ReportNo. 8623-30 Bolivia UpdatingEconomic Memorandum

August30, 1990

Public Disclosure Authorized LatinAmerica and the CarinbeanRegion CountryOperations Division I CountrVDepartment IlI

FOR OFFICIALUSE ONLY Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized

Documentof theWorld Bank

Thisdocument has a restricteddistribution and may be usedby recipients Public Disclosure Authorized only in the performanceof their officialduties. Itscontents may not otherwise be disclosedwithout WorldBank authorization. Fiscal Year

Janaury 1 to December 31

Currency Eqauients

Currency Unit: Boliviano (Bs) Exchange Rate Effective July 31, 1989 US$1.00 Bs 3.17 Bs 1.00 US$0.32

Abbreviations

AASANA - Administracion de Aeropuertos y Servicios Auxiliares a la la Navegacion Aerea (Airport and Air Navigation Auxiliary Services Administration) LAB - Lloyd Aereo Boliviano (Bolivian Airline) CAF - Corporacion Andina de Fomento (Andean Development Corporation) COBEE - Boliviax.Power Company CONIBOL - Corporacion Minera de Bolivia (Bolivian Mining Corporation) CRA - Certificado Reintegracion Arancelaria (Customs Certificate) DINE - Direccion Nacional de Electricidad (Regulatory Authority for Power) ENDE - Empresa Nacional de Electricidad (State Electricity Company) ENFE - Empresa Nacional de Ferrocarriles (National Railways Corporation) ESAF - Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility ESF - Emergency Social Fund EXI - Export Import Bank of Japan IBRD - International Bank for Reconstruction and Development IDA - International Development Association IDB - Interamerican Development Bank IMF - International Monetary Fund IKBOPIA - Bolivian Institute of Small Industry and Artisans KFV - German Aid Agency LIBOR - London Interbank Offer Rate MACA - Ministerio de Asuntos Campesinos y Agropecuarios (Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs) NCS - North South Central (power grid) SAFCO - Sistema Integrado de Administracion Financiera y Control (Integrated System of Financial Administration and Controls) SIF - Social Investment Fund SISIN - Systema de Informacion y Seguimiento de la Inversion (Information System for Managing Investments) SsC - Servicio Nacional de Caminos (National Road Service) UDAPE - Unidad de Analysis Politico y Economico (Unit for Political and Economic Analysis) UNDP - United Nations Development Program UNICEF - United Nations International Childrun's Emergency Fund USAID - United States Agency for International Development YPFB - Yacimientos Petroliferos Fiscales Boliviaiios (Bolivian :etroleum Corporation) FoR omCLALUSE ONLY

This report is based on a mission in Pebruary 1990 by William Shaw, assisted by Juan Carlos Aguilar of the Bank's Resident Mission. Chapter II is based on reports and discussions with a number of contributors, including Robin Carruthers (transportation),Alvaro Covarrubias (power), Abderrahmane Negateli (hydrocarbons),Benjamin Friedman and Julio Linares (water), Julie Vandomelen (health), Dan Newlon (education),James Cock and Douglas Forno (agriculture),and Felix Remy (mining). Juan Carlos Aguilar provided a background paper on exports and public sector investment. Jamil Mubarak assisted in the production of tables and in preparation of the projections. Ms. Elena Rodriguez and Ms. Diana Cortijo coordinated the production of the report.

This document has a restricted distibution and may be uswdby reciPientsonly in the performance of their officialduties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosedwithout World Bnk authorization. BOLIVIA

UPDATINGECONOMIC MEMORANDUM

Table of Contents Page No.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS ...... i-vi

CHAPTERI: BACKGROUNDAND RECENT ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS ...... 1 A: Historical Background ...... 1 B: Recent Economic Developments ...... 4 C: Structural Policies ...... 7

CHAPTERII: MEDIUM-TERHPROSPECTS ...... 14 A: Introduction ...... 14 B: Fiscal and Monetary Policy ...... 14 C: Export Prospects ...... 21 D: The Bolivian Economy through 2000 ...... 30

CHAPTERIII: PUBLIC SECTORINVESTMENT REVIEW ...... 38 A: Investment Programming ...... 38 B: Transportation ...... 43 C: Agriculture ...... 48 D: Mining ...... 52 E: Hydrocarbons ...... 53 F: Power...... 56 G: Water ...... 59 H: Social Sectors .62

