25 Years of the Liberal Democrats

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25 years of the Liberal Democrats Mark Pack The Liberal Democrat approach to campaigning Matt Cole The importance of local government to the Liberal Democrats David Howarth The Liberal Democrats and the functions of policy Duncan Brack Liberal Democrat leadership The four leaders analysed Andrew Russell Who votes for the Liberal Democrats? Sources of electoral support Liberal Democrat History Group New from the Liberal Democrat History Group The Dictionary of Liberal Quotations

‘A liberal is a man or a woman or a child who looks forward to a better day, a more tranquil night, and a bright, infinite future.’ (Leonard Bernstein) ‘I am for peace, retrenchment and reform, the watchword of the great Liberal Party thirty years ago.’ (John Bright) ‘Few organisations can debate for three days whether to stage a debate, hold a debate, have a vote and then proceed to have a debate about what they have debated. But that is why the Liberal Democrats hold a special place in the British constitution.’ (Patrick Wintour) Edited by Duncan Brack, with a foreword from Paddy Ashdown. Writers, thinkers, journalists, philosophers and politicians contribute nearly 2,000 quotations, musings, provocations, jibes and diatribes. A completely revised and updated edition of the History Group’s second book (published originally in 1999), this is the essential guide to who said what about Liberals and Liberalism. Available at a special discounted rate for Journal of Liberal History subscribers: £10 instead of the normal £12.99. To order by post, send a cheque (to ‘Liberal Democrat History Group’) for the cover price plus postage and packing at the rate of £2 per copy. Orders should be sent to: LDHG, 54 Midmoor Road, London SW12 0EN.

The best single-volume study available of British Liberalism and British Liberals Peace, Reform and Liberation

‘This new volume, taking a long view from the later seventeenth century to the Cameron-Clegg coalition of today, is a collective enterprise by many hands … This is an excellent book.’ Kenneth O. Morgan, Cercles ‘I had not expected to enjoy this book as much as I did, or to learn as much from it.’ William Wallace, Lib Dem Voice ‘The editors and their fourteen authors deserve congratulation for producing a readable one-volume history of Liberal politics in Britain that is both erudite but perfectly accessible to any reader interested in the subject.’ Mark Smulian, Liberator Edited by Robert Ingham and Duncan Brack, with a foreword from Nick Clegg. Written by academics and experts, drawing on the most recent research, Peace, Reform and Liberation is the most comprehensive and most up-to-date guide to the story of those who called themselves Liberals, what inspired them and what they achieved over the last 300 years and more. An essential source for anyone interested in the contribution of Liberals and Liberalism to British politics. Available at a special discounted rate for Journal of Liberal History subscribers: £24 instead of the normal £30. To order, send a cheque (to ‘Liberal Democrat History Group’) for the cover price plus postage and packing at the rate of £4 for one copy; £7 for two copies; £9 for three copies; and add £1 for each further copy. Orders should be sent to: LDHG, 54 Midmoor Road, London SW12 0EN.

2 Journal of Liberal History 83 Summer 2014 Journal of Liberal History Issue 83: Summer 2014 The Journal of Liberal History is published quarterly by the Liberal Democrat History Group. ISSN 1479-9642 The Liberal Democrats: the first 25 years 4 Editor: Duncan Brack Duncan Brack and Mark Pack introduce this special issue of the Journal. Deputy Editor: Tom Kiehl Assistant Editor: Siobhan Vitelli Biographies Editor: Robert Ingham The Liberal Democrat approach to campaigning 6 Reviews Editor: Dr Eugenio Biagini Mark Pack examines the evolution of the party’s campaigning techniques and Contributing Editors: Graham Lippiatt, Tony Little, structures York Membery Can the Grand Old Duke of York march back up 16 Patrons Dr Eugenio Biagini; Professor Michael Freeden; again? Professor John Vincent The importance of local government to the Liberal Democrats; by Matt Cole

Editorial Board The Liberal Democrats and the functions of 24 Dr Malcolm Baines; Dr Ian Cawood; Dr Matt Cole; policy Dr Roy Douglas; Dr David Dutton; Prof. David Gowland; Prof. Richard Grayson; Dr Michael Hart; Peter Hellyer; David Howarth explores the different roles played by policy and policy- Dr Alison Holmes; Dr J. Graham Jones; Dr Tudor Jones; making within the party Tony Little; Michael Meadowcroft; Dr Michael Steed; Dr Mark Pack; Dr Ian Packer; Dr John Powell; Jaime Liberal Democrat leadership 34 Reynolds; Dr Andrew Russell; Dr Iain Sharpe Duncan Brack describes the key characteristics of Liberal Democrat leaders, and analyses the record of the four leaders to date Editorial/Correspondence Contributions to the Journal – letters, articles, and book reviews – are invited. The Journal is a refereed Report 45 publication; all articles submitted will be reviewed. The progressive coalition that never was: lessons from the Ashdown–Blair Contributions should be sent to: ‘project’, with Paddy Ashdown, Roger Liddle and Pat McFadden; report by Duncan Brack (Editor) Douglas Oliver 54 Midmoor Road, London SW12 0EN email: [email protected] Who votes for the Liberal Democrats? 48 All articles copyright © Journal of Liberal History. All Sources of electoral support; by Andrew Russell rights reserved. Liberal Democrats in coalition: the Scottish 56 Advertisements record Full page £100; half page £60; quarter page £35. Discounts available for repeat ads or offers to readers Caron Lindsay examines the record of the Liberal Democrat–Labour coalitions (e.g. discounted book prices). To place ads, please in Scotland, 1999–2007 contact the Editor. Going into Labour: the Welsh Liberal Democrat 62 Subscriptions/Membership coalition experience 2000–2003 An annual subscription to the Journal of Liberal History costs £20.00 (£12.50 unwaged rate). This includes Russell Deacon examines the record of the Liberal Democrat–Labour coalition membership of the History Group unless you inform in Wales, 2000–2003 us otherwise. Non-UK subscribers should add £10.00.

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Patrick Mitchell 6 Palfrey Place, London SW8 1PA; email: [email protected] Liberal Democrat History Group Payment is also possible via our website, www.liberalhistory.org.uk. The Liberal Democrat History Group promotes the discussion and research of topics relating to the histories of the Liberal Democrats, Liberal Party, and SDP, and of Liberalism. The Cover design concept: Lynne Featherstone Group organises discussion meetings and produces the Journal of Liberal History and other Published by the Liberal Democrat History Group, occasional publications. c/o 54 Midmoor Road, London SW12 0EN For more information, including historical commentaries, details of publications, back issues Printed by Kall-Kwik, of the Journal, and archive and other research sources, see our website at: 18 Colville Road, London W3 8BL www.liberalhistory.org.uk. August 2014 Chair: Tony Little Honorary President: Lord Wallace of Saltaire

Journal of Liberal History 83 Summer 2014 3 The Liberal Democrats: the first 25 years

n 3 March 2013, the Lib- On 3 March special issue of the Journal of Liberal party’s campaigning techniques eral Democrats marked History, but rather than simply tell and structures. Otheir twenty-fifth birth- 2013, the the story chronologically, we have Although the Liberal Demo- day. The story of the party since aimed to identify the key factors in crats have never managed to win 1988 has been a dramatic one, from Liberal the party’s survival and success, at as much as 10 per cent of Parlia- near-extinction, through a failed least up until entry into coalition. mentary constituencies, they have realignment of the left, a period of Democrats First, the party’s campaign- been much more successful at local rapidly changing leaders, and then ing ability. As noted above, from level. The Liberal Party had built into government, for the first time marked their 1997 onwards the Liberal Demo- up its local strength to almost 1,500 for a third party for sixty years. crats have managed to win signifi- councillors by the time the SDP The Liberal Democrat History twenty-fifth cantly greater numbers of seats than was formed in 1983; the Alliance Group’s history of British Liber- birthday. their predecessor parties, often on took this to over 3,500 by 1987. For alism, Peace, Reform and Liberation smaller shares of the national vote. most of the lifetime of the Liberal (published in 2011; see advert on This has been the outcome of a Democrats, the party has had over page 2), analysed the history of the combination of intensive local cam- 4,000 councillors, briefly topping Liberal Democrats in six phases: paigning – both contributing to 5,000 in 1996–97, 22 per cent of the survival, 1988–92; an attempt to and reinforced by local government UK total. Local Liberal Democrats realign the left, 1992–99; a return success – an increasing targeting of have had a focus for their efforts to more traditional protest politics, resources on winnable seats and a and, in most areas, a taste of elec- 1999–2005; a period of instability, steadily more professional organi- toral success and a demonstration including two leadership elections, sation. Parliamentary by-elections of the way in which effective cam- 2005–07; the search for a definition have also helped, and sometimes paigning and organisation can lead in the wake of the disintegration of proved vital, to the party’s national to results. There was a strong cor- New Labour, 2007–10; and coali- image. Eastbourne in 1990 demon- relation between local government tion, 2010–. strated that the party had survived success and many of the Westmin- With the exception of the last (and contributed to Mrs Thatcher’s ster seats gained in the 1997 and phase, these are familiar themes downfall). Newbury and Christch- subsequent elections. Matt Cole’s from earlier periods of Liberal his- urch in 1993 showed that the Lib- article looks at the party’s record in tory – though a major difference, eral Democrats could challenge local government elections and its at least from 1997 onwards, is that the Conservatives even in their impact. the party succeeded in targeting strongholds, while Brent East in Throughout its life, the party its vote effectively, overcoming to 2003 and Leicester South in 2004 has attempted, with some success, a certain extent the drawbacks of achieved the same with respect to to sharpen its definition, devel- the first-past-the-post system and Labour. In 2006, Dunfermline & oping policies that the elector- delivering the highest number of West Fife rescued the party from ate came to recognise as distinctly Liberal MPs since the 1920s. In turn the aftermath of the resignation Liberal Democrat – including, in this led to the party being strong of Charles Kennedy, and in 2013 particular, support for investment enough to hold the balance of Eastleigh showed that the party in education, opposition to univer- power after the 2010 election, ena- could still hold on in its strongholds sity tuition fees, opposition to the bling its entry into government. despite the impacts of coalition. In war in Iraq and support for green The party’s twenty-fifth birth- the first article in this issue, Mark policies. As a party based more day seemed an obvious topic for a Pack examines the evolution of the on ideology than class or sectoral

4 Journal of Liberal History 83 Summer 2014 The Liberal Democrats: the first 25 years

support, policy-making has been to which the four leaders to date coalition, 1999–2003 and 2003–07, important internally, one of the have possessed them. and draws parallels with the later ways to define what being a Lib- The Liberal Party both benefited UK experience. Russell Deacon eral Democrat means. The party’s and suffered from being primarily The story of looks at the Welsh Liberal Demo- retention of a democratic policy- a repository for protest votes. To a crats’ period in coalition in 2000– making process is no accident; certain extent the Liberal Demo- the party 03, and reflects on the experience of and when leaders have decided to crats have strengthened their social working with the Labour Party. ignore it, as over university tui- bases of support, appealing most since 1988 The impact of the current coa- tion fees, the outcome has not been strongly to the educated middle lition government on the Liberal happy. David Howarth examines classes, particularly those work- has been a Democrats is of course of huge sig- the functions of policy for the Lib- ing in the professions and the pub- dramatic nificance, and we aim to consider it eral Democrats. lic sector. This made it well placed properly in the Journal after the 2015 The role of the party leader has to pick up the support of discon- one, from election. Douglas Oliver’s write- often been crucial. For smaller tented Labour voters after 1997, up of the History Group’s meeting political parties the media tends to and especially after the Iraq War. near-extinc- in January 2013, however, provides focus on the leader to the exclusion This helped to ensure that it was the a chance to look a different coali- of his or her colleagues. Compared main beneficiary from the accel- tion, through tion that never happened, when to other parties, therefore, the Lib- erating decline in support for the Paddy Ashdown, Roger Liddle and eral Democrat leader occupies a other two major parties (which in a failed rea- Pat McFadden discussed ‘the Pro- larger part of the kaleidoscope of 2010 fell below two-thirds for the ject’ – the attempt by Ashdown and impressions that together form the first time since 1918). The impact of lignment of Tony Blair to realign the centre-left overall image of the party in the coalition, however, and the party’s of British politics by closer collabo- mind of the electorate – along with actions in government, has been the left, a ration between the Liberal Demo- the party’s national policies, its substantial, severely testing the crats and Labour. There may be local record and its local representa- electorate’s support for the party. period of rap- lessons here for the aftermath of the tives. Overall, the party has been In the fifth article in this issue, 2015 election. well served by its leaders, particu- Andrew Russell considers who idly chang- The publication of this special larly during general election cam- votes for the Liberal Democrats. issue has been delayed well beyond paigns, which is when most electors Constraints of space prevented ing leaders, the Liberal Democrats’ twenty- see and hear them; Ashdown, Ken- us, in Peace, Reform and Liberation, fifth birthday for a series of rea- nedy and Clegg all performed cred- from affording detailed consid- and then into sons (including the fact that party itably in the elections in which they eration to the achievements of the government, activists are even worse at meet- led the party, except for the open- Liberal Democrats in Scotland and ing deadlines than academics!), but ing of the 2005 campaign. This in Wales, who both participated in for the first we hope you find it an interesting turn, of course, places a greater pre- coalition governments with Labour read – and, with the approach of the mium on their effectiveness, which before the UK party entered into time for a 2015 election marking an uncertain is why Kennedy’s and Campbell’s coalition with the Conservatives. future, a thought-provoking one. perceived shortcomings caused This issue of the Journal has enabled third party such concern. Duncan Brack’s us at least to begin to redress the Duncan Brack is the Editor of the Jour- article describes the key character- balance. Caron Lindsay analy- for sixty nal of Liberal History and co-edited istics necessary in a Liberal Demo- ses the record of the Scottish Lib- this special issue with guest editor Dr crat leader, and analyses the extent eral Democrats’ two periods in years. Mark Pack.

Journal of Liberal History 83 Summer 2014 5 The Liberal Democrat approach to campaigning

Started by pioneering academics such as David Denver, Gordon Hands and Justin Fisher,1 there is now a well-established tradition of research into the impact of local campaigning on British election results. This work, however, tends to be cross-party and to rely heavily on evidence such as officially recorded spending figures, election results, questionnaire findings and statistical analysis of all three. As a result, there is still very little written about the development of particular campaign techniques, especially where they were specific to one party for a long period of time. By Mark Pack.

6 Journal of Liberal History 83 Summer 2014 The Liberal Democrat approach to campaigning

his article fills part of elections, and accusations that it (by the margin of seventeen to six that gap in the histori- was being dumbed down into an in 1983, and by seventeen to five in Tcal record, by considering election-only approach, was a regu- 1987). For all the importance the the Liberal Democrat (and before lar feature of Liberal Party debates SDP attached to bringing a sense that Liberal Party) campaign tech- over the future of the idea. As one of professionalism to the (as they niques, and the evolution of party of its seminal texts warned (and saw it) amateurish approach of the strategies and structures to support note that its authors felt the need to Liberals, when it came to votes them.2 issue this warning): ‘Community being counted it was the Liberal politics is not a technique. It is an Party approach that consistently ideology, a system of ideas for social did better. The Liberal Democrat transformation. For those ideas to It is no surprise, therefore, that inheritance from its become a reality there is a need for a comparing the different campaign predecessor parties strategy of political action. For that manuals produced for the two pre- The techniques, strategies and strategy to be successful it needs decessor parties, for the Alliance structures were not all created to develop effective techniques of and then for the Liberal Democrats afresh when the party was formed political campaigning. Those tech- reveals a strong continuity in both out of the merger of the Liberal niques are a means to an end. If they content and authors from the Lib- Party and SDP. Rather, the merged become an end in themselves, the eral Party through to the Liberal party inherited most of its initial ideas they were designed to pro- Democrats.4 Indeed, in many cases approach from its predecessors. mote will have been lost’.3 large pieces of text were copied over In establishing a campaign tradi- By contrast, the SDP’s roots were and then updated for new editions tion for their merged successor to predominantly in national politics or nominally new titles, so that even inherit, the Liberal Party had two and national issues, which did not where the author’s names and titles big advantages over the SDP: it had in the same way lead naturally to a are new, the continuity is still there.5 been around, doing campaigning, distinctive approach to local cam- Some of the SDP election manu- for longer and, at least as far as local paigning. A Labour MP who left als did have a distinctive approach campaigning was concerned, had his party for the SDP over Europe, from the contemporary Liberal been seen even by many in the SDP trade union power or voting rights Party ones. For example, the SDP’s as being the more skilled party. at a national party conference did firstLocal Government Election Hand- Moreover, in adopting com- not as a result adopt a different book, published in January 1982, munity politics in the 1970s, the approach from that of other par- highlighted the importance of Liberal Party had taken both a phil- ties to grassroots politics in the same ‘Policy Formulation’, which fea- osophical and a practical approach way that a Liberal attracted to com- tures as early as page 2, giving it a that venerated local activity and munity politics did. prominence that equivalent Liberal regular communication. It was Moreover, the relative results Party publications of the time did about being active on the doorsteps of the two parties in 1983 and 1987 not grant. But subsequent Liberal and via letterboxes all year round reinforced the existing percep- Democrat publications followed and not simply (as was traditional tion of the Liberal Party as being the Liberal Party and not the SDP with election campaigns) in the few the skilled exponent of grassroots choice of emphasis. weeks before a polling day. Elec- political campaigning. Despite a Liberal Democrat This documentary and authorial tions were, in the old Liberal Party tortuous process to ensure a ‘fair’ campaigning: trail from the Liberal Party through saying, but the punctuation marks allocation of seats between the two Brent Central in to the Liberal Democrats was also in community politics. Alliance partners, at both elections the 2010 election reflected in the nature of the grass- The degree to which community the Liberals were far more effec- (photo: Liberal roots campaigning that the Lib- politics should be about winning tive at winning seats than the SDP Democrats). eral Democrats specialised in. The

Journal of Liberal History 83 Summer 2014 7 the liberal democrat approach to campaigning various techniques described below campaigns and careful targeting to Chris Ren- Also, for local council elections, all had antecedents in Liberal Party win local elections was well estab- targeting usually meant asking activities. It is hard to identify a lished and, in many parts of the nard liked to people to travel less far than for tar- distinctive SDP contribution, save country, successful. However, it geting at parliamentary elections. for perhaps one crucial one: many had not achieved similar levels of tell the story Parliamentary constituencies are in the SDP viewed themselves as success at a national level. considerably larger, and winnable taking the fight for Westminster of how he constituencies fewer. As a result, constituencies seriously, in a way going to your nearest target con- that the Liberal Party, with its – in Targeting met with the stituency might even mean travel- their view – undue concentration Part of the reason for this distinc- ling 100 miles or more. By contrast, on local councils, had not.6 tion between local level success and Liberal Par- going to your nearest target ward Westminster-level disappointments ty’s 1987 Gen- usually meant only a short trip, save was the difficulty of applying tar- for the most rural of areas. The need for leaflets geting effectively at parliamentary- eral Election Moreover, at a national level Central to this inheritance for the level elections. many believed that very little could Liberal Democrats was the role of At the local level, the Liberals Campaign be done to influence the chances leaflets. If one image can sum up in particular in their most success- in individual seats, if indeed that the approach to campaigning taken ful areas had honed a very strict Commit- was even the point of a national by the Liberal Democrats across approach to targeting, pouring campaign. Thomas (Jack) Daniels, twenty-five years, it would be a efforts into winnable wards whilst tee and was the Liberal candidate for Luton in piece of paper on a doormat embla- neglecting other wards – often 1966, recounted11 how despite his zoned with a bar chart and a head- in those doing no more than put- firmly told very low prospects of victory, he line screaming that ‘Only the local ting a candidate’s name on the bal- received an election visit from then Liberal Democrat can beat Party X lot paper, if that. But when it came that, ‘which Liberal leader Jo Grimond because round here’.7 to general elections, it was far less Grimond simply thought it was the Then Liberal Party MP David common for candidates and their seats the right thing for him to do to visit Penhaligon coined the phrase that helpers to similarly abandon no- everyone who was standing as a many activists have since quoted, ‘If hope seats and move instead to help party won candidate. you believe in something, write it on in winnable constituencies.9 (Par- That sort of attitude lasted over a piece of paper and stick it through liamentary by-elections were an at a general the decades. Chris Rennard liked a letterbox’. However, it was Chris exception to this due to the paucity to tell the story of how he met with Rennard, first as the Liberal Demo- of other elections usually taking election was the Liberal Party’s 1987 General crats’ Director of Campaigns and place on the same day – and it was just a matter Election Campaign Committee Elections, and then subsequently as no coincidence that this made it and was firmly told that, ‘which Chief Executive, who turned it into easier to encourage large volumes of luck, com- seats the party won at a general an effective seat-winning tactic at of help and that the party devel- election was just a matter of luck, general elections for the party.8 oped something of an expertise at pletely out of completely out of the control of the Both when Penhaligon first winning such contests.) central campaign’. That was a belief coined the phrase and during Ren- The relative reluctance on the control that he did not share and set out nard’s time in charge of the party’s the part of activists to move dur- to change, and during his time in campaigning, the party suffered ing general elections was in part of the central charge of the party’s campaigning from not only an absence of favour- because Westminster elections it did change radically. able newspaper owners but also a came with elements that made it campaign’. The most notable example of paucity of coverage on impartial harder for candidates to turn their the party’s improved ability to win radio and TV channels. As a result, back on their own seat and con- seats under the British electoral sys- the Liberals and subsequently Lib- centrate on helping someone who tem was 1997. At that election the eral Democrats had turned to could win. Public meetings may party’s vote share fell, and was less intensive and local leafleting to get be in a long-term decline in Brit- than the party’s previous 1974 peak. out the party’s message. ish politics, but most candidates Yet the number of seats the party Moreover, the workings of Brit- felt they had to turn up for those won went up, to more than three ain’s first past the post electoral sys- in their own seat. Similarly, the times the number of seats won dur- tem required that leafleting – and provision by the Royal Mail of a ing the two 1974 elections. other campaigning – be tightly tar- free delivery service for one elec- geted geographically in order for tion leaflet to every voter encour- support to be turned into seats. That aged candidates and their teams to A semi-autonomous campaign is because, outside of parts of the feel that they had to ‘show the flag’ organisation Celtic fringe, the third party’s vote and at least get one election address Under Chris Rennard, targeting was usually fairly evenly distrib- out. Although the Royal Mail did also meant strong central control, uted around the country, which is the delivery of the freepost elec- with funds and staffing under his not the route to winning under first tion address, its production could direction pointed towards a limited past the post. Only by concentrat- still require significant local cam- number of seats. ing on building up support within paign effort, such as to address and To be successful, this required particular seats could votes secured stuff envelopes to hold the election two internal debates to be won, be turned into actual seats won. address, reducing the amount of repeatedly. First, the ability of a By the time of the Liberal Dem- time available to help in winnable well-resourced targeting opera- ocrats, the idea of intensive leaflet constituencies.10 tion to win seats was so important

8 Journal of Liberal History 83 Summer 2014 the liberal democrat approach to campaigning that the party should dedicate more also specially created, autonomous in accordance with the Medium resources to target seat campaign- structures for running the 1992 and Term Review appointed Ren- ing. Second, that the selection of 1997 election campaigns, under nard as a ‘Chief Executive of the target seats should be sufficiently Des Wilson and Richard Holme General Election’ (he was not then narrow to make it meaningful – respectively. Those separate general party Chief Executive). This both and so only giving target seat sta- election structures came with their simplified the structures and solidi- tus to those performing at a level own budgetary autonomy. fied Rennard’s influence, which which could bring victory. All this caused some in the vol- had spread from key seats in 1992 Rennard therefore believed that untary party’s democratic struc- to an increasingly important role effective targeting also required tures to complain about lack of in deciding messaging in 1997 to him to have significant power and clarity or control over what was being the day-to-day person in discretion within the party organi- being spent, by who and on what charge for 2001. sation. It meant he argued both for basis. A significant part of the par- Alongside this integration of an increasing share of the party’s ty’s federal (UK-wide) funds were, budgets and structures around gen- resources to be dedicated to the key for example, put into a campaign eral elections, the Parliamentary seats operation and for him and the fund and a by-election fund, whose Office of the Liberal Democrats (the party’s campaign staff working for income (in particular, its sources operations in parliament, funded him to have substantial autonomy of fundraising) and expenditure by public money and employing over the key seat operation. This had far less detailed scrutiny from much of the party’s London-based was only partly tempered by a need the party’s elected committees and staff) became more integrated with to cooperate with other parts of conference than the main federal the federal HQ’s operations. Such the party in order to bring in their party budget. The general elec- integration brought many ben- resources to the operation. As a tion budget itself received even less efits for the party and its ability to result, the selection of target seats scrutiny from the party’s demo- make the best use of its resources. in England in the run-up to the cratic processes.12 It also meant that Chris Rennard’s 1997 general election, for example, There was a significant benefit role was an increasingly powerful involved regional parties in help- for the party’s campaigning from one – a trend strengthened by the ing to evaluate seats against per- this opacity. It protected ‘com- need to fill the vacuum caused by formance criteria such as level of mercially confidential’ informa- Charles Kennedy’s lack of inter- members and regularity of leaflet tion from the prying eyes of other est in organisational details and delivery. Central party staff and parties, such as over the relative by his health issues at the time.13 funding resources were only avail- amount of resources put into con- Consequently, whatever benefits able for those seats and regions that testing different seats and whether these changes brought, they did not complied with the scheme. or not any particular parliamentary assuage – and if anything increased Supporting activity in key seats by-election was going to see a seri- – the concerns of some critics about became an increasingly important ous campaign launched. the semi-autonomous nature of the funding priority for the party, with The party’s Medium Term campaigning control he exercised. the £120,000 allocated to the Cam- Review following the 1997 cam- Some steps were taken by Chris paigns Department for key seats in paign decided that the party’s elec- Rennard in response to these con- 1992 growing to £1m in 1997 and tion campaigns should in future cerns – such as the creation of a new continuing to grow subsequently. be more accountable to the main- senior management team to take on Controversy came from the three stream party structure and that some of the powers newly concen- different sources of financial power the Campaign & Communications trated at party HQ. There were also for the 1992 and 1997 general elec- Committee Chair should chair the many vocal and passionate defend- tions. There was the mainstream election campaigns. Tim Razzall ers of his approach, especially from federal (UK-wide) party budget. was elected to this position fol- the party’s organisers, agents and There was Rennard’s growing lowing Charles Kennedy’s elec- candidates. In part this came from a campaign operation. There were tion as leader and he in turn and simple record of success (see Table 1) that seemed to justify this approach and which suggested that the more Table 1: Liberal, Alliance and Liberal Democrat general election performance of the party’s funds that went on Election Seats won Share of the vote Votes:seats ratio campaigning, and the more that 1970 6 8 0.8 was under Rennard’s control, the 1974 Feb 14 20 0.7 better the party did. It also reflected the mixed repu- 1974 Oct 13 19 0.7 tation of the party’s Federal Execu- 1979 11 14 0.8 tive (FE) and Federal Finance and 1983 23 26 0.9 Administration Committee (FFAC) who had control over the federal 1987 22 23 0.9 budget and were therefore sidelined 1992 19 18 1.1 when funds went elsewhere. Com- 1997 46 17 2.7 ments such as ‘it’s the worst com- 2001 52 19 2.8 mittee I’ve ever served on’ were common from FE members during 2005 62 22 2.9 this time, and spanning several dif- 2010 57 23 2.5 ferent FE chairs.

Journal of Liberal History 83 Summer 2014 9 the liberal democrat approach to campaigning

Moreover, there was a more credited by many with helping to elections than simply delivering subtle, cultural factor at work, aris- save the party after the traumas of leaflets. He set out his campaigning from the way that election law merger, and all through the next ing style most clearly in a guide to requires individual ward or con- two decades, high profile by-elec- winning local elections, originally stituency election campaigns to be tion victories gave the party much written for the Liberal Party but conducted. By making the candi- needed bursts of publicity and anticipating the merger.21 He used date and their election agent legally credibility.19 to offer would-be candidates a bet: responsible for all the campaign They often also helped set the he was so sure that if they did eve- activities carried out on behalf of political mood, helping to shift the rything in the book they would a candidate and their party, elec- journalistic consensus as to what win, that if they followed every- tion law encourages a very central- the party’s fate was likely to be. thing in the book and failed to win, ised approach to election campaign For example, after the 1997 general he would refund the cover price. management, which was widely election gains, the media generally According to the tales, he never had reflected in the party’s general elec- assumed the next general election to make a refund. The book covers tion agent manuals and similar would be about the Liberal Demo- more than just leafleting, includ- publications for local elections.14 crats trying to minimise the degree ing a key place for a regular ‘resi- The logic was simple: if someone to which they slipped back – until dents’ survey’, asking people what is going to be legally responsible, the Romsey by-election victory in issues are important to them and then they should be in charge and 2000 set the political story as being what problems in the area needed other bodies – such as the local one in which the party would make fixing. Find out what the public party executive – should not have further progress. is concerned about, then tackle it power, otherwise they would be and report back regularly through making decisions for which some- repeated leaflets was the formula. one else then has to carry the legal More than just leaflets It was both a winning formula responsibility. Although there was Chris Rennard’s approach to win- and became a controversial one for no directly similar legal require- ning parliamentary constituencies its focus was on volume of activ- ment to concentrate power at the was always heavily rooted in local ity and populism, taking up issues national level for elections,15 the campaigns and leaflets. When in that concerned people rather than culture that elections are run by a subsequent years he recounted his preaching political philosophy small number of individuals who role in achieving the biggest swing at them. It was clearly effective have complete control did seep against the Tories in the country in but always risked, especially in over from local to the national 1983 with David Alton’s re-election untrained or naive hands, lapsing level, especially as many of those in Liverpool Mossley Hill, it was into crude populism without a dis- involved at the national level in the number of leaflets and the size tinctive liberal tinge. This point election campaigning first learnt of the swing that most frequently is explored further below (see The their skills at the local level.16 featured, even though an intensive Rennard strategy). Finally, there was also a tra- door-knocking campaign and a dition dating back to the Liberal A typical bar growth in the volunteer base from Party days of general election cam- chart / two-horse 100 to 600 were also key parts of the Bar charts paigns or key seat activities being race leaflet, from campaign.20 Both the electoral effectiveness and run in semi-autonomous ways.17 Broadland in the Yet there was always more to ideological doubts of this approach When this was added to the SDP 2010 election Rennard’s approach to winning were heighted by the heavy heritage, with its revulsion at the way Labour’s cumbersome committees had mismanaged elections, and a continuing tradition of Lib- eral Democrat leaders liking to put general election campaigns outside the party’s usual democratic structures,18 there was a very open door for Rennard to push at with his actions to have centralised, semi- autonomous control.

