VRAM!0 - KttJ33lAN- WAR,

18?0-7l

Submitted aa a study In Indlv dual Research.

By

Chas, M, Alike orn Captain Infantry

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port L^avonwortb, Kansas. 1934. oatmorrs.

CHAPTiS I . Page Introduction—-— ..--———. i Rated and Lengths of Marches——— 2 Forced torches ———————­ 3 Night Marches — 5 Trains and Composition of Columns 5

CHAPTER II. Introduction ——————~ 8 August 22nd -———— — 9 August 23rd 11 August 34th --­ 11 August 25th 13 August 26ih • — 14 Conclusions — —-———— 16

CHAPTER III. Introduction — 17 March of Southern Column-———-­ 19 March of Northern Colunn ———— 20 A Solution —————— — 23 Conclusions — — —— . 24

CHAPTER IV General Conclusions — 25 Bibliography 26 Map No. 1. Map No* 2. MAHCHB3 IN THB fflANCO- PRUSSIAN WAH. Chapter I. Introduction. Marohes, under campaign conditions, maybe, in general, olaes­ ifled as taotieal marches, and strategical marohes. (1) The desired tactical or strategical combinations necessary to defeat an enemy at a given point or place are obtained in the main by marching. The art of marching} therefore, combines all the art of war. The commander who achieves the advantage of concentrating a superior mass at the dooislve point must depend to a great extent on the ability of his command to march. Marching in most certainly an art in itself* Many cirounatances enter to complicate the best oonoieved march pJans; tht> time of year the climate, condition of roads, physical condition and morale of the troops, whether marching in friendly o* hostile territory, are all faotors which have to be taken carefully into account. The larger the army, the more difficult it becomes to move and maneuver* (2) Every move is a march for the smaller elements of a consand. "A successful march is one that plaoes the troops at their destination at the proper moment and in the best possible condition." (3) History is full of examples where losses sustained from long or forced marohes, which taxed the troops beyond their phyeioal limits, exceeded the losses in battle* As an example, the Prussian Guard Corps, when it left the Rhine on the 3rd of August 1870, had 30,000 effeot­ ives* It lost 8,000 men at the battle of St* Privat on the 18 th. of August* On the morning of the battle at Sedan it numbered 13,000, of which 350 were lost in that engagement. On reaching Paris on the 19th of September to take part in its capture and occupation, it was reduced to only 9,000 men* Wiis oorpa, in forty-seven days, had lost by exposure and fatigue about 12,650 men or 481* of its strength.

(1) *urse p 5* (2) Furao p 4* (3) F3R. V 56. (1) The Infantry of the German Annyi when it appeared before Paris on the 19th September 1870, had been reduoed by one-third, principally march casualties. (4) It had covered a distance of 540 miles with only four days of rest. (5) La*JTH3 OF MARCHES. Mujor General Hamley, British Army, in his book " Operations of War", (1878), written t few years after the Franoo-Prussian War, covers rates of marching, and length of marches, muoh as follows: " In small detaohed bodies, infantry averages a£ miles an hour, field artillery 3&, and cavalry 6 miles, including halts of a few minutes•" The rate decreases as the numbers iuorenae* A division marching on one road can seldom do more than 2^ to 2^ miles an hour, and a oorps not more than 2 miles* For a division of all arms, 15 miles is a fair average marohi 16 to 20 miles a long march; and above 20 mile* a forced march* A large army, marching continuously, seldom covers more than 10 or 11 miles in a day, lue&eured on the map from point to point* In 1870 the Second German Army, marching front Jietz to the Loire, averaged 12 miles per day* The IX Oorps, which made the fastest march, averaged 13& miles for.the firtt nine days* In consequence of urgent orders received at Troyes, it pushed on to Fontainebleau, 76 miles, In four days* This was considered almost a forced march," (6) The progress of armies depend on the marohlng ability of their major units, that is, their corps and divisions* Best results have been obtained when not more than ons division attempts to use a rood, A oorps| due to Its length, must have several roads* A oorps on one road can not close the tail of the column on the head, in one day, it it marohes with all of its trains. (4) Purse p 7* 15) Furse p 824* (6)tiainleyp 32*

(2) The following table givas the length of Infantry division and corps columns of the German Arn>y, at field strength, during the War of 1870-71• Infantry division, with combat train—-—-5 miles. The same with regimental trains­ —6.8 miles. With its convoy -11.2 miles. A corps with its combat trains —12.7 miles. With Its regimental trains— —17.4 miles. With its convoy 29.8 miles. General Von der Goltz estimates that the length of the corps column with its combat trains is about 18& miles* (7) This authority writes of a much earlier period tHan the ono under diaousslon, how­ ever, the composition of columns '.'hanged very little during this timo, and it has been found that where larger units got away from a railroad, their trains were much larger. Both Gernan and Fronoh differed little in rates of march and length of marches, during the period 1870-71. The average tor large units was a rate of from 2^ to 2£ miles per hour, under favorable con­ ditions, and a distance cf from 13& to 14 miles per day* The averages given above were, in all probability, not the average aohieved by many large units but can more fittingly be described as prescribed rates* More marches of from 10 to 11 miles will be found than at the graater rate. (3) German experience had found it best to rest the troops every third day* FOROKD MARCHES. In Germany, as well us in France, the term, •Quick torches1, is used to describe marches of a. length greater than 80 miles, tore ex­ amples of quick marohes are to be found In the German Army than in the