ANNEXI: Estimationof the Demand for Mney ...... 67 ANNEX II: StatisticalAppendix .69 ANNEX III: Public Sector InvestmentProgram ...... 88

MAP IBRD 16591

Tables

1.1 Macroeconomic Accounts .5...... S 1.2 Key EconomicVariablex, 1986-89 ...... 6 1.3 FinancialIndicators ...... 10 1.4 CommercialBank Portfolios...... 11 2.1 Financingof the Public Sector Deficit, 1989 ...... 16 2.2 NonfinancialPublic Sector Accounts ...... 17 2.3 Financingthe Public Sector 1990-2000 ...... 20 2.4 Export Receipts, 1987-89.22 2.5 Medium-Term Export Projections .25 2.6 Required Approvals for Export .28 2.7 Base Case Projections,1988-2000 ...... 31 2.8 Base Case Balance of Payments Projections ...... 32 2.9 Financing Investmant,1990-2000 ...... 34 2.10 Impact of the Brazil Scenario,1991-2000 ...... 36

3.1 QuestionableProjects ...... 4 . . 39 3.2 InvestmentProgram, 1987-92 ...... 41 Table of Contents--Cont'd

3.3 Road ConstructionProjects ...... 45 3.4 1990 ProgrammedInvestments in the Health Sector ...... 63

2.1 Base Case Projections ...... 19a 2.2 Impact of Non-InterestDeficit of 1.31 of GDP ...... 19a - i -

SUMKARYAND CONCLUSIONS

1. The Bolivianeconomy has begun to recover from the hyperinflationarycrisis of the early 1980s, when politicalinstability, a crushing debt burden, extensivecontrols on economicactivity, a huge and inefficientpublic sector, and erraticmacroeconomic management severely reduced output and living standards. The Governmentof Paz Estenssoro restoredprice stabilityby increasingpublic sector prices, raising revenues, and imposing tight controls on expendituresand Central Bank credit. At the same time, the Government initiateda comprehensiveliberalization of markets, includingan eliminationof most quantitativetrade restrictionsand reduction of tariff rates, eliminationof controlson interest rates and on foreign currency transactions,removal of price controls,setting up of an auction system to determinethe exchange rate and a reductionof state interventionin private sector wage and employmentdecisions. The Gover.anentsustained the program in the face of the collapse in the price of tin in 1985 and continued difficultiescaused by delays in payment by Argentinafor Bolivian gas shipments.

2. Despite the remarkableachievements of the former administration, the Paz Zamora Governmentfaced a difficultfinancial situation on taking office in August 1989. Uncertaintyover the outcome of the electoralprocess had reducedbank deposits and reserves,and slowness in adjustingpublic sector prices and the exchange rate, plus the arrears in Argentina'spayments for Bolivian gas shipments,had led to some deteriorationin fiscal performance. The Governmenttook decisive actions to raise public sector prices, depreciatethe boliviano and reject demands for unrealisticincreases in public sectorwages. These measures,along with Supreme Decree 22407 which confirmedthe Government'scommitment to the present structureof economic incentives,encouraged a recovery of public confidence. The new Government also made substantialprogress in its negotiationswith the international financialcommunity, including agreement with the IMF over the second year of the Enhanced StructuralAdjustment Facility, elimination of Bolivia'sdebt to Argentina in return for cancellingArgentina's arrears on gas payments, achievementof furtherprogress in retiringBolivia's commercial bank debt, establishmentof a new mechanism for retiring a portion of Bolivia'sdebt with Brazil and the receipt of a highly-concessionaldebt reschedulingagreement from the Paris Club, includingthe so-calledToronto terms.

3. While the Governmenthas maintainedits commitmentto stabilityand the basic structureof incentives,the agenda for policy reform remains long. Proposed revisionsto the laws governinginvestment need to be adopted to encourageprivate sector investment. The proposed investmentcode would guaranteestable rules of the game for private investment,ensure equal treatmentof domesticand foreign investors,prohibit restrictionson profit repatriation,and simplifyprocedures for registrationof foreign investors. - il -

While many of these provisionsare already in force, the investmentcode would provide more assuranceof stabilityin the policy regime,thus encouraging increasedinvestment. The investmentcode was approvedby the Deputies during the last sessionof Congress,but still must pass the Senate.