Parliamentary by-elections This applied first with parliamentary by-elections and then with constituency campaigning for general elections. As with the Alliance and before them the Liberal Party, parliamentary by-elections played a large role in the party’s fortunes, especially in its early days. The Eastbourne by-election victory in 1990 was

10 Journal of Liberal History 83 Summer 2014 the liberal democrat approach to campaigning emphasis on appealing to tactical normally give a conventional polit- The prob- being copied by the other parties. voters. It was an effective way of ical leaflet a second glance. Indeed, by the time of the Cheadle turning the disadvantages the third The delivery of a newspapers, lem was not by-election in 2005, not only were party faced under first past the post including one over the last week- the Conservatives closely copying on their head, making the electoral end of the campaign containing so much the the campaign tactics of previous system count against one of the an extremely strong tactical vot- Liberal Democrat by-elections, but other main parties within a partic- ing message, became a staple of the lack of policy many of the standard phrases and ular constituency. party’s electioneering for decades wording used in them were also Where the third party was in until reductions in printing prices, consistency being copied. It led to increasingly second place (or could plausibly more generous expense limits and questions over whether the party’s argue that it had moved into second imitation from other parties made across dif- campaign techniques were fresh place since the previous election), a newspapers spill over into repeated ferent seats, enough and modernising at a pace strong appeal could be made to the appearances during a campaign. to keep up with the other parties. supporters of the major party that As with other techniques, such for there was found itself in third place, arguing newspapers often showed up the they should switch their votes to variation in skill levels amongst high con- The Rennard strategy the Liberals/Alliance/Lib Dems, as campaign teams. The newspa- Part of these criticisms was a view their favoured party could not win per produced for high-profile by- sistency at that Rennard-style campaigning but by switching they would at least elections usually had production added up to less than the sum of its be able to stop the other main party quality matching the independent Rennard’s parts. By fighting a series of very winning. Moreover, in making the local media. However, the format intensive local constituency cam- tactical voting case, the party was of the item showed up particularly instiga- paigns, each shaped by the varying also implicitly making the case that harshly any falling short of such particular issues and concerns in the the party could win, at least in that standards, with local campaign tion, but individual constituencies – so the seat, which was also an effective tac- teams not in receipt of direct cen- argument went – the party was fail- tic for appealing to voters, many of tral artwork support not infre- rather that ing to build up a clear, consistent whom were willing to vote for the quently producing newspapers image of itself or carve out a clear party as long as it would not end up so amateurish in appearance as to the ‘we’re core vote. Instead, it was accumulat- being a wasted vote.22 undermine the concept. ing different sets of diverse support- A key part of making this point Yet such newspapers continued nice, hard ers in various seats, with the only effectively was to present it graphi- to be produced because, as with bar possible progress coming from put- cally, in the shape of a bar chart. charts and other parts of the suc- working and ting together new bespoke coalitions The origins of the first bar charts cessful campaign paraphernalia, concerned of supporters a few seats at a time. on leaflets painting a contest as a in less skilled hands they became This criticism can be overdone, two-horse between the party and totemic concepts to copy. Copying about the for the party’s polling actually its main rival, with the other party concepts is much easier, of course, found rather similar results across or parties labelled as unable to win than copying quality – and with the same issues its different key seats. The typical are lost to history although most rationale behind such paraphernalia key-seat constituency polls with a likely date to the late 1970s.23 By the rarely discussed widely in the party, as you’ mes- sample size of around 450 found a early 1980s Chris Rennard was pro- it became easy for people to copy consistent pattern – both around moting tactical voting, authoring a poorly without understanding why sage was not the country and across the years – guide for the Association of Liberal what they were doing was inferior. of voters liking hard-working Lib- Councillors that included advice sufficiently eral Democrats, with strong local on how to use what he then called credentials, who concentrated on ‘block diagrams’. By the time of the ‘Blue ink’ letters distinctively the issues that the public told the Liberal Democrats the use of tacti- In the search to find formats that pollsters were the most important cal voting appeals illustrated by bar would result in voters actually liberal. to their family. These were usually charts was a major part of the par- reading political literature, hand- health, crime and education, with ty’s target seat campaigns. addressed envelopes containing a issues such as constitutional reform reproduced handwritten letter also and Europe as a result being heavily became common. Typically the let- downplayed. Tabloid newspapers ters used blue paper and envelopes, If anything, the problem was Another distinctive feature of Lib- with the printed handwriting often not so much the lack of policy eral Democrat campaigns, less in dark blue ink, giving them the consistency across different seats, remarked on than bar chart but as name ‘blue ink letters’. The first for there was high consistency at with them ending up widely cop- such blue ink letters were invented Rennard’s instigation, but rather ied by other parties, was the use by Rennard when he was organ- that the ‘we’re nice, hard work- of four-page constituency news- ising the Liberal breakthrough in ing and concerned about the same papers. Given a non-party mast- Leicester in the 1980s. issues as you’ message was not suf- head to encourage readership, and As with other campaign tech- ficiently distinctively liberal. As a with no prominent logo on the first niques, such as the old Liberal Par- result, the party’s pitch was one any page, these newspapers made clear ty’s habit, born in 1970s Liverpool, other party could – and sometimes who they were from but were writ- of delivering a ‘Good Morning’ did – copy and match. By concen- ten in a third-person local newspa- leaflet before voters had woken up trating on promoting the virtues per style and designed to attract the on polling day, they started as a of individual candidates, their interest of people who would not distinctive technique and ended up local connections and their local

Journal of Liberal History 83 Summer 2014 11 the liberal democrat approach to campaigning campaigns, the approach built up Namely that the best results in PR so that the ground war took place support for individuals who hap- elections, where votes were counted against a more welcoming back- pened to be Liberal Democrats, up over a much larger area than a drop. As a result, and in one of the rather than for the party in its own single Westminster constituency, least frequently commented on right. This made it hard to trans- were garnered by concentrating episodes during Rennard’s time at fer that support to their successors activity on the strongest constituen- party HQ, the party’s press team28 as candidates. Where an incum- cies and wards within those larger was roughly doubled in size. The bent MP was standing down, there areas. Rennard-style concentrated ground tactics changed little, for was some scope for them to sup- campaigning generated more votes as in 1997 there was a compellingly port the building up of their suc- overall than alternative approaches clear and neat pattern of the seats cessor. However, where the party to spread the party’s activity more which followed the standard Ren- had come close but not won and thinly over wider areas.24 nard campaign template winning the defeated candidate retired, or A related criticism frequently and those that did not, losing. where an MP was defeated and a made, especially in the pages of For 2005, the pattern was much new person was seeking to regain Liberator magazine, was that by less clear cut, and as a result the the seat next time round, it was concentrating party resources on a campaign activity template that extremely hard to pass on the accu- limited number of target seats, the seats were expected to follow mulated support for their predeces- party failed to grow in other parts underwent significant changes, sor to the new person. of the country and instead was left including a big increase in the vol- Rennard’s response to this was to whither. In truth, though, the ume of direct mail. This was in partly that it was a better approach number of seats being seriously part a reaction to the large Con- than anything that anyone else had fought by the party doubled across More widely servative direct mail operation in tried or suggested, in that it did at the 1997, 2001 and 2005 parliaments 2005, although whilst the latter least get Lib Dem MPs elected in before Chris Rennard’s departure in the party relied overwhelmingly on postage, far greater numbers than before. He as Chief Executive.25 the lower-budget Lib Dem opera- also argued that there was a long- this still left tion was reliant on hand-delivered term strategic element to it: the aim direct mail. was to build up the number of seats Post-2005 reviews a sense that More widely in the party this the party could win until it was big Following the 2005 election, within still left a sense that further mod- enough to force a hung parliament. the Campaigns Department there further modernisation of campaign tactics was At that point, he hoped, the party was a limited review of the general required. Such modernisation was would be able to get the rules of the election result and revision of the ernisation part of Ming Campbell’s pitch for game changed, with a new voting party’s template campaign strat- the party leadership in 2006 and, system and party funding reform egy for target and held seats. More of campaign after he won, a campaign review then letting the party fight future generally there was debate in the tactics was headed up by Ed Davey MP was elections on a level playing field party over how the general election carried out. This included a study with the other main parties. was conducted, and whether the required. trip to Canada and the US to learn On that basis, the election- result constituted a missed oppor- lessons from sister parties there. fighting part of the strategy almost tunity given the political dam- Such mod- Before there was a chance to see the delivered in 2010. But the math- age to Labour thanks to the fallout result of these changes at a general ematics of the hung parliament did from the Iraq war.26 The party had ernisation election, Chris Rennard departed not make a Labour–Lib Dem deal some dramatic wins from Labour, as Chief Executive. feasible, and so the party’s negoti- such as in Manchester Withington was part of ating position for electoral reform and in Hornsey & Wood Green, but was weakened. That plus the sub- should there have been more given Ming Camp- Post-Rennard sequent disastrous AV referendum the political environment offered The new Chief Executive, Chris campaign meant the strategy did up by the Iraq war and resulting bell’s pitch Fox, set out to organise party HQ not end in triumph. widespread centre-left disenchant- in a very different style (more flip Where the party did succeed ment with Tony Blair? for the party charts and less bar charts was the in changing the rules of the elec- Within the Campaigns Depart- quip). His Director of Campaigns, toral game – with electoral reform ment the thinking was much more leadership Hilary Stephenson, nonetheless for Scotland, Wales, London and about how the party had performed took an approach to campaigning the European Parliament elections against the Conservatives, and the in 2006 and, that was very rooted in the mode – this simply extended the contro- failure to win a string of seats that of the 1997 and 2001 successes, and versy. For critics of Rennardism, on paper were promising prospects after he as a result the focus was on fighting the party’s failure to shine in those and appeared to have run the sort won, a cam- those sorts of campaigns better and ballots conducted by versions of of campaign which had in the past on a larger scale rather than signifi- proportional representation showed resulted in victory. paign review cant changes in the party’s cam- its limitations. If the party could not After the 2001 general election, paigning style.29 do well in elections of the very sort the implicit27 lesson drawn by the headed up by The 2010 general election saw a it wanted, freed from the shackles of party was that a very effective key- huge bump in the opinion polls for first past the post, what long-term seats operation could only get the Ed Davey MP the party after the first TV Lead- future for the party was there? party so far, and in addition to an ers’ Debate, and as a result the party The answer to that, for Ren- effective ‘ground war’, the party was carried started putting effort into a much nardism’s defenders, was that the needed to be better at the ‘air war’ wider range of seats. In addition, future required more of the same. in the national media and the like out. the focus of party campaigners on

12 Journal of Liberal History 83 Summer 2014 the liberal democrat approach to campaigning targeting weakened, as more activ- What is British political campaigning. It was Campaigning in your community. The ists started staying at home to work both a tribute to the success of its origins of parts of the text can be their own seats, thinking they already clear tactics and a frustration to its further traced back through to 1970s Liberal could win, rather than travelling to success that other parties ended up Party publications. near-by more marginal seats.30 is that the so heavily copying its techniques. 6 ‘There were many areas of Liberal As a result, when the votes Whether it is the regular appear- local government strength where lit- came in the 2010 election was the third party ance of a leaflet outside of election tle or no attempt was made to convert worst for the party since 1992 when time, heavy focusing of resources this to parliamentary elections and judged by the campaign machine’s did remake on a limited number of target seats, indeed even those with much experi- ability to turn national vote share emphasis on the local roots and local ence of local election success had not into actual seats (see Table 1). For British politi- campaign record of candidates or much idea of how to adapt commu- pessimists this was the result of cal cam- the widespread use of bar charts, nity politics techniques for parlia- the Conservatives in 2005 having electoral politics in Britain has fol- mentary elections. In contrast many largely cottoned on to how to do paigning. It lowed where the third party led. of the seats we did hold were not intensive key-seat campaigning, and really bastions of community poli- by 2010 Labour doing so too, leav- was both a Dr Mark Pack worked at Liberal Dem- tics. Campaigning in Liberal-fought ing the party’s ability to out-per- ocrat HQ from 2000 to 2009, and prior to South Leicester and SDP-fought form the national picture in selected tribute to the that was frequently a volunteer member Watford in 1985–87, I found the for- constituencies hugely reduced. of the Parliamentary By-Election team. mer more dynamic in terms of win- One issue that was clear is success of its He is co-author of 101 Ways To Win An ning council seats, but the latter more that the party called several seats Election and of the party’s General Elec- focused on the parliamentary elec- wrongly in the last few days before tactics and a tion Agents Manual. tion,’ said Iain Sharpe, now a Watford polling day, misdirecting resources borough councillor, to the author at as a result. For example, a great deal frustration 1 For example, see David Denver and the Liberal Democrat autumn federal of effort was directed to Oxford Gordon Hands, Modern Constitu- conference, September 2013. East on polling day, which Labour to its further ency Electioneering: Local Campaign- 7 The same image would also cover the held on to by a significant margin – ing in the 1992 General Election (Frank predecessor Liberal Party’s approach 4,581 votes – whereas, had the effort success that Cass, 1997) and Justin Fisher, David to campaigning over several decades been directed instead to neighbour- Denver and Gordon Hands, ‘Unsung too. The distinctive features of the ing Oxford West & Abingdon, other par- Heroes: Constituency Election party’s approach to campaigning, Evan Harris would not have ended Agents in British General Elections’, leaflets, bar charts and all, came over- up losing by just 176 votes.31 ties ended British Journal of Politics and Interna- whelmingly from the merged party’s The party’s own official review up so heavily tional Relations, vol. 8, no. 4, 2006. Liberal, rather than SDP, heritage. was a relatively low-key affair. It 2 This gap is not unique to the Lib- 8 Director of Campaigns and Elections made many detailed recommenda- copying its eral Democrats or the tactics that 1989–2003 and then Chief Executive tions, and some significant organi- party pioneered. Phil Cowley, now 2003–9. He was created a life peer in sational ones – particularly that the techniques. co-author of the Nuffield general 1999. party should change its computer election series, has made the point 9 This reluctance to move resources database software for fighting elec- to the author that he and his col- and people in order to concentrate on tions.32 In addition, the increasing leagues know very little about direct target seats is one the other main par- emphasis in the Labour Party on the mail’s impact on election results even ties have encountered too, and indeed virtues of canvassing has rubbed though it is clear from his conversa- is a reason why even as they saw the off on the Liberal Democrats, with tions with campaign organisers that success of targeting for the third a switch from viewing canvassing they put much time and money into party they were not able to match it as a data-gathering opportunity, producing it. As a result he has pos- because of greater resistance to mov- where a virtue is made of talking to ited, half in jest but also half seri- ing effort between seats from within each person for as little time a possi- ously, ‘Cowley’s Law’, namely that their own organisations. ble, to an attempt to get into longer the level of media attention given to a 10 Technology has increasingly made conversations about issues. campaign technique is in inverse pro- readying a candidate’s freepost elec- Whether such changes are the portion to the importance given to it tion address a less labour-intensive right ones and are radical enough, by campaign organisers. operation than it used to be. The abil- remains to be seen with the 2015 3 Bernard Greaves and Gordon Lish- ity to print names and addresses and election yet to cast its verdict. man, The Theory and Practice of Com- to automatically fold and stuff litera- munity Politics (Association of Liberal ture into envelopes has made their Councillors, 1980). production increasingly something Conclusion 4 The most notable of the names that for machines rather than volunteers. The Liberal Party, then the Alliance provides continuity from the Liberal The impact of this on the willingness and subsequently the Liberal Demo- Party through to the Liberal Demo- of volunteers therefore to move to crats all set out to remake British crats is Chris Rennard. However, help in a different constituency is an politics. With the post-2010 coalition there are others too, such as Tony unresearched area. government not yet run its course, it Greaves. 11 Conversation with the author, Lib- would be premature for historians to 5 This applies to some of the Liberal eral Democrat autumn federal con- cast a verdict on the extent to which Democrat campaign publications ference, September 2013. this aim was achieved. which have my own name on the 12 For example, the autumn 1996 federal However, what is already clear cover, such as the 2011 pamphlet conference in Brighton had presented is that the third party did remake co-authored with Shaun Roberts, to it a draft outline federal budget for

Journal of Liberal History 83 Summer 2014 13 the liberal democrat approach to campaigning

1997, a draft outline campaign to Chris Rennard. people voted tactically. The add up to a coherent overall mes- development fund budget for 19 The Eastbourne by-election debate was fuelled in part by sage or image for the party. Chris 1997 and a by-election fund state- was also the first by-election to disagreements over how tacti- Rennard himself afterwards ment of income and expendi- make use of a relatively small cal voting should be precisely likened the process to being like ture for 1995. The 1997 federal sample constituency poll, of defined for the purposes of aca- having had all the right ingredi- budget envisaged expenditure of the sort that became a regular demic research. However, the ents for a meal but not a recipe. £1,487,300. The campaign devel- staple of key-seat campaigning party’s own polling in mar- 27 Implicit in that there was not opment fund was at £292,000 under Chris Rennard. American ginal seats consistently showed a specific post-election review and the previous year’s by-elec- political consultant Rick Ridder that being able to win over the which came to this conclu- tion fund had spent £149,909. had first introduced very limited supporters of the third-placed sion. However, it was conclu- In addition, there was a general polling to the party at the end party, along with a more gen- sion that Chris Rennard came election fund mentioned but with of the Richmond by-election eral message showing that the to and communicated to others, no details provided. Moreover, campaign, but Eastbourne saw party was able to win at all, was and subsequent budget decisions very little detail was provided for the first poll carried out early an extremely important part of flowed from this. either the campaign fund or the enough in the campaign to be building up a winning share of 28 This is a somewhat imprecise by-election fund, each only get- used to help make decisions the vote in such seats. term as many of the press team ting one side of summary figures. on messages and tactics. See 23 The earliest bar chart the author were formally employed by The mainstream federal budget, Rick Ridder, ‘How Margaret has located is on a Richmond, the Parliamentary Office of the by contrast, came with more Thatcher Advanced My Con- London leaflet from 1979 (http:// Liberal Democrats and reliant than a dozen pages of detail on sulting Career’, Campaigns & www.markpack.org.uk/35442/ on state funding, which limited expenditure in the previous year. Elections, May/June 2013. the-first-bar-chart-richmond- the range of activities they could 13 The different personalities of suc- 20 Systematic analysis over decades in-1979-possibly/). However, engage in. However, as far as the cessive party leaders also played of the volume of leaflets deliv- despite questioning several of the outside world was concerned a role. As the Helen Morrissey ered during election campaigns main campaigning experts from there was a group of press offic- report, Process and Culture within is absent from British politics. the 1970s, the answer to who ers based in the party’s HQ and the Liberal Democrats and recommen- However, there are plenty of started the use of bar charts, when this was seen – and in practice dations for change (2013) put it, ‘The fragments of evidence that sub- or where, has not been identified. acted as – the party’s press team. relatively relaxed management stantiate anecdotal claims about Anyone able to beat the 1979 date 29 Nick Clegg’s commitment dur- style of the party leader, Charles Liberal Democrat campaigns with an earlier example is most ing his successful run for party Kennedy, compared with Paddy featuring a tidal wave of paper welcome to contact the author on leader to double the number of Ashdown who has a military being pushed through letter [email protected]. the party’s MPs added to this background, also contributed to boxes. For example, the Nuf- 24 However, it should be noted that sense that what was needed was Chris Rennard’s power base.’ field general election series pub- in the first European elections to fight more seats to the tradi- 14 It was also reflected in similar lications for the 1960s and 1970s by PR, in 1999, Rennard him- tional intense template rather publications in the other main show how even in marginal self was a supporter of trying out than to change what the tem- parties too. seats two or three leaflets in total some thin, blanket activity. He plate contained. 15 This changed somewhere fol- were the norm during a general was instrumental in securing the 30 A defence of this dissipation lowing the Political Parties, election campaign. By the time funding to ensure that election of effort is that 2010 appeared Elections and Referendums Act of the Liberal Democrat elec- addresses via the Royal Mail’s to offer a once in a generation 2000 with its introduction of tion guides for the twenty-first election freepost facility went opportunity to win new seats. national expenditure controls. century, campaigns were being out to the whole electorate. This The party may have gambled 16 The most common route to advised to use that many leaflets produced little apparent ben- and lost by spreading its effort recruitment by the Campaigns simply on election day itself. efit for the party, and in future thin, but in the face of such an & Elections Department during 21 Chris Rennard, Winning Local European elections the party opportunity it is only hindsight the Chris Rennard period was to Elections (Association of Liberal increasingly moved towards that tells us going for the big first have been a winning elec- Councillors, January 1988). The concentrating its funds on more prize was the wrong move. tion agent. Even those who did central importance of leaflets is and better election addresses in 31 Some in the party blamed poor not follow this route, such as the revealed by the explanation of its stronger areas, with lower constituency polling for these author, usually had other local strategy in the book’s foreword: quality, cheaper and fewer elec- misjudgements. However, given campaigning credentials. ‘The book explains a strategy tion addresses elsewhere. the availability of data also from 17 This was particularly a feature for building a campaign. Not 25 This is based on the (unpub- other sources, simply blaming the of Jeremy Thorpe’s leadership, just what leaflets should say lished) lists of seats circulated polling is unfair on the pollsters. during which there was secretive but when, how and why – with within the Liberal Democrat 32 It did. After a competitive pitch fundraising for campaign activi- examples’. This quote illustrates Campaigns Department during process, the old EARS pro- ties with the wider party kept both the key features of Ren- this time. gramme was replaced not by a out of the loop. nard’s very successful approach 26 The party’s use of ten we pro- new product from the same team 18 For the early general elections in to winning elections and also pose/we oppose statements but by a product called Con- the Liberal Democrats’ history, a two of the features that most during the 2005 election was a nect, based on NGPVAN, a US separate general election organi- often attracted criticism – ‘strat- particular cause of debate. Each programme used by the Barack sation was created. Integrating egy’ meaning a campaign plan of the ten individual pairs had Obama presidential campaigns the general election campaign for a specific election and cam- been market researched heavily and by many other Democrat into the party’s usual operations paigning meaning leafleting. ahead of the election and each was campaigns as well as by the at subsequent general elections 22 As tactical voting became more generally popular both within Canadian Liberals. By 2014, only was seen across the party as a talked about in the 1980s and the party and with the public. a small number of local parties sensible reform – and one which early 1990s there was a lively However, many people felt that continued to use EARS. therefore also gave more power academic debate on how many the ten individual policies did not

14 Journal of Liberal History 83 Summer 2014 History Group booklets In addition to the Liberal Democrat History Group’s reference books (see page 2 for the most recent), we also publish a range of shorter and more accessible booklets – an ideal introduction to aspects of Liberal history.

All the booklets below are available at special discounted prices for subscribers to the Journal of Liberal History. To order, please send a cheque (made out to ‘Liberal Democrat History Group’) to LDHG, 54 Midmoor Road, London SW12 0EN. Postage and packing is included. Liberal Leaders of the 20th Century The sixty-page booklet contains concise biographies of every Liberal, Social Democrat and Liberal Democrat leader since 1900. The total of sixteen biographies stretches from Henry Campbell-Bannerman to Nick Clegg, including such figures as H. H. Asquith, David Lloyd George, Jo Grimond, David Steel, David Owen and Paddy Ashdown. Full price £6; available to Journal of Liberal History subscribers at the special price of £5.

Liberal Leaders of the 19th Century The forty-page booklet contains concise biographies of every Liberal leader from the Great Reform Act to the end of the nineteenth century – the heyday of the Victorian Liberal Party. The total of eleven biographies range from Lord Grey to Sir William Harcourt, including such towering figures as Viscount Melbourne, Lord John Russell, Lord Palmerston and William Ewart Gladstone. Full price £4; available to Journal of Liberal History subscribers at the special price of £3.50. Mothers of Liberty: Women who built British Liberalism Even before they gained the right to vote and to stand for election, women played many key roles in the development of British Liberalism – as writers and thinkers, campaigners, political hostesses, organisers and, finally, as parliamentary candidates, MPs and peers.

This booklet contains the stories of the women who shaped British Liberalism – including Mary Wollstonecraft, Harriet Taylor Mill, the suffragist leader Millicent Garrett Fawcett, the first woman Liberal MP Margaret Wintringham, Violet Bonham Carter, Megan Lloyd George, Nancy Seear, Shirley Williams and many more. Full price £6; available to Journal of Liberal History subscribers at the special price of £5. Coming soon: Liberal thinkers Concise summaries of the lives and thoughts of the greatest Liberal thinkers, from John Milton to John Rawls, including John Stuart Mill, Tom Paine, L. T. Hobhouse and many more. Available in October; see next issue for details. Can the Grand Old Duke of York march back up again? The importance of local government for Liberal Democrats

As Liberal Democrats recover from the worst local election losses since the formation of the party, Matt Cole examines the place of the coalition years in the quarter-century of the Liberal Democrats’ life, and finds that these are not the first local losses, nor did the decline start with the coalition. The fall in local representation began before 2005, and the party’s peak of local success lies as far back as 1996. Nevertheless, local politics remains at the front line of Liberal t was asserted in the first poisonous element. Torbay MP Democrat politics: the major study of the Liberal Adrian Sanders complained in the IDemocrats that, for both prac- run-up to the local elections of 2011 most vulnerable to tical and ideological reasons, ‘the that: importance of local politics to the attack, the first to suffer Liberal Democrats cannot be over- We have irrevocably damaged losses, and yet the most stated.’1 Recent setbacks in local our public image. We now face council elections are therefore seen the brutal realisation that we essential to the heart and by some as more significant than have fractured our core vote, the usual cyclical losses of gov- lost a generation of young vot- to the recovery of the ernment parties, and the reputa- ers and alienated thousands of party. tion of the coalition is seen as the tactical voters in seats where it

16 Journal of Liberal History 83 Summer 2014 Can the Grand Old Duke of York march back up again? The importance of local government for Liberal Democrats

makes the difference between From the 1960s onwards, Liberal The Liberal Democrats’ electoral success or failure. The achievements were underpinned fortunes message on the doorstep before by the party’s commitment to local The formation of the Liberal Demo- the election was often ‘I support government. A Local Government crats showed that their strength in another party, but you seem to Department was established at party local government was an asset at a have more integrity and do more headquarters in 1962, the Association time of turbulent national leader- for local people so you have my of Liberal Councillors first emerged ship. There was considerable con- vote.’ Now it is ‘I used to vote in 1965 and was officially recognised tinuity in the core organisation for you, you still work hard for in 1969, and the decade saw a series of Liberal Democrat councillors, your local area, but you are dis- of parliamentary election victories – largely because the ALC dominated credited and lied just like the rest including those at Orpington, Colne its Social Democrat counterpart, of them.’2 Valley and Birmingham Ladywood the Association of Social Demo- – at least in part built upon success in crat Councillors, both numerically Analysing the position in 2013, local politics. and in terms of leadership, experi- author of the Local Elections Hand- In 1970 the role of local govern- ence and resources. SDP councillors book Professor Michael Thrasher ment in the Liberal Party’s profile were outnumbered by five to one even warned that Liberal Dem- was confirmed by the Assem- before the merger, and a proportion ocrats ‘need resurrection, not bly’s adoption of the community of these declined to join the Lib- recover y’; 3 and the losses of 2014 politics strategy, and by the addi- eral Democrats, leaving their erst- prompted pressure for a change tion of environmental concern while colleagues in an even smaller of leadership. However, a longer- to the existing focus on localism minority. The Association of Liberal term view of the Liberal Democrat and regionalism, to form a policy Democrat Councillors had its head- record in local government shows agenda particularly suited to fight- quarters in the Birchcliffe Centre that the party’s participation in the ing local elections. In 1977 the and the rallying cry for the party’s coalition is not the only factor in ALC’s strength was visible with first electoral test in May 1988 was Liberal Democrat local election the opening of its headquarters in given by former ALC General Sec- performance, and that local politics the Birchcliffe Centre in Hebden retary Maggie Clay.7 At a joint ALC remains vital to the Liberal Demo- Bridge, where its identity as what and ASDC conference in June a crats’ future fortunes. one supporter described as ‘the Lib- From the timetable was established (after what eral Party in exile’5 was expressed was acknowledged as ‘some hard in a programme of publications and 1960s bargaining’) leading to a launch of Liberals and local government4 campaign meetings, as well as in the joint organisation in November.8 The Liberal Party was born from criticism of the Liberal leadership onwards, Lib- The first two years of local elec- the municipal campaigning of over pacts and alliances with other tions were difficult as the Liberal Joe Chamberlain, built strength parties and departures from distinc- eral achieve- Democrats dealt with the fall- through the campaigns of Lloyd tive Liberal policy positions. ments were out from the merger, and the 1989 George’s rate strike in Wales and From a few hundred councillors county council elections saw the E. D. Simon’s plans for develop- (some of doubtful association with underpinned loss of 20 per cent of the seats won ment in Manchester and found even the party) in the 1950s, the Alliance in the big advance of 1985. There- in the dark days of the 1950s, when in 1986 passed the 3,000 mark, of by the par- after the party re-established and the party’s MPs could be counted whom 524 were Social Democrats.6 expanded its strength, though on the fingers of one hand, that On the eve of the merger between ty’s commit- national circumstances halted and council chambers provided the last the Liberals and Social Democrats, even sometimes reversed the pat- redoubt of Liberal power, the party the Alliance controlled dozens of ment to local tern more than once (see Fig. 1). remaining in control of a small councils and took part in adminis- By 1992 there were 3,800 Lib- number of local authorities. trations on dozens more. government. eral Democrat councillors;9 and

Journal of Liberal History 83 Summer 2014 17 the importance of local government for liberal democrats

Figure 1: change in Liberal Democrat seats held at contests 1989–2014 national image only determine the shorter-term and most extreme swings in Liberal Democrat strength in local government. The long-term pattern is more complex.

Functions of local representation As well as carrying out their own work as representatives, councillors and their campaigns can play three types of wider role in a party – an electoral function; a communication function; and a recruitment function – and for the Liberal Dem- ocrats these have been especially important. Council election success is particularly important in giving credibility to the Liberal Democrats as the third party nationally. The slogan ‘Winning Round Here’ is in 1996 the figure was over 5,000 elections saw net gains, sometimes often held aloft on photographs and the party controlled over fifty of 8 or 12 per cent, in council seat in Liberal Democrat literature by councils.10 This partly resulted numbers. Significantly, these led to well-known councillors support- from the disintegration of Con- the capture or retrieval of north- ing parliamentary candidates, and servative support during the sec- ern, former Labour, administra- many Liberal Democrat MPs owe ond Major administration, but tions such as Newcastle and Pendle their seats to the confidence given had also been growing since 1990 – adding to Liverpool and Sheffield, to voters to back them by preceding because of the effective targeting which the party won in 1998 and local election success for the party. of scarce resources on winnable 1999 respectively. By 2007 the num- One MP noted that ‘most of the wards, referred to eight years ear- ber of Liberal Democrat Council- ’97 intake have seats built on local lier in Maggie Clay’s exhortation lors had returned to 4,700. government success’12 and this was to activists to ‘get on your bike’ to a This was, however, a peak. quantified by a study showing that target seat. Every year except one since 2006 eighteen of the twenty-eight new The ‘soft’ victories handed by has seen a decline in the number of Liberal Democrat MPs in that par- the national image of the Conserv- Liberal Democrat councillors and liament represented areas governed atives, including the near-doubling councils.11 Though heightened in by Liberal Democrat local authori- of the number of Liberal Demo- 2007 by the party’s national leader- ties. ‘For the Liberal Democrats, crat county councillors in 1993, ship difficulties, this pattern clearly local election success has been vital proved hard to defend as Tony Blair predates the formation of the coa- to their improvement in parliamen- replaced Major as prime minister lition and is reflected in the three tary representation since the 1990s’ in 1997, and consequently almost case studies below. This strengthens concluded Russell et al. ‘Building all of the 392 gains made four years the conviction that Liberal Demo- a strong local base has been one of earlier were lost in net terms. The crat performance at local elections the main mechanisms the party has whole of the first Blair premiership is only partly a result of national used to bridge the electoral cred- was a period of damage limitation events, and that on occasion the ibility gap,’ they continue, adding for Liberal Democrats in local gov- causal relationship can be the other that ‘the Liberal Democrat cam- ernment, each round of elections way around. paign strategy may have worked seeing the party shed up to 12 per It would be fatuous to dispute on a micro-scale since the victories cent of the number of seats it was that the record of the coalition, in Cardiff, Leeds and Manches- defending. The period ended with and its perception by the public, ter reflected gains at the local level the loss of another eighty county has damaged Liberal Democrat short of taking the council.’13 A council seats in 2001. The Liberal strength in local government. After particularly clear example is Burn- Democrats controlled twenty fewer four years of losses – not all unprec- ley, where the party went from councils than four years earlier. edented in scale, but previously seven councillors (one less than From this period onwards, how- unknown in succession – there the BNP) in 2003 to twenty-three ever – prior to the Iraq War, the first were by 2013 only 2,700 Liberal (and control of the council) in 2008 trebling of tuition fees or the inten- Democrat councillors, the lowest before winning the parliamentary sification of the Blair–Brown strug- number in the party’s history; in seat in 2010. There is also a meas- gle – Liberal Democrats in local 2014 this fell to under 2,400. The urable ‘horizontal’ electoral effect government showed their ability first and heaviest of these defeats in which success in one council to achieve growth independently led to calls for Nick Clegg’s resig- prompts confidence and improve- of, and prior to, the party nation- nation, but the record of the past ment in neighbouring Liberal ally. Each of the next five rounds of suggests that leadership change and Democrat council campaigns.14

18 Journal of Liberal History 83 Summer 2014 the importance of local government for liberal democrats

Secondly, like other parties, the deputies of party groups, two cabi- two generations earlier. By 1953 Liberal Democrats use council rep- net members or committee chairs, there were no Liberals on the city’s resentation to assist dialogue within and two mayors. Although in 2010 120-strong council and no candi- the party. ‘One of my rules for run- the proportion of Liberal Democrat dates at council elections. But Lib- ning the Lib Dems’, reflected Paddy MPs with council experience fell eral Democrats built on the revival Ashdown, ‘is that, whenever the to 60 per cent, it remained above of the 1960s to achieve joint control Leader and the ALDC act together, the comparable figure for Labour of the city, from which came their we can always get our way.’15 Lead- (54 per cent) and far ahead of that first general election victory in ers who preside over dramatic for the Conservatives (21 per cent). Birmingham since before the First fortunes for the party would also Whilst some have regarded this World War (see Fig. 2).23 receive the reaction from council as regrettable because of its ten- The experience of Birming- groups, whether a boost as with dency to exclude ‘big personalities’ ham Liberal Democrat council Kennedy in 2001,16 or a backlash or because it inhibits the selection group’s longest-serving members such as Menzies Campbell suffered as parliamentary candidates of dates back to the 1960s when Wal- in 2007.17 This exchange also takes women, others argue it improves lace Lawler used community cam- place at constituency level, with parliamentary discipline. Either paigning and extensive casework Liberal Democrat MPs taking the way, the distinctively clear role of in the north of the city to build a pulse of local opinion from coun- local government experience in group of eight councillors and win cil representatives, and sometimes Liberal Democrat parliamentary the Birmingham Ladywood par- feeding back parliamentary busi- candidate selections is evident.22 liamentary seat at a by-election in ness or constituency cases to them. 1969. Lawler lost Ladywood at the ‘Politics when it works well is about 1970 general election and died the communication other than through Three case studies following year, but his colleagues the media’, concluded John Hem- Three case studies serve to illustrate maintained Liberal representation ming after two years as MP for at ward level the principles first on the city council through chal- Birmingham Yardley: ‘you have observable through the national lenging circumstances. discussions in the council group, data, and to indicate the impact of The turbulent fortunes of the for instance. Birmingham’s council local variables in such contests. The Liberals nationally in the late 1970s group obviously is more than just cases examined here, echoing the coincided with major demographic Yardley constituency, and we have regional examples of Orpington, change in the Aston and Newtown discussed issues there before com- Colne Valley and Ladywood in areas, which were Lawler’s political ing to a conclusion in Parliament.’18 the 1960s, are from the Midlands, base, and the Liberal group declined Lastly the Liberal Democrats Yorkshire and Greater London. to only two councillors. A stra- have used local politics to greater tegic decision was made to target effect than other parties in recruit- Birmingham City Council wards in the east of the city around ing, training and promoting The West Midlands – and espe- Sheldon, and victories there were members in the party structure. cially its urban areas – have proved supplemented by three SDP coun- Community politics emphasised difficult territory for Liberal candi- cillors established by 1986 from the importance of year-round cam- dates at all levels since the Second neighbouring Hall Green ward. paigning, and the effects of this are World War. Birmingham, in par- This group formed the founda- reflected in quantitative studies ticular, suffered until 1940 from the tion of Liberal Democrat success showing that ‘the Liberal Demo- effects of the Chamberlain dynas- in Birmingham, which grew from crats are more able to recruit their ty’s departure from Liberal ranks single figures after the merger to members to do election campaigning than is true of other parties’19 Figure 2: Liberal Democrat councillors on Birmingham City Council 1990–2014 and that 16 per cent of Liberal Democrat members have stood for elected office, compared to 9 per cent for Labour and 3 per cent for the Conservatives.20 It is interesting to note that at the formation of the Liberal Democrats, the party showed its keenness to promote newer recruits through local government contests by drawing almost half of its council candidates from those under forty-five, compared to figures of a third for Labour and under a fifth for the Conservatives.21 Moving to the Commons, two- thirds of the largest-ever group of Liberal Democrat MPs (2005) had council experience, including thirteen former leaders or deputy leaders of authorities, six leaders or

Journal of Liberal History 83 Summer 2014 19 the importance of local government for liberal democrats double in size within ten years and was reproached by the city council are also to be found in an earlier peak at 33 out of 120 councillors in chief executive for leading a group Liberal revival, and as in Birming- 2007. By this time the Liberal Dem- which brought more cases to the ham the Liberal Democrats were ocrat group had shared power with administration than any other, and able to go from the secure but lim- the Conservatives for four years, thanked the chief executive for the ited representation this achieved to with Paul Tilsley, first elected to compliment. take control of the council. the council in 1969, as deputy coun- The formation of the coalition A small but determined Liberal cil leader. The partnership with in 2010 clearly raised the prospect group was established on York City the Conservatives was made easier that the Conservative–Liberal Council from 1973 onwards under than one with Labour not by ideol- Democrat administration in Bir- the energetic but controversial ogy, but chiefly by Labour’s reluc- mingham would become victim leadership of Steve Galloway, a Lib- tance and the electoral politics of to public dissatisfaction at govern- eral activist in Yorkshire since the Birmingham local government, in ment policy. The Liberal Demo- 1960s. Galloway was Liberal parlia- which only one ward is a genuine crats’ support slipped to the point mentary candidate in York in 1974, contest between Lib Dems and the where the group was reduced to but when in the 1980s he was denied Tories. In 2005 the Liberal Demo- less than half its original size, and the opportunity to stand again by crats were able to use the support Labour retrieved control of the the decision to assign York to the and credibility they had developed council. However, the equation of Social Democrats, his hostility to in local government to secure the coalition with collapse of support the Alliance inhibited its electoral election of city councillor John is simplistic: the support of the Lib- progress in York. Hemming as the MP for Birming- eral Democrats was in decline from Galloway refused any Liberal ham Yardley, in which constitu- 2007 onwards, and in its heart- cooperation in York general elec- ency the party had already won land the party remained popular, tion campaigns, leading the SDP every council seat. winning the popular vote in the candidate Vince Cable to despair This success arose in part from Yardley constituency at the local that ‘even by the standards of a the failings of the Conservative and elections of 2011, 2012 and 2014, party with more than its share of Labour governments of the period, when all four wards in the seat were bloody-minded individualists, he with the controversy over Iraq con- won by the Liberal Democrats. was (and I understand, remains) in solidating support in wards such The impact of the coalition has a league of his own.’25 At local elec- as Sparkbrook. Added to this was been to return Liberal Democrat tions this isolation of the Social the discredit brought to Labour in council representation in Birming- Democrats restricted them to win- Birmingham by the overturning ham to its pre-Blair level. The ning only one council seat at a by- of three of its 2005 election vic- long-term resilience of Birming- election in 1986. When the York tories following successful pros- ham Liberal Democrats which was Liberal Democrats were formed ecutions for fraud.24 It also relied, visible in the 1980s, and the con- (with Galloway as their group however, upon careful targeting tinuing higher base in seats which leader) they had only six seats, of resources and the maintenance have been won and then lost in quickly reduced to four by the of the community politics phi- the interim, will be important in early troubles of the merged party. losophy of ‘actively seek out and restoring the balance in the future. In most York wards by the early deal with constituents’ grievances’, 1990s the Liberal Democrats had as group member Roger Harmer City of York Council fallen into fourth place behind the puts it. Veteran of the 1960s and The roots of the Liberal Democrat Greens. 1970s revival David Luscombe group on the City of York Council As Liberal Democrats, however, the group prospered, growing from Figure 3: Liberal Democrat councillors on City of York Council 1990–2014 four seats to eighteen by 1995, and peaking at twenty-nine in 2003 (see Fig. 3). As in Birmingham, there were both external and internal factors involved. Significantly, the former included the creation of the City of York Council in the 1990s, which broadened the authority’s territory to include the areas of Harrogate and Ryedale and thereby brought the activist body to what former group leader Andrew Waller calls a ‘critical mass.’ Deployed effectively around target wards, these supporters could make a telling difference to results. York Conservatives, meanwhile, did not learn this message, and allowed their activists to spread randomly, leaving them with no seats in 2003. The Conservatives also lost the parliamentary constituency of York

