Norman Schofi eld · Gonzalo Caballero · Daniel Kselman Editors Kselman · CaballeroSchofield Advances in Political Economy Institutions, Modelling and Empirical Analysis Eds.

Th is book presents latest research in the fi eld of Political Economy, dealing with the integration of economics and politics and the way institutions aff ect social decisions. Th e focus is on innovative topics such as an institutional analysis based on case studies; Norman Schofi eld the infl uence of activists on political decisions; new techniques for analyzing elections, involving game theory and empirical methods. Gonzalo Caballero Daniel Kselman Editors 1 Advances in Advances in Political Economy Political Economy Institutions, Modelling and Empirical Analysis

Social Sciences / Political Science

ISBN 978-3-642-35238-6

9 783642 352386 Book ID:306518_1_En, Date:2013-02-19, ProofNo: 1,UNCORRECTED PROOF

368 367 366 365 364 363 362 361 360 359 358 357 356 355 354 353 352 351 350 349 348 347 346 345 344 343 342 341 340 339 EDITOR’S338 337 336 335 334 333 332 331 330 329 PROOF328 327 326 325 324 323 h atbsino h rsorc neto linewt pra h rnfrof transfer goes The Athens and Sparta. , the with finance alliance who those on of intent weight relative Aristocracy the the increases power of Giovan- bastion and last Magalhães the De interpret of can model the we ( within noni that Ephialtes suggests of transition evidence political This the Kleophon. Hy- lamp-manufacturer lyre-maker Kleon, and tannery-owner perbolos, examples: ( following Hansen the wealthy. After gives considerably Aristocracy. still 39) the but includ- p. of birth, and lower part of were to often Athens up were in they Indeed, Perikles leaders com- policy. political the foreign main gave over the system control Perikles, ing political of degree Athenian some the elite that mercial expect should we policy, foreign solutions. an n omn o ieaohrt omn)atieefroeya i some (in year one purpose). for this main- for for, a together pay command) pool to would to individuals citizens another rich wealthiest hire cases the (or required command that and tax) Navy tain, rotating the financing (a in liturgy component a important An was regiment. Hoplite a financing of that en wy h sebywstle oad h ors citizens. poorest the Hoplites towards of regiment tilted to large was a Cimon to Assembly of due the that willingness is away, the element being key against other also The those were Spartans. issue: the reforms key the assist Hoplite a political which was large policy the under foreign a proposed conditions over with dispute that The a revolt. away that Helot shows was approved a was Cimon suppress reform Athe- while Sparta the help passed of to General was contingent and reform Archon these The an of Navy. Cimon, Opposers nian and Assembly). Aristocracy the institu- the (mostly other included Demos aristocracy—to reforms the owning Areopagos—the land of the the representative from of more power bastion tions transfer a and to body reform judiciary a main proposed Ephialtes 461/2 In 462BC Ephialtes, 2.1.3 38 19 18 17 eswr rn ofe-iigpolm,adtxaodnewscmo.Christ common. was avoidance tax and problems, free-riding ( to prone were tems rd.Wti tescmec a nne ymrtm on n togcom- strong a and loans maritime emerged. by elite financed mercial was commerce Athens Within paid trade. be to started they as life, public in part who active it. more and for a Navy, take and the to after re- for Thetes soon a followed the essential reforms allowed as were Perikles’s Empire. who role from naval Thetes, directly the Athenian benefited therefore of prominent empowerment a the for of support sult the and reforms mocratizing eutdi itrdsuewt io srczda etidt ees h reforms, the reverse to ( tried Raaflaub he assassinated. as eventually ostracized Ephialtes Cimon with and dispute bitter in resulted 1990 e asn(1991 Hansen See ( Raaflaub See ( Raaflaub See o h elhetidvdasi oit oqaivlnaiyfiac Athenian finance quasi-voluntarily to society in individuals wealthiest the For ihEpr,Ahn eaetecne falrentoko Mediterranean of network large a of center the became Athens Empire, With ecie ndti h xeto h a viac rbe n h attempted the and problem avoidance tax the of extent the detail in describes ) 2012 .Ehats(isl naitca)rdcstepwro h Areopagos, the of power the reduces aristocrat) an (himself Ephialtes ). 2007 2007 .10 o oedtisadpiaysources. primary and details more for 110) p. , .18 n ilt( Millet and 118) p. sources. , primary and details for 113) p. , 18 h nnigo h aywscnieal ifrn from different considerably was Navy the of financing The 1983 o eal n rmr sources. primary and details for ) 2007 .12 xlisteede- these explains 122) p. , 19 fcus,sc sys- such course, Of 17 .D Magalhães De L. h reforms The 1991, Book ID:306518_1_En, Date:2013-02-19, ProofNo: 1,UNCORRECTED PROOF

