battlefield where no independent observers nowhere independent observers battlefield ever-changing the on situation chaotic the from Apart in Syria. detect to difficult be can weapons of chemical use The consequence. without is them using may weapons chemical against norm global the that risk aserious is There members. are all states almost of which (CWC) Convention Weapons Chemical the by prohibited and is taboo, moral a global violates weapons of chemical use the But common. most the nor deadliest, the not are attacks Yet, these reprisals. public significant and cause attention media most the receive attacks weapons chemical but of people, number alarge killed has weaponry Conventional human suffering. enormous caused has conflict Syrian The 1 Sudan. Sudan. South and Korea North Israel, Egypt, are: CWC the ratified The only states that have not (yet) signed or or signed (yet) not have that states only The to such retaliatory bombardments. retaliatory such to support for international required is perpetrators the identify to in order investigations independent Strengthening weapons. these against norm global in the upholding effective be can in Syria weapons of chemical usage the against retaliate to threat acredible that and implies in Syria weapons of chemical use the over structure control and command asolid suggests research The weapons. of chemical use the stop (temporarily) to tools of the one be to have proven bombardments retaliatory vetoes, by paralyzed often were Nations United the via initiatives diplomatic While weapons. of chemical use and the bombardments retaliatory link between asurprising is there that shows in Syria incidents weapon chemical alleged on analysis data In-depth deter their usage? bombardments do retaliatory Syria: in weapons Chemical 2018 JULY erode if if 1
weapons temporarily. weapons of chemical usage the of deterring effect the have yielded condemnation diplomatic than rather bombardments retaliatory that is answer Our weapons? of chemical use the ceasing in impact an identifiable have bombardments by and retaliation do diplomatic condemnation in Syria: action international surrounding question a key answer to us help trends The of incidents. number actual the an into insight provide which emerge overlaps some source, their and period time the incidents, of these frequency the comparing By compared. are organisations by different reported incidents weapons chemical publication, In this are and which real are accusations which favour. of fog define war, to Inthe hard is it in their intervention foreign persuade to or adversaries of their reputation the discredit to weapons chemical of using other each accuse parties Combating place. taking is war apropaganda active, are false.
Kars de Bruijne & Sico van der Meer Policy Brief Clingendael Policy Brief
Chemical weapons: The number of (alleged) defining what is what chemical incidents
Chemical weapons are defined by the The exact number of incidents involving Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical chemical weapons in Syria is hard to verify. Weapons (OPCW), the verification Sources of reported incidents do not always organisation of the Chemical Weapons overlap. The Independent International Convention (CWC), as: “anything specifically Commission of Inquiry on Syria has verified designed or intended for use in direct 34 incidents since 2013, while noting there connection with the release of a chemical are more. In the UN Security Council, the US agent to cause death or harm”. Some recently claimed that there have been chemicals are solely used as weapons and 50 incidents. Human Rights Watch reported are completely forbidden under the CWC in 2017 that 85 chemical incidents have (so-called Schedule 1 chemicals). Other taken place in Syria. The French Foreign chemicals are ‘dual-use’: they can be used Ministry, whose intelligence position in for both peaceful and military purposes. Syria apparently gives it relatively good These materials (Schedule 2 chemicals) access to evidence, has put the number are not prohibited and are generally of attacks at 130. The Syrian Archive has freely available; only weaponizing them documented 212 chemical attacks since is prohibited. 2012, of which 26 occurred in 2017 and five in 2018. ACLED – an organization collating The most commonly reported chemicals political violence incidents across the globe – used in the Syrian conflict are sarin (a nerve has been collecting data on Syria from 2017 gas – schedule 1) and chlorine (leading onwards. ACLED data provide similar high to suffocation – schedule 2) while a numbers as those reported by the Syrian smaller amount is reported as ‘undetected’ Archive in 2017. Moreover, for 2018, its data (suggested to be isopropanol). report an even higher number of ‘alleged chemical incidents’ (19 incidents rather than The OPCW has declared that all of the the five reported by the Syria Archive). Syrian regime’s declared Schedule 1 and 2 chemicals have been destroyed. The This Policy Brief uses data from these destruction of chemical agents in Syria in organizations to make a number of recent years is the main explanation for the