20 Journal of Liberal History 83 Summer 2014 the importance of local government for liberal democrats in 1992, and between then and 2010 Figure 4: Liberal Democrat councillors on Haringey Council 1990–2014 the local government success of the Liberal Democrats was matched in general elections, at which Andrew Waller was three times the candidate and the party’s poll share rose from 10.6 per cent to 25.2 per cent, the latter figures less than 1 per cent behind the Conservatives. Waller attributes the growth in general election votes partly to the training and recruitment of activists at local elections, though the increase in support did not mirror the ward- by-ward pattern as clearly as in Birmingham, and this effect has been reduced by the introduction of ‘all in’ local elections at four-year intervals. Responsibility for the more recent decline of the York group’s size and influence is placed squarely at the door of the party leadership by Waller, who, along with ten other Liberal Democrat councillors including Galloway, lost their of circumstances both within and three behind Labour) in 2006 (see seats in 2011. Waller pointed to ‘a outside the group’s control. Fig. 4). At the previous year’s gen- very serious change of approach The Liberal Democrats con- eral election Lynne Featherstone, that’s needed at the leadership of tinued to run York as a minority one of the 1998 victors, secured the party’26 and claims that local administration, finding the Con- Hornsey and Wood Green, one of government representatives of the servatives realistic partners com- the two parliamentary seats in the party have been treated as ‘road- pared to Labour, whose councillors borough. The Liberal Democrats’ kill’. Though the raw vote of estab- are accused by Waller of ‘sabotage’. first attempt to win the seat only lished Liberal Democrat councillors Labour ministers at national level, thirteen years earlier had garnered held up, he claims, the ineffec- however, Waller found more help- less than one vote in ten. tiveness of the Liberal Democrat ful than coalition ones after 2010: Mark Pack, who joined the Lib- leadership in imposing the party’s he found the Liberal Democrat eral Democrat campaign team in identity positively on the coali- national leadership ‘did not care 1997 after cutting his electioneer- tion’s image led to a rallying of the about local government’. In York, ing teeth in York and at various Labour vote to overhaul him and a Liberal Democrat group with parliamentary by-election cam- his colleagues. a strong tradition of independ- paigns, attributes the party’s success As in Birmingham, however, ence and radicalism has found itself there to three factors, any two of this is only part of the story. The alienated from the party leadership. which are in his experience neces- organisational recovery of the Con- This is not an unknown scenario sary for success: the right demo- servatives meant that they gained in party history, and blame for it graphic base, party organisation, eight seats and deprived the Liberal may be placed on either side. What- and external factors such as national Democrats of overall control in ever else is true, the coalition envi- politics or failure locally by other 2007. Cable also blames Galloway’s ronment amplified the scenario’s parties. divisive leadership for some loss of unwelcome features. Pack argues that, as well as tar- support in his five years as council geting, organisation in Haringey leader: whilst significant improve- Haringey has benefitted from the integration ments were made in environmental Liberal Democrat representation of campaigns at all levels: coun- policy, and the Liberal Democrat in the Borough of Haringey dis- cil, mayoral and London Assem- council pioneered the ‘York Pride’ appeared in 1990 when the party’s bly, parliamentary, and European project, Cable claims Galloway lone councillor was beaten at the elections. The largely interlocking ‘made mistakes which led to them nadir of the merger process. This cycles of these elections has meant being swept out.’27 Whatever the left the authority a virtual one- they have become ‘building blocks’ reason, there can be no dispute that, party affair, with Labour holding for continuous campaigning by as in Birmingham, the ebbing of fifty-seven of its fifty-nine seats, consistent teams: each ward team the Liberal Democrat tide began running an administration which in Hornsey and Wood Green shows before the formation of the coali- earned national publicity for the MP Lynne Featherstone as a mem- tion. York’s ‘natural’ state is one of poverty of its standards. It was not ber on local campaign literature. no overall control, a balance that until 1998 that three seats were Pack also points to the impor- was lost in the Liberal Democrats’ secured by the Liberal Democrats, tance of the atmosphere and culture favour before 2007 and to their dis- rising rapidly to fifteen in 2002 of campaign teams; of avoiding a advantage after that date, as a result and peaking at twenty-seven (only ‘self-reinforcing circle’ of veteran

Journal of Liberal History 83 Summer 2014 21 the importance of local government for liberal democrats activists; and of recognising the Local poli- same time even more important Democrat politics: the most vul- point at which charismatic perfor the future. It is likely – and this nerable to attack, the first to suffer sonalities – best for ensuring the tics remains was confirmed by the experience losses, and yet the most essential to survival or revival of small and of the Eastleigh by-election victory the heart and to the recovery of the threatened groups – need to step at the front in February 2013, based upon dec- party. back to create the collegial atmos- ades of success in council elections phere which sponsors growth. line of Lib- – that the inevitable challenge to Matt Cole is a Teaching Fellow in the Campaigns can also be inhibited the Liberal Democrats’ parliamen- Department of Modern History at the by ‘lack of experience of knowing eral Demo- tary number arising from the expe- University of Birmingham. He is grate- what winning an election means.’ rience of coalition in 2015 can be ful to Roger Harmer, Andrew Waller Opponents on both sides sup- crat politics: offset to some extent by strength in and Mark Egan for interviews, from plied Haringey Liberal Democrats local government. which quotation not otherwise attributed with a great deal of ammunition: the most vul- Secondly, Liberal Democrat is taken. local Conservative tactics are nerable to success in local government often described by Pack as ‘inept’, leav- builds on the achievements of Lib- 1 M. Temple, ‘Power in the Balance’ in ing them with no seats at all after attack, the eral and Social Democrats over D. McIver, (ed.), The Liberal Democrats the last three elections; the ruling decades, but at its height produced (Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1996), p. 225. Labour group, on the other hand, first to suffer results greater in scale than even the 2 Liberator, April 2011. has gained national notoriety for Alliance’s most prosperous periods. 3 M. Thrasher, ‘Lib Dems need Resur- low standards of service. In 2009, losses, and Recent detailed studies of Liberal rection not Recovery’, http://news. Haringey’s performance was placed Democrat activity in local elections sky.com/story/1157349/lib-dems- by OFSTED in the bottom nine in yet the most show that, contrary to widespread need-resurrection-not-recovery, the country for children’s services, assumption, campaigning and 21 October 2013 (accessed 1 January and the whole council was listed essential to organisation remain key factors,28 2014). by the Audit Commission in the and the survey above suggests 4 A good summary of the Liberal Par- worst four nationally, the worst in the heart that national images of the Liberal ty’s post-war record in local govern- London. Democrats and their opponents are ment is B. Keith-Lucas, ‘The Liberals National image effects were and to the variable in their impact on local and Local Government’ in V. Bogda- limited until 2014, with Labour’s election results. nor (ed.), Liberal Party Politics (OUP, decline (as in York and Birming- recovery of The idea that the coalition has 1983), pp. 242–59. ham) preceding the party’s difficul- killed the Liberal Democrat repre- 5 I. Bradley, The Strange Rebirth of Lib- ties in government. Similarly, the the party. sentation in local government is far eral England (Chatto & Windus, 1985), peak of Liberal Democrat success too simplistic: decline in the par- p. 166. was 2006; three councillors were ty’s number of councillors began 6 The Social Democrat, 15 May 1986. lost in 2010, and two more resigned before 2010, as did the weakening 7 ‘Local elections show us only 2% the party following the formation of the transfer of local success to behind Labour!’, Democrats News, no. of the coalition. The 2014 elections, parliamentary representation. The 3, 27 March 1988, p. 1. Maggie Clay when the party lost over half of its analysis by Russell et al. of the 2005 (1947–2009) was a legendary figure councillors, showed how far this intake of Liberal Democrat MPs of northern municipal Liberalism pattern has been extended by the shows that ‘only Cambridge fol- whose endorsement of the Liberal Liberal Democrats’ time in national lowed the 1997 stepping stone pat- Democrats reflected and encouraged office – especially with a local MP tern’29 and suggests that the party’s Liberal councillors’ acceptance of the who is a government minister – general decline in local politics merger. See http://www.bramley. but, as in Birmingham and York, began before 2005. Indeed, the Lib- demon.co.uk/obits/clay-LDN.html. the tide was already receding from eral Democrats’ peak of success in 8 Social & Liberal Democrat News, 20 the Liberal Democrat high water- terms of numbers of councillors May 1988. mark before 2010. and councils lies as far back as 1996. 9 Liberal Democrat News, 15 May 1992. The rises and falls in Liberal 10 C. Rallings and M. Thrasher, ‘The Democrat local government for- Electoral Record’ in D. McIver (ed.), Conclusions tunes before and since that date The Liberal Democrats (Harvester Several issues worthy of further demonstrate the persistency of Wheatsheaf, 1996), p. 209. examination are raised by this the party at municipal level: even 11 2008 saw an increase of thirty-three survey, including the regional the loss of three-quarters of Lib- in the number of borough councillors patterns, parliamentary and elec- eral seats fought in the 1977 county on a day when the Liberal Democrats toral records of Liberal Democrat council elections (held as the Lib– won over 1,800 seats, and gained one councillors. From these introduc- Lab Pact got underway) did not more council; in 2013 no councils tory observations, however, it is signal the end of the party; and it were lost. clear, firstly, that local government was strength in local government 12 A. Russell and E. Fieldhouse, Neither remains more important for Liberal which helped all but three Liberal Left nor Right? The Liberal Democrats Democrats than for other parties MPs hold their seats in the general and the Electorate (MUP, 2005), p. 61. in sustaining electoral credibil- election two years later. The Grand 13 A. Russell, D. Cutts and E. Field- ity, conveying ideas internally and Old Duke of York (or Birming- house, ‘National–Regional–Local: preparing the next generation of ham, Haringey or anywhere else) The Electoral and Political Health implementers of party policy. The has been further down the hill and of the Liberal Democrats in Britain’, coalition has made each of these will march up again. Local politics British Politics, no. 2 (2007), p. 206. processes more difficult, but at the remains at the front line of Liberal 14 I. MacAllister, E. Fieldhouse and

22 Journal of Liberal History 83 Summer 2014 the importance of local government for liberal democrats

A. Russell, ‘Yellow fever? The Liberal Democrats at the Grassroots pp.259–79. uk-england-york-north-york- political geography of Liberal (OUP, 2006), p. 72. 23 A fuller summary of this back- shire-13284976 (6 May 2011, support’, Political Geography, 21 20 L. Bennie, J. Curtice, and W. ground can be found in P. Tils- accessed 3 January 2014). (2002), pp. 421–447. Rudig, ‘Party Members’ in ley, ‘Birmingham: Birthplace 27 Cable, Free Radical, p. 219. 15 P. Ashdown, The Ashdown Dia- MacIver, The Liberal Democrats of Radical Liberalism’, Journal 28 D. Cutts, ‘‘Where We Work We ries Volume 1 1988–97 (Allen Lane, (Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1996), p. of Liberal History, no. 70 (spring Win’: A Case Study of Local 2000), p. 194. 139. This figure was confirmed 2011), pp.19–21. Liberal Democrat Campaign- 16 G. Hurst, Charles Kennedy: A ten years later in Whitely et al., 24 John Stewart, ‘A Banana Repub- ing’, Journal of Elections, Public Tragic Flaw (Politico’s 2006), p. Third Force Politics. lic? The Investigation into Elec- Opinion & Parties, vol. 16, no. 3 194. 21 G. Stoker, The Politics of Local toral Fraud by the Birmingham (2006), pp. 221–242. This article 17 M. Campbell, My Autobiography Government (Macmillan, 1988) p. Election Court’, Parliamen- analyses Liberal Democrat suc- (Hodder & Stoughton 2008), p. 37. tary Affairs, October 2006, pp. cess from 1999 onwards in Bath 279. 22 M. Cole, ‘Growing Without 654–67. & North East Somerset. 18 Interview, 19 May 2007. Pains’, British Journal of Politics and 25 V. Cable, Free Radical (Atlantic 29 Russell et al., ‘National– 19 P. Whitely, P. Seyd, and A. Bill- International Relations, Vol 11 No Books, 2009), p. 218. Regional–Local’, p. 206. inghurst, Third Force Politics: 2, May 2009 (Wiley-Blackwells) 26 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/ The Liberal Party and the First World War A one-day conference organised by the Journal of Liberal History and King’s College, London. Saturday 1 November 2014, Room K2.40, Strand Campus of KCL

In this year, 100 years since the coming of war in August 1914, the conflict is remembered chiefly for its impact on the millions of ordinary men, women and children who who were to suffer and die and over the following four years. Lives were altered forever and society transformed. But the war had political consequences too: empires fell, new nations emerged and British political parties and the party system underwent profound change, a transformation which plunged the Liberal Party into civil war and caused it to plummet from a natural party of government to electoral insignificance within a few short years. This conference will examine some of the key issues and personalities of the period.

Papers already confirmed: • Lloyd George and Winston Churchill (Professor Richard Toye, Exeter University) • Asquith as war premier and Liberal leader (Dr Roland Quinault, Institute of Historical Research) • The First World War papers of H H Asquith and Lewis Harcourt (Mike Webb, Bodleian Library) Papers are also being sought on: • Sir Edward Grey and the road to war • The Liberal Party and the politics of the First World War • The Liberal Party, the Irish question and the First World War The day will conclude with a panel discussion on whether or not the war was the destroyer of the Liberal Party (the Trevor Wilson thesis).

Full details of all speakers, guest chairs and papers will appear in the autumn edition of the Journal of Liberal History.

The cost of the conference will be £15 (students and unwaged £10) to include morning and afternoon refreshments. (Lunch is not provided but there are plenty of cafes and sandwich shops in the vicinity of the Campus.)

To register please send your name and address to Graham Lippiatt, 114 Worcester Lane, Four Oaks, Sutton Coldfield, B75 5NJ, or [email protected]. Payment can be taken on the day.

Journal of Liberal History 83 Summer 2014 23 Twenty-five years on from the foundation of the Liberal Democrats, many commentators THE LIBERAL DEMOCRATS ANd still fixate on the party’s political positioning and electoral strategy. Questions about whether the party has THE FUNCTIONS OF POLICY moved decisively to the right under Nick Clegg echo questions in the 1990s about the party’s movement towards Labour. The party’s rise and fall is generally seen in similar terms: equidistance before 1992, an unofficial electoral pact with New Labour in 1997, moving away from Labour in a progressive direction under Charles Kennedy, but then an internal coup by the so- called ‘Orange Bookers’ leading to coalition with the Conservatives, contradicting the direction of the previous twenty years.1 Former MP and Federal

Policy Committee here is another story, in penny on income tax to be spent on member David which the party’s policies education gained the party crucial Tare important. The Hong support from public sector pro- Howarth examines Kong passports issue, when Paddy fessionals. The constant emphasis Ashdown broke with the politi- on environmental policy not only the functions of policy cal consensus to argue for granting helped the party recover from the within the Liberal Hong Kong residents the right to disastrous European elections of leave Hong Kong for Britain, gave 1989, when it finished behind the Democrats. the party the profile it needed to Greens, but also put it on a path survive. The proposal of adding a very different from that of many

24 Journal of Liberal History 83 Summer 2014 THE LIBERAL DEMOCRATS ANd THE FUNCTIONS OF POLICY

other European Liberal parties. of what functions policy-making for their supporters, however, this Opposition to the war in Iraq, a served in the Liberal Democrats in amounted not to a position but to policy born of the party’s member- that quarter of a century. sitting on the fence. ship in the country as much as in The birth of the SDP in the parliament, and so arguably itself an early 1980s brought with it a dif- outcome of the process of attract- ‘No policies’ ferent political tradition. The SDP ing progressives to the party, estab- Liberal canvassers in the 1970s and was born of the Labour Party, a lished the party as distinctively left 1980s were often faced by con- party whose history was steeped of centre, a process complemented temptuous voters telling them in the politics of sectional interest. by the party’s resolute championing that their party ‘has no policies’.2 The SDP of the early ’80s hoped to of civil liberties and human rights. Canvassers would splutter back, inherit Labour’s working-class vote And, after 2010, it was a policy ‘But we have loads of policies’ and and held on to the idea that they issue, the abandonment and reversal threaten to send the elector vast could represent the interests of the of the party’s opposition to univer- piles of policy papers to prove it. working class even while expand- sity tuition fees, a policy the inter- But those Liberal activists funda- ing their appeal into the middle nal coup by the right had failed to mentally misunderstood what vot- class.8 SDP supporters expounded change, that lay at the heart of the ers were telling them. By ‘policies’ a theory, much derided by urban electorate’s rejection of the party, voters did not mean lists of detailed Liberal community politicians, that with poll ratings below 10 per cent, proposals or even lists of election the Liberals should leave the cities the party’s local government base ‘pledges’. They meant that the Lib- to the SDP, because the SDP could close to being wiped out and its del- eral Party was not obviously on beat Labour, whereas the Liberals egation to the European Parliament the side of an identifiable group could only beat the Conservatives reduced to one MEP. in British society. Labour, as vot- in the countryside.9 This article looks at the party ers declared, was ‘for the working The election of 1983 tested the in the quarter of a century since man’ (or sometimes ‘the working Liberal can- SDP’s theory to destruction. Doz- 1988 through the lens of its policy- class’), and the Conservatives were ens of SDP MPs went down to making. It draws on manifestos for ‘business’.3 There was no need vassers in defeat in working-class constituen- and policy documents published to know any details of their policies, and of the surviving six, two in that period, but it also draws on cies. One could just guess them. But the 1970s and held Scottish Highland seats and one the author’s own recollections and who were the Liberals for and who the distinctly upscale former Con- reminiscences as an active partici- were they against? It was difficult 1980s were servative constituency of Glasgow pant in the process – as chair of the to say, especially as Liberals seemed Hillhead. By the time of the Liberal party’s first working group on eco- not to know themselves. ‘The rea- often faced Democrats’ first general election in nomic policy, as a member of the sonable man’, said David Steel.4 1992, when the party’s manifesto Federal Policy Committee for the ‘Radicals’, they said to themselves, by contemp- promised to ‘put people first’ with- whole of the 1990s, as a member of though more rarely to outsiders.5 tuous voters out any attempt to specify which policy working groups from 2000 Instead, Liberals made a virtue of people, little sign could be discerned to 2005, as a Member of Parliament not representing one of the ‘sides’ telling them of the politics of interest. The Lib- from 2005 to 2010 and as a confer- of industry and claimed to stand eral Democrats, like the Liberals ence representative for the whole not for a social group but for an idea that their before them, saw themselves as a period. But instead of looking at and an ideal, for liberalism and a party of values, not of class. Perhaps sequences of events that took the liberal society.6 They were a party party ‘has no as a consequence, the ‘no one knows party from one policy to another, of values, not of class interests.7 For what they stand for’ syndrome con- it looks principally at the question the two great parties of interest and policies’. tinued to haunt the party.10

Journal of Liberal History 83 Summer 2014 25 liberal democrats and the functions of policy

To attempt any account of Lib- within a parliamentary team, the late-period Ashdown would have eral Democrat policy in the first shadow cabinet and the parliamen- tolerated.16 Subsequent leaders dis- twenty-five years of the party’s tary party, and might also include engaged even more from the party’s existence is, for this reason, poten- endorsement by the Federal Pol- formal policy-making processes, to tially a futile exercise. For much icy Committee, but their status as such a degree that chairing the FPC of that period, despite the party’s party policy was doubtful in the came often to be seen as a minor efforts, large swathes of the elec- absence of a vote by the conference. incident of the job of leader’s parlia- torate were unaware of most of Parliamentary spokespeople were mentary private secretary. the party’s policies.11 Moreover, therefore encouraged to align the But ‘garbage can’ theories tend the chances of any of the party’s positions they were taking in par- to explain better the content of proposals being put into practice liament with official party policy decisions than how those deci- were for much of that time slim. by proposing motions to the con- sions are made. What is interest- This was not ‘policy’ in the sense ference. Positions taken by the ing about the Liberal Democrats is used within government. That was leader of the party required confer- their tendency to generate a very especially true, paradoxically, of ence endorsement in the same way, large number of opportunities to policies that only the Liberal Dem- although this would often occur make decisions about policy even ocrats advocated. Those policies without the stage of producing a though no one seemed to be listen- were distinctive precisely because paper. ing. The most obvious function of the other parties were united in policy-making by a political party rejecting them. is to attract electoral support,17 but Liberal Democrat policy-mak- The functions of policy- Liberal Democrats made so much ing is thus a puzzle. What exactly making in the Liberal policy unlikely to be read by vot- was it for? The question is espe- Democrats ers that other explanations are cially puzzling because the party So what was the purpose of all of required. Admittedly at one point made so much of it. Two party this policy-making? Of course in the political cycle, right at the conferences a year were taken up there does not have to be a purpose. start of the general election cam- largely with making policy. To In all organisations whose ultimate paign when the media briefly pub- begin with, conferences debated objectives are up for grabs one will lish comparisons of all the parties’ policy papers that had emerged find elements of ‘garbage can’ pro- manifestos, a party’s policies might from an elongated process in which cesses, that is to say processes in possibly be electorally relevant (or expert working groups produced which individuals use the organisa- perhaps an absence of policy might ‘green’ and ‘white’ papers (later tion to further their own agendas, be embarrassing), but the same ‘consultation’ and ‘policy’ papers) and in which the outcome of the point applies: the party produced a for the Federal Policy Commit- process is ultimately a function of quantity of policy way beyond that tee, which debated them at length which people had access to oppor- required for a potted manifesto in a before putting them to the parlia- tunities to make decisions.14 Policy newspaper. mentary party (later to the shadow entrepreneurs within a party can Another possibility is that cabinet and then to the parliamen- use whatever access they have, as policies were designed to attract tary party).12 Eight to ten of these committee members, members of financial support from lobbyists papers would be debated every staff, MPs, frontbenchers or just as or special interest groups. But not year, sometimes even more. In 1993 conference representatives to lob only is it unclear why lobbyists or and 1994, for example, the FPC into the process their own pet solu- special interest groups should want produced thirty-one papers on tions and problems. Much depends Liberal Dem- the endorsement of a party with so twenty-five different topics. Later on their energy and determination. little prospect of entering govern- conferences saw more time devoted The impact, for example, of Don- ocrat policy- ment, it is also evident from the to lengthy policy motions closer in nachadh McCarthy as a member of Liberal Democrats’ lack of major style to those of the Liberal Party, the Federal Executive on policy on making is donations from industry interest submitted by local parties or indi- the Iraq War or Evan Harris as an groups (as opposed to from value- vidual conference representatives MP or as an FPC member on any thus a puz- driven bodies such as the Rowntree or parliamentarians, especially by number of policy areas was very Trust and perhaps, as was some- parliamentary spokespeople. great. Party leaders, through their zle. What times alleged, from individuals The submission of policy ex officio position as chair of the in search of ennoblement18) that if motions by parliamentary spokes- FPC, had more access to the process exactly was gathering financial support was one people became particularly sig- than anyone else, but that mattered of the purposes of policy-making it nificant following the emergence, only if they wanted to use it. Paddy it for? The was singularly unsuccessful. under the pressure of parliamentary Ashdown was engaged and eager question is events, of a new policy-making to use his position as FPC chair to Positioning and ideology process separate from the official get his way on policy issues, at least especially The overproduction of policy also route, a process that largely con- in the early part of his leadership.15 limits the explanatory power of sisted of parliamentary spokespeo- Charles Kennedy, perhaps discour- puzzling another, often plausible, view of ple writing a ‘spokesperson’s paper’ aged by the sulphurous atmosphere policy-making, that it is subsidi- (previously a pamphlet designed of the FPC in the latter part of the because the ary to political positioning. On to draw attention to policy not to Ashdown leadership, took a more this view, policies are designed to make it) and publicising it.13 These hands-off approach, although argu- party made illustrate a party’s political posi- papers would emerge from a pro- ably one that allowed for more con- tion or changes of its position. cess that might include discussion sultation with the party than the so much of it. Certainly some Liberal Democrat

26 Journal of Liberal History 83 Summer 2014 liberal democrats and the functions of policy policy-making was designed to One of the serious policy while in opposition, ‘It’s About Freedom’ it is a decen- signify or to facilitate changes of all the more to release energies for tralised state in the tradition of political positioning. In the period most impor- campaigning. Mill’s Representative Government. In before the 1997 election, for exam- Another possible explanation is ‘Our Different Vision’ we owe obli- ple, Paddy Ashdown set out to tant tensions that policy is designed to illustrate gations to communities, but in ‘It’s reduce the party’s policy differences larger themes and ideological com- About Freedom’ communities have with Labour, a process designed to in the Liberal mitments. A party begins with its to be voluntary. encapsulate his ‘end of equidistance’ fundamental commitments, but The early policies of the merged change in positioning and to facili- Democrats needs constantly to explain, both party show very little sign of com- tate a coordinated electoral cam- to itself and to the electorate, how ing from the same stable as ‘Our paign against the Conservatives. In was that those commitments apply more Different Vision’, and chairs of this way, for example, the party’s between concretely. That process in turn working parties, of which I was support for a ‘citizens income’ – the reinforces the ideological com- one, were not expected to conform full integration of income tax and policy and mitments. Unfortunately, if that with it in any way, or even to read benefits – disappeared from the par- was ever the intention of Liberal it. ‘It’s About Freedom’ might have ty’s programme in favour of a more campaign- Democrat policy-makers, it was had more influence, but its function conventional social security policy, rarely put into practice. The party was mainly symbolic, to confirm and all references to the party’s ing. Those has issued overarching ideologi- that although Charles Kennedy favoured electoral system, the sin- cal statements, but they appear to himself might have come from the gle transferable vote, were replaced who saw have had little influence on sub- SDP, he was entirely unconcerned in the 1997 manifesto with vaguer sequent detailed policy positions, about the party identifying itself references to ‘proportional repre- themselves being more a summary of where as Liberal. Indeed, it is possible ret- sentation’.19 Similarly, in 2013, Nick the party had arrived rather than rospectively to interpret ‘Our Dif- Clegg supported a policy motion as ‘cam- an attempt to guide further devel- ferent Vision’ in a similar fashion, committing the party to the coali- opment. The problem in writing as a move by a party leader from tion’s ‘fiscal mandate’ as a way of paigners’ manifestos was the opposite – how the Liberal tradition, Ashdown, to signalling a decisive change in the to reduce the mass of material to a reassure the SDP wing of the party party’s positioning and facilitat- rather than manageable number of ideas, such that the new party welcomed them. ing an electoral strategy based on as the cumbersome five ‘E’s of 1992 attacking the Labour Party’s eco- as ‘policy (education, environment, the econ- Campaigners versus wonks nomic competence. omy, Europe and electoral reform One of the most important ten- The problem is that the amount wonks’ often – or, as some wanted ’ealth), or the sions in the Liberal Democrats was of policy-making required for expressed apple pie ‘Freedom, Justice, Hon- that between policy and campaign- positioning purposes is tiny, and a esty’ of 2001. ing. Those who saw themselves as party committed to putting poli- dissatisfac- Even more puzzling for the rein- ‘campaigners’ rather than as ‘policy tics ahead of policy would not pro- forcement part of the thesis, the wonks’ often expressed dissatisfac- duce anywhere near the quantity tion with the two most important ideological tion with the failure of the party’s of policy generated by the Liberal statements, ‘Our Different Vision’ policy-making process to produce Democrats. One explanation might failure of of 1989 and ‘It’s About Freedom’ in policies that could be reproduced simply be that party members 2002 are themselves so different that in large type in Focus leaflets. For thought that a party with preten- the party’s one might be forgiven for think- them, ‘policy’ should mean noth- sions to being serious needed a full ing that they emerged from differ- ing beyond ‘three points to remem- slate of policies, and certainly that policy-mak- ent parties. ‘Our Different Vision’, ber’ or a good slogan. The policy seemed to be an important motive written by a group chaired by ex- wonks, however, argued that for policy-making in the very early ing process SDP grandee David Marquand, policies needed to be able to with- days of the party. Why it carried could have emerged from the pages stand public, and especially media, on with such verve after that first to produce of ‘Marxism Today’. Its starting scrutiny, since even in campaign- phase, after the 1992 election, is point is an analysis of the forces of ing terms, policy positions that far less clear. A subsidiary expla- policies that production and its normative con- fell apart in five minutes would be nation might be a kind of political clusions seem to depend on the idea electoral liabilities. The campaign- overshoot. Detailed policymak- could be of ‘going with the grain’ of inevita- ers’ response was that, in that case, ing might have been appropri- ble social change. ‘It’s About Free- there should be much less policy. ate at local authority level where reproduced dom’, written by a group chaired But the FPC continued to churn the party was a real contender for in large type by ex-Liberal grandee Alan Beith, out substantial, sometimes elabo- power, and where policy could be starts with the normative, with rately argued papers. Occasion- designed for the real world pur- in Focus liberalism as a political idea that ally candidates for FPC elections pose that it might help guide offi- prioritises freedom, and proceeds would openly present themselves cials about what the party wanted leaflets. to suggest how that commitment as ‘campaigners’ and would prom- to do, but that drive towards detail applies to contemporary problems. ise to make the FPC concentrate carried over into national policy Even where some of the vocabulary on producing short messages that making where it was not needed. overlaps – for example both papers their fellow campaigners could The problem with that explana- speak of the ‘Enabling State’ and of work with, but when elected they tion is that the party’s local govern- ‘Community’ – their meaning is usually disappeared without trace. ment association, ALDC, for all of entirely different. In ‘Our Different What FPC debates usually dem- this time discouraged the party’s Vision’ the enabling state is a way onstrated was that the hoped for local councillors from making to reconcile liberty and equality. In simple message would fail to get

Journal of Liberal History 83 Summer 2014 27 liberal democrats and the functions of policy a spokesperson through a second The theory densely argued, not the kind of twenty-five years, namely making question in a Today Programme material busy journalists would the Bank of England operationally interview before being shredded. is that the absorb, and they often contained independent. The Liberal Demo- A view of some former Direc- policies stunning only in their crats adopted the policy in the Eco- tors of Policy for the party (includ- party acted erudition and refusal to chase nomics for the Future white paper in ing the editor of this journal) is that headlines. In addition, the yearly 1991, the first and only UK party to policy creation was often driven by as a policy timetable produced policy papers commit to it. It was put into effect another aspect of campaigning, a at times of the year – especially the by the Labour Party, entirely with- desire to placate values-based inter- avant-garde, summer – guaranteed to gener- out warning and with no mention est groups – especially campaigners ate as little media impact as possi- in their manifesto, within weeks about the environment, education staking out ble, especially when papers had to of their being elected in 1997. The and democracy. It is certainly the positions, be issued with the caveat that the difficulty, however, with this as a case that the party’s officials were conference might throw them out theory of Liberal Democrat pol- very keen to gain endorsements for example or pass a different policy. In fact, icy-making is that party members’ from such groups, or at least to a vociferous section of the party reaction to such theft was not to be come out ahead of the other par- on Keynes- objected to the promotion of policy pleased that someone else had put ties in their various scorecards and papers at all before the conference, their ideas into operation but anger checklists. The manifesto check- ian economic on the ground that the confer- that they had received no credit. list of the Green Alliance was par- ence was supreme over the Federal ticularly influential. The problem, policy, the Policy Committee and any pre- Control mechanism however, is that the party gener- publicity was attempt to bounce it Another theory is that policy- ated policy after policy of little welfare (which, admittedly in the case of making in the Liberal Democrats interest to such groups, or of inter- Paddy Ashdown, it often was). The was a form of control mechanism. est only to groups of microscopic state, joining objection was often phrased as a Although the Liberal Democrat size. In 1993 and 1994, for example, complaint that policy papers were policy process was originally set up when the FPC produced papers on the European ‘unamendable’, which was techni- to be ‘deliberative’, in imitation of twenty-five different topics, one cally true even though the party’s that of the SDP as opposed to that can see that some of those papers Community, policy as expressed in the motion of the supposedly anarchic Liberal might have been generated by pres- referring to the paper was amend- Party, it was still resolutely demo- sure from substantial external inter- gay rights able. A curious compromise was cratic.21 Although the leader and the est groups, for example the papers reached in which policy papers parliamentary party were very well on disabilities, pensions and con- and the envi- were published in plain black and represented in the FPC and able, sumer rights, and external interest ronment, white paper covers to symbolise informally, to block objectionable group pressure might have been a that the text was not final until the proposals in policy papers in parlia- contributing factor for a few more, that the conference had agreed the policy. mentary party meetings, they had for example those on women, envi- In contrast, on the ‘wonk’ side no power beyond their own votes ronmental taxation, health and main par- of the divide, there is a wholly dif- as representatives and their own transport. Of the remaining top- ferent way of understanding of the organisational and rhetorical capa- ics, however, some seem driven ties would party, according to which the Lib- bilities to influence what was passed by forces within the party itself, erals and the Liberal Democrats by the conference as party policy. for example papers on community not dare to were not so much political parties All they ultimately could do was to politics, rural policy and urban pol- as a type of think tank associated attempt to limit what went into the icy, but most seem not to be react- be the first with a few largely independent party’s manifesto through a pro- ing to any kind of pressure at all. MPs who were there to supply cedure under which the manifesto Some reflect the party’s long-term to adopt, credibility and occasional political had to be agreed by the FPC and obsessions, such as the constitu- leverage.20 The theory is that the the parliamentary party (a process tion and tax and benefits, some are but might party acted as a policy avant-garde, that sometimes felt like ping pong conventionally important political staking out positions, for example between two houses of a parlia- topics, such the economy, defence adopt if they on Keynesian economic policy, the ment, especially when it took place and security, jobs, and North- welfare state, joining the European in the Palace of Westminster in dif- ern Ireland, and others seem to be seemed to Community, gay rights and the ferent committee rooms). Policy- ploughing a furrow of the party’s environment, that the main par- making could, therefore, provide a own choice: prostitution, press and be gaining ties would not dare to be the first way in which party members might broadcasting and genetic engineer- traction. to adopt, but might adopt if they constrain and even attempt to con- ing. External campaign group pres- seemed to be gaining traction. trol the leader and parliamentary sure was a driver, but very far from The function of policy-making party. The volume of policy pro- a complete explanation. in the party was thus to float new posals and amendments might then Another possibility related to ideas for the governing parties to be thought to measure the degree to campaigning is that the party was steal, and the attraction of being which the party had to intervene to generating media opportunities. a party member was that one was control the leadership.22 Although That is certainly part of the expla- always on the cutting edge of new examples of successful insurrec- nation for spokespersons’ papers, policy thinking, although never in tions against the leadership are not but as an explanation for policy a position to implement it. There as numerous as one might think papers it leaves a great deal unex- is certainly one very important (the failure of the ‘neighbourhood plained. For example, the papers example of such policy theft from school trusts’ concept in 1998 is themselves were often long and the Liberal Democrats in their first one of the few on major issues), the

