevalence of these fake news can rile up the public and create instability. According to
Shanmugam, “fake news today, we must assume can be used as an offensive weapon by foreign
18 agencies and foreign governments… to get into the public mind, to destabilise the public, to psychologically weaken them.” As such, Singaporeans must remain vigilant against the rise of such threats to social stability and maintain a high degree of psychological safeguards against them (Singapore M. O., 2017).
Current Situation
Complacent mindset towards terrorism
Two weeks before the 2005 London bomb blasts, the British authorities downgraded their terror alert. For some unknown reason, they were not even aware of the May 29 warning via the Internet of an imminent al-Qaeda attack on Europe until the Spanish secret service passed on a copy of the Arabic message to MI5 two days too late. If there was a lesson to be learnt, it is that complacency and lack of information is as dangerous as the actual threat itself, in this ever- pressing war against global terrorism (The Star, 2005).
The frequency of terrorist attacks may have decreased in the region, but the periodic occurrence of new attacks such as the Christchurch mosque shootings in New Zealand and the persistent spread of radical online propaganda serve as a grim reminder: the threat of terrorism has not disappeared. The recent arrests of two Singaporeans in January 2019 under the Internal Security
Act (ISA) for involvement in terrorism-related activities, further attest to the threat of terrorism to
Singapore today. However, according to the Ministry of Home Affairs’ (MHA) 2019 Threat
Assessment Report, a survey of around 2,000 Singaporeans conducted in 2018 found that only one in five feels that the terrorism threat is imminent. Alluding to the survey findings, the MHA said, "it is important for Singaporeans to not become complacent''. (The Straits Times, 2019)
19 This complacent mindset is problematic as it adversely affects Singapore’s ‘Psychological
Defence’ by lulling the community at large into a false sense of security. As Law and Home Affairs
Minister K. Shanmugam shared, “… given that we are and have been a very safe place, the first and most difficult task is getting people to understand that this is real and this is serious”. If left unaddressed, this complacency can undermine Singapore’s Total Defence and in particular its national crisis preparedness efforts.
Rising threat of information warfare
The use of information in warfare has always been an integral arm of military warfare, be it in the forms of covert intelligence or overt domestic propaganda (MINDEF, n.d). Yet, it was not until recently that Singapore became unprecedentedly vulnerable to the rising threat of information warfare. Due to the proliferation of mobile communications and social media and the growing dependence on technology with the advent of the Smart Nation project, Singapore is faced with modern challenges (MINDEF, n.d).
Experts from the S. Rajaratnam School of Informational Studies (RSIS) cited evidence of an unnamed country trying to influence local opinions through news articles and social media. The experts added that Singapore is not yet fully prepared to handle such disinformation campaigns that are usually attempts aimed at destabilizing the government and society, posing a threat to serious to national harmony, especially in a country like Singapore with a diverse society (The
Straits Times, 2018).
With the increase in speed and reach of information, any newsworthy conflict will be immediately thrust into the consciousness of the local community, and subjected to scrutiny, debates, and opinions which will shape the portrayal of the parties involved in the conflict (MINDEF, 2020).
20 Moreover, traditionally weaker adversaries can leverage on cheap and readily available information technology such as social media platforms and video hosting websites, to wield disproportionate influence over domestic citizens’ beliefs in the legitimacy of the government
(MINDEF, 2020). In Singapore, online falsehoods about new immigrants have provoked xenophobic comments; communal and religious online falsehoods have stirred tensions within communities (Parliament of Singapore, 2018). Over time, such falsehoods can corrode
Singapore’s social cohesion and exposure over time to falsehoods and partisan views can skew worldviews.
Motivated by ideologies, politics and prejudices, citizens and others, in different countries use online falsehoods to illegitimately promote their causes. Elections around the world have seen domestic groups use disinformation to support their favoured politicians and denigrate the opposition (TODAY, 2017). Extreme right-wing groups in the US, UK and France have used falsehoods to stoke anger against Muslims and migrants and undermines trust in the government’s ability to deal with these issues (Parliament of Singapore, 2018). Falsehoods by domestic groups in Indonesia have furthered racist and sectarian interests (SCMP, 2019). Fake news that has a bearing on election results would be the most troubling. Disinformation therefore has the ability to create unnecessary fault-lines and anxieties within society, threatening social cohesion and undermining social stability at the same time (Ang, 2017). As part of Singapore's
Psychological Defence, Singaporeans must be cognizant of these issues and do their part in being able to see through the falsehoods, stopping the spread of misinformation, and remaining resilient and cohesive in the face of these emerging challenges.