observations on potential trends and key upward trend in global chemical weapons points in the use of chemical weapons across destruction. However, there are continuing Syria. In particular we use data for the period doubts as to whether Syria actually declared 2012-2017 from the Syrian Archive, the all of its chemical weapon stockpiles when Independent Commission of Inquiry on Syria acceding to the CWC in 2013. and the French Foreign Ministry. These data stem from a range of (intelligence) sources Moreover, the possession of chlorine is and – for the Syrian Archive in particular – not forbidden because it has many civil a range of vetted videos at the scene of the applications, for example, to sanitize drinking incidents. All these data have been verified water or to manufacture detergents. Using it and corroborated. With the exception of as a weapon is prohibited, but the threshold some events reported by the Syrian Archive, between acquiring chlorine for peaceful these data report fewer events for 2017 and purposes and secretly misusing a small hardly any events for 2018 and there is less amount for weaponizing is not very high. information on the actors involved in the While creating advanced chemical weapons incidents (both perpetrator and recipient). such as nerve agents is complicated, and We therefore supplement our analysis with requires advanced industrial facilities and data from ACLED for 2017-2018. ACLED laboratories, weaponizing Schedule 2 data are not vetted and corroborated chemicals as improvised chemical weapons with physical or digital evidence. For this is relatively easy. reason, we use the term ‘alleged chemical incidents’ for ACLED data and ‘verified
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Figure 1 Distribution of (alleged) chemical incidents in Syria
e li e e force P P e r c io ir eco re o e oc ile co le e o r e o r e fro co ry r r
umber of confirmed and alleged chemical incidents
e orting organi ation yri rc i e yri rc i e yri rc i e re c i i ry fro o r yri rc i e co i io of i iry
chemical incidents’ for data from the other notions of brutal yet incidental attacks organizations. ACLED data comes from with chemical agents in Syria. Yet, the a network of local Syrian partners and most poignant observation is the variation international research institutions. Most over time in the use of chemical weapons. of the partners are disclosed (e.g. Airwars Chemical incidents seem to be grouped in and the Syrian Network for Human Rights), time. There are distinct clusters of chemical others remain anonymous for security incidents reported at different points of the reasons. The baseline of ACLED data stems conflict. There are clusters in the middle of from public sources (click here for more 2013, 2014 and 2015 and towards the end of information on sources). 2016 and the beginning of 2018. There are similarly seven points in the conflict where Figure 1 describes a large number of chemical agents have (temporarily) not been reported and verified (Syrian Archive used. We discuss the potential reasons for and others – in blue) as well as alleged the clustering and the non-reporting of chemical incidents (ACLED – in black).2 incidents later in this Policy Brief. These data highlight that the number of chemical incidents in Syria is very large at Figure 2 shows alleged incidents specifically over 200 incidents, far surpassing popular reported by ACLED in 2017 and 2018, the years that were subject to retaliatory bombardments by the United States. Unlike the data from the Syrian Archive, 2 Each reported event by every organization has been ACLED data allow us to observe suspected matched. See here for the method. perpetrators and fatalities (figure 2.a) and
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Figure 2
a. er etrators and sus ected fatalities (2 1 resent)
e orted Fatalities
umber of Events
lle e Per e r or ili ry orce of yri ili ry orce of r P Peo le Pro ec io i i e ifie ili ry orce of r ey li ie
b. Alleged ocations c. Alleged ictims
i ili yri r r l or y l l cle r er io li e Br c i er io r y
victims (figure 2.c). Most incidents are ACLED data note that nearly all incidents reported for the Rural Damascus Region in 2017 and 2018 are alleged to have been (see figure 2.b). carried out by the regime (see figure 2.a on alleged perpetrators). These acts were For 2017 and 2018, ACLED data reports predominantly directly aimed at civilians. eleven and eight incidents, respectively, A clear deviation to this pattern occurred of suffocation, pupil dilatation, breathing earlier in 2018 when two potential incidents difficulties and chlorine use; zero reports of were reported near the Turkish border where Sarin use; while 14 cases of other chemical both Turkish and YPG fighters were accused agents are reported.3 A similar clustering of firing a shell containing a chemical agent. of events occurred in 2017 and 2018: particularly in the first months of 2018, both alleged chemical incidents as well as the Which numbers are correct? number of estimated fatalities increased.4 There is the possibility that chemical events are both under- and over-reported. Underreporting may occur through the same 3 An extract from the data is available on request; please contact the authors for this. issues that plague the general reporting of 4 Note that ACLED is likely to miss out on information (political) violence. Reports come to light for 2017 as, to date, some sources still remain to be when they: a) are witnessed; b) are reported published. by the witness to a reporting outlet; and