414 413 412 411 410 409 408 407 406 405 404 403 402 401 400 399 398 397 396 395 394 393 392 391 390 389 388 387 386 385 EDITOR’S384 383 382 381 380 379 378 377 376 375 PROOF374 373 372 371 370 369 yatn meo ihrwtaigpiiee rne oVnc htfre the King formed The wealth. that 1024. Adriatic. Venetian to in the of granted along privileges backbone cities in trading ap- Venetians withdrew exile political conquered Emperor to and Byzantine and religious sent attacked contentious and swiftly Grado, broth- further ousted Stephen of mar- two to Patriarch was and placed Due as Otto Venice, Torcello. 16 Otto in pointments, of at 1017, positions Bishop dodge In religious as Hungary. important a most and of made third Em- two Stephen was his the Byzantine King Otto raised in the ers Pietro of retired. of 1005, daughter and niece in the dodgeship the son ried the to eldest success- son to his very eldest of Otto, a his death son, was premature marry the II to came With able Orsoleo Venice perors. was Pietro family, monarchy. and Orsoleo ruler hereditary the ful a With becoming succession. to for close them setting fathers, their families. nteae eeBznieofiil pone yteEprri Constantinople in (the Emperor assembly the general a by in appointed officials ( Byzantine (Lane were area 1172, council. his the place of in took decisions the reform by political abide key to were constrained The was there 1032. dodge but illustrate the monarchy, in 1032 when hereditary changes around a institutional events becoming clear checks The to no considerable 1172. close came and with monarchy dodgeship 1032 system the elected executive: Republican how the from a on transition to Venetian balances heredity) and the of in degree dates some (with important two are There Venice 3.1 Genoa and Venice Medieval in Transitions Political 3 and Kyriaziz Sparta. with conflict and hegemony maritime ( of Zouboulakis policy a pursue to on Narrative Analytic An Italy: Medieval and Greece Ancient in Transitions Political 20 interests. commercial their were further Sparta) to power and yield (Persia and threats financ- gain foreign in to constant able indispensable under stability was and its elite defences, and commercial Athenian democracy ing The conquest. Athenian Macedonian of more the consolidation and ( until the more Giovannoni and understand depend Magalhães to to De propriate starts of wealth model the Athens’ commerce, and on de- instrument as military war (2009 main into Vindigni effort the and put Ticchi and participate in both scribed to individuals for incentives creating Navy. Athenian the of needs financial the to linked e ozlsd aa(2011). Lara de Gonzáles see o ecito ftesl nocn ntttosta rmtdtaei eiei hsperiod this in Venice in trade promoted that institutions enforcing self the of description a For ihtm,pwru ogswr bet as hi ost uetgte with together rule to sons their raise to able were dodges powerful time, With eiebgnishsoyudrcnrlo h yatn mie h rtrulers first The Empire. Byzantine the of control under history its began Venice nsmay h oiia rniint eorc nAhn a la oein role clear a had Athens in democracy to transition political the summary, In ) yte8hcnuy eiewseetn hi ruler their electing was Venice century, 8th the By (2003)). Norwich 1973), 2004 loageta h ieo nuneo h omrilcasis class commercial the of influence of rise the that argue also ) 20 or ihsc xenlpesr,teitrmdodge interim the pressure, external such With Arengo .Hwvr steAhna aybecomes Navy Athenian the as However, ). otlkl oiae ytepowerful the by dominated likely most ) 2012 em oeap- more seems ) 39 Book ID:306518_1_En, Date:2013-02-19, ProofNo: 1,UNCORRECTED PROOF

460 459 458 457 456 455 454 453 452 451 450 449 448 447 446 445 444 443 442 441 440 439 438 437 436 435 434 433 432 431 EDITOR’S430 429 428 427 426 425 424 423 422 421 PROOF420 419 418 417 416 415 osrit nteeeuiecm n17 n ol elne oetra threats external to linked Navy. the be Venetian consolidate the would would of and financing that 1172 the law sixty-two in to the for and came in family executive change Michiel the The the on years. of constraints seventy-six members last by the held of been out had dodgeship the that elected an as rule the to of (2003) continued power executive dodge Norwich The monarch. the sons. onwards, and their intact, 1032 to remained dodgeship however, From the dodgeship, monarchy. passed fathers that hereditary no signal a that clear notes a favor sending in not were Venetians change did the a pretensions they choosing dynastic was By no There nepotism. the with regarding dodge. dodge specially described ruler, a the a and to for elections behavior counterbalance acceptable for was a what called as already councillors reform law of clear Existing positions no then. was next law there old Venetian (2003) their the to Norwich in as link According no Venice. chose with of Venetians silk-merchant families wealthy The powerful a Venice. 1032, in in Flabanico rule Domenico dodge hereditary establish to attempt i f40wst enmntdb h egbrod fVnc ohl office hold to Venice of neighborhoods the by nominated be uncon- Coun- to whose Great A dodge, was in. the herself 480 found of Venice of position power institutions the cil the Roman for The blamed difficulties. western constrain was in and to power Navy strained eastern designed a the were had both followed and financially, with that straits war dire at in now Empires, were They in reforms. murdered the and litical ousted to was burnt) He in be city. Venice to the to had to return Plague (that streets. to the ships the brought forced and also was men the he Vitale During loose but time. Vitale and Plague, gain did fleet; to only the Emperor Not the in Vi- humilation. by spread Dodge ploy plan. Plague a peace be the a to wait, out out asked work turned Emperor and what Byzantine Constantinople ex- accepted the to were tale sea, go men at to able already embassy fleet all Venetian the and a With contribute, Navy. a to the ordered man had Vitale to means Dodge pected with debts. citizen previous every for pledged loan: been forced already had decade a least ( Norwich ditions. and Constantinople in confiscated property Empire. Constantino- the and opposite of citizens settlement ports Venetian other Genoese all (the had Galata for and at Venetians the ple) Genoese blamed the Emperor on The break-down. attack of an point the at were Venice and nosuemme fteOsoofml re osieteddehpbtwas but dodgeship the seize to Venice. tried to family return Orseolo his the before ousted. of died but member back, obscure called An was Otto abdicated. Centranico 40 21 o oedtisseNrih(2003 Norwich see details more For owc ( Norwich ( Lane 1172, by monarchy hereditary a to aversion this with Even family’s Orseolo the to response a as came Venice in reform important first The eoeimdaeyeetn e og,teVntasdcddt moepo- impose to decided Venetians the dodge, new a electing immediately Before con- financial strenuous under preparation war the led Michiel II Vitale Dodge 21 2003 hp )dsrbshw n17,rltosbtenByzamtium between relations 1171, in how, describes 8) Chap. , 2003 hp )mnin htaltervne ftesaefrat for state the of revenues the all that mentions 8) Chap. , hp 5). Chap. , .D Magalhães De L. 1973 remarks ) Book ID:306518_1_En, Date:2013-02-19, ProofNo: 1,UNCORRECTED PROOF

