Case Study of Two Alternative Russian Media a Thesis Submitted in P

Home , Alexander Mamut, Dmitry Kiselyov, Echo of Moscow, Ivan Golunov, Mass media in Russia, Meduza

University of Nevada, Reno

Diversifying the Media Landscape: Case Study of Two Alternative Russian Media

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in Journalism

by Sarmat Misikov

Dr. Paromita Pain / Thesis Advisor

December, 2020

THE GRADUATE SCHOOL

We recommend that the thesis prepared under our supervision by

entitled

be accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

Advisor

Committee Member

Graduate School Representative

David W. Zeh, Ph.D., Dean Graduate School

Abstract

The Russian government tends to control most media outlets in the country either directly, through state-owned companies or through a so-called political elite. This, along with existence of various restrictive laws and their usage, forms a barrier to the flourishing of ethical, unbiased, and objective journalism. Nevertheless, a few independent media outlets still function in Russia. They adhere to certain self-protective strategies to be able to deliver an alternative agenda. This thesis focuses on two media outlets in particular —

Meduza and Lentach. The study, based on multiple data sources, explores their work and ethics, codes of conduct, and media and journalistic content they produce.

Keywords: Russian media landscape, censorship, alternative media, propaganda, self-censorship, ethical journalism.

Table of Contents

Abstract……………………………………………………………. i

Table of Contents………………………………………………….. ii

List of Figures……………………………………………………... iii

Introduction……………………………………………………….... 1

Literature Review…………………………………………………... 2

State of Russian Media………………………………………… 2

Silencing Alternative Voices…………………………………… 5

Internet Censorship…………………………..………………… 7

Alternative Media…………………………………….……….. 12

Research Questions………………………………………………… 14

Methodological Design……………………………………………. 14

Researcher Background………………………………………. 14

Participants……………………………………………………. 15

Selection of Research Subject………………………………… 16

Results……………………………………………………………… 17

Discussion & Conclusions…………………………………………. 36

Works Cited ………………………………………………….……. 38 iii

List of Figures

Figure 1: Oligarchs and their media holdings…………………………………. 5

Figure 2: “LGBT instructors from NATO”………………………...... 20

Figure 3: “Courts in Russia”…………………………………………………... 21

Figure 4: Kiselyov…………………………………………………………….. 30

Figure 5: Note to readers regarding an investigative report about journalist and public figure Ksenia Sobchak……………………………………………... 31

Figure 6: Note to readers regarding Meduza’s mistake caused by reliance on misleading information by Russian newspaper Kommersant……………… 31

Introduction

Mass media in Russia is diverse, comprising a wide variety of broadcast and print media (Roth, 2011). This is reasoned by the fact that Russia has a very multiethical, multicultural and multilinguistic nature (Vartanova, 2012). For instance, 2200 media outlets in the country broadcast information in ethnic languages (Lange, 2018), while over

60 000 publications are registered in Russia overall (Roskomnadzor, 2019). Many of those media outlets are local and work for certain regions exclusively, however, they convey information in Russian language that serves as a language of interethical communication.

The Russian Constitution may guarantee freedom of speech, but media here is plagued by issues of extreme government and self-censorship. Issues of censorship in the Russian press draws academic attention, but alternative media that seeks to combat such censorship needs more focused attention (Welle, 2019).

The country, for instance, is in 149th place out of 180 countries in the 2020 World

Press Freedom Index. This annual ranking is compiled and published by international nonprofit organization Reporters Without Borders (RSF). As RSF states, “Leading independent news outlets [in Russia] have either been brought under control or throttled out of existence. As TV channels continue to inundate viewers with propaganda, the climate has become very oppressive for those who question the new patriotic and neo- conservative discourse, or just try to maintain quality journalism. Journalists and bloggers have been jailed under selectively applied anti-extremism laws or on territorial sovereignty grounds” (RSF, 2020). 2

An independent media and the freedom of thought and speech — are the foundation of democracy. This is also stated in the Russian Constitution and the same constitution states that censorship is prohibited. However, this does not necessarily apply, which has been proven multiple times in studies cited in this research.

The biggest media channels in Russia are controlled by the government and are a source of propaganda than a source of journalism. Yet in the country there are still media outlets that try to combat censorship and propaganda and strive to explore topics other media are too scared to explore, and in the process make the Russian media landscape more diverse and innovative. Two such alternative media outlets are the focus of this study, which investigates how they operate, innovate, use social media platforms, and engage audiences, in their fight against larger more established media.

Literature Review

State of Russian Media

The current state of Russian media is closely tied to censorship and control that the government has over the media landscape to promote its agenda (Schimpfössl and

Yablokov, 2020). This explains the country’s low ranking in various freedom indexes.

Russia ranks 149th out of 180 countries in the 2020 World Press Freedom Index (RSF,

2020). The Freedom House gives Russia 0 points out of 4 for the presence of free and independent media (Freedom, 2020). 3

“Although the constitution provides for freedom of speech, vague laws on extremism grant the authorities great discretion to crack down on any speech, organization, or activity that lacks official support.” (Freedom, 2020). The study concludes that the government controls all of the national television networks and many radio and print outlets either directly or through state-owned companies and friendly business magnates. A handful of independent media outlets still operate — mostly online and with headquarters abroad.

Broadcast media are still a big resource of information for citizens of the country, and television remains the most popular source of news, “but its influence is declining, particularly among young people who rely more on social networks” (Freedom, 2020). A study, conducted by a Russian non-governmental research organization Levada-Center in

January 2020, reports that 73% of respondents consider television as the main source of information and 52% trust the broadcasting information, especially among those older than

18 years in 50 cities (Levada-Center, 2020). “Emotional and compelling news stories are broadcasted on the television screens of nearly every Russian household, offering households a certain entertainment value,” Veronica Ma writes in her study Propaganda and Censorship: Adapting to the Modern Age. “As many in Russia struggle to understand where the truth lies, the Kremlin continues to manufacture, brand, and refine its narrative, while suppressing those of others” (Ma, 2016). Outlets that were operating independently were purchased by offshore companies, which are controlled by the Kremlin — most of the time indirectly (Kovalev, 2020). An example is the Business News Media Vedomosti.