21 Rising threat of radicalization
In June 2019, a 40-year-old Singaporean was detained under the ISA for intending to join Islamic
State in Syria. Three months earlier, a 39-year-old food delivery man was issued a restriction order after investigations found he was influenced by IS' radical ideology and had considered travelling to Syria to join the group.
That same month, a 62-year-old production technician was issued a restriction order after she was found to have been in contact with multiple foreign entities suspected of involvement in terrorism-related activities, including people who expressed support for IS (CNA, 2019).
In light of the rising number of radicalisation cases, the MHA has urged the public to exercise caution against viewing radical material online and to report people suspected of being radicalised. But how exactly does radicalisation happen and why is it on the rise today?
Radicalization has been defined, by security experts, as a process during which an individual or group adopts increasingly extreme political, social or religious ideals and aspirations. The process involves rejecting or undermining the status quo or contemporary ideas and expressions of freedom of choice (The Conversation, 2016).
Those who are more susceptible to becoming radicalized perceive themselves to be marginalised
(politically, racially, religiously or socio-economically), feel a pervasive sense of purposelessness and hope for the future (TODAY, 2019). Newly radicalized people do not just agree with the mission and the message of the group they are joining; they embrace the idea of using violence to induce change. Those who view themselves as victims of their countries’ governments and believe that their political grievances cannot be channelled into an existing political system are among the key targets for radicalization (The Conversation, 2019). In today’s digital age,
22 radicalisation can spread and take root rapidly as extremist groups harness the power of the
Internet to preach their brand of exclusivism, distort events and create misinformation and extend their influence over a broader audience than ever before (CNA, 2018).
Merely defending ourselves against terror attacks can blindside us to the more serious and long- term risks of radicalising influences that seek to create schisms and divide society, weakening our social fabric. There is a huge challenge in how to inoculate ourselves from these influences and be more discerning about potentially polarising developments, especially if complacency about racial and religious harmony sets in. Regional issues, if not actively and openly discussed, can lead to polarisation among segments of society and the creation of enclaves.
Singapore needs to watch out for greater interplay of radicalisation and regional developments that can seed ill will and communal conflict by proliferating feelings of victimhood, injustice and disenfranchisement. No longer does radicalisation confine itself to actions that terrorise urban centres in countries far away, it now has the potential to convince radicalised elements to take up arms and lay siege to major countries in Asia (CNA, 2018).
23 Current Considerations
Simulated terror attacks
The inherent complacency suggests that efforts to raise awareness of ‘good preparatory practices’ through education might not be persuasive to individuals who see no value in doing so.
Rather, overcoming complacency involves creating a realistic representation of the physical and psychological sensations associated with an attack. Currently, simulated terror attacks organised by the government at the community level, such as Exercise Northstar, seek to physically reproduce actual attack scenarios to help familiarise Singaporeans on what to do in the event of an attack. People will be more likely to take action to strengthen security if they believe that terrorism poses a real threat to their and their own country’s interests and their actions can significantly reduce the threat (Harvard, 2019).
The participants’ experience can be further enhanced by actually immersing them in the ‘real’ conditions of an attack. At present, they are merely playing the role of ‘spectators’ without any real or relatable means of experiencing how an attack may unfold and the resulting devastation.
It is suggested that Virtual Reality (VR) technology can be deployed for this purpose. VR simulations basically imbue users with a sense of presence by allowing them to experience a virtual representation, where they can receive instantaneous feedback on the sensations and emotions induced by the phenomenon.
For example, VR simulations can be used during training to expose the participants to a realistic situation that they may potentially face during an actual attack. VR simulations therefore serve as
24 an opportunity for participants to understand the rationale behind government advisories such as
‘run, hide, tell’. More importantly, this approach has the potential to encourage cooperation from the community in the event of an attack as they would be more aware of why and what they should do in such situations. That said, it is important to recognise that such simulation training may induce trauma for the participants. There is therefore the need to strike a balance between the realism of the attack with the potential harm that the participants may be exposed to (RSIS, 2019).
Other solutions representatives can consider include harnessing the power of the media and exposing prominently the threat of terror attacks. The media has the ability to influence the thoughts and change our habits that can be leveraged upon. By churning out more media such as stories, television shows and films that contain scenes of terror attacks in their narratives, those who consume those media can be continuously yet subtly reminded of the need to keep their guard up.