(7) Derr. p 18* (8) Derr. p 12-13. 13) Frenoh. This is probably duo to the faot that in advancing toward the Ge nouns, the French did not employ their cavalry to the beat advantage; but relied on infantry adv&noo guards and flank guards to do their rec~ onnoitering. The result was a slow, cautious, indecisive marching and countermarching. An example is the maroh of kaoidahon from Reins to Sedan £4th to 30th August, 18V0, After deoisive battles during this period, the withdrawal of the Frenoh was in most cases characterized by un­ oontrolled end uncoordinated marohes which approached routs* The Germans on the other *jand, profited much from their campaigns against Austria in 1866* Their long marohes showed careful planning by the staff and excellent exeoution by the subordinate commanders, end the well dis­ oipllned troops* The 14th Prussian Infantry Kegiment, escorting the trains and tho artillery of the II Corps from Metz to Furls, marched from the 4th to the 16th of November 1870, without a single days rest* It made 193 miles, averaging 14 to 15 miles per day for 13 days. The average dally length is not excesaive but the lenpth of time is worthy of note*(9) Another example is the march of the German IX Corps, the 16th and 17th of December 1870* On the 15th it was at Bloia. During the night it received instructions to march to Vendome* It started the morning of the 16th, crossed the Loire, and took the road toward its destination* Vkhile enroute it was directed to change direction toward Orleans and reach that place by the next night* At 2:00 AM the 16th, marching in two columns, it reached Beaugenoy. Darkness had fallen at 5:00PM and early in the evening a fine rain started to fall and lasted through out the night. The roads were soon in a bad state, due to the constant passage of troops ahead of the IX Corps. The roads became strewn with wagons and carcasses of horses, and the columns were delayed by collisions with the trains of the X Corps, end 17th Division, moving

(9) Derr p 15. (4) toward Vendorae, all of which added to the slowing up of the march. The heads of the columns reaohed Orleans at 2:00 PM the 16th, and at 8:00 o'clock in the evening the entire force was ooncentraxod in the city. The hoads of thV columns had traveled 51 miles in 33 hours, and the toil of the columns olosed in 36 hours. According to General Lewal, the un­ favorable conditions of the maroh led to a lengthening of the columns by eight-ninths. (10) MIGHT MAK0HK3. Night marches during this period were more incidental than planned* Marches were made by small groups but they were more in the nature of raids* Often oolumns were placed in march, which were of such length that the rear elements were efton roquired to finish the march after dark. Marshal Bazaine, in his attempted evacuation of Katz on the 14 th to 16th of August 1870, planned for a continuous moveiumt of his col­ umns over a restricted road net • His difficulty, however, was not caused by night marching, but was the result of a poor plan. This operation is described in detail in Chapterlll, TRAIN3 AND COMPOSITION 0* C0LUW3. At the opening of the war, vae German Army Headquarters and the prlnoipal subordinate headquarters, did not provide a staff officer to assuaie responsibility for the supervision and direction of uni*; trains* The Frenoh, under Napoleon I, had provided eaoh corps and eaoh division with one permanent wagonmaster. The Germans began the 1870-71 oampalgn by indicating by name, the officer in oharg* of the trains for eaoh days maroh.(ll) This method resulted in a different plan for the march of the trains, eaoh time a new train commander was named. Detailed description of the inaroh of almost any unit, of a division or larger, comraont on the

110) Derr p 15-16 (11) Ball p 127, 131, 140-2* (5) difficulty and confusion resulting from the poorly conduoted maroh of their own trains, or the trains of the units *hey are following* Poor roada or inolement weather caused many ration trains to fall to get up in time to supply food to the troops, March columns, in the presenoe of the enemy, were similarly composed in bovh the Frenoh and German Armies* Large columns were in­ variably preceded by cavalry on the German side and usually on the Frenoh side* The advance guards wore stronger than those employed at the present time, considering the nuroerioal strength of the column they were protecting* The Frenoh and German corps numbered from 25,000 to 30,000* The following extraot from a Corps maroh order gives an idea of the distribution of troops in the column:

HEADQUARTERS I. ARMY CORPS Puttlingen, 9, Aug* 1870* DISTRIBUTION FOR THK MARCH, ADVANCE GUAM) t Major General von Falokenstein. Dragoon Regiment no,l, less 1st Platoon remaining at the disposition of Lieut-General von Uentheira. Regiment No. 43* 1st Foot Battalion* Grenadier Regiment No*3* Jager Battalion Mo* 1* 1st Pioneer Company with light field bridge train* Sanitary Detachment No* 3* Field Hospital No* 0. I Section of vehloles of the advance guard. Interval—-2 miles* MAIN BODY. Lieut- General von Bentheim* 1 Platoon Dragoon Regiment No*l* let Infantry Brigade: Major General von (toyl* Regiment No* 41 Grenadier Regiment --Crown Prinoe*

(6) Sanitary Detaohmont No.l. Field Hospital rto*l. I Seotion of vehioles of 1st Infantry Brigade* II Foot Battalion, 2nd and 3rd Pioneer companios with intrenohing tool column. Corps Headquarters without supply depts. I Seotion of vehicles of the oorps artillery. 2nd Infantry Division*- MaJ- General •on Pritzelwitz. 3rd Infantry Brigadai Major General von Meuerty* Rogiment «o»l. 44 Grenadier Regiment No.4. 3rd ifoot Battalion

