Armenia and Nagorno borders after the 2020 Karabakh war

Dr. Benyamin Poghosyan, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

The 2020 Karabakh war has significantly changed the Karabakh conflict's status quo. , supported by , has occupied significant territories of the unrecognized Nagorno Karabakh Republic (approximately 8500 square km from 11500). The November 10 , Azerbaijan, and trilateral statement has fixed Karabakh's new territorial status quo1. As of now, Azerbaijan controls not only the seven regions, which were not the parts of the former Nagorno Karabakh Autonomous Region before the collapse of the Union but also 30 percent of Nagorno Karabakh Autonomous Region itself, including the entire region, parts of , Martuni and regions and the second biggest city of Karabakh – Shushi. The 3000 square km of the territory remains under the protection of the Russian peacekeepers, including Nagorno Karabakh’s capital and parts of Martakert, Martuni, and Askeran regions.

Meanwhile, the Karabakh war has also resulted in territorial changes for the Republic of Armenia. It should be noted that no demarcation and delimitation of borders between Armenia and Azerbaijan has ever taken place. Immediately after the collapse of the , Azerbaijan launched large–scale hostilities against Nagorno Karabakh, while Armenia was supporting its compatriots living there. As a result of the 1992-1994 Karabakh war, some former Soviet Azerbaijan territories bordering Soviet Armenia were included in the unrecognized Nagorno Karabakh Republic. Thus, Armenia and the Nagorno Karabakh Republic had a

1 Statement by the Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia, the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan, and the President of the Russian Federation, https://www.primeminister.am/en/press- release/item/2020/11/10/Announcement/.

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common border of approximately 400 km, which stretched from the Armenian city of Sotk until Armenia – border.

As a result of the 2020 war and the November 10 trilateral statement, Armenia agreed to return to Azerbaijan Karvachar and Berdzor regions of Nagorno Karabakh Republic (former Soviet Azerbaijan Kelbajar and regions). The absence of the Nagorno Karabakh Republic representative's signature under the November 10 statement created a significant backlash in Armenia. It should be noted that Armenia, Azerbaijan, and NKR signed the 1994 ceasefire agreement. By agreeing to sign the November 10 statement without NKR, Armenia accepted Armenia, not NKR, which controlled those territories. However, due to this statement, parts of the Gegharquniq and regions of Armenia have been transformed into border regions with Azerbaijan. (Before the 2020 Karabakh war, Syunik had border only with the Nakhijevan Autonomous Republic).

Meanwhile, according to the November 10 statement first article, all troops should remain on territories they controlled as of November 9 evening. At the time of the statement's signature, the Armenian army and volunteer units were deployed approximately 25 kilometers inside the former Soviet Azerbaijani territory along the 100 km of the line stretching from Armenian city in the Syunik region until the Armenia – Iran border.

According to the November 10 statement, these forces should stay there, especially as no demarcation and delimitation exist between Armenia and Azerbaijan. However, based on Azerbaijani demands and tacit support of these demands by Russia, Armenian authorities ordered Armenian army units to withdraw from their positions and redeploy along with the former administrative border between Soviet Armenia and Soviet Azerbaijan. After the withdrawal of army units, volunteers were forced to withdraw too. Thus, in the Gegharkunik and Syunik regions of Armenia, the current line of contact with Azerbaijan passes along the former administrative border of Soviet Armenia and Azerbaijan. This situation has created significant tensions and problems for the Armenian population, especially in the Syunik region. The most interesting is that and use Android Smartphones' Google maps to fix the exact border between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Due to these actions, parts of the two Armenian villages in the Syunik region – and – have been given to Azerbaijan, and

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currently, the line of contact passes through these villages. Up to 20 Armenian families were forced to leave their houses from these two villages.2.