Another possible solution the government could also adopt is the preparation of detailed reports and briefings on the threats of terrorism. These reports would include, among other details, analyses of real terrorist efforts to obtain weapons; assessments of how difficult it would be for terrorists to overcome the key barriers to these types of terrorism; and descriptions of types of security vulnerabilities that must be addressed. Currently, the Singapore Terrorism Threat
Assessment Report exists and is published annually. Representatives could look into how to ensure that the report findings reach and keep the public aware of the threat by preparing the report in varying levels of classification, to suit and engage different audiences (Harvard, 2019).
It is difficult to say for certain how Singaporeans will react to an attack, particularly when we have not exactly experienced one yet. As encapsulated in the SGSecure slogan: “Not IF, but When” -- in spite of robust vigilance and prevention efforts by the government, which are undeniably
25 extremely crucial, a terror attack in Singapore is inevitable. It is therefore paramount for
Singaporeans to get rid of their complacent mindset and play a bigger role in counter-terrorism efforts. A less complacent group of citizens means a more resilient country and a greater pool of people who are mentally prepared and are more able to contribute to national crisis preparedness efforts.
Select Committee on Deliberate Online Falsehoods and POFMA
Singapore’s answer to “fake news” has been to set up a Select Committee on Deliberate Online
Falsehoods, to study and tackle the spread of online disinformation. The Select Committee held a series of public hearings that culminated in 22 recommendations, including:
● advising strengthening trust among people and communities,
● urging technology companies to regulate malicious online content,
● suggesting the development of a framework to increase national media literacy and
● recommending that media organisations and their industry partners establish a fact-
checking coalition.
Apart from the above, the Select Committee also emphasised that the government should have the power to restrict the spread of “fake news” and discredit the sources of these falsehoods
(Parliament of Singapore, 2018). In October 2019, the Protection from Online Falsehoods and
Manipulation Act kicked in, empowering the Government to quickly remove malicious falsehoods.
However, the controversial new law has ignited debate over whether it was necessary, amid concerns of regulatory overreach and Pofma’s effect on freedom of expression and speech
(TODAY, 2019).
26 Public Education
The Government has put in place several public education measures. Information literacy — including the ability to discern the authenticity of digital information — is currently taught in primary and secondary schools, as part of the Cyber Wellness syllabus. The Government has also set up a website called “Factually”, which aims to clarify widespread or common misperceptions of
Government policy, or other matters of public concern. The Media Literacy Council (MLC) runs an annual campaign to educate Internet users, including outreach programmes targeted at those aged 15 to 35. Set up in 2012, the MLC works with the industry, educators, parents and the
Government on public education and awareness programmes relating to media literacy and cyber wellness. To tackle the growing concern of fake news, the MLC shares tips on how to discern content accuracy via its website and social media platforms, such as the importance of cross- checking various sources, and considering the agenda of the purveyors of information (TODAY,
2017).
However, some have cast doubt on the efficacy of current public education efforts, stressing that media education should be especially extended to the older generation, who may be more vulnerable to “fake news” (Lee, 2017). Others have urged efforts to educate the millennial generation on the rules of engagement of social media as young “citizen journalists” may be unaware of the severe consequences their tweets or posts may have (Tan, 2017).
Evidently, there is no ‘silver bullet’ solution to combat information warfare. A multi-pronged approach is needed, and representatives must take into account the nuanced strengths and weaknesses of each solution when agreeing on the appropriate measure to undertake to ensure that the solutions put forth unite, rather than divide further, Singapore’s society.
27 Ensuring no community feels marginalised
The best defence against extremism is to ensure that no community feels marginalised or disadvantaged, said the Minister of Law for Home Affairs K Shanmugam.
He stressed that underlying the Government’s efforts to stamp out extremism is the battle for the hearts and minds of Singaporeans across all communities got to keep community tolerance between communities, between religions and work hard, making sure that no community feels left out. And no community feels that they are going to be prejudiced or racially targeted,” he said.
It is critical for citizens to feel that the Government is fair, committed to their well-being and will treat everyone equally. Because if they feel as a community, any community feels that they are marginalised or disadvantaged, they will become far more vulnerable to radicalization (TODAY,
2019).
As seen in the Timeline of Important Events (Annex B), Singapore has made many efforts in the past to upkeep racial and religious harmony, which is ever so important for a multi-racial country like itself. Representatives must, together, discuss the usefulness of these efforts, where they fall short, and how to improve them.
Internal Security Act
Mr Shanmugam has also emphasised the importance of the ISA, having said previously that there is substantial support for the law. He personally believes the ISA to be highly critical, essential and the single most important tool available, allowing early detainment.