In March 2020 the company was sold to a group of Russian businessmen who were 4 connected to the Kremlin (Meduza, 2020). New owners appointed a new and more compliant editor-in-chief.

Shortly after the outlet’s employees accused the editor-in-chief of promoting censorship and undermining the credibility of the publication. The reasons behind the accusation were that the editor-in-chief edited or deleted stories that were inconvenient for the Russian authorities and companies close to the Kremlin (among them Russia’s biggest state-owned oil company Rosneft). He also banned the publication of polls by Levada-

Center (now it is included in the registry of non-commercial organizations acting as foreign agents in Russia) and abandoned criticism of the constitutional amendment to nullify

Putin's presidential terms (Echo Moskvy, 2020).

This shows that besides the fact that news coverage of the majority of media in

Russia is coordinated with the Kremlin and media are “under pressure of being agreeable to the Kremlin and pleasing their audiences with their products and output” (Schimpfössl and Yablokov, 2017), the government does not control all media directly. There is a so- called political elite, whose members run all big media holdings in the country and have mutual and direct access to President Vladimir Putin.

“While the Russian government directly controls and operates state media, it is also able to exercise considerable influence over private media through formal and informal channels of control” (Zakem, Saunders, Hashimova, and Hammerberg, 2018).

Figure 1 below is made by a nonprofit research and analysis organization CNA and depicts media ownership in Russia in connection with Putin oligarchs’ names.

Figure 1: Oligarchs and their media holdings

CNA also highlights Putin’s role in Russian media decision-making as a consistent media style, “something that he and Russian observers describe as ‘manual control’.”

Manual control is distinct from ‘automatic’ control and refers to Putin’s direct intervention, as necessary, to ensure implementation of state objectives” (Zakem, Saunders, Hashimova, and Hammerberg, 2018).

Silencing Alternative Voices

Pro-Kremlin information is the one that is being daily delivered through various media outlets (controlled either by the country’s rich business and political elite or the 6 government itself) and is freely distributed in contradiction to the information that does not fit into how the Kremlin portrays certain events. Veronica Ma writes: “Reports of the

Russian government attempting to silence domestic voices of dissent by jailing opposition journalists and shutting down opposition stations have also surfaced, further supporting the misinformation narrative that is present in modern Russia” (Ma, 2016).

Besides mainstream media, political bloggers who are not professional journalists initially are under pressure from the regime as well. They are often represented as a source of alternative information in authoritarian countries (Bode and Makarychev, 2014).

However, even if they are not necessarily doing what professional journalists do, they are

“one of the primary social media targets” since they can be easily traced through their media pages and broadcast information that does not correlate with the government agenda

(Rudnik, 2020; Zelizer, 2009).

Attempts of silencing opposition bloggers and journalists have started to attract a lot of attention lately, especially in Moscow where people united in rallies in defense of, for instance, Ivan Golunov, a Russian journalist, known for his professional investigations.

He was arrested in 2019 for alleged drug possession. His colleagues and activists made several successful campaigns so later the journalist was released, and all charges were dismissed (CNN, 2019).

Arrests, raids, and threats against journalists are common in Russia (Freedom,

2020). A Freedom of the World 2020 study states that “In late July 2019, five journalists covering preelection protests in Moscow were physically attacked by police. By August, 7 at least 14 journalists covering the protests were detained, in one case even after their accreditation was found.”

In this light, pro-Kremlin media and Russian media overall face declining audience trust. According to the 2019 Edelman Trust Barometer Global Report, only 26% of respondents trust the media, which is 9% less comparing to the year prior and 21% less than the global index (Edelman, 2019). Journalism in Russia is suffering, but it is certainly not dead. A few outlets even continue to do investigative reporting (Lipman, 2010).

“Compared to the USSR, Russia allows a much wider freedom of expression. On the web

(uncensored in Russia), in print media, on the radio, or on smaller-audience TV channels, one can find plenty of reports, opinion pieces, and blog posts criticizing government policies” (Lipman, 2010).

Internet Censorship

However, a lot has changed since Lipman’s article was published 10 years ago, especially regarding the internet and social network regulations. As the RSF (2019) states,

“Today the internet is thought to be a strategically crucial sector in Russian politics although for a long time those in power in the Kremlin did not recognise its importance.”

In 2012 the law of publishing a “blacklist” of websites was passed. It was aimed at sources that included pornography content, drugs, and websites that discussed suicide. In 2013, the law was extended to cover political extremism which was so loosely defined that the courts reached a series of rather questionable verdicts (Stewart, 2017). Since 2014, bloggers with more than 3000 readers have had to register with the authorities by providing their contact information (Denisova, 2017). Such a requirement was a result of anti-regime protests online. 8

Later, authorities gained control over one of the most popular social networks in

Russia, VKontakte. Its founder, Pavel Durov, left the company saying that “the freedom of action of the chief executive in managing the company has considerably decreased”

(Walker, 2014).

Internet control is a very commonly used technique by the Putin administration.

Directly or indirectly, they try to take over the most important web infrastructure and websites. “Control through ownership over the Russian Internet companies has increased, but in a finely calibrated fashion in order not to spark discontent and risk the formation of a social movement” (Pallin, 2015).

