Discourse and Perspective in Daoism: a Linguistic Interpretation of Ziran Author(S): W

Home , De (Chinese)

Discourse and Perspective in Daoism: A Linguistic Interpretation of Ziran Author(s): W. A. Callahan Source: Philosophy East and West, Vol. 39, No. 2 (Apr., 1989), pp. 171-189 Published by: University of Hawai'i Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1399376 Accessed: 08/09/2010 12:22

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http://www.jstor.org W. A. Callahan Discourseand perspectivein Daoism: A linguisticinterpretation of ziran

In Chinese philosophicalliterature, the term ziranais generallyrendered as "spontaneity,""natural," or "self-so" by both Chinese and Western trans- lators. I think that these translationsnot only miss the point being made in the texts, but actuallyserve to obscureit. Herein I propose a differentinterpretation of ziran-a linguisticinterpretation as a specificallyDaoist term. Broadlyspeaking, this essay seeks to re- examine certain presuppositionsthat we have with respect to Chinese philosophy, particularlyDaoism, combiningrecent philosophicalinsights with those made available by the sinological community.This essay argues that ziran serves as a basis for rational decisions for action that can be made within daoism.1I do not venture do claim that daoism is a rationalthought system; rather it contains elements of both rational and arational action. However, as traditional interpretationsof Daoism have concentrated on its arationalaspects (usually callingthem irrational),this essay will focus on the possibilitiesfor rationaldecision makingand action. My analysisis based on Chad Hansen'sDaoist Theoryof Language,begin- ning with his ContrastTheory of Language.2The ContrastTheory of Lan- guage states that names are createdin pairsas opposites. Examplesof this are found in the second chapterof the Dao De Jingb: That the whole world knows the beautiful'sbeing deemed "beautiful"is suf- ficient for "ugly". That the whole world knows the good's being deemed "good" is sufficientfor "evil". Thus "having"and "lacking"produce each other. "Difficult"and "easy" complementeach other. "Long" and "short" offset each other; "high" and "low" incline toward each other; "note" and "sound"harmonize each other; "before"and "after"follow each other.3 The image is of a whole, the fundamentalmetaphor being that of the "un- carved block" which is divided by a "line" to distinguishbetween opposites, for example, beautiful and ugly. Such delineation, then, is the process of distinctionand naming;when we distinguishand name one thing, we simul- taneouslydistinguish and name its opposite. Now let us put the ContrastTheory of Languageinto the more general scheme of the relation between languageand reality as found in the Dao De Jing. This is a theory of prescriptiverather than descriptivelanguage. In this theory, languageis composed of names, and knowing(knowledge) is having the abilityto manipulateand use these names towardsa desiredend. Thus, it is "know-how"rather than "know-that."According to this ContrastTheory, names come in pairs, and thus "knowing"is knowingthe distinctionbetween them. In makinga distinction,we create desires and values whichin turnlead to actions to fulfillthem. The Zhuang Zic is a source which in its own terms elaboratesthis Contrast

W. A. Callahan is a graduate student in Political Science at the University of Hawaii. Philosophy East & West, volume 39, no. 2 (April 1989). ? by University of Hawaii Press. All rights reserved. 172 Callahan

Theory, stressingas it does linguisticrelativity. This means that there is no fixed relationbetween the name and the object that it names. The distinctions out of which names grow are not fixed, but are alwaysshifting-the line that divides the whole is not set. The "line" is shifting, accordingto the Zhuang Zi, because distinctionsare alwaysmade from a perspective,and since every perspective is different, the distinctionsdiffer with every perspective. The ZhuangZi illustratesthis in its use of indexicals:

What is "this"(shid) is also "that"(bie); what is "that"is also "this". There they say "that's it/that'snot" (shi/feif) from one point of view, here we say "that'sit/that's not" from anotherpoint of view.4

Zhuang Zi uses shilfei, "that's it/that's not," to illustrate both how discri- minationsarise between opposites and how judgmentsare invariablymade from a perspective.Cilbig, "this here/thatthere," is anotherpair of indexical opposites which operate analogouslyto shilfei, and will be importantin my theoreticalconsiderations. In this essay I want to regardthe fact that ziran originatesand occursin the pre-Qindaoist canons as being of considerablesignificance.5 will analyzethe worldview of daoismwhich developed in responseto the views of the schools of Confucius,Mo Di, the Dialecticians,and so on. Daoism, as articulatedin the Dao De Jing and the Zhuang Zi, rejects these several philosophies in favor of a new approachto the problemsin Chinesephilosophy. Ziran is part of this creation, for its first appearanceas a compoundin the corpusis in the Dao De Jing. Hence, ziran seems to be peculiarto daoismin its introduction and developmentin the classicalperiod. Daoism uses the linguisticallyderived notion of ziran as an alternativeto the Realisticways of Confucianismand Mohism,pitting its relativismagainst the rule-orderedrites and utility of these rival schools. Daoism presents a relativistworld view which rejects the hierarchyinherent in institutionsand conventions.In this theory I interpretziran to be "action-discriminationfrom a particularperspective." In this sense, it stands in contrast to the other schools' "action-discriminationfrom convention(for example, rites, utility)." In daoism, each "part"distinguishes from its own perspectiveand acts on it, rather than submittingto the establishedcustoms of society, which can be artificialto it. Thus, with this theory, we do not just walk our daoh; we are continuallyin the process of creatingit. The standardtranslations of ziran do not express this creativity,unfortu- nately suggestinga more quietistic,passive, and fatalisticinterpretation. The most common reading of ziran is "spontaneous."This interpretationmight originate from Shen Dao's proto-Daoism, which is anti-languageand anti- knowledge. It postulates a single absolute metaphysicalDao, as opposed to the multiple daos found throughout Chinese classical thought.6 And, of course, it is the Dao so defined (sometimes"Heaven") that inspiresa rather 173