506 505 504 503 502 501 500 499 498 497 496 495 494 493 492 491 490 489 488 487 486 485 484 483 482 481 480 479 478 477 EDITOR’S476 475 474 473 472 471 470 469 468 467 PROOF466 465 464 463 462 461 nuneo h oyRmnEprr ob ue yaPdsa oege who foreigner a Podesta, year. a one by of ruled mandate be a with to the Genoa (under Emperor) rule 1190 Roman by would agreed Holy families power the the Since of clans, (clans). key influence the families of noble any different with between consolidated never war civil into escalate ularly of None aristocracy. In the stable. 1339. and proved in rulers, government Genoa foreign of of forms podestas, Dodge these by first ruled the of or was as Captain council Boccanegra Genoa as by Simone Boccanegra between and rule Gugliemo 1257 of to in rise transition People the a the are for candidates date best accepted The historically parliament. clear no has Genoa Genoa 3.2 done a as people the to choice their nominated present Council ( and of Norwich Great dodge (see citizens the the deal all directly, choose the comprising to dodge including and electors the state, Arengo, 11 nominating the the of of by officials Instead elected chief Venice). officially the then nominate (until thereafter dodge and year one for Narrative Analytic An Italy: Medieval and Greece Ancient in Transitions Political 22 objective essential the powers state. with foreign the the not of antagonizing wealth and of the or mind, monarchy, for in hereditary a interests up would their they setting power, with of in policy Once state. foreign the of over of defence hands decide the the finance in to and entrenched afford threat was could policy external who foreign those high over of power period the a straights, from financial During away dire populace. and merchants, the wealthy and the quasi-nobility, state, old the the of financiers the to power transfer ( to Giovannoni and Magalhães De in model Venice when point a at threat weakened. consolidation foreign militarily the considerable was that under done so was terms, regime the new accept the sued to of immediately refused also who Venice Byzantium, dodge. with (Venetians new peace creditors the there for under the seems State of It the willingness finance Navy). to a the themselves) demonstrates finance which to resentment, loans little forced was men the wealthiest (from the bonds of government new one ( Norwich was to Ziani According Sebastiano Venice. Dodge in . its the strengthening of financiers while pyramid administrative the in of power base gained the Senate center’. and The apex dodge. the coun- the The both (2003 six. restrain Norwich to to two affairs. power from foreign given councillors of also number were the cillors increase to was reform other podestaria. e pti (1996 Epstein See hogotishsoy eo swl nw o nenlsrf htwudreg- would that strife internal for known well is Genoa history, its Throughout h oiia eomi eieo 12cnb etudrto nlgto the of light in understood best be can 1172 of Venice in reform political The the towards power in change a reflected clearly dodge next the of choice The o aetertcaayi fthe of analysis theoretic game a for (2006) Greif and details more for 88) p. , 2003 hp )frdtisadLn (1973 Lane and details for 9) Chap. , nepesteefc fteerfrst ‘weaken to reforms these of effect the interprets ) 2003 hp ) in upne amn nthe on payment suspended Ziani 9), Chap. , .Teerfrsse ob designed be to seem reforms These 2012). 22 p 511) The 95Ð101)). pp. , 41 Book ID:306518_1_En, Date:2013-02-19, ProofNo: 1,UNCORRECTED PROOF