The extended list of all the laws restricting press freedom and freedom of expression is presented in RSF’s research Taking Control? Internet Censorship and

Surveillance in Russia (2019). It includes recriminalization of defamation, expansion of the definition of treason and espionage, bans on swearwords, insulting religious feelings,

“homosexual propaganda”, blocking of websites without a court order, harsher penalties for separatist appeals, a stipulation of storing personal data of Russian citizens in the country, restrictions on the activities of foreign publishers, large-scale data retention, making news aggregators accountable for the content, a requirement for companies to provide access to encrypted messages, ban of VPNs and anonymizers from showing blocked content, ban of anonymous communication via messaging apps, immediate deletion of defamatory information, required registration of media outlets that are registered abroad or receive foreign as “foreign agents”, harsh penalties for search engine operators, prison sentences for not deleting prohibited content, ban on soldiers from using 9 smartphones, and ban on “fake news” and “disrespect” towards the state. And finally,

Russia’s “sovereign internet law”, which stipulates that a large proportion of internet traffic in the country will be routed through servers inside Russia. The purpose of such a law is, as it was stated, to maintain independent internet in Russia in case of cyberattacks from outside the country.

The law states that Russian internet service providers are supposed to route internet traffic exclusively through domestic internet exchange points (IXPs) that are registered with Roskomnadzor, The Federal Service for Supervision of Communications, Information

Technology and Mass Media. Moreover, all internet service providers are to install new technology that enables Roskomnadzor to centrally block websites and reroute internet traffic. “This would mean that it would no longer have to rely on the assistance of providers that have not always followed the government’s instructions in the past” (RSF, 2020).

It is well known that online platforms provide opportunities to share information without high monetary investments. They also allow information to be easily spread and multiplied. Those factors make the online landscape more uncensored even if the authorities try to implement the regulations partially discussed above. Some of them were included in the list of press freedom’s digital predators by RSF for jeopardizing the ability of the public to get news and information.

The research was especially focused on Roskomnadzor. It has blocked around

500,000 websites without warning and without respecting legal procedures, and it has a secret blacklist of banned sites. Its targets have included news agencies, investigative websites, and political magazines. “It also blocks platforms and apps that refuse to store their data on servers in Russia or provide the Russian authorities with keys to decrypt 10 messages. This has been the case with the encrypted messaging service ProtonMail, which was partially blocked in January 2020” (RSF, 2020).

The list also includes the so-called Kremlin’s troll army for “spreading false reports and videos, publishing personal information (“doxxing”), defamation”. As RSF states, they target journalists who write about propaganda and oppose the current political regime.

Governmental attention to the internet, online media outlets, and social media is constantly rising along with the news consumption on those platforms. According to

Levada-Center’s study, 39% of respondents consider social media as a primary source of information. It is 11% more than a year and a half before. Online media, for example, has the same index — 39% (Levada-Center, 2020).

The increase in choosing social media as a main source of information is logical.

They expand freedom of expression, access to information and they are a powerful tool that is used for communication during many kinds of crises, political or otherwise (Forelle,

Howard, Monroy-Hernández, & Savage, 2015). In addition, in countries such as Russia, they serve as a refuge for diversity in media and “a lifeline to journalists, activists, and ordinary citizens attempting to exercise their democratic rights” (Repucci, 2019).

Authorities do not find this state of social media safe for the regime. Thus, they seek to dismiss “social media as a cesspool of lies and vitriol plays directly into the hands of authoritarians looking to increase state hegemony over the information landscape”

(Freedom, 2019).

One of the most noticeable attempts to shut down independent, or inconvenient, media outlets happened when Roskomnadzor attempted to block the Telegram messenger, which is another creation of Paver Durov. Telegram has a lot of features that social media 11 platforms usually have. Its Channels tool quickly became an effective way to share news, personal opinions, and conduct live coverage of certain events based on short posts, something similar to microblogs on Twitter (Glukhova, 2018).

The app did not cooperate with the Russian administration and user identities were not disclosed to the Federal Security Services (FSB), and thus more and more oppositionist media channels started to appear in the messenger. It consequently became popular among urban dissenters (Akbari and Gabdulhakov, 2019). In April 2018, Roskomnadzor sent information about Telegram to telecom and internet providers to restrict access to the messenger (Interfax, 2018). The reason for the blocking was Telegram's refusal to transfer encryption keys from users' messages to the FSB.

At the same time, Durov, the founder of the app, issued a statement to the messenger’s users that Telegram will continue to work and use built-in blocking bypass methods that do not require additional action from users. He also stated that “Privacy is not for sale, and human rights should not be compromised out of fear or greed” (Durov, 2018).

After two years of unsuccessful blocking, the Russian government decided to unblock the messenger, admitting that the app was still working and available for download in the country. The reason for the unblocking was the ineffectiveness of blocking and the fact that a lot of governmental agencies used Telegram as the main source of information

(Tumusov, Ionov and Terentev, 2020).

This, again, shows how Russia tries to control the internet and online media with various oppression tools. However, in addition to the legal approaches, “online and offline actors are utilized within the Kremlin’s surveillant assemblage. Online actors include groups, such as pro-Kremlin bloggers and trolls, who spread counter-dissent content” 12

(Akbari and Gabdulhakov, 2019). Trolls are part of the Kremlin’s propaganda system and technique of information warfare. Recruited commentators distribute messages of Russia’s political leaders online (Aro, 2016).

Alternative Media

Despite the censorship and control that Russian authorities have over media in the country, several independent publications still function. As they deliver an alternative to

Russia’s censored reporting agenda, provide accountability journalism, and offer reliable information, they will be referred to as alternative media outlets in this thesis.

“Until relatively recently, the Russian government has been more or less happy to allow a range of points of view to compete in the public space” (Greene, 2014), however,

“as the economy has faltered”, the Kremlin became stricter in controlling channels of communications. The tendency can be seen through the many outlets that have changed their owners. In 2014, The Calvert Journal published a list of independent media. They included such outlets as Lenta.ru, Afisha, Echo of Moscow, Russian Reporter, The Village,

Vedomosty, RBC Daily, Rain TV, BBC Russian Service, Novaya Gazeta, and others

(Beard, Crews, Omidi, Pakhomova, Rann, and Zinatulin, 2014). Since the study was published, some of these media became state-owned and changed their narrative to pro-

Kremlin lines (Vedomosti, RBC). Popular independent outlets are being acquired by the authorities to be “turned into loudspeakers for the dominant ideology”, any serious sociopolitical discussions are being undermined and replaced (Mejias and Vokuev, 2017).