The main international highway connecting Armenia with Iran (M2 highway) passes through the Syunik region. Meanwhile, the part of that highway, which connects Goris with (the Syunik region's capital), passes through the former Soviet Azerbaijan territories. As a result of the implementation of Azerbaijani demands and Armenian forces' withdrawal, 6 km of Goris - Kapan highway is now controlled by Azerbaijani border troops. Armenia asked Russia to deploy Russian border troops to secure people's movement and transportation along that highway. Armenian border troops are stopping all cars traveling to the Syunik region and Iran from the rest of Armenia and vice versa just outside the Goris city. They told passengers that they would enter Azerbaijani territory and asked not to stop their cars and not make any photo/video shooting in this 6 km part of the highway. Armenian border troops distribute special phone numbers to people, asking them to call if anything happens in the "Azerbaijani territory." Azerbaijani border troops have established a big road banner – "Welcome to Azerbaijan" along the highway3. As of now, no serious incidents have taken place along this highway. However, a growing number of prefer to use the alternative Goris – Kapan road. This road is much more complicated, is very difficult to pass, especially during the winter, and is not usable for trucks. Nevertheless, many drivers seek to avoid entering Azerbaijani territory despite all these circumstances.

The same situation is along the several roads connecting the Syunik region's capital Kapan to several Syunik region villages. As a result of the Armenian government's decision to withdraw Armenian forces from the lines they controlled on November 9, parts of these roads are controlled by Azerbaijani troops. They established "Welcome to Azerbaijan" banners along these

2 Armenia and Artsakh face tension, uncertainty in the new year, https://armenianweekly.com/2020/12/30/armenia-and-artsakh-face-tension-uncertainty-in-new-year/,

3 Banner disputes highlight problem with the demarcation of the border between Armenia and Azerbaijan, https://www.eng.kavkaz-uzel.eu/articles/53241/

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roads. During the nights, Azerbaijani soldiers shoot using rifles, which puts significant psychological pressure on the population living in these villages. Thus, we have a situation that with Russian support and agreement by the Armenian government, de facto delimitation and demarcation has been implemented in parts of the Armenia – Azerbaijan border based on the administrative border between former Soviet Armenia and Soviet Azerbaijan.

Meanwhile, Azerbaijan demands implementing the same process in Armenia's Ararat and Vayods Dzor regions bordering Nakhijevan Autonomous Region and the northern Armenian Tavush region bordering Azerbaijan. As a result of the 1992-1994 war, several Soviet Azerbaijan enclaves situated inside Soviet Armenia were taken by Armenian forces, and now Azerbaijan demands to return these villages to Azerbaijani control, arguing that Armenia – Azerbaijan international border should pass exactly along with former Soviet Armenia – Soviet Azerbaijan administrative border.

If the Armenian government agrees to implement those demands, up to 10 km of – Vayots Dzor highway, which is also part of Armenia – Iran international highway, will be put under the Azerbaijani control in the Ararat region. The same will happen in the Tavush region along Yerevan – Bagratashen highway, the main international highway connecting Armenia with Georgia. Part of this highway in the Tavush region, near (M16), will be controlled by Azerbaijan.

As a result of these developments, Azerbaijan now controls parts of the Armenia – Iran international highway and may soon control parts of the Armenia – Georgia international highway. It will have a significant negative impact on Armenia's security as it will provide Azerbaijan an opportunity to block the traffic on these two vital routes connecting Armenia with the world. Meanwhile, as many Syunik region villages now border Azerbaijan with few security guarantees, it may trigger immigration from these villages either to Yerevan or outside Armenia. Given the fact that now Syunik region is squeezed between Azerbaijan proper and the Nakhijevan Autonomous Republic, the possible immigration from the Syunik region may create favorable conditions for Azerbaijan to implement a policy of slow penetration into the region with the final aim of establishing a direct land corridor between Nakhijevan and Azerbaijan proper and via Nakhijevan with Turkey.