4. Monopolizationof promising reservesby relativelyinefficient public sector companieshas stifledprivate investmentin mining and hydrocarbons. The proposedmining and hydrocarbonscodes would provide legislativesanction for joint venturesbetween COMIBOL and YPFB and the private sector,which is essentialfor the efficientdevelopment of Bolivia's natural resources. The hydrocarbonscode also would expand the areas eligible for private sector exploitationand eliminatethe restrictionon private sector ownershipof oil and gas pipelines. The mining code would authorizean optional tax regime that is consistentwith tax policy in the home countries of most multinationalenterprises. Taxes paid by multinationalsunder the present regalia system can not be deducted from their tax liabilityin home countries,placing Bolivia at a significantcompetitive disadvantage with other countries.

5. Some progresshas been made i7 improving public sector administration. Adoption of the SAPCOJ law was an essentialstep towards establishinguniform procedures for public sector accountingthat would enable the central administrationto controlexpenditures more effectively. The SAFCO law also clearly defines responsibilitiesfor public sector financial management and provides for the independenceof the Central Bank, a prerequisiteto a rationaland effectivemonetary policy. Furtherwork on a number of administrativeimprovements is necessary,including simplification of bureaucraticapprovals (particularlyfor exports) and implementationof the public sector managementprogram to establisha key group of adequately compensatedpublic servants. Greater efforts to improve the living stmtdards of the most vulnerablegroups are a prerequisiteto both economic development and a more equitable society. The Governmentcan progress towards this goal by raising the efficiencyof public sector expendituresin tne social sectors and reallocatingsubsidies which presentlybenefit the middle and upper classes.

6. The Bolivian financial system remains extremelyfragile. Interest rates greatlyexceed internationallevels, banks are heavily dependenton short-termdollar depositsand many banks are undercapitalizedand hold a large volume of nonperformingassets. Over time, maintenanceof the present incentivesstructure should increase confidenceand permit some easing of interest rates, while economic recovery should strengthenbank portfolios.

/ SAFCO stands for Sistema Integradode AdministracionFinanciera y Control, and refers to the system adopted by the Bolivian Governmentto improve control of expenditures. - iii -

Still, substantialrisk of instabilityremains in the system. The Government must continue the successfuleffort to improvesupervision of the banking system. Impositionof strict capital adequacy standardsand stronger provisioningrequirements are essentialto discourageexcessive risk-taking and improve the efficiencyof credit allocation. Cessationof lendingby the public banks directly to the nonfinancialprivate sector is necessaryto avoid further losses and increase relianceon the private sector for allocating credit. This implies closure or privatizationof the Banco Agricola and the Banco Minero, and restrictingthe activitiesof the Banco del Estado to serving the public sector. Finally, interestrates on developmentcredit intermediatedby the Central Bank should be raised to market levels in order to ensure appropriatepricing of credit.

7. The supply of public goods essentialfor sustainedgrowth is too low in Bolivia. Transportinfrastructure is inadequateand unreliable,many areas remain unserved by power and communications networks, the educational system is wasteful and ineffective, and poor water, sanitation, and health services result in alarminglyhigh rates of sicknessand death. Thus, continueddevelopment wi'' require a level of public sector expenditures sufficientto raise the supply of public goods. However, the Government's ability to spend is limitedby the availabilityof non-inflationaryfinance. A key question for macroeconomicpolicy is how the expendituresessential to developmentcan be financedwithout excessivelevels of debt or money issuance.

8. To address this question,a consistencyframework for the financial position of the consolidatedpublic sector (includingthe general government, state enterprisesand the Central Bank) is presented. This frameworkshows that the primary deficit (deficitexcluding interestpayments) must be reduced from 1.32 of GDP in 1989 to near zero in the medium term, in order to avoid a rise in domestic debt and ensure that the private sector receives sufficient resourcesto supportprojected levels of investment. To achieve the required decrease in the primary deficit, it will be necessaryto increasetax revenues throughmore rigorous enforcementand to limit the rate of increase in overall expendituresto slightly below the rate of increaseof GDP. This constraint on total public sector expenditurescan be made consistentwith providingthe public goods essentialto developmentby% a) reducingcurrent expendituresto permit a more rapid increase in investment;b) reducing the high level of waste in selected categoriesof current expendituresand reallocatingthese funds to more effectiveuses; and c) eliminatinginefficient public sector investmentsnow being consideredand using the savings in more productive investments. Suggestionsfor improvementsin public sector investmentsare provided below.