552 551 550 549 548 547 546 545 544 543 542 541 540 539 538 537 536 535 534 533 532 531 530 529 528 527 526 525 524 523 EDITOR’S522 521 520 519 518 517 516 515 514 513 PROOF512 511 510 509 508 507 ti ( ( stein Epstein what particular in the people, called the and families noble the between eca lt rfrafrinrt hi itn ue.Ti em ohv entecase com- the the been that have be to seems must This it Genoa. ruler. credible sitting in aristocratic be their repeatedly to to (or foreigner threat monarch a the prefer current For elite Genoa). mercial the of replace case necessary to the A in ready families rule. someone foreign ( threat, support Giovannoni outside and to Magalhães ible classes De merchant in transitions the political sec- of for The condition will war. (commercial) the aligned is an aspect versus ond war (dynastic) misaligned a ob- ( of commercial Giovannoni choice following and and Magalhães finances De stable abroad. classes with jectives merchant government the stable versus a rule in aristocratic interests impose to attempts and concerns nastic ( Giovannoni and hães France later and 1331Ð1335, example, from key Naples the of King is Milan. the then podesta 1311, and The in choice. ruled by VII but Henry but conquered, were they because Not the or poor the not artisans, master and people traders ‘the new (Epstein middling towards elite’ the a geared traditional office, and were in policies People him regime’s the put new who of The Anziani. Captain 32 as of Boccanegra council Gugliemo elected revolt popular n eido ntberl yteodnblt,tepol eotdadcetda created and revolted Gugliemo). people of the (grandnephew nobility, Boccanegra old Simone electing the Dodge by of rule position new unstable of period (probably a fell and he nobles). before the years of five some by for coup office a in 147). to (p. stay due state to Genoese the creation was finance the Boccanegra to to securities’ led Gugliemo public and for debt markets state ‘precautions on a default of the preventing at aimed was Boccanegra a lot alb 34udrteimnn tako nalac aeu fnobles of up made alliance an power. Boccanegra of from attack Simone excluded imminent commercial money’. been the making for had under who of 1344 Pera by task fall to congenial to out more also was the was to fleet war new civil from a without debt 1340, ( public By Epstein a consolidate ventures. debt. is to of old none had master any governor councillors: again a new repudiating The and and ducal profession. maker, defences 22 by shield themselves Genoese the identified a strengthened that of butchers, those three of 16 guild’ drapers, for wool ‘two the details are have there ( Epstein we and nobles. noble; the that of not notes and classes 205) merchant p. the of rule the was this Again, 42 24 23 e pti (1996 Epstein See (1996 Epstein See eie h oflc ewe ifrn ol aiis hr a loaconflict a also was there families, noble different between conflict the Besides h vnsi eo ihih w motn set ftemdli eMagal- De in model the of aspects important two highlight Genoa in events The foreigners. by ruled repeatedly was it that was Genoa of characteristic Another n13,atrapro ne oeg ueb oetAju igo Naples, of King Anjou, Robert by rule foreign under period a after 1339, In 1996 ooograsso popolo .17 ecie h vnso 27 fe rs nteeooya economy the in crash a after 1257: of events the describes 137) p. , .208). p. , 204). p. , 1996 .Tefis stecercnitbtentenblt’ dy- nobility’s the between conflict clear the is first The 2012). .27 oe htteeplce eetda‘unn away ‘turning a reflected policies these that notes 207) p. , h ihmrhnswowr o ato h oiiy Ep- nobility. the of part not were who merchants rich the , 1996 .18.Itrsigy n ftefiaca eom of reforms financial the of one Interestingly, 138). p. , 24 2012 oe hscnitwt the with conflict this model ) 2012 .D Magalhães De L. .206) p. 1996, sacred- a is ) 1996, 23 Book ID:306518_1_En, Date:2013-02-19, ProofNo: 1,UNCORRECTED PROOF