“A handful of longtime independent newsrooms still survive under Putin, though their journalistic lives can be precarious” (Cooper, 2020). The author claims that, as many 13 analysts theorize, Putin allows a few alternative media to exist so he can tell critics that

Russia does have independent publications. However, Cooper highlights that “there’s not much evidence that he cares what press freedom critics have to say.”

Even though independent, or alternative, media exist, particularly online (Terzyan,

2020), survival of such journalism in Russia is essential and vital for Russian audiences.

“But foreign audiences also have a stake in truthful reporting that can help us better understand Russia” (Cooper, 2020).

In a discourse of Russian propaganda, control and censorship, the topic of self- censorship cannot be avoided. Studies on self-censorship in public life often include democratic context — they usually see this phenomenon as obstructive to democracy, as a constraint for people to be a part of deliberative processes (Festenstein, 2018; Bunn, 2015).

“For merely being mindful of the limitations of freedom inevitably makes one also an enforcer of these limitations. But the penalties for not being mindful, for refusing to play by the rules, are too grave” (Gessen, 2005).

While personal motives influence decision-making processes for journalists, the most significant external pressure both online and offline are political threats (Bodrunova,

Litvinenko, and Nigmatullina, 2020). A recent study found that that only 5.3% of journalists (5 of 95) did not self-censor within the previous 3 to 5 years; for 14.7% (14 of

95) self-censorship was a regular practice, while almost 55% (52 of 95) practiced it from time to time (Bodrunova, Litvinenko, and Nigmatullina, 2020).

In such a landscape where media outlets self-censor themselves out of the fear of being oppressed by authorities, the value of media publications that keep working according to established codes of conduct and journalistic ethics rises dramatically. 14

It is in this light that this study focuses on the following three research questions:

RQ1: How are alternative media in Russia adhering to their professional values and combating propaganda?

RQ2: How does the information they provide differ from mainstream media?

RQ3: How do they use social media to innovate and attract attention to uncensored information?

Methodological Design

This thesis presents a qualitative case study of two Russian alternative media outlets — Meduza and Lentach. Analysis in this research is based on multiple data sources, including interviews with five people working in the case study media outlets, documents such as codes of conduct, media content published on various platforms including social media, and an observation in the time period between June 2020 and October 2020.

A qualitative case study was chosen as a research design to describe, explore, explain and compare experiences of different media outlets in the same settings of the

Russian media landscape that has been in details presented in the Literature Review section.

Researcher Background

I worked as a reporter for various media organizations in Russia such as a newspaper, news websites, analytical websites and television. I held news editor, TV host, 15 reporter and creative editor positions. This experience helped me to better understand the system of how media operate in Russia both in small regions and towns, and in big cities such as Moscow, the capital of the country.

Previously my research interests were in speech etiquette and implications in journalistic news and feature stories. Noticing the lack of research media on censorship in media in Russia encouraged me to focus of analyzing media that do not fear opposing propaganda and does ethical journalism.

Participants

For this case study, I interviewed five people from Meduza and Lentach media organizations. The interview participants were found through their outlet’s websites and social media platforms and contacted through their personal or corporate social media pages. The choice was motivated by the backgrounds and positions that the participants hold.

Data was collected through semi-structured interviews conducted through video or audio calls in Zoom, Facebook Messenger, and VK. Each interview was recorded either with Zoom or a iPhone 11 voice memo application. Discussion topics included, but were not limited to, interviewees’ background, job responsibilities, job structure, codes of conduct, bases of ethical journalism, social media strategies, censorship and pressure arising from it.

Selection of Research Subject

The selection of research subjects was based on three main criteria: the media should be alternative, thus make effort in combating propaganda, be innovative in the way of operating as a media overall and have big audience engagement rates.

Two media outlets — Meduza and Lentach — were a great fit, and, consequently, were selected as case study subjects.

Meduza is an international publication released in Russian and English. According to the outlet’s About page, Meduza brings its readers “the most important news and feature stories from hundreds of sources in Russia and across the former Soviet Union” (Meduza).

The publication claims its independence and desire to be a source of reliable and unbiased information. Meduza claims that it is squeamish about the interests of officials and big business, despises propaganda, and prefers factual journalism over journalism of opinions.

According to one of the interviewees, the outlet has its offices in a couple of cities across

Russia, but the headquarter is in Riga, Latvia.

Lentach is a satirical socio-political media outlet. It claims to be the biggest independent information community in Russia. Lentach accompanies every news story with a meme picture or photo. That approach reflects the main principles the editorial office declares: “relevance, efficiency, giggles and not being assholes” (Lentach).

As memes are the addition that editors make to every news article, reports, understandably, become subjective. However, one of the interviewees from the publication said they still “try to be objective in their subjectiveness”. The outlet’s code of conduct says, “We are not liberals, we are not conservatives, we are not fascists, we are not pro- 17 feminists, we are not democrats, we are not communists, we are not for Navalny, we are not for Putin. We are Lentach. Lentach always has its own opinion on the processes. And we must not forget that we live in Russia and our common goal is to try to make it better.”

Results

The main ways Lentach and Meduza combat censorship are, understandably, by broadcasting information that pro-governmental media cannot broadcast or exposing and proving that those media either lie or tell half-truths. While both Meduza and Lentach have different approaches to do their job, they have a lot in common. They have very transparent codes of conduct that all employees are obliged to follow.

Both case study media outlets have a significant background that cannot be avoided since it sets and speaks a lot about the values of journalists behind these outlets. Founders of both Lentach and Meduza worked in the same web media outlet called Lenta.ru.

However, after March 2014 when Galina Timchenko was dismissed from her position as editor-in-chief by Russian entrepreneur Alexander Mamut (owner of Lenta.ru; his connection to Putin can be found in Figure 1), many employees left the publication with her. Shortly after, Timchenko and her colleagues started to work on a new project, Meduza, that launched in October 2014.