oxymoronic"determined spontaneity." Spontaneity, in this view, is not a fac- tor of the object itself, a problemthat is implicitlydemonstrated in alternative translationssuch as "natural."Hence, in the traditionalinterpretation, humans are distancedfrom nature, whereasone of the centralpoints of daoism surely is that humans are a part in the composite harmonyof nature. This Shen Dao proto-Daoism is further appealed to by traditional scholars to understand classical daoism as a whole, without due cognizance of the development that took place within daoism itself, and within the greater Chinese philosophicaltradition. My theory of ziran offeredhere places daoismin the context of the classical Chinese philosophicaldialectic and relates it to the contending schools of Confucianism,Mohism, and the Dialecticiansand, further, entails a serious critiqueof all Realistic theories of Dao by suggestinga workablealternative to them. Ziran is central to the daoist world view. In analyzingit theoretically, it should be noted that I am not a prescriptivegrammarian of the classical Chinese language. I see relationshipsbetween terms in classicalChinese, but no incontrovertibleprinciples of grammarthat might define the language separatefrom the context of the text at hand. Thus, I drawon the etymology and grammarof the terms to suggest an interpretation,and then go to the texts to see if it is borne out philosophically. To understandhow ziran comes to mean "discrimination,"and further "discourseabout actions from a perspective,"we must analyze the compo- nent charactersof the expression.7 Zii first appears in classical Chinese texts as a preposition that is usually translated"from." In the developmentof the languagethrough the classical philosophicalperiod, zi is extendedas a reflexiveadverb roughly analogous to "self' in English. Examiningthe etymology of the term is important,for it might enable us to discover a commonalityamong the several renderingsof zi. Accordingto the Shuo Wenjlexicon, the characterzi means "nose" (bik), with the characterbeing a pictographrepresenting a nose. The Qing-dynasty Duan Yucai commentarystates that zi is rarelyused as "nose." From this I conclude that the "from"and "self" meaningsof zi are metaphoricalexten- sions of the literal meaningof "nose." The nose is a common metaphor in popular Chinese culture. It refers to one's point of view-Chinese point to their nose, ratherthan their heart, in referring to their perspective. In traditional China, a common amputory punishmentwas the cuttingoff of a criminal'snose, signifyingthat this person no longer had a humanperspective, and thus was not entitled to its benefits. Both "from"and "self" have developed from this sense of "nose"-"from" in a wider sense of perspective,and "self" in a more definedsense. Grammatically,zi as "from" requires an object following it; if it is the adverbial"self," zi should be followed by a stative verb. As zi is followed by 174 Callahan

the stative verb ran', the first choice in interpretation should be "self." But "self' is burdened in English. It tends to conjure up images of ego as resi- dence for autonomous individuality as the primary focus of discourse. I choose to avoid these connotations, for such individuation and autonomy is problematical in the classical Chinese tradition. According to Hansen's Mass Noun Hypothesis, classical Chinese is composed of mass nouns, such as "sand" or "water" in English, which carry with them no inherent individualization as do the count nouns of modern English. Mass nouns are more adequately described as representing a part/whole relation.8 In classical Chinese all things are "parts," and all things are composed of parts which extend in an unbounded way large and small, qualita- tively and quantitatively. For example, the term renm, which stands for human, refers to all things that are human, ranging from the human population of the Earth, to the human society of China, to an individual human being, to a human toenail, to a molecule within that toenail, and so on. To avoid the emphasis on individuals, particularly human individuals, I wish to focus on the reflexive meaning of zi. "Reflexive actions" are those which issue forth from the perspective and come back to the perspective, allowing it to make decisions in a circular process of self-creation. Following this, I designate zi as "from," keeping in mind that it is from a perspective-a perspective which is relative in terms of size and scope to the possibilities afforded by the situation in question. Furthermore, there is an important change in zi when it is found in ziran. It makes the leap from zi in the directional sense of "from" and "self," to a cognitive zi of perspective which includes the whole history of the "viewer." And when we begin thinking and distinguishing in this way, we realize that everything has such a perspective. This brings out the relativity of language and action, and attests to the multiplicity of perspectives that combined make up our environment. This is a departure from the view of many Chinese scholars, who invariably separate zi and ran, translating zi as zi jin, "oneself."9 The etymology of the second term, ran, is problematic. It originally meant "to burn" and has since been replaced by ran0 in this distinction.10 In the development of the language, the term acquired a quite different meaning which is very common in classical literature: ru ciP, "like this.""1 The term further appears to have developed into an affirmation, something like (it is so =) "yes, it's like this." But for the time being we will stay with "like this," for it encompasses a greater scope, and thus is more simple and elegant. When using the term ran, we already presuppose that there is a discourse and a process of distinction. For if there is "like this," then there must also be "like that." Hence ran represents the ability to distinguish and assign names and to act from them. In pre-Qin literature, ran was used to distinguish between alternatives in 175

a way analogous to the use of shi/fei.12The differencebetween ran and shi was expressedmost clearlyby the neo-Mohists.Whereas shi/fei distinguished between names, ranlburanqdistinguished between strings of names. Since strings of names contain "verbs," ran distinguishesbetween actions ("ride horse/not ride horse"), while shi only designatesthings ("horse/nonhorse"). Hence ran representsthe capabilityand act of distinguishingand assigning names to actions. This abilityto distinguishis furtherexplicable by referenceto the termsdao and der. I translate dao as "discourse"rather than by the traditionalmeta- physicalinterpretation of "The Way." In so doing, I wish to underscorethe verbalprimacy of dao as a mode of action that entails communicationamong the partsconstituting the event. I extend the meaningof discoursemetaphor- ically beyond human speech to the interrelationsmore generally in nature, from simplyhuman communication to a communionof all parts. Discourse, or more particularly"prescriptive discourse," is the act of "communicating,"which creates a mode, and it is also a mode that has been "communicated."Further, in the act of communicationand the deference it entails, it establishes dao as a model. "Discourse"is a useful translationin that it also connotes the multiplicityof dao, being consistentwith the ethical notions of dao found in the other classicaltraditions. De representsthe unique particularityout of which a perspectivecomes. We appeal to de, rather than convention, when we are distinguishingfrom our perspective.The de growsout of a greaterdiscourse, through a processof its own unique discourse.De startsfrom and uses existinghistorical discourse to extend discourse. Throughthis process of discoursefrom our de, we discriminateand thus create discourse. It is when the zi is addedto ran that the distinctionsare judged. Thus, ziran means "from a perspectivemaking distinctions among actions like this." The part is involved in a "personal" discourse to make continuously action- distinctions,and then to choose an appropriatepath based on the continually changingconditions that surroundthe partand the basic organictendencies- the knowledgeand desires-characteristic of the part. Now we must step back and put this into the perspective of the Daoist Theory of Language. The term ziran comes in at the stage of distinguishing and then acting. If we distinguishfrom our own perspective, we will reflect our desires and propensities;if our distinctionis mediated throughsociety's conventionalperspectives, we will take on the desires and actions of society, which in some measure are foreign to us, and which to the daoists, conse- quentially,are artificialand corrupt. Using conventionsto discriminateand relying on traditionto indicate the correctpath is Confucian;distinguishing and acting accordingto our organic desires as found in each of our de is daoist. But the matteris not this simple. Ziran is in a polar relationshipwith "conventionalaction." There is no abso- 176 Callahan