598 597 596 595 594 593 592 591 590 589 588 587 586 585 584 583 582 581 580 579 578 577 576 575 574 573 572 571 570 569 EDITOR’S568 567 566 565 564 563 562 561 560 559 PROOF558 557 556 555 554 553 rniint ueb alaetsol epeee ya ntbepro hr the where period unstable an by ( preceded be Giovannoni should and parliament Magalhães by rule De to of transition model the to specific Ma- De is transition of political of merchants ( aspect Giovannoni wealthy this and were explains galhães best who in that dodges and model chose The 1172 1172) birth. of lower and changes (1032 institutional moments the key proposed both above. families (Kleis- discussed powerful aristocracy reforms the the state institutional Venice, of the the In proposed members that plausi- Perikles) which a so and in seems Ephialtes, elite, This Athens, thenes, threat. in commercial foreign events the a of against to interpretation itself ble or defend to people funds the enough raise to can either power over hand etvspae e oei rvnigasal omo oenetfo appearing from government of ob- form dynastic stable competing a Genoa. with preventing in aristocracy in role divided key a a that played clear jectives seems It the ruler. in single ( shortcoming a Giovannoni a and recognize Magalhães to De (as is in difficulties explanation model financial alternative and An threat 1172). foreign in hostile did Venice a faced country ( the Giovannoni when and moment Magalhães De of logic nVnc n ae nGna h oe htbs ep sudrtn hs driving these understand us helps (2009 Vindigni best both and that dodges, Ticchi their model is chose The must to forces Genoa. forces voice in a Similar given later Athens. was and the Venice populace in of the in Thetes) how inclusion in (the political role class the a landless for played have the also and of for Sparta, later key in been and have Rhetra Hoplites to Great seems the motive of This citizens. creation own the state’s the by manned army an also was this production; grain Genoa. for and Venice soil for (2006 inadequate true Hanssen and and insufficient Fleck little had As had Athens sea. have like the to to seem they turn Moreover, to times. but those choice of that cities worlds executive trading medieval the leading evidence and on the ancient constraints were The the considerable flourished. with in trade institutions cities representative The where developed prediction. arise this to support to likely seems more with are ( sectors and governments Lien economic Venice, tative and the Bates Athens, of of ( importance in papers Hanssen in The trade growth elasticity. international relative tax economy— high and a the to Athens, in problem due in inconsistency Genoa—or time production condi- a economic solve oil to help response olive to driving a order One as in transitions. institutions either representative political tions: of for creation forces the driving is different force of emerges picture A 4FinalRemarks Narrative Analytic An Italy: Medieval and Greece Ancient in Transitions Political eas on vdnet upr w set fpltcltastosta are that transitions political of aspects two support to evidence found also We to chooses elite aristocratic established an as about come also may transition A h a hr osal rniint ueb sebyi eo?Wti the Within Genoa? in assembly by rule to transition stable no there was Why oiia rniinmyas oea ouint rbe fhwt motivate to how of problem a to solution a as come also may transition Political ,adD aahe n ivnoi(2012 Giovannoni and Magalhães De and 2006), 2012 ). ). 2012 2012 hr h rsorc smdldas modeled is aristocracy the where ) ,teesest aebe oclear no been have to seems there ), ,Fekand Fleck (1988), Levy 1985), oe,acetcity-states ancient notes, ) 2012 rdc htrepresen- that predict ) .Tefis sta a that is first The ). 43 Book ID:306518_1_En, Date:2013-02-19, ProofNo: 1,UNCORRECTED PROOF

644 643 642 641 640 639 638 637 636 635 634 633 632 631 630 629 628 627 626 625 624 623 622 621 620 619 618 617 616 615 EDITOR’S614 613 612 611 610 609 608 607 606 605 PROOF604 603 602 601 600 599 rlzdpwrmyhv ob salse eoei a ehanded-over. be can it Cen- before parliament. established be by to rule have through may executive power tralized the constraining towards step intuitive enil n oh(2011 Voth and Gennaioli onr W aosL I(91 tesfo litnst eils nvriyo California CREI-Barcelona paper, Working of conflict. University military and Pericles. capacity State to (2011) ancient H-J Voth Cleisthnes N, to from Gennaioli application Athens with (1991) model II LJ a Hill, Samons democracy: Chapel CW, of Press, Fornara origins Carolina The North (2006) FA of Hanssen University RK, genoese. Fleck the and Genoa by (1996) rule to SA absolutism from Epstein Assoc transition the Philol and financing Am War Trans (2012) F Athens. Giovannoni Political L, classical In: Magalhães in De states. antidosis of and formation avoidance the Liturgy and (1990) wealth MR War, Christ politics. (2011) and R taxation, Giovanni rights, B, property Codenotti capacity: C, state Boix of origins The (2009) Social T government. Persson representative T, and development Besley taxation, on note A (1985) D Lien RH, centralization. Bates to fragmentation 91(4):938Ð963 from Rev Mexico: Econ colonial in Am capacity transitions. fiscal political Building of (2012) theory LM A Arias (2001) JA Robinson D, Acemoglu References Byzantium. against Navy the to fund had to dodge order The jeopardy. in loans in forced empire Western to in- the resort commercial and eventually Venice, key Venice’s Byzantine In put the that supporters. both policies in his followed terests con- and Michiel a Ephialtes II was Vitale by revolt Dodge opposed Helot the move a against containing city policy the in foreign defend Sparta tentious to to of mercenaries Tyrant assistance The on Cimon’s merchants. rely Later, the to Sparta. or had citizens example, the for of Hippias, support Athens, the without war to goes ruler 44 fVnc eeal o hscudsgetta h etaiaino oe a de- (as power of centralization the that suggest (1990 dodges Tilly could the in This or scribed Athens to. of able tyrants were the Genoese Venice that interests. way of dynastic the in with power clans consolidated different never leaders between strife internal was system ( Giovannoni and Magalhães De constrained was dodge the of Byzantium power both the from when 1172. lose Empire in eventually threat Roman would direct western it under the whom was from Athens Venice and (to threat. and Sparta external war), and credible Peloponnesian Persia a the both intermediate be from of must threats states there clear in because faced only is transitions This political strength. observe military should we that predicts rs,Berkeley Press, 49(1):115Ð146 Econ Law J Greece. 958Ð1528 pp University Bristol Mimeo, parliament. 120:147Ð169 45Ð74 pp Heidelberg, Springer, voting. and democracy institutions, of economy 99(4):1218Ð1244 Rev Econ Am Caltech 567, paper working science Madrid Institute, March Juan paper, Working h eodapc sta h oe nD aahe n ivnoi( Giovannoni and Magalhães De in model the that is aspect second The ial,Gnapoie neapeta hwdtelmttoso h oe in model the of limitations the showed that example an provided Genoa Finally, ,HfmnadRsnhl( Rosenthal and Hoffman ), ,adAis(2012 Arias and ), .A motn seto h eos political Genoese the of aspect important An 2012). )myb nipratadcounter- and important an be may )) ,Bse n eso ( Persson and Besley 2000), .D Magalhães De L. 2009 2012) ), Book ID:306518_1_En, Date:2013-02-19, ProofNo: 1,UNCORRECTED PROOF