Meduza’s headquarter is in Riga, Latvia. According to Timchenko, she and her team understood that they will not be able to work in Russia (Fontanka, 2014). That is why, along with other economic factors, the editorial office had to be based outside the country they primarily write about. 18

Lentach’s story starts after Timchenko’s dismission too. The outlet operates through the biggest Russian social media website VK.com, and initially, Lentach was

Lenta.ru’s official page on that media platform. However, in March 2014 the page lost its official status and was renamed to its current name. After that, the editors of the page, Igor

Belkin, Andrei Konyaev, and Igor Petrushov, decided to hand over the control over the page to its most active commentators. Two years later, Belkin and Konyaev took over

Lentach again.

Lentach presents itself as new media which according to the Cambridge Dictionary include “products and services that provide information or entertainment using computers or the internet, and not by traditional methods such as television and newspapers.” It also works as a news aggregator, repackaging information they obtain from different media outlets. Editorial staff write a summary of news and attach a link to the source. Often, they attach a meme to the story. This technique became a significant mark of their corporate style. The Cambridge Dictionary describes a meme as a “humorous image, video, piece of text, etc., that is copied (often with slight variations) and spread rapidly by internet users.”

The purpose of such an approach was described as a way of attracting more attention and, consequently, raising engagement rates, expressing the editorial office’s position and attitude towards events.

In its code of conduct, Lentach dedicated a chapter to the basics of humor.

Considering three theories of humor: superiority, incongruity, and relief theories, the editorial office chooses the second one — incongruity — as the base of their conduct code.

“The funny, on this view, is found in the incongruous: we laugh at things that are unexpected or unusual because they surprise us, or seem somehow out of place” (Olin, 19

2016). As the document says, this theory lies in the absurdity, the discrepancy between expectations and reality, the discrepancy between the beginning and the expected end.

Lentach also uses the trick of breaking a template as the basis of humor. The conduct code states that in every story, there is a beginning that allows guessing what the end would be like. However, the purpose of a joke is “to make the end atypical, i.e. “break the template”, while maintaining the logic of the story of the template.” They use two pictures of a sheep as an example. The first one is a close-up of the animal’s head stuck in a fence. The context implies that the sheep is trying to escape from the fenced-in area. However, the next picture shows us a wider frame where is almost no fence at all, except for the small fragment where the animal’s head is stuck. Lentach wants its employees to achieve a similar effect as from viewing this picture so that the audiences can will never guess how the joke ends based on how it starts.

Lentach also advises its employees to be able to find a middle ground between making a joke understandable and yet making it in a way that audiences will need “to think a little to unravel it.” Lastly, the outlet draws a line between just a picture and a meme picture. “A joke where are not two, but only one story, i.e. nothing breaks it, — is not a joke, but only an illustration.”

Almost all the employees of Lentach know how to either draw memes or use the

Adobe Photoshop application to make memes. They are not journalists and they do not have media education. They are called “pikchery”, which would be translated to English as picturers. They are referred to as “pikchery” not only by staff members but by their readers too. In the hiring process, they are usually evaluated by their sense of humor and creativity, rather than their writing skills, which they later are taught by their colleagues. 20

Below is a picture that Lentach used with the news article about the discussion of the topic of homosexuality on a state-owned television channel Russia-1 where one of the speakers, Alexander Malkevich, president of the Foundation for National Values

Protection, said that if Russia will not engage in sex education for children, “LGBT sex instructors from NATO” (The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, a military alliance between 30 North American and European countries) will do it instead (Lentach, 2020).

Translation:

LGBT instructors from

NATO develop a device for massive conversion of Russians to gays (1608).

Figure 2: “LGBT instructors from NATO”

This phrase has been widely ridiculed on social media platforms. Lentach used a drawing of Isaac Newton's 1666 experiment where he sends white light through a prism and finds the division of white light into its component colors (dispersion). The outlet, in 21 its usual manner, used a picture (Figure 2) to make fun of Malkevich and the fact that he believes in the existence of such NATO instructors who turn Russian children into LGBTQ community members. They sarcastically use Newton's persona as a metaphor for “NATO instructors,” and a prism as a “conversion devise” which can transform white light (straight people) into a rainbow (gay people).

Another example is Lentach’s picture used with another news article about the authorities of one of the regions in Russia who proposed to abolish the Constitutional Court in their area due to its ineffectiveness (Lentach, 2020).

Translation:

The most useless things:

Courts in Russia

Figure 3: “Courts in Russia”

Again, Lentach ridicules the authorities to highlight the problem of the judicial system in Russia that is often called ineffective, opaque, and not credible (Muižnieks,

Hammarberg, and Gil-Robles, 2016).

Besides making the pictures, pikchers also write or rather rewrite news articles too.

Thus, they are responsible for producing the whole story, including the process of deciding whether or not a news event is worthy enough to be published on Lentach. Both decision- making and writing are explained in details in the code of conduct. Regarding news selection, the editorial office considers four factors: the importance of the news, public attention to it, emotionality, and the ability to joke about the topic. The news selection process consists of double screening. As one of the interviewees said: “The editorial office has monitors. These are the people who are looking for news. Twice an hour, they send 10-

20 news, which came out in the last half hour, to the work chat. Pikchery are choosing from this news.” Publications code of conduct also regulates terms of news freshness and includes paragraphs about the importance of fact-checking.

As memes are a big part of Lentach’s work, they have certain self-restrictions — topics they do not joke about. They include death, grief, and disabilities. At the same time, as every joke is subjective, the media often faces pressure from some readers to delete certain posts. In such a case, the editorial office makes individual decisions about every reported news story.

According to an interviewee from Lentach, the publication has not experienced pressure from the Russian authorities. However, the editorial staff has to self-censor itself to keep the media afloat and not put employees at risk. “We live in a country where we have a law banning disrespect toward the authorities. We have lawyers with whom we 23 periodically consult on how to joke, how not to joke, whom to joke about, whom not to joke about. We understand that due to the fact that we are one of the largest [digital media platforms in the country], we receive a lot of attention,” one interviewee said highlighting the aforementioned law’s existence as an oppressive tool.