9. Export growth and diversificationare essentialto Bolivian development. Export performanceimproved markedly in 1989, as revenues from nontraditionalexports nearly doubledand private sector mining increased strongly. Strong export growth was due to maintenanceof low inflationand - iv -

the liberal incentivesstructure, a rise in the real exchange rate,V introductionof export incentivesfor nontraditionalexports and some improvementsin transportinfrastructure. Prospects for Bolivian exports appear bright. Substantialinvestment in non-tin private sector mining is now underway with significantparticipation by foreign firms, which should help to sustainminerals exports for years to come. Exports of a variety of nontraditionalproducts (e.g. soya, coffee, sugar and perhaps processed skins) should continue to rise.

10. Realizationof Bolivia'sexport potentialwill require continued commitmentto the macroeconomicframework, adoption of the revisionsto laws governinginvestment discussed above, maintenanceof an appropriateexchange rate, improvementsin transportinfrastructure and power, and eliminationof unnecessaryand time-consumingbureaucratic requirementswhich restrict export growth. Presently,firms must receive several approvals,all of which require time and provide opportunitiesfor corruption,from differentoffices to export goods. Proposa'lswhich should be consideredare eliminationof the requirementthat foreign exchange earningsbe depositedin the Central Bank and consolidationof all approvalsand registriesin a single office,with a system of compensation(for the relevantofficials) designed to provide incentives for speedy approvals.

11. Bolivia faces a difficultfuture, in which ensuring continued developmentwill require courageousand far-sightedeconomic policy. The base case projectionsshow the domesticpolicies and internationalassistance required for an average growth rate of 42, a moderate rise in per capita consumptionand reduced dependenceon external capital flows. To financethe investmentnecessary under this scenario,the countrymust achievea rise in domestic savings from 9X of GDP in 1989 to 15? by the year 2000, receive continuedassistance from officialcreditors (albeitat a declining level relative to output), attract higher levels of private capital inflows and negotiate generous levels of debt servicerelief, equivalentto 2.5? of GDP per year over the next ten years. The potential for achievinghigher rates of growth through the proposed project to sell gas-producedelectricity to Brazil should also be explored. This project is technicallyfeasible and would, if successful,raise governmentrevenues, investment and growth rates. The project would also carry a substantialrisk, however, as Boliviawould have to borrow about US$570 million at nonconcessionalterms to finance it. Some insuranceshould be obtained through increasedequity participationby the pr4.vate sector and arrangementsto reduce Bolivia'sdebt service obligations in case of failure of the project.

2/ The Latin American Region defines the exchange rate as units of domestic currency per unit of foreign currency. Therefore,an increase in the exchange rate implies a depreciationof the boliviano (prior to January 1987, the Bolivianpeso). 12. The base case projectionsshow a vision of the future under which Bolivia can achieve a substantialincrease in per capita output, reduce debt and debt service relative to economic activity,and achieve the rise in the capital stock which would serve as a basis for higher growth in the future. But the rise in domestic savingsnecessary to attain these resultsmeans that per capita consumptionmust improveonly slowly from current, depressed levels. Limiting consumptiongrowth today to permit faster growth in the future will present an enormous challengeto the Bolivian Governmentand society. This observationunderlines the importanceof transparencyand credibilityof economic policy. The Government'scommitment to macroeconomic stability,an appropriateframework of incentivesand social justicemust be obvious and convincing. Any deviationfr:om effective policies can have serious implicationsfor the whole economicprogram. Wasteful investment expenditures,failure to push through legislationwhich would encourage private sector investmentand lack of implementationof necessaryimprovements in public sector administrationall impair the effectivenessof economic policy and help to underminepublic confidence. The Bolivian Governmenthas accumulatedenormous good will both domesticallyand internationallyfor the effectivenessof its adjustmentprogram, but this report shows evidence of difficultiesin policy implementationin all of these areas. Decisive measures are now essentialto ensure sustaineddevelopment

