DOCSLIB.ORG

THE SOCIAL WELFARE STATE and POPULISM How Does the Social Welfare State Affect Populism?

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
THE SOCIAL WELFARE STATE and POPULISM How Does the Social Welfare State Affect Populism? THE SOCIAL WELFARE STATE AND POPULISM How does the social welfare state affect populism? Abstract This paper is focusing on the social welfare state and how their components influence the political backlash created by globalization. The political backlash, which is the rise in populism as a result of globalization, becomes a problem when the power of populistic parties becomes too big. This paper tries to explain this relation between globalization and populism and why the political backlash could be dangerous for developed countries. Furthermore, it tries to give a solution for these problems by investigating the influences of the social welfare state on this political backlash. The results of this paper show us that the unemployment tempers the effect of globalization on populism and that unemployment has a direct, negative relation with populism. This paper also shows that income inequality has an amplifying effect on the political backlash, provided that the income inequality grows in the middle segment of society. Sander Spijkers Supervisor: Albert de Vaal Table of content 1 Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 2 2 Literature review and hypotheses ................................................................................................... 5 2.1 Problems of Globalization ....................................................................................................... 5 2.1.1 Economic problems of Globalization ............................................................................... 5 2.1.2 Social problems of Globalization ..................................................................................... 7 2.2 Globalization paradox ........................................................................................................... 10 2.3 Solutions to the paradox ....................................................................................................... 14 2.4 Populism and globalization ................................................................................................... 16 2.4.1 Relation Globalization and Populism............................................................................. 17 2.5 The social welfare state ......................................................................................................... 19 2.5.1 Components of the social welfare state ........................................................................ 20 2.6 Hypotheses ............................................................................................................................ 23 3 Method and Data .......................................................................................................................... 27 3.1 Regression and tests .............................................................................................................. 27 3.2 Variables ................................................................................................................................ 28 3.3 Regressions ............................................................................................................................ 34 3.4 Data and database discussion: .............................................................................................. 36 4 Results ........................................................................................................................................... 39 4.1 Tests and main result ............................................................................................................ 39 4.2 Robustness checks ................................................................................................................. 43 5 Discussion ...................................................................................................................................... 48 5.1 Validity of the variables ......................................................................................................... 48 5.2 Results and hypothesis .......................................................................................................... 50 5.3 The regression ....................................................................................................................... 54 6 Conclusion ..................................................................................................................................... 56 7 Bibliography ................................................................................................................................... 58 8 Appendix ........................................................................................................................................ 65 8.1 Appendix 1 ............................................................................................................................. 65 8.2 Appendix 2 ............................................................................................................................. 68 8.3 Appendix 3 ............................................................................................................................. 69 8.4 Appendix 4 ............................................................................................................................. 72 8.5 Appendix 5 ............................................................................................................................. 72 8.6 Appendix 6 ............................................................................................................................. 