lute ziran or "not-ziran,"only discriminationsand actions which are more accordingto ziran or less accordingto ziran. Yet by realizingand thus utiliz- ing the possibility of ziran, we continuallydeconstruct our socializationof institutionaland conventionalsets of distinction, and then recreate our or- ganicdesires and needs into a more "personal"set of distinctionsaccording to our de. The Dao De Jing and the ZhuangZi reflectthis process of awakeningand change. Ziran in them is involved in the shift in Chinese philosophyfrom its Heaven-basedmorality in the early part of the WarringStates period (domi- nated by Confucius,Mo Di, Shen Dao, and Yang Zhu) to the secondphase of classical Chinese philosophy in the latter half of the WarringStates period which was more concernedwith languageand logic, as seen in the School of Names and the neo-Mohists.The Dao De Jing, given its fruitfulambiguity, is not clear on where it stands in this dialogue: it can and certainlyhas been interpretedas an absolutistmetaphysical system. This essay stands as a cor- rectiveto these metaphysicalinterpretations, for throughoutthe Dao De Jing and the Zhuang Zi, ziran shows development as a linguisticterm which is most radicallyfound in the Zhuang Zi's sophisticatednominal relativist out- look. In the five occurrencesof ziran in the Dao De Jing, as everywherein classical Chinese, there are ambiguitiesin the grammarand terms which make interpretationand translationdifficult. Here one point affectsfour out of the five chapterswhich include ziran. It is the question of the apparentmissing subject of many of the passages. Since subjects can be understoodfrom the context or the structureof classicalChinese, many passagesdo not explicitly mention them. Thus, we have to performan act of interpretationto decide who or what Lao Zi is writingabout. The specificproblem that we encounter here is whetherthe passagesshould be taken as commandsto a ruler, or as a descriptionof a general situation having prescriptionsdirected at all. Both traditionallyand in modernscholarship, interpreters have generallychosen to take the passages as prescriptionsdirected at a ruler. Angus Grahamcom- pares the Dao De Jing and the ZhuangZi by statingthat the Dao De Jing was directed primarilyto a ruler, while the Zhuang Zi was for people more generally.13This seems to hold true in the passagesthat we are dealingwith, but if they are reexaminedwith the hypothesizedmeaning of ziran in mind, then in each of the passagesan alternateinterpretation more consistentwith the "perspectivalaction-discrimination" hypothesis is just as felicitous. There is a similarproblem with the term dao which leads to parallelinter- pretations:dao has metaphysicalimplications as in traditionalinterpretations, and it also suggests discourse, as in the linguistic interpretationdescribed above. Even though this essay is primarilya linguisticinterpretation of the term ziran, I will initially present both interpretationswhere applicable, 177

because both the terms ziran and dao were still evolving in the Dao De Jing, and thus are attended in some places by metaphysicalconnotations. The Dao De Jing is generallyaccepted to be a work edited long after it was written, and thus the order of the chaptersdoes not necessarilyrepresent an order of development.Here we will analyzechapter 25 first, since it is central to metaphysicalnotions of dao and ziran, and presents perhapsthe greatest challenges to my notion of ziran.14

There was somethingheterogeneously formed, PredatingHeaven and Earthin its birth. Soundless, formless, it standssolitary and does not change. It revolves without pause. I do not know its name; Constrained,I would designateit "dao/discourse," And if forced to assignit a name, I would call it "Great". "Great"means "passing", "Passing"means "distance", And "distance"means "returning". Thus, the dao/discourseis Great; Heaven-Natureis Great; Earth is Great; And humansare also Great. In this universe, there are four "Greats", And humansoccupy one of them. Humanstake Earth as their model; Earth takes Heaven-Natureas its model; Heaven-Naturetakes dao/discourseas its method; And the dao/discoursetakes ziran as its method.15

In chapter 25 we encounter the first problem in our interpretationof the term "dao." Traditionallythis chapter is taken to be an explanationof the originand the force of the metaphysicalDao. But this Dao is not categorialas it otherwise appears, because it now follows somethingwhich has been dis- tinguishedfrom it, namely, ziran, or at least it uses ziran as its method. This can be taken as the borderline between the primitive metaphysical Dao reminiscentof Shen Dao, and a linguisticdao of discourse. This citation of ziran, in addition to challengingthe absolutenessof the Dao, also begins a discoursefrom a perspective(although solely from the perspectiveof the Dao at this point), and opens the way for the myriadthings to do the same, for they already"emulate" the Dao. The traditional interpretationsaccept that ziran is a process, a method ratherthan an entity-yet dao is still entified.My alternativeinterpretation of chapter 25 sees both dao and ziran as methods that a composite whole of natureuses in its action and interaction.The "discourse"in this chapteris the greatercommunion of parts that constitutethis compositewhole of nature. This interpretationof dao and ziran as method for the variousparts which 178 Callahan