28 Journal of Liberal History 83 Summer 2014 liberal democrats and the functions of policy threat of rejection was a real deter- courts, the leadership and much the next manifesto. The net result rent for a leadership anxious to of the parliamentary party sim- of these developments seems to avoid headlines implying that it had ply ignored the conference and the have been a slowing of the pace of no control over its troops. offending coalition bill passed. In the production of policy on impor- There was a particular problem, the case of the NHS, some conces- tant issues and the devotion of more which the Liberal Democrats inher- sions were won, but the party con- time in conferences to ministerial ited from both predecessor par- ference, despite leadership attempts speeches. ties but of which the Liberal Party to keep the issue off the agenda, had longer experience, a problem voted to withdraw support for Distinctiveness and identity that made the control function of the bill. The leadership carried on Although several of the factors so policy-making more important. regardless.25 far discussed played a part in Lib- The parliamentary party was geo- A further complication of coali- eral Democrat policy-making, the graphically unrepresentative of the tion contributed to the decline of most obvious goal of much of the wider membership and contained a the control function of party pol- party’s policy-making was to cre- disproportionate number of maver- icy-making. The government made ate distinctiveness for a party not icks and local champions for whom policy as well as the party, policy clearly associated with a social constituency interests overrode all that might be announced and even group or class interest.27 The goal of else.23 In environmental and energy voted on in parliament before the distinctiveness, endlessly stated by policy, for example, there was often party conference could decide the Paddy Ashdown in FPC meetings serious tension between the princi- party’s line (a fact the party lead- in the 1990s, became second nature pled goal of reducing carbon emis- ership tried to exploit by delib- to all who took part in policy-mak- sions from transport and the view erately scheduling controversial ing at that time. Ashdown reversed of residents of large rural constitu- parliamentary votes ahead of party direction in the period of his pro- encies represented by Liberal and conferences, for example the third ject with Tony Blair, but distinc- then Liberal Democrat MPs that reading of the Health and Social tiveness returned as a goal under they should not pay more for pet- Care Bill in the Commons in Sep- Charles Kennedy, and, although it rol. Some of the oddities of Liberal tember 2011). The party found it was briefly abandoned for a second Democrat policy, for example the difficult to manage the relationship time during the politically disas- 2005 manifesto’s enthusiasm for between government and party trous period at the start of the 2010 road-pricing and a carbon-related policy-making. Ministers tended coalition, it came back yet again as variable vehicle excise duty com- to regard the government’s policy, a goal of policy-making in the sec- bined with phasing out an already even if the result of compromises in ond half of that government, albeit existing carbon tax, namely pet- which Liberal Democrat positions in great tension with the desire of rol duty, can only be explained as had been completely abandoned, the leadership to take credit for uneasy compromises between the as the party’s position. For parlia- actions of the coalition as a whole. principled views of the wider mem- mentary purposes that was true in There is a theory of the behav- bership and the electoral interests of a literal sense, since the party had iour of political parties that says certain MPs. 24 agreed to the concept of a single that since in two-party systems the There is, however, a question government whip, so that there was The goal of parties have an incentive to move mark over whether the control no separate official Liberal Demo- towards one another, a new entrant function of policymaking contin- crat position for MPs to support. distinctive- party can profitably place itself ued to work in the era of the coali- Ministers would also have had a anywhere on the political spectrum tion. There certainly were some keen sense that ‘policy’ within gov- ness, end- except for the remaining space attempts by the party’s left and ernment was much closer to action between the two incumbents.28 The centre, excluded almost entirely in the real world than ‘policy’ in lessly stated position between the two incum- from the leader’s entourage but the political marketing sense they bents is always small and liable to still numerous in the party’s mem- would have been used to when by Paddy get smaller, but there is space eve- bership, to use policy motions to making party policy. That con- rywhere else. That explains why constrain a leadership perceived as trast might have contributed to the Ashdown in Ashdown eschewed any form of rapidly tacking to the right, espe- starkest version of the view that centrism and chose positions – cially over the Health and Social government policy took prece- FPC meetings especially on the Hong Kong pass- Care Bill 2011, in which the party’s dence over party policy, namely the ports issue and a penny on income commitment to democratic con- idea that the Coalition Agreement in the 1990s, tax for education – where he sus- trol of the NHS at local level was with the Conservatives had some- pected the major parties would not watered down and accusations how replaced the party’s manifesto became sec- go. It also explains why Kennedy, were levelled that decisive steps as the authoritative source of the ond nature despite all his inner caution, was had been taken towards commer- party’s policies.26 The party confer- eventually drawn into opposing the cialisation. ‘Secret courts’ (the pos- ence, however, and some of its rep- to all who Iraq War.29 sibility of closed proceedings in all resentatives on party committees, But the part of the theory says courts) provided another example, treated the party’s policy and the took part in that an insurgent party might although one in which the whole government’s policy as entirely sep- advantageously take any position party was alarmed, not just the left arate. A further layer of complex- policy-mak- outside the mainstream provides and centre. The tangible results of ity was a distinction that seemed to no explanation of precisely where passing motions in opposition to arise between party policy about ing at that Liberal Democrats put themselves.30 the leadership line, however, were the current government’s decisions As UKIP would later demonstrate, negligible. In the case of secret and party policy for the purposes of time. an anti-European, anti-immigrant

Journal of Liberal History 83 Summer 2014 29 liberal democrats and the functions of policy stance would have been just as dis- little more than that the party is its enthusiasm for green policies at tinctive, but there was never any for entry into the euro and for ‘a local authority level resulted, by chance of the party adopting that competitive and sound economy to 2004, in an enormous opinion poll kind of distinctiveness. The party’s deliver prosperity for all’. lead over both the other parties on liberal internationalist values and Specific taxation and spend- environmental issues.35 humane instincts placed very severe ing decisions, however, were not How does distinctiveness constraints on the kind of positions off limits. Both could illustrate the explain the volume of policy? No it could take. party’s distinctiveness and were doubt distinctiveness might be So where could the party look safe to use as long as they balanced achieved using only a few, strategi- for distinctiveness and definition? out and so did not leave the party cally chosen policies, but there are The most obvious place to look was open to charges of fiscal irrespon- two reasons why distinctiveness in the constitutional reform tra- sibility (for which purpose much was not compatible with concision. dition of the Liberals, which was effort, at least in the 1990s, went First, the party was in no position shared by many in the SDP. It was into the manifesto costings). Hence to know which policy initiatives an area in which the party felt at the party produced, for example, would succeed in giving it a disease with itself. Unfortunately, it proposals for a local income tax tinctive public profile, so that it was also an area in which most of to replace the poll tax and spend- had an incentive to offer more and the public were completely unin- ing commitments on social care for more policies that might do the job. terested. During the entire period older people. Above all it meant Secondly, and more importantly, from the foundation of the party the penny on income tax for edu- the function of distinctiveness was until the 1997 election, constitu- cation, which had the additional not merely to give Paddy Ash- tional reform received precisely advantages of being both easy to down something striking to say in zero support in MORI’s monthly understand and a rare example of a media appearances (although that poll of the most important issues policy that illustrated many of the motive cannot be discounted). It facing the country, with the sole party’s values. The use of distinc- was also to give the party a sense of exception of August 1992, when it tive spending commitments also led itself as a political force. In a party scored an asterisk, signifying less to the ill-fated policy on university eschewing social characteristics as than 0.5 per cent.31 In the course fees, which was also easy to under- a unifying theme, policy-making of the 1990s, the party looked for stand and illustrated fundamental helps to define the party to itself, other, more everyday themes. values. and to reassure members that they One might have expected eco- Green policies provided another are in the right party. Accord- nomic policy to be a prime can- opportunity. The two predeces- ing to a study of party members in didate, given its high salience and sor parties had very different 1998–99, more than 50 per cent of the Liberal Party’s history of radi- approaches to the environment. So where party members reported that they cal thinking in macro-economic The Liberals had embraced pol- could the had joined because they agreed policy. The recent history of both lution taxes in the 1970s and were with Liberal Democrat principles the Liberals and the SDP, however, moving in a distinctly deep green party look or policies and another 8 per cent effectively put macro-economic direction, questioning economic said they had joined specifically to policy off limits as a place to seek growth as conventionally meas- for distinc- support proportional representa- distinctiveness, since both parties ured and distrusting nuclear power. tion and constitutional reform.36 had formed a deep commitment In contrast, the SDP, with some tiveness The policy process gives partici- to fuzzy macro-economic cen- notable exceptions (including pants a feeling of taking part in trism. Admittedly the party’s first the influential activist Mike Bell) and defini- politics and of keeping the party attempt at macro-economic policy, was largely a conventional pro- going. Policy-making can thus cre- Economics for the Future, did contain ductionist party, a difference that tion? The ate and maintain a feeling of com- several distinctive proposals, the caused tensions from the start of munality and common purpose, independence of the Bank of Eng- the Alliance.33 The shock of com- most obvi- and the apparent over-production land being not the least of them, ing behind the Green Party in 1989 of policy can be seen as the con- but it is striking how fast the ones removed political objections to ous place to stant manufacturing of that reas- not adopted by other parties were taking advanced environmental- surance. It might even be seen as dropped. In particular, a commit- ist positions – indeed it created look was in responding to an unspoken anxiety ment to a New Keynesian aggre- urgent if short-term political rea- about the fact that the party began gate savings target (a policy which, sons to adopt them to see off the the constitu- as a merger between different par- incidentally, might have reduced threat from the Greens. The party ties, so that policy-making became the impact of the crash of 2008 had set about making the environ- tional reform a way of continually asking and it been adopted32) was abandoned ment a priority in a wide range of tradition of answering the question of whether almost as soon as it was passed. policy areas,34 culminating in the the party really was a cohesive Having no distinctive approach manifestos of 2001 and 2005 carry- the Liberals, body. At the time of the foundation to macro-economic policy, the ing ‘green action’ sections on prac- of the party, some from the Liberal party tried to make a virtue out of tically every page. Admittedly, which was side, particularly Michael Meadow- generating a great deal of micro- the Liberal Democrats never fully croft, questioned whether the two economic policy, though with no returned to the radical zero-growth shared by political traditions of liberalism and great pretensions at originality or green trajectory of the Liberals, but social democracy were compat- distinctiveness. In the 2001 mani- the party’s championing of envi- many in the ible enough to exist within a single festo, for example, the section enti- ronmental taxes, its willingness party,37 and one can see the constant tled ‘Economy’ comes last and says to talk about climate change and SDP. production of detailed policy as a

30 Journal of Liberal History 83 Summer 2014 liberal democrats and the functions of policy response to that questioning – that For another impact of betraying the trust of a on the part of the public, require even if the two traditions might not generation of student voters and further explanation. Part of that be fully reconcilable at a theoretical set of mem- their parents.38 explanation is the need for the level, the fact that the party could Finally, there is a darker side party to be distinctive, albeit with produce reams of detailed policy bers, what to the identity politics of policy. a distinctiveness constrained by its demonstrated to those within it Policy-making allows the party’s values. But distinctiveness in itself that it was nevertheless a viable has kept leadership to attempt to define is not a complete explanation of political organisation. the party, so as to attract, or even how much policy the party pro- The identity-creating func- them going to repel, members with particu- duced. After all, UKIP managed to tion of policy-making should not lar views. The attracting func- be distinctive even though its leader be underestimated. It is one of the within the tion would have been particularly ditched its entire manifesto and reasons policy can be so hard to party is both important for a small party born replaced it with a ‘blank sheet of change in the Liberal Democrats. from two different political tradi- paper’. Another part of the expla- The university fees issue illustrates the activity tions, but the repelling function is nation is the use of policy-making the point in many ways. Those not entirely to be dismissed. Even to play out tensions between the who wanted to maintain the party’s of making in small parties, leaders might wider membership and the party position on fees during the crucial want to consolidate their posi- elite, although when the party period of 2008–10 did so because of policy itself tion by winning symbolic victo- entered government that particu- what it represented: that the Liberal ries and encouraging enemies to lar process tended to become more Democrats were a party that valued and the feel- leave. Paddy Ashdown used to talk symbolic than effective. A third and education for its own sake. They at FPC meetings about embark- perhaps the most important expla- saw education as an instrument of ing that the ing on ‘bumpy rides’ which would nation is the use of policy-making, liberation not of economic plan- inevitably lead to some people ‘fall- to a degree possibly unique in Brit- ning. Loading young people with resulting sets ing off’. It is a legitimate question ish parties, as a means of creating a debt and encouraging them to take to ask whether the Clegg leader- sense of identity within the party. high-paid jobs to pay it off seemed of proposals ship has taken up such a repelling It is not the only means of creat- to them the antithesis of what edu- strategy in an attempt to remake ing identity. Campaigning, in some cation should be for and of what the were more the party in its own image. Cer- ways the antithesis of policy, also party was for. For their part, the tainly it is difficult to understand produces a sense of common pur- opponents of the fees policy might detailed, in any other terms the leadership’s pose, especially for the thousands have thought of themselves as hard- rhetoric about being a ‘party of of party members who have deliv- headedly sacrificing students to better government’ not a ‘party of pro- ered leaflets and knocked on doors secure more resources for primary thought test’ which seems to imply that at parliamentary by-elections or schools, or as proponents of social those who joined the party in pro- local elections. But for another set justice, slashing away at a subsidy through test against, for example, the Iraq of members, what has kept them for the middle class, but their real War or Labour’s authoritarianism going within the party is both the difference with the supporters of and more should now go elsewhere. There is activity of making policy itself and the fees policy was that they treated a similar flavour to policies such as the feeling that the resulting sets it as technical matter, not one that rational than the approval of fracking (very dif- of proposals were more detailed, defined the party or themselves. ficult to reconcile with the party’s better thought through and more The notorious breaking of the the policy zero carbon ambitions) and con- rational than the policy of other pledge to vote against increasing ference debates such as the one the parties. tuition fees, the source of many of of other leadership initiated in Septem- It remains to be seen what effect the party’s subsequent woes, is a ber 2013 on the fiscal mandate, the the 2010 coalition will have on the separate matter. It is one thing to parties. main message of which seemed to identity-creation function of pol- shelve a policy to abolish fees, quite be that economic recovery was the icy-making within the party. The another to increase them threefold. result of austerity and that anyone experience of seeing policy posi- But there is a connection with the who thought otherwise (which tions abandoned or reversed by identity function of policy-mak- includes many mainstream econo- the party in government has been ing in the way the party in gov- mists39) was some kind of weakling deeply disillusioning for the pol- ernment dealt with the issue over or deserter.40 icy-making section of the party. the summer and autumn of 2010. The ultimate failure of attempts It dealt with it in a purely techno- to use the party’s policy process cratic way, ignoring the emotional Conclusion as a way of controlling the deci- impact that abandoning the pledge Although Liberal Democrat policy- sions of the party within govern- would have. That would not have making was influenced by factors ment has strongly reinforced that happened had the policy meant one would expect to influence pol- feeling of disillusion. In some par- more to those involved. Enormous icy-making in all political parties ties, those effects might be unim- efforts went into devising an elabo- – electoral appeal, political posi- portant. They can resort to other rate scheme that, if one followed it tioning, satisfying external cam- powerful sources of unity and iden- through, had certain advantages – paign groups and internal interest tity – common social characteris- for example, that although students groups and generating media tics, common enmities, common would be indebted for longer many opportunities – its specific charac- histories and mythologies – but would be paying off less per month. teristics, particularly the dispropor- those sources are not as power- Little or no time or effort seems to tion between its sheer volume and ful within the Liberal Democrats. have gone into dealing with the scope and the lack of interest in it We might therefore expect those

Journal of Liberal History 83 Summer 2014 31 liberal democrats and the functions of policy whose identification with the party It remains to 8 See J. Curtice, ‘Why Owen Is Agendas, Alternatives and Public Poli- has depended on policy and policy- Wrong’, New Statesman, 14 Aug. 1987, cies, 2nd edn (Longman, 1994). making to drift away. Perhaps a few be seen what pp. 20–21. See also I. Crewe and A. 15 Later on he became more manipula- whose enjoyment derives entirely King, SDP: The Birth, Life and Death tive, as his Diaries perhaps inadvert- from the process itself might effect the of the Social Democratic Party (Oxford, ently reveal (e.g. vol. 2 (Allen Lane, remain and perhaps some new 1995), p. 170 (Bill Rogers assuming 2001), p. 417: ‘I had hoped to get the members not aware of the discon- 2010 coali- that the SDP would fight in Labour widening of the remit of the JCC nection between the party’s policy seats, the Liberals in Conservative [Joint Cabinet Committee] through and what it actually does might tion will have seats). This was also the ‘Labour the FPC, but in the event there were come in. But anyone who felt con- Party Mark II’ view of the SDP men- too many of the awkward squad there nected with the party because of on the iden- tioned by Crewe and King on p. for me to be sure, so I slipped it side- the content of its policy and demo- 125. The SDP was in reality an over- ways to the next meeting’). I should cratic nature of the way it made it tity-creation whelmingly middle class party: see add that Ashdown’s accounts of the will increasingly find little to hold function of Crewe and King, pp. 272–282. key FPC meetings of 1997 to 1999 them. That would leave the field to 9 Curtice, ‘Why Owen Is Wrong’; cf. are not entirely reliable. In particular the leadership and those motivated policy-mak- Crewe and King, SDP, p. 170. his account of the 17 November 1998 primarily by campaigning, a situa- 10 See e.g. A. Russell and E. Fieldhouse, meeting on the first expansion of the tion the leadership would no doubt ing within Neither Left Nor Right: The Liberal remit of the Joint Cabinet Commit- see as ideal: a party that never raises Democrats and the Electorate (Manches- tee (vol. 2, p. 339) is greatly at vari- its eyes above the letterbox is one the party. ter, 2005), p. 258 ance with my own recollection, and that will never threaten its leaders. 11 See ibid., ch. 8, and pp. 258–9. The not just the part where Ashdown But it would also be another step one policy that did break through says that I acted ‘angrily, bitterly towards a hollow and empty poli- into public consciousness was the and almost beyond reason’ (I cherish tics, a politics purely of manoeuvre. penny on income tax for education, the ‘almost’). For example, he unac- It would represent the ultimate vin- although Russell and Fieldhouse say countably omits any mention of the dication of those voters who used to that even in that case more voters defeat of his attempt to induce the tell Liberal canvassers that they had who agreed with it voted Conserva- FPC to support his position. He suc- no policies. tive than Liberal Democrat. cessfully resisted discussion of my 12 See e.g. R. Brazier, Constitutional motion critical of him by claiming David Howarth is Reader in Law and Texts (Clarendon, 1990), pp. 464–466 that the FPC had no jurisdiction over Director of the MPhil in Public Policy for the original version of the party’s party strategy. He then contradicted at the University of Cambridge. He was constitutional provisions on policy- himself by proposing that the FPC the MP for Cambridge between 2005 making. For the current text see the welcome his strategy and was furi- and 2010 and Leader of Cambridge City Constitution of the Federal Party ous when the FPC applied the same Council from 2000 to 2003. He served article 5.4 (which, as a result of an logic to his proposal as it had applied as a member of the Liberal Democrats’ arcane dispute, also makes clear that to mine. He also fails to mention that Federal Policy Committee from 1990 to the FPC may put options to the con- the FPC voted 17 to 2 in favour of a 2000. ference). See also Russell and Field- motion regretting his failure to con- house, Neither Left Nor Right, p. 58 sult and saying that it saw no scope 1 ‘Orange Bookers’ refers to D. Laws for a very brief account, although for any further expansion of the and P. Marshall, The Orange Book: they do spot the fact (p. 258) that the JCC’s remit. But all that is perhaps Reclaiming Liberalism (Profile, 2004), parliamentary party developed an for a different occasion. meaning right-wing, small-state lib- informal veto on policy papers, a 16 See P. Dorey and A. Denham, ‘ eralism. The contents of the book do theme taken up in full in A. Russell, “Meeting the Challenge”? The Lib- not justify the epithet, but the views E. Fieldhouse and D. Cutts, ‘De facto eral Democrats’ Policy Review of of its editors and their political allies Veto? The Parliamentary Liberal 2005–2006’, Political Quarterly (2007), are another matter. Democrats’, Political Quarterly (2007), 89 (1), p. 68–77. The ‘Meeting the 2 See also A. Beith, The Case for the Lib- 89 (1), pp. 89–98. For an account of Challenge’ exercise was impressively eral Party and the Alliance (Longman, the process in a period in which I had consultative, although, because of 1983), p. 138. less personal experience of it, see C. Kennedy’s fall, it had less effect on 3 See e.g. J. Goldthorpe, D. Lockwood Bentham, ‘Liberal Democrat Policy- subsequent policy-making than and F. Bechhofer, The Affluent Worker making: An Insider’s View, 2000– might have been hoped. (Cambridge 1968), p. 18ff. 2004’, Political Quarterly (2007), 89 (1), 17 Cf. Russell and Fieldhouse, Neither 4 D. Steel, Militant for the Reasonable pp. 59–87. Left Nor Right, p. 11. Man (LPO, 1977). 13 There are many examples, but one of 18 See e.g. http://www.independent. 5 Notably the group around Radical the clearest is C. Huhne, S. Kramer co.uk/news/uk/politics/lord-oake- Bulletin, later incorporated into Lib- and V. Cable Towards carbon free trans- shott-resigns-read-lib-dem-peers- erator magazine. port (Liberal Democrats, 2007), whose scathing-parting-comments-about- 6 The attack on the phrase ‘the two proposals were incorporated into a party-leader-nick-clegg-in-his-state- sides of industry’ has a long history in larger conference motion on climate ment-in-full-9446189.html. the party, but was a particular theme change policy. 19 No doubt one could point to prac- of David Steel, back to his earliest 14 See M. Cohen, J. March, and J. tical problems with both policies, days in the Commons – see e.g. HC Olsen, ‘A Garbage Can Model of but these had been known for some Deb 20 June 1966, vol. 730 col. 228. Organizational Choice’, Adminis- time. The timing was entirely about 7 See M. Meadowcroft, Liberalism and trative Science Quarterly (1972), 17 (1), positioning. STV later returned to the Left (Liberator, 1983). pp. 1–25. See further John Kingdon, the party’s programme, albeit once

32 Journal of Liberal History 83 Summer 2014 liberal democrats and the functions of policy

again to be sacrificed to the cause 26 See e.g ‘Lib Dems broke no com/researchpublica- charge – subsequently found to of inter-party agreement in the tuition fee promise – Vince tions/researcharchive/poll. have been underestimated) – see coalition negotiations of 2010. Cable’, BBC, 21 Nov. 2010, aspx?oItemID=24&view=wide. BIS, Interim Impact Assessment: The citizens’ income has yet to http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/ See also P. Burall, ‘The Environ- Urgent Reforms To Higher Education return, though it has become uk-politics-11803719. ment: A Winner for the Liberal Funding And Student Finance (Nov the official policy of the Green 27 Cf. Russell and Fieldhouse, Nei- Democrats?’, Political Quarterly 2010) p. 20. At the same time as Party, which is positioning ther Left Nor Right, p. 11. (2007), 89 (1), pp. 50–57. Burall making that rather modest sav- itself to attract the old Liberal 28 Cf. Anthony Downs, An Eco- throws some doubt on the envi- ing, the government was, for vote, and it continues to attract nomic Theory of Democracy (New ronmental record of Liberal example, proposing cuts in cor- many idealists and even some York, 1957), pp. 47–49, 128–132 Democrats in local govern- poration tax netting out at £5bn economists. See e.g. E. Skidelsky 29 It further explains why the ment, and it is true that some a year (see HM Treasury, Budget and R. Skidelsky, How Much is explicit adoption of ‘centrism’ Liberal Democrat groups, for 2011, pp. 42–44), sums that ended Enough? Money and the Good Life by Nick Clegg is likely to be a example in Oxford and Nor- up in the massive and immobile (Allen Lane, 2012), pp. 197–202. disaster, but perhaps that is a wich, allowed themselves to cash balances of the UK corpo- 20 E.g. V. Bogdanor, Liberal Party topic to consider at a much later be entirely outflanked by the rate sector (see A. Smith, ‘Cash Politics (Clarendon, 1983), pp. date. Greens, but the failure of the held on balance sheets of largest 275–285. 30 Russell and Fieldhouse, Neither Greens in many other Liberal companies at record high’, Finan- 21 That the Liberal policy process Left Nor Right, come to a similar Democrat controlled councils cial Times, 15 Sept. 2013). The was anarchic was certainly the conclusion at pp. 258–259. points to a different story. idea that the fees decision was view of the SDP and of David 31 See the Ipsos-Mori archive 36 P. Whiteley, P. Seyd and A. Bill- inevitable because of the need to Steel (see e.g. Crewe and King, at http://www.ipsos-mori. inghurst, Third Force Politics: reduce the deficit is nonsense. It SDP, p. 470), and the central com/researchpublica- Liberal Democrats at the Grassroots was a political choice. The key to principle of the process, that tions/researcharchive/poll. (Oxford, 2006), p. 70 (Table 4.2). understanding why it happened the Assembly was sovereign, aspx?oItemID=2440&view=wide. 37 See e.g. ‘A Critique Towards is who made that choice. Both the could certainly lead to results 32 R. Barrell and M. Weale, ‘Fiscal Realignment’, in F. Dodds, Into Liberal Democrat coalition nego- the leadership did not like. It policy, fairness between gen- the 21st Century (Greenprint, tiating team and Liberal Demo- was not, however, as anarchic as erations, and national saving’, 1988). crat members of the ‘Quartet’ some of the myths, for example Oxford Review of Economic Policy 38 This is, of course, not the full at the heart of government (for those about the 1986 Eastbourne (2010), 26 (1), pp. 87–116. Mar- story of the fees debacle, which which see R. Hazell and B. Yong, Assembly vote on nuclear weap- tin Weale was a member of the deserves its own separate article. Inside the Coalition (Constitution ons, would make out. working group that produced One point that might be made Unit, 2011)) were dominated by 22 One would have to discount the Economics for the Future. in advance of that future article individuals who in the inter- volume of proposals coming 33 See e.g. M. Meadowcroft, Social is that the amounts at stake were nal debates in 2008 to 2010 had from the leadership itself, but I Democracy, Barrier of Bridge (Lib- not high and the real problem was opposed the party’s fees policy – am grateful to one of the review- erator, 1981). lack of political will on the part in particular, Nick Clegg, David ers of this article for pointing 34 See e.g. Agenda for sustainability of the Liberal Democrat leader- Laws and Danny Alexander. out that in periods in which the (1994), Transporting people, tackling ship. According to the Depart- 39 E.g. S. Wren-Lewis, ‘UK membership was comfortable pollution (1995), Conserving tomor- ment of Business, Innovation and growth numbers highlight the with its leader, notably under row: energy problems for the future Skill’s own impact assessment, gap between rhetoric and reality Charles Kennedy, the number (1996), Living in the greenhouse: the amount saved by government on recovery’, The Conversation, of conference motions submit- policies to tackle climate change from introducing the £9000 fee 30 Apr. 2014. ted by local parties seems to have (1997) and Making the environment was to have been £1.6bn a year, 40 See e.g. R. Mason and P. Win- fallen. our business: proposals to improve i.e. the proposed cut in the uni- tour, ‘Nick Clegg persuades Lib 23 I am grateful to the same business efficiency and environmental versities’ teaching grant minus Dems to stick with austerity’, reviewer for reminding me of performance (1998). financing costs (the Resource The Guardian, 16 Sept. 2013. this important fact. 35 http://www.ipsos-mori. Accounting and Budgeting 24 See The Real Alternative (2005 manifesto), pp. 16-17. This policy was later replaced by Liberal Democrat History Group online a proposal almost as curious that petrol tax should rise with GDP but petrol sold in rural Email areas should attract a substantial Join our email mailing list for news of History Group meetings and publications – the fastest and earliest way relief. See the Huhne, Kramer to find out what we’re doing. Fill in the form at: http://bit.ly/LDHGemail. and Cable (2007) spokespersons’ paper, p. 10. Website 25 Defenders of the leadership say See www.liberalhistory.org.uk for details of our activities and publications, guides to archive sources, that the conference was ignoring research resources, and a growing number of pages on the history of the party. the realities of coalition politics. The most important reality, Facebook page however, was that the leadership News of the latest meeting and publications, and a discussion forum: fatally undermined its own bar- www.facebook.com/LibDemHistoryGroup. gaining position within the coalition by announcing in advance Twitter that it would never endanger the The History Group is now on Twitter! A daily posting of Liberal events on this day in history. Follow us at: continuation of coalition itself. LibHistoryToday.

Journal of Liberal History 83 Summer 2014 33 LIBERAL DEMOCRAT LEADERSHIP

34 Journal of Liberal History 83 Summer 2014 LIBERAL DEMOCRAT LEADERSHIP

An important factor verall, the Liberal or worse state than they found it; Democrats have been see Table 1. contributing to Owell served by their lead- the survival and ers – particularly during election campaigns, which is when most Communications skills achievements of the electors see and hear them; Paddy The leader’s communication skills Ashdown, Charles Kennedy and cover a variety of characteristics, Liberal Democrats has Nick Clegg all performed credit- including media-friendliness and been the abilities of the ably in the elections in which they the ability to communicate well in led the party. different settings, such as confer- individuals who have So what makes a good Liberal ence speeches, press conferences, Democrat leader? All leaders inevi- interviews and meetings with party led the party. Given tably possess a mixture of strengths members. Particularly in the early the media’s tendency and weaknesses; equally, all change years of the party, when the leader and develop in response to the new was almost the only Liberal Demo- to focus on the party challenges and stresses of their ten- crat likely to receive any media ure in office. Nevertheless, it is attention, his ability to communi- leader to the exclusion possible to identify a series of char- cate the party’s message was crucial acteristics and abilities which make to its survival. All the four party of their colleagues, an individual well or less well fit- leaders have possessed some skills as the Liberal Democrat ted to the job. The leader needs a communicator – it would be diffi- communication skills, being able to cult to be elected to Parliament and leader has always played project the party, the party’s posi- then to the party leadership with- tion and his own competence as a out them – but their styles have a significant role in party leader and potential Prime varied widely. establishing the image Minister. This ability is reinforced It was clear even before his if the leader has something to say election to Parliament that Paddy of the party in the – a distinctive position or image for the Ashdown was a naturally gifted party. A related characteristic is his speaker; in 1981, after his first mind of the electorate. ability to develop a strategy for the speech to the Liberal Assembly, This in turn places party: what does the leader want opposing the deployment of US to do with his leadership, whether cruise missiles in the UK, he gained a premium on the in opposition or in government? a standing ovation. He worked hard The leader also needs to manage on his delivery and style, receiv- leader’s effectiveness, his own party, including his parlia- ing assistance from, among oth- which is why Charles mentary colleagues and the party ers, Max Atkinson, author of the in the country. Finally, the leader’s classic study of political speech- Kennedy’s and Menzies personal abilities – including their making, Our Masters’ Voices.1 energy, stamina and self-belief – Although his conference speeches Campbell’s perceived underpin everything else. could occasionally suffer from shortcomings caused This article considers how the being over-rehearsed, at his best four men who have so far occupied he was a powerful and inspiring such concern in 2005–06 the Liberal Democrat leadership speaker, with a compelling voice measure up against these charac- and distinctive turn of phrase. He and 2007. Duncan teristics and have proved effective was probably even better at talks Brack describes the in advancing the position and aims with small groups of party mem- of the party. In addition to this bers or ordinary citizens, taking characteristics of the qualitative assessment, a quantita- his jacket off and turning his chair tive element can be added through round in an easy, familiar way. He ideal Liberal Democrat examining the leaders’ political dealt effectively with the media leader, and considers records, in terms of votes won, and although at times could tend to MPs, MEPs and councillors elected, sound sanctimonious (something how the four men who party membership and their own of an occupational hazard for poli- personal opinion poll ratings, dem- ticians from third parties, used to have so far led the party onstrating the leaders’ electoral criticising both government and achievements and the extent to opposition), he came over well to measure up. which they left the party in a better the public, and frequently featured

Journal of Liberal History 83 Summer 2014 35 liberal democrat leadership in opinion polls as the most popular simple soundbites, and took some tendency to focus primarily on party leader. time to settle into the political thea- the Labour and Conservative par- Charles Kennedy was also a nat- tre of Prime Minister’s Questions. ties, and journalists’ preference for urally gifted speaker, though with Although all this had improved reducing everything to a two-way a very different style to Ashdown’s substantially by the time he stepped choice, the Liberal Democrats suf- – low-key, humorous, often self- down, it was the initial poor image fer from an indistinct image; vot- deprecating. He honed his skills that stuck in the public’s mind. ers are often unclear what the party at Glasgow University, where he Nick Clegg has had less of a stands for. won the Observer Mace for debat- political apprenticeship than any of The more that the leader can ing. While studying for a PhD in the other Liberal Democrat lead- establish a Liberal Democrat posi- the US, he taught public speaking ers – five years as an MEP and just tion that is both memorable and and carried out research in speech two and a half as an MP before different from those of the other communication, political rhetoric being elected leader – but has been parties, then, the more effective he and British politics. After election a decent communicator, lacking the will be in projecting the party as a to the Commons, he soon acquired inspirational qualities of Ashdown whole. This includes the ability to a reputation as a gifted communi- but proving much steadier than spot a distinctive Liberal Democrat cator, both on the conference plat- Kennedy and much more attuned position in an existing debate, but form and TV, reaching not just to the political cut-and-thrust than even better is to be able to create an the usual political audience but a Campbell. After his election he entirely new and distinctive policy wider public with appearances on proved an effective speaker at party position which the party can call programmes such as ‘Wogan’ and conferences, and increasingly dis- its own. Or, it may revolve around ‘Have I Got News for You’. He played an ability to grab the media a more general positioning of the came over well in the 2001 elec- limelight. He also set out to pro- party, associating it with a set of tion, his image as an ordinary man, mote the party outside parliament, attitudes or general trends, or rela- someone people could enjoy a drink holding regular ‘town hall meet- tionships to either or both of the with in the bar, contrasting posi- ings’, where members of the public other two main parties. tively with his opponents, the pro- could question him on any topic Ashdown himself succeeded fessional politicians Tony Blair and they chose, a practice he took up in finding positions for his party William Hague. again after the formation of the which were highly liberal, princi- He steadily came to rely, how- coalition in 2010 and extended to a pled and distinctive – though his ever, too heavily on his native weekly radio phone-in on LBC. first attempt at finding a defini- talent and too little on detailed Clegg’s high point was the first tion for the new merged party, the preparation. The low point was the television leadership debate dur- adoption of the name ‘Democrats’ launch of the election manifesto in ing the 2010 election campaign, in 1988, was disastrous and was April 2005, where he proved inca- where he performed strongly in reversed a year later. His champi- pable of explaining the details of putting over the message that real oning of the right of Hong Kong the party’s policy on local income change was needed and that only citizens to be given British pass- tax. He was able to shrug this off the Liberal Democrats, with no ports in advance of the colony’s as a result of the birth of his son The leader record of failure in government, incorporation into China, after three days before, but in reality could deliver. ‘I agree with Nick’ the Tiananmen Square massacre in he was under-prepared and hung- needs com- became a widespread slogan after 1989, was distinctly more successful over. Although his performance Gordon Brown used it several times in raising the profile of the party. improved later in the campaign, the munication in the debate, and ‘Cleggmania’ Later positions included support for party probably suffered from the became a phenomenon. He could the Maastricht Treaty of European fact that voters did not see him as a skills, being not, however, sustain this record Union in Parliament (including potential Prime Minister in what in the second and, especially, the voting with John Major’s govern- was a closer election than 2001. able to pro- third, debate, and his performance ment after it lost its majority fol- Like Kennedy, Menzies Camp- in the radio and TV debates against lowing internal rebellions) and bell acquired a fine debating repu- ject the Nigel Farage in the run-up to the pressing for western action on Bos- tation at Glasgow University, and European election in 2014 was nia and Kosovo. honed his skills further as a Scottish party, the much less impressive – though he In domestic policy, Ashdown advocate. He proved an eloquent gained respect, at least within the steered the party towards a more debater in the House of Commons party’s posi- party, for his decision to take on the market-oriented economic pol- and steadily built a reputation as a UKIP leader over the question of icy than the Liberal-SDP Alli- respected commentator on foreign tion and his EU membership. ance had possessed (including the affairs and an effective critic of gov- own compe- proposal for independence for the ernment policy. This did not serve, Bank of England, implemented however, as a suitable apprentice- tence as a Distinctive positioning by Labour after the 1997 election), ship for his leadership. Aged 64 Communications skills are of lim- a strong environmental platform when elected leader, he looked party leader ited value if the leader has noth- and a pledge to invest in public ser- and acted older, with an old-fash- ing particular to say. A constant vices, including, most memorably, ioned turn of phrase and style of and poten- problem for the Liberal Democrats a penny on income tax for educa- dress; his age was cruelly mocked has been to be noticed; as Paddy tion. By 1993, the party was coming in newspaper cartoons. He had tial Prime Ashdown is supposed to have said, top in opinion polls asking which too much respect for intellectual ‘I’d sell my grandmother for a bit party was the best on environmen- argument to be comfortable with Minister. of definition’. Given the media’s tal issues; it also scored relatively

36 Journal of Liberal History 83 Summer 2014 liberal democrat leadership

Table 1: Leadership performance Ashdown (1988–99) Kennedy (1999–2006) Campbell (2006–07) Clegg (2007–) Personal ratings (net score satisfied minus dissatisfied and date)a When elected –4 Aug 1988 +11 Aug 1999 +5 Mar 2006 –3 Jan 2008 Highest during leadership +58 May 1997 +42 June 2001 +6 May 2006 +53 Oct 2010 Lowest during leadership –24 July 1989 +8 June 2004 –13 May 2007 –45 Oct 2012 When stood down / latest +39 July 1999 +20 Aug 2005b –11 Sept 2007 –42 July 2014 Range (highest – lowest) 82 34 19 98 Party poll ratings (per cent and date)c When elected 8 July 1988 17 Aug 1999 19 Mar 2006 14 Dec 2007 Highest during leadership 28 July 1993 26 Dec 2004, May 25 Apr 2006 32 Apr 2010 2005 Lowest during leadership 4 June – Aug, 11 Oct 99, July 00, 11 Oct 2007 7 Feb 2013 Nov 1989 Jan, May 01 When stood down / latest 17 Aug 1999 15 Jan 2006 11 Oct 2007 8 July 2014 Westminster election performance: MPs and vote MPs when elected 19 46 63d 63 MPs when stood down / latest 46 62 63 56e Highest party vote in election (per cent 17.8 1992 22.0 2005 n/a 23.0 2010 and date)

Lowest party vote in election (per cent 16.8 1997 18.3 2001 n/a n/a and date)

European election performance: MEPs and vote MEPs when elected 0 10 12 12 MEPs when stood down / latest 10 12 12 1 Highest party vote in election (per cent 16.7 1994 14.9 2004 n/a 13.7 2009 and date)

Lowest party vote in election (per cent 6.4 1989 n/a n/a 6.6 2014 and date)

Local election performance: councillors and votef, g Councillors when elected 3,640 4,485 4,743 4,420 Councillors when stood down / latest 4,485 4,743 4,420 2,257 Highest party vote in election (per cent 27 1994 27 2003, 2004 25 2006 25 2009 and date)

Lowest party vote in election (per cent 17 1990 25 2002 24 2007 11 2014 and date)

Party membershiph, i Membership when elected 80,104 82,827 72,064 64,728 Membership when stood down / latest 82,827 72,064 64,728 43,451 Change (per cent) +3.4 –13.0 –10.2 –32.9 a Ipsos-MORI series on ‘satisfac- e 57 MPs were elected in 2010, but the total number of councillors largest UK political parties has tion with party leaders’; ibid. Mike Hancock was suspended fell by about 15 per cent. declined fairly continuously b Ipsos-MORI did not ask the from the party in January 2014. h Stephen Tall, ‘Lib Dem party since the 1950s. From 1988 to question after August 2005 dur- f Colin Rallings and Michael membership: the occasional 2011, Conservative membership ing Kennedy’s leadership. Thrasher, Elections Centre, ups and mostly downs since fell by about 85 per cent, and c Taken from the Ipsos-MORI Plymouth University. For vot- 1988’ (Lib Dem Voice, 3 August Labour membership by about 30 series, available at: http://www. ing figures, years in which local 2014); leadership election results per cent; set against this, the 46 ipsos-mori.com/researchspecial- elections coincided with general (including numbers of ballot per cent fall in Liberal Democrat isms/socialresearch/specareas/ elections are excluded. papers issued) at http://www. membership from 1988 to 2013 politics/trends.aspx g The total number of council- crosenstiel.webspace.virgin- does not look so bad. Source: d Willie Rennie was elected in the lors has been falling since the media.com/ldelections/lead- House of Commons Library Dunfermline & West Fife by- mid 1990s, as unitary authorities ers.htm. ‘Latest’ figures are end Standard Note, Membership of election during the 2006 leader- have replaced district councils 2013. UK political parties (December ship election. in some areas; from 1994 to 2013, i Membership of all the three 2012).