690 689 688 687 686 685 684 683 682 681 680 679 678 677 676 675 674 673 672 671 670 669 668 667 666 665 664 663 662 661 EDITOR’S660 659 658 657 656 655 654 653 652 651 PROOF650 649 648 647 646 645 il 19)Ceco,cptl n uoensae.Bakel Oxford Blackwell, states. European Lucca and IMT paper, capital, Working Coercion, democracy. (1990) endogenous C and Tilly War (2009) A Vindigni D, In: Ticchi Greece. archaic in trends egalitarian and power” “People’s of (2007) Origins RW In: Wallace Athens. KA, mid-fifth-century Raaflaub in London demokratia Routledge, of of edn. breakthrough University 2nd The Greece. BC, (2007) 1200Ð479 ancient making KA in the Raaflaub democracy in Greece of (2009) Origins R In: Osborne man’. that besieged Econ ‘I in Trade London (2007) J Penguin, In: J Venice. Athens. Q of Ober history fourth-century A franchise. in (2003) credit JJ the of Norwich structure and the and growth, loans Maritime competition, (1983) Partisan P Millet (2005) of scope RJ the and Oxoby Democracy suffrage? H, the extend Llavador elites the did Berkeley Why Press, (2004) California N of Persico University Baltimore revenue. A, Press, and University Lizzeri rule Hopkins Of Johns (1988) The M republic. Levy maritime a Venice (1973) FC Lane economic an 97(4):1353Ð1372 change: institutional Rev and Econ power Am sea Democracy, war. (2004) and MS Zouboulakis bias NC, Political Kyriaziz (2007) taxation. M and Morelli warfare M, of Jackson economy political the fall: we Divided (2000) and J-L principles Rosenthal structure, PT, Demosthenes: Hoffman of age the in democracy Athenian The New (1991) Press, MH University Hansen Cambridge economy. modern the to path the and Institutions (2006) A Greif lit- enforcement: contract for institutions public-order Self-enforcing, (2011) Y Lara de Gonzáles Narrative Analytic An Italy: Medieval and Greece Ancient in Transitions Political rgn fdmcayi nin ree nvriyo aionaPes odn p22Ð48. pp London, Press, California of University Greece. ancient 2 Chapter in democracy 5 of Chapter 105Ð154. Origins pp London, Press, California of University Greece. ancient in democracy 4 Chapter 83Ð104. pp London, Press, California 36Ð52 pp London, Press, Hogarth The Ð Windus & Chatoo economy. ancient the 119(2):707Ð765 Econ 120(3):1155Ð1189 J Q reform”. of “Age Britain’s to application an with government, 17:117Ð132 Econ Law J Eur law. naval Athenian the of analysis paper working Caltech Oxford Blackwell, ideology. of economy York Political In: 95Ð115 pp 1050Ð1350. Heidelberg, Venice, Springer, voting. in and government democracy institutions, limited and regulation, igation, 45 Book ID:306518_1_En, Date:2013-02-19, ProofNo: 1,UNCORRECTED PROOF