74 1 1 Introduction Globalization, “a situation in which available goods and services, or social and cultural influences, gradually become similar in all parts of the world” (Cambrigde , 2013). A quick search on the internet gives you this as the definition of Globalization. Globalization is going on for ages, but the last few decades, the rate in which globalization is happening is extraordinary (Osterhammel & Petersson, 2005). Main reasons for this are improved transport, technology, mobility of capital and the rise of global trade blocks (Osland, 2003). All contributing to a decline of costs and barriers, which stimulates not only the economic trade, but also social interactions between different cultures. Globalization also brings problems. After decades of prosperity and globalization, the financial crisis struck in 2008 which resulted in a crisis on global scale. Due to the worldwide intertwining and the deregulation of the (financial) markets (Crotty, 2009), markets all over the world were hit. Together with the downfall of many firms, the public opinion towards globalization turned a bit (Noury & Roland, 2020). Since the crisis of 2008, the call for less globalization and more economic and political independence is growing. This is also shown by the rise of populism in many European countries. In almost every Western European country, populistic parties grow in numbers, e.g. AFD in Germany, Lega in Italy and PVV in the Netherlands. That populism and the anti-globalization sentiment are growing, is not a coincidence, due to the complementarity of them. Populism, which can be defined as the political ideas and activities that are intended to get the support of ordinary people by giving them what they want (Cambrigde , 2013), focusses on national interest rather than international benefits (Rodrik, 2018). Although populism was not always against globalization, they turned to a more anti-globalization approach simply because it gains votes (Zaslove, 2008). Reasons for populism to adopt anti-globalization in their agenda are: globalization is elite driven, globalization limits state sovereignty, globalization is linked to the growing power of the EU and economic globalization destroys the organic nature of civil society (Zaslove, 2008, p. 174). Populism is therefore a good outcome for the anti- globalization movement. The growth in populism due to the growth in globalization is seen in the literature as the political backlash (Rodrik, 2018). The political backlash can be defined as the shift of the voters from traditional parties to more populistic parties, caused by globalization. There are two conditions in order to refer to the rise in populism as a political backlash (Rodrik, 2018). First, the political backlash is mostly present in the more developed democracies, as voters 2 have to have the ability to change the sitting government by fair elections. As mentioned before, countries like Italy, Germany and other European countries do have to deal with the political backlash, as they have a well-developed democracy. Second, the rise in populism has to be the result of growing globalization, but not at every level of globalization the political backlash occurs. In the early stages, in which a country opens up, this effect is not present at all (Milner, 2018). A more detailed explanation for the creation of the political backlash, is given by Rodrik with the globalization paradox. In his book “The Globalization Paradox” (Rodrik, 2012), he claims that globalization comes with a paradox. The three pillars of the paradox; (economic) globalization, national sovereignty, and democracy, are causing frictions between the institutions within and between the countries. Institutions play a central role in the paradox, as they are fundamentally different between countries due to the democratic process in each country. In
Load more

Recommended publications
  • The Greek New Right and the Eve of Conservative Populism
    The Visio Journal ● Volume 4 ● 2019 The Greek New Right and the Eve of Conservative Populism By Athanasios Grammenos* The economic crisis in the Eurozone and its dire consequences for Greece terminated the post-1974 political consensus, which was based on a pro-European and democratic concord. The collapse of the social-democratic Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) in 2012 allowed space for the radical Left to become the new pole of the political system. To this advancement, the conservatives, being the other pole, responded with a prompt enlargement attempt to the populist right-wing, engulfing several elements of the New Right. This new political order had had evident effects on the party’s social and economic agenda, escalating the political debate at the expense of established liberal principles. While in opposition (2015-2019), New Democracy (ND), member of the European Peo- ple’s Party (EPP) in the European Parliament, voted against a series of liberal bills (gender issues, separation of Church and State, the Macedonian issue, etc.) giving out positions with authoritarian and populist essence. The purpose of this paper is to focus on the rise of the New Right in Greece (2012-2019) in both rhetoric and practice, and its consequences for law institutions, human rights and foreign affairs. It is argued that ND, currently holding office, has been occupied by deeply conservative elements as a response to the rise of the radical Left, adopting occasionally ultra-conservative positions in a wide range of social issues. Although the case of Greece is unlike to those in other European countries, nevertheless, to the extent to which the preservation of traditional hierarchies come into question, the political platform of the Greek New Right, which has embedded authoritarian attitudes cultivating an anti-liberal sub-culture to the party’s voters, is in accordance with several European conservative movements like in Hungary, Austria or Czechia.
    [Show full text]
  • West European Politics the Transformation of the Greek Party
    This article was downloaded by: [Harvard University] On: 11 July 2010 Access details: Access Details: [subscription number 915668586] Publisher Routledge Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House, 37- 41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK West European Politics Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information: http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/title~content=t713395181 The transformation of the Greek party system since 1951 Takis S. Pappasa a Politics at the Aristotle University, Thessaloniki, Greece To cite this Article Pappas, Takis S.(2003) 'The transformation of the Greek party system since 1951', West European Politics, 26: 2, 90 — 114 To link to this Article: DOI: 10.1080/01402380512331341121 URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01402380512331341121 PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE Full terms and conditions of use: http://www.informaworld.com/terms-and-conditions-of-access.pdf This article may be used for research, teaching and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic reproduction, re-distribution, re-selling, loan or sub-licensing, systematic supply or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden. The publisher does not give any warranty express or implied or make any representation that the contents will be complete or accurate or up to date. The accuracy of any instructions, formulae and drug doses should be independently verified with primary sources. The publisher shall not be liable for any loss, actions, claims, proceedings, demand or costs or damages whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with or arising out of the use of this material.