4th Infantry Brigade: Major General Ton &glinitzki# Regiment ho* 45. Grenadier Regiment No.5. Dragoon Regiment No* 10* Mounted battalion ( 2nd and 3rd horse batteries.) Sanitary Detaohment No* 2* Field Hospitals NOB. 3 and 4. I Seotion o2 vehicles of 2nd Infantry Division* 4 mile interval THAIN3

ft) CHAPTER II., MARCH 07 THE GERMAN THIRD ARMY August 22nd to 26th 1870. Following tho dofeat of Marshal MaoMahon at Woerth, end of Marshal Ba'/.aine at Orayelotte, the German. Army was free to cross and operate west of the Moselle* The Third Army operating Independ­ ently, moved west toward Paris by way of Nancy, Chalons, and Sedan. The First and Second Armies, less units detached to make up the Mouse Army, remained in the Metz area to contain the French there and carry out siege operations. The Initial advance from the Rhine to the Moselle was on a broad front, but was not a wide dispersion of the force* The caln columns were separated by sons thirty or more miles, the cavalry and other flank guards were most generally within a days maroh of eaoh other, so the House and Third Armies may be said to have been within supporting distance of one another* After the battles of Gravelotte and at* Prlvat, in the vicinity of Metz, a new army, oalled the Army of the Mouse, was formed from the troopo not needed at Metz* This Army, was formed with a view of having it cooperate with the Third Army against Chalons, where It was estimated the Frenoh weve collecting a Reserve Army* Marshall MaoMahon and General De Fallly, after the severe defeat at Woerth, were believed to be fall­ ing baok on Ohalons* (13) Chalons thus became the maroh objective of the Third Amy* The orders iosued for this maroh, at 11:00 AM, 21st August, by Royal Head­ quarters, at Pont-a-Mousson, gave the line to be reached on the 26th of August as St. Mard sur le Mont —Vitry le Franoaise* (14) This la a front of about 20 miles* fcarohing on this front with an enemy two

(13) Blums p 5* $ Hoh p 33* (8) days march away, the corps of the artsy oould be concentrated to meet the Kronen with out difficulty* By indicating a line on whloh the army marched, it was not necessary to preaoribe boundaries* The Army Oom­ mander in this particular naroh had little difficulty in finding sufficient roads for his Gorps, therefore the crossing of march columns presented no problem* A point worthy of note in respeot to the advance of this group of Armies, is, that Royal Headquarters did not issue a naroh table giving the location of each corps every night* (16) Had the Germans been confronted by a more aggressive enemy this detail probably would have been necessary to insure a concentration of the mass at the decisive point* The following chronological discussion of the advance of the Third German Amy from Vne 22nd August 1870, to the 27th August, is based for the most part on "Letters On Strategy", Vol.11,, by General Prince Kraft zu uohenlohe- Ingelf ingen, who served during this period with the Guard Corps, one of the oorpo of the keuse Army* Tho Third Army was composed of the V, VI, and XX Prut'olan, the I and II Bavarian Army Corps, the Vurttamberg field Division, and the 2nd and 4th Cavalry Divisions* Its total strength Included 116,095 infantry, 19,567 cavalry, and 525 pieces of artillery*(16) In addition to the two divisions of Army cavalry, eaoh Oorps had its own cavalry. This Arcy was commanded by the Grown Prince of Prussia, AUGUST 22liD, On the 81st and 22nd the Army rested, recuperating from the loag and difficult marohes it had exeouted for the past several days* The French Army had broken contact and Gorman advance cavalry detach­ ments wer* only in accasional contact with the enemy*

(15) Hoh p 37 (16) Hoh p 4 ) Clarke App, XXXI p 34* (9) During the 22nd of August th« Third Army was disposed as follows: (See map Mo. 2, disposition* la blue) Headquarters--- vaucouleurs* I Bavarian corps -—Void* II Bavarian corps — uenll-la-Borgne* Wurttemberg Division--- haudellncourt* DC Corps —— rtmdreeourt* VI Corps — Pagny, V Corps — Treveray. 4th cavalry Division— otalnville, with advance partlos at 8t«Dlzler and bar-le-Duo, 2nd cavalry Division—«artigny-les uorbonveux* From a strategical standpoint this period was the concentration and regrouping stage, and marked the beginning of the second phase' of the advance on Paris* (17) The first phase having boon the march from tho hhine to the left bank of the Moselle by the First, Second, and Third *railes« 'ihe decision by the uernan High Command on August 19th, to con­ tinue the Baroh to the west on the 23rd, before the frenoh Army in Metz had capitulated may be questioned as to its soundness* Clausewitz says, "What appears to be simple is often difficult of execution*" Una plan to contain the French in Metz with a part of the force, and advance to the vest with the remainder tros a siaple plan, but had a strong element of danger in it whiofc was appreciated by many members of the O.U.Q* etaff, who however, were not in the majority* Th« danger lay in Marshal Sazaine's plan of forolng his way out offttotz*O f thefteveral plans he had in mind one was to w»i™ a break to the south toward Spinal* This would have been the most disasterous to the Germans had it been atfceopted, because there

