Risk and Regulation Monthly November 2019
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Luis De Guindos Appointed As Vice President of the European Central Bank
PRESS Council of the EU EN PRESS RELEASE 160/18 22/03/2018 Luis de Guindos appointed as Vice President of the European Central Bank The European Council appointed today Luis de Guindos as Vice-President of the European Central Bank for a non-renewable 8- year term. The new Vice President will replace Vítor Constâncio as of 1 June 2018. The decision was taken after having consulted both the European Parliament and the European Central Bank's Governing Council. The Economic and Financial Affairs Council on 20 February issued a recommendation to the European Council, confirming the nomination of Luis de Guindos as vice-president of the European Central Bank, after the Eurogroup gave its support to the candidacy a day before. Background: Article 283(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union specifies that appointments to the ECB executive board are made "by the European Council, acting by a qualified majority, from among persons of recognised standing and professional experience in monetary or banking matters, on a recommendation from the Council, after it has consulted the European Parliament and the Governing Council of the European Central Bank." The ECB executive board is responsible for implementation of eurozone monetary policy, as laid down by the ECB governing council. It is composed of the President, the Vice President and four other members, all appointed for non-renewable eight-year terms. The governing council is composed of the six executive board members and the governors of the national central banks of the eurozone member states. Curriculum Vitae of Luis de Guindos Press office - General Secretariat of the Council Rue de la Loi 175 - B-1048 BRUSSELS - Tel.: +32 (0)2 281 6319 [email protected] - www.consilium.europa.eu/press. -
ECB Policy and Eurozone Fragility: Was De Grauwe Right?
ECB Policy and Eurozone Fragility: Was De Grauwe Right? ORKUN SAKA*, ANA-MARIA FUERTES and ELENA KALOTYCHOU Cass Business School, City University London, U.K First draft: November 2013; This draft: May 2014 Abstract De Grauwe’s Eurozone fragility hypothesis states that member countries of a monetary union are highly vulnerable to a self‐fulfilling mechanism by which the efforts of investors to avoid losses from default can end up triggering the very default they fear. We test this hypothesis by applying an eclectic methodology to a time window around Draghi’s “whatever‐it‐takes” pledge on July 26, 2012 which was soon after followed by the actual announcement of the Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) program. The principal components of Eurozone credit default spreads (CDS) validate this choice of break date. An event study reveals significant pre‐announcement contagion from Spain to Italy, Belgium, France and Austria. Furthermore, the analysis of time‐series regression residuals confirms frequent clusters of large bad shocks to the CDS spreads of the above four Eurozone countries but soley during the pre‐announcement period. Our findings support the Eurozone fragility hypothesis and endorse the OMT program. Keywords: Sovereign debt; Eurozone; European Central Bank; Outright Monetary Transactions; Self-fulfilling panic. JEL classification: E44, F36, G15, C52. _____________________________________________________________________ * Corresponding author. Cass Business School, 24 Chiswell Street London, EC1Y 4UE United Kingdom; Tel: +44 (0)75 9306 9236; [email protected]. † We are grateful to Paul De Grauwe, José-Luis Peydró and Christian Wagner for their useful comments and suggestions. We also thank participants at the Young Finance Scholars’ Conference and Quantitative Finance Workshop at the University of Sussex (May 2014), and seminar participants at Cass Business School, Keele University and Brunel University. -
Risk and Regulation Monthly November 2020 Contents
CENTRE for REGULATORY STRATEGY EMEA Risk and Regulation Monthly November 2020 Contents CONTENTS HIGHLIGHTS COVID-19 BANKING CAPITAL MARKETS INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT CENTRAL BANK OF IRELAND OTHER CONTACTS Highlights In Ireland, the Central Bank published the outcome of its thematic review of fund management companies. It was found that a significant number of firms have not fully implemented the framework for governance, management and oversight in fund management companies. The European Commission published a consultation on AIFMD. This ask respondents whether fund delegation rules should be accompanied with quantitative criteria or a list of core functions that cannot be delegated. For a full list of COVID-19 related regulatory, monetary and fiscal policy initiatives, please see our report available here. COVID-19 Speech by Pablo Hernández de Cos, Governor of the Bank of Spain, on EU Spain's experience with risks and ECB vulnerabilities in the corporate sector as a result of the COVID-19 crisis Speech by Philip R. Lane, Member of the Executive Board at the ECB, on the Speech by Luigi Federico Signorini, ECB’s monetary policy in the pandemic Deputy Governor at the Bank of Italy on mobilising private finance for a Interview of Christine Lagarde, green recovery and hence “building President of the ECB on the role of the back better” ECB in non-normal times Macroprudential bulletin covering the Speech by Randal K Quarles, Vice usability of capital buffers Chairman for Supervision of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve ECB - -