    [Show full text]
  • Globalization and Its Political Consequences: the Effects On
    Globalization and its Political Consequences: The Effects on Party Politics in the West Helen V. Milner, Princeton University∗ Current Draft: September 20, 2018 Abstract Globalization has grown much since 1980s. What political trends have been associated with this growth? This paper examines two aspects of the political consequences of globalization. Economic globalization, according to some economic theories, has adverse consequences for la- bor, especially less skilled labor, in the rich democracies. If these voters are the median, then we might expect parties to respond to this by turning against globalization and the openness to flows of goods, services, people and capital that it brings. Have parties turned against economic openness? And have parties, especially extreme right-wing ones, that oppose openness advanced in terms of their electoral strength as a result? Furthermore, have these pressures from global- ization been mitigated by social welfare policies, as earlier research claimed? First, updating and extending the research of Burgoon(2009), I ask whether political parties in the advanced indus- trial countries have adopted more anti-internationalist platforms as globalization has advanced. Second, I examine whether parties have been affected deferentially by globalization; in particular, have extreme, right-wing populist parties gained vote share as globalization has proceeded, while mainstream left ones have lost. The evidence suggests that globalization, especially trade, is associated with a political turn to anti-internationalism and to extremist parties. Word Count: 13647 words (Excluding Abstract, Appendix, and References) ∗Prepared for the annual APSA conference, August 2018 Boston MA. Thanks to Dominic De Sapio, Sayumi Miyano, and Bryan Schonfeld for their excellent research assistance.
    [Show full text]
  • Comparative Political Data Set, 1960-2019 Codebook
    1 Codebook: Comparative Political Data Set, 1960-2019 Codebook: COMPARATIVE POLITICAL DATA SET 1960-2019 Klaus Armingeon, Sarah Engler and Lucas Leemann The Comparative Political Data Set 1960-2019 (CPDS) is a collection of political and institutional data which have been assembled in the context of the research projects “Die Handlungsspielräume des Nationalstaates” and “Critical junctures. An international comparison” directed by Klaus Armingeon and funded by the Swiss National Science Foundation. This data set consists of (mostly) annual data for 36 democratic OECD and/or EU- member countries for the period of 1960 to 2019. In all countries, political data were collected only for the democratic periods.1 The data set is suited for cross-national, longitudinal and pooled time-series analyses. The present data set combines and replaces the earlier versions “Comparative Political Data Set I” (data for 23 OECD countries from 1960 onwards) and the “Comparative Political Data Set III” (data for 36 OECD and/or EU member states from 1990 onwards). A variable has been added to identify former CPDS I countries. For additional detailed information on the composition of government in the 36 countries, please consult the “Supplement to the Comparative Political Data Set – Government Composition 1960-2019”, available on the CPDS website. The Comparative Political Data Set contains some additional demographic, socio- and economic variables. However, these variables are not the major concern of the project and are thus limited in scope. For more in-depth sources of these data, see the online databases of the OECD, Eurostat or AMECO. When using data from this data set, please quote both the data set and, where appropriate, the original source.