make up a whole, is evident throughoutthis chapter.The firstclause, "There was something heterogeneouslyformed" (a thing formed by many things), presupposesthis distinction.The statementof returning(yuan yue fans) can be the notion of returningto our own perspectiveafter being drownedin the exteriorconventional perspectives of rulersand rites. The final four clauses make the point most clearly. First the composite whole is realized:humanity looks to the broadercontext of Earthas a model, then Earth looks to the broadercontext of Nature (the cosmos) as a model. The composite whole of Nature emerges through a process. The discourse- dao, which is the communionof partswithin Nature, is this process. This dao of communioninterrelates each part by entailingaction-discrimination from each part'sperspective as its method of interaction.Thus ziran is used as the method for a harmoniousinterrelation of partswithin the cosmos. Roger T. Ames and Rhett Y. W. Young translatechapter 17 in the following way: The most excellent [ruler]-the people do not know that he exists; The second most excellent-they love and praise him; The next-they fear him; And the worst-they look on him with contempt. When the integrity[of the ruler]is inadequate,there will be those who do not trust him. Relaxed, he [the ideal ruler]prizes his words. When his accomplishmentsare complete and the affairsof state are in order, The commonpeople all say, "We are naturallylike this (ziran)". In this chapterit seems quite clear that these are instructionsto a rulerwho wishes to be "ideal." If such a ruler sets up a system of governmentwhere he16did not interfere("the people do not know that he exists") and does not issue commands("he prizes his words"), then the commonpeople would be unfettered and thus would be able to accomplishthings through ziran, by making distinctions based on their own perspective and acting on them. As translatedby Ames and Young, however, the notion of ziran is not given full force. The common people are still relying on a ruler to set up the system whereby they can act of their own accord. But the fact is that the chapterdoes not refer to a ruler in any explicit way, and can be interpreted without it: The highest-is to not know you have it; Next one-love and praise it; Next one-fear it; Next one-ridicule it; When trust is insufficientin it, There will be [those] who do not trust in it. Relaxed, they treasuretheir words. Accomplishmentscompleted, affairsordered, The commonpeople all say: "We have perspectivalaction-discrimination." 179

With this translationthe ambiguityof the chapteris maintained,thus leaving it much more open to interpretation.The antecedent of "it" in the above passagescould be either ziran or discourse-dao.Again, there are no fetters to constrainthe people; in this translationthere is no hint of a ruler, government, or structureof any kind. The people live and prosper accordingto ziran. Chapter23 continuesalong the same theme as chapter17, but also branches off, for it can accommodateboth of the ambiguitiesmentioned above-of the indefinite subject and the differentinterpretations of the term dao. As Ames and Young translate: Seldom issuingcommands is in accordancewith the natural[ziran]. Hence a whirlwinddoes not last for the durationof a morning, And torrentialrains do not persistfor the durationof a day. Who causes them to be like this? Heaven and Earth [tiandit-the world]. If Heaven and Earth are unable [to express themselves]for long periods of time, How much less is man able to! Therefore, those who devote themselvesto the dao Are one with the dao; Those [who devote themselvesto] de Are one with de. Those who lose them Are one with the loss of them. For those who become one with the dao, The dao is pleased to accept them; For those who become one with de; The de is pleased to accept them; For those who become one with the loss of them, Loss is also pleased to accept them! When the integrity[of the ruler]is inadequate, There will be those who do not trust him. The first question of interpretationappears in the first line-whether to translateyanu as "commands"or as "words/speaking."17If it is interpretedas "issuingcommands," then it introducesthe notion of ruler. When this ruler does not speak, then the particular'sperspective can be realized without ex- ternal coercion. Hence, the idea of "makingdistinctions based on a part's perspective"is possible and fitting here, but it is not complete, for it is still temperedby the presence of an overlordwho potentiallyhas veto power. My alternativeinterpretation is as follows: the firsttwo characters,xi yanv, can be translatedmore literallyas "seldom speaking"or "few words." This, then, would be the consequence of ziran in that if everythingis making its own distinctionsfrom its own perspective,then wordswould not be necessary to the same degree, and actuallywould be potentiallydetrimental. Through the rest of the chapter, the process of ziran is reconfirmedby appeal to examplesof nonhumandiscourse and discrimination,such as wind 180 Callahan

and rain. Next are dao and de. If these are read as the metaphysicaldao and de, they do not bringclarity to the situation.If we designatethem "discourse" and "uniqueparticularity" as stated in the theoreticalsection of this essay, then it is consistentwith the interpretationof ziran as "the abilityof each part to discriminateactions from its own perspective." This interpretationis consistent with the rest of the chapter in that the things or people that are devoting themselves to dao and de are the myriad things, not a ruler. And the last two lines, which, in the Ames and Young translation, refer again to the ruler, could be translatedas in chapter 17: "When trust is insufficientin it [the world], there will be [those] who do not trust in it." Whetherwe choose one interpretationor the other, the essential meaningof ziran is clear:the choice of interpretationonly affectsit in degree. The force of this linguisticexplanation of ziran is furtherborne out in chapter 51. I again take dao to stand for "discourse,"de "uniqueparticularity," and ziran "perspectivalaction-discrimination": Discourse engendersit [ziran]; Unique particularitynurtures it; The physicalworld gives form to it, Then the environmentcompletes it. Therefore of the myriadthings none but venerate the discourse and honor their unique particularity. Veneratingthe discourseand honoringtheir uniqueparticularity, Now none commandthem [myriadthings], They make perspectivalaction-discrimination [ziran] constant. Thereforediscourse engenders it, Unique particularitycultivates it. It is nourishedand developed; It is stabilizedand pacified; It is providedfor and sheltered. It is engendered,but not "owned". It is assisted, but not dependent. It is nourished,but not directed(controlled). This is called the abstrusepower. With this translation,chapter 51 outlines in a coherentway the origin, development and force of ziran. Actually, the terms themselves are "defined" here. Dao and de are combined to form ran, the act of distinction,which is then located in the physicalworld and the environmentby addingthe zi, or perspective, as the text says "completing"it. Dao and de do not command things. They cannot, for they themselvesconstitute the processin whichthere is an interdependenceand mutualityamong particulars. Once the perspectival action-discriminationhas begun, it continues independentlyin a manner indicatedin the remainderof the chapter.The process of ziran providesthe part with care and what it otherwiserequires, without placing it in an inferior position, for the part is in fact in control of its own situation. The last line bringsus back to the origins. The capacityof each of us as part to distinguish ourselvesis de; our de is our expressionof dao. It is a mysterybecause it is the 181