In this regard, Meduza’s journalists individually experience a lot more pressure from the authorities. The reason is the publication’s investigative journalism that is not self-censored and is a big part of Meduza’s work.

Overall, the publication states in its code of ethics that it strives to meet international professional standards, and hold the rights and freedoms outlined in the

Universal Declaration of Human Rights as core values. Meduza also claims that it devotes special attention to the freedom of speech and the free flow of information (Meduza, 2019).

The editorial office’s independence is a big topic for the publication too. The media does not support any political politician or political party, does not accept help from them, and covers its own costs without accepting money from outsiders.

Meduza ensures that their reporting is fact-based, objective, impartial, and their sources are truthful and credible. Investigative reporting correspondents of the publication work with a certain range of topics and have their own sources of information that are sometimes anonymous. That is how the editorial staff is capable of doing investigative reporting on topics no one else in Russia does. One of the latest investigations was conducted by Liliya Yapparova who wrote about sexual harassment that took place for a long time in the intellectual club called What? Where? When? (Yapparova, 2020). The club has its own well-known game show that is still being broadcasted on Russian governmental television channel Channel One. Club members, who are usually referred as a connoisseur, 24 travel around the country to conduct their off-screen games, and to teach teenagers how to play it. In the summer, when one of the members of the club was accused of sexual harassment towards teenagers, Yapparova found out that, in different years, at least five more club members were accused as well.

Meduza’s investigative reporting correspondent talked to a former connoisseur, or rather, connoisseur from different generations, and found out who forbad them from discussing and revealing schoolchildren harassment, why certain club members have been harassing teenagers for years without consequences, and how one of the connoisseurs returned to work with children after being accused of rape.

Investigative reporter Ivan Golunov works for Meduza too. He has done several investigations that allegedly led to his arrest in 2019 for the fabricated case of drug possession. His investigations include stories about how the family of the deputy mayor of

Moscow, Pyotr Biryukov, earns billions of rubles (the currency of Russia) on city contracts to spend on massive mansions (Golunov, 2018); how gangsters and officials in the police, military, and state carve up Russia’s funeral business (Golunov, 2019); how Vyacheslav

Volodin’s (10th Chairman of the State Duma) friends and family landscape villages, make money off mayo, and are canonized as saints (Golunov, 2017); among others.

Golunov’s case shows how indulging in investigative journalism in Russia is menacing and, at any rate, attracts a lot of attention from authorities. One of the interviewees from Meduza said that they are often warned that the topics they are going to explore are “very dangerous” and are recommended “not to write about that.”

“Once upon a time, people from one of the Russian special services gave me a strong warning not to write some story, but these are completely regular things that most 25

Russian journalists face when they try to write about something. I want to say that I may have been lucky, but me and my family have never faced any serious threats. Verbal threats, warnings, and loud formulations are nothing in Russian realities,” the interviewee says.

They also highlight that Meduza takes good care of the informational and physical security of its correspondents.

Besides the Russian version of the publication’s website, Meduza has its English version too. According to another interviewee from the editorial staff, it is meant to

“amplify best and newsworthy coverage for a broader audience that doesn’t speak

Russian.” The English version’s editor mostly translates the stories from the original website. They also decide what to translate based on what they think would resonate with anglophone readers. However, they do not take part in deciding what stories Meduza will produce.

The English editorial office says its biggest challenge lies in communicating effectively to an audience “that does not care that much” and “is predisposed to certain biases.” The goal of the staff is to communicate “an independent Russian perspective on

Russia.” The interviewee said that it is “different from official state perspective that you can get from a lot of media, you can get it from Russia Today or Sputnik. It is not hard to get, it is not in short supply. Even in English.”

Besides Meduza’s investigations on the topics state-controlled media never explore, they write about serious events that state media are deliberately ignoring. The most vivid instance is what has been happening around the poisoning of opposition leader, politician, jurist and anti-corruption activist Alexey Navalny. To set the context, Navalny was on a flight from Tomsk to Moscow on August 20, 2020, when he felt sick. The plane 26 made an emergency landing in Omsk, where he was hospitalized in a coma. Two days later, despite objections and resistance of the chief physician of the local hospital, Navalny was transported to Germany for treatment. While doctors in Omsk reject the poisoning version and argue that nothing of the kind was found during the medical tests, German officials confirmed that Navalny was poisoned with a chemical weapon — a substance from the

Novichok group of nerve agents. These findings were also confirmed in special laboratories in France and Sweden, the German government representative said (Seibert, 2020).

On September 23, the opposition politician was discharged from the hospital but was still recuperating in Germany. He himself believes that he was poisoned on the orders of Putin, and that the Omsk hospital was not letting him get transferred to Germany so that he either died, or the poison was completely removed from his body so it was no longer possible to suspect that the chemical weapon had been used against him (60 Minutes,

2020).

After the incident, the European Union announced personal sanctions against six high-ranking officials who may have been involved in the poisoning of the politician. The official Russian position on this topic asserts that the poisoning is an anti-Russian provocation, and that Russia does not have Novichok chemical weapons at all since it was destroyed in 2017 (Russian Foreign Ministry, 2020). Understandably, all pro-government media adhere to the same position.

In the light of what has been discussed above, this case is interesting to consider from the point of view of comparing how news about Navalny is presented by the censored media and the outlets under study. 27

Governmentally controlled media publications refer to Navalny as a blogger, not a politician. For instance, news outlet iz.ru writes the following in a lede paragraph from a

Navalny-related story: “Russia will respond proportionately to the restrictive measures of the European Union because of the incident with blogger Alexey Navalny” (Iz.ru, 2020).

Another example from Russian news agency TASS’ website describes: “Reasoning behind the EU’s decisions on introducing anti-Russian sanctions over the incident with Russian blogger Alexey Navalny borders on the absurd, while the decisions themselves infringe on the UN functions, the statement of the Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the

European Union made public on Friday” (TASS, 2020).