    [Show full text]
  • Download/Print the Study in PDF Format
    GENERAL ELECTIONS IN GREECE 17th June 2012 European Elections monitor The Greeks called to ballot again on June 17th in a bid to break the stalemate Corinne Deloy Translated by helen Levy The Shock of May 6th The general elections of May 6th in Greece caused a political earthquake in a country suffering an extremely serious financial and socio-economic crisis. People voted en masse against austerity and Analysis the European Memorandum, the agreement signed in February by Athens with the International 1 month before Monetary Fund (IMF), the Union and the European Central Bank. Both of the main government the pool parties – the Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) and New Democracy (ND) collapsed, whilst together they won 77.40% of the vote in the previous elections of October 4th 2009, they only won 32.03% of the vote on May 6th last. ND won 18.85% of the vote (108 seats, +17) in comparison with the last general elections on October 4th 2009 and PASOK were totally wiped out with 13.18% of the vote (41 seats, -119). The real winner of the election was the Radical Left Coalition government together suggesting the establishment of a “na- (SYRIZA) which under the banner “They chose without us. tional salvation” coalition. After failing to do this the leader of Let’s move on without them,” campaigned on the rejection the party that came second, Alexis Tsipras (SYRISA) tried to of the Memorandum and the maintenance of Greece in the form a coalition. This was to no avail since the KKE refused euro zone.
    [Show full text]
  • The Extreme/Radical Right in Spain, Portugal, Greece, and Switzerland
    The Extreme/Radical Right in Spain, Portugal, Greece, and Switzerland The Radical Right in Western Europe Review The Mediterranean Countries Switzerland Summary Review The Mediterranean Countries Spain Portugal Greece Switzerland Summary The Radical Right in Western Europe Spain, Portugal, Greece, and Switzerland (1/18) Review The Mediterranean Countries Switzerland Summary Last week I Two constitutional monarchies/ liberal democracies I Both with long histories of high levels of (non-Western) immigration I Two very different electoral systems I Tiny, marginalised, old-fashioned, slow-to-modernise Extreme Right in the UK, but then UKIP I Modern, strong, (close to) acceptable Extreme Right in NL I Which other parties do UKIP and PVV resemble most? The Radical Right in Western Europe Spain, Portugal, Greece, and Switzerland (2/18) Review The Mediterranean Countries Switzerland Summary Today I Three countries with long authoritarian histories and a (mostly) weak Extreme/Radical Right I One country with a long democratic history and a strong Radical Right (?) party The Radical Right in Western Europe Spain, Portugal, Greece, and Switzerland (3/18) I Split, underdeveloped societies, left behind by devlopments in north-western Europe Review Spain The Mediterranean Countries Portugal Switzerland Greece Summary What did they have in common? I Late and selective modernisation/industrialisation, huge agricultural sectors I Small, marginalised, radicalised working class I Impoverished peasants (vs. rich land-owners) I Smallish middle-class I Late transition to democracy (1980s/90s) I Very strong position of the church The Radical Right in Western Europe Spain, Portugal, Greece, and Switzerland (4/18) Review Spain The Mediterranean Countries Portugal Switzerland Greece Summary What did they have in common? I Late and selective modernisation/industrialisation, huge agricultural sectors I Small, marginalised, radicalised working class I Impoverished peasants (vs.
    [Show full text]
  • The Rise of the Golden Dawn: the New Face of the Far Right in Greece
    From the SelectedWorks of Antonis A. Ellinas January 2013 The Rise of the Golden Dawn: The ewN Face of the Far Right in Greece Contact Start Your Own Notify Me Author SelectedWorks of New Work Available at: http://works.bepress.com/antonis_ellinas/12 The Rise of the Golden Dawn: The New Face of the Far Right in Greece Antonis A. Ellinas, University of Cyprus Abstract The article examines the rise of the one of the most extremist political parties in Europe, the Golden Dawn. It sketches the historical trajectory of the Greek far right, examines the ideological, organisational and voter profile of the Golden Dawn, and offers possible explanations for its breakthrough in the 2012 elections. The article shows how the economic crisis has brought about a massive realignment of the Greek electorate away from mainstream parties, giving rise to anti-system and anti- immigrant sentiments. The violent tactics of the Golden Dawn allowed the party to establish an anti-system and anti-immigrant profile, and capitalize on these sentiments. The future of the party will depend on its capacity to organisationally absorb future tensions between party pragmatists and idealists. Key words: Greece, Golden Dawn, National Socialism, far right, Michaloliakos, economic crisis, immigration, anti-system Introduction For a long time late democratized Southern European countries were thought to resist the rise of far right parties observed elsewhere. The legacy of authoritarianism and the absence of postindustrial welfare states presumably limited the electoral demand for the far right (Kitschelt 1995, pp. 52-54; Ignazi 2003, p. 196; Ellinas 2010, p. 38).