bottom line; inquirycannot carryus beyond the presencingof the particular de. In chapter64 there is a questionof textualdislocation. Commentators seem to agree that the last thirty-threecharacters of the chapterare separatefrom those which precede them. These two sections discuss different aspects of daoism with no apparenttransition, and since it is the latter section which containsziran, we will confine our discussionto it.18 ... the sages desire not to desire, And do not value articlesdifficult to acquire. They study not studying, And restore that which the commonpeople have passed over. In order to assist the perspectivalaction-discrimination of the myriadthings, They dare not deem. This passageis also consistentwith the theory of ziran presentedhere. The sages mentionedare not Confuciansages, but daoistsages who evidence all of the daoist paradoxes of desiring not to desire, and studying not to study. What they are not desiring and not studying are things which were never theirs in the firstplace-the objects of conventionaldesires and conventional knowledge that attend the conventional perspective. It is their organic disposition-organic desires and knowledgethe commonpeople have passed over in embracing the social order advocated by the so-called sage kings which daoist sages work to restore. Daoist sages do not dare to "deem"19the world into static names, because that would be imposingtheir perspectiveon other things. "Deeming" is taken in contrast to ziran, and thus would be contraryto assistingin the developmentof perspectivalaction-discrimination of the myriadthings. Here I take the myriadthings to be the full complement of all of the phenomenain the world, and thus this passage assertsa notion of relativitythat is familiarto us from our readingof the ZhuangZi. One could arguethat the ziran of the myriadthings is still underthe guidanceof the sage who could choose to disruptit by his action, but this referencewould seem to emphasizea particularsort of nonaction(noninterference) and mutuality,for the sage "darenot deem." These chaptersfrom the Dao De Jing demonstratea developmentof ziran which is also to be found in the ZhuangZi. Ziranis mentionedseven times in the Zhuang Zi, startingwith the passagebelow from chapter5: Zhuang Zi said, "Takingthings as either rightor wrong [shilfei]is what I call zeal [qingw]. What I mean by being without zeal is that people do not inwardly wound their persons by preferences,but that they take as constantrelying on ziran (perspectivalaction-discrimination), and are not concernedto over- do the process."20 In this passage Zhuang Zi is talking with Hui Shi, from the School of Names, about the distinction between nature and humanity. Humans, Zhuang Zi argues, are characterizedby qing-single-minded zeal-which 182 Callahan

leads them to distinguishin an exclusive and therefore oppressive way: to choose a single right or wrong, forcingtheir own perspective.This inwardly wounds us in excludingother perspectivesand the value judgmentsthey produce. The ZhuangZi, then, takes qing and the attendantimposition of shilfei as the negative aspects of these two concepts. Specifically,Zhuang Zi does not wish to discardshilfei itself, but the inclinationto impose a single shilfei and the culture and customsthat grow out of this exclusivity.He is rejecting this shi/fei, which is characteristicof corrupthuman society, and appealingto the fruitfulmultiplicity of shi/feiin the greatercontext of nature.This is dem- onstrated by Zhuang Zi's explicit rejection earlier in the story of society's imposed "virtues"of courtesy, duty, knowledge, good will, and honesty.21 With these "virtues,"which become a partof us by our livingin a conventional society, we again wound ourselves. Zhuang Zi leaves this behind and roams off, appealingto the greatercontext of Nature, where he "constants" (changx) the following of ziran (using it as his method), liberatinghimself from the knowledgeand desireswhich are the result of the conventionalperspective. Zhuang Zi, conversely,generates knowledge and desires according to his perspective-in this case the perspectiveof ZhuangZi the human.The characterfor "human"is not specificallymentioned in the text, implyingthat the liberationand developmentthrough ziran can be extrapolatedto include all particulars. Throughoutthe Inner Chapters,Zhuang Zi outwardlyneglects the topic that was centralin the WarringStates period, and which even dominatesthe Dao De Jing: how best to govern the people. Instead, he is preoccupiedwith the appropriatedisposition of the particularperson. Perhapsthis is due to his stress on relativityand the many-sidednessof choices in every situation-he might have felt that even asking how to govern well was in fact to beg the question. Indeed, we should not searchfor rules and rulers, and thus equate politics with government,but should concentrateon the politics of living out our lives as particularperspectives in community. Chapter7 is a compilationof the sparse referencesin the Inner Chapters to government.Below is a passage that containsziran. It is in a story about how a person named "Heaven-rooted" (tian genY) disturbs "No-named- person" (wu ming renz), who is engaged in "ecstaticroaming," to ask about good government.The section that I quote is No-named-person'sresponse, which he would only give after being pestered:

Where you let your heart-mindroam in the bland, blend your energies with the tranquil,and go along with the ziran of thingswithout entertaining selfish motives with respect to them, the worldwill be properlyordered.22

Here, No-named-persondoes not speak of governing,but of what politics is in its most basic sense-the relationand interrelationof people (or parts)in a social ecosystemwhich includes nature. He firsttalks of the "bland"and the 183

"tranquil"in contrastto heart-mindsand energies that are full-full of conventionaldistinctions. Hence there is an emptyingof heart-mind(see the Dao De Jing, chapter3) that is preliminaryto participationin the processof ziran, and which permits us in this process to appreciatethe more organic flavors and activity constitutingour environment.With the part/wholeimplications of ziran, even though each part (or "thing"-wuaa here) moves from its own perspective to constitute its own whole, the myriadperspectives are all in- terrelatedand mutuallyentailing. Hence, selfishnesshas no referencein this system. And thus, with this interactingand cooperation, the world will be more organicallyordered. The next quotationis from chapter14: Perfect music must firstrespond to the needs of humans,and accordwith the reason of Heaven, proceed by the Five Virtues, and blend with spontaneity [ziran].23