Navalny, indeed, runs a successful YouTube channel (currently 4.17M subscribers) that he uses as a way to communicate with his supporters and, most importantly, publish his investigations that get millions of views. One of his most viewed investigations, Don’t

Call Him Dimon, has 36M views and 118,609 comments. According to the description of the video, Navalny and his team attempted to tell “the story of the corrupt empire of the chairman of the government of the Russian Federation and the United Russia party Dmitry

Medvedev.”

Video description says: “Some ironically call him pathetic and use ‘Dimon’ instead of his full name. But he is not pathetic. Through his puppet ‘charity foundations’ Dmitry

Medvedev owns real estate around the country, controls giant lots of land in the most elite districts, enjoys yachts and apartments in pre-revolutionary mansions, and receives profit from the agricultural companies and vineyards both in Russia and abroad.”

Navalny uses social media platforms as a medium of communication with his audiences, however, the tactic of referring to him only as a blogger misleads the audience 28 and attempts to undermine his position as an important figure in Russian political life. The refusal to call him a politician becomes even more absurd in the light of sanctions imposed by the EU — a range of countries put in place restrictions over high-ranking officials because of “a blogger.”

Analysis of the media narrative around Navalny shows that outlets include both information about the official position of Russian doctors and the findings of German doctors. In terms of journalistic standards, the coverage of opposing viewpoints can be considered as a correct strategy to adhere, however, the way the sentences are made and what words are used in the description of this case suggests that the pro-government media are trying to manipulate the audience. For instance, iz.ru writes at the end of many latest

Navalny-related news stories the identically formulated backstory: “After Russian doctors stabilized the blogger's condition, he was allowed to be taken to Germany for treatment. In the Berlin clinic Charite, where Navalny was taken, they told about the discovery of signs of intoxication with a substance from the group of cholinesterase inhibitors, although tests taken in Omsk showed the absence of such substances in his body. The German government stated that Navalny was allegedly poisoned with a substance from the

Novichok group. No evidence or facts were provided. Berlin did not respond to Russia's requests” (iz.ru, 2020).

This implies that the official position of the Russian government is the only correct position in the story. That appears to be propaganda rather than ethical journalism. It is even easier to trace such narrative on governmental channels’ TV shows. Vladimir

Soloviev, who is considered to be one of the most notable propagandists in modern Russia, started his show about Navalny on Russia-1 saying: “The day today, of course, turned out 29 to be an interesting one, because in the morning the German prosecutor's office said that they did not see anything special about Navalny, they were silent for 8 days. And then, apparently, they got a call from Britain, they say that there are traces of a poisonous substance from the Novichok group. At the same time, the developers of Novichok say that the clinical picture is completely different. To which they are told [by Germans]: no, no, no, if we decided so, then we decided so!”

It is worth mentioning that propaganda goes beyond media outlets. The editor in chief of RT (international television network funded from the Russian budget), Margarita

Simonyan, wrote the following about Navalny’s poisoning on her personal Twitter page:

“You will not believe it, but I said at home yesterday that Navalny seemed to have advanced hypoglycemia. This is when blood sugar suddenly drops sharply. I have this when I do not eat for a very long time. Suddenly, icy sweat hail, trembling, wild weakness, and you realize that you are leaving. If they had given him a spoonful of sugar on the plane, nothing would have happened” (Simonyan, 2020). This utterance has been widely ridiculed on social media. Navalny’s wife, Yulia, reacted to it as well, and called Simonyan a “state terrorist” (Navalnaya, 2020).

Another noticeable propagandist is Dmitry Kiselyov. As it relates to the topic of our study, it is worth mentioning that he believes Russia is “a world champion in freedom of speech” (RIA Novosti, 2019). This news story was broadcasted on RIA Novosti website.

The outlet is part of Rossiya Segodnya (English: Russia Today) news agency. Kiselyov was appointed by Putin to head that agency.

Lentach shared this news as well. The editorial staff member made a meme picture using Kiselyov’s photo: 30

Translation:

Of course, there is freedom of speech in Russia…

I'm not talking about the freedom of those who say these words

Figure 4: Kiselyov

In an effort of combating propaganda, Meduza does not fear disclosing lies that censored outlets usually publish without fact-checking. After Navalny was transported to

Germany, Meduza published a story with the following headline: Kremlin spokesman says

Putin didn’t hold any international talks about sending Navalny abroad for treatment — but that’s not true (Meduza, 2020). In the story, publication proves that Putin took part in at least one international phone call concerning oppositionist’s health. Two months later,

Putin has stated that he helped to ensure Navalny’s transportation. This, again, contradicts what his spokesman said and shows, along with the level of trustworthiness, how authoritarian censorship adjusts to agenda that is more convenient to the regime at a specific time. 31

After a period of observation, it is clear that Meduza proves its high journalistic standards. It is obvious that in a country like Russia, alternative information is as essential as transparent journalism is. Meduza admits its mistakes (for example, by including a line

“There was an error in this material, changes were made to it” into a headline of the story after it was edited) and tries to be honest with its readers by, for instance, leaving a variety of notes in stories:

Figure 5: Note to readers regarding an investigative report about journalist and public figure Ksenia Sobchak

Figure 6: Note to readers regarding Meduza’s mistake caused by reliance on misleading information by Russian newspaper Kommersant

Lentach’s, in its own manner, strives to provide truthful information too, even if the outlet is more self-censored than Meduza. In modern Russia, alternative media face a 32 choice of either being more cautious about what they publish or being put under authoritarian pressure. Lentach chooses the first option, but still, what has been noticed in the process of observation, tries to broadcast accurate information by sourcing independent outlets.

In the case of Navalny, Lentach did not post memes, which is known as their style.

The reason behind the editorial staff’s decision is unknown, however, their code of conduct says to not joke about those who have been harmed. Perhaps the situation with the poisoning of the oppositionist did not seem to the editorial office to be a topic for jokes.