EXHIBIT I Article 3: Nepotism
EXHIBIT I Article 3: Nepotism. Solbes´son in law and Guindos’ nephew assigned 21 job contracts in the Spanish Embassy. El ESPAÑOL reviews all connections in the diplomatic legation that has become a placement agency. JOSE GALLEGO ESPINA ”josegallego81 4/27/ 2017 02:59h It is a popular saying in Spain that “If you don´t have a Godfather you will not get baptized”. Although this saying isn’t used in English it has been easily applied at the Spanish Embassy in Washington, where it became normal to hire friends and family of politicians and diplomats: an assignment to an architect –who is accused of manipulating the time limit specified using his wife´s influence as a diplomat, the creation of a few job positions to accommodate a few friendly faces... All of these things are tainting the Minister of Economy Luis de Guindos with suspicions and also his colleague Pedro Solbes, a Socialist, who occupied this position from 2004-2009. The last case laid out on the table – and in court is that of a North American Construction Company who has denounced at The Superior Court of the District of Columbia (DC) the assignment of one of the contracts that was given to Gustavo Frech. According to the report Gustavo Frech manipulated the timeframes using information obtained from his wife who was working as one of the General Secretaries and is known to be one of the Minister Luis de Guindos nieces. Gustavo Frech and his wife Maria Pedrosa de Guindos on the Spanish Embassy in Washington The lawsuit was presented way before El Español unveiled the connection between Frech and the Embassy. -
Short Biography of Yves Mersch
Short biography of Yves Mersch Copyright: (c) CVCE.EU by UNI.LU All rights of reproduction, of public communication, of adaptation, of distribution or of dissemination via Internet, internal network or any other means are strictly reserved in all countries. Consult the legal notice and the terms and conditions of use regarding this site. URL: http://www.cvce.eu/obj/short_biography_of_yves_mersch-en-ad643658-c212- 4443-b1d7-0b8f6dbb014f.html Last updated: 07/07/2016 1/3 Yves Mersch President of the Banque Centrale du Luxembourg (since 1 June 1998) Born on 1 October 1949 in Luxembourg Education and training 1973: Master’s in Law, University of Paris I–Panthéon-Sorbonne 1974: Postgraduate studies in International Public Law and Master’s in Political Science, University of Paris I–Panthéon-Sorbonne 1975: Postgraduate studies in Political Science, University of Paris I–Panthéon- Sorbonne Career 1974: Admission to the Bar in Luxembourg and appointment as Assistant Professor in Public Law at the University of Paris–Sud 11 1975: Assistant in the Luxembourg Ministry of Finance 1976–1978: Assistant at the International Monetary Fund, Washington D.C. 1978–1979: Attaché in the Luxembourg Ministry of Finance 1980–1981: Financial adviser to the Permanent Representation of Luxembourg to the United Nations, New York 1981: Adviser in international financial and monetary relations at the Ministry of Finance 1983–1999: Member of the Council of the Luxembourg Monetary Institute 1985–1989: Government representative for the Luxembourg Stock Exchange 1989–1998: -
OBSERVATORIO9 Ingl:OBSERVATORIO 24/10/07 13:36 Página 1
OBSERVATORIO9 ingl:OBSERVATORIO 24/10/07 13:36 Página 1 Observatorio Económico INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 9 IS IT THE END OF ECONOMIC PROSPERITY? The 9th session of the FAES Economic Forum took place on July 9, 2007, during the opening of the FAES campus summer course called “Evaluating the Economic Future.” The forum was attended by Jaime García-Legaz, Secretary General of FAES and course director, Fernando Fernández, Vice-Chancellor of the University of Antonio de Nebrija, José Luis Feito, President of ASETA, Luis de Guindos, President of Lehman Brothers in Spain and Portugal, and Juan José Toribio, Professor at IESE. The participants analysed the principal factors affecting the international economic situation in the context of interest rate hikes, which have major reper- cussions on the international financial markets. José Luis Feito opened the debate with a comment about the key international economic indicators, which point to the end of an eco- nomic cycle of intense growth and low rates. Luis de Guindos followed with an analysis of how these new situations can affect the financial markets, and particularly the credit markets. Juan José Toribio described four strategic challenges for the economy in the future. Fernando Fernández ended the speeches with an analysis warning of the imminent change in the eco- nomic cycle. José Luis Feito, Juan José Toribio, Fernando Fernández, Luis de Guindos and Jaime García-Legaz. OBSERVATORIO9 ingl:OBSERVATORIO 24/10/07 13:36 Página 2 Observatorio Económico TThe end of cheap money in the US and to a lesser extent in Europe, In the last few years the international eco- started rising again and this trend intensified nomic arena has been characterized by in 2006 and in 2007, and spread to all long strong economic growth driven by uncharac- and short term interest rates. -