(If) Hoh p 10*

(10) io little doubt but what a port of his force would have been able to out the llne» of ccmaunloatlon, and eupply of toe Third Army, by inter­ rupting the railway east of Nancy* AUQLBT 83HD* On the 23rd the Third Army and the Jfeuae Army marched as dlreoted. On the evening of the 23rd, we find the elements of the Third Army located as followsi (Seo map No. 2, dispositions in red*) Headquarters Third Aray——Ligny-sn-Barrois* 4th Cavalry Division—- 3t, Dialer. II Bavarian Oorpe —north west of Ll&iy-en-Barroie* V Corps Stalnvllle. Wurtteraberg Division— #enll* XI Oorpe —-Montiere. I Bavarian Corps-— St. Aubin. VI Corps --- Gondr«oourt* 2nd Cavalry Division —-Chassey* The advance parties of the cavalry did not encounter the enemy on this front except at one point* Two squadrons of Dragoons from the 4th Oavalry Division, under Major Klocko, reaohed the vicinity of Chalons and reported the town unoccupied, but tjat there was an occupied camp a ehort distance to tho north* Royal Headquarters directed the Comnander Third Army to discover the enemies direction of march as soon as possible* The Crown Prlnco ordered the 4th Cavalry Division to orosc the Karne, south of Vitry, on the 24th of August and advance on Chalons via the left bank of the river* The Wurttenberg divisional cavalry wasfelrena similar mission on the right bank cf the aiarne* AUGUST eith* At the end of the days ma/oh on this date the major units of the Third krjy were located as followst ( se* map Mo* I, dispositions shown in green* )

(U) Headquarters Third Army -—remained at Ligny, 4th Cavalry Division —Arzlllleres. II Bavarian Corpa——ttar-le-Duo and Lolmont* V Corps ——Robert-lspagne and Couvonces, Wurtteraberg Division —ttondrupt* XI Corps —>Ancervllle and St. Dizior. I Bavarian Corps,—-Tronvllle* VI Corps—-JoUiyille. end Cavalry Division —Hassy and Doulevent. Royal Headquarters advanced to tfar-le-Duo. During the afternoon of the £4th, the Connander of the Third Army received a copy of a Paris newspaper picked up by detachments of the 4th Cavalry Division, which continued previous information and intelligence e^v^jatee, that tiacUahon was in Reins with 150,000 men* The Crown Prince of Prussia acting on his own initiative, decided to narch on the 85th of August to the line St. Hard -~sur-le~ Mont, Vltry, thus reaching the line of his objective one day earlier than required* This inarch wo^jld place th* Third Army one days march ahead of the Mouse Army, The Freaoh, by their B&rch fron Chalons to the north had now placed themselves la front of the Ueuse Anqr* The Cavalry of the Third Arwy had not et yet made oontaot with the main force of tiactfahon* Hearer, two squadrons of the 4th Cavalry division had found the abandoned camp of Chalons, and determined from local Inhabitants that the French had marched on Relxs* The Supreme Coraand on the 84th stil l had littl e positive Inforootion es a basis for a decision* They knew that MacMahon had a considerable force, end had no red to the no**th or northwest, but the information was not fully confirmed by dark of this date. Also from intercepted letters from the Jtotz Any, the impression woa conveyed that Bazaine was expecting

(12) i.>:ci>iihon to inarch to his rescue and relief. ikcMahons movements of the rust few days fitted in well with this plant However, duo to tho close­ ness of tho iieltfiura border, it a Denied a very unsound move to attempt to ...aroii orounfc the Uer.nan right in ouch a restricted area. With so little ini'oiM/ition available, wad the German columns still not fixed as to direction, because tho French were two days march away, tho high Com­ 'jiuvl nuneura to hav*» exercised good Judgement in reserving a decision until the following day. To have halted at the end of the march on the iMtn. and reconnoiterod on the 85th would have been the heighth of timidity. AUGUST «5TH. The novumont of the Third Army on the 25th of August resulted in the various olenunts bivouacing in the following localities: (See map lio.ft, locatiu.s indicated in brown.) Army Headquarters remained at Liguy-en-Barrois. II Bavarian Corps —-Oharmont. V Corps —Hoiltz-le-lteurupt and Heiltz-l'Eveque. XI Corps —-Porches ar»d Faremont. Wurttemberg Division — So maize. I Bavarian Corps —Bar-le-Duo. VI Coi'ps —Wassy. 4th Cavalry Division ---La Chausne and Pogny, with a dotachinont of two squadrons just east of Reims. 8nd Cavalry Division —- Chavangos. Royal Hoadquarters reiaained at 3ar-le-Duc. iiinjor iClocko, tdth his two squadrons from the 4th Cavalry Division, had continued his good work on the 24th. His reports constituted almost all of the roliable information in the hands of Koyal Headquarters up im411 11:00 PM tho 84th August. Botvoen this hour and daylight on the 25th, a telegram dated tho 23rd of Auguat, sont from Paris by the way