28 The ISA allows for preventive detention, the prevention of subversion, the suppression of organised violence against individuals and property in order to ensure internal security.
But human rights activists have long called for the ISA to be abolished, accusing the Government of having used it against political opponents in the past. The calls grew louder after Malaysia repealed its own ISA in 2012, introducing a replacement law called the Security Offences (Special
Measures) Act or Sosma. It took effect in July that year (TODAY, 2019).
The new law, however, has been criticised by security analysts as a weak instrument that does not tackle the rising threat of terrorism. And this led the Malaysian government to pass another law, the Prevention of Terrorism Act (Pota), in 2015 to deal specifically with terrorism. This begs the question: Is the ISA still relevant today or does it need improvements or to be supplemented with other laws?
Current Constraints
Deep, underlying reasons for complacency against terrorism
To successfully overcome Singaporeans’ complacency about terrorism, it is essential to first identify the long-standing factors of the complacency.
First of all, the complacent mindset arises from human beings’ cognitive biases that serve as mental shortcuts to help people make sense of their surroundings and make faster decisions in their lives. In the context of terrorism, for example, the absence of attacks in Singapore and the
29 continuous news reports of terrorists being defeated in the Middle East has been interpreted by many Singaporeans that Singapore will therefore not be targeted by terrorists (RSIS, 2019).
Complacency may lead many to dismiss the slew of security-related messaging from the government as irrelevant. Some may even feel overwhelmed by existing announcements and initiatives, which not only result in messaging fatigue but also impair their ability to learn, actively engage in preparedness efforts, as well as be adequately prepared (RSIS, 2019).
Complacency may also arise from the view that many believe the role of securing Singapore is primarily the job of the government. While the government has taken necessary measures and precautions to mitigate the threat of terrorism and has seemingly done a good job of keeping
Singapore safe from terror attacks so far, it is important to be cognisant that there are no fool proof approaches that can insulate any country completely from the threat today. This seeming over-reliance on the government therefore raises concerns of unrealistic expectations and dependency. The fact that Singapore has been kept relatively safe from terrorist attacks compared to its neighbours in recent years also gives the impression that the government is doing a good job of counter-terrorism efforts and that the public’s vigilance is not sorely required (RSIS,
2019).
False information difficult to identify in the share-first and crowded online world
News-related hoaxes have been around for hundreds of years. But things are different now: Never before has information - or disinformation - been able to spread so quickly, in such copious amounts, to so many people, in so many places worldwide (TODAY, 2017). This means that there is very little time for authorities to react, and it is difficult to debunk hoaxes promptly and effectively.
30 For the public, it can be difficult to discern what is satire and what is truth among the sheer quantity of information sources.
Moreover, in today’s share-first world, people race to be the first to share something with others and might only read the first paragraph of a story, and it is therefore unlikely that they will spend the time to perform in-depth research about the outlet they are sharing from (Forbes, 2016). It is hence important that representatives consider the current context of the digital climate and the difficulties it will pose towards their attempts to regulate disinformation campaigns by modifying existing solutions or crafting new solutions.
Extremist groups harnessing the Internet
Extremists and violent extremists have always sought to use compelling messages and narratives as a means of attracting followers to their cause. In the modern age it follows that the internet and social media represent a significant and easy to use medium to inspire, radicalise and recruit young people. It is apparent that if countering radicalization is to be effective, there must be greater focus and resources made available to the development of effective countermeasures to radicalism -- online.
The Singapore Government is also looking to update the nearly 30-year-old Maintenance of
Religious Harmony Act (MRHA), with proposed changes introduced in Parliament on Monday
(Sep 2) to address the impact of social media and foreign influence.
Some of the key changes proposed include expanding the Restraining Order (RO) to require those who post inflammatory content to take down the posts, as well as shortening the time before
31 the RO takes effect. This is to counter the speed with which content that threatens to sow disharmony can now spread over the Internet.
With the proliferation of the Internet and social media, however, Law and Home Affairs Minister K
Shanmugam said in July there is a need to update the law to better keep up with developments.
Like the MRHA and ISA, the relevance and value, in today’s world, of many other solutions which were implemented a long time ago are being questioned. Representatives direly need to discuss which solutions are worth bringing forward into the future and what improvements are in order.
Questions for Discussion
1. How will the solutions proposed ensure Singaporeans become more alert towards the
threat of terrorism?