13. The severe constraintsimpeding Bolivian developmenthighlight the importanceof ensuring that public sector investmentexpenditures are made in the most efficientmanner possible. The Governmenthas continuedand strengthenedthe improvementsin public sector investmentprogramming begun under the previous administration. The Ministry of Planning is expandingthe SISIN3 computer system to includephysical indicatorsof progress and an economic evaluationof investmentprojects. Selectionand evaluationof investmentprojects at the sectoral level remain weak, however. Many sectors lack the financial,administrative, and technicalresources necessary to evaluate or propose investmentprojects. In some sectors, the agencies responsibledo not have sufficientinformation on investment,and project selection is largely determinedby donors, leadingto a lack of coherencein investmentplanning, inadequatesupervision of projects,and poor coordination among projects, In other sectors,agencies may have detailed investmentplans and sufficienttechnical expertise, but the sharingof informationwith the centralministries is limited. Weaknessesin managementof investmentat the sector level severely impair the effectivenessof investmentprogramming by the centralministries, which depend on the quality of data providedby the sectors.

3/ Sistema de Informaciony Seguimientode la Inversion,a repositoryof financialinformation on investmentprojects. - vi -

14. Improvementsin the selectionof projects for the public sector investmentprogram are necessary. The Governmentis consideringa few projects which either are too expensiveor would involve the state in productive activitiesbetter left to the private sector. Examples include constructionof the Misicuniwater project in Cochabamba,a huge, excessively expensive,and unnecessarysolution to the area's water supply problems; developmentof a large agroindustrialproject in Villamontes;building of expensivenew terminalsfor the Cochabambaand La Paz airports;and constructioncf new hospitalswhen the Ministry of Health is not able to staff the present facilities. We urge the Governmentand interesteddonors to eliminatethese projects and reallocatethe funds to more efficientand higher-priorityareas. Bolivia can ill-affordto waste its limited financial resources,or devote scarce technicaland managerialpersonnel to unnecessary projects. There are many useful opportunitiesfor increasinginvestment expendituresfor which funds are not available,particularly basic health care projects, improvements in the road network, power projects consistent with the least-costexpansion plan, and water supply and sewerage projects. CHAPTERIs BACKGROUNDAND RECENTECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS

A. HistoricalBackaround

1. The 1952 Revolutionand the Role of the State. The 1952 revolution,in which armed civiliansdefeated an attempt by the army to annul the results of the recent election,brought to power the Movimiento NacionalistaRevolucionario under the presidencyof Victor Paz Estenssoro. This party was dedicatedto destroyingthe power of the mining families and landowningelites, -xhich had dominatedBolivian politicallife since independence. A new electorallaw provided for universaladult suffrage,thus increasingthe electoratefrom 10X to 100X of the adult population. An agrarian reform broke up the large estates in the western part of the country and gave the land to those working on it. The larger mines were nationalized under the managementof the state-ownedBolivian Mining Corporation(COMIBOL). These measures held the promise of a significantredistribution of income and a more equal distributionof politicalpower, as well as a large increase in the role of the state in the economy.

2. SubsequentGovernments steadily increasedthe share of the economy controlledby the public sector. In the 30 years following1952, the state set up numerous productiveenterprises and accountedfor over two-thirdsof total investment. At the same time, private sector activitieswere largely conditionedby Governmentdecisions, through subsidizedcredit programs directed at particularsectors, an extremelycomplex and protectivesystem of tariffs and quotas, allocationof scarce foreign exchange,and marketing boards and price controls for most agriculturalcommodities. State direction of economic activity resulted in an extremelyinefficient structure of productionand a continuedneglect of essentialinfrastructure and social services. The state's emphasis on the productionof private goods (goods that could be produced efficientlyby the private sector) led to a neglect of public goods. Productiveenterprises had a source of income independentfrom the budget, and powerfulunions of state enterpriseemployees were able to capture additionalfunds from the Treasury. The productiveenterprises thus absorbed the lion's share of public resources,while servicesnormally provided by Governmentlanguished for lack of funds.

