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Case Study of Two Alternative Russian Media a Thesis Submitted in P University of Nevada, Reno Diversifying the Media Landscape: Case Study of Two Alternative Russian Media A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in Journalism by Sarmat Misikov Dr. Paromita Pain / Thesis Advisor December, 2020 THE GRADUATE SCHOOL We recommend that the thesis prepared under our supervision by entitled be accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Advisor Committee Member Graduate School Representative David W. Zeh, Ph.D., Dean Graduate School i Abstract The Russian government tends to control most media outlets in the country either directly, through state-owned companies or through a so-called political elite. This, along with existence of various restrictive laws and their usage, forms a barrier to the flourishing of ethical, unbiased, and objective Journalism. Nevertheless, a few independent media outlets still function in Russia. They adhere to certain self-protective strategies to be able to deliver an alternative agenda. This thesis focuses on two media outlets in particular — Meduza and Lentach. The study, based on multiple data sources, explores their work and ethics, codes of conduct, and media and journalistic content they produce. Keywords: Russian media landscape, censorship, alternative media, propaganda, self-censorship, ethical journalism. ii Table of Contents Abstract……………………………………………………………. i Table of Contents………………………………………………….. ii List of Figures……………………………………………………... iii Introduction……………………………………………………….... 1 Literature Review…………………………………………………... 2 State of Russian Media………………………………………… 2 Silencing Alternative Voices…………………………………… 5 Internet Censorship…………………………..………………… 7 Alternative Media…………………………………….……….. 12 Research Questions………………………………………………… 14 Methodological Design……………………………………………. 14 Researcher Background………………………………………. 14 Participants……………………………………………………. 15 Selection of Research Subject………………………………… 16 Results……………………………………………………………… 17 Discussion & Conclusions…………………………………………. 36 Works Cited ………………………………………………….……. 38 iii List of Figures Figure 1: Oligarchs and their media holdings…………………………………. 5 Figure 2: “LGBT instructors from NATO”……………………….................... 20 Figure 3: “Courts in Russia”…………………………………………………... 21 Figure 4: Kiselyov…………………………………………………………….. 30 Figure 5: Note to readers regarding an investigative report about journalist and public figure Ksenia Sobchak……………………………………………... 31 Figure 6: Note to readers regarding Meduza’s mistake caused by reliance on misleading information by Russian newspaper Kommersant……………… 31 1 Introduction Mass media in Russia is diverse, comprising a wide variety of broadcast and print media (Roth, 2011). This is reasoned by the fact that Russia has a very multiethical, multicultural and multilinguistic nature (Vartanova, 2012). For instance, 2200 media outlets in the country broadcast information in ethnic languages (Lange, 2018), while over 60 000 publications are registered in Russia overall (Roskomnadzor, 2019). Many of those media outlets are local and work for certain regions exclusively, however, they convey information in Russian language that serves as a language of interethical communication. The Russian Constitution may guarantee freedom of speech, but media here is plagued by issues of extreme government and self-censorship. Issues of censorship in the Russian press draws academic attention, but alternative media that seeks to combat such censorship needs more focused attention (Welle, 2019). The country, for instance, is in 149th place out of 180 countries in the 2020 World Press Freedom Index. This annual ranking is compiled and published by international non- profit organization Reporters Without Borders (RSF). As RSF states, “Leading independent news outlets [in Russia] have either been brought under control or throttled out of existence. As TV channels continue to inundate viewers with propaganda, the climate has become very oppressive for those who question the new patriotic and neo- conservative discourse, or Just try to maintain quality Journalism. Journalists and bloggers have been Jailed under selectively applied anti-extremism laws or on territorial sovereignty grounds” (RSF, 2020). 