2. How can the Government combat information warfare in the digital age without overly
infringing on freedom of expression and speech?
3. What would be the best way to reduce the risk of self-radicalisation while ensuring that
fragile racial and religious sentiments are safeguarded?
4. To what extent are the current measures such as simulated terror attack simulations useful
in reducing complacency towards terrorism?
5. How can it be ensured that newer solutions will prove to be more effective than the many
previous efforts in ensuring no community feels marginalised in the battle against
extremism?
6. What further measures can be undertaken to ensure the proposed solutions are
implemented swiftly and smoothly?
32 Bibliography
Amalina Abdul Nasir (2019): CO19142 | Women in Terrorism: Mitigating a New Development https://www.rsis.edu.sg/rsis-publication/icpvtr/women-in-terrorism-mitigating-a-new- development/#.XhlAjcgzbIU
Amy Chew, Andre Barahamin (2019): Chinese Indonesians in Jakarta fear attacks on the community, as anti-China hoaxes spread on social media https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/politics/article/3011392/chinese-indonesians-jakarta-fear- attacks-community-anti-china
Channel NewsAsia (2019): 2 Singaporeans detained under ISA for intending to join Islamic State in Syria https://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/singapore/singaporeans-detained-isa- intending-to-join-islamic-state-syria-11753094
Corey Dickstein (2018): Dunford warns against complacency in fight against terrorism as ISIS’ caliphate disintegrates https://www.stripes.com/news/dunford-warns-against-complacency-in-fight-against-terrorism-as- isis-caliphate-disintegrates-1.552097
Faizal A Rahman, Remy Mahzam (2018): Commentary: Radicalisation not a threat that can be flushed out https://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/singapore/commentary-radicalisation-not-a-threat-that- can-be-flushed-out-9835408
Faris Mohktar (2019): In the fight against extremism, Singapore needs to ensure no community feels marginalised: Shanmugam https://www.todayonline.com/singapore/fight-against-extremism-need-ensure-no-community- feels-marginalised-shanmugam
Frederic Lemieux (2016): How radicalization happens and who is at risk https://theconversation.com/how-radicalization-happens-and-who-is-at-risk-52248
Hariz Baharudin (2019): Singapore still faces strong threat from terrorism: MHA https://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/spore-still-faces-strong-threat-from-terrorism-mha
Hariz Baharudin (2019): Terror threat to S'pore remains high, but only one in five sees it as an imminent threat: MHA report https://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/terror-threat-to-spore-remains-high-but-only-one-in-five- sees-it-as-an-imminent-threat-mha
Jeffrey Francis (2005): No room for complacency in war against terrorists https://www.thestar.com.my/opinion/letters/2005/07/17/no-room-for-complacency-in-war- against-terrorists
Jeffrey Ng Zhaohong (2016): Information Warfare – The Challenges and Opportunities for Militaries in the Information Age https://www.mindef.gov.sg/oms/safti/pointer/documents/pdf/v42n3%206%20information%20warf are.pdf
33
Kalev Leetaru (2016): Why Stopping 'Fake' News Is So Hard https://www.forbes.com/sites/kalevleetaru/2016/11/30/why-stopping-fake-news-is-so- hard/#1caceaea22d6
Kelly Ng (2017): THE BIG READ: In an era of fake news, the truth may not always be out there https://www.todayonline.com/singapore/big-read-era-fake-news-truth-may-not-always-be-out- there
Kevin Kwang (2019): Changes proposed to Singapore’s religious harmony law to address impact of social media, foreign influence https://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/singapore/changes-maintenance-religious-harmony- act-amendments-11864272
Lester Hio (2018): Indications of information warfare against Singapore, say two experts https://www.straitstimes.com/politics/indications-of-information-warfare-against-spore-say-two- experts
Matthew Bunn, Nickolas Roth, William H. (2019): Combating Complacency about Nuclear Terrorism https://scholar.harvard.edu/files/matthew_bunn/files/bunn_nuclearsecuritypolicybrief_2_2019.pd f
Mohamed Bin Ali, Sabariah Binte Mohamed Hussin (2017): CO17179 | Countering Violent Extremism: Role of Women and Family https://www.rsis.edu.sg/rsis-publication/icpvtr/co17179-countering-violent-extremism-role-of- women-and-family/#.Xhk8_8gzbIU
Nee Loo Seng (2019): CO19062 | Singapore’s Total Defence: Overcoming Complacency https://www.rsis.edu.sg/rsis-publication/nssp/singapores-total-defence-overcoming- complacency/#.Xfw1vkczbIV Neyla Zannia (2017): K Shanmugam: Government to consider how to address fake news issue https://www.theonlinecitizen.com/2017/04/03/k-shanmugam-government-to-consider-how-to- address-fake-news-issue/
Ng Jun Sen (2019): Singapore’s fake news law kicked in on Oct 2. Here is how it works https://www.todayonline.com/singapore/singapores-fake-news-law-kicked-oct-2-here-how-it-will- work
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34 Annex A
The timeline below highlights important events in the history of the development of Singapore’s Military Defence.