46 45 44 43 42 41 40 39 38 37 36 35 34 33 32 31 30 29 28 27 26 25 24 23 22 21 20 19 18 17 EDITOR’S16 15 14 13 12 11 10 PROOF 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 .Shfil ta.(eds.), al. et Schofield N. Spain 28006, Madrid 77, e-mail: C/Castello Institute, March Juan CEACS, DOI onigsse.Ma rwhfrteMxc iyTesr vrgdams 60 1800. almost and averaged 1770 between Treasury decades City the Mexico of each the in ac- for percent proficient growth a at Mean and succeeded bureaucrats system. officials fiscal counting public with success Mexico administration limited central colonial with the in strengthening century, met nineteenth Spain early in the modernization until fiscal at attempts parallel though a n cnmc,Safr a col n h etro eorc,Dvlpet n the and University. Development, Democracy, Stanford in on at Program Center (CDDRL) Olin the Law M. and of John School, Rule the Law Research, Stanford Policy financial Economics, Economic the and for without Law Institute possible Stanford been the not have from on would support Center Berkeley’s work UC This the Governance. at and University, and Conflict Stanford Institutions Political at and Workshop Institutions and History Endogenous Economy and on Political Science Workshop on Social Conference the International Baiona, II in Gavin the Institutions Rabushka, at Alvin participants Pancs, the Romans and Marichal, de Wright, Carlos Gonzalez Alberto Yadira Levi, David, Jáuregui, Margaret Paul Luis Haber, Bernheim, Steve Greif, Douglas Avner Lara, B. Dobado, Baron, Rafael David Dincecco, referee, Marc anonymous Díaz-Cayeros, an to grateful am I 2 1 (O’Brien reputation bureaucracy, world-renown Brewer fiscal acquired efficient navy and and the new and created, a in- was of army was hands an collection the in fiscal put England, and In cen- centralized the roles. creasingly granted unprecedented century and eighteenth new the government in tral state fiscal-military the of emergence The Arias Marina Luz Building State Fiscal-Military of Theory Collective-Action A ..Ais( Arias L.M. century. eighteenth the of end the by percent 12 over to 1670s the in percent n oa ltsfrtecleto ftxrvneaddfne iclcpct was capacity Fiscal defense. and revenue tax of collection the for elites local and centuries. nineteenth early and eighteenth late the in lowed li (1985 Klein (1988,Table2).O’Brien ro oti rniin otmnrh eeddt ag xeto economic on extent large a to depended monarchs most transition, this to Prior 10.1007/978-3-642-35239-3_3 [email protected] B 566Ð574). , 1989 ) .Txpoed sapretg fntoa noers rm3.5 from rose income national of percentage a as proceeds Tax ). dacsi oiia Economy Political in Advances sawy oeflmtvto ntxpolicy. tax in motivation powerful pay’ a should always else is ‘somebody earmarked, not are benefits Where pigrVra elnHiebr 2013 Heidelberg Berlin Springer-Verlag © , , 2 te uoensae fol- states European Other l (1983 Alt .194) p. , 1 Even 1988 47 Book ID:306518_1_En, Date:2013-02-19, ProofNo: 1,UNCORRECTED PROOF

92 91 90 89 88 87 86 85 84 83 82 81 80 79 78 77 76 75 74 73 72 71 70 69 68 67 66 65 64 63 EDITOR’S62 61 60 59 58 57 56 55 54 53 PROOF52 51 50 49 48 47 aieisiuinbidn eaiet h ne fwr htepan h aito nficlcapacity fiscal in variation the explains what wars of centralization. onset the to relative institution-building tative tal. et Weingast a expendi- and public (North like on credible representation, commitments tures making of by institutions cooperation fiscal higher political increases them of parliament, granting establishment upon The rulers revenues. constrain to fiscal need the underscore approach second Persson and Besley zd nvra,eutbe n oetal oepoutv ytm ftxto and taxation of systems productive more finance.” central- potentially modern, and more [ equitable, of families universal, imposition ized, noble the against as defences well and privileges as domains, maintained necessary. ecclesiastical corporations, was estates, and elites “provinces, the cities, fis- Europe of privileged strengthen modern fraction to early a across or least all army at Indeed, an of provide compliance lacked to the ruler revenue administration, a increase cal that unilaterally extent to the in- To ability to militarily? ruler the build-up the allow and elites centralization powerful fiscal politically crease and fiscally did Why elites. different paaue.Teeaetoapoce nteltrtr.Oeapoc ihihsthe conflicts. highlights approach military One of literature. administrative the role states’ in European approaches two of are growth There the apparatuses. for impetus major the as tablishments h rvnilEtts h sebyo h lry n a amr a a author- tax had farmers Crown. tax the and to clergy, funds the transferred of and assembly ity the Estates, provincial the tsvg ( Stasavage 3 corporations, return. and in elites privileges other these and with exemptions them loans granted and and taxes. of transfers dispatch monetary and aristocrats, negotiated collection as Rulers the for corporations—such level responsible in ecclesiasts—were national organized or Provin- actors merchants the elites. economic local at the or by institutions authorities collected monies cial fiscal the of enforcement and recipients and as Treasuries primarily monitoring taxes. functioned in collect minimally to invested capacities ruler central The fragmented. 48 8 7 6 5 4 nf ies ouain(Huntington 2001 population diverse a unify omo ovy,adhdacnrc ihte o h olcino the of collection the for them the with Mexico. in contract colonial defense in a with tax had them (sales) and provided convoys, colonies, of the in form competition foreign from guild n eluh( Hellmuth and ubro tde aeepne hsagmn n nlddqaictos e o instance for See qualifications. included and argument this expanded have studies of number A ( Weber instance for See ( Bonney also See 432). (2011, O’Brien ( Marichal ( Rosenthal (2011 O’Brien instance, for See, h sa-iiaysae hn mle osso sa n te rvlgsfor privileges other and fiscal of losses implied then, state, fiscal-military The xlntosfrficlcnrlzto mhsz h edt nraemltr es- military increase to need the emphasize centralization fiscal for Explanations ,o h eet ftxto eoemr ain octzn (Levi citizens to salient more become taxation of benefits the or ), 2011 6 2002, 2007 ). 68). 1998, 8 .Frasnhss e apel( Campbell see synthesis, a For 1999). 67)adSih( Smith and 76Ð77) , 2003 ,adCx( Cox and ), 2009 1922 7 rcptlivsos(Mann investors capital or ) ,Sopl(1979 Skocpol ), iiaycnit aiiaeficlrfr eas wars because reform fiscal facilitate conflicts Military ,adLv (1988 Levi and (1989), Brewer 421Ð423), , 2011 5 1948 .Eta (1997 Ertman ). n trs( Storrs and 1999) 1989 ). 4 ofa n Norberg and Hoffman ; h pns rw rtce h merchant the protected crown Spanish The ,Tly(1990, Tilly ), 1968 n ’re ( O’Brien and 1993) Herbst ; anan hti stetmn frepresen- of timing the is it that maintains ) 2009). 1993 2000 1988 ,Bne (1995 Bonney ), 3 o ntne nFrance in instance, For n ie n Kane and Kiser and ; .Epaain nthe in Explanations ). 2011). .]and city...] states, 1994 ). n Dincecco and ; ,adBrewer and ), 1988 ..Arias L.M. alcabala and ; Book ID:306518_1_En, Date:2013-02-19, ProofNo: 1,UNCORRECTED PROOF 138 137 136 135 134 133 132 131 130 129 128 127 126 125 124 123 122 121 120 119 118 117 116 115 114 113 112 111 110 109 108 107 106 105 104 103 102 101 100