3. The Economic Crisis. The problems inherent in this strategy of developmentwere masked during the 1960s and 19708 by a high rate of investmentfinanced by foreign aid, increasedinflows of direct investmentin the petroleum sector, terms of trade gains owing to strong commodityprices, and the discoveryof sizeablepetroleum and gas depositswhich made the country an attractivecliert for foreignlenders. However, towards the end of the 1970s it was apparent that many of the investmentsfinanced by foreign loans at commercialterms were poorly conceived,reflected distorted prices, and/or resulted from politicalpressures. A significantportion of foreign borrowingended up as capital flight. Thus Bolivia built up a huge debt burden during the 1970s, without achievingthe increase in productivecapacity necessary to service the debt. By 1980, politicalinstability and concerns over economic performanceled to a drying up of foreign ioans,which together with the rise in real interestrates on the outstandingdebt forced a severe cut in imports. The fall in importscaused productionbottlenecks, - 2 - contributingto the decline in output and fueling inflation. A severe drought in the Altiplano in 1982-83 and floods in the lowlands in 1983 further reduced output.

4. While reduced external savings initiatedthe crisis, its severity .. length were caused by disastrouseconomic management, particularly an overvaluedofficial exchange rate and a huge public sector deficit financedby money creation. Despite the sharp fall in external finance,political instabilityand social conflictprevented a sufficientcut in expenditures, which were increasinglyfinanced through issuingmoney and building up arrears to domestic and foreign creditors. At the same time, the overvaluedexchange rate and decliningtin prices reducedthe export receipts on which the Governmentdepended for substantialrevenues. As revenues declined,the Governmentissued more money to cover its bills, and inflationaccelerated. Competitionover wage increasesintensified. Real money holdings dropped substantiallyas the public sought to protect the real value of their assets, a process given impetus by the forced conversionof dollar deposits into pesos at the overvaluedcfficial rate. The shrinkingof the monetary base in turn required an acceleratingrate of money creationto finance Government expenditures,while rising inflationsharply reduced the rial value of tax revenues. Inflationreached 28,000% (at an annual rate) in the first 9 months of 1985.

5. Hyperinflationhad a disastrousimpact on the economy. Inflation is a regressivetax paid by the poor and poorly organized,who lack the power to protect the real value of their incomes. Forced savingsthrough the inflationtax and increasesin arrears reducedthe resourcesavailable for private investment,while chaotic economic conditionsmade investment extremelyunattractive. The decline in economic activityas a result of the crisis is difficultto determine. Official estimatesshow a fall in real GDP of over 102 from 1980 to 1985, 242 in per capita terms. Per capita consumptionis estimatedto have droppedby a total of 16? over the period. Private fixed investmentaveraged about 3? of GDP in 1983-85,compared to over 72 in 1980. These figuresmay overstatethe decline in output, as price controls and the overvaluedexchange rate greatly encouragedthe conduct of economic activity through unrecordedchannels, while the illegalcocaine trade also increasedduring the 1980s. However, the trends of a deteriorating economy and falling consumptionare probably an accurate representationof Bolivia'sexperience.

6. The 1985 Stabilization. The new Governmentwhich took power in August of 1985 (headedby Dr. Paz Estenssoro,also presidentduring the 1950s and 1960s) viewed the perilous state nf the economy as an indictmentof the developmentmodel pursued since the 1952 revolution,and moved quickly to stabilizethe economy and reduce the role of the state. A massive devaluation of the exchange rate, increasesin public sector prices, and reductionsin Governmentexpenditures to the level financeableby availablefunds lowered the deficit on a cash basis to almost zero. Inflationhalted within two weeks of the announcementof the program; the consumer price index actually declined on average in October 1985. 7. In conjunctionwith the stabilizationprogram, the Government instituteda far-reaching liberalizationof markets to increasereliance on the price system for the allocationof resourcesand encouragegreater private sector participationin the economy. Price controls and marketing boards were virtuallj eliminated. Public sector prices were raised using neighboring countries'prices as guidelines. An auction system was establishedto determinethe exchange rate, taxes and commissionson foreign exchange transactionswere eliminated,and capital controlswere abolished. Quantitativerestrictions and export licensingrequirements were eliminated, with the exceptionof controls on wheat and sugar, and import tariffswere reduced and simplified. The Governmentinstituted a major reform of the financialsystem which abolishedcontrols on interestrates and other restrictions,reorganized the Central Bank to strengthenits traditional functionsof monetary control, and improvedbanking supervisionand the soundnessof the banking system. Restrictionson the hiring and firing of employeeswere eased and private sector wages were to be set in negotiations at the level of individualfirms. Public sector employmentwas reduced,and effortsbegun to improve the efficiencyof public sector administration.