Scholarlyconsensus has it that the thirty-fivecharacters which constitute this passage, for reasons of style and textual redaction,are a commentaryof Guo Xiangabwhich was interpolatedinto the text.24If I were to accept this passage as authenticallyin the ZhuangZi, it would cause complicationsin the theory presented here. It is, however, consistentwith what we know of the balance of Guo Xiang's commentaryon the Zhuang Zi, in that Guo Xiang was primarilya Confucianinterpreting the text in an effortto form a synthesis of Confucianismand Daoism.25 The parallel construction of the passage equates ziran specificallywith human affairs,the principlesof Heaven, and the Five Virtues. The reference to the latter three terms is consistent with the story, for the Yellow Emperoris explaininghow he firstplayed his music in a "strict formal performancewhich inspired the Confucian virtues."26 Ziran is not appropriate here, since the parallel terminologies refer to distinctions(human/Heaven) and customs (Five Virtues) which grow out of a lack of perspectivalaction-discrimination. Thus, in terms of an analysisof the place of the term ziran in the text of the ZhuangZi, this instanceof ziran should be disregarded. The next citationof ziran is withinthe same anecdote as the last reference, but it is found in the text itself rather than in Guo Xiang's commentary.It is important to note that Graham characterizesthe chapter that contains this story as "Unrationalisingthe way," for all the stories included appeal to mysticism, to the ineffable, and are thus concerned with the limits of language.27 The story here involvesthe Yellow Emperorexplaining his music to Cheng of the North Gate. The music is divided into three performances.The first one, as noted above, is formalin that it imposes itself on nature and is therefore artificial.The second performanceis spontaneous and unordered, and thus confusingto the listener, who fails to understandit and finallygives up.28 184 Callahan

The problemis that the listener is still imposinghis humanperspective onto the notes, when the music in fact has a perspectiveof its own. The last performanceis a dialecticalsynthesis of the first two extremes, which "breaksout of the dichotomyof order and license."29As the Yellow Emperorstates: I played it again with notes that had purpose, attuningthem with the com- mandof ziran (perspectivalaction-discrimination).30 This passageis a statementof how even the notes in a song all have their own perspectives:they are not subjectto anything,neither an imposednature nor the rebellion againstthat imposed nature-they representdiscourse and discriminationfrom their own perspective.It is the attuningof these parts that composes the perfect performance.This point is reiteratedin the poem that follows this passage, which attempts to describe the indescribableperfor- mance;for example: It moves withoutdirection, Resides in mystery[dark and obscure].... It does not submitto any note as norm.31 The performancemoves without any imposed direction,or the sole direction of any one note ("part")within it. The directionthat the performancehas is the emergent coordinationof the participatingdirections. It resides in mystery because, looking at it from any one perspective,we cannotpredict where it will go. It is a mystery to us, and it is a mystery to itself (or better, "itselves") because the discourse and discriminationare constantly being negotiated.This, then, is the relativityof ZhuangZi. The fifthquotation of ziran in the ZhuangZi occursin a storycalled "Men- ders of Nature," which is considereda statementof daoist anarchism.In the story, the sage first describesthe things necessaryfor an ideal society, then goes on to describethe ideal society of old. This ideal society was harmonious and prosperous.The following passage for analysis suggests the reason for this state of affiairs:

Even if humanshave knowledge, they will not have any use for it. It is this that is called utmost oneness. During this era nobody interferedwith things, and they took as constantperspectival action-discrimination.32 The society has "un-developed"to such a point that knowledgeis no longer necessary, for knowledge in this case denotes the imposed knowledge of a conventionalperspective. Nobody interferedwith thingsbecause they did not have the artificialknowledge which promotes artificial desires, and whichulti- matelyleads to unnaturalactions. All of this is avoided, for they "constant"the process of ziran, which then results in knowledge, desires, and actions which are organic to them as in- tegralto their own perspective. 185

This quotationis followed by the story of the decline of society into "civi- lization"and its ills, expressedin the linguisticallyrelated terms "perception" (making a distinction) and "knowing" (knowing a distinction). Thus, the world fell into violent disorderprecipitated by the contention which attends conventionaldistinctions. Ziran next appearsin chapter 17, but I do not take it to be a compound term, and hence it does not concernus here.33 The last instance of ziran appears in chapter 31, the story of the "Old Fisherman,"as a quote from him:

The rites are what the custom of the times has established. The genuine [zhenac]is the means by which we draw upon nature; this is perspectival action-discrimination,and it is irreplaceable.Therefore, sages taking nature as their model value the genuine, and are untrammelledby custom. Fools do the opposite; incapable of taking nature as their model they fret about humans, ignorant of how to value the genuine, they timidly let themselves be altered by custom, and so are unsatisfied.34

Here, the Old Fishermanis explainingto Confuciusthe nature of zhen, the genuine. As we see above, the genuine stands in contrast to the rites. The rites are contrivedconventions that disciplineeach generation, whereas the genuine is within us, like de, and though its changesare continuous,we cannot perceive them. We take the genuine to be characteristicof the organic knowledge and desire that exist before knowledge and desire based on conventional discriminations.(There are numerousexamples of the genuine in the text which suggest this.) The genuine is an expression of nature rather than humancivilization; nature is not separatefrom us, for as "parts"we not only compose nature, but we are nature. The only way to be genuine is throughthe process of perspectivalaction-discrimination. Without ziran, we are forced back into the conventional perspective and the embellishments that it produces. The sages take nature as their model, as an expressionof their extending beyond humancivilization, recognizing that as humansthey are also parts of nature. Thus, they value the genuine, for it comes from within themselves, and are not restrainedby customswhich are a functionof someone or something else's perspective. The fools cannot separatethemselves from convention, and, hence, are unable to know the genuine. Thus, this passagedistinguishes between the artificialand the genuine, conventional discriminationand ziran. My interpretationof ziran in termsof the Daoist Theoryof Languageleads to both historical and political conclusions. In the traditional history of Chinese philosophyand language, the term ziran has been used to designate and describe metaphysicalforces. When somethingis distinguishedas ziran, with ziran interpretedas "spontaneous,""natural," or even "self-so," that object is removedfrom discourse.We cannot analyzeand otherwiseconsider 186 Callahan