    [Show full text]
  • Niarchos Brochure 2013
    OCTOBER 1, 2013 Special Fall Edition of the Annual Stavros Niarchos Foundation Lecture THE NEW GREECE: a Stability Asset in the Eastern Mediterranean ANTONIS C. SAMARAS Prime Minister of the Hellenic Republic ABOUT THE STAVROS NIARCHOS FOUNDATION LECTURE SERIES The annual Stavros Niarchos Foundation Lecture Series at the Peterson Institute was established in 2001 through the generous support of the Stavros Niarchos Foundation. The Series enables the Institute to present a leader of world economic policy and thinking for a major address each year on a topic of central concern to the US and international policy communities. The Series’ inaugural lecture was delivered by Alan Greenspan, former chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, in 2001. The list of subsequent speakers includes Ernesto Zedillo, former president of Mexico, in 2003; Lawrence H. Summers, former director of the White House National Economic Council, in 2004; Long Yongtu, former vice minister of China’s Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation, in 2005; Mario Monti, former Prime Minister of Italy, in 2006; Heizo Takenaka, former minister for economic policy of Japan, in 2007; Petr Aven, former president of Alfa Bank, in 2008; Nandan M. Nilekani, former co-chairman of the Board of Directors, Infosys Technologies, LTD, in 2009; Dr. Niall Ferguson, Laurence A. Tisch Professor of History, Harvard University, in 2010; John Lipsky, former first deputy managing director of the International Monetary Fund, in 2011; Jean-Claude Trichet, former president of the European Central Bank, in 2012; and Fred Bergsten, in 2013. The Stavros Niarchos Foundation (www.SNF.org) is one of the world’s leading interna- tional philanthropic organizations, making grants in the areas of arts and culture, education, health and medicine, and social welfare.
    [Show full text]
  • Political Culture and Foreign Policy: Greek-Turkish Relations in the Era
    Political Culture and Foreign Policy: Greek-Turkish Relations in the Era of European Integration and Globalization A NATO Fellowship Final Report Dr. Dimitris Keridis Director of the Kokkalis Program on Southeastern and East-Central Europe at The John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University Cambridge, June 1999 2 Abstract Greek-Turkish rivalry continues to produce instability in war-torn Southeastern Europe, threatening the very cohesion of NATO. Recently however, there have been some promising signs of a breakthrough, following three devastating earthquakes in Greece and Turkey. The causes for this progress should be explored in relation to an international environment that is increasingly conducive to such progress. In addition, more importantly, they are located in the significant domestic changes—cultural and institutional—that both Greece and Turkey are experiencing. These changes involve the liberalization of their polity and economy and are directly linked to the effects of and responses to globalization. For Greece and Turkey, the driving force of modernization and globalization has been the demands of European integration. Participating in European structures has meant democratic and market reforms and the spread of West European liberal values. Contrary to traditional security studies of Greek-Turkish relations, the present research is inter-disciplinary and aims at integrating comparative politics, historical sociology and other fields of social sciences to the study of international relations. The research’s underlying assumption is that both Greece and Turkey are experiencing radical rethinking of traditional configurations of the nation-state and dramatic redefinition of its role in today’s world. National interest, to the degree that it is not limited to the existential survival of the state, is not pre- 3 determined and static but rather, it is constantly negotiated among political actors with different views and preferences.