8. The EconomyAfter Stabilization. The first year followingthe end of the hyperinflationwas extremelydifficult. GDP declined by 2.9% in 1986 and unemploymentrose. The principalreason was the collapse of tin prices in late 1985, which led to a massive layoff of tin miners and a sharp fall in Governmentrevenues, requiring even more restrictivepolicies to limit the budget deficit. The abrupt liberalizationof economic policies also may have reduced output in the short run. During the hyperinflation,the bulk of productionin the formal sector of the economy occurred in industriesowned or subsidizedby the state. The liberalizationdisrupted these activitiesby revampingthe tariff structure,raising the prices of public sector goods, eliminatingthe opportunitiesfor profit involvedin the dual exchange rate system, and reducing subsidizedcredit. Over time, greater relianceon the market should lead to a more efficientstructure of productionand to higher growth. Still, it takes time for the private sector to recover from the loss of state protectionand undertakenew productiveactivities in response to the new system of incentives.

9. Higher growth also requiresincreased investment, and initiallythe experienceof the hyperinflationand the many failed stabilizationattempts was far too fresh to encouragea sharp reboundin entrepreneurialactivity. Uncertaintyover the stabilityof the new policy regime also hampered the supply of investmentfunds. While a significantrepatriation of assets held abroad did occur in response to the stabilization,the risk premiumnecessary to obtain funds, even at very short maturities,was extremelyhigh. The real interestrate on peso-denominatedloans equalled522 at end-1986,and dollar deposits in Bolivian banks earned 15%, or about 8 percentagepoints above the return availablein the internationalmarket.

10. From 1986-88GDP increasedby 2.5X a year, less than the rise in populationbut a dramatic improvementover the early 1980s. Relativelyslow growth was due to a number of factors. Confidenceimproved only slowly,which maintainedinterest rates at high levels and limitedthe availabilityof long- term credit. Falls in natural gas prices and frequent interruptionsin - 4 - payment by Argentina for Boliviangas shipmentsreduced reservesand kept the public sector accounts in a state of crisis. A severe drought reduced agriculturalproduction in the altiplano. The Governmentmaintained a fairly tight grip on inflation;consumer prices increaseeby 162 a year from end-1986 to end-1988.

B. Recent EconomicDevelopments

11. National Income Accounts. Preliminarydata show that GDP may have increasedby 2.72 in 1989, but the large share of unrecordedtransactions in the economy raises doubts concerningthe reliabilityof this figure and makes it difficultto analyze the determinantsof GDP growth. The availabledata show substantialinconsistencies among the trade, balance of payments,and national accounts. For example, accordingto official trade statisticsthe current account deficit declined sharply in 1989 compared to 1988. due to a large decrease in imports. However, recordedcapital inflows (including reserves)in 1989 were only slightly smallerthan in 1988, implyingonly a small improvementin the currentaccount deficit. Further, the drop in the trade deficit in the official statistics,coupled with the estimatedrise in investmentand slow GDP growth,would imply that consumption(the residual in the national income accounts)fell in absoluteterms. This does not appear probable. Most likely, the fall in importsand the rise in investmentare both overstated,so that consumptionactually increasedslightly, which still implies a 22 fall in per capita terms.