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Article 9 of the November 10 trilateral statement stipulates the opening of all communications in the region, including the routes between Azerbaijan and Nakhijevan. On January 11, 2021, Armenian, Azerbaijani, and Russian leaders signed another statement. It stipulates the establishment of a joint working group led by Armenian, Azerbaijani, and Russian Deputy Prime Ministers to elaborate the projects of establishing new communication routes4. The working group's first meeting took place on January 30, 2021, in Moscow. According to the working group's schedule, the concrete projects with implementation road maps will be presented until March 1, 2021. According to preliminary information, a new highway and railway will be constructed along the Araks river to connect Azerbaijan with Nakhijevan, which will pass through the Syunik region of Armenia5. Turkey discusses the possibility of constructing the Kars – Igdir – Nakhijevan railway, which will be connected in Nakhijevan with Azerbaijan – Nakhijevan railway.6. If implemented, this project will create a second railway connection between Azerbaijan and Turkey via Nakhijevan and Armenia along with – – Kars railway, which was launched in autumn 2017. Azerbaijan promises to provide Armenia with railway access to Iran through Nakhijevan and to Russia via Azerbaijan (Yerevan – Nakhijevan – Syunik – Baku – Dagestan line). However, if the Nakhijevan corridor is opened, it will significantly increase the Azerbaijani and Turkish influence in the Syunik region. In the long term, it may create a real danger for Armenia to partly lose the Syunik region and its land border with Iran. Besides this, establishing the Nakhijevan corridor will allow Turkey to establish a direct link with Central Asian Turkic Republics via Azerbaijan and the . The

4 The joint statement issued following meeting between , and , https://www.primeminister.am/en/press-release/item/2021/01/11/Nikol-Pashinyan-Moscow-meeting- Announcement.

5 The corridor will boost connectivity in the Caucasus, https://www.euractiv.com/section/azerbaijan/opinion/the-nakhchivan-corridor-will-boost-connectivity-in- caucasus/.

6 Turkey Plans To Build Railway To Azerbaijan's Nakhchivan Exclave, https://caspiannews.com/news- detail/turkey-plans-to-build-railway-to--nakhchivan-exclave-2020-11-13-51/

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expansion of Turkey's influence in Central and realization of Panturkism ideas is the long Turkish dream dating back to the last years of the .

Not surprisingly, Azerbaijan and Turkey were at the roots of establishing the Cooperation Council of Turkic-speaking states back in 2009, an intergovernmental organization created in 2009 and uniting Azerbaijan, Turkey, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan as full members and Hungary as observe state. This organization is an embodiment of Turkey’s desire to gain strategic influence in Central Asia and unite Turkic speaking states' capacities.

The situation with borders remains fluid in Nagorno Karabakh too. As of now, Russian peacekeepers protect the current line of contact. However, there are no sufficient Russian troops to be deployed along the whole contact line. Peacekeepers' main base is in Stepanakert, and they have created up to 25 checkpoints along the main roads in Nagorno Karabakh, including six checkpoints around the Goris – Stepanakert highway (), connecting Armenia with Nagorno Karabakh. Meanwhile, many Armenian villages and cities in Karabakh are located less than 1 km from the new contact line and face Azerbaijani troops deployed in their new positions, often without robust Russian presence. It creates significant challenges for Armenians of Nagorno Karabakh, as Azerbaijan will do everything possible to force Armenian out. No large- scale attacks of the Azerbaijan army are feasible, but they may use subversive actions, kidnapping people from the roads, and entering Armenian villages during the nights to threaten the Armenian population.

Meanwhile, the key location for Russian forces is Stepanakert, as the headquarter of their military units. In mid-term perspectives, Azerbaijan and Russia may agree to withdraw Russian checkpoints located outside Stepanakert, keeping them only in town and along the Lachin corridor. It may provide Azerbaijan an opportunity to force Armenians out from the remaining territories of Nagorno Karabakh, including cities of Martakert, Askeran, and Martuni and surrounding villages. It may once more change the Nagorno Karabakh's borders, bringing the territory outside of Azerbaijani control to only 1000 square km – mainly Stepanakert with surrounding small villages and the Goris – Stepatanakert highway.

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