(13) of London, was received by German Koyal Headquarters* This orystal­ ized staff opinions, and a decision was reached at IIJOOAM the 25th, to change the direotion of march to the north and northwest on the 26th of August* Tho telegram read, "MacMahon's Army assembled at Reims, Emperor Napoleon and Prince with Army, MacUahon seeking to Join with Bazaino." This last sentanoe confirmed the truth of the reports and the letter from Metz that Bazaine was waiting for Mac­ Mahon's assistance* Royal Headquarters, in preparing a new pltnoon the evening of the 24th, to carry beyond the 26th, foresaw that plans could not be made to cover a period later than the 28th, due to the closeness of the French* This plan to include the 27th and 28th of August, designated a line tiuippe, - Chalons, - Coole, as the line to be reached* This plan was never given to Army Commanders in orders, due to the receipt of the Paris telegram* It will be noted that had it been carried out the Third Army would have been placed southeast of Reims, in an awk­ ward position to change direotion, to meet the situation whioh did develops when the French Army did march toward Touzlers* Had Vouziers been reached before the change of direction was made the Freneh would have had a favorable opportunity to reaoh Metz. AUGUST 26m. The ohange of direction by the Third Army was made without inter­ ference by the French* Darkness on thi6 date found the Crown Prince's Army located as follows: (See map No. 2, locations indicated in orange). Third Army lioadquartera —Revigny- aux- vaohea* II Bavarian Corps— Triauoourt» I Bavarian corps — J£rize-la-Petite* V Corps --- aeiltz- with its Oth Division at vanauld"­ les-Damea and Vonauld-le-Ohatol,

(14) Ws £*aberg Division —remained at Sermaize. VI obrpa — Thieblemont. The units of this Corps that had been detaohed for operations at Toul and Pfalzburg, rejoined the Corps at this place. 4th Cavalry Division—-Chalons. This division did not get the change In orders until late in the evening of the 26th so did not change dlreotlon until the 27th* 2nd cavalry Division—Aulnay. This Division also failed to get the change in orders until the evening od the 26th. It had complied with previous orders and marohed from chavanges to Aulnay and destroyed the railroad near Payns. The marches of the Corps on this date were not accomplished without some difficulties. Orders whioh usually oame from Royal Head­ quarters about midnight were delayed. The Third Army orders to Corps were also delayed. Normally the foot troops were in :narch by 6:00 AM and the artillery and baggage trains by 8:00 AM. Early the morning of the 26th | the Commander of; the Third Army and his Chlof of Staff rode

to Bar-le-Duot to Royal Headquarters, to get more compete information of the situation. At his suggestion, the two Bavarian Corps were to be sent north behind the Meuse Army at once, and the remainder of the Army was to follow on the 27th. The result of this decision was that the VI and XI Corps marohed to a location favorable for a march to the north. The 2ndCavalry continued its reconnaissance missions to the west and furnished flank protection for the left flank of the Army* Had the Crown Prince of Prussia not gone to Bar-le-Duo and determined the situation, but instead Issued orders and marched the V, VI, and XI, Oorps and the Wurttemberg Division to the west, it is highly probablt they would not have been in position on the 30th Of August before Beau­ mont and Sedan to take part in fighting there with the Meuse Army.

(L5) The Third and Ueuse Armies continued their marches and man­ euvera for the next five days under Royal Headquarters direction* On the )7th, the movements of both the Frenoh and German Armies became restricted as to direction, to such an extent that they nay be said to have become fixed* Abbattle was imminent unless Kacifahon withdrew* In this particular operation the advance ceased and the concentration stage began on the 27th* This phase will not b« dis­ cussed in this paper* CONCLUSIONS. Proa the standpoint of march technique, the advance of tho Third Army has many points worthy of comment. a* The march was executed on a broad front, whioh permitted a change of direction at the deolsive time without material confusion or crossing of columns* b. The cavalry of the Corps and the two divisions of Army Cavalry were used continuously and effectively to soroen the tidvanoe, and reconnoiter well to the front* The cavalry divisions narohed one days march ahead of the leading Corps and had reconnaissance detachment another days march in advance* o* Royal Headquarters and the Third Army Commander planned the operation well in advance, permitting Corps and Division Coamanders the opportunity of conducting oaoh days march with tho minimum of hard­ ship on the troops* With a definite plan to follow, supply ana ovaouation arrangements could be made to insure the troops being fed each day* d* The Third Army normally advanced with its Corps in two echelons or waves* The bulk of the Army was in the second nave. This was an elastic formation whioh permitted the best use of the road net as found, and allowed for prompt concentration of the oorps In one day, to the front or either flank* (19)

(19) Clarke p 171-240. Hoh p 30-140.

(16) CHAPTER III. THIS EVACUATION OY MBTZ BY VtiK FRKNCH AHMY. AUGUST 13th TO 10th, 1870. Under pressure from Jtaperor Napoleon III, and Tilth the knowledge of the steady advance of the superior First and Second Armies of the Uormana, Marshal Bazalne was forced to deoide on a withdrawal on Verdun with his Army of itetz. His plan for the crossing of the Moselle Hiver, and the organization and launching of his army into maroh columns consisted briefly of the following* His Ohlef of Staff, General Jarras, was to give Instructions for clearing the streets of beta leading to the two available bridges,and during the afternoon of the 13th got the baggage trains of the Guard and III Corps, as well as the reserves, to the east bank of the river, to the village of aan-Saint-wartin, where these trains would wait and take their proper place in the columns. The parks ( trains less combat wagons) of all corps were to be put in motion when it was ascertained that the convoys of xue II and IV Corps had started* Reconnaissance was to be made prior to the starting of the trains and locations seleoted which would permit the parks to biuouao ahead of the convoys. The II and IV Corps early the morning of the 13th received their orders, and a short time later orders were issued to the Guard and III Corps. General Jarras was to personally notify the VI Corps. As a result of the staff reconnaissance, the parks and convoys were looated as follows: II Corps—between Longeville and Moulin-les-Motzw III Corps— Ban-Saint-Martin. IV Corps—south of the bridge toward Maison-de-Planohes. VI Corps— between Longeville and Moulin-los-Uetz. Guard Corps— Ban-3alnt-Martin» 1st Cavalry Division— Ban-Saint-Martin. 3rd Cavalry Division— Ban-Saint-Martin.