Journal of Liberal History 83 Summer 2014 37 liberal democrat leadership well on education, though remain- anti-American and far left groups), Communica- however, overwhelmingly defined ing in third place.2 Both the elec- Kennedy left it until the very last by the party’s decision to enter into tion manifestos produced under moment to decide to join in, tak- tions skills coalition with the Conservatives in Ashdown’s leadership were well ing the decision without consulting 2010. This had led most observers regarded by the media. ‘The Liberal Campbell, or anyone else, follow- are of limited to conclude that this was his strat- Democrat essay far out-distances ing a Guardian lunch at which jour- egy from beginning, and indeed, its competitors with a fizz of ideas nalists criticised his prevarication. value if the he did make early attempts to steer and an absence of fudge,’ stated The In fact, although Kennedy rarely the party to the right, announcing Guardian in 1992.3 In 1997 The Inde- showed much initiative, he gener- leader has after the leadership election his sup- pendent called the party’s manifesto ally displayed good judgement in port for free schools and a widening the most challenging of the three, reacting to events. Over the Rom- nothing par- of the use of private health care to saying that politics without the sey by-election in May 2000 (where ticular to say. meet NHS targets, and beginning Liberal Democrats would be ‘intol- he took on the Conservatives over to talk about using savings in public erable’; Peter Riddell in The Times their policy on immigration and on A constant expenditure to cut taxes rather than enjoyed its ‘refreshing candour’ and the right of self-defence, after Nor- see increased spending elsewhere. admired Ashdown’s willingness folk farmer Tony Martin had shot problem for The 2010 manifesto, however, with to leap where Tony Blair feared to dead a burglar), gradual withdrawal its top four priorities of the pupil tread.4 from the Joint Consultative Com- the Liberal premium, constitutional reform, In this respect, as in many oth- mittee set up by Ashdown with the job creation through green growth ers, Charles Kennedy was a com- Labour government, and his refusal Democrats and investment in infrastructure, plete contrast. Laid back to the to participate in the Butler Inquiry and an increase in the income tax point of inertia, he seldom pushed into the intelligence on Iraqi weap- has been to threshold, paid for by closing tax any particular position, leaving the ons of mass destruction, he instinc- loopholes and green taxation, did running to be made by others in tively adopted positions that kept be noticed; not represent a notably right-wing the party. The book he published in the party happy while differentiat- agenda, and the reasons for joining 2000, The Future of Politics, although ing it in the eyes of the public. as Paddy a coalition with the Conservatives designed to answer the question Menzies Campbell’s leadership instead of Labour were so strong ‘What makes this Kennedy fel- was too brief to give him much of Ashdown is that it is inconceivable that any low tick? … Why is he a Liberal a chance to develop any distinctive alternative leader would have done Democrat?’5 revealed only, as his positioning of his own. He inher- supposed to anything different – which is why biographer put it, ‘a startling lack ited an agenda of policy reform, only a handful of activists voted of original thinking on policy or a including significant changes in have said, against the coalition at the party’s strand of political thought that was taxation policy and a new approach ‘I’d sell my special conference in May 2010.8 identifiably his own’.6 The ques- to the British nuclear deterrent, Clegg’s handling of party position was still going begging in June but fought for these changes in a grandmother tioning within the coalition has 2005, when Kennedy failed to give way that Kennedy never would not been without its problems. any convincing answer to Steve have, including in particular his for a bit of At the beginning he chose – not Webb MP’s question after his deliv- intervention in the debate on Tri- unreasonably – to stress the virtues ery of a paper on the party’s future dent at the spring 2007 party con- definition’. of coalition as an effective form prospects: ‘I would just like to ference, which clearly swung the of government, but went too far know: what motivates you? What vote. However, he was too innately in giving the impression that the gets you up in the morning?’7 cautious for the leader of the third coalition was better than a Liberal The major exception to this, party. On a number of occasions, Democrat government would have of course, is Iraq, where Kennedy he took his time reaching decisions, been. As the introduction to the full ended up in the fortunate posi- only to find that the ground had coalition programme claimed: ‘We tion of opposing an unpopular war shifted under his feet, often because have found that a combination of backed by both the government of leaks to the media, before he our parties’ best ideas and attitudes and its main opposition, and with could announce them (his measured has produced a programme for gov- a united party behind him. In real- response to Gordon Brown’s mis- ernment that is more radical and ity, no Liberal Democrat leader chievous attempt to recruit Liberal comprehensive than our individ- (apart, possibly, from Ashdown, Democrats into his cabinet in 2007 ual manifestos’,9 and at the Liberal who supported Blair’s actions, but ended up looking like duplicity and Democrat conference in September only in private) would have been weakness). His preference for con- 2010, Clegg argued that the coa- likely to do anything different: in sultation before he reached deci- lition was ‘more than the sum of September 2002, the party con- sions – in itself an admirable trait our parts’.10 In practice this simply ference voted overwhelmingly to – sometimes stopped him making undermined the party’s image as support military action only as a the snap decision that might have anything more than Tory sidekicks. last resort and under a clear UN served better. The crushing electoral defeats in mandate, and in February 2003 the Nick Clegg made early attempts the 2011 local, Scottish and Welsh party’s Federal Executive called to carve out distinctive positions elections, and the failure of the unanimously for Liberal Demo- for the party, over, for example, alternative vote referendum, forced crat participation in the major equal rights of residence for Gur- a reappraisal. As Clegg put it a week anti-war march in London. Held khas, or his call for the resignation later, ‘the current government is a back by the concerns of the foreign of the Speaker, Michael Martin, coalition of necessity ... In the next affairs spokesman Menzies Camp- over the failure to police MPs’ phase of the coalition, both partners bell (who feared association with expense claims. Clegg’s image is, will be able to be clearer in their

38 Journal of Liberal History 83 Summer 2014 liberal democrat leadership identities ... You will see a strong potential or actual, with other par- early years at all without Ashdown, liberal identity in a strong coalition ties; or both. It should be noted, or at least would have taken much government. You might even call though, that a leader can prove longer to recover. it muscular liberalism.’11 Yet three himself effective without having In the second phase of his leader- years later, after even worse results any particular strategy. The real- ship, 1992–97, he successfully rode in the 2014 local and European elec- ity of life for a third party in Brit- the rising tide of support for centre- tions, he had to do much the same, ish politics is that its performance left sentiment and the rejection of defending the decision to enter coa- depends often – perhaps mostly the Conservative government that lition while highlighting policy – on external factors over which it not only swept Labour into power differences with his coalition part- has little or no control: the perfor- in 1997 but delivered the highest ners: ‘I want people to know that mance of the government and the number of seats for a third party for we have our own distinct vision, main opposition, and key devel- seventy years. Under a less skilled based on our own distinct values – opments such as wars or economic leader, the Liberal Democrats could a liberal belief in opportunities; a recessions. As the journalist and easily have been squeezed out by liberal faith in people’s talents and party employee David Walter Blair’s New Labour. The abandon- ambitions’.12 described it, ‘the party’s position ment of ‘equidistance’ between The major problem faced by has been that of a surfer, waiting the Conservatives and Labour that Clegg is that whatever he says, a patiently for the right wave to rise Ashdown championed from 1992 portion of the electorate now does and then using all its skills to stay onwards can thus be seen as an – not believe him – a legacy primar- upright and to travel as far and as ultimately successful – attempt to ily of the way in which the party fast as possible’.14 become part of the movement for campaigned in 2010 on a promise These constraints never, how- change rather a casualty of it. to phase out university tuition fees, ever, prevented Paddy Ashdown In contrast, the third phase of and then signed up to a policy of from developing a strategy – or, the Ashdown leadership, 1997–99, increasing them once in govern- indeed, several. He had mapped was a failure, as Ashdown himself ment. Clegg has only himself to out his own three-phase plan on freely admits. Following up his blame for this: he (and the party’s becoming leader: proposal, in 1992, to ‘work with economic spokesman, Vince Cable) others to assemble the ideas around never believed in the policy and The first was survival from a which a non-socialist alternative never attempted to advance it in point of near extinction; the sec- to the Conservatives can be con- the coalition negotiations, despite ond was to build a political force structed’,16 he edged steadily closer the damage that they should have with the strength, policy and to the Labour leader Tony Blair realised this would inflict in the positions to matter again in Brit- after his election in 1994; this led light of the party’s election cam- ish politics; and the third was in turn to agreement on a joint paign, which included all its MPs to get on to the field and play in agenda for constitutional reform signing pledges to vote against any what I believed would become a (the Cook–Maclennan agreement), increase in tuition fees, and one of very fluid period of politics.15 covert electoral cooperation with his own election broadcasts focus- Labour in the 1997 election, secret ing entirely on the ‘broken prom- Strategic planning of this sort was talks over a joint electoral plat- ises’ of other parties. It may be that absolutely typical of Ashdown, form and a coalition government, his perceived poor performance in one of the characteristics almost and the eventual creation of a con- the 2014 debates with Nigel Far- everyone who worked with him sultative Joint Cabinet Commit- age can be at least partly attributed The ability remembers – he always had a plan, tee between the two parties after to the fact that some in the elector- and a position paper, and when the election. Although several ate are now no longer prepared to to develop he achieved one objective he was aspects of the Cook-Maclennan listen to his message whatever it is. already looking ahead to the next. agenda were implemented, the big As one of his ministers despairingly a strat- And in fact, within the constraints prize, proportional representation put it in 2014, ‘is there anything he he faced, he was remarkably suc- for Westminster, was never even can say on any subject that doesn’t egy for the cessful. His party survived its first close – either because Blair never just make things worse?’13 difficult years, despite the self- meant it, and was simply string- party is am inflicted wounds it had inherited ing Ashdown and his party along, from the break-up of the Alliance or because he did mean it but was Party strategy important and the merger negotiations, its unable to force it through his own The ability to develop a strategy internal weaknesses of finance and party. for the party is am important lead- leadership membership, the challenges it faced Ashdown’s approach increas- ership characteristic: what does for third-party status from the ingly alarmed his own MPs and the leader want to do with his character- Owenite SDP and the Greens, and party activists, particularly after leadership? This may focus on the istic: what its lack of a distinct image. He took the 1997 election, when they could development of distinctive posi- the party organisation seriously, see no point in trying to align tions, as discussed above, but it is does the chairing its Federal Policy Com- themselves with a Labour govern- – at least potentially – more than mittee and giving a clear lead on ment with a massive majority. As that. The strategy can be internal, leader want key policies, working with council- Tony Greaves has observed, ‘Lib- revolving around reforms of the lors and campaigners and restoring eral Democrats loved their leader party’s organisation or campaign- to do with his morale and a sense of purpose. It but, insofar as they sensed his ing approach; or it can be exter- is not unreasonable to suggest that strategy, most wanted none of it. nal, concerned with relationships, leadership? the party may not have survived its The “what if” question must be

Journal of Liberal History 83 Summer 2014 39 liberal democrat leadership how much more could have been style became steadily less well To start with, Nick Clegg’s achieved if all that time at the top suited to the higher profile role the strategy was similar to Campbell’s: and personal energy had been spent party began to play after its oppo- to stabilise the party after a forced on something other than “The sition to the Iraq War boosted its leadership election. He achieved Project”.’17 But was there a realistic standing in the approach to the this and presided over a period of alternative? Like the Liberal lead- 2005 election, widely expected gradual recovery in the opinion ers Jo Grimond and David Steel to be considerably closer than the polls, reassuring the party that it before him, Ashdown was driven 2001 contest. His lack of a coher- would have no need to face a third inexorably by the logic of the Lib- ent agenda became increasingly leadership election. As discussed eral Democrats’ position as a third obvious and his (previously largely above, it is not clear whether Clegg party. However well the party per- hidden) alcoholism began to cause came into office with a clear plan formed in elections it never seemed more problems, including a series and determination to move the feasible that it would leap straight of missed speeches and a disastrous party to the right, or whether it to majority government from third opening to the 2005 election cam- simply seemed a sensible response position, or even replace one of paign. The feeling, in the party and at the time to the disintegration of the two bigger parties as the main outside, that the Liberal Demo- New Labour and the attempt by the opposition. Sooner or later the crats had failed to realise a historic Conservative leader David Cam- party would hold the balance of opportunity in the 2005 election eron to attract Liberal Democrat power, and in the political circum- helped to trigger increasing con- supporters. After the party’s deci- stances of the 1990s it was incon- cern, which manifested itself in a sion to enter into coalition with the ceivable that the Liberal Democrats notably unhappy party conference Conservatives in 2010, most com- could have reached an arrangement It should in September 2005 and a wide- mentators found it easier to present with anyone other than the Labour spread perception of drift and lack it as the former, conspiracy stories Party. Indeed, Ashdown was not be noted, of direction – all contributing sig- about takeovers of the party by a particularly aiming for a hung nificantly to Kennedy’s forced res- small right-wing clique making parliament, in which, he thought, though, that ignation in January 2006. His basic a better story. It is also plausible, any attempt to bring in PR would problem – that he had no agenda however, that Clegg was simply be seen as weakness on the part of a leader can for his leadership, no obvious rea- reacting to circumstances, in a way the bigger coalition partner; he son to be leader and no idea of the that his predecessors had always wanted to introduce it from a posi- prove him- direction he wanted the party to done. Having said that, it is also the tion of strength, with both par- go in – perhaps leads to the conclu- case that Clegg was the first Liberal ties of the left genuinely behind self effec- sion that even if Liberal Democrat Democrat leader not to have been it. His problem was that most of leaders have little real control over active in politics under Thatcher’s the Labour Party was never com- tive without the success of their party’s strategy, and Major’s Conservative govern- mitted to PR at all, and saw no having any they do at least need to be seen to ments; his instincts always appeared point in making any concessions to have one. to be more hostile to Labour and Ashdown’s party once they com- particular Menzies Campbell’s immedi- economic-liberal than were Ash- manded a 179-seat majority in the ate tasks were to stabilise the party, down’s, Kennedy’s or Campbell’s. House of Commons (though he did strategy. The after the disruption of the previous This was reinforced by the eco- achieve it for the European elec- six months, to professionalise its nomic-liberal tendencies of the tions and the new Scottish and reality of life organisation and to give it direc- majority of the Liberal Democrat Welsh parliaments). But Ashdown tion. To a considerable extent he Shadow Cabinet, in contrast to the was always going to try; he did for a third achieved all three. Like Ashdown, wider parliamentary party and the not possess the temperament to sit he took the party organisation seri- party membership as a whole. quietly on the sidelines, snatching party in Brit- ously, chairing meetings effectively As noted above, Clegg’s strat- what chances he could to advance and imposing a sense of purpose. In egy in coalition has veered from incrementally. And in the final ish politics is terms of policy, he largely adopted concentrating on the virtues of analysis, if Ashdown had delivered the reform agenda begun after the coalition as a form of effective on PR, the third phase of his lead- that its per- 2005 election but, as noted above, government to differentiating his ership would have been seen as a fought for it and pushed it through. party more clearly from the Con- triumphant success. It was a calcu- formance After Gordon Brown’s arrival as servatives. Yet while the first phase lated strategy, but it failed. Prime Minister in June 2007 raised of this approach may have been Charles Kennedy possessed depends the prospect of a general election in successful, with one study of the an entirely different approach to the autumn, a manifesto was final- coalition’s first eighteen months party strategy: he didn’t have one. often – per- ised after the September confer- concluding that it ‘set a model for As noted above, this is not always haps mostly ence, and the party organisation harmonious and unified govern- a major defect. Unlike Ashdown, was in good shape to fight an elec- ment’,18 the second phase has been he inherited a party organisation – on external tion in October. Unfortunately for much less so, with a succession of in reasonably good shape, and, as Campbell, none of this counted for awful local election results, and noted above, he proved astute at factors over much in the outside world, where the party’s opinion poll rating judging political opportunities he failed to build an image as an stuck generally below 10 per cent. and reacting to events. He had a which it has effective and charismatic leader. It It was always clear that entry into good election campaign in 2001, was not his strategy but his image coalition – with any other party – with a net gain of six seats even little or no that let him down; and Brown’s would alienate a proportion of the though most observers expected postponement of the election from party’s voters, but the party always losses. However, his leadership control. autumn 2007 sealed his fate. hoped that it would win others to

40 Journal of Liberal History 83 Summer 2014 liberal democrat leadership replace them, including those who policy, where the Liberal Demo- Indepen- much as possible, the grim national perhaps might have supported them crats signed up almost entirely to picture. in 2010 but had not because they the Conservative agenda for reduc- dently- believed the party could never form ing public expenditure, despite a government. In reality, there their manifesto warning of the minded and Party management is very little sign of this, and the perils of cutting too fast. This The leader needs to manage his party’s actions in coalition could came as a surprise to the Conserva- inherently own party. Independently-minded almost have been designed to alien- tive negotiating team; George and inherently suspicious of author- ate its core bases of support. As one Osborne, the Shadow Chancel- suspicious ity, the Liberal Democrats are not Liberal Democrat minister put it lor, is reported to have said: ‘This an easy party to lead; as Paddy Ash- as early as 2011: ‘Unless we can get should be the happiest day of our of authority, down put it in June 1999: some of the fluffy bunny voters lives, because it’s all our policy the Liberal back, we are done for. I’m not sure that’s being agreed’.20 (Clegg’s jus- … our beloved Lib Dems, who there are enough centre ground tification was that the coalition Democrats are, bless them, inveterately voters. The Lib Dem base has been needed, above anything else, cred- sceptical of authority, often public sector workers, students and ibility in the financial markets, are not an exasperating to the point of intellectuals. We have contrived to given the growing sovereign debt dementia, as difficult to lead fuck them all off.’19 This is perhaps crisis in Greece and other European easy party to where they don’t want to go as the most serious criticism that can countries.) It can also be argued a mule, and as curmudgeonly be levelled at Clegg’s strategy for that the party underplayed its hand lead. about success as one of those the party: that while he was right in the distribution of ministries, football supporters who regards to enter coalition, his and his col- leaving them without control of his team’s promotion to the leagues’ actions since have been any of the major spending depart- premier league as insufficient conducted without enough thought ments such as health or education. because they haven’t also won to the party’s ability to survive. Constitutional reform and climate the FA cup!24 A key part of Clegg’s strategy change are important issues for will be to face the 2015 election the party but are less salient to the The leader has much responsibil- with a strong list of Liberal Demo- general public. This only serves to ity, but not always a commensurate crat achievements in government demonstrate, one academic argued, amount of authority. Neverthe- – the first third-party leader to be ‘what happens when vegetarians less, he can do much to earn – or to able to do so since 1945. There is a negotiate with carnivores’.21 In an lose – the respect and affection of real record which the party will opinion poll in May 2011, 74 per his party members, and the lack of point to, particularly in the areas cent believed that the Liberal Dem- either makes it more difficult for of income tax, green energy, child ocrats had little or no influence him to get his own way. However, care and the legalisation of same- over government decisions.22 the party has never been faction- sex marriage. Equally, there are The party’s achievements will be alised in a way in which other par- many Tory measures which the important to some groups of voters, ties often are; there has never been Liberal Democrats have prevented, but overwhelmingly the coalition a group hostile to everything any including several dropped from partners will be judged in terms of of the four leaders have tried to do, the Conservative manifesto in the their economic record; and, as an and the party membership has con- coalition agreement. To set against analysis of the record of coalition sistently proved loyal to the leaders this, of course, there are clear fail- governments in other countries it elects. The successive overthrows ures, particularly in Clegg’s own suggests, the electoral benefits of of Charles Kennedy and Men- area of ministerial responsibility, economic growth are normally felt zies Campbell were implemented constitutional reform – notably by the party of the Prime Minis- by Liberal Democrat MPs, not by the defeat of the alternative vote ter rather than by any other parties members in the country – under- proposal and the dropping of plans within their coalition.23 More fun- lining the importance of manag- for reform of the House of Lords damentally, how the British elec- ing the parliamentary parties. The (though the adoption of fixed- torate will respond to a period of situation has become more com- term parliaments will have lasting coalition is not clear: commonplace plicated since 2010, with three dif- consequences). in other developed democracies, it ferent groups – cabinet ministers, Will this, however, prove to be is still rare in the UK, and the evi- all Liberal Democrat ministers, enough? There is a credible argu- dence suggests that what would and backbenchers (including some ment that the Liberal Democrats elsewhere be viewed as parties sacked former ministers) needing did not get enough out of the coali- cooperating in the national inter- to be managed – along, of course, tion negotiations in the first place. est is more likely to be interpreted with the parliamentary party in the The party likes to point to the in the UK as the Liberal Democrats House of Lords, the party in the fact that a greater proportion of in general, and Nick Clegg in par- country (including its structure of its manifesto pledges than of the ticular, breaking the promises they committees, English regional and Conservatives’ made it into the made in 2010. In reality, this will autonomous Scottish and Welsh coalition agreement, but since the force the party back into a strat- parties), and the leader’s own office Tory manifesto was twice as long egy with which it has long been and advisers. as the Liberal Democrat one, the familiar: fight the election like a Paddy Ashdown was a party coalition agreement was still Tory- series of by-elections, focusing on manager par excellence. After dominated. This is particularly local issues and the strength of the some initial mistakes, his efforts to true in the crucial area of economic local candidate, while ignoring, as rebuild the party after its disastrous

Journal of Liberal History 83 Summer 2014 41 liberal democrat leadership early period, his down-to-earth by an MP, but not necessarily the And he needs by supporting the idea of a refer- manner and easy rapport with leader. Unlike Ashdown, however, endum on British membership of party activists and his evident cha- his impact on the Committee, and to love his the EU, a response to the growing risma generated not merely respect on the party’s policy-making pro- pressure from the Conservatives but love; as the Economist put it in cesses, was almost zero. party and all and UKIP for a referendum on the 1991, ‘ordinary party members will He failed most starkly in man- potential European constitution; take things from him for which aging his MPs. Initially his more it stands for; many Liberal Democrat peers had they would have lynched David collegiate style of leadership was experienced the European ques- Owen’. 25 He managed the party welcome after Ashdown’s lead from as Ashdown tion as a defining issue of their time structure well, involving himself the front, but it gradually turned in politics in the 1960s, 1970s and fully in its committees and key into a leadership vacuum. He was put it, ‘It is, 1980s, and tended to be a good deal organisations. Yet it is also true, as often very talented at analysing a incidentally, more pro-EU than their counter- Tony Greaves pointed out, that his situation (suggesting that he might parts in the Commons. The party’s strategy of doing deals with Labour have been a success at the career he not neces- slide in the opinion polls through- – ‘The Project’ – steadily alienated almost followed, journalism) but out 2007 led to number of MPs and first his parliamentary party and seldom put forward a clear direc- sary for par- peers starting to try to destabilise then the wider party membership. tion for his MPs to react for or his leadership, briefing the press This was not a case, however, of a against, although he was capable of ties to love against him and hoping to trigger leader losing touch with his party; it on some occasions, for example a new leadership election – which Ashdown argued that he knew over Iraq. Never close friends with their leaders ultimately succeeded. exactly what he was doing: most of his MPs, he seldom mixed Nick Clegg proved himself a socially with them and steadily – to respect relatively astute party manager up I quite deliberately went round grew more and more isolated – until entry into coalition in 2010. building up my popularity in reinforced by the behaviour of his them is usu- Relatively unknown within the the party, both by delivering office, which, necessarily, devoted party on his election, he steadily results and also by being very more and more of its efforts to ally enough. came to command respect for his consensual, conscious of the fact keeping him out of sight rather energetic efforts to raise the party that when I started to play on the than keeping him in touch. Despite But it is vital profile, both in parliament and the field in stage 3, I was really going all this, his parliamentary party dis- country, culminating in his sterling to have to [use up this politi- played an incredible degree of loy- for leaders performance in the 2010 election. cal capital and] … make myself alty, those of them that knew about to love their Although his leadership election unpopular with the party.26 his alcoholism repeatedly cover- gave no hint of his preference for a ing up for him, sometimes over parties – more right-wing slant to party pol- After his resignation, Ashdown a period of years. Right up until icy (see above), he was able to edge remained immensely popular with the last few months, most of them otherwise the party in that direction with- Liberal Democrats; the announce- never wanted him to go, just to be out too much trouble. He paid less ment, at the September 2013 confer- better. In the end it was Kennedy why would attention personally to the party ence, of his appointment as chair of that destroyed his own support by organisation than did Ashdown the 2015 general election campaign failing to show any signs that he we put up and Campbell, chairing the Fed- was greeted with delight. understood his lack of leadership eral Policy Committee only briefly Charles Kennedy displayed a and was capable of dealing with it. with it?’ (and not particularly successfully), very different style of party man- Menzies Campbell inspired though the major review of the agement: laid-back and relaxed, respect rather than the affection party structure he commissioned in this formed a considerable part of generated by Ashdown and Ken- 2007–08 (the ‘Bones report’, after his attraction after the last, divi- nedy; he was less well-known its author) led to some organisa- sive, years of the Ashdown leader- in the party in the country, and tional reforms, mainly in the party ship. He was already well-known always more of an aloof figure at headquarters.27 within the party, and well-liked, party conference. Nevertheless, Although all wings of the party partly because of his lone stand, he had a solid reputation as a long- supported entry into coalition, it amongst the SDP’s MPs, against term activist and candidate in the was Clegg’s handling of the tuition David Owen’s opposition to merger Scottish party, and a respected fees question in government which in 1987, partly because of his ami- foreign affairs spokesman and dep- severely damaged his reputation, able and approachable nature, uty leader under Kennedy. But as among party members as much as partly because of his popular media with Kennedy, he failed mainly the wider public. Over the first half profile. In the end, however, sim- in managing his parliamentary of the Parliament, his approval rat- ply being likeable was not enough; party, where he lacked solid sup- ing amongst party members fell he needed to at least try to give a port. Although the vast majority from +68 in July 2010 to –2 in Sep- lead to the party, but, as his former of the party’s MPs had voted for tember 2012.28 It is notable, how- speech-writer Richard Grayson him in the leadership election, there ever, that right up until the May commented in 2005, he was ‘per- was no real inner circle commit- 2014 elections, there was no system- haps more chairman than leader’. ted to the Campbell leadership; as atic attempt to force him out; and Even in that role he was not nota- an obvious caretaker leader never the ‘Lib Dems 4 Change’ campaign bly successful. Like Ashdown, he likely to do more than one elec- started afterwards failed to gain chose to take over the chairman- tion, most of them were looking much momentum, with another ship of the Federal Policy Com- ahead to his successor. He alien- Lib Dem Voice poll in May 2014 mittee, a post which has to be filled ated many Liberal Democrat peers showing opposition to resignation

42 Journal of Liberal History 83 Summer 2014 liberal democrat leadership by 54 per cent to 39 per cent – Citizen’s Britain in 1989, and Beyond has been argued by this author33) is partly because there was no obvious Westminster in 1994;31 his confer- unresolvable. alternative leadership candidate and ence speeches often challenged As argued above, although partly because many party mem- party orthodoxies, particularly in Menzies Campbell’s leadership bers recognised that the problems the early years. He was – almost helped to stabilise the party after facing the party were wider than always – tremendously self-confi- Kennedy’s resignation, his own just Clegg’s leadership. In fact, the dent, sometimes too much so; as his image then undermined it. As main impact of the coalition on the adviser Richard Holme warned in one commentator put it, ‘he has party has been a significant fall in January 1997 about his approaches been wounded by polls suggest- its membership, down by 35 per to Tony Blair: ‘You must not get ing that voters still preferred Ken- cent from 2010 to December 2012, carried away with the film script nedy drunk to Campbell sober ... when it stood at 42,501 (though it you have written in your head – He likes to think of himself as a has since seen a slight increase (see two strong people standing up and statesman. He needs to remember Table 1); since most of those leav- shaping history.’32 Arguably, this that a leader also has to be a sales- ing can reasonably be assumed to self-confidence led him to put too man.’34 He was a decent, honour- be hostile to Clegg’s leadership, this much trust in Blair and to believe able and thoughtful man, driven has in practice helped to secure his too strongly in the prospects for by a sense of duty and responsibil- position. ‘The Project’ – but, as argued ity underpinned by an instinctive, above, it was worth the attempt. slightly old-fashioned liberalism, Charles Kennedy’s main prob- rather than by any clear ideological Personal abilities lem was that he never appeared or policy agenda – but these quali- Leading the Liberal Democrats is a to believe in his own abilities as ties proved to be not enough for stressful and at times thankless job. leader. Possibly this was a result leading a third party lacking a clear As well as the normal pressures of of only infrequently having to national message in an increasingly politics, there is the strain of car- fight for his goals; after he was media-intensive age. rying the responsibility of being selected as SDP candidate for Ross, Whatever criticisms can be lev- the main – sometimes almost the Cromarty & Skye in 1983, his elled at Nick Clegg, one has to only – public face of the party, political career followed almost admire his toughness. The abuse together with the knowledge that effortlessly. His candidacy for the he suffered over tuition fees was far the media is watching every step leadership in 1999 can be seen as worse than that faced by any Lib- and probing every secret. It there- simply following the line of least eral Democrat leader, or by most fore helps if the leader is healthy resistance, which was to do what politicians in any circumstances. and possesses energy and stamina. everyone expected him to and Student demonstrations before the He also needs to believe in his own put his name forward. This back- Parliamentary vote in December basic abilities and competence. ground, coupled with an over- 2010, well-supported and occasion- And he needs to love his party and reliance on his natural talent at the ally violent, were targeted par- all it stands for; as Ashdown put expense of preparation, left him ticularly at Clegg and the Liberal it, ‘It is, incidentally, not neces- with too few reserves of self-con- Democrats; he was burnt in effigy sary for parties to love their lead- fidence and self-discipline to fall and had excrement pushed through ers – to respect them is usually back on under the strains of leader- his letterbox in his constituency enough. But it is vital for leaders to It seems to ship. He had seemed to be able to home. (His young sons once asked love their parties – otherwise why overcome his shyness at school and him: ‘Papa, why do the students would we put up with it?’29 be an iron university by donning a different hate you so much?’35) Despite the As his diaries reveal, even Paddy persona, as an actor or as a debater, additional strains of representing Ashdown sometimes buckled law of poli- but he could not cope with the the party in coalition, and acting under the strains of leadership. ‘I requirement, as leader, to wear a as one member of the ‘quad’ which am plagued by the nightmare that tics – or at public persona all the time. Under takes the key decisions, he retains, the party that started with Glad- pressure, when he had to perform – at least in public, a very high level stone will end with Ashdown’ he least of Lib- for example in election campaigns of self-confidence, sharing this recorded on European election day – he could often recover much of characteristic with Ashdown. This in 1989, and after the results were eral Demo- his native ability and talent, but is almost certainty a prerequisite announced three days later, ‘to bed away from pressure, in the day-to- of effective leadership – but it also about 3.00. I couldn’t sleep a wink. crat politics day work of Parliament and the has its drawbacks, as in the tuition We are in a very black position month-to-month job of manag- fees episode, when Clegg failed indeed.’30 Nevertheless, in public he – that paring the party, he too often simply to appreciate the opposition his displayed an apparently inexhaust- ties elect lapsed into inertia. All of this was position would generate, because ible supply of energy, helped by his of course exacerbated by alcohol, he had convinced himself of its obvious physical fitness, and hyper- leaders as which he turned to increasingly, rightness. activity. He thought – and wor- perhaps out of recognition of his One interesting aspect of party ried – about everything, ringing up different own under-performance. Whether leadership is whether the leader is party spokesmen, for example, to he would have proved a fine leader an insider or an outsider. Kennedy get them to respond to an obscure as possible if it wasn’t for his problems with and Campbell were the former, proposal in a local party’s confer- alcohol (as expressed in the title with a long background in Liberal, ence resolution. He was fascinated from their of his biography, Charles Kennedy: SDP and Liberal Democrat poli- by ideas, and published a series of A Tragic Flaw) or whether he was tics (starting at university) before books and pamphlets, including predecessors. a poor leader drunk or sober (as becoming leader. Ashdown and

