Logistical Notes on Contra Military Buildup: Use of Islands in Gulf of Fonseca" Deborah Tyroler

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Logistical Notes on Contra Military Buildup: Use of Islands in Gulf of Fonseca

University of New Mexico UNM Digital Repository NotiCen Latin America Digital Beat (LADB) 11-19-1986 Correction—cau 11/12/86, "logistical Notes On Contra Military Buildup: Use Of Islands In Gulf Of Fonseca" Deborah Tyroler Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalrepository.unm.edu/noticen Recommended Citation Tyroler, Deborah. "Correction—cau 11/12/86, "logistical Notes On Contra Military Buildup: Use Of Islands In Gulf Of Fonseca"." (1986). https://digitalrepository.unm.edu/noticen/150 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Latin America Digital Beat (LADB) at UNM Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in NotiCen by an authorized administrator of UNM Digital Repository. For more information, please contact [email protected]. LADB Article Id: 077635 ISSN: 1089-1560 Correction—cau 11/12/86, "logistical Notes On Contra Military Buildup: Use Of Islands In Gulf Of Fonseca" by Deborah Tyroler Category/Department: General Published: Wednesday, November 19, 1986 The geographical location of the Swan Islands mentioned in the article, "Logistical Notes on Contra Military Buildup: Use of Islands in Gulf of Fonseca," is in the Caribbean Sea, NOT the Gulf of Fonseca. Thus, the title should read, "Logistical Notes: Use of Swan and Tigre Islands in Contra Military Buildup." "Little Swan" is uninhabited. "Great Swan" is 2 mi. long by 1-1/2 mi. wide. The islands are located 200 mi. southwest of Grand Cayman island, 97 mi. north of the Honduran coast. The history of these islands is interesting, in terms of their apparent strategic importance to the United States. Honduras has claimed the islands for several decades. In 1863, however, via an act of Congress, the US unilaterally declared it to be an American possession. In fact, on Dec. 10, 1912, the island was leased to the United Fruit Company by the US government. The islands are today "administered" via several federal agencies. At present, a federal compound and airport are located on the island. In 1960, "Radio Swan" was established on Big Swan. The radio station was owned by Gibraltar Steamship Corp. of New York City. Gibraltar, however, did not own steamships; it was merely a CIA front. Thomas Dudley Cabot was head of the company in 1960. Cabot was a former president of United Fruit Company, and one-time director of internal security at the State Department. Radio Swan was the source of news about the Bay of Pigs invasion. Radio Swan went out of business in 1962, and the facilities were purchased by Radio Americas Inc. of Coral Gables, Fla. According to the Nov. 1985 issue of POPULAR COMMUNICATIONS, Radio Americas, which was still broadcasting in 1968, was "another CIA front." It was from Radio Swan that news about Bay of Pigs invasion was given. After that in 1962, as Radio Swan went out of business, the station was sold to Radio Americas Inc. of Coral Gables, Fla. Radio Americas, according to POPULAR COMMUNCIATIONS Nov. 1985, the station was "another CIA front." Radio broadcasts from Big Swan in the early 1970s disappeared, but in 1975, the radio facility once again was put to use. Although the facility is still known as Radio Americas, the station is apparently no longer a CIA front. (For further information on the use of Big Swan for broadcasting purposes, see Popular Electronics, March 1961; Electronics Illustrated, Sept. 1967, and July 1968; CQ Magazine, May 1960; and Popular Communications, Nov. 1985 and December 1985.) -- End -- ©2011 The University of New Mexico, Latin American & Iberian Institute. All rights reserved. Page 1 of 1.

Copy Link

Recommended publications

Cuba's Battle of the Airwaves I Am( Mum ,MINA
.-ham.0. " °100 ^ 8' 'Mom Moe. Cuba's Battle of the Airwaves I am( mum ,MINA. Story and QSLs ..htC RADIO OM & By Gayle Van Horn W4GVH AMERICAS FO Ent -.11F Mimi O. herd. Along a sparsely populated region situated The Battle Begins name to Radio Americas which remained on about 100 miles southeast of Havana, In 1960, a small island off the coast ofthe air until it abruptly left the airwaves in May sits an area that resembles the swamps Honduras, known as Swan Island, was pur- 1968. of southern Florida. This area is connected tochased by the Gibraltar Steamship Company Even so, anti -Castro voices have continued the mainland by a couple of two-lane asphalt from New York (a company which owned no throughout the years to transmit propaganda roads, and is of historical value to the peoplesteamships)! A 50,000 watt transmitter was and program to the island nation. At presstime of Cuba. quickly set up on Great Swan Island. As soon there are six active clandestine broadcasters; It is known as the Bay of Pigs. the transmitter became operational, it started five of them broadcasting from the transmitters On April 17-19, 1961, a 60 hour raging battle blasting anti -Castro programs beamed to theof WRMI in Miami, Florida. These include: ensued at the Bay of Pigs, when Fidel Castro's rev- nearby communist island. Conversando entre Cubanos, Entre Nosotros, olutionaries defeated a band of 1,400 CIA trained By May of that year, shortwave listeners Foro Militar Cubano, Radio Oriente Libre and Cuban exiles determined to repel the threats of were riveted by the sounds of Radio Swan on Voz de la Junta Patrieitica Cubana.