12. Table 1.1 shows the picture of the economywhich emerges by adjustingthe official statisticsto impose consistencyamong the accounts, and assuming that the fall in per capita consumptionwas moderate. Private investmentmay have increased,but public sector investmentfell from US$352 million in 1988 to US$341 million in 1989. Lack of improvementin public sector investmentwas due to lower than expected disbursementsfrom official donors. Total investmentremained only slightlyabove 12? of GDP. A 22? increase in the volume of exports (see discussionof exports in 1989 below), coupledwith a small terms of trade improvementmaintained import growth in the face of the decline in external finance. Table 1.1t Macroeconomic Accounts

1986 1987 1988 1989

PercentageChange at Constant Prices

GDP -2.9 2.1 2.8 2.7 Investmentla -34.3 48.1 2.0 4.6 Exports 16.1 -3.0 10.8 21.7 Imports -2.3 8.3 -13.9 8.7 Consumptionper Capita -7.9 0.0 -3.8 -2.1

Percentageof GDP at Current Prices

Current Account Deficit 10.6 12.1 9.8 8.8 National Savings -2.7 -1.0 1.9 3.4 Investment/a 7.9 11.1 11.9 12.2 Public 4.9 6.4 8.2 7.2 Private 4.6 3.9 5.3 5.2 Change in Stocks -1.6 0.8 -1.6 -0.2 ia Includes change in stocks.

Sources: National Instituteof Statisticsand IMF

13. Fiscal and Monetary Policy. Despite the remarkableachievements of the Paz Estensooroadministration, the new Paz Zamora Governmentfaced a difficult financialsituation on taking power in August. Problems in controllingGovernment expenditures and some slowdown in revenueswere evident in the first half of the year, particularlydue to the failureto adjust public sector prices and the build-up of arrears on Argentina'spayments for Bolivian gas shipments. Further,uncertainty over choice of the new Governmentled to a sharp decline in bank deposits,a drop in international reserves,and a growing divergencebetween official and parallel exchange rates. The Governmentmoved immediatelyon taking office to resolve the growing financialcrisis. Increasesin public sector prices and a more rapid depreciationof the bolivianoboosted revenues. Public confidencereturned, bank deposits increased sharply,and internationalreserves recovered.

14. Success in controllingpublic sectorwages was mixed. Wage rates increasedby less than the inflationrate, despite demands for higher wages supportedby strikes and considerablepublic unrest towards the end of the year. However, these data may not adequatelyreflect reported increasesin bonuses and non-wage payments. There appear to have been significant increasesin employment in the public enterprises,and there is some evidence that the wage bill of the nonfinancialpublic sector increasedin the fourth quarter (after taking into account seasonalfactors). This increasecould - 6 - imply difficultiesin 1990 if future increasesin wage levels are based on the fourth quarter level. However, the Governmenthas taken steps to controlwage increases (particularlyin Social Security)and reduce employmentin the central administration.

15. The increase in public sector prices and more rapid depreciationof the bolivianocontributed to a rise in inflationto 30? (at an annual rate) in the second half of 1989. Initially,many firms increasedprices by much more than requiredby the impact of higher energy prices on costs, perhaps reflectingfears of a renewed inflationaryspiral. By the end of the year, when prices continuedto rise by 22 a month, there was some concern that the new Government'smore aggressiveexchange rate policy would have too high an inflationarycost. Fortunately,inflation moderated in the first half of 1990.

Table 1.2: Key EconomicVariables. 1986-89 (percentagechange)

1986 1987 1988 1989

Real Exchange Rate la 239.8 3.8 5.1 4.5 Real InterestRate /b 18.8 22.0 17.9 16.1 Consumer Prices 276.3 14.6 16.0 14.3 Terms of Trade -32.8 -9.1 -14.6 1.2

/a Real effectiveexchange rate calculatedby the IMF. /b Average interest rate on bank lending,deflated by change in the consumerprice index.

Sources: IMF, Banco Central de Bolivia,National Instituteof Statistics

16. Debt Negotiations. Bolivia achieved considerablesuccess in reducing its debt burden last year. An agreementwith Argentinaextinguished US$697 million in Bolivia'slong-term debt to Argentina,along with US$107 million in short-termarrears. In return,Bolivia renouncedclaims to US$328 million of Argentina'sarrears in payments for gas shipments. Bolivia concluded an agreementwith Brazil which establisheda menu of options for retiring Bolivia'sarrears and for paying future debt service. In accordance with this agreement,Bolivia retired its US$140 million of arrears through purchasingBrazilian debt (at an averagediscount of 74Z) in the secondary market and swapping this debt for Bolivia'sobligations to Brazil. Further negotiationsstill will be necessaryto settle the remainderof the debt. Progress also was made in retiringcommercial bank debt. Bolivia'sdebt to the commercialbanks