(17) The lat Cavalry Division under Du Braile, was to cover the march via the route Gravellote, Donoourt, les Conflane, while the 3rd Cavalry Division! under Forton, was to follow the Verdun road by way of Gravelotte --Mara la Tour, The Cavalry was to proteot the exposed flank of march and maintain communication with eaoh other* Initially both Divisions were to march to Gravelotte and if there was not suf­ ficient water there, then one, the 3rd, was to go on to RezonviJ.le and cover the advance from Gravelotte• Acoording to the plan, the time of movement of the combat troops was not more definitely decided upon than to state that, M If practicable it will begin in the afternoon, but probably It will not commence until evening." In marching from tho east bank of the Moselle to Gravelotte it would be necessary for the entire army to inarch in one column through the defiles this one road formed, for a distanco of about 8 miles. On roaching GravP16tto it was to form two columns* The column to march through Hezonville and wars la Tour ( southern column) was composed of the following troops: the 3rd cavalry Division, the II and 71 Corps, uuard Corps| and Artillery Reserves. The column to go by way of Donoourt ( northern column) included the 1st oavalry Division, III Corps, and IV Corps* On the 13th the Army was in position west of wetz in contact with the ueroan VII Corps and uerman Cavalry* t20) The corps were looated as follows: II Corps and uipasset's Brigade—at Meroy-les-Metz III Corps-— at urigy, Colombey, Montoy, and flouilly. IV Corps— at key* VI Corps— was in the *orts and near aoippy, on tho left bank of tne Moselle River* Much of tho detailed mot^saonts of the units is available; and in order to arrive at sound conclusions, and deduce march principles, the (20) Slief -Map No.75. maroh of eaoh oolunn is disouased* The total strength of the Army the evening of the 13th, was 176,195. Losses in the engagements in the vioinity of tiorny, and others, incidental to breaking contact, together with sick and wounded, and the Divisions remaining in Ifetz, reduoed the total to 168,587 men. This number In maroh formation, with the infantry marohtng in column of fours, the cavalry in column of twos, and the wagons in single file, made a column 140 miles in length* By marohing both infantry and oavalry in column of fours, and the wagons in column or twos the length was reduced to 95 miles* At 2*2 miles per hour, the normal rate, it would require 63 hours 36 minutes for the longer ooluran to pass a given point and 43 hours 27 minutes for tho shorter column* Marshall Bazalne, inspite of the recommendations of his staff as to the dangers of attempting such an operations, persisted in his plan, SOWHKHN Movement of troops of the II and Vi Oorps began about noon of the 14th* By four PM both Ocrps were on the left bank of the Moselle, but congestion and obstruction of the roads impeded their advance and they were forced to spend the night in the vioinity of Mt, St. Quintin* The meroh was continued on the 15th, both Corps reaching Rezonville during the norning and afternoon without unusual delay* The 3rd Division of Reserve Cavalry reached Mars la Tour by 9:30 AM of tho 15th* It had required 6& hours to go 12 miles* This distance should normallye have required 2houre and 57 minutes, inoludlng time .{or halts. After reoonnoltering, it fell back Vionville instead of advanoing and pushing its reconnaissance to the front and flanks* Altho diffloult to give the exaot location of tho German 5th Cavalry the afternoon of the 15th, it was well ahead oft thr aivanoing oolumns on the south, probably betwoen Thianoourt and Mars la Tour, operating a days maroh ahoad of the infantry, while the French Oavalry was now only l£ miles in advance of the main forces* The Guard Corps began its movement to the west about 8:00 FH, the 14th, after the combat of Borney* It reaohed Gravelotte the even­ ing of tho 15th, twenty-four hours later. The distance traveled we a 10 9/10 miles, which should have required 13& houis. The remaining 1O£ hours of the total iime consumed was causdd by delays of the troops preceding it* A logistical summary of the march of this first part of the army, which had been able to quit the west bank of the Moselle River axil follow the road designated, shows that with a strength of 73,165 men marching in double formation, the length of the column was 38*1 miles and the distanoo marched was 10*3 miles or a total of 50 miles* At the normal rate of march of 2*2 miles per hour, the time necessary, including halts, would be 26 hours and 22 minutes* The time aotually consumed was 36 hours, or a total delay of 9 hours 38 minutes* NOBTHgRN COUJMJ. The movement of the IV Corps, from the vicinity of LSey, began about 11:30 AM of the 14 th » Before two divisions had crossed lie Chambers, artillery fire from the southwest, in the direction of Borny, caused then to be ordered back to their positions, where they fought until 8:00m, Orders were received to go into bivouac and rest before resuming the march later in the night* The Corps marched again at 1:00 AM and oompleted the crossing of the Moselle, and was assembled by noon of the 15th in Sansonnet where it was halted* The Corps was due in Donoourt on the 15th according to the Army march directive? but due to the delay oooassioned by the pressure exerted by the Germans which caused the French to return to their position, it was impossible to accomplish the maroh in the designated time* On finding the Oravelotte road obstructed, the uorpa Cotwnander directed one division by way of Lossy, apparently without making a road reconnaissanoe, for when it reached Lossy, it was found that the Reserve Artillery was using the road* The evening of the 15th found the W Corps disposed with one division at Loosy and two divisions and corps troops at