2 An independent media and the freedom of thought and speech — are the foundation of democracy. This is also stated in the Russian Constitution and the same constitution states that censorship is prohibited. However, this does not necessarily apply, which has been proven multiple times in studies cited in this research. The biggest media channels in Russia are controlled by the government and are a source of propaganda than a source of Journalism. Yet in the country there are still media outlets that try to combat censorship and propaganda and strive to explore topics other media are too scared to explore, and in the process make the Russian media landscape more diverse and innovative. Two such alternative media outlets are the focus of this study, which investigates how they operate, innovate, use social media platforms, and engage audiences, in their fight against larger more established media. Literature Review State of Russian Media The current state of Russian media is closely tied to censorship and control that the government has over the media landscape to promote its agenda (Schimpfössl and Yablokov, 2020). This explains the country’s low ranking in various freedom indexes. Russia ranks 149th out of 180 countries in the 2020 World Press Freedom Index (RSF, 2020). The Freedom House gives Russia 0 points out of 4 for the presence of free and independent media (Freedom, 2020). 3 “Although the constitution provides for freedom of speech, vague laws on extremism grant the authorities great discretion to crack down on any speech, organization, or activity that lacks official support.” (Freedom, 2020). The study concludes that the government controls all of the national television networks and many radio and print outlets either directly or through state-owned companies and friendly business magnates. A handful of independent media outlets still operate — mostly online and with headquarters abroad. Broadcast media are still a big resource of information for citizens of the country, and television remains the most popular source of news, “but its influence is declining, particularly among young people who rely more on social networks” (Freedom, 2020). A study, conducted by a Russian non-governmental research organization Levada-Center in January 2020, reports that 73% of respondents consider television as the main source of information and 52% trust the broadcasting information, especially among those older than 18 years in 50 cities (Levada-Center, 2020). “Emotional and compelling news stories are broadcasted on the television screens of nearly every Russian household, offering households a certain entertainment value,” Veronica Ma writes in her study Propaganda and Censorship: Adapting to the Modern Age. “As many in Russia struggle to understand where the truth lies, the Kremlin continues to manufacture, brand, and refine its narrative, while suppressing those of others” (Ma, 2016). Outlets that were operating independently were purchased by offshore companies, which are controlled by the Kremlin — most of the time indirectly (Kovalev, 2020). An example is the Business News Media Vedomosti. In March 2020 the company was sold to a group of Russian businessmen who were 4 connected to the Kremlin (Meduza, 2020). New owners appointed a new and more compliant editor-in-chief. Shortly after the outlet’s employees accused the editor-in-chief of promoting censorship and undermining the credibility of the publication. The reasons behind the accusation were that the editor-in-chief edited or deleted stories that were inconvenient for the Russian authorities and companies close to the Kremlin (among them Russia’s biggest state-owned oil company Rosneft). He also banned the publication of polls by Levada- Center (now it is included in the registry of non-commercial organizations acting as foreign agents in Russia) and abandoned criticism of the constitutional amendment to nullify Putin's presidential terms (Echo Moskvy, 2020). This shows that besides the fact that news coverage of the maJority of media in Russia is coordinated with the Kremlin and media are “under pressure of being agreeable to the Kremlin and pleasing their audiences with their products and output” (Schimpfössl and Yablokov, 2017), the government does not control all media directly. There is a so- called political elite, whose members run all big media holdings in the country and have mutual and direct access to President Vladimir Putin. “While the Russian government directly controls and operates state media, it is also able to exercise considerable influence over private media through formal and informal channels of control” (Zakem, Saunders, Hashimova, and Hammerberg, 2018). Figure 1 below is made by a nonprofit research and analysis organization CNA and depicts media ownership in Russia in connection with Putin oligarchs’ names. 5 Figure 1: Oligarchs and their media holdings CNA also highlights Putin’s role in Russian media decision-making as a consistent media style, “something that he and Russian observers describe as ‘manual control’.” Manual control is distinct from ‘automatic’ control and refers to Putin’s direct intervention, as necessary, to ensure implementation of state obJectives” (Zakem, Saunders, Hashimova, and Hammerberg, 2018). Silencing Alternative Voices Pro-Kremlin
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