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c) are subsequently published by that outlet. use in an effort to discredit them and attract Research suggests that underreporting is outside support. In 2013, opposition groups common when the population is small, as accused the regime in an effort to press for there are fewer witnesses; when events US military intervention. In turn, the Syrian take place in areas with an underdeveloped regime counter-accused the opposition in an road network, in rural areas, and where effort to present them as a radical coalition. there is an absence of phone coverage There is still fierce debate over who is or when taboos are involved. There are culpable for the 2013 attack on Eastern and several reasons why a story may not reach Western Ghouta, the 2017 Khan Sheikoun an outlet, especially when the events are attack and the recent hit on Eastern Ghouta. small and have little impact. This is often Even independent verification processes true when there is an absence of fatalities have become subject to debate as Western in an incident, while there are many reports states believe that Russia and other Assad of high-level destruction. Outlets may not proponents purposely generate confusion; publish what is not newsworthy.5 Despite in turn, Russia believes that allegations of these issues in many conflicts, it is unlikely chemical incidents are used as a pretext for that underreporting affects the information unauthorized Western actions. Independent on Syrian chemical events. In Syria, chemical and thorough verification is the only way to incidents are often aimed at large, urban be sure about the true numbers. and dense populations. Moreover, given the intense scrutiny and outrage over chemical What about the incidents used in this weapons use, such a story is of interest to report, are they subject to overreporting? nearly every outlet. Hence, it is not very likely Particularly for the events not corroborated/ that chemical incidents are underreported. validated, overreporting may be a problem. However, we think that overreporting in Syria A greater problem is overreporting. Since the in ACLED data is – if it exists – minor, for start of the war in Syria, belligerents have two reasons. First, verification by the Syrian accused opponents of chemical weapons Archive suggests that of all the alleged incidents, less than 5% is not corroborated and may be a product of overreporting. Hence, the problem of overreporting appears 5 Dustin Carpenter, Tova Fuller, and Les Roberts, to be limited. Second, one way of assessing “WikiLeaks and Iraq Body Count: The Sum of Parts the credibility of incidents is to count the May Not Add Up to the Whole—A Comparison of number of independent sources reporting Two Tallies of Iraqi Civilian Deaths,” Prehospital and on an event. Research suggests that events Disaster Medicine 28, No. 03 (June 2013): 223–29; reported by more than one independent Nils B. Weidmann, “The Higher the Better? The source have a higher likelihood of being Limits of Analytical Resolution in Conflict Event correct (see here and here). An analysis of Datasets,” Cooperation and Conflict 48, no. 4 (2013) ACLED data for 2017 and 2018 shows that 567–576; Weidmann, “A Closer Look at Reporting most potential incidents in 2018 are reported Bias in Conflict Event Data”; Megan Price and Patrick Ball, “Selection Bias and the Statistical by more than once source (see figure 3). Patterns of Mortality in Conflict,” Statistical Journal This also suggests that the problem of of the IAOS 31, no. 2 (January 1, 2015): 263–72; overreporting is likely to be limited. M. Herbert Danzger, “Validating Conflict Data,” American Sociological Review 40, no. 5 (1975): 570–84; Jennifer Earl et al., “The Use of Newspaper Military retaliation versus Data in the Study of Collective Action,” Annual Review of Sociology 30 (2004): 65–80; Christian diplomatic action? Davenport and Patrick Ball, “Views to a Kill: Exploring the Implications of Source Selection in Chemical incidents have perhaps been the the Case of Guatemalan State Terror, 1977-1995,” only consistent factor shaping the United Journal of Conflict Resolution 46, no. 3 (2002): 427– 450; Robert Justin Goldstein, “The Limitations of States’ position on the civil war in Syria, Using Quantitative Data in Studying Human Rights during both the Obama and the Trump Abuses,” Human Rights Quarterly 8, no. 4 (1986): presidency. A chemical attack on Eastern 607–27. Ghouta in August 2013 prompted actions
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Figure 3 Corroborated Events
of Sources ore o e o rce e o rce