(20) Sansonnet* The road Sansonnet—-3t«* Uarle- aux- Chones was found to be open; so the movement was oontlnued the morning of the 10th and the leading elements of the column reached Doneourt about IK:30 PM the pome day. The III Copps moving by way of the Colonbey - Metz road, starting on the night of the 14th, completed the crossing of the Moselle on the morning of the 15th* Little time was taken for rests, so by evening the leading division of the corps reached San iiarcel and during the night and following moraing two more divisions arrived* This left one on the Moselle* The time and space factors for the march of the III and IV Corps as reviewed by General Lewal and General Derreoagalx, show pointedly the difficulties of the marok, under conditions imposed by the army commander* The IV Corps had a strength of 32,581 men or a length of 14 3/5 miles in simple formation ( oolumn of fours)* The vicinity of the west bank of the MOBelle from May was 5 3/5 miles, which at normal rates required 10 hours 37 minutes, Including halts* The time consumed was 11 hours, which was excellent time considering that part of the march was oonduotea at night and Immediately after combat* It is 15 miles from St Martin via ate* JfSarie aux Chenes to Doneourt and 5 3/5 miles from Key to St* Martin, or a total distance marched of 20 3/5 miles plus 14 3/5 miles, tbe length of the column* After allowing 4 hours for halts, and figuring at a rate of 2*2 moles per hour, 27hjurs 44 minutes should have been the normal time required* Actually it required 49 hours 23minutes, or a total delay of 21 hours 39 minutes* The III Oorps, for which the strength of foot and animal elements is not available, has the following time and cj>ace data given by General Lewal and General Derrecagalx* The Corps consisted of four divisiono. The distance from Colombey to St* Marcel is Bl$ miles, whloh after allowing for holts and the closing of the column, should have required

(21) 24 hours 4& minutes. Starting as it did, the evening of the 14th and completing the march with three of the divisions in 30 hours, and with the fourth on the morning of the 16th or about 36 hours required. This made a delay of about 11 hours* A recapitulation of the time and distances covered by the Army as a whole, reveal the following data: 1* In simple formation (infantry in column of fours cavalry in oolumn of twos, wagons in single file) its length was 286,450 meters or 141 miles or a time length of 74 hours 56 minutes including halts, for the tall of the column to olose on its head.

2 9 Inrdouble formation ( infantry in column of fours, cavalry in column of fours, and wagons in column of twos) the march could have been made in 47 hours 33 minutes* The movement began about 11:30 AM of the 14th and was finished about midnight of the 16th, giving an elapsed time of 60 hours. Roads other than those dlreoted for the maroh "ere used In attaining this tiue. The time is not excessive for a single road in simple formation, but is excessive for the roads used, and considering that double for­ mation was employed where ever possible. A SOLUTION, General Lewal in hie " Tactics for the March" gives the following solution to the problem of evaouating toetz, which confronted Marshal Bazaine and his chief of staff. In crossing to the west bank of the aoselle, there were available, two permanent and three ponton bridges, or five in all. The railroad bridge about three miles south of the olty might also have been»used, if given protootion to the south. However, the Fronoh mass was to the north of the oity so a flank march along the east side of the river would have beon necessary and very dangerousf on the 15th and later. Leading out of tho rivor valleiy to We west, we find four available roadai 1. To Saint©fclarieau x Ohenes, by nay of Woippy, Saulny, and aaint Prival-la-Montagne; a distance of 10 miles, 2. To Habonville, by way of Lorry and Amanville; a distance of 10 miles.

3* To Verneville, by way of Plappevllle, Lea ay, Chatel- St Germain; a distance of 9 1/3 miles* 4. To Qravelbtte, by way of Moulins and Point du Jour; a distance of 8 1/3 miles* With five bridges and four roads open on the 13th, it rozained, then, for the Chief of Staff to organize and coordinate the march, and provide sufficient protection for its successful completion* Definite covering missions should have been assigned to the cavalry, placing it at least one days march in advance and to the flank of the Army. A covering force, with artillery,under Army control, to remain east of the river, until all corps were in march west of the river would have be on best* uad Corps Commanders provided covering protection individually, there would not have been the delay getting the III and IV Corps east of the river* A covering force could have withstood the German pressure on the 14th and 15th. To accept combat on the east bank of the Moselle was a ^rlous error, and played Into German hands, thus enabling them to gain time and reaoh positions on both flanks of the French vest of the river, resulting later in the battles at St. Prlv?t and Kezonvllle*

Had the four roads been fully utilized, marching in simple formation, the Army could have been marched from the moselle and oon­ centratod on the plateau west of the line Hezonville --St. Kario aux Chenes in from 87 to 28 hours* If the double formation had been used only Id or 20 hours would have beon required. (21)

