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How Do Central Banks Invest? Embracing Risk in Official Reserves

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How Do Central Banks Invest? Embracing Risk in Official Reserves How do Central Banks Invest? Embracing Risk in Official Reserves Elliot Hentov, PhD, Head of Policy and Research, Official Institutions Group, State Street Global Advisors Alexander Petrov, Senior Strategist, Official Institutions Group, State Street Global Advisors Danae Kyriakopoulou, Chief Economist and Director of Research, OMFIF Pierre Ortlieb, Economist, OMFIF How do Central Banks Invest? Embracing Risk in Official Reserves This is an update to the 2017 SSGA study of central bank asset allocation.1 In contrast to the last study which focused on the allocation of excess reserves (i.e. the investment tranche) exclusively, this study reviews the entire reserve portfolio. Two years on, the main findings are: • Overall, there is greater diversity of asset • Central banks hold around $800bn (6% of classes and a broader use of risk assets, portfolio) in equities and over one trillion with roughly 15% ($2tn out of total $13tn) (9% of portfolio) in return-enhancing2 bonds in unconventional reserve instruments. (mainly investment-grade corporates and • Based on official reserves, central banks asset-backed securities) compared with are significant, frequently dominant, close to zero at the beginning of the century. capital markets participants: they hold about a third of all supranational debt and nearly a fifth of high-grade sovereign debt (or nearly half if domestic QE holdings are added). Central Banks as Asset Owners In December 2017, total global central bank reserves5 stood at around $13.3tn, recovering from their end- After a decade of unconventional monetary policy, one 2015 trough but below the mid-2014 peak of over could be forgiven for confusion around central bank $13.6tn (see Figure 1). This makes central banks one of investment patterns.3 This report is a reminder that the largest, if not the largest public investor group; for the core investment assets of central banks stem from comparison, sovereign wealth funds (SWF) manage the official reserve portfolio. Assigning clear nominal between $6tn and $8.2tn, depending on the definition, and relative numbers will help dispel some of the and public pension funds between $6tn and $15tn.6 obscurity around the reserves management practices of this traditionally non-transparent group of global Figure 1: Estimated Total Global Official Reserves, $tn7 public investors. $ Trillion 14 In this study we attempt to bridge existing data gaps 12 by conducting a bottom-up estimate of the global reserve portfolio. We have studied the balance sheets 10 of 30 large reserve holders4 at a detailed, granular 8 level, using a mix of public and private information. 6 Together, they manage $10.7tn in reserve assets, i.e. 4 over 80% of global central bank reserves. Based on 2 0 Mar Oct May Jan Sep the composition of their collective portfolio and some 2000 2004 2009 2014 2018 further data from the International Monetary Fund Sources: IMF COFER database, World Gold Council, Central Bank of the Republic of and the World Gold Council, we made some qualitative China (Taiwan), SSGA and OMFIF analysis. adjustments for the profile of the remaining central banks to estimate the total tally (see Methodology box on page 9 for more details). State Street Global Advisors 2 How do Central Banks Invest? Embracing Risk in Official Reserves While the path and outlook for the value of reserves is Liquidity Instruments: Safety influenced by numerous factors (not least fluctuations in currencies and gold prices), it is clear the era of rapid Remains A Priority reserve growth is over. As reserve levels are stabilising, In line with the liquidity and safety objectives, central banks are re-assessing the balance of different high-grade sovereign bonds issued in reserve objectives of reserve management. currencies, gold and deposits have usually been the classic reserve instruments. They still constitute These objectives have been traditionally quite narrow the bulk of the global reserve portfolio (almost and can be summarised as follows: (i) exchange 82%), and even among the group of the 30 largest rate management and backing domestic currency, security-holders our analysis focuses on, 16 invest if applicable, (ii) maintaining external liquidity and nearly exclusively in these liquidity instruments. supporting market confidence therein, (iii) supporting the government in external debt management and (iv) maintaining an emergency reserve.8 This informs Deposits the traditional approach to reserve management, The most liquid instruments are deposits,10 which governed by objectives of, in order of priority, safety, stand at $1.6tn and make up 12.2% of the global liquidity and return. reserve portfolio. This share has fluctuated in the past While safety and liquidity remain the clear priorities, two decades but never exceeded 20% according to IMF the focus on return has increased in recent years, data. Over 60% of deposits are held with other central contributing