[Show full text]
Military Intelligence), “Report on Mercenary Camps and Bases in Guatemala, Nicaragua, and Florida” (Forwarded to Cuban President Osvaldo Dorticos Torrado)
Digital Archive digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org International History Declassified January 12, 1961 Cuban G-2 (military intelligence), “Report on mercenary camps and bases in Guatemala, Nicaragua, and Florida” (forwarded to Cuban President Osvaldo Dorticos Torrado) Citation: “Cuban G-2 (military intelligence), “Report on mercenary camps and bases in Guatemala, Nicaragua, and Florida” (forwarded to Cuban President Osvaldo Dorticos Torrado),” January 12, 1961, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Released by Cuban Government for 22-24 March 2001 conference (“Bay of Pigs: 40 Years After”) in Havana. Translated by National Security Archive. http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/115184 Summary: A military intelligence report from the Cuban G-2 service, outlining the miltiary capabilities of nearby Latin American countries, as well as the miltiary situations (uprisings) in many of those same countries. Credits: This document was made possible with support from the Leon Levy Foundation. Original Language: Spanish Contents: English Translation Scan of Original Document [Box] DIY. INT. G-2 MINFAR CENTRAL HEADQUARTERS APR 7 1961 RECEIVED NO. 2681 THIS REPORT IS EXCLUSIVELY FOR THE INFORMATION OF THE CHIEF OF REVOLUTION TO WHOM IT IS ADDRESSED. IT SHOULD BE RETURNED TO THE DEPARTMENT CHIEF INF G-2 MINFAR [MINISTRY OF THE REVOLUTIONARY ARMED FORCES] CONFIDENTIAL From: Dr. Tec. 0. Inf. G-2 To : Commander Ramiro Valdes Menendez Department Chief. Inf. G-2 MINFAR Dpt. Inf. G-2 MINFAR January 12, 1961 “YEAR OF EDUCATION’’ Re : Report on mercenary camps and bases in Guatemala, Nicaragua, and Florida In 1959, the “yanki” [Yankee, i.e., US] Department of State made the Dominican Republic its main mercenary training center.
[Show full text]
Rr Ee Aa Dd Ee Rr
Turbulence July 2006 CSDS, Delhi The SaraiProgramme 06 saraiREADER / i i ii / Sarai Reader 2006: Turbulence / iii iv / Sarai Reader 2006: Turbulence SARAI READER 06: Turbulence Produced and Designed at the Sarai Media Lab, Delhi Editors: Monica Narula, Shuddhabrata Sengupta, Ravi Sundaram, Awadhendra Sharan, Jeebesh Bagchi + Geert Lovink Associate Editor: Smriti Vohra Translations: Shveta Sarda Editorial Collective: Monica Narula, Shuddhabrata Sengupta, Ravi Sundaram, Ravi S. Vasudevan, Awadhendra Sharan, Jeebesh Bagchi + Geert Lovink Design: Mrityunjay Chatterjee Design Intern: Mrinalini Aggarwal Cover Design: Mrinalini Aggarwal Back Cover Photo: Monica Narula Published by: The Director Centre for the Study of Developing Societies 29 Rajpur Road, Delhi 110054, India Tel: (+91) 11 2396 0040, Fax: (+91) 11 2392 8391 E-mail: [email protected] www.sarai.net Delhi 2006 ISBN 81-901429-7-6 Any part of this book may be reproduced in any form without the prior written permission of the publishers for educational and non-commercial use. The contributors and publishers, however, would like to be informed. Sarai Reader 06: Turbulence <http://www.sarai.net/journal/reader_06.html> Sarai Reader 06: Turbulence is part of 'the Documenta 12 Magazines Project’ <http://www.documenta12.de/english/magazines.html> 608 pages, 14.5 cm X 21 cm Paperback: Rs 350, US$ 20, € 20 Printed at Impress, Chittaranjan Park, New Delhi / v CONTENTS In Turbulence - Editorial Collective - vii TRANSFORMATIONS: REFLECTIONS ON UNCERTAINTY - 1 The Time of Turbulence - R. Krishna -
[Show full text]
Radio and the United States' Cultural Cold War in Latin America
International Journal of Communication 14(2020), 346–363 1932–8036/20200005 Three Peasants Fight for Freedom: Radio and the United States’ Cultural Cold War in Latin America YEIDY M. RIVERO University of Michigan, USA This article examines the 1961–1962 adaptation of the highly successful 1940s Cuban radio series Los tres Villalobos and the sociopolitical and industrial circumstances that shaped this radio product. Produced by the Miami-based company America’s Production Inc. for the United States Information Agency and authored by the scriptwriter of the original series, the 1960s version explored the evils of communism and introduced the economic, political, and social benefits of John F. Kennedy’s “Alliance for Progress” plan for Latin America. The article argues that through radio programs such as Los tres Villalobos, America’s Production Inc. and its Cuban media professionals initiated a series of “ventriloquist” acts