Navalny’s case was covered but without any meme pictures.

Both Meduza and Lentach prove their status of alternative media, not only by the way they work with information but in regard of attracting attention, innovating, and engaging through social media. The media outlets under consideration operate very differently but both are extremely popular.

Lentach initially has been launched on VK.com, a social media network mostly popular in Russian and other post-Soviet counties. The editorial office still considers that network as their main platform since it accumulates most of the followers of the outlet — over 2.3M people. When Lentach was starting, it experimented with a format. As one of the interviewees says, the founders’ goal was to broadcast news ironically and informally.

Lentach was the first media in Russian media space to implement a reporting technique where memes accompany the news. After the editorial staff noticed that this format gathered more attention than other approaches, they tried to adhere to it.

Lentach mixes up its content. Again, it does not always post jokes; sometimes news is accompanied by photos, videos, infographics. Another common format that the outlet 33 posts twice a day, during day and night, is news digest format. It comprises 7 to 10 news stories combined on one page without any illustrations. On almost all platforms, including

Twitter, Facebook, Telegram, ICQ, OK.ru, the editorial board duplicates everything that is published in the main community. The exception is TikTok, where the outlet attempts to innovate. Here they post creatively processed news stories along with purely entertaining content. They are produced by a separate editorial office whose tasks include only to maintain the outlet’s page on this social network. Compared to their main community, the

TikTok page has not yet gained much popularity and has about six thousand subscribers.

Lentach, recognizing that its biggest platform is its VK page, admits that Telegram is still the most interesting platform for the outlet — it has around 220 thousand subscribers on its channel.

The publication has its own website too. It is a one-page site that imitates social media feed style and duplicates all the content from other platforms as well. Since Lentach is a news aggregator, it produces its own original stories only once or twice a year. As for becoming completely autonomous, in terms of news production, one of the interviewees from Lentach says that in that case an investor will be needed. However, as the editorial office will not comply with an investor’s “interests”, the outlet continues to be an aggregator. The interviewee also mentioned that even in case of potential expansion,

Lentach will have separate editorial staff but under the same brand name: ones will continue to do what the outlet does now on social media, while the others will produce journalistic content. 34

Meduza is presented on fewer social media sites than Lentach, however, it still has pages on the major platforms. According to one of the interviewees from Meduza, their social media team consist of five people who generate ideas together on weekly meetings.

“All our social networks strive to exist as independent media. But to varying degrees. Instagram and Telegram — more. In VK, we are also now trying to make original content”, the interviewee said highlighting that platforms such as Facebook and Twitter serve more to attract an audience to the site.

Thus, one of its most popular pages the publication runs on Twitter with 1.3M followers. In terms of published content, on Facebook, VK, Telegram, and OK.ru, it publishes mainly news content produced by the publication.

The most attention-grabbing and engaging content Meduza produces for its

Instagram page which has around 750 thousand followers. According to the publication,

Meduza’s Instagram is the most popular account in the entire Russian media. Social media managers make a variety of content for the page along with what is taken from the media’s website: entertaining Instagram Stories, quizzes, recipes, meme pictures, and games. A large portion of the content is based on user-generated content, Meduza constantly interacts with and often initiates communication with users. According to one of the interviewees from the publication, the social media team uses Instagram lately as “to support and entertain the audience in difficult times and limit the amount of disturbing and negative news in the feed.” The media outlet also has a YouTube channel (over 280 thousand followers) with news content, explainer videos, documentary films, and streaming content.

Meduza’s social media tactic is comprehensive and well-constructed. It attracts the attention of different audiences on a variety of platforms. In the end, it leads not only to 35 social media engagement but also converts into unique website visitors (for example,

Meduza has around 13 million monthly visitors) and loyal readers overall making the publication very popular in Russia.

The number of followers and the engagement rates of case study media again show that Russian needs and believes in alternative information. In comparison to social media pages of pro-governmental publications, the difference is drastic. This might be an indicator that trust to propaganda collapses, especially among younger generations that, according to a variety of researches, are the most active social media users.

Discussion & Conclusions

This research aimed to explore the Russian media landscape, examine the function of alternative media outlets, and thus, answer three research questions: how alternative media in Russia adhere to their professional values and combat propaganda; how the information they provide differs from mainstream media; how they use social media to innovate and attract attention to uncensored information.

Using a qualitative research method and multiple data sources, such as interviews with five people working in Meduza and Lentach, codes of conduct, observation, and media content published on various platforms including social media, this study reveals an important trend. Despite heavy state propaganda and censorship, some independent media outlets still manage to survive and serve as a source of alternative information.

The agenda these media broadcast differs from what state-owned publications focus on: the range of topics, investigative and news reporting, as well as different approaches of providing uncensored information, indicate the passion of the case study outlets to combat propaganda and set freer professional landscape. In order to do so, alternative media outlets engage in practicing professional and ethical journalism that is based on professional standards and their own transparent codes of conduct. Their journalistic effort and social media strategies attract attention of a wide audience, making Meduza and Lentach one of the most popular and spreadable media sources in the country.

The overall suppression and pressure that publications experience dictate how they operate. Alternative outlets have to choose between various methods of self-protection: registering media in other countries, consulting with lawyers, or self-censoring. Meduza and Lentach use different tactics. While Meduza is guided by more journalistic approaches, 37 such as doing important reporting and investigations, Lentach is a more self-censored outlet that uses social media in order to attract attention to different news stories. Both of them contribute to diversifying and building freer media space in Russia.

Amidst a variety of studies about censorship in Russia, this thesis explores two specific outlets and their place on the media landscape. Thus, the purpose of this research was not only to understand the overall censorship media in the country face, but to acknowledge the existence of alternative voices in the Russian media context.

The results show that censorship is a deep-seated problem. However, independent media outlets take this, along with all disruptions, threats and other barriers to the performance of professional duties, as a starting point from which to base their journalistic activities, engage audiences, innovate, and find ways to spark changes in the Russian media narrative.

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