entities which are "spontaneous"or "natural,"for these terms designate things that are beyond our control to influenceand change; they are axiom- atic. This traditionalinterpretation of the term leads directlyto ziran'smodem Chinese meaningof "physicalnature" in additionto what things "naturally" are. Yet, as I have shown, ziran comes from a differentbranch of the Chinese philosophical tradition. It is part of the latter half of the WarringStates period, where thinkerswere concernedwith developinglogic and language. The linguisticinterpretation of ziran places it withinour world and designates it as an ability that all of us use. Rather than being "natural"and "spontaneous," our discriminationsand actions are "organic." As opposed to "natural,"which suggests static states, "organic"denotes a processof growth and decay, of life and death, in which there is continualnegotiation to main- tain and develop our unique particularity.This interpretationshifts the im- port of daoism away from the metaphysicaland certain "quietistic"assump- tions towards an active critique of the society and a positing of a different way, or ways. In examiningwhat the daoistswere arguingfor ratherthan arguingagainst, we can see that the consequencesof this interpretationof ziran and daoism are indeed political:there can be orderwithout an orderer,a ruler. Each part has its own unique basis of judgment and action, yet this does not lead to chaos. It leads to a form of anarchismin which there is human-humanand human-natureinterrelation, not atomization and separation: all the parts coexist and cooperate within the gradationsof compositewholes. This is not politics in the colloquialsense of elections and laws, but politics in the more basic sense of harmonious interrelation and interdependence of parts in humansociety as well as in the largercompound of nature. Ziran as presented in this interpretationestablishes a distinctionbetween the artificialand the genuine in judgmentand suggestsa method wherebywe can disengage from the societal conventions that are inherentlyrestricting, and thus liberateourselves to create our lives with discourseexpressive of the genuine de withinus, to live out our days in satisfaction.

NOTES

1. Please note the juxtapositionhere of an upper-case"D" and a lower-case"d." This shuf- fling of cases contradictsstylistic convention in English,where propernouns such as "Daoism" are capitalized.With ziran as explainedin this essay, style is a philosophicalconcern; we are urged to question conventions,and reevaluatethem accordingto our perspective,using those conventionswhich accord with our de, and discardingthose whichdo not. This act of interpretation is particularlyvital in readinga Chinesetext whichitself does not rely on suchconventions as capitalizationto set one term out from another-importance and centralitycome from interpretationof the content and style of the surroundingtext. Here I make distinctionsfrom the 187

perspectiveof this essay by writingrelativist "daoism" in English with a lower-case"d" and absolute"Daoism" with an upper-case"D": Daoism is more of a singularsystem, a "privileged discourse"(as are Confucianismand Mohism),and thus it is appropriateto markthis exclusive distinctionwith an upper-case"D." 2. The followingsection about the Daoist Theory of Languageis based on the theory presented primarilyin chapter 3 of Chad Hansen's Languageand Logic in Ancient China (Ann Arbor: University of MichiganPress, 1983). I am greatly indebted to ProfessorHansen for answeringmy many questions, and commentingon this essay in variousstages of its development. The interpretationand use of his theoryis my own, and I, of course,take full responsibility for it. 3. Ibid., p. 70. 4. A. C. Graham,Chuang-tzu (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1981),p. 53; ChenGuying, ZhuangZi jinzhujinyiad, rev. ed. (Beijing:Zhonghua Shuju Publishers, 1983), p. 54. 5. The only other places in which it is used in the pre-Qinphilosophical corpus are in later works:the Xun Zi and the Han Fei Zi, beginningin the Han Fei Zi withreferences to the Dao De Jing. I consultedthe Harvard-YenchingConcordance Series to verifythis, with the exceptionof Han Fei and Shen Dao, for which I used: Han Fei, Hen Fei Zi suoyin, Zhou Zhonglinga, and others, eds. (Beijing:Zhonghua Shuju Publishers, 1982); P. M. Thompson,The Shen Tzu Frag- ments(New York: OxfordUniversity Press, 1979). 6. This is the traditionalinterpretation of Shen Dao, whichis basedon the "Tianxia"chapter (33) of the Zhuang Zi. Paul Thompson argues this interpretation,specifically as found in Feng Youlan's [FungYu-lan] A Historyof ChinesePhilosophy, which relies so heavily on the Tianxiachapter to the exclusionof the Shen Tzu Fragments(Thompson, Shen Tzu, pp. 3-7). Hence, perhapsShen Dao has been historicallymisinterpreted as well. But that is not the issue here; I am usingthe traditionalinterpretation of ShenDao to bringout the traditionalinterpretation of Daoism and ziran. 7. I would like to thank Angus Grahamfor his comments,which prompteda reworkingof this theoreticalsection. 8. Hansen, Languageand Logic, pp. 30 ff. 9. Chen, ZhuangZi; Chen Guying, Lao Zi zhuyiji pingjieaf, rev. ed. (Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju Publishers, 1984); Jin Rongwo, Lao Zi "ziran" zhexuezhong "wuwei" zhi gongnengag (Taibei:n.p., 1975), p. 109. Jin Rongwotranslates ziran into ziji ruciruciah (ibid., p. 112), which is essentiallythe standardtranslation "self-so" in English.Perhaps Jin is workingto separatethe classicaldistinction from the modernone of "physicalnature," for he stressesthe point that ziran is not a substance(shitiai) (ibid., p. 108). I, as well as most Westerncommentators, have taken this for granted. 10. Ciyuanai,rev. ed. (Beijing:Commercial Press, 1984), p. 1935. 11. Duan Yucai, Shuo wenjiezi zhuak (Shanghai:Shanghai Guji Publishers,1981), pp. 480. 12. A. C. Graham, Later Mohist Logic, Ethics and Science (Hong Kong: The Chinese Uni- versityPress, 1978), p. 120. 13. Graham,Chuang-tzu, p. 170 n. 14. In the Ciyuanentry for ziran,it specificallylists the twenty-fifthchapter of the Dao De Jing as the firsthistorical citation even thoughit is also writtenin chapters17 and 23. 15. Ch'en Ku-ying[Chen Guying], Lao Tzu: Text,Notes, and Comments,trans. and adapted by Rhett Y. W. Young and Roger T. Ames (San Francisco:Chinese Materials Center, 1977), p. 142 (my retranslation).All subsequentcitations from the Dao De Jing are fromthis edition;I will hereafteronly cite the chapternumber. Unless otherwisestated, I have revisedthe translations. 16. I use the masculinepronouns not in the generic sense, but in recognitionthat classical Chinesephilosophy was writtenexclusively by men. It shouldbe noted, however,that I only need to use the gender-specificpronouns when I talk of singularaction, whichis characteristicof the absolutemetaphysical interpretations which I critique.In my interpretationsit is more appropriate to speak in pluralforms, which in Englishare not genderspecific. 17. Wing-tsitChan translates this line as "Naturesays few words,"citing a "parallelpassage" in the Analects 17:19 (Wing-tsitChan, A SourceBook in ChinesePhilosophy (Princeton: Prince- ton UniversityPress, 1963), p. 151). I feel that it is an erroreven to relate these two passages. 188 Callahan