1966 SAF is formed in conjunction with the Ministry of the Interior and Defence (MID) to oversee domestic security and national defence.
1967 The National Service (NS) (Amendment) Bill is introduced, mandating the compulsory conscription of 18-year-old citizens and Permanent Residents (PRs).
1971 British military troops had completely pulled out of Singapore.
1995 SAFTI Military Institute (MI) is opened with various facilities incorporated with advanced technology as it serves as a tri-service military institute to cater to the army, navy and airforce.
1999 The Bionix infantry fighting vehicle (IFV), Southeast Asia’s first armoured vehicle was developed by the Defence Material Organisation of the Ministry of Defence, the SAF Armour Formation and Singapore Technologies Automotive (STA).
2004 Length of NS is reduced by six months for NSFs with at least a corporal rank and above (they have either “A”-level or diploma qualifications). This major change was announced following the estimated increase in NSFs from 2006 to 2016 due to increased births from 1988 to 1997 as well as the declining emphasis on a large soldier manpower due to technological advancements.
2006 Refinements made to the Individual Physical Proficiency Test (IPPT) include remedial training (RT) and voluntary IPPT preparatory training programmes to hone the physical fitness of NSmen.
2017 It was announced that a 88-hectare Singapore Armed Forces Training Institute City will be built in Lim Chu Kang to train soldiers in homeland security, counter-terrorism, etc.
35 2018 It was announced that the SAF would transition from current third-generation technologies to fourth (next-gen) technologies by overhauling current arsenal.
2019 Office of Inspector-General of the Armed Forces was set up to oversee and scrutinise the enforcement of safety protocol in the military.
Countries part of the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA), Singapore included, reaffirmed their commitment to counter-terrorism and maritime security as well as support for FPDA exercises such as Exercise Bersama Shield and Exercise Bersama Lima.
Annex B
The threats to Singapore’s Psychological and Total Defence have certainly been on the rise. Below is a timeline that highlights incidents that have threatened to erode Singapore’s psychological defence, and the efforts made by the Singapore government to safeguard it.
1970 The Presidential Council for Minority Rights is established to scrutinize most of the bills passed by Parliament to ensure that they do not discriminate against any racial or religious community and safeguard minority rights.
1988 The Group Representation Constituency (GRC) is introduced, ensuring that the Parliament will always be multi-racial in its composition to guarantee a minimum representation of minorities in Parliament.
1989 A White Paper on the Maintenance of Religious Harmony Act is released, amidst a worldwide resurgence of religiosity.
The Housing and Development Board introduces its Ethnic Integration Policy to ensure a balanced mix of ethnic groups living in HDB estates, so as to promote racial harmony and strengthen social cohesion.
1991 The first of five ethnic-based Self-Help Groups provide community-based
36 assistance to low-income persons/families.
1997 Racial Harmony Day is celebrated in schools for the first time.
2002 Inter-Racial and Religious Confidence Circles (IRCCs), local-level inter-faith platforms formed to promote racial and religious harmony, are introduced.
2009 The National Integration Council (NIC) was introduced to drive integration efforts in a comprehensive, sustainable and ground-up manner through the partnership of the public, people and private sectors.
2012 Factually, a state-run website, is set up. Articles on Factually are published on a timely basis so prevailing falsehoods and misinformation are debunked as soon as possible.
The Media Literacy Council (MLC) is formed. The MLC spearheads public education on media literacy and cyber wellness.
2015 Several foreign news outlets, including American news network CNN and Chinese broadcaster CCTV, falsely reported that founding Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew - who was then in intensive care - had died, based on an announcement made by a fake government website.
2017 The first phase of Exercise Northstar 10, a multi-agency counter-terrorism exercise led by the Singapore Police Force (SPF), began.
August 2019 Number of radicalised individuals on orders under the Internal Security Act (ISA) reached its highest in seven years.
October 2019 The Protection from Online Falsehoods and Manipulation Act (POFMA) came into effect.
37
38