    [Show full text]
  • List of Political Parties
    Manifesto Project Dataset Political Parties in the Manifesto Project Dataset [email protected] Website: https://manifesto-project.wzb.eu/ Version 2015a from May 22, 2015 Manifesto Project Dataset Political Parties in the Manifesto Project Dataset Version 2015a 1 Coverage of the Dataset including Party Splits and Merges The following list documents the parties that were coded at a specific election. The list includes the party’s or alliance’s name in the original language and in English, the party/alliance abbreviation as well as the corresponding party identification number. In case of an alliance, it also documents the member parties. Within the list of alliance members, parties are represented only by their id and abbreviation if they are also part of the general party list by themselves. If the composition of an alliance changed between different elections, this change is covered as well. Furthermore, the list records renames of parties and alliances. It shows whether a party was a split from another party or a merger of a number of other parties and indicates the name (and if existing the id) of this split or merger parties. In the past there have been a few cases where an alliance manifesto was coded instead of a party manifesto but without assigning the alliance a new party id. Instead, the alliance manifesto appeared under the party id of the main party within that alliance. In such cases the list displays the information for which election an alliance manifesto was coded as well as the name and members of this alliance. 1.1 Albania ID Covering Abbrev Parties No.
    [Show full text]
  • The Party System in Switzerland: an International Comparison a Study Based on Data from 1971-1999 National Council Elections
    The Party System in Switzerland: an international comparison A study based on data from 1971-1999 National Council elections ,.( Office fédéral de la statistique Bundesamt für Statistik Ufficio federale di statistica 111 Swiss Federal Statistical Office Neuchâtel, 2003 OFS BFS SFSO The «Swiss Statistics» series published by the Swiss Federal Statistical Office (SFSO) covers the following fields: 0 Basic statistical data and overviews 11 Transport and communications l Population 12 Money, banks, insurance companies 2 Territory and environment 13 Social security 3 Employment and incarne from employment 14 Health 4 National economy 15 Education and science 5 Prices 16 Culture, media, time use 6 lndustry and services 17 Politics 7 Agriculture and forestry 18 Public administration and fin ance 8 Energy 19 Law and justice 9 Construction and housing 20 Incarne and standard of living of the population 10 Tourism 21 Sustainable development and regional disparities 8.2003 500 100495 Swiss Statistics he a System in S itzerland: an international comparison A study based on data from 1971-1999 National Council elections Klaus Armingeon Professor of Political Science University of Berne Office fédéral de la statistique Bundesamt für Statistik Ufficio federale di statistica Il1 Swiss Federal Statistical Office Neuchâtel, 2003 OFS BFS SFSO Published by: Swiss Federal Statistical Office (SFSO) Information: Werner Seitz, Madeleine Schneider, SFSO, 'Phone 032 713 65 85 e-mail: [email protected], [email protected] Author. Klaus Armingeon
    [Show full text]
  • The Financial Drivers of Populism in Europe WORKING PAPER N
    WORKING PAPER SERIES The Financial Drivers of Populism in Europe WORKING PAPER N. 166 SEPTEMBER 2021 By Luigi Guiso, Massimo Morelli, Tommaso Sonno and Helios Herrera This Paper can be downloaded without charge from The Social Science Research Network Electronic Paper Collection: http://ssrn.com/abstract=3922661 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3922661 The Financial Drivers of Populism in Europe∗ L. Guisoy M. Morelliz T. Sonno§ H. Herrera{ September 1, 2021 Abstract This paper argues that the financial crisis was a watershed in the burst of populism both on the demand side (voters behaviour) and on the supply side (political parties behaviour). On the demand side, we provide novel results on the causal effect of the financial crisis on trust, turnout and voting choices via its effects on voters economic insecurity. Economic insecurity peaks during the financial crisis and extends to seg- ments of the population untouched by the globalization and robotization shocks. To establish causality, we use a pseudo-panel analysis and instrument the economic inse- curity of different cohorts leveraging on a new methodology designed to highlight the different sensitivity to financial constraints for people in different occupations. On the supply side, we trace from manifestos the policy positions of old and new parties showing that the supply of populism had the largest jump right after the financial crisis. The size of the jump is largest in countries with low fiscal space and for parties on the left of the political spectrum. We provide a formal rationalization for the key role of fiscal space, showing how the pre-financial crisis shocks enter the picture as sources of a shrinking fiscal space.
    [Show full text]