to the diversification of central bank banks and the Bank for International Settlements, reserve portfolios (see Figure 2). As we describe in a form of cash unavailable to other investors. Some the next section, 81.6% of assets are primarily held to of these arguably constitute indirect sovereign bond address the first two objectives (deposits, high-grade exposure as well, as the ultimate deposit-taking central bonds and, tentatively, gold). We will refer to those bank has to have a corresponding asset which is likely as liquidity instruments. On the other hand, 14.9% are to be a treasury bond. That leaves around $600bn investment instruments (equities and return-enhancing in commercial bank deposits, used by central banks bonds), which are predominantly held to satisfy the which might be seeking higher deposit rates, using return objective. A further 2.6% are IMF allocations9 their deposits for custody and trading purposes, or may which represent the countries’ relationships with the not have access to the full range of official deposits. IMF and the remaining 0.9% are chiefly derivatives. High Grade Sovereign Figure 2: Global Central Bank Reserve Portfolio, by Asset Class, Fixed Income % of $13tn Total High grade sovereign and quasi-sovereign bonds are the key tool to meet the objectives around safety ide Got (given that they carry the lowest credit risk) and d iil eosits 59.9% 12.2% liquidity (as they are one of the most liquid markets), especially as they are available in all potentially Gold desirable currencies. They make up 59.9% of the 9.5% total portfolio (or 68.1% of reserves excluding gold and te etuei ods 0.9% 8.7% IMF allocations). In nominal terms, this amounts to approximately $7.9tn (see Figure 3), underscoring the llotios Equities 2.6% 6.2% significant role central banks’ ownership of sovereign bonds plays in global finance. While these assets Source: National central banks, IMF, SSGA & OMFIF analysis. State Street Global Advisors 3 How do Central Banks Invest? Embracing Risk in Official Reserves generally carry the lowest credit risk, the average Figure 3: Global Central Bank Reserve Portfolio, by Asset Class $bn credit rating has deteriorated over the past decade. and % of Total This category of investments includes the highly-rated Holdings, $bn % of Total Total Official Reserves 13,261 100.0 (usually AA and AAA, occasionally lower11) government IMF Reserve Positions + SDRs 347 2.6 debt as well as debt of government agencies and Gold 1,265 9.5 supranational institutions.12 We do not include US Agency Securities, Deposits and Other Investments 11,649 87.8 Mortgage Backed Securities in this category as their cash Deposits 1,618 12.2 flow profile is rather different (see next section). Securities 9,914 74.8 Supranational bonds are popular with central banks High-grade Govt and Similar 7,943 59.9 Government 6,875 51.8 and, based on our analysis using S&P data, we estimate Supra 364 2.7 that central banks may be holding as much as a third Agency/Guaranteed 704 5.3 of all supranational issuance. For comparison, we Return-enhancing Bonds 1,152 8.7 estimate that they hold around 18% of pure sovereign Asset-backed 459 3.5 13 bonds. Adding the $6.9tn which (mostly EM) IG Corp Bonds 670 5.0 central banks hold in their reserve portfolios to over HY Bonds — 0.0 $9tn on domestic monetary balance sheets (mostly EM Debt 24 0.2 DM through quantitative easing), central banks in Equities 819 6.2 aggregate hold almost 43% of all high-grade sovereign DM Equities 781 5.9 bonds as of 2017. If we add this to our estimates of EM Equities 38 0.3 holdings of other public investors,14 around half of all Other 117 0.9 high-grade sovereign debt is recycled on a sovereign Source: National central banks, IMF, SSGA & OMFIF analysis. balance sheet elsewhere. On top of increased credit risk, the ultra-low or associated income stream;15 normally, such assets are negative yields on vast swaths of the sovereign universe popular with investors with higher risk budgets and have proved a major challenge. Many EM central more diversified portfolios. banks set domestic policy rates at levels which exceed Even there, commodities usually merely form a small high-grade bond yields, creating negative carry. The sliver of the alternatives portfolio. For example, public traditional approach to reserves is to manage the high- pension funds had 0.5% of their assets in commodities, grade bond portfolio to an internal benchmark with a including gold, as of year-end 2016. In contrast, 9.5% fixed targeted duration achieved through diversified of official reserves are held in gold (on market prices) holdings across the relevant segment of the yield curve. as of year-end 2017; in fact, the World Gold Council Some central banks manage duration more actively estimates that official holders are in possession of and deviate from the target more frequently, but over 17% of all gold above ground.16 To understand the main source of volatility is usually the currency and interpret this number, we delve deeper into the risk which they take on by managing the currency underlying factors.
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