Journal of Liberal History 83 Summer 2014 43 liberal democrat leadership

Clegg were the latter, coming into All the four had an election in 2007 resulted in a Government: Coalition (2010–2011)’. politics, and the Liberal Democrats, hung parliament, could have occu- In Duncan Brack and Robert Ingham late and with no particular back- men who led pied a coalition ministerial post (eds.), Peace, Reform and Liberation: A ground before being elected to the with distinction; but, like Kennedy, history of Liberal politics in Britain, 1679– Commons or the European Parlia- the Liberal his own qualities did not equip him 2011 (Biteback, 2011), pp. 362–65. ment. Insiders are more likely to for playing the role of the Liberal 9 HM Government, The Coalition: Our understand and respect the party; Democrats Democrat leader in the twenty-first Programme for Government (May 2010), outsiders are more likely to dis- century. His leadership saw a steady p. 8. count the party’s response and over its first fall in the party’s poll ratings and a 10 Full speech available at www. perhaps care less about its survival twenty-five slight drop in its council strength. libdemvoice.org/full-text-nick- – but also, perhaps, more likely to Nick Clegg is still the big cleggs-speech-to-liberal-democrat- provide the innovation and new years have unknown: his place in history, as autumn-conference-21236.html thinking that third parties need to the first Liberal in British govern- 11 Nick Clegg speech, 11 May 2011, prosper. displayed ment for more than sixty years, is ‘One year in: coalition and Liberal secure, but what shape he will leave politics’. qualities that the party in after the 2015 election 12 Nick Clegg speech, 9 June 2014, Conclusion is still to be determined. He led ‘Opportunity for everyone – that’s It seems to be an iron law of politics have served the party to its highest ever vote in the liberal promise’. – or at least of Liberal Democrat 2010, but the polling and electoral 13 Rafael Behr, ‘The Lib Dems could politics – that parties elect leaders their party record since entering coalition has survive in government by going back as different as possible from their been grim; although to an extent to their roots’, The Guardian 30 July predecessors. All the four men who well; all have this would have happened any- 2014. led the Liberal Democrats over its way, some of his decisions, particu- 14 David Walter, The Strange Rebirth of first twenty-five years have dis- possessed larly over tuition fees, have made Liberal England (Politico’s, 2003), p. 3. played qualities that have served it worse. 15 Paddy Ashdown, The Ashdown Dia- their party well; all have possessed weaknesses Whether the next leader will ries: Volume Two, 1997–1999 (Allen weaknesses that helped to under- take over a secure position in a con- Lane / The Penguin Press, 2001), p. mine their leadership; all have pos- that helped tinuing, or new, coalition govern- 494. sessed skills that were suited to ment, or will, like Ashdown, be 16 Paddy Ashdown, ‘A broader move- some periods of leadership and not to under- faced with the task of rebuilding a ment dedicated to winning the bat- to others; and all have been very mine their party from near-collapse, remains tle of ideas’, 9 May 1992 (the ‘Chard different from one another. to be seen. speech’), in Duncan Brack and Tony Paddy Ashdown rescued his leadership; Little (eds.), Great Liberal Speeches party from near-collapse and estab- Duncan Brack is Editor of the Journal (Politico’s, 2001), p. 427. lished it firmly as an effective and all have pos- of Liberal History. He has worked 17 Tony Greaves, ‘Audacious – but fun- coherent third force. Although he with all four Liberal Democrat lead- damentally flawed’, review ofThe failed in his main aim – to deliver sessed skills ers in his capacities as Director of Policy Ashdown Diaries – Volume 1: 1988–1997, proportional representation for (1988–94), Chair of the party’s Federal Journal of Liberal History 30 (spring Westminster – the deals he reached that were Conference Committee (2003–10) and 2001), p. 28. with Labour helped to change the Vice Chair of its Federal Policy Com- 18 Robert Hazell and Ben Yong, The country’s constitution for good. As suited to mittee (2012–). Politics of Coalition: How the Conserva- can be seen from Table 1, he left the tive-Lib Dem Government Works (Hart, party in much better shape than he some periods 1 Max Atkinson, Our Masters’ Voices: 2012). found it, in terms of MPs, MEPs The language and body language of politics 19 Jasper Gerard, The Clegg Coup (Gib- and councillors, and its standing in of leadership (Methuen, 1984). son Square, 2011), p. 234. the polls; he also remains the leader 2 See Ipsos-MORI series, available 20 Rob Wilson, 5 Days to Power: The achieving the highest personal pop- and not to at: http://www.ipsos-mori.com/ Journey to Coalition Britain (Biteback, ularity rating. researchspecialisms/socialresearch/ 2010), p. 171. Charles Kennedy initially gave others; and specareas/politics/trends.aspx; anal- 21 Tim Bale, ‘The Black Widow Effect: the party the quiet life it craved ysis based on all respondents. The Why Britain’s Conservative–Lib- after Ashdown’s last years, and all have been party first came top on environmen- eral Democrat coalition might have had a successful first few years, but very differ- tal issues in September 1993, and an unhappy ending’, Journal of Liberal ultimately failed (whether because thereafter always came first or second History 76 (autumn 2012), p. 9 of alcohol or because of his own ent from one as long as the question, or a related 22 Coralie Pring, ‘Disloyal Lib Dems’, innate weaknesses) to fulfil effec- one, was asked. YouGov, 16 May 2011. tively the high-profile role increas- another. 3 Leader, The Guardian 19 March 1992. 23 Bale, ‘The Black Widow Effect’. ingly needed in the party leader. 4 David Butler and Denis Kavanagh, 24 Paddy Ashdown, open letter to lead- Nevertheless, he led the party to its The British General Election of 1997 ership contenders, The Guardian, 11 strongest ever representation in the (Macmillan, 1997), p. 178. June 1999. House of Commons, the European 5 Charles Kennedy, The Future of Politics 25 ‘Paddy’s people’, Economist 14 Sep- Parliament and local authorities; (HarperCollins, 2000), p. xii. tember 1991. the question that hangs over his 6 Greg Hurst, Charles Kennedy: A Tragic 26 Duncan Brack and Harriet Smith, leadership is whether he could have Flaw (Politico’s, 2006), p. 119. ‘Ashdown as Leader’, Journal of Liberal achieved more. 7 Ibid., p. 225. History 30 (spring 2001), p. 13. Menzies Campbell helped to sta- 8 This is explored in detail in Philip 27 For a detailed assessment, see Mark bilise and reorganise the party, and, Cowley and Martin Ryder, ‘Into Pack, ‘Nearly three years on, how

44 Journal of Liberal History 83 Summer 2014 report: the progressive coalition that never was –lessons from the ashdown–Blair ‘project’

does the Bones Report look?’, Lib Beyond Westminster: Finding Hope in became a Labour government min- Dem Voice, 1 June 2011. Britain (Simon & Schuster, 1994). ister under Gordon Brown, and 28 Polls conducted by Lib Dem Voice; 32 Ashdown, The Ashdown Diaries Vol- remains in Westminster today as these are unweighted but participa- ume One, p. 452 MP for Wolverhampton South tion is large enough to make them 33 See Duncan Brack, ‘Liberal Dem- East. Pat McFadden said that the reasonably representative. ocrat Leadership: The Cases of ‘Project’ could primarily be under- 29 Paddy Ashdown, open letter to lead- Ashdown and Kennedy’, Political stood through the prism of per- ership contenders, The Guardian, 11 Quarterly 78:1, January – March 2007. sonality: Tony Blair ‘was, like June 1999. 34 Andrew Rawnsley, ‘Burst out of the Ashdown, a big leader … and he 30 Paddy Ashdown, The Ashdown Dia- pinstripes and show us some passion’, believed in a Big Tent’. ries: Volume One, 1988–1997 (Penguin, Observer, 17 September 2006. Paddy Ashdown’s first gen- 2000), pp. 50–51. 35 Chris Bowers, Nick Clegg: The Biogra- eral election as leader of the Lib- 31 Paddy Ashdown, Citizen’s Britain: A phy (Biteback, second edition, 2012), eral Democrats was in many ways Radical Agenda for the 1990s (Fourth p. 249. one of political containment, fol- Estate, 1989) and Paddy Ashdown, lowing the trauma of unification Looking with the SDP in 1988. However, within days of the result, and with back, in 2013, Labour in flux, Ashdown delivered a landmark speech in Chard on the post- in Somerset on the need for a new, non-Socialist, centrist approach 1992 period, to British politics. Looking back, in 2013, on the post-1992 period, Ashdown he described his feeling that a bi- Report partisan approach was necessary, as described his ‘we genuinely feared defeat again to the Tories … everyone believed feeling that this, including Tony, until his The Progressive Coalition that never was – phone call to me at a Somerset sec- lessons from the Ashdown–Blair ‘project’ a bi-partisan ondary school on the day before the 1997 election’. Evening meeting (joint with the Labour History Group), 22 approach Roger Liddle was a key bridge between the two parties during January 2013, with Paddy Ashdown, Roger Liddle and Pat was nec- the era and an advocate of coopera- McFadden MP; chair: Steve Richards essary, as tion from within both: he described Report by Douglas Oliver himself as having ‘ratted and re-rat- ‘we genu- ted’ à la Winston Churchill, after leaving Labour to join the SDP and s the Liberal Democrat– Red–Yellow cooperative initiative inely feared then the Lib Dems, before being Conservative coalition buried, at least by the time of Ash- lured back by his good friend Peter Aenters its parliamentary down’s retirement from the Lib- defeat again Mandleson, following Tony Blair’s mid-term, the Labour and Lib Dem eral Democrat leadership in 1999. rise to power. He described his History Groups met in Westmin- However, despite this, almost to the Tories sadness at Neil Kinnock’s defeat, ster to reflect upon another, past, two decades on, in the context despite being a Liberal Demo- attempt at inter-party collabora- of a Yellow–Blue coalition, the … everyone crat candidate that year in North tion: the 1990s ‘Project’, initiated period’s relevance to British politi- Hertfordshire, because, he said, he by Tony Blair and Paddy Ashdown, cal life seems enduringly salient. believed this, sensed common purpose between to defeat British Conservatism As evidence of that, three of the the two parties. Throughout the and redefine the British political key protagonists in the ‘Project’ including period Liddle retained strong centre-ground. – Paddy Ashdown, Pat McFad- friendships and a network of pow- The fourth successive Tory gen- den and Roger Liddle – chaired Tony, until erful connections in both parties. eral election victory in April 1992 by The Independent’s Steve Rich- Pat McFadden said that the ‘Pro- provided an existential challenge to ards, were re-united to speak of its his phone ject’ failed critically in two out of the British political left and liberal impact and moment, as well as its three respects. He felt that ‘leader- centre: despite the difficulties of relevance for today, in front of an call to me at ship, arithmetic and subject’ were the post-Thatcher transition, John audience of over a hundred mem- a Somerset the three factors that ‘mattered’, but Major’s victory led many to believe bers of the History Groups of both that although the first was strong, Conservatism was in danger of parties. secondary failures in the latter two aspects holding indefinite sway over Brit- Pat McFadden was a key adviser doomed the project. ish public life, and that the forces of to the Labour Party throughout school on the Ashdown and Blair, he felt ‘were ‘Progressivism’ could never win in the 1990s, and his career spanned “big leaders” who believed in some- Britain again. John Smith’s leadership as well day before thing transformational’. Blair liked Whilst the 1997 general election as Tony Blair’s ascent to power as and trusted Ashdown, and felt that, did result in an eventual defeat party leader and Prime Minister, in the 1997 like himself, he was an outsider to of Toryism, the historic Blair the aftermath of Smith’s untimely his own party. However, the ‘arith- landslide also eventually left the death in May 1994. McFadden later election’. metic’ of Labour’s domination in

Journal of Liberal History 83 Summer 2014 45 report: the progressive coalition that never was –lessons from the ashdown–Blair ‘project’

throughout the 1980s and ’90s, and was a figure of inspiration for many in the Liberal Democrats, both in terms of constitutional matters and other areas. In the early years of Blair’s government, there was limited cooperation between Liberal Democrats and Labour over the issue of constitutional reform, and in 1998 Jen- kins delivered a radical report on electoral reform, recommending a form of ‘AV Plus’. However, it ultimately foundered on the apa- thy of the Labour Party: whilst modernisers like incoming For- eign Secretary Robin Cook sig- nalled support, many conservative elements inside it did not, notably Cabinet members John Prescott and Gordon Brown. Indeed, according to Liddle, even moderate members of Labour were sceptical, because they feared that, under PR, Labour would be usurped as the party of the centre-ground by the Liberal Democrats. Blair’s attitude to electoral reform remained ambiguous; indeed, according to Steve Rich- ards, who said he had interviewed the new Labour leader extensively during the period, he was ultimately negative throughout, even in the mid-1990s. Ashdown noted that, once in government and as time went on, it became clear that Blair ‘was not a pluralist … he wanted power for himself’. Paddy Ashdown felt that electoral reform was the ‘critical framework’ within which the realignment of the left could occur and without it the ‘Project’, as a whole, was undermined. McFadden stated that whilst PR was an area of common interest, it was not a strong enough ‘subject matter’ in itself and that there Westminster after the 1997 land- Top: from left Pat McFadden described Tony was a lack of common purpose slide precluded further coop- – Roger Liddle, Blair’s feeling that ‘the divide in in other areas that New Labour eration, and he sensed that Blair Steve Richards, the progressive vote had allowed felt were important: public ser- underestimated the importance of Paddy Ashdown, a period of mostly Conservative vices, pensions and other domestic forces throughout the Labour Party Pat McFadden. dominance’. issues. According to McFadden, resistant to cooperation with lib- Bottom: standing In his 1979 Dimbleby Lecture, whilst Blair had faith in Ashdown, erals and unenthusiastic about the room only at the Roy Jenkins – liberal Labour Home he had little faith in the Liberal case for electoral reform. meeting. Secretary and founding father of Democrats as a whole, a suspicion A key subject of connection the SDP – had famously outlined that grew in the years of govern- between the two groups was the the case for electoral reform, and its ment as, under Ashdown and later desire to reform the voting system. importance in defending a strong Charles Kennedy, the Lib Dems Despite four powerful parliamen- political centre, from the irrational opposed reforms to Higher Edu- tary majorities, the Conserva- whims of the extremist factions of cation and initiatives to provide tive popular vote in the 1980s and Britain’s two right and left-wing greater administrative autonomy 1990s was always smaller than parties. Jenkins was an influen- for schools and hospitals. that accumulated by Labour and tial figure for many modernising McFadden felt that ‘New the Liberal Democrats combined. figures within the Labour Party Labour’ was then – and now

46 Journal of Liberal History 83 Summer 2014 report: the progressive coalition that never was –lessons from the ashdown–Blair ‘project’

– misunderstood as an extension of throughout the ‘Project’ both were Most notably, Liberal Demo- right-wing Labour, and a resurrec- cognisant of the need for approval crats disagreed with Tony Blair tion of the Gaitskellite tradition in from their own parties, and this over the 2003 Iraq war (though the party. According to McFadden, party approval, or lack of it, proved curiously not Ashdown, who was Blair believed in broad-church pol- important in the eventual collapse by then outside Westminster, as itics that went beyond traditional of the ‘Project’. But Liddle and NATO High Representative in notions of party; however McFad- Ashdown both felt that Blair was Bosnia). Pushed for a counter-fac- den also stated that proportional unwilling to cede power from cen- tual historical analysis, Ashdown representation was an insufficient tral government and the Labour would not be drawn on how his- point of connection between the Party; McFadden did not demur. tory might have been different. two parties. The Joint Cabinet Committee Instead he related a colleague’s In response to McFadden, Ash- (JCC) aimed at promoting com- anecdote of the first meeting down rebuked the idea that Blair mon endeavour between the two between Chairman Mao and Henry was ultimately a positive agent for parties gradually broke down fol- Kissinger in the 1970s and the sto- reform. He argued that, within lowing Ashdown’s retirement and chastic nature of history: asked the Liberal Democrats, the historic Charles Kennedy’s succession to how history would have been dif- foundation that the ‘Project’ sought Liberal Democrat leadership in ferent had the Russian leader been to build on was deep: the intel- 1999. This development marked assassinated in 1963 and not the lectual legacy of Liberal leader Jo the ‘Project’s ultimate demise by American President, Mao report- Grimond in the ’50s and ’60s – who the decade’s end. edly stated that it was unlikely rejected Socialism as an antidote to A lively discussion ensued in the Mrs Kruschev would have ended the perceived bleak imperialistic audience about the ‘Project’ and the up married to the Greek shipping Conservatism of the post-war era reasons for and degree of its fail- magnate Onassis. – and the strategic approach of the ure. Speaking from the floor, Bill Mark Twain once remarked that ‘Gang of Four’ who aimed to ‘break Rodgers, member of the ‘Gang of ‘History does not repeat itself, but the mould’ of politics through the Four’ and Liberal Democrat leader it does Rhyme’. In that light, there creation of the SDP in the 1980s. in the House of Lords in the early has been much speculation that the As Liberal Democrat leader, Ash- years of Blair’s premiership, spec- cross-party relationship might be down said he felt like a custodian ulated that ‘self-deceit’ was key reconceived after the 2015 election, of this legacy, and that this was the to understanding the project: ‘it particularly if the ‘arithmetic’ test rationale behind his centrist politi- was never going to work from the can finally be passed. cal positioning between 1992 and beginning’. Liddle stated that the ‘Project’ 1994, and his frustration that Blair Ashdown was more positive ‘is not yet dead’ and that there was had ‘occupied Liberal Democrat about its aims: whilst he accepted a strong chance that the two par- ground’ once he became leader of that the odds were against suc- Liddle stated ties might be thrust together: as in the Opposition. cess, ‘romanticism is the hallmark the 1990s, the purpose remained Liddle highlighted Blair’s of all great political movements that the ‘Pro- unchanged – ‘dishing the Tories’. address to the Fabian Society on – including the SDP – and with- McFadden was cool on the sub- the fiftieth anniversary of Labour’s out it very little is achieved, even ject’ ‘is not ject and warned against presump- post-war landslide as evidence when the main objectives are left tive allocations of vote shares to of Blair’s pluralistic feelings and unachieved’. Although the ‘Pro- yet dead’ and parties long before people had awareness of the Liberal herit- ject’ did not live up to the high voted: ‘it’s up to us as politicians to age. In the speech, Blair had said aspirations held for it, it did suc- that there offer solutions to the ongoing chal- that Clement Attlee’s victory was ceed in bringing about reforms lenges to people’s living standards’. as much to do with the legacy of such as devolution in Scotland and was a strong Ashdown said that, for Liberal Liberal members Beveridge and Wales, as well as helping to double Democrats, pluralism could involve Keynes, as of Nye Bevan and others Liberal Democrat parliamentary chance that any party that believed in the within the Labour movement. representation in May 1997, in the national interest and liberal values, Ashdown said that throughout face of the Labour surge, through the two par- and he praised Nick Clegg’s flexible the process he had wished to main- a combined association with approach to coalition and his deci- tain the Liberal Democrats’ inde- anti-Toryism. ties might sion to take his lead from the elec- pendence and stressed that even One audience member asked torate in 2010. where alignment was possible, it how the Labour era would have be thrust Pressed by Richards on his ulti- was conditional upon his own par- been different had the Liberal Dem- mate attitude to post-2015 coop- ty’s consent. Ultimately though, ocrats been able to work alongside together: as eration with Labour, Ashdown Ashdown argued the Liberal Dem- the other party effectively in some in the 1990s, referred to the transferable skills ocrats had a positive attitude to form of coalition. Ashdown said he had developed in the military cooperation: by way of evidence, that in the context of Liberal Dem- the purpose and how they were of to use him he highlighted its relatively united ocrat coalition, Labour’s perceived in his later political career: ‘in my and pragmatic approach to govern- disdain for Human Rights as well remained time in the Marines, I spent time ment shown since 2010, in juxtapo- as the lack of challenge it provided in Borneo, and was trained in how sition to the attitude of their Tory to Euroscepticism, could have been unchanged – to discover elephant traps – this is coalition bedfellows. much altered and improved. Liddle one!’ Each of the three panellists and Ashdown spoke of their disil- ‘dishing the highlighted the ‘personal political lusionment with certain aspects of Douglas Oliver is Secretary of the Lib- risks’ both political leaders faced: Blair’s legacy. Tories’. eral Democrat History Group.

Journal of Liberal History 83 Summer 2014 47 Who Votes for the Liberal Democrats? Sources of Electoral Support

48 Journal of Liberal History 83 Summer 2014 Who Votes for the Liberal Democrats? Sources of Electoral Support

Over the years it has eographically the party provided a foundation for party inherited from the Alli- advance. been surprisingly Gance an even national share Traditionally Liberal voting has difficult to get to grips of the vote but prospered only after been thought of as relatively indis- it was able to efficiently concentrate tinct in social terms. The Liberals, with the question of campaign resources on heartland Alliance and Liberal Democrats all and expansion areas at the turn of made a virtue of being fairly class- who votes for the Liberal the century. The Liberal Democrats less in their approach to politics, Democrats. On the have always had popular leaders at so it is not surprising that third- the time of general elections – in party voting is often thought in one hand the party has fact Paddy Ashdown, Charles Ken- this way. As the third party in a nedy and Nick Clegg were all the two-party system, the security of been disadvantaged most popular (or at least the least the Liberal Democrat vote is not by an electoral system unpopular) of all three party leaders assured and unlike the nationalist at certain points of the campaigns parties in Scotland and Wales the that tends to make it a of 1992, 2005 and 2010. Moreo- Liberal Democrats cannot rely on ver, the party has developed poli- an extreme concentration of sup- sideshow in too many cies that have been popular with port to protect the heartland vote the electorate, yet at times popu- geographically. The party has often constituencies. On the lar leadership and popular policies benefitted from protest voting other the party has have been insufficient to persuade which is by its nature volatile and large numbers of the electorate to the Liberal Democrats have found it benefited from some vote for the party. At the centre difficult to appeal to a large section of the question of who votes for of society even when they appar- spectacular by-election the Liberal Democrats and how ently share some of the party’s core victories and its record has the profile of the party’s elec- values. torate changed since 1988 is the We will approach this analysis of keeping those seats struggle for credibility. More than by looking at the social and politi- their competitor parties, the Lib- cal basis of the Liberal Democrat has been remarkably eral Democrats have been forced vote. On the way we will look at good up to now. In social to fight for every vote in every the social profile of Liberal Demo- ward in every constituency because crat voting in terms of social class, terms it is hard to see the their starting point has been – and education and geography. Politi- remains – weak. cally we will look at the nature of Liberal Democrats as a In charting the dynamics of electoral campaigning, the party’s class-based party, but Liberal Democrat support since ideological position in relation to the formation of the party we other parties and the difficulties the common view of the will sketch some of the bases of of firstly bridging the credibil- electoral support for the party. ity gap caused by being the third party as a recipient of In order to do this we will ana- force in British politics and then of random votes from all lyse results from the period of the being the minor party in a national Liberal–SDP Alliance and even coalition. classes cannot be upheld. from the old Liberal Party, since the Grimond revival and com- Andrew Russell Left: the UK’s munity politics are both impor- The dynamics of the Liberal examines who votes for political map tant in explaining how Liberalism Democrat vote after the 2010 retained a foothold in the elec- We will begin by attempting to the Liberal Democrats. election. toral landscape of Britain and both map out the electorate that the

Journal of Liberal History 83 Summer 2014 49 who votes for the liberal democrats? sources of electoral support party inherited and the change in compared to less than a fifth from section of the electorate has long the party’s electoral fortunes since the more plentiful DE categories. been recognised as misplaced. As the 1987 general election. Nevertheless the decades of class Curtice points out: ‘Support for The first thing to say about the and partisan dealignment created the party is not classless, but is dis- Liberal Democrats and the party’s opportunities for the third party to tinctly stronger amongst the edu- key electoral support is how lit- claim new voters. The fragment- cated middle class than in the less tle progress has been made since ing of the council estates and the well educated classes.’2 Given this, the last election of the Alliance trade unions meant that the semi- the expansion of university edu- in 1987. In that election the Alli- automatic link that many voters cation since the 1990s and paral- ance received 23 per cent of the had to the Labour party was dis- lel embourgeoisement of British popular vote, in 2010 the Liberal rupted, and the expansion of the society might have enabled fur- Democrats 24 per cent. Of course affluent working class meant that ther gentrification of the Liberal the major difference in the party’s many socially mobile voters were Democrat vote. If the expansion electoral performance in the inter- up for grabs. of higher education has altered the vening quarter of a century has Since the 1980s, social change in class boundaries for a large slice of been its ability to concentrate sup- Britain might be said to have played the British electorate, this might port in winnable seats. So while into the party’s electoral fortunes, have provided an inbuilt advan- the Alliance received over 7 mil- since the decoupling of class attach- tage for the party that was already lion votes – 23 per cent of the pop- ments to the Conservative and disproportionately popular with ular vote – the Liberal party and Labour parties has coincided with degree holders. SDP won a grand total of 22 seats. the expansion of an affluent mid- In 2005 and 2010 the Liberal The 2010 general election returned dle class. Democrats were actually the party fifty-seven Liberal Democrats In the 1990s it became clear that of choice for those voters with a (and even that was retreat from the the profile of the typical Liberal university degree (Figure 1). By sixty-two seats from 2005) from Democrat voter was someone who 2010 nearly one-third of all voters 6.8 million votes. looked like a Conservative in social with a university degree chose the status but was closer to Labour atti- Liberal Democrats, making them tudinally,1 but these individuals the party for graduates. Although The social profile of the Liberal were not in plentiful supply. Hence, this represents an achievement for Democrat vote as Russell and Fieldhouse note, the party, a longer view reveals the party must look to issue-based the real story – that since the 1980s Class and Liberal Democrat voting mobilisation. However, although graduates have turned away from One of the commonly assumed appeal to voters’ beliefs and policy the Conservatives. In fact, amongst features of the Liberal Democrat preferences means their votes are voters with a university degree, the vote is its classless nature. In truth likely to be more volatile than the Liberal Democrats still fared worse the party – and its predecessors, party would want, there are certain in 2010 than the predecessor Alli- the Alliance and the Liberal Party societal groups where liberal values ance did in 1987. Whereas 38 per – recruited disproportionately might flourish. cent of voters with a degree voted from the better-off sections of the either Liberal or SDP in the 1987 electorate. Even in 1987 more than Education and Liberal Democrat voting general election compared to 36 a quarter of the third-party vote The traditional view of Liberal per cent for the Conservatives and was drawn from the ABC1 classes voting as coming from no single 26 per cent for Labour, only 32 per cent of degree holders voted Liberal Figure 1: Vote choice of degree holders in Britain, 1974–2010 Democrat in 2010. In truth, the real story of graduate voting is the vac- illating fortunes of both Conserva- tive and Labour parties among this group (as the profile of the group has dramatically transformed itself) rather than a positive endorsement of the third party. Nevertheless the party did benefit from the extension of access to higher education. In many ways this is not surprising, since the link between education and liberalism is well established.3 It is also possible that the party appeals to those liberal-minded middle classes traditionally disinclined to vote Labour because of their class background, or simply that the Liberal Demo- crats tend to be the credible opposition to the Conservatives in so many seats where those with higher Source: British Election Study series, cross-sectional data. education choose to live.

50 Journal of Liberal History 83 Summer 2014 who votes for the liberal democrats? sources of electoral support

Figure 1 demonstrates the vot- Figure 2: Vote of degree holders by employment sector, 1983–2010 (per cent) ing pattern of degree holders and shows that the third party has performed well within this group ever since the Liberals managed to field a candidate in most constituencies in February 1974. Although the Alli- ance was marginally the party of choice for degree holders by 1987, by 2001 the Liberal Democrats were comfortably out-polling the Con- servatives within this group (who themselves were beginning to represent a sizeable section of society). Comparing degree and non-degree holders shows that the Liberal Democrats gained between 10 and 15 per cent more votes from those with a university qualification. Linking education to employment sector also sees the emergence of interesting patterns (Figure 2). The Liberals have traditionally recruited particularly well among Source: British Election Study surveys 1983–2010 university graduates with public sector jobs. In fact, between 1983 and 1992 the party won the larg- successful that by 2005 the Liberal with a university degree or higher est share of the vote amongst this Democrats had won parliamentary degree represented 46 per cent of section of the electorate. By 2005 seats in Cambridge, Oxford, Bris- prospective Liberal Democrat vot- and 2010 the Liberal Democrats tol, Ceredigion, Leeds and Man- ers, fewer than 10 per cent of gradu- had a distinct advantage among chester (although no further wins ates were actually choosing the public sector graduates despite fall- took place in student seats in 2010 Liberal Democrats.6 We should be ing behind both Conservatives despite the no tuition fees pledge, wary, naturally, of comparing poll and Labour among graduates with and Oxford West and Abingdon evidence with actual votes, but private sector jobs. Russell and was lost to the Conservatives). In there is nevertheless a stark warn- Fieldhouse report that this profile 2010 the Liberal Democrats aver- ing here to the party. Since enter- of voters that the Liberal Demo- aged 31 per cent of the vote in those ing the coalition in 2010, the Liberal crats could appeal to and places parliamentary constituencies where Democrats have remained a party where the party might thrive was full-time students amounted to of the university educated, but well known to party activists, more than 10 per cent of the elec- the university educated have not who often talked of targeting uni- torate. Of course the real problem remained Liberal Democrats. versity lecturers and teachers and here is that, despite the expan- seats characterised by health ser- sion of higher education, there Religion and Liberal voting vice employment and community are so few seats where the student The link between Liberal vot- voluntarism.4 vote is particularly influential on ing and Nonconformist religious Of course, one of the dangers the electoral outcome: only 43 of observance in Britain is well estab- for the Liberal Democrats of the the current configuration of 650 lished.7 The party’s traditional 2010 coalition could therefore be constituencies have student pop- heartlands were often associated that the post-crash government ulations of over 10 per cent. Fur- with Methodism and non-union- strategy has directly marginalised thermore, many students may also ised agriculture labour and the link those in the public sector. Since the be registered in their family home with Nonconformist communi- 2010 election the Liberal Democrats constituency or be disinclined to ties and Liberal Democrat voting have had to try to engage with a vote in any case, so although the has had an enduring legacy at the new narrative of public thrift and party enjoyed a relative advantage aggregate level if not at the indi- responsible expenditure while try- in student seats, it does not seem vidual level. ing to maintain their advantage sufficient to engineer many victo- The link between Nonconform- among professionals employed in ries in itself. ist religious denominations and the very sector hit hardest by public Of course, since 2010 the rela- Liberal voting was clearly demon- spending cuts. tive advantage that the Liberal strated by Russell and Fieldhouse.8 If the third party has always Democrats had among graduates In both the 1987 and 1997 general enjoyed a relative advantage among may have been decimated due to elections the third party performed graduates, in the twenty-first cen- the undoubted damage done to the significantly better amongst Non- tury the party developed policies party’s reputation by the raising of conformist than Anglican (or designed to appeal to undergradu- tuition fees by the coalition gov- Church of Scotland) voters, who ates as well. The pursuit of the ernment. A Populus poll in Febru- seemed more likely to opt for the ‘student-plus’ audience was so ary 20145 reported that while those Conservatives. In Roman Catholic

Journal of Liberal History 83 Summer 2014 51 who votes for the liberal democrats? sources of electoral support communities there was a clear rather than religiosity). However, of the electorate, the Liberal Demo- and strong bias towards Labour the events after 11 September 2001 crats averaged nearly 21 per cent (although this was often also highly made it seem possible that the Lib- of the vote – a fall of nearly three- dependent on class profile). eral Democrats could appeal to a quarters of a per cent overall – as In more recent times the per- new and significant section of the the shift towards the Liberal Demo- tinence of Christian denomina- UK electorate – Muslim voters, crats from Labour among Muslim tional differences to British voting The Liberal Democrats’ une- voters seemed to slow down or behaviour has clearly receded, so quivocal opposition to the inva- reverse.10 that in the twenty-first century sion of Iraq in 2003 enabled the there is little merit in the party try- party to exploit disenchantment ing to build an electoral strategy with Labour amongst Muslim com- The geographic profile of based on Nonconformist voters. munities – a traditional electoral Liberal Democrat voting Indeed so few citizens seem to iden- stronghold for Labour. In 2005, Probably the greatest achievement tify themselves as Nonconformists the Liberal Democrat vote share in of the Liberal Democrats in the last that it would be surprising if the those seats with a Muslim elector- twenty-five years has been to gain denominational distinctions in the ate of more than 10 per cent had parliamentary representation in Christian church had an independ- improved on average by 9 per cent every region of Britain (although ent effect on voting patterns. Nev- on 2001.9 Even then, coming from the only East Midlands seat, Ches- ertheless the major legacy of the such a poor starting position this terfield, was lost in 2010). The party Liberal Nonconformist vote seems upturn in Liberal Democrat vot- has done this by concentrating its to be that the Liberal Democrats ing only delivered two Westmin- vote in winnable seats, usually by established themselves as a credible ster seats (Brent East and Rochdale). converting local election success party in those places where Non- Furthermore, in many ways the into a wider framework and seeing conformists used to live – and as a 2005 general election was a high- success spill over into parliamen- result the Liberal Democrat vote water mark for the Liberal Demo- tary seats. The contagion theory of might be more durable in those crat targeting of Muslim voters. By Liberal Democrat success is a seduc- areas than one might otherwise 2010 the Liberal Democrats were tive one,11 but it should not obscure expect. finding it even harder to access the sheer hard work that the party As the influence of a traditional the Muslim vote (partly due to had to put into its campaigning confessional cleavage has dimin- the decreased salience of opposi- efforts.12 ished, it might be that Britain’s tion to the war, and possibly in part Having started by noting the more contemporary religious dif- because of the lack of natural fit similarities between the contem- ferences find expression in the elec- between liberal values and the con- porary Liberal Democrats and the toral battleground. Labour has servative religious values embod- Alliance, it should be stated that clearly been associated with ethnic ied in many Muslim communities). in terms of electoral geography minority voting since the 1950s and At the 2010 general election, in the the party is very different from 1960s (although, once more, this thirty-nine parliamentary con- the Alliance, which had a habit of may have been primarily an expres- stituencies where Muslim voters coming second in all regions and sion of social class and exclusion amounted to more than 10 per cent winning none. This enabled the tremendous advances at Westmin- ster in 1997 where a deterioration of Figure 3: Total number of local councillors, 1973–2010 (GB) the popular vote nevertheless saw a doubling of Liberal Democrat MPs, and beyond. Indeed the Liberal Democrats managed to improve both their vote share and parliamentary representation in 2001 and 2005 However, most of the Liberal Democrat parliamentary success came from strong electoral performances in local contests and the brutal truth is that this has decayed at an alarming rate. Liberal Demo- crat local election performance is worse now than at any time since the 1970s. In terms of the councillor base (which was, after all, the activist base of the party) the Liberal Democrats are reduced to just over 2,000 councillors – the worst showing by the third party in Britain since 1983 (Figure 3). It is not too big an exaggeration to say that the party is in danger of losing all the Source: House of Commons, ‘Local Elections 2014’, Research Paper 14/33 (2014) progress made since the 1970s, as in