Biographies Latin America, the United States and Spain in the Global Economy Forum
BIOGRAPHIES LATIN AMERICA, THE UNITED STATES AND SPAIN IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY FORUM LUIS DE GUINDOS Minister of Economy and Competitiveness, Government of Spain Luis de Guindos Jurado is a Spanish politician and the currently Minister of Economy and Competitiveness of Spain. He holds a Bachelor of Economics and Business at the Colegio Universitario de Estudios Financieros. He is since 2012 the current Minister of Economy and Competitiveness Acting Minister of Spain, and from Friday, April 15, 2016 he also assumes Affairs Ministry of Industry, Energy and Tourism. In December 1996, he was appointed General Manager of Economic Policy and Defense of Competition, and in May 2000 he was appointed Secretary General of esta same charge. He has been part of the Board of Renfe Between 1997 and 2000, the Official Credit Institute from 2000 to 2002, the Sociedad Estatal de Participaciones Industriales in 2002, and the Secretary of State of Economy in the last government of José María Aznar (2002-2004). In 2004, he was responsible for the economic program that Mariano Rajoy was presented at the General Elections. Luis de Guindos is the Director of the Instituto de Empresa since 2010, Member of the Board of Directors of Endesa as an Independent External. De Guindos was the coordinator of the book promoted by the FAES Foundation in 2010. This book could be considered the basis of the ideological Economic Policy of the Popular Party and it moves between two fundamental areas: drastic cost containment in Public Administration and Reforms areas such as labor and financial sector. ALFONSO PRAT-GAY Minister of Finance of Argentina Alfonso Prat-Gay is Minister of Economy and Finance of Argentina. -
ECB Organisational Chart
Executive Board DG= Director General D= Director ECB PUBLIC Directorate General Dep./Deps.= Deputies ECB Organigramme Directorate Division Executive Board Other Units Christine Lagarde - President Luis de Guindos - Vice President Centre Fabio Panetta Frank Elderson Reporting line Philip R. Lane Isabel Schnabel Principal Macroprudential Market Infrastructure Legal Services Coordinator of the ESRB Secretariat Communications Policy & Financial International & Secretariat Internal Audit Risk Management Banknotes & Payments Counsel to the Stability European Relations DG: Wolfgang Proissl DG: Chiara Zilioli D: Francesco Mazzaferro Executive Board DG: Petra Senkovic D: Claudia Mann Deps.: Thierry Bracke DG: Ulrich Bindseil Deps.: Christian Dep.: Tuomas Peltonen DG: Sergio Nicoletti-Altimari D: Fernando Monar Lora DG: Hans-Joachim Klöckers D: Ton Roos Conny Lotze Deps.: Dimitri Pattyn Kroppenstedt Deps.: John Fell Dep.: Livio Stracca D: Roland Straub Fiona van Echelpoel Roberto Ugena Fátima Pires Compliance and ECB Representative Climate Change Centre Governance Office** Global Media Systemic Risk & Office in Brussels Currency Audit Missions Risk Strategy Oversight Institutional Law Senior Adviser: Irene Relations Financial Development Heemskerk Chief Compliance and Principal Adviser: Boris Institutions Governance Officer: Roman Kisselevsky Schremser ECB Representation in Washington D.C. Audit Support & Currency Market Innovation Web & Digital Stress Test Risk Analysis Principal Adviser: Financial Law Information Investigations Management & Integration -
The Question of Who Succeeds Jean-Claude Trichet
Gunfight at the ECB Corral The question of who succeeds Jean-Claude Trichet. urope’s eleven-year-old monetary union is still being tested by skeptical investors and markets. It was barely saved by a €750 ($955) billion rescue plan that European Union leaders B Y K LAUS C. ENGELEN put together in May of this year. Although the immediate danger of Greece—or other eurozone member countries like Portugal or Spain— defaulting seems to have been averted, the pressure from markets to cut public deficits, stabilize banks, and reform economies remains. A look at the interest rates and insurance premia that financially Eweak eurozone countries have to pay on their new sovereign debt issues makes it clear that the crisis is not over. A year of major challenges for the sixteen-member eurozone is in store, with an uncertain outcome. For Europe’s central bankers and policymakers, one of those challenges is to rebuild confidence in the euro and its guardian, the European Central Bank. Since the ECB joined the international rescue of Greece and other financially weak nations on Europe’s southern periphery and announced that it would indef- initely accept those countries’ debt as collateral regardless of credit rating, the ECB, its President Jean-Claude Trichet, and its governing council have been con- fronted with a credibility crisis. “Trust in the ECB, as measured by the standard Eurobarometer (and other) sur- veys, has fallen to an unprecedented low—especially in the larger euro area coun- THE MAGAZINE OF tries,” concludes a major empirical study by Daniel Gros and Felix Roth of the INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY Centre for European Policy Studies. -