that voiced the political and socioeconomic objectives of the Kennedy administration and represented some of the political rhetoric emerging from Cuban exile groups in Miami. Keywords: Cuban exiles, Miami, USIA, propaganda, 1960s, Latin America, radio What happened with the happiness of the people, the cordiality of men, and the generosity of the farmers? They are gone! They died when communism took over the region! Now, there is only mistrust! The father distrusts the son! Brothers are suspicious of each other. Families are divided. And over the entire region, the phantom of hunger slowly takes over. (Couto, 1961–1962, p. 1) These words frame the beginning of the second season of the 1961 version of the adventure radio show Los tres Villalobos.
[Show full text]
Open Final Dissertation.Pdf
The Pennsylvania State University The Graduate School College of Communications TRANSNATIONALISM, REVOLUTION AND RACE: THE CASE OF CUBA’S RADIO FREE DIXIE A Dissertation in Mass Communications by Cristina Mislan 2013 Cristina Mislan Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy December 2013 ii The dissertation of Cristina Mislan was reviewed and approved* by the following: C. Michael Elavsky Associate Professor Dissertation Advisor Chair of Committee James Ford Risley Professor/Head of Department of Journalism John S. Nichols Professor Emeritus of Communications and International Affairs Solsiree Del Moral Associate Professor Marie Hardin Associate Dean/Professor, Journalism Head of the College of Communications *Signatures are on file in the Graduate School iii ABSTRACT During the early 1960s, the Cuban Revolution was creating a new country based on anti- colonial revolutionary principles. Simultaneously, Robert F. Williams and his wife Mabel R. Williams preoccupied themselves with broadcasting Radio Free Dixie, a radio program that aired from Cuba’s Radio Progreso in Havana, Cuba, to spread their messages of anti-imperialism and self-defense to parts of the Jim Crow South and North. This dissertation, therefore, aims to connect the Cuban Revolution to the Black Power Movement in the United States by positioning Radio Free Dixie at the center of a historical moment that intersected the Cold War and black struggle. Such a story is significant because it historicizes previous literature on transnationalism and transnational media and also contributes to recent scholarly conversations that have connected global politics to the United States Civil Rights and Black Power movements of the 1960s.
[Show full text]
American Broadcasting to Cuba: the Cold War Origins of Radio and TV MARTI
View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by Ritsumeikan Research Repository 2011】 © Institute of InternationalAmerican Broadcasting Relations and to AreaCuba （Studies,PROGLER Ritsumeikan） University159 American Broadcasting to Cuba: The Cold War Origins of Radio and TV MARTI PROGLER, Joseph* Abstract Current American debates on broadcasting to Cuba are dominated by opponents who cite economic concerns and proponents who cite political goals. This article seeks to provide historical context for these debates by investigating the formative years of Radio and TV Marti during the Reagan administration and shows that the current debates were present from the beginning, that the political side prevailed, and that the politics of Radio and TV Marti originated with Cold War goals and ideology. The article further observes that a third position, which saw the broadcasts in terms of cultural exchange, was undermined by the dichotomy of economics and politics. Keywords: media, policy, propaganda, intercultural communication RITSUMEIKAN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS Vol.10, pp.159-182 (2011). * Associate Dean and Professor of Asia Pacific Studies, Ritsumeikan Asia Pacific University 160 RITSUMEIKAN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 【Vol. 10 INTRODUCTION In 1985 the American government began broadcasting to Cuba on Ra- dio Marti, followed in 1990 by TV Marti. Both were ironically named after the Cuban independence icon Jose Marti, who once said, “The scorn of our formidable neighbor who does not know us is our America’s greatest dan- ger” (cited in Manuel, 1991, p. iv). Prior to implementation, the broadcasts were debated in the US Congress and they remain controversial today. A 2006 report from the Council on Hemispheric Affairs termed the broad- casts “a bridge to nowhere,” noting that “almost half a billion dollars have been thrown away in the project” (Harr, 2006).