52 Journal of Liberal History 83 Summer 2014 who votes for the liberal democrats? sources of electoral support four short years since the formation The num- Democrat vote share in such places choice may never forgive the party of the coalition, the bulwark of the is around ten percentage points for propping up the party they party’s local vote has been severely ber of peo- rather than twelve points every- really identified against. Given the compromised. where else. Although incumbency irresistible force of the electoral There are, however, two impor- ple who has been a factor in explaining Lib- mathematics in Westminster after tant caveats here. Firstly, the Lib- eral Democrat election results, it the 2010 general election, the Lib- eral Democrat vote share in the identify as can only provide a small crumb of eral Democrats may have had no local elections of 2011–13 was mar- Liberal Dem- comfort to the party. real choice, but entering coalition ginally better than the national with the Conservatives was always polls might have indicated, with ocrat has not a gamble. If this was the hope, it the party gaining 14–15 per cent The political profile of Liberal seems that the gamble has not paid of the popular vote in all contests. transformed Democrat voting off, not least because the fragility of This improvement is marginal but Turning finally to the political the Liberal Democrat core vote has nevertheless should provide some in the aspect of Liberal Democrat sup- been exposed. succour to the party strategists. port, we should first acknowledge The same was true of the 2014 local twenty-five an essential truth about the Lib- Identification elections in England, although eral Democrats over the past quar- The number of people who identify in the European Parliament elec- years since ter of a century: that, as the third as Liberal Democrat has not trans- tions the Liberal Democrat vote party in a system designed to sus- formed in the twenty-five years share fell to below 7 per cent. Sec- the party’s tain only two, they have too often since the party’s inception. Indeed ondly, Liberal Democrat electoral been defined only in relation to analysis of the 1987 general elec- performance continues to be best inception. the main two parties. The Liberal tion reveals that the Alliance could where the party has sitting MPs. It Democrats’ struggle for identity count on 16 per cent of all British was certainly the case in 2010 that and credibility has too readily been voters to class themselves as party the Liberal Democrats had a much seen as an effort to tack themselves identifiers (for either party, natu- greater chance of retaining the to, or manoeuvre themselves away rally). In both 2005 and 2010 the Westminster constituency if the from one of the other parties. This Liberal Democrats’ core of support incumbent MP re-stood. In 2010, is not surprising for a party that (their partisans) amounted to only the party selected ten new candi- struggles to make a national impact 11 per cent of the electorate.13 This dates to stand in seats where they and which had clearly decided by is important, since it reveals that were the incumbent party. Not the turn of the century that its best so much of the Liberal Democrat only did they lose six of these seats chance of achieving and maintain- vote (even when the party are doing to the Conservatives (Harrogate ing breakthrough at Westminster well) is loaned to rather than owned and Knaresborough, Winchester, was by establishing the Liberal by the party. As such, it is more York Outer, Truro and Falmouth, Democrats as a viable party locally vulnerable to erosion from both Cornwall South East, Hereford – usually as the effective opposition sides than any party would hope. and Herefordshire South), but their to an incumbent from the Con- Electoral appeal predicated on average vote share declined by 4.69 servatives or Labour. Three-way attracting switchers from the other per cent on 2005. The only Liberal marginal constituencies remain parties is problematic while too Democrat successes were in Cam- extremely rare, and the Liberal large a proportion of voters seem bridge, Chippenham, Edinburgh Democrats created a series of local to share the view, encapsulated by West, and St Austell and Newquay. narratives about the party’s cred- John Curtice’s famous phrase, that Those candidates who were neither ibility via local election presence the Liberal Democrats are more of new nor first-time incumbents saw and occasional by-election success. a one-night stand than long-term their vote share fall by 1.25 per cent, In other words, the Liberal Dem- relationship material. with five incumbents losing their ocrats became credible through seats. Across all Liberal-Democrat- establishing a status as one of the Credible, electable, alternative? held seats, party performance only two main parties in a series of two- One of the key aspects of Paddy marginally declined in 2010, with party systems. Ashdown’s speech at Chard in 1992 an average vote share of 45.51 per It might have been reasonable was that he set a fierce test by which cent in these constituencies. to assume that the establishment of we can judge the subsequent elec- Looking at the data from the the coalition government of 2010 toral performance of the Liberal elections since 2010, it does seem, and the wide-ranging involve- Democrats. Immediately after the firstly, that the Liberal Democrat ment of the Liberal Democrats in 1992 general election, Ashdown vote holds up slightly better than all aspects of that coalition would claimed that the Liberal Democrats the national polls might predict solve the traditional problem of must rise to the challenge of at least and, secondly, that this is especially credibility for the party. After all, being a part of ‘a credible, elect- true in places where the party has what better signifier of credibility able alternative government to the a sitting MP. However the incum- could there be than the presence of Tories’.14 This was a key moment bency bonus to the party is far less the party in peacetime government for the party since it paved the way than the party faithful commonly for the first time since the National for the abandonment of equidis- imagine; and it is worth reiterat- Government? tance from the Conservative and ing that, despite the incumbency There was of course a risk Labour parties. Writing now, this bonus, the party is managing elec- attached to entering coalition. Elec- might seem little more than a nec- toral decline rather than promising torally those voters who came to essary and viable electoral tactic, success. In fact, the drop in Liberal the Liberal Democrats as a tactical or a reaction to the unpopularity

Journal of Liberal History 83 Summer 2014 53 who votes for the liberal democrats? sources of electoral support of the Conservative brand, but the Given the assiduously. The Liberal Democrats by Eurosceptic neo-liberals – and context is important. have, however, not made much the Liberal Democrats’ stance The 1992 general election asymmetri- progress in twenty-five years in against the Iraq War, in favour had seen the Liberal Democrats fundamentally changing the basis of hypothecated taxation, and underperform electorally. There cal approach of British electoral politics. against ID cards was popular with was a widespread notion that the In truth the Liberal Democrat many voters. On the other hand, party had missed winnable targets to electoral heartland is still a niche in Brit- their approach to Labour identifi- because they had insufficiently dif- ish politics as the key electoral ers was qualitatively different and ferentiated themselves from the strategy, the cleavages remain class-based. For sat uncomfortably with the rest of incumbent party – and in the vast instance, although the influence of their electoral strategy. Criticism majority of cases this was the Con- decision to social class upon the preferences of of New Labour’s foreign policy and servatives. In seats like Sheffield enter coali- an individual has seemingly dimin- approach to civil liberties seemed Hallam and Littleborough and Sad- ished since the 1960s, the aggregate to strike a nerve less with moder- dleworth the Liberal Democrat tion with class characteristics of an area have ate Labour supporters than with challenge to sitting Conservatives become an even better predictor the relatively diehard left. In sim- had faltered since the party could the Con- of voting behaviour in each con- ple terms, the party was no longer not adequately convince Labour stituency.16 Furthermore the pre- acting as, nor could be perceived supporters to transfer their votes to servatives dominant determinant of British as, a party of the centre. Pursuit of the Liberal Democrats in order to electoral politics remains the left– one of these electoral flanks (Con- defeat the Tories. Academics had after 2010 right axis rather than the liberal– servative moderates) would sooner written of Ashdown’s mistake in authoritarian one. This means that rather than later come into con- misjudging the public mood.15 The would inevi- party has to compete on territory flict with the pursuit of the other Chard speech and the subsequent that it finds harder to own than the (Labour stalwarts), and as the party abandonment of equidistance paved tably harm other parties do. grew the cracks began to show. the way for the party to become In left–right terms, the party This meant that at the heart of the part of the anti-Conservative oppo- the party’s inherited a set of voters from the Liberal Democrat electoral strat- sition or, in Ashdown’s own phrase, Alliance that was slightly left of egy was an asymmetry that simply a credible, electable alternative. potential centre. Alliance voters in 1987 could not be sustained. It should further be empha- identified themselves as typically Given the asymmetrical sised that the realignment sig- voting base. to the right of Labour, but signifi- approach to electoral strategy, the nalled by Chard occurred before cantly closer to them than to the decision to enter coalition with the the ERM crisis, and before John Conservatives. The Chard Speech, Conservatives after 2010 would Major’s back-to-basics rallying the abandonment of equidistance, inevitably harm the party’s poten- call and the subsequent discredit- the adoption of clear tax-and- tial voting base. In policy terms, ing of a sleaze-ridden Conservative spend policies (and in particular the Liberal Democrats had sig- government. Ending equidistance the hypothecated taxation that nalled a discernible move back may now seem like the inevitable targeted spending on education) towards the centre between 2005 consequence of 1990s British poli- all facilitated the closer relation- and 2010 with the election of Nick tics, but at the time there was lit- ship between Liberal Democrat Clegg to the leadership and the tle inevitable about it. Indeed, it and Labour voters that followed. advance, to a certain extent, of the prefigured a period of intense col- Indeed in the early years of New economic liberals over the social laboration between Labour and the Labour, when that party’s apparent wing of the party. Liberal Democrats and the prom- obsession with ‘prudence’ led them The political perception of the ise (or threat) of still more, as the to accept the spending proposals of Liberal Democrats by the public two party leaders seemed intent on the outgoing Conservative regime, can be gauged by the second pref- dragging their parties even closer it was the Liberal Democrats who erences of voters in general elec- towards each other. began to seem the most left wing tions. This is a regular question in Since the Labour and Liberal of all parties on certain issues. the British Election Study series Democrat leadership have drifted Public perception of the Liberal and allows us to analyse and locate apart with the disintegration of Democrats reflected this, and the the public placement of the party. the ‘Project’ between Blair and party began to compete, in some Despite the fact that most Alli- Ashdown, the Liberal Democrats seats at least, for the credible anti- ance voters in 1987 placed them- have had some spectacular but spo- Conservative vote. In addition, the selves to the left of centre, a small radic electoral success. Tellingly Liberal Democrats were able, cru- majority of them preferred the this success typically resulted from cially, to open up a second front and Conservatives to Labour as their relentless and efficient targeting of to compete with Labour in some second choice of political party. Of resources on winnable seats rather areas based on dissatisfaction with course this might signify little more than on spreading support over a Labour’s record in government. than the relative unpopularity of wider canvass. This is central to understanding Labour in the 1980s and the antipa- Importantly, every Liberal the appeal of the Liberal Demo- thy of those that deserted Labour Democrat vote, every ward held crats in the twenty-first century. to join the SDP in the first place. and every Westminster seat won The party were able to follow their Between 1987 and 1997 the public has been fought over a number of familiar strategy for Conserva- discerned a move left in the Liberal contests and years. This strategy tive sympathisers – a moderate Democrats, which was mirrored in requires a labour-intensive party appeal to those worried that the the perceptions of Liberal Demo- machinery in order to campaign one-nation party had been hijacked crat voters themselves. For the first

54 Journal of Liberal History 83 Summer 2014 who votes for the liberal democrats? sources of electoral support time the general electorate and the terms, the Liberal Democrat vote defensive campaign in 2015 would party’s own voters tended to place is still much more fragile than that see the Liberal Democrats concen- the party as closer to Labour than of the main two parties. Whereas trate on a heartland vote strategy, to the Conservatives. This was con- nine-tenths of all Conservative and since these are the areas where the firmed by the Chard speech and Labour supporters identify them- vote has collapsed least since 2010. subsequently the ‘Project’. selves as supporters of the party Local election results would sug- By 1997, when the non-equi- they voted for in 2010, only just gest that the party will find it hard distant Liberal Democrats stood over one-half of Liberal Democrat even to be viable in places previ- in stark contrast to the toxic Tory voters did the same. The Liberal ously identified as expansion ter- brand, only 22 per cent of Liberal Nor is the basis of Liberal Dem- ritories (local Liberal Democrat Democrat voters favoured the Con- ocrat support any more stable than Democrats representation has been wiped out servatives as their second prefer- it was at the party’s launch. The in Greater Manchester and Liver- ence; 64 per cent chose Labour. By Liberal Democrat vote still con- find them- pool for instance). 2010, despite the general downturn tains a large element of protest selves in a Systematic and prolonged elec- in Labour popularity nationally, voting, which means that any electoral progress has occurred over Liberal Democrat voters were still toral success for the Liberal Demo- very similar the first quarter of a century of the markedly more likely to favour crats has been built upon the most party – in terms of representation Labour as their second preference fragile of foundations. In Crewe’s position to if not in terms of the popular vote to the Conservatives (40 per cent to terms, the traditional Liberal chal- – and an asymmetric approach to 24 per cent). lenges of recruitment and reten- when the campaign strategy was remark- tion of voters remain difficult for ably successful up to a point. The politics of second choice the contemporary party. At the last party was However the limits of the asym- In a similar vein, over the course general election, 64 per cent of Lib- metry became apparent in the early of the past quarter of a century the eral Democrat voters were new to founded. It twenty-first century. Entering Liberal Democrats had become the party (versus only 40 per cent into coalition with the Conserva- more palatable to Labour support- of Conservative and 27 per cent of can rely on tives gave the Liberal Democrat the ers than to Conservative voters. Labour voters), which demonstrates chance to finally bridge their cred- This is important, in that it pro- both the success of the electoral the votes of ibility gap – but the price of the vides a good guide for the latent project and its inherent weakness. coalition has been to undermine support needed to convert tactical Votes which are lent to a political a small and much of the progress made since voters in strategically important party – for whatever reason (strate- the birth of the party. constituencies. By 2010 the Liberal gic voting, a symbol of protest, or a indistinct Democrats were the second choice personal reward for an incumbent Andrew Russell is Professor of Politics of two-thirds of Labour voters and or local candidate) – can just as eas- social com- and Head of Department at the Uni- 54 per cent of Conservatives.17 Of ily be withdrawn, and being in coa- munity and versity of Manchester. He has written course, this effectively meant that lition with the Conservatives runs extensively on party politics and voter many more voters were going to be the risk of losing two of these three is vulnerable engagement. His publications include antagonised by the coalition agree- sources. Anti-Conservative tacti- Neither Left Nor Right? The Lib- ment with the Conservatives than cal voters will be less inclined to to surges in eral Democrats and the Elector- the party would have wanted and vote for a party that put the Tories ate (with Ed Fieldhouse) and Voter made a deal with the Conserva- in power, and anti-politics protest the popular- Engagement and Young People for tives harder for the party to sell to voters are likely to be swept away as the Electoral Commission. its own voters than any deal with soon as the protest party becomes a ity of parties Labour would have been. It also party of government. 1 A. Russell and E. Fieldhouse, Neither explains why disenchantment with on either Left Nor Right? The Liberal Democrats the Liberal Democrats in govern- and the Electorate (Manchester Univer- ment has translated directly to Conclusion side of the sity Press, 2005), pp. 117–23. Labour support for the most part In summary, then, the contempo- 2 J. Curtice, ‘Who Votes for the Centre (although there is a significant boost rary Liberal Democrats find them- spectrum (or Now?’ in D. MacIver (ed.) The Liberal to UKIP also). This transfer to selves in a very similar position to Democrats (Harvester Wheatsheaf, Labour means that, at the time of when the party was founded. It even outside 1996), p. 20. writing, a party with distinct dis- can rely on the votes of a small and 3 For a full discussion of how formal advantages in terms of the public indistinct social community and is the spectrum education is positively associated perception of both leadership and vulnerable to surges in the popu- with progressive attitudes to redis- economic competence still leads in larity of parties on either side of if anti-party tribution and social liberalism, see the opinion polls. the spectrum (or even outside the sentiment M. Forslund, ‘Patterns of Delin- Finally it is instructive to reiter- spectrum if anti-party sentiment quency Involvement: An Empiri- ate a fundamental point about the can be harnessed by another party can be har- cal Typology’, Western Association of vulnerability of the electoral for- of protest). Unlike the Alliance, the Sociologists and Anthropologists Confer- tunes of the third party in British Liberal Democrats are a party with nessed by ence (Alberta, 1980), or E. Babbie, The politics. Writing before the founda- some geographic strongholds, par- Practice of Social Research (Wadsworth, tion of the Liberal Democrats, Ivor ticularly where the party can call another 1995). Crewe recognised the ‘softness’ of on the benefits of prolonged incum- 4 Russell and Fieldhouse, Neither Left the Liberal vote, based as it was on bency, but by and large the party’s party of Nor Right?, p. 93. relatively small and relatively weak prospects for expansion were fairly partisan identification. In simple evenly spread. It is likely that a protest). Concluded on page 68

Journal of Liberal History 83 Summer 2014 55 liberal democrats in coalition: the scottish record

In 1997, the Labour government, fulfilling the formed between the Liberal Democrats and promises of the Cook-Maclennan Agreement Labour. Caron Lindsay examines the record reached between Labour and the Liberal of the coalitions, and the Liberal Democrat Democrats before the election, finally created impact on them, and concludes that there are the longed-for Scottish Parliament. The first lessons from the first eight years in Scotland eight years of the Parliament, after elections which might yet help restore the fortunes of in 1999 and 2003, saw coalition governments the party at UK level.

56 Journal of Liberal History 83 Summer 2014 liberal democrats in coalition: the scottish record

n 1979, Scotland had voted radical abounded. Would Scot- sceptical about creating the Scottish by 51.6 per cent to 48.4 per cent land’s first devolved government Parliament. In his autobiography, Ifor a Scottish Assembly; how- confound sceptics and be radical he said: ever, despite the majority within enough for optimists? the votes cast, the yes vote failed On 14 May 1999, Donald Dewar I was never a passionate devo- to meet the required threshold of and Jim Wallace announced a lutionist. It is a dangerous game 40 per cent of the total electorate. Labour/Liberal Democrat Part- to play. You can never be sure Eighteen years of Conservative nership Agreement. The parties where nationalist sentiment ends rule then further intensified Scot- governed together for eight years, and separatist sentiment begins. land’s desire for devolution. The through three Labour and two Lib- I supported the UK, distrusted 1997 referendum showed a three to eral Democrat leaders, implement- nationalism as a concept and one ratio in favour of a parliament, ing landmark reforms. For Liberal looked at the history books and and two to one in favour of tax- Democrats, it was the first chance worried whether we could get it raising powers. The Scotland Act to govern in eighty years. How through. of 1998 gave a parliament and Scot- would inexperienced new ministers tish executive control over most adapt to government and maintain The Scottish Constitutional Con- domestic matters and the never- the party’s identity as the junior vention in its 1995 blueprint, Scot- used power to vary income tax by partner in coalition? This article land’s Parliament, Scotland’s Right, set three pence. aims to discuss the formation of out that the parliament should con- Elections took place on 6 May the coalition, assess its impact on tain 129 MSPs: seventy-three from 1999: Labour won fifty-six seats, Scotland, the UK and the Scottish constituencies and fifty-six elected SNP thirty-five, Conservatives Liberal Democrats, look at how it from a top-up list. That figure was eighteen, Liberal Democrats sev- governed as well as what it did, and a compromise. The Scottish Labour enteen, and others three. Together, draw some comparisons with the party were willing to agree to 145 Liberal Democrats and Labour had current UK coalition. MSPs in total, but that would have a majority. set it against Westminster Labour Both parties knew that the new who wanted just 108. Liberal Dem- Scottish Executive would have a Constitutional convention ocrats had helped broker the even- great deal to prove. On the one When Conservatives and Liberal tual deal. As a result, by the time hand, there was a great sense of Democrats sat down to negotiate of the Holyrood election, Labour optimism. The carefully built con- after the 2010 general election, they should have known that Liberal sensus among politicians and civil were unfamiliar with each other. Democrats were tough but reason- society on devolution was realised. David Laws says in his account that able negotiators. There was talk of a better way of he and William Hague had never doing politics, where people could previously met.1 This was not the engage more with parliament and case in Scotland: the parties had Coalition negotiation 1999 government. Sceptics, however, been involved in tough negotia- Labour as the largest party made a doubted that coalition could work. tions in the Scottish Constitutional foolish assumption. They expected For years the prevailing narrative, Convention which had estab- the Liberal Democrats to be so spread by those in power with no lished the blueprint for the Scottish excited at the prospect of govern- appetite to share it, had been that Parliament. ment that they would simply join proportional representation would Left: Scottish For instinctively centralis- Labour in implementing its poli- lead to instability. Fears of a bland Parliament in ing Labour, giving away power is cies. A two-page letter, inviting government which did nothing session. difficult. Tony Blair was always Liberal Democrats to join their

Journal of Liberal History 83 Summer 2014 57 liberal democrats in coalition: the scottish record government, was immediately dis- When the deal was announced4 was accepted by a Liberal Demo- missed by Jim Wallace. on 14 May 1999, topmost in com- crat Special Conference with little It was not just Labour who had mentators’ minds was the ques- opposition, it was very much a take to learn to take Liberal Democrats tion of what would happen on the it or leave it affair. More widespread seriously. During the negotiations, controversial issue of tuition fees. consultation prior to the agreement a senior civil servant was asked to This issue dominated the election: being finalised is needed: votes of leave the room because of a percep- Labour wanted to charge for uni- the Parliamentary Party and the tion that they felt they were there versity tuition; Liberal Democrats Federal Executive are not enough. to serve the largest party. David were implacably opposed. If any- Laws talked about these experi- one had wanted any wiggle room, ences in 2010 in the wake of the David Steel removed it during the Achievements in the first term Westminster deal: last week of the campaign, saying In May 1999, Scottish Liberal A joint meet- that if you voted Liberal Democrat Democrats produced a document David Laws was asked whether ing of Lib on Thursday, tuition fees would be outlining forty-eight pledges in he would wish to see the dead by Friday. the Partnership Agreement – ‘one involvement of the Civil Service Dem MSPs Maintaining free higher educa- a month for four years’. Labour in any future coalition negotiation was the Liberal Democrats’ top were, however, better at selling tions. His feeling was, based on and the priority, and Labour were not in a their wins and the Liberal Demo- the evidence of Civil Service mood for negotiation. The Liberal crats were roundly criticised in involvement in Scottish nego- Executive Democrats held their ground, and the media and within the party for tiations, that this may act as a insisted on implementing Laws’ making too many compromises. hindrance to proceedings. In and Policy fifth rule, as illustrated by the fol- By the 2001 Westminster elec- this instance his view was that lowing excerpt from the Partner- tion the forty-eight pledges became the Civil Service had shown a Committees ship Agreement: 185 measures that had been either preference towards the stronger implemented or were on the way to party, and that their presence gave a green We are agreed that the contro- being so. Jim Wallace wrote: stifled more frank and open versial issue of tuition fees is too discussion.2 light to the important and too complex to You only have to compare the be decided in the short period of actions of the Liberal Democrat/ Laws discussed the negotiation pro- deal, but lit- time between the elections of 6 Labour partnership govern- cess at a Liberal Democrat History May and the formation of this ment in Scotland to those of the Group fringe meeting in 2009, out- tle effort was Partnership Government. The majority Labour government in lining his seven rules for coalition Universities and other Higher London to see the difference: negotiations which are recounted made to get Education bodies have empha- – Tuition fees – gone in Scot- in full by Mark Pack. They are: the wider sised to us the need to proceed land, still there in England through careful and thorough – Free personal care for the 1 There is huge pressure from party on examination of all of the options. elderly – coming soon in the media and others which The Liberal Democrats stood Scotland, no sign of action in requires a deal to be struck board, lead- on a manifesto commitment to London quickly if at all. abolish tuition fees. The Lib- – A fair deal for teachers Eng- 2 About 20 per cent of colleagues ing to resent- eral Democrats have maintained land’s teachers are demanding will be happy with any sort their position on it. The partner- a deal like those of their Scot- of coalition, 30 per cent will ment. This ship agreement does not mean tish counterparts oppose any sort of coalition abandonment of that position. – Freedom of information – the and the rest will decide on the was changed UK government’s proposals details of the proposal. The staging post in the agreement are a shadow of our Scottish 3 Any coalition has to address for the 2003 was that the parliament would be plans.5 issues of policy substance. asked to set up a review that would 4 You have to be tough and pre- elections, report by the year’s end. The first term saw some forty- pared to walk away to get a Liberal Democrat approval of eight pieces of legislation passed good deal. with much the deal seemed alienly inclusive by the parliament – and there 5 But you can agree to postpone to Labour but too exclusive to Lib- were some complaints that parlia- tackling some large compli- wider con- eral Democrat grassroots. A joint mentary committees were being cated issues if more time is meeting of Lib Dem MSPs and the overworked. Here are some of the genuinely needed to work out sultation Executive and Policy Commit- highlights: a compromise – and if there taking place, tees gave a green light to the deal, is always the threat that the but little effort was made to get Free personal care coalition will end if it is not involving the wider party on board, leading This is an example of Liberal Dem- reached. to resentment. This was changed ocrats exerting their influence 6 You need to get commitments local party for the 2003 elections, with much within government to enact a radi- in writing about the adminis- wider consultation taking place, cal reform. The Liberal Democrat trative details of how coalition and regional involving local party and regional manifesto committed us only to: government will work. office bearers. There are lessons 7 Vigorous internal party debate office to be learned from this for future Promote an early dialogue with over the proposed terms is vital Westminster negotiations. While all interested parties throughout for any deal to stick.3 bearers. the 2010 Coalition Agreement the UK to establish a common

58 Journal of Liberal History 83 Summer 2014 liberal democrats in coalition: the scottish record

way forward in achieving the south of the border allowing a In 2003, Scot- in England but was still traumatic. recommendations contained in straightforward right of access Liberal Democrats maintained the Royal Commission on Long to information, fewer grounds tish Liberal pressure for the repeal, as Labour Term Care.6 for exemption and quicker support wobbled, particularly from time frames. Democrats – central-belt MSPs who received That Royal Commission, chaired • Radical land reform which robust representations from the by Stewart Sutherland, had radi- gave walkers the right to roam for the first Catholic Church. The Keep the cally recommended that: and enabled community buy- Clause campaign run by million- outs of land put up for sale, time in liv- aire Stagecoach owner Brian Souter The costs of care for those indi- such as on Gigha, where it reju- ing memory sent a postal ballot paper to every viduals who need it should be venated the island. house and claimed massive opposi- split between living costs, hous- • Abolition of personal cross – went into tion to the measure. ing costs and personal care. Per- examination by rape accused sonal care should be available of victim in court f previous a national Four more years after an assessment, according to sexual history of victim being In 2003, Scottish Liberal Democrats need and paid for from general admissible evidence. election ask- – for the first time in living mem- taxation: the rest should be sub- • Reforming criminal justice ory – went into a national election ject to a co-payment according giving more power to victims ing for ‘four asking for ‘four more years’ and to means.7 and restricting corporal pun- ran proudly on their record. The ishment of children. more years’ election strengthened their hand: The Westminster government • Simplifying arrangements the seventeen Lib Dem seats were rejected the Commission’s recom- regarding personal debt. and ran retained, whereas Labour lost six mendations on affordability. Scot- seats and the SNP lost eight seats. tish Labour thought similarly. This This contrasts with Nick Clegg’s proudly on This paved the way for an extra did not stop Liberal Democrats, situation in the current West- fourteen Green, Socialist and in particular Mike Rumbles and minster coalition. His attempts at their record. Independent MSPs. They could Margaret Smith, pushing the exec- reforming the House of Lords and have been a powerful force within utive to implement free personal party funding were blocked by the parliament had they worked care. Labour’s Henry McLeish, both Labour and the Conservatives together constructively. It was an who became First Minister on through little fault of his own. opportunity lost for more diverse Dewar’s death, favoured the policy politics. and the landmark legislation was Nursery for three and four year olds Labour approached the 2003 passed in 2002. We now take for granted that our coalition negotiations in a spirit of three and four year olds go to nursery simply continuing the government Higher education for two and a half hours a day, giving of the past four years. Liberal Dem- The outcome of the tuition fees them the best possible start. Liberal ocrats wanted a whole new deal and dilemma, reached in January 2000, Democrats are now extending places were prepared to be robust to get was a deal which guaranteed no for two year olds in England. it. After press stories suggested that front-end fees but introduced a the Liberal Democrats had ‘ripped graduate endowment of £2000, Housing and homelessness up their manifesto’, Jim Wallace to help those from a poorer back- A radical target of ending home- put his foot down. He told Labour ground attend university.8 lessness by 2012, modification of he would not negotiate until they This was not well received, pres- the right to buy, and more rights stopped briefing. I wonder what aging the rage eleven years later in for social tenants went some way to would have happened if there had England. Liberal Democrats took dealing with the shortage of afford- been a similar rebuke to William a hammering: MSPs were abused able housing, although it would be Hague’s public comments about an in the street and thirty pieces of wrong to say that it has resolved the AV referendum in 2010. ‘silver’ were delivered to their issues. The big Liberal Democrat win, headquarters. The SNP minority arguably the most major of the government with Liberal Democrat Foot and mouth eight years, was the introduction of support eventually abolished the The measure of a government is proportional representation by the endowment in 2008. tested when it faces a crisis. In 2001, Single Transferable Vote for local foot and mouth disease spread into government. Prior to the 2007 elec- Jim Wallace’s personal achievements Scotland. In England, the conse- tion, Labour did not have to try Jim Wallace became Minister for quences had been catastrophic. in many areas under first past the Justice and introduced seventeen Prompt and efficient action ensured post. In 2003, seventy-one Labour pieces of legislation which had a that the outbreak was contained. councillors were elected in Glas- significant impact on individu- The executive was able to prove gow. Between them, the opposition als and communities, earning him itself as a competent administration parties mustered eight. Although wide respect amongst the justice and the reputation of Ross Finnie as Labour continues to have a major- community. These include: enhanced. ity there, they now have a significant opposition. In addition, • Enabling civil marriages to take Section 28 many other fiefdoms have gone. place outside a registry office. The repeal of Section 28, or Section The Electoral Reform Society, in • Significantly stronger Freedom 2A as it is more correctly known its study of the first elections held of Information legislation than in Scotland, was much easier than under the new system said:

Journal of Liberal History 83 Summer 2014 59 liberal democrats in coalition: the scottish record

Councils across Scotland are procedures to be established for These efforts minister resign on a policy issue: now much more representative handling business within the Tavish Scott over fisheries policy. of the views of their voters. No Executive will require officials at intra-coa- Jim Wallace told Holyrood mag- longer are there councils where to copy all relevant material to azine in 2011 about the lengths parties have majorities that can- the offices of the leaders of both lition har- the coalition partners could go not be justified by electoral parties in the Executive. The to in order to find an acceptable support; where parties with sig- Deputy First Minister will have mony helped compromise: nificant support have no, or few, appropriate official, political and seats; or where the largest parties specialist support to enable him to ensure dis- Discussions between coalition in terms of seats are not those to discharge his role effectively. partners can be very robust and with most votes.9 cipline. There that’s important because you The 2003 equivalent10 cleared up an were very have to be able to do that and Liberal Democrats also won on the omission – specifying that the First carry on the business of gov- health promotion agenda. While Minister should also be copied in on few rebel- ernment and sometimes it can Labour’s emphasis was on building everything – and went into more be very funny. I remember on more hospitals, Liberal Democrats detail about issues not covered by lions over the my very last night as deputy wanted free eye and dental checks the Partnership Agreement, so that FM when we had had a cabinet and won. Other financial priori- events such as the Iraq war did not years and meeting earlier that day and the ties included historic investment in destabilise the coalition. planning [of the] white paper further education colleges by both Despite that agreement, there only once did had to be finalised and there was Jim Wallace and Nicol Stephen, was, according to one former min- one paragraph that was very which the Nationalists have been ister, a need for vigilance. If issues a minister difficult, I think about third paring back ever since. In contrast, arose, Labour would instinctively party right of appeal, and Jack Liberal Democrats in the UK coali- revert to their policy to find a solu- resign on a [McConnell] and I resorted to tion have made significant cuts in tion and had to be pulled back. a thesaurus to find a word that this area. Labour ministers would go policy issue. we thought could square the along to Liberal Democrat Par- circle and would mean we both Justice liamentary Party meetings. The had a different word and yes, we Despite Jim Wallace’s move to minutes of the meeting of 29 Janu- saw the funny side at the time. Enterprise and Lifelong Learning, ary 2002 show that Labour Health I can think of many occasions significant concessions were won Minister Malcolm Chisholm when Jack and I could easily from Labour on anti-social behav- would be invited to the next meet- have reached agreement on some iour. Plans to jail parents of per- ing to discuss a dispute between policy issue but we had to go sistently offending children were care home owners and local coun- through a negotiation because watered down considerably. Labour cils. The minutes of 4 March 2003 we had to be sure we could bring had also wanted a paradoxical cen- indicate that Liberal Democrat our respective parties along tralised community justice sys- MSP Robert Brown withdrew with us, so you had to rehearse tem. Liberal Democrats prevented an amendment on the Homeless- any of their views or objections the retention of DNA of anyone ness Bill after Labour Minister Des and given the nature of the Lib arrested and the introduction of McNulty had come to the meet- Dems, we had a very large num- an ID card to access to devolved ing. Last year Brown, asked for this ber of consultations!12 services. article if that type of interaction helped intra-coalition relations and Jim Wallace as acting First Minister Process of government maintained discipline, wrote: First Minister Donald Dewar’s hos- The Partnership Agreement in pitalisation for heart surgery thrust 1999 explicitly set out how the Being in Coalition gave you an Jim Wallace into the media spot- government would work, particu- inside track to Ministers who light as acting First Minister for larly when it related to an issue not needed your support both in three months. His performances at covered in the Partnership Agree- Committee and in the Cham- First Minister’s Questions against ment. This section on the Role ber. There was therefore a lot the SNP’s Alex Salmond saw him of the Deputy First Minister was of interchange on the detail of being depicted in a newspaper car- interesting: Bills. We lodged amendments, toon as a Roman gladiator with his sometimes serious, sometimes foot on Salmond’s chest. In Neither The parties agree that, subject probing, to get Ministers to give Left nor Right? The Liberal Demo- to the approval of the Parlia- explanations, make concessions, crats and the Electorate, Andrew Rus- ment, the Leader of the Scot- say things on the Record, etc. sell quotes one Liberal Democrat tish Liberal Democrats should The Party spokesman would insider as saying: be nominated to hold the office make recommendations to the of Deputy First Minister in the Group for discussion and usu- I think a lot of people in the Partnership Executive. ally a satisfactory resolution was Labour Party just could not see It is essential that the Dep- obtained.11 how the government of Scotland uty First Minister is kept fully could continue with Wallace in informed across the range of These efforts at intra-coalition har- charge, but in fact Jim has done a Executive business so that he mony helped to ensure discipline. very good job and has got a very can engage in any issue where he There were very few rebellions good press out of it and I think considers that appropriate. The over the years and only once did a that has to some extent solidified

60 Journal of Liberal History 83 Summer 2014 liberal democrats in coalition: the scottish record

the relationship between at least notably on constituency bounda- When the Liberal Democrats the Lib Dem and Labour mem- ries and House of Lords reform. were formed a quarter of a century bers of the Executive.13 In Scotland, Jim Wallace would ago, I cannot imagine that many not agree anything until there was people predicted that eleven out of Jim had to act twice more as First whole group sign off. Compromise our first twenty-five years would be Minister, on Dewar’s sudden death was sought on every issue. spent in government at a national in October 2000 and a year later In Scotland, the Liberal Demo- level. There are lessons from the when Henry McLeish resigned over crats governed at a time of eco- first eight years in Scotland which expenses mistakes. Jim deserves nomic prosperity. A generous might yet help restore the fortunes great credit for managing transi- budget and plenty Barnett For- of the party at UK level. tions to new First Ministers. It is mula consequentials to spend as worth considering whether such an we wished meant that there was Caron Lindsay joined the SDP on her arrangement could possibly take enough cash to satisfy both par- sixteenth birthday in 1983. Since then place at Westminster. Would Nick ties’ policy agendas. Lib Dem she has held various offices at local and Clegg be able to command a major- ministers at UK level were not national level. She is currently Treasurer ity of the House of Commons in so lucky. Taking office after the of the Scottish Liberal Democrats and a similar circumstances? banking collapse, under threat member of the Federal Executive. She is Wallace’s and Dewar’s personal of a sovereign debt crisis, in the also co-editor of Liberal Democrat Voice. friendship was vital both in estab- worst economic circumstances in lishing the executive and in its There is a eighty years, is significantly more 1 David Laws, 22 Days in May: The Birth ongoing work. Henry McLeish and challenging. Despite that, Lib- of the Lib Dem–Conservative Coalition Jack McConnell were less well dis- predisposi- eral Democrats have ensured tax (Biteback, 2010), pp. 63–4. posed towards Liberal Democrats, cuts for those on low and middle 2 http://www.instituteforgovernment. but Jim was able to establish effec- tion to trade incomes, free school meals and org.uk/events/5-days-may-inside- tive working relationships with extra money for disadvantaged coalition-negotiations (22 May 2013, both of them. It was the Liberal at Westmin- children in school. accessed 23 June 2013. Democrats who provided the sta- A major difference is that, 3 http://www.markpack.org.uk/4767/ bility, particularly in the early days ster, a ‘Tories because of PR, the Scottish people hung-parliaments (30 Sept. 2009, of the coalition. get the parliament they asked for. accessed 13 Jan 2014). In 2007, the coalition ended and can have x if If that had happened at Westmin- 4 http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_ the SNP formed a minority gov- ster, there would be 140 Liberal politics/344130.stm (14 May 1999, ernment. Their well-funded ‘It’s we can have Democrats – which would have accessed 20 June 2013 Time’ campaign compared well strengthened the Lib Dem hand in 5 Jim Wallace, Making a Difference – with Labour and the Liberal Demo- y’ approach, negotiations. It is to Lib Dem min- Scottish Liberal Democrats delivering crats. The latter had been too busy most nota- isters’ credit that they have man- their manifesto in government (2001) – governing to develop a narrative aged to fulfil so many key pledges published by Scottish Liberal Demo- that would resonate with the elec- bly on con- from that position. crats 2001 torate. The Liberal Democrats only There is still much that West- 6 Raising the Standard (published by lost one seat, but there were two stituency minster MPs can learn from those Scottish Liberal Democrats, April major barriers to forming a further who have been through it in Scot- 1999 ), p. 13. coalition with the SNP. Firstly, the boundaries land. Jim Wallace’s experience 7 http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Publi- parties did not have enough seats could be better used. cations/2006/06/29093046/5 Accessed between them to make a major- and House of 4 August 2014 ity. Secondly, Liberal Democrats 8 http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/scot- had insisted that they would never Lords reform. Conclusion land/618698.stm (25 Jan. 2000, agree to an independence referen- The Labour/Liberal Democrat accessed 24 June 2013. dum, which quickly proved a deal In Scotland, coalition proved three major 9 Local Authority Elections in Scotland breaker. things. Firstly, that two parties Results and Analysis (Electoral Reform Jim Wallace could work together at national Society, 2007), p. 11. Comparison with Westminster level. The two parties had a 10 http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Publi- The discipline in Scotland is not would not respectful and disciplined approach cations/2003/05/17150/21952 (15 May repeated at Westminster, with fre- and showed that coalition could 2003, accessed 23 June 2013 quent rebellions by both Conserva- agree any- succeed in providing stable gov- 11 Email to the author, 24 June 2013.] tive and Liberal Democrat MPs. It ernment. Secondly, the coalition 12 http://www.holyrood.com/2011/01/ is accepted that some people will thing until succeeded in enacting substantial, keeping-counsel/ (14 Jan. 2011, not support particular measures there was radical and lasting reform. And, accessed 13 Jan 2014). and ministers push ahead regard- finally, it proved that different 13 Andrew Russell and Edward Field- less. In Scotland there was much whole group systems could be in place in dif- house, Neither Left nor Right? The more emphasis on getting everyone ferent parts of the UK and the sky Liberal Democrats and the Electorate on the same page before legislation sign off. Com- would not fall in. Free personal (Manchester University Press, 2004), was agreed, which had the effect care, free university tuition, free p. 47. of keeping the individual party promise was eye and dental checks, robust free- groups together. dom of information legislation are There is a predisposition to trade sought on all examples of enduring reforms at Westminster, a ‘Tories can have which take a different approach x if we can have y’ approach, most every issue. than in England and Wales.