Válogatás a Nemzetközi Intézmények És Külföldi Jegybankok Publikációiból
NEMZETKÖZI SZEMELVÉNYEK Válogatás a nemzetközi intézmények és külföldi jegybankok publikációiból 2020. november 26. – december 02. 26. 1 TARTALOMJEGYZÉK 1. MONETÁRIS POLITIKA, INFLÁCIÓ ................................................................................................... 3 2. PÉNZÜGYI STABILITÁS, PÉNZÜGYI PIACOK .................................................................................... 4 3. MIKROPRUDENCIÁLIS FELÜGYELET ÉS SZABÁLYOZÁS ................................................................... 5 4. FINTECH, KRIPTOVALUTÁK, MESTERSÉGES INTELLIGENCIA .......................................................... 6 5. ZÖLD PÉNZÜGYEK, FENNTARTHATÓ FEJLŐDÉS ............................................................................. 8 6. PÉNZFORGALOM, FIZETÉSI RENDSZEREK ....................................................................................... 9 7. MAKROGAZDASÁG ....................................................................................................................... 10 8. ÁLTALÁNOS GAZDASÁGPOLITIKA ................................................................................................ 11 9. KÖLTSÉGVETÉSI POLITIKA, ADÓZÁS ............................................................................................. 12 10. SZANÁLÁS .................................................................................................................................. 14 11. STATISZTIKA ............................................................................................................................. -
Press Release Distribution of Responsibilities Among The
18 December 2012 PRESS RELEASE DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONSIBILITIES AMONG THE MEMBERS OF THE EXECUTIVE BOARD OF THE ECB The Executive Board of the European Central Bank (ECB) agreed today, within the framework of its collective responsibility, on the following distribution of responsibilities among its members, with immediate effect: In addition to his statutory duties as President of the Executive Board, the Governing Council and the General Council, the President, Mr Mario Draghi, will remain responsible for Communications, the Counsel to the Executive Board, the ESRB Secretariat, Internal Audit, and Secretariat and Language Services1. In addition to his statutory duties as deputy to the President, the Vice-President, Mr Vítor Constâncio, will remain responsible for Administration (with the exception of the New ECB Premises Project), Financial Stability, Oversight of Payment Systems and, together with Mr Yves Mersch, the Banking Union Project. Mr Jörg Asmussen will remain responsible for International and European Relations. In addition to his role as the ECB’s representative at international meetings, he will continue to represent the ECB in meetings of the Eurogroup Working Group and the Economic and Financial Committee and will attend with the President or the Vice-President the meetings of the Eurogroup, ECOFIN and the Heads of State or Government at the EU and euro area level. He will remain responsible for Legal Services, the New ECB Premises Project and the Permanent Representation in Washington, DC. Mr Benoît Cœuré will remain responsible for Market Operations, Payments and Market Infrastructure, and Research. Mr Yves Mersch will be responsible for Banknotes, Information Systems, Risk Management, TARGET2-Securities and, together with Mr Vítor Constâncio, the Banking Union Project. -
Briefing Paper November 2010
DIRECTORATE GENERAL FOR INTERNAL POLICIES POLICY DEPARTMENT A: ECONOMIC AND SCIENTIFIC POLICIES ECONOMIC AND MONETARY AFFAIRS Changing of the guard Briefing Note Abstract The enlargement of the European rescue fund EFSF should be part of a comprehensive approach of strengthening the Stability and Growth Pact both in terms of its corrective arm by using automatic sanctions and in terms of the preventive arm by introducing the European fiscal semester. The consequence would be that the Securities Markets Program could be terminated and the ECB’s portfolio of government bonds (presently around EUR 100 billion) could be transferred to the EFSF for the ECB’s book value. This would reduce the tensions within the ECB Governing Council and enable the ECB to focus on its direct mandate for monetary stability and its indirect responsibility - through the European Systemic Risk Board - for financial stability. This would result in a clear separation of responsibilities between the ECB and ESRB for monetary policy and macro-prudential supervision and the EFSF for fiscal policy and structural reforms in the Member States facing austerity measures. The ECB will certainly be confronted with possible trade-offs between monetary and financial stability. This problem could be solved by changing the ECB’s mandate for price stability from the medium term to the longer term (longer than two years) as financial stability is prerequisite for monetary stability in the longer term. Consequently, the two-pillar strategy of the ECB could be adapted in such a way that its economic analysis focuses on price stability in the medium term and its monetary analysis (e.g., credit and money growth) on financial stability in the longer term.