towards an attack led by the Obama passed with only one chemical incident being administration. This counter-attack was reported. In January 2016, the OPCW stated avoided by the Assad regime acceding to the that all declared Syrian chemical weapons CWC and giving up its chemical stockpiles. that were shipped out of the country were In April 2017, the regime allegedly attacked now destroyed. This time, nearly eight Khan Sheikoun with chemical weapons, months passed with only two chemical prompting the Trump administration to incidents. The systemic increase from August retaliate by bombing Shayrat Air Base. 2016 followed upon an OPCW announcement In April 2018, chemical attacks in Duma in July 2016 that it suspected that the regime led to another bombardment by the US had been hiding chemical agents and still and its allies. possessed them. Apart from many interesting observations that may stem from this, How effective has military retaliation been? the apparent relation between the OPCW To answer this, we compared how the declarations and the regime’s behaviour is reported number of incidents responded a first indication that the chemical weapon to diplomatic initiatives and the retaliatory stockpile is (firmly) controlled by the Assad bombardments. regime and also that it uses its chemical arsenal strategically. If true, this shows a In total the combined data show seven more or less voluntary halt on the usage of drops in reported chemical incidents in chemical weapons by the regime in response Syria (December 2012, September 2013, to OPCW activities. the autumn of 2014, November2015/January 2016, April 2017, November 2017, and Two other drops – the one in December 2012 April 2017). What can explain these drops? and the drop in November 2017 – are harder Diplomacy, retaliatory bombardments or to explain. The drop in November 2017 is perhaps something else? probably a result of a massive movement of regime forces from Raqqa, Deir-ez-Zor First, there are two relatively clear and Idlib to Rural Damascus after ISIS was connections to be made between the drop ‘defeated’.6 The drop in December 2012 is in reported incidents and declarations by more difficult to explain, though the fact that the OPCW. In the autumn of 2014 the OPCW stated that all declared Syrian chemical weapons and facilities were shipped out of the country or destroyed; after that, 5 months 6 More information here.
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the war had just started may explain the We consider two potential explanations, on-off character of chemical agent usage at rule them out and subsequently discuss that point in time. what diplomatic initiatives have yielded. The combined evidence suggests with This leaves three lulls in the usage of considerable caution that the use of force chemical agents, and all of these are directly seems to have been proven to be an effective connected to the only three instances where tool to deter the usage of chemical weapons force has been used or was about to be used in Syria. by the US against the Syrian regime. The first drop, in September 2013, coincides with the A first alternative is that the drop in chemical imminent threat to use force by the Obama weapons usage after the retaliatory administration after the regime had crossed bombardments is a coincidence as the the ‘red line’ of chemical weapons usage. regime has accomplished its military goals The two other drops coincide with Trump’s (causing fear among civilians and combatants, retaliatory bombardments in 2017 and resulting in them leaving a certain area). 2018 (see figure 1) after which no reported This argument – while plausible – is unlikely to chemical incidents occurred for more than explain why that usage has stopped. In 2013 2 months. In 2017 there were no incidents the regime was not in a position to claim reported for two and a half months after success and the usage of chemical weapons Khan Sheikoun; after that period, a potential did not yield military success. Equally, the chlorine attack was reported on June 22nd.7 April 2017 attack on Eastern Ghouta did For 2018, no incidents have been reported induce fear but did not help to dislodge since the Duma attacks, as of early July 2018 Al Rahman Corps, Jaysh al Islam (JaI) and (more than three months). other rebel groups. It was only after the final incidents in April 2018 that rebel-groups were Comparing the absence of reported incidents at a breaking point (and may have led JaI to for these three periods with the previous sign an agreement). However, the chemical absence of incidents between clusters of attack was one of many in the previous reported incidents may point to more than a months thus begging the question why JaI coincidence. The credible threats and usage did not withdraw before this time. It is more of force seem to have led to a more cautious likely that it was an effect of a combination of chemical weapon use policy by the regime. pressuring activities (e.g., a massive airstrikes This suggests that retaliatory bombardments campaign since December 2017 as well as or credible threats thereof may be an the successful ground operation in the weeks effective tool to halt the use of chemical prior to the last incident splitting Eastern weapons. Ghouta into various enclaves).