[Show full text]
Lee Swan Island.Indd
Lee Swan Island, its radio history AWA Review including the CIA and the revenge of United Fruit 2010 Bartholomew Lee ABSTRACT Swan Island, between Honduras and Cuba (Figure 1), amounts to just over three-square Swan Island in the miles of very little: coral, palms and big igua- Caribbean, once a pi- nas. But from the standpoint of radio, it does rate lair, can tell many have “location, location, location” and some related radio stories. It very interesting radio tales to tell. United Fruit shows a century of com- Company used it ﬁ rst as a wireless telegraphy munications technol- relay station circa 1911. In 1960 through 1968, ogy in the real world of the American Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) commerce, geo-politics, used it as a propaganda and clandestine station war and weather. Unit- against Cuba on short wave and in the broadcast ed Fruit Company put band. As Radio Swan, it broadcast anti-Castro Swan Island to work programming and operational messages for as its long wave spark the ill-fated Bay of Pigs invasion in 1961. Then wireless relay station for as Radio Americas, it broadcast propaganda its sea-borne commerce to Cuba, all of which was preceded by a little in bananas and sugar. known CIA pirate radio operation on Swan Swan Island thereafter Island in the previous decade. provided an ideal site for researching the Carib- bean hurricanes. In the Cold War, Latin Ameri- can insurgencies sur- rounded Swan Island. In opposing them, the American Central Intel- Fig. 1. Swan Island on the Horizon, c.
[Show full text]
M a G a Z I N
APRIL VOLUME 17 2017 MAGAZINE ® ISSUE 2 Where everyone goes for scripts and writers™ The Eyes Opens in Theaters Across the Country PAGE 8 Q&A with Screenwriter Robert T. Roe PAGE 14 FIND YOUR NEXT SCRIPT HERE! CONTENTS Contest/Festival Winners 4 Feature Scripts – FIND YOUR Grouped by Genre SCRIPTS FAST 4 ON INKTIP! The Eyes: Seeing is Deceiving 8 INKTIP OFFERS: Q&A with Screenwriter Dale Neven • Listings of Scripts and Writers Updated Daily • Mandates Catered to Your Needs 14 • Newsletters of the Latest Scripts and Writers • Personalized Customer Service Scripts Represented • Comprehensive Film Commissions Directory by Agents/Managers 31 Teleplays 33 You will find what you need on InkTip Sign up at InkTip.com! Note: For your protection, writers are required to sign a comprehensive release form before they place their scripts on our site. 3 WHAT PEOPLE SAY ABOUT INKTIP WRITERS “[InkTip] was the resource that connected “Without InkTip, I wouldn’t be a produced a director/producer with my screenplay screenwriter. I’d like to think I’d have – and quite quickly. I HAVE BEEN gotten there eventually, but INKTIP ABSOLUTELY DELIGHTED CERTAINLY MADE IT HAPPEN WITH THE SUPPORT AND FASTER … InkTip puts screenwriters into OPPORTUNITIES I’ve gotten through contact with working producers.” being associated with InkTip.” – ANN KIMBROUGH, GOOD KID/BAD KID – DENNIS BUSH, LOVE OR WHATEVER “InkTip gave me the access that I needed “There is nobody out there doing more to directors that I BELIEVE ARE for writers then InkTip – nobody. PASSIONATE and not the guys trying THEY OPENED DOORS that I would to make a buck.” have never been able to open.” – DWAIN WORRELL, OPERATOR – RICKIE BLACKWELL, MOBSTER KIDS PRODUCERS “We love InkTip.