EDITOR’S 99 PROOF98 97 96 95 94 93 agie eaaeywt ahgop sa rgetto e ofe iigand riding free to led fragmentation fiscal revenues. fiscal group, lower each with grants separately similar (2008 bargained upon Summerhill conditional France. grants in towns” subsidy (1971 other make Henneman from to from towns quote led 57) jealousies (1985, “fiscal Lien and Bates rights.” among group cooperation narrow inhibit to tended privileges, distinct the own their with each groups lt oprto nsaigteitra raiaino h state. the of organization internal the shaping in cooperation elite we h ltsadterlr ntepoeso sa-iiaysaeformation. state fiscal-military of be- process than the empha- rather in chapter elites, ruler, the powerful the such, fiscally and As the elites territory. of the among the contribution tween problem of the commitment with defense a elites the the sizes for of resources cooperation and the men impeded that regimes century. eighteenth fiscal the in regions some in reforms imple- military successfully and officials fiscal Spanish mentated yet assemblies representative lacked ( America Marichal parliaments. of formation the ihmr sa n oriepwr a aeicnie oeporaeeie or elites expropriate to incentives ruler have A debts. may its problems. powers on commitment coercive renege of and because fiscal taxation cooperation more of fiscal with benefits taxation. in the of translate in benefits increases not the that may however, salient highlights, making approach by second govern- centralization The and fiscal monarchs negotiate for window to a ments provide conflicts Military state. fiscal-military tesrcueo h sebis iie ste eeit separate into were they as divided assemblies, the of structure “the ( Ertman documented. well been nisiuinlfaeokta loe ltst omtt otiuet military to contribute well. to as contributing commit were to others ensuring elites and by low-contribution allowed protection provided a that centralization framework in fiscal institutional stuck that an were to argue ruler amount I the optimal con- equilibrium. socially and the low-public-good-provision the elites on a than The ride to less protection. free led contributing to military then thereby incentives fragmentation others, had fiscal group of conflict, to elite tributions military benefits each of earmarking problem: threat action a on collective of rested face income the fiscal In ruler’s elites. the regimes, fragmented In Building State Fiscal-Military of Theory Collective-Action A 12 11 10 9 n h opineo coswt efr-nacn oprto.Se o ntne lo (1993 Olson instance, for See, cooperation. welfare-enhancing (2006 with Greif actors of compliance the ing atsa.Gef(1998 Greif Baltistan. rlzto ihn ntttoso ersnaini lc.Teeiec nDincecco in evidence The place. in representation ( of institutions no with tralization 2011 ute,i ie fwr h ue a icutteftr oeta te iies(Levi citizens other than more future the discount may ruler the war, of times in Further, 56Ð57). (1988, Levi also See ( Emerson prevent- in problems free-rider and action collective of role the emphasized have scholars Many nti hpe,Iudrcr h olcieato rbe rsn nfragmented in present problem action collective the underscore I chapter, this In oho hs prahscnrbt oorudrtnigo h rwho the of growth the of understanding our to contribute approaches these of Both htcletv cinpolm r neett sal rgetdsae has states fragmented fiscally to inherent are problems action collective That curiae 7 hw hti ayErpa ttsficlcnrlzto aebefore came centralization fiscal states European many in that shows 27) , n ri ta.( al. et Greif and ) n edtenblt,ceg,adtetwst ou ntedfneo their of defense the on focus to towns the and clergy, nobility, the lead and rvdsasmlrisgtrgrigsaefraina nerirsaein stage earlier an at formation state regarding insight similar a provides 1983) , 9 2006 oemnrh,hwvr ucee ticesn sa cen- fiscal increasing at succeeded however, monarchs, Some 12 lohglgt h motneo iiaytrasadtene for need the and threats military of importance the highlights also ) 1994 ). 0 oe bu h sae nGraythat: Germany in Estates the about notes 50) 1999, 2007 1 ihihsta ooilSpanish colonial that highlights 51) , 2Ð2)ntsta eas rulers because that notes 224Ð225) , 11 curiae félite of 1988 that ) ). 49 10 ),