(21) Derr p 31-43. (23) C0HCLDBI0K3. 1* Careful consideration of routes available and the maximum use of all roads suitable for march columns should be made before the order for the inarch has been issuod* 2, Long columns in close proximity to an enemy are dangerous* Not less than one good reid per oorps should be allotted, and it is preferable to inarch in division columns* (22) 3* Reconnaissance of routes both prior to and dux ing the inarch, by the cavalry, engineers, and the staff, will do much to prevent delays from unexpected road blocks, by other columns of your own troops, and from enemy interference* 4* If marches are to be executed in accordance with a definite plan or march table, officers and men must be trained and disciplined in time of peace or prior to entering the theater of operations. Factors such as the length of marches, lengthening of columns, march casualties from fatigue, poor food and equipment, unusual weather con­ ditions, marohes during the day or nighttime should all be considered by the comuander and bis staff, before the final march plan is approved* 9* Napoleon 1 is oredited with the statement, before his last campaign, "--the success of an entire campaign may depend on correct leadership and orderly conduct of the trains,—etc•" Bazalne at Metz proved the correctness of this statement* (23)

(22) 3llef p 252. (23) Bell p 138 (24) The successful advance of the Third and Mouse German Amies, end the disaster vhloh befall tb« French Ifetz Amy are excellent examples of the proper and Improper application of logistical prin­ ciples of narch, and illustrate the manner In ublcb they directly affect the tactical situation* The march of the Third Amy demonstrated the truth of uohenlohe­ Ingelfingen's statement, " To oaroh d IT id ©4, and fight united is a condition, *f successful strategy** (24) Regardless of the strength of an army; or group of hmles, it it ifc dangerous to narch beyond a strong eneny force, even though he Is contained, for be presents a constant menace to your roar and your lines of eonamlcation. Bazalne's Anay presented this threat to the Gernan forces as long as he remained in Ifetz•

Ocisaanders of larger units should be given general directives in order to pentit then to act independently and nake decisions to meet sudden or -local changes on their front. The Cornander of the TJLlrd German Amy enjoyed this freedom of comanft, while Bazaine suffered, and only from the personal supervision and suggestions of itapoleon III, but also from the pressure of the political mob in Paris* Madtehon was similarly affected, and the alalets and indecisive actions of his force froa the 23rd to 30th August was due to the fact that he was receiving orders froa too many sources* Political clamor and the Paris press actually made his tactical and strategical decisions* (25)

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(24) Hoh p 16. (25) Hob p 111* CHAPTER IV

COHCIABIOKS The suojessful advance of tho Third and Mouse Conn&n Annies, and the disaster which befell the French Ifotz Army are excellent exenplee of the proper and improper application of logistical prin­ ciples of march, and Illustrate the manner in which they directly affect the tactical situation* The march of. the Third Army demonstrated the truth of nohenlohe­ ingelfingen's statement, * To march divided, and fight united is a condition of successful strategy*" (24) Regardless of the strength of an army, or group of aroles, it it is dangerous to march beyond a strong enemy force, even though he

Is containedt for he presents a constant menace to your rear and your lines of comramicatlon* Bazalne's Army presented this threat to the German forces as long as he remained in Uotz* Coananders of larger units should be given general directives in order to permit them to act Independently and make decisions to ncot sudden or: local changes on their front. The Comander of the TJLird German Army enjoyed this freedom of conrand, while Bazalne suffered, and only from the personal supervision and suggestions of napoleon III, but also from the pressure of the political mob In Paris* Uac&fehon was similarly affected, and the aimless and indecisive actions of bis force froa the 23rd to 80th August was due to the fact that he was receiving orders from too many sources* Political olemor and the Paris press actually made his tactical and strategical decisions. (25)

(24) Hoh p 16. (25) Uoh p 111* BIBLIOGRAPHY

Abbreviations

isoll i»averconts of Trains. Translations of uonnan General Staff Accounts, harry Boll*

tilurto She Operations Of the German Armies* William Blumo, Major in Prussian Mlnistery of nar.

Clarke Jfranco ­ German War. F. 0. H. Clarke, R. A,/ D.A.Q.M.G. Captain British Army. Den. : luodorn War, Part II, General V. Derrecagiax, trench Army.

Furso 'itoo Art of Marching, George A. Furso, C.B. Colonel british Army.

Ham Operations of rtar, Edward B. Hamley, Major General, british Army.

ilitfi Lottors on Strategy, volume 11. Prince Kraft zu HohenlohQ-Inslnfin^yn, General, Gormnn Army* tor Tho Art of Kar. Junes Merour, Professor Military Engineering, U. S. Military Academy* Slief-— —Cannae* Count Alfred v Sohlieffon, General FioldMarshal, German Army,

COLLATERAL STUDIES. St. Privat —Gei^aan Sources. Kxcellont sourco of a limited operation. Translated by Harry Bellw 49th. Brigade at Vionville. An historical study. Trunolatod by Harry Bell. Sedan ­ The Downfall of the Second ttnpiro. Good for a general orientation. 0. Hooper. Tho Pranoo-Pruasion War. General history not of particular military research value, 11. M. Hozior, F C S., KG S.? Franco - Gorwan War , Source Book* A study of Strategy and Leadership—has little of research value on marches. Compiled from Gorjian official sources at the C & G. S. School as a text* Saarbruek to Paris. An easily read account of the principle battles of the war - not authoritative* Feeding Fighting Armies, A compiled book dealing with the problems in the Franco-Prussian War that its title indicates* Author unknown*

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