[Show full text]
None Dare Call It Treason, by John Stormer
The carefully documented story of America's retreat from victory NONE DARE CALL IT treason by John A. Stormer 1964 is a year of crisis and deci sion. Will Ameri ca continue to aid the commu nist enemy, to disarm in the face of danger, to bow before communist dicta tors in every cor- ner of the earth? L The decision is I yours! NONE DARE CALL IT TREASON A Liberty Bell Book To Holly, May her future be as bright as mine was at age 5. © 1964 by John A. Stormer All rights reserved First Printing, February, 1964—100,000 Second Printing, April, 1964—100,000 Third Printing, April, 1964—100,000 Fourth Printing, May, 1964—100,000 Fifth Printing, May, 1964—100,000 Sixth Printing, June, 1964—100,000 Seventh Printing, June, 1964—100,000 Eighth Printing, June, 1964—100,000 Ninth Printing, July, 1964—100,000 Tenth Printing, July, 1964—100,000 Eleventh Printing, July, 1964—400,000 Twelfth Printing, July, 1964—400,000 Hardcover Edition, July, 1964 Thirteenth Printing, August, 1964—400,000 Fourteenth Printing, August, 1964—400,000 Fifteenth Printing, August, 1964—800,000 Liberty Bell Books are published by THE LIBERTY BELL PRESS P. O. Box32 Florissant, Missouri Printed in The United States of America NONE DARE CALL IT TREASON By John . AStormer i LIBERTY BELL PRESS P. O. Box 32 Florissant, Missouri ABOUT THE AUTHOR John Stormer is, like most young Americans who grew up during the Depression, the product of a conservative 1 home and a liberal education. In the late 1950’s he grad ually came to realize that the political candidates and philosophies he was asked to support in the voting booth did not reflect the standards and principles he tried to apply in his business and personal life.
[Show full text]
Cuban Relations by Aaron Birks
UCCS|Undergraduate Research Journal|10.1 Dangerous Obsession: The Troubled History of US- Cuban Relations by Aaron Birks Abstract The objective of this research is to provide a better understanding as to why Cuba, more than any other Latin American nation maintained its enormous place in the American imaginary throughout the tensest decades of the Cold War. Immediately following the success of the Cuban Revolution, misinterpretations of Cuban objectives, fears of Soviet style Communist expansion, and the resulting failures in American policy turned Cuba from ally to enemy. By examining recently declassified government documents, recorded conversations, and interviews with the most influential figures involved in producing this Cold War foreign policy quagmire, this paper will illuminate one of the most misunderstood aspects of American Cold War history. This research will bring better understanding as to why the US Government’s frequent mishandling of Cuban affairs only intensified America’s obsession with Cuba and its seemingly invincible dictator. The conclusion of World War II brought with it more questions than answers for the citizens of the world. The United States of America and the Soviet Union emerged as victors of the war, and new hostilities developed between the two nations almost immediately. In the place of a clear-cut conflict against a recognized evil arose a new war based on vastly different social, political, and economic ideologies. The first hints of the Soviet Union’s plans to extend their influence emerged immediately following WWII in Iran, Turkey, and Greece. Recognizing the possibility of Communist success in Greece and Turkey specifically, President Truman promised America’s help to stem the tide.
[Show full text]
Operational Discrepancy: an Analysis of the CIA's Success in Iran And
Operational Discrepancy: An Analysis of the CIA’s Success in Iran and Guatemala and Subsequent Failure in Cuba by Cindy Lewis The end of the Second World War signaled the emergence of a new global conflict. The United States and Soviet Union emerged from the war as superpowers and each aimed to spread their influence across the globe. As communism began to spread, the United States adopted the policy of containment, which involved preventing the further expansion of communism by any means necessary. Containment comprised a myriad of tactics which included providing economic and military aid to ailing nations in an effort to revive economies and reduce the appeal of Soviet communism; direct military conflict as in Korea and Vietnam; and covert operations carried out by the United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). The failed Bay of Pigs invasion of April 1961 was a covert operation which aimed at deposing the communist dictator Fidel Castro. It was not the first or the last time that the United States government attempted to overthrow the leader of a sovereign nation. In 1953 and again in 1954, the CIA successfully deposed of the democratically elected leaders of Iran and Guatemala. The success of these operations led the CIA and other government officials to believe that similar results could be achieved in Cuba. The operation in Cuba, however, would not share the successful outcome of its predecessors. The Bay of Pigs invasion ultimately ended in failure because the CIA neglected to employ the same tactics that worked in Iran and Guatemala. The CIA implemented inadequate and inefficient propaganda and psychological campaigns and were therefore unable to influence public opinion in their favor.
[Show full text]