However, correlation is no causation. The fact A second alternative is that Iranian and that there have been no reported incidents Russian diplomatic pressure may have since the bombardment of April 2018 does forced the regime into not using chemical not necessarily mean that the bombardment agents after all three instances. However, has caused the temporarily lull in usage. the key point is that all bombardments were A definitive answer as to why the regime preceded by multiple months of reported stopped employing chemical weapons at chemical incidents and none of these led different points in time will perhaps only to a successful change in the regime’s be available after the war when internal positions (assuming pressure was applied deliberations may become available through by outside allies). Hence, if Russian/Iranian archives and oral history. In the absence of pressure led to a change in the regime’s this, a viable strategy to make a reasonable position at all three points in time, it is likely case is to consider and rule out alternative that either pressure was applied or applied explanations. more forcefully because the US had used or threatened to use force.
Hence, while new evidence may be made 7 Which may be interpreted as a response to the US downing of a regime fighter aircraft in Raqqa. available refuting our claims, the available
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evidence so far suggests that retaliatory albeit temporary, effect on the military bombardments are likely to be responsible realities on the ground. Despite claims for temporary lulls in the usage of chemical that the US response was not driven by a weapons by the Syrian regime. While we do strategic calculation to enforce a norm but not suggest that bombardments are the only rather the emotional response of President viable policy option, it cannot be denied that Trump vis-à-vis the images of suffocating the various diplomatic initiatives have not children, the effects have been more yielded similar results so far. The removal ‘positive’ in upholding a norm than most and destruction of declared Syrian chemical – including these authors – may initially weapons stockpiles and production facilities, have imagined. The implication is that facilitated by the UN and the OPCW, was bombardments may be one of the strategic an important milestone, and these activities tools via which the norms against the usage may have caused temporary pauses in of chemical weapons can be upheld. chemical weapons usage as well. Yet, many chemical weapon incidents were investigated This also means that decisive action against and attributed by the specially established any new chemical incident – however Joint Investigation Mechanism (JIM) of the small – is necessary. The large-scale OPCW and the UN, but these reports were chemical attack on Duma in 2018 was contested by Syria and its powerful ally, preceded by a number of smaller incidents Russia. Attempts to follow up these reports in the months prior to the attack. Alleged with sanctions by the UN Security Council chemical incidents occurred from January all failed because of vetoes by Russia and 2018 onwards; as the regime was closing China. In October 2017 Russia even vetoed in on Eastern Ghouta there was a clear the extension of the mandate of the JIM. The build-up of incidents. This suggests that effect of unilateral economic and diplomatic chemical incidents in Syria are ‘social’ in sanctions by various Western countries is nature: they rarely come in isolation but are unfortunately hard to measure, as is the clustered in time and space. effect of diplomatic pressure behind the scenes on Syrian allies like Russia and Iran. A striking feature of the last spike in alleged incidents is also the increased lethality of incidents. While chemical weapons in Implications and suggestions Syria are thought to be a tool to break the resistance of rebel groups after they have What does this mean? First and foremost that been brought to a breaking point, the slow the Syrian regime has an apparent ability to build-up may also suggest that the regime halt the usage of chemical agents. Whether has been slowly increasing the magnitude being told to do so by Russia or Iran or due of attacks in an attempt to test whether and to a deliberate choice, it has the power to where international red lines are drawn. temporarily stop the usage of chemical It continues when it is not forced to stop. weapons. This observation fits previous From a policy perspective this means that research on the way the chemical weapons new incidents may need to be responded programme in Syria is tightly controlled by to swiftly and decisively as soon as new Assad’s inner-circle (dubbed the ‘Syria Kill reports of chemical weapon attacks begin Chain’). It also squares more generally with to emerge. Without retaliation, every new the way in which the Assad regime operates. chemical attack may further erode the global For example, despite relying on outside norm against using chemical weapons. proxies it still has a relatively significant hold over its pro-government militias. A final implication is that the verifiable The authority and capacity of the regime attribution of alleged chemical weapon means that the possession of chemical incidents is required. If retaliatory weapons has become a deliberate strategic bombardments are one of the effective tool to further regime interests. tools to prevent the further use of chemical weapons in Syria, it should be clear which A core implication is that retaliatory allegations are true, and who is responsible bombardments are likely to have a real, for the proven incidents.