The wordsof Confuciusare tian he yan zaial(Shisan jing zhushu,Yuan Jiaokeam,ed. (Beijing: ZhonghuaShuju Publishers, 1980), p. 2526)or "Howcan Heaventhen speak?"(my translation). ProfessorChan seems to be relatingthe two very differentterms tian and ziran. 18. Ch'en, Lao Tzu, p. 272; ProfessorCh'en quotes Yan Lingfeng,who argues that these thirty-threecharacters should be separate. 19. "Deem"is a translationfor "weian."Wei is usuallytranslated "to act" or "to make." Wei is here consideredlinguistically as a namingand judging-actions which set the terms of discoursefrom without-interfering: the oppositeof ziran. Deem representsthis notionof wei well; accordingto the OxfordEnglish Dictionary it means"to judge"or "to advocate"-both of which are actions.These actionsinterfere because they requireceding our decisionmaking, our judging, to someone else-these verbs require an object, and we are that object. The secondary definitionsof deem as "to rule," "to administer,"and "to judgeor think(in a specifiedway) of a personor thing"reinforce the positionthat deem is an actionimposed from without in interfer- ence. 20. Graham, Chuang-tzu,p. 82 (15/5/57-58) (the numbers in parentheses refer to the Harvard-YenchingConcordance Series). Unless otherwisenoted, I have reinterpretedGraham's translations. 21. Ibid., p. 81; A. C. Graham,Chuang-tzu: Textual Notes (London:School of Orientaland AfricanStudies, 1981), pp. 20-22; Grahamfeels that this section of the ZhuangZi has suffered severe textualdislocation, and thus has proposeda radicalreconstruction using both the Zhuang Zi and the Lie Zi. 22. Graham,Chuang-tzu, p. 95 (20/7/10-11). 23. BurtonWatson, The CompleteWorks of ChuangTzu (New York: ColumbiaUniversity Press, 1968),p. 156 (37/14/16). 24. Chen, ZhuangZi, p. 368; Chen quotesfrom four other commentators who state that these charactersare a commentaryfrom Guo Xiangon the basisthat there are editionsas importantas the Dao Zanga?which do not include this passage. This passage also in many importantways mirrorsthe passagethat precedesit in the text (Graham,Chuang-tzu Notes, p. 44; Grahamalso leaves out these characterson the basisof Chen'sannotation). 25. FungYu-lan, A Historyof ChinesePhilosophy, Derk Bodde, trans.(Princeton: Princeton UniversityPress, 1953), p. 173; Fung states that both Wang Bi and Guo Xiang honored Con- fuciusas the greatestsage. He also statesthat they were "criticsof them [Lao Zi and ZhuangZi] and modifiersof their ideas" (ibid., p. 175). I have since conductedresearch on the ZhuangZi Commentariesof Guo Xiang, researchthat calls this traditionalinterpretation into question based on textualand philosophicalinconsistencies and the problemof authorship.I hypothesize that Guo actuallyhad two paralleland contradictoryphilosophies: one whichis a developmentof daoismand the other whichis like Confucianism.Here I wouldsay that this passagecomes from the Confucianstrand of Guo's commentary.But untilI workout all of the bugsin this interpretation, I mustrely on the traditionalinterpretation of Guo Xiang'sZhuang Zi Commentaries. 26. Graham,Chuang-tzu, p. 166 n. 27. Ibid., p. 158 n. 28. Ibid., pp. 164-165, 166 n. 29. Ibid., p. 166 n. 30. Ibid., p. 165 (37/14/24). 31. Ibid., p. 166. 32. Ibid., p. 171 (41/16/6-7). If this soundssimilar to Lao Zi and his favoriteprimitive village, it is because there are fundamentalparallels between the languageused here and in that of chapter51 in the Dao De Jing. The last clausein the quotation,"mou zhi wei er changziranap," is exactly the same in structureand essentiallythe same in meaningto this line from chapter51: "mou zhi ming er chang ziranaq."As this passage of ZhuangZi is in the outer chapters,it is possible that the author(s)could have read the Dao De Jing; the passage quoted here would certainlyjustify such a claim. 33. The passage in question is an inimitablerational argument of Zhuang Zi's concept of relativityand perspective,arguing, among other things, against an absolute point of view of "noble or base, small and great" (Graham,Chuang-tzu, p. 146), and specificallyin the quotation, againstabsolute "right" and "wrong": 189

Examiningthem in termsof inclinations,if assuminga standpointfrom which it is rightyou see it as right,not one of the myriadthings is not right;if assuminga standpointfrom which it is wrong you see it as wrong, not one of the myriadthings is not wrong.When you know that [sage]Yao and [tyrant]Jie each thoughthimself right [ziran] and the other wrong,the commitmentsbehind the inclinationswill be perceived.(Ibid., p. 147) (43/17/33-34) Zirancomes in the conclusionof this passage,which uses historicalfigures very familiar to Confu- ciansin a way that wouldhorrify these same Confucians,for the "sage"Yao and the "tyrant"Jie are equated. Chen Guyingargues that in this passage,shi, "that'sit" or "right,"should be substitutedfor ran (Chen, ZhuangZi, p. 421), and upon examiningthe surroundingtext, we see the parallelism of ran withfei, ratherthan the usual shilfei pair. Hence, I do not take ziran to be a compound term, but as zi, "reflexive,"and ran (shi) as "right,"following Graham's rendering of "each thoughthimself right." 34. Graham,Chuang-tzu, p. 252 (87/31/37-39).

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