Journal of Liberal History 83 Summer 2014 61 TGohe Welshi nLibergal Democ inratt coaoliti Labouon experience 2000–2003r

The Cook-Maclennan Agreement reached Unlike in Scotland, the Labour Party in Wales between Labour and the Liberal Democrats was hostile to a coalition, and initially tried before the 1997 election included a to govern alone – only to enter coalition with commitment to establish directly elected the Welsh Liberal Democrats from 2000 to parliaments in Wales and Scotland. After a 2003. Russell Deacon tells the story, and closely-fight referendum campaign in 1997, reflects on the experience of working with the the Welsh Assembly came into being in 1999. Labour Party.

62 Journal of Liberal History 83 Summer 2014 TGohe Welshi nLibergal Democ inratt coaoliti Labouon experience 2000–2003r

rior to the Welsh Lab–Lib Labour just three AMs short of a the time being, the Welsh Liberal coalition in 2001, the Welsh majority. To an astute observer Democrats were able to settle into PLiberal Democrats – like the of British politics, it would have opposition without the rigours of Liberal Democrats across the UK seemed obvious that a coalition ministerial office and government – had little experience of govern- would therefore be the inevitable responsibility. ment. Welsh Lords Geraint How- result. This was what had happened ells and Emlyn Hooson had been in the Scottish Parliament, in most closely involved with the 1970s local councils and also at Westmin- The road to forming a Lab–Lib Westminster Lib–Lab pact but that ster in the past and would happen coalition had ended over two decades before again in the future. It was expected For reasons of both geography and both politicians were now of to be the case in 1999 by both and population, the Welsh politi- advancing years in the Lords and national party leaders, Tony Blair cal world is much smaller than that quite distant from the day-to-day and Paddy Ashdown.3 of England. Most people, how- politics of Wales. The reality in Wales was that ever, have no idea quite how small Of the six newly elected Lib- Labour did not want a coali- the Welsh political world can be eral Democrat Assembly Members tion, even though it did not have on occasions. This is an important (AMs), none had parliamentary a majority of Assembly seats. The point when it comes to understand- experience, although five had local concept of a coalition governing Welsh elections and coalitions. council experience1 (Kirsty Wil- ment was quite alien to its nature Prior to the Assembly elections liams being the exception with no because, unlike in Scotland, the both Michael German and Jenny previous elected experience outside Labour Party had held the major- Randerson were linked closely to of the party). Michael German had ity of Welsh parliamentary seats the Cardiff Central constituency, the most experience, being a for- since 1922. In the 1997 general elec- as both had gained their political mer deputy leader of Cardiff City tion they had secured 85 per cent experience within that constitu- Council in a Lab–Lib coalition in of the Welsh representation; the ency as Cardiff City councillors. the 1980s. Welsh Liberal Democrats, in con- They had both been group leaders On 27 May 1999 Queen Eliza- trast, had secured a mere 5 per cent. on the city council and both had beth II officially opened the Welsh Although Labour had only gained worked closely with future Labour Assembly. In the run up to the 47 per cent of the seats at the 1999 members of the Assembly Cabi- Assembly elections, the Welsh Lib- Welsh Assembly elections, this net whilst on the council (Rhodri eral Democrats had talked publicly sense of dominating Welsh politics Morgan, Alun Michael and Sue about gaining ten seats out of sixty; remained strong within the Labour Essex). German, Randerson and privately they believed would get Party. As proof of this, Labour’s Peter Black had also worked closely eight; they ended up with six. The First Secretary at the Assembly, with Andrew Davies (the Assem- electorate did not, in fact, give a Alun Michael, had chosen his bly’s Labour Business Manager) majority to any one party, let alone Assembly Cabinet as soon as the during the ‘Yes for Wales’ refer- the Welsh Liberal Democrats,2 election results were known. So endum campaign. As a result, the leaving the Assembly in a position despite Ashdown’s anger over what senior Liberal Democrat AMs had of no overall control. The numbers he saw as Blair’s squandering of the extensive experience of working were twenty-eight Labour AMs, chance to ‘play out the project on not simply with Labour but also seventeen Plaid Cymru AMs, nine Left: the Welsh another stage’,4 the Welsh Assem- with the very individuals who were Conservative AMs and six Welsh Assembly in bly Executive did not contain now sitting in the Welsh Assembly Liberal Democrat AMs – with session any Liberal Democrats. Thus, for Cabinet.

Journal of Liberal History 83 Summer 2014 63 going into labour: the welsh liberal democrat coalition experience, 2000–2003

After a short while, the Welsh overall control’, he would bring stabilise the situation, the half a bil- Liberal Democrats settled down in everyone on board equally. After lion pounds of ‘matched funding’ the Assembly and began to assert the Assembly election, Michael needed for Objective 1 were now themselves within the Welsh party, was keen to secure Welsh Liberal made available. The Welsh Liberal moving its centre of gravity away Democrat support in the event of Democrats had felt they achieved from the mid-Wales Liberal parlia- a vote of no confidence in him. He their first victory. They then joined mentary dominance of the previous did not, however, wish to concede the Labour Party in further secret half a century, towards other parts a formal coalition, with real influ- talks and shortly afterwards proof Wales. This power shift did not ence for the Liberal Democrats duced a draft partnership agree- take place without some resistance within the Assembly government; ment. It was not until a week before from the mid-Wales MPs, and com- and the Lib Dems had little enthu- the announcement of this Partner- munication between the Assembly siasm for a partnership on lesser ship Agreement that German and Members and the Welsh Lib Dem It was here grounds. Alun Michael himself was Morgan eventually sat in the same MPs and Lords was, for a while, that German consequently seen as a major obsta- room to thrash out the finer points quite strained with neither side con- cle to the formation of a Lib–Lab of the deal. The whole process had sulting the other about their plans was able to coalition and to the future of the been so secretive that the two par- or strategies.5 Whilst these internal Assembly itself, not only by Liberal ties felt that they could have walked squabbles were taking place, upon convince Democrats but also by many of his away at any stage without recrimi- the horizon arose the increasingly own Labour Assembly Members. nations.9 Reviewing the coalitions important issue known simply as conference The Welsh Liberal Democrats, in Wales and Scotland in 2004, the ‘Objective 1’, which would come to like the other opposition parties, academic Ben Seyd felt that the dominate Welsh politics and lead to representa- were not prepared to accept Alun Welsh coalition arrangement had an eventual coalition. Michael’s assertion that they could worked out better for both Labour tives that trust the Chancellor to deliver the and Liberal Democrats in Wales extra funding required in the Com- because it had been worked out The background to ‘Objective 1’ the Liberal prehensive Spending Review in over a much longer period than in In 1999 the West Wales and the Val- the summer of 2000. Thus, when Scotland.10 Part of the result of this leys region qualified for Objective Democrats an opportunity came for a vote of was that the coalition agreement 1 European Funding as its GDP was no confidence in Alun Michael, between the parties in Wales was less that 75 per cent of the EU aver- had got such the party joined the other oppo- more than twice the length of that age. Some £1.2 billion was made sition parties in supporting this in Scotland despite the fact that available to be drawn from EU a good deal vote. Michael was able to resign Wales had no primary law making structural funds, however around shortly before the vote was carried powers at this time. a further £860 million needed to in the coali- out against him, therefore avoid- Before the Welsh Liberal Demo- be contributed from British pub- tion arrange- ing having to do so afterwards. crats could officially go into coa- lic finances in order to secure this Prior to this event he had already lition they still needed to have funding. The consequence was that ments, lost the confidence of his own AMs a special conference and vote to the First Minister Alun Michael who declined to renominate him if endorse the coalition. This was was unable to guarantee that Wales getting he resigned, which meant that his duly done in Builth Wells on 14 would get this funding because the old political rival Rhodri Morgan October 2000. It was here that Ger- Chancellor of the Exchequer, Gor- some 114 of now became the new First Min- man was able to convince confer- don Brown, would not commit the ister and the coalition arrange- ence representatives that the Liberal New Labour government to any their poli- ments were back on the table. The Democrats had got such a good new spending.6 Welsh Assembly Business Manager deal in the coalition arrangements, cies imple- and Swansea West AM, Andrew getting some 114 of their policies Davies, had already privately met implemented,11 that when the con- The process of going into mented, that Michael German on behalf of the ference day arrived, members felt coalition majority of Labour AMs to seek an unable to resist the coalition and The Welsh Liberal Democrats when the assurance from him that the Liberal voted for it overwhelmingly. By had set out the mechanisms for Democrats would not back Alun comparing the Welsh Liberal Dem- going into coalition at their party’s conference Michael in a coalition arrange- ocrat Assembly manifesto with the autumn AGM in 1998 in Builth ment. This Davies–German meet- Partnership Agreement, it is easy to Wells, Powys.7 The mechanism was day arrived, ing helped ensure that the Welsh see why the special Liberal Demo- then referred to after that as the Liberal Democrats would no longer crat conference so comprehensively ‘Builth Motion’. This required any members back Michael, whatever compro- endorsed the coalition deal.12 So possible future cooperation with felt unable mises he offered.8 much of the Lib Dem manifesto other parties to be recognised as a With the removal of Michael had been incorporated that it was, formal partnership or coalition. to resist the secured, the Welsh Liberal Demo- arguably, a Welsh Liberal Demo- Prior to the Assembly elec- crat leadership expected things crat programme of government for tions, there had been two meet- coalition and to proceed more quickly, but it the next three years rather than a ings between Welsh Labour leader would be a while before Mor- Labour one. The lack of any sub- Alun Michael and Michael Ger- voted for it gan pushed for a coalition. Hav- stantial Labour policies, due in part man to discuss ‘what if?’ scenarios. ing initially rejected Morgan as a to interference in the Welsh mani- A Labour majority was assumed at overwhelm- Welsh Labour Party leader, Tony festo from London, allowed Welsh this point, but Alun Michael had Blair was now keen to see Mor- Labour AMs to give the first Welsh declared that, in the event of ‘no ingly. gan remain in power. In order to government more of the taste of

64 Journal of Liberal History 83 Summer 2014 going into labour: the welsh liberal democrat coalition experience, 2000–2003

Welsh distinctiveness they had then end of the coalition in May A compara- available for students in fur- desired when they had campaigned 2003. Nevertheless we should note ther as well as higher education, for the Welsh Assembly in the refer- that there has been some success tive study of freezing prescription charges endum two years before. This was in persuading the government in and free prescriptions for the reflected in the title of the partner- Westminster to continue to evolve the Scottish under-25s, free eye tests, class ship document signed by both lead- Welsh devolution through primary sizes under 26, widening the ers: Putting Wales First: A Partnership law-making and tax-raising pow- and Welsh entitlement to eye tests, free for the People of Wales. ers. The increase in the number of access to national museums, class In order to iron out areas of pol- Welsh Assembly Members and the coalitions of sizes coming down below 30 for icy where the two parties were not change in the voting system to STV this period all primary pupils: all of these in agreement, a number of commis- has not been pursued at Westmin- are claimed by Mr German as sions were established. These were: ster. These would benefit the Welsh … concluded specifically Liberal Democrat Liberal Democrats most but have achievements. To those in the The Rees Commission on student fees. never seemed to appear on the cur- that ‘the Labour Party who accuse him of The Welsh Liberal Democrats were rent Westminster coalition’s agenda. exaggerating his party’s influ- against fees, Welsh Labour for proportion ence, Mr German asserts that them. Unable to ditch tuition fees none of the changes listed above because the Assembly lacked pri- The coalition government’s of purely LD appeared in Labour’s manifesto.16 mary powers, another way had to success and failure be found around this issue.13 The Out of direct power for six decades, initiatives Professor Martin Laffin also under- result was the introduction of fund- the Welsh Liberals had made vir- took a comparative study of the ing to enable Welsh students to tually no impact on government (… not men- Scottish and Welsh coalitions of avoid paying tuition fees.14 policy in Wales until they were this period and concluded that part of the coalition government. tioned in the the proportion of purely LD ini- The Sunderland Commission on local Getting their 1999 Assembly mani- tiatives (… not mentioned in the government, festo implemented virtually in full Labour mani- Labour manifesto) in the Partner- which reported back in July 2002 therefore remains the Welsh Liberal ship Agreement, was even greater and recommended STV for Welsh Democrats’ greatest post-war policy festo) in the than Scotland.17 Adding to Ship- council elections. The report was triumph and their only substan- ton’s earlier list Laffin noted there quietly dropped after Labour tial political legacy as a state party. Partnership were a number of other significant became the sole party of govern- Their role in the 2010 Westminster policy achievements on the part of ment at the Welsh Assembly, in coalition was, in contrast, limited to Agreement, the coalition, which were:18 May 2003. just one junior minister at the Wales was even • a commitment to an inquiry Office, Baroness Randerson, whose into student hardship and The Richard Commission, appointment was only made in 2013 greater than funding; which examined the future role some three years after the UK coali- • free dental checks for over 55s and function of the Welsh Assem- tion government was formed. Scotland. and under-25s; bly. The Welsh Liberal Democrats The Welsh coalition had a num- • free school milk for infants; wished to see it recommend a pri- ber of benefits for the Welsh Liberal • three weeks’ free personal care mary law-making and tax-raising Democrats, the most important of for the elderly; legislature. When the Commission which was the breaking of the myth • an experimental Welsh reported back in April 2004, it rec- that they would never be in a posi- Baccalaureate; ommended that by the year 2011 or tion of power and therefore could • a new farming support sooner if possible, the Assembly:15 promise any policy because they package. 1 should have its delegated pow- would never have to implement Importantly, these policies were ers enhanced; it. The party was able to boost its in the Welsh Liberal Democrats’ 2 should be given primary law- credibility within Welsh civil and manifesto but none of these were in making powers; political society, as their previous Labour’s Welsh manifesto. In order 3 should have its membership minor role now became a central to help ensure that the policies were increased from sixty to eighty one. However, as we noted earlier, delivered the Welsh Liberal Demo- and all members should be it was actual policy implementation crats had regular Cabinet awaydays elected by STV; that the Welsh Liberal Democrats to review policy implementation.19 4 should be reconstituted with felt to be their central achievement. They were also aware that they a separate legislature and Martin Shipton, the Western Mail’s had to make sure that the elector- executive. chief political reporter, noted at the ate knew who was responsible for The Welsh Labour Party later time some of what the Welsh Lib- each policy in the coalition govern- rejected the third point totally, eral Democrats felt to be the policy ment. Therefore before the First accepted the fourth, ignored the successes of coalition: Minister’s second Annual Report first and allowed the second only in October 2002, Mike German, after a further referendum in 2011. Mr German … is adamant that much to Labour’s annoyance, was This was a major disappointment the six-strong Lib Dem group able to claim that six of the eight for the pro-devolution Welsh Lib- can legitimately claim credit leading achievements of the Assem- eral Democrats. In hindsight it was for the majority of the Assem- bly government that year had come also a tactical mistake not to ensure bly Government’s most trum- directly from the Liberal Democrat that the Commission’s recommen- peted successes. Reintroducing manifesto.20 As none of the policies dations were accepted in full before student grants, making them listed were in the Labour manifesto,

Journal of Liberal History 83 Summer 2014 65 going into labour: the welsh liberal democrat coalition experience, 2000–2003 it is unlikely that they would have the only post-war Welsh Liberal Having been Democrats later reflected sourly on been achieved by Labour alone to serve in two different coalition the failure to change the electoral within the Assembly. The issue of governments. At the time, how- the major- system for the Welsh Assembly and no tuition fees, later adopted as a ever, Randerson was left with the local government to STV and on central plank of Welsh Labour’s burdens of office. This left her open ity Welsh Labour’s subsequent tinkering with ‘clear red water’ with Westmin- to criticism – the Western Mail’s the AMS system to stop candidates ster, would certainly not have been chief political correspondent refer- party at standing both in constituencies and dealt with as it was, as both the ring to her as ‘a harassed council- on the regional list. This latter was Welsh and UK Labour Parties had lor out of depth’.23 This comment Westminster something that they were only able accepted this as policy. Labour’s aside, the situation did place a lot to reverse through the Westminster short manifesto for this first Assem- of pressure on just one person to since 1922, coalition government almost a dec- bly had consisted mainly of com- fulfil the Welsh party’s coalition however, ade later. mitments to invest more in public ambitions. While it is true that there were services and develop new strategies Another major negative about Labour did not the widespread anonymous on everything from tourism to the the coalition was the naivety of press briefings about splits within economy, but included no real tan- Liberal Democrats over the coali- not expect the coalition that later occurred gible steps towards achieving this tion’s various commission reports. when Labour went in coalition beyond merging some of the public The Lib Dems saw these reports as to share with Plaid Cymru, neither side bodies into bigger ones.21 instruments for delivering sweep- looked back on the experience Perhaps the biggest internal ing changes; whereas Labour saw power and with undiluted pleasure. In fact, disappointment during the Welsh them merely as reviews, which they such was the reluctance of the two Lib–Lab coalition of 2000–2003 could and would choose to ignore.24 there was parties to engage again that when concerned the personal prob- Academics reflecting on the Liberal the opportunity arose for another lems suffered by the party’s leader Democrats in coalition in Wales, widespread coalition, after the 2007 Welsh Michael German. In January 2001 such as Alan Trench, would later Assembly election, the Welsh Lib- the European anti-fraud organi- also see this as the party’s major resentment eral Democrats rejected a second sation began investigating finan- failing.25 coalition with Labour in favour cial problems within the European The final major negative was in the grass- of a ‘rainbow’ coalition with the Unit of the Welsh Joint Education that they agreed to a number of Conservatives and Plaid Cymru. Committee (WJEC). Michael Ger- policies, such as the reorganisation roots and In turn, Labour preferred to go man had been head of the unit for of Local Health Boards, which they directly into coalition with Plaid most of the 1990s. The WJEC was had not been fully committed to amongst Cymru and leave the Liberal Dem- run and operated by the Welsh but delivered as part of the coalition many Labour ocrats on the opposition benches. local authorities, the majority of agreement. When these policies Between 2000 and 2003 the ide- which were Labour-controlled and were later seen as mistakes, and the AMs and MPs ological differences between the bitterly opposed to the Lib–Lab party was in opposition once more, parties helped ensure that both par- coalition. The Labour Party mem- the Lib Dems were constrained at having ties could remain distinct to the bership had not been consulted over from criticising them because they electorate. The Welsh Labour Party the coalition and most, as we noted had been part of the government the ‘Liberal always regarded itself as socialist, earlier, saw this as a case of the ‘Lib- that had implemented them. and the Welsh Liberal Democrats, eral tail wagging the Labour dog’. tale wag the in contrast, saw themselves as cen- Whether or not the WJEC was trists. With decades of hostility in politically motivated in its inves- Reflections on working with Labour dog’. the council chambers of south and tigations, by May 2001 they had the Labour Party north Wales added into the mix, called in the police to examine The concept of a coalition at a the combination helped ensure that Michael German’s expenses whilst national level was new to both the two parties remained quite dis- he had worked there. The police Labour and the Welsh Liberal tinct. The fact that the Welsh coa- investigation eventually concluded Democrats. Whilst the Welsh Lib- lition government lasted for less that there was ‘insufficient evidence eral Democrats had realised for a than one four-year term also helped to proceed further’.22 The time long while that they would never ensure that the two parties kept taken to reach this decision, how- form a majority government in their distinctiveness. ever, was enough to keep German their own right, the same was not Unlike the Westminster elec- out of the Cabinet between July true of the Labour Party in Wales. tions, the date of the Welsh Assem- 2001 and June 2002. However their experience of pre- bly elections for 2003 was known In his place Jenny Randerson viously working together in local four years in advance. The prob- became Deputy First Minister – government did help both Labour lem for the Welsh party was that and the first female Liberal ever and Liberal Democrat AMs bond they did not know whether they to hold a government post in the more quickly. Having been the would be punished or rewarded UK. In the process this made her majority Welsh party at Westmin- for being in coalition with the the most powerful female Liberal ster since 1922, however, Labour Labour Party. In the run up to Democrat at a government level, did not expect to share power and the Iraq War, however, the Welsh arguably until this day. A decade there was widespread resentment in election was significantly over- later she was also to become the the grassroots and amongst many shadowed by international rather Parliamentary Under Secretary of Labour AMs and MPs at having than domestic issues. The coali- State for Wales in the Westminster the ‘Liberal tale wag the Labour tion in Wales – and the role of the coalition government, making her dog’. 26 In turn the Welsh Liberal Lib Dems – therefore made little

66 Journal of Liberal History 83 Summer 2014 going into labour: the welsh liberal democrat coalition experience, 2000–2003 impact on the electorate one way internal rows between the parties. Plaid Cymru rather than once more or another, and the party stayed There are, however, a few final with the Welsh Liberal Democrats. stuck on six Assembly Members, observations that may be worth Labour still nursed a sense of the and would remain so until 2011. recording. tail wagging the dog, while the This was partially due to the fact Whilst the Labour members Welsh Liberal Democrats wished to that Wales has a very weak national of the Welsh government worked avoid being aligned once more with media, which meant that many in well with the Welsh Liberal Demo- what they regarded as a reactionary the electorate were unaware of the crats, outside the Assembly hostili- party that had betrayed the prom- very fact that there was a coalition Whereas the ties remained constant. There was ises of electoral reform. government in Wales. For them no coming together of the parties’ the focus was still on Westminster, Welsh Lib- grassroots – quite the opposite. In Professor Russell Deacon is a lecturer which was the domain of Tony the 2004 Welsh council elections in History and Governance at Coleg Blair’s New Labour government. eral Demo- the Welsh Liberal Democrats made Gwent and an Honorary Research Fel- Then – as now – the Welsh Assem- crats had sweeping gains against Labour and low in the Department of History and bly elections played second fid- took control of a number of coun- Classics at Swansea University. He is dle to Westminster, with the main always seen cils including the Welsh capital, chair of the Lloyd George Society and Welsh parties being punished or Cardiff. There was therefore no also author of the recently published book rewarded by what happened there themselves desire to remind voters that the two The Welsh Liberals. rather than in Cardiff Bay. In 2003, had been in power together only after the election dust had settled as the poten- the year before. 1 Michael German (Cardiff City Labour had exactly half of the seats: Some decisions made in the coa- Council), Jenny Randerson (South thirty. Despite Rhodri Morgan tial power lition government had not been Glamorgan County Council), Chris- indicating before the election that truly supported by the Welsh Lib- tine Humphreys (Conwy County he needed a majority of two AMs brokers in eral Democrats and were to prove to Council), Peter Back (Swansea City to govern, he did not call the Welsh be costly disasters such as the reor- Council), Mick Bates (Powys County Liberal Democrats back into a coa- any Welsh ganisation of the health authorities. Council). lition. Just as his predecessor Alun In the 2003–7 Welsh Assembly the 2 Russell Deacon, The Welsh Liberals: Michael had done and his succes- Assembly party could not criticise these fail- The History of the Liberal and Liberal sor Carwyn Jones would later do, ures but the other opposition parties Democrat Parties in Wales (Welsh Aca- he preferred to govern without the govern- were able to do so. demic Press, 2014), p. 260. Liberal Democrats and as a minor- The Welsh Liberal Democrats 3 Paddy Ashdown, The Ashdown Dia- ity executive. ment, the were able to get vote-winning poli- ries, Vol. Two 1997–1999 (Allen Lane, After the coalition had ended cies through which appealed to 2002), pp. 452–453. the Welsh Liberal Democrat AMs reality did both the public and its own mem- 4 ‘The Project’ refers to the agree- at its heart were to have varied not match bership on areas such as free entry ment between Labour and the Liberal fortunes. Mike Bates AM left the into museums and on tuition fees. Democrats in 1997 at Westminster Assembly in 2011; Eleanor Burn- the expecta- They were not, however, any entitled Partnership For Britain’s ham lost her seat in the same elec- good at putting into effect policies Future. It led to a Joint Cabinet tion, having failed to re-secure her tions. Both that would have benefitted them Committee between both parties in position at the top of the North directly in the long term such as the early years of Tony Blair’s first Wales regional list. Peter Black AM Welsh Labour STV for Welsh local government New Labour government. remained in the Welsh Assembly or the Welsh Assembly elections or 5 Deacon, The Welsh Liberals, p. 271. and Kirsty Williams became the and Welsh increasing the number of Assem- 6 Welsh European Funding Office new Welsh leader in 2008. German bly members. Whereas the policy (2001) Objective 1 Guide 2001: The and Randerson were both to have Liberal Dem- successes were soon forgotten by essential guide to the Objective 1 Pro- further careers at Westminster in the electorate, the change in the gramme, Western Mail and Echo, the Lords, each having failed to get ocrats were electoral system and the increase in Cardiff. into the House of Commons when elected members would have done 7 Liberal Democrats Wales, Conference they had contested Cardiff Cen- so alienated much more to increase their for- Agenda (Liberal Democrats Wales, tral unsuccessfully against Labour tunes in the coming years by abol- 1998). Builth Wells. between 1983 and 1997. Neither by the expe- ishing the bias of the first past the 8 Lord Michael German to author 12 played a central role in the West- post electoral system. Oct. 2008 minster coalition despite both hav- rience that Whereas the Welsh Liberal 9 Deacon, The Welsh Liberals, p. 268. ing gained valuable ministerial Democrats had always seen them- 10 Ben Seyd, Coalition Governance in experience, although Randerson they shied selves as the potential power Scotland and Wales (UCL Constitution would later be called on to play a away from brokers in any Welsh Assembly Unit, 2004), p. 16. junior ministerial role. For some government, the reality did not 11 South Wales Argus, 6 Oct. 2000, p.7 reason the Welsh experience of coa- it when the match the expectations. Both stated 100; Michael German to the lition was not seen by the Federal Welsh Labour and Welsh Lib- author 11 Aug. 2004, stated that this leadership as being of much value in opportunity eral Democrats were so alienated eventually worked out at 114. a Westminster coalition. by the experience that they shied 12 Liberal Democrats Wales, Guar- The Welsh experience of a Lab– arose again away from it when the opportunity anteed Delivery: National Assembly Lib coalition may be entirely dif- arose again in 2007 and 2011. In the Manifesto (Liberal Democrats Wales, ferent from what is now occurring in 2007 and event, the Welsh Liberal Democrats 1999); Wales Labour Party, Working at the national Westminster level. dithered and Labour preferred to Hard for Wales, Labour’s Manifesto for There were certainly no damaging 2011. go with their old political enemies the National Assembly (Wales Labour

Journal of Liberal History 83 Summer 2014 67 A Liberal Democrat History Group fringe meeting great liberal thinkers: lessons for the future Baroness Liz Barker and MPs Alan Beith, David Laws and John Pugh draw lessons from past Liberal thinkers for the future direction of the Liberal Democrats. Chair: Malcolm Bruce MP; Twitter: #LDHGFringe. Marks the launch of a new History Group booklet on ‘Liberal Thinkers’, containing concise summaries of the lives and thoughts of the greatest Liberal thinkers, from John Milton to John Rawls, including John Stuart Mill, Tom Paine, L. T. Hobhouse and many more. See next issue for details

Speakers: Baroness Liz Barker, Alan Beith MP and John Pugh MP. Chair: Malcolm Bruce MP.

7.45pm, Sunday 5 October Picasso 2 Room, Campanile Hotel, 10 Tunnel Street, Glasgow G3 8HL (just outside the conference centre, and outside the secure area – no conference passes necessary)

Party, 1999). back again’, The Political Quar- earn-Labour-voters-rent-home- of Elections, Public Opinion & Par- 13 Martin Shipton, Poor Man’s terly, vol. 78, iss. 1 (Blackwell, Lib-Dems-better-educated- ties, 16/3 (2006), pp. 221–242. Parliament: Ten Years of the Welsh 2007), p. 160. Ukip-voters-white-retired.html 13 H. Clarke, D. Sanders, M. Stew- Assembly (Seren, 2011), p. 52. 23 Shipton Poor Man’s Parliament, 7 See: M. Kinnear, The British art and P. Whiteley, ‘Valence 14 Independent Investigation Group on p. 81. Voter (Batsford, 1968). Politics and Electoral Choice Student Hardship and Funding in 24 Ibid., pp. 54–55. 8 Russell and Fieldhouse, Neither in Britain 2010’, Journal of Elec- Wales (Welsh Assembly Govern- 25 Alan Trench, The Dynamics of Left Nor Right? tions, Public Opinion and Parties, 21 ment, 2001), p. 7. Devolution: The State of the Nations 9 E. Fieldhouse and D. Cutts, (2011), pp. 237–53. 15 Michael German, ‘Views from 2005 (The Constitution Unit, ‘The Liberal Democrats: steady 14 P. Ashdown, ‘Chard Speech’ Cardiff Bay’, in John Osmond Imprint Academics, 2005). progress or failure to seize the (1992), http://www.totalpolitics. (ed.), Welsh Politics Comes of Age 26 Russell Deacon Devolution in moment?’ in A. Geddes and J. com/speeches/liberal/liberal- Responses to the Richard Commis- Britain Today, 2nd edn (Manchester Tonge (eds.) Britain Decides: the politics-general/34753/chard- sion (Institute of Welsh Affairs, University Press, 2006), p. 171. UK General Election 2005 (Pal- speech.thtml 2005), p. 103. grave MacMillan, 2005), pp. 15 P. Dunleavy, ‘The Political Par- 16 Shipton, Poor Man’s Parliament, 82–3. ties’ in P. Dunleavy, A. Gamble p. 88. 10 D. Cutts, E. Fieldhouse and A. I. Holliday and G. Peele (eds.), 17 Martin Laffin,Coalition Forma- Russell, ‘The Campaign that Developments in British Politics, 4 tion and Centre–Periphery Relations Who votes for the Liberal Changed Everything and Still (Macmillan, 1993). in a National Political Party: The Democrats? Didn’t Matter? The Liberal 16 W. Miller, Electoral Dynamics Liberal Democrats in a Devolved concluded from page 55 Democrat Campaign and Per- (Macmillan, 1977); R. Johnston, Britain (ESRC, 2005), p. 27. formance’ in A. Geddes and J. and C. Pattie, ‘Class Dealign- 18 Ibid., p. 21. 5 Populus (2014), http://www. Tonge (eds.) Britain Votes 2010 ment and the Regional Polari- 19 Seyd, Coalition Governance, p. 16. populus.co.uk/wp-content/ (Oxford University Press, 2010). zation of Voting patterns in 20 Alys Thomas, ‘Liberal Demo- uploads/2014/03/OmOn- 11 See: D. Dorling, C. Rallings and great Britain, 1964–87’, Political crats’, in John Osmond and J. line_Vote_February_2014.pdf. M. Thrasher, ‘The Epidemiol- Geography, 11 (1992), pp. 73–86; Barry Jones (ed.), Birth of Welsh Accessed 25 Feb. 2014. ogy of the Liberal Democrat R. Johnston, C. Pattie, D. Dor- Democracy: The First Term of the 6 See also: ‘The secrets of the Vote’, Political Geography, 17/1 ling and D. Rossiter, From Votes National Assembly for Wales (Insti- ballot box: Tories earn the (1998), pp. 45–70; I. MacAllis- to Seats: the operation of the UK tute for Welsh Affairs and Welsh most, Labour voters rent ter, E. Fieldhouse and A. Rus- electoral system since 1945 (Man- Governance Centre, 2003), ch. their home, Lib Dems are sell, ‘Yellow Fever? The Political chester University Press, 2001). 12, p. 187. better-educated and almost Geography of Liberal Support’, 17 D. Sanders, H. Clarke, M. Stew- 21 Wales Labour Party, Working all Ukip voters are white and Political Geography, 21 (2002), pp. art, and P. Whiteley, ‘Simulat- Hard for Wales. retired’, Daily Mail, 3 Mar. 421–47. ing the Effects of the Alternative 22 Russell Deacon, ‘The Welsh 2014, http://www.dailymail. 12 D. Cutts, ‘Where we work we Vote in the 2010 UK General Liberal Democrats: From Gov- co.uk/news/article-2572187/ win: a case study of local Liberal Election’, Parliamentary Affairs, ernment to Opposition and then The-secrets-ballot-box-Tories- Democrat Campaigning’, Journal 64 (2011), pp. 5–23.