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Yet this is a problem as the activities by the military locations should be considered as OPCW and the UN to investigate chemical an effective instrument. The effects of these incidents in Syria have been seriously counter-attacks are enabled by the apparent hindered. Even thorough reports through top-down control over the use of chemical the specially established Joint Investigation weapons in Syria, as the regime is clearly Mechanism (JIM) were contested by Syria using weapons in a strategic and targeted and its powerful ally, Russia. In October 2017 way. More research is nevertheless required Russia vetoed an extension of the mandate to strengthen the link between retaliatory of the JIM, which meant there is no longer bombardments and drops in the usage of any diplomatic attribution mechanism for the chemical weapons. use of chemical weapons in Syria. The OPCW still tried to investigate the alleged incidents Because chemical weapon incidents in but was not mandated to attribute them. Syria do not occur in isolation but are In June 2018 a special Conference of States clustered in time and space, it follows that Parties to the CWC decided that the OPCW retaliation should occur as soon as possible should attribute proved chemical incidents after a reported chemical weapon incident. as well – how this will work out in practice is However, quick response requires an yet to be seen. independent attribution of chemical weapon incidents. The only neutral, multilateral Strengthening the capabilities of the neutral organisation with excellent expertise in OPCW to investigate and attribute is one chemical weapons investigations, the way of creating broader international support OPCW, could play an important role here, for any retaliatory actions. Yet, even if the even though its speed of investigations complicated problem of the attribution and attribution should ideally increase and mandate will be definitely resolved, the it is facing unfair criticism from some of timeframe for verification and attribution its member states. Other avenues, such is currently fairly long as it generally as strengthening the position of public takes at least several weeks to come to verification initiatives, could be explored a report. A speedier process should be as well. possible. In both cases of US retaliatory strikes, convincing evidence of the attack’s These findings lead to three policy perpetrators surfaced within a few days recommendations: via intelligence services that are active in Syria. To work on alternatives, policy-makers 1. Stringent upholding of the global norm aiming to uphold the global norm on the of the prohibition of chemical weapons prohibition of chemical weapons may also by military means can be effective, consider strengthening the position of public particularly when there is a clear ‘kill verification initiatives such as the Syrian chain’ and top-down control over the use Archive. As long as some states are eager of chemical weapons; to even cast doubt on neutral multilateral expert organisations like the OPCW for its 2. Chemical weapon incidents in Syria have alleged “very mediocre” research quality, been highly ‘social’: where there was one others should not be afraid of similar incident there were often various incidents criticism of public verification initiatives. clustered together in time and space. This suggests that the earliest reports of any incident should be punished in order Conclusion to prevent further usage;
In-depth data analysis on alleged chemical 3. The verification of alleged incidents by weapon incidents in Syria show that the neutral OPCW is crucial. The OPCW incidents slow down or temporarily come investigations should ideally be quicker, to a halt after retaliatory bombardments. and it will be helpful that its mandate was For that reason, this Policy Brief argues that recently expanded to include assigning in order to stop the use of chemical weapons culpability. Strengthening the position and to uphold the global norm against these of public verification initiatives could be weapons, retaliatory bombardments at explored as well.
9 About the Clingendael Institute Clingendael – the Netherlands Institute of International Relations – is a leading think tank and academy on international affairs. Through our analyses, training and public debate we aim to inspire and equip governments, businesses, and civil society in order to contribute to a secure, sustainable and just world. www.clingendael.org @clingendaelorg [email protected] The Clingendael Institute +31 70 324 53 84 The Clingendael Institute
About the authors
Dr. Kars de Bruijne is a Research Fellow at the Clingendael Institute in charge of Clingendael’s Strategic Foresight Programme. He is also a Senior Researcher at the Armed Conflict Location Event Dataset Project (ACLED) where he is heading the Syria team.
Sico van der Meer is a Research Fellow at the Clingendael Institute. His research focusses on non-conventional weapons like Weapons of Mass Destruction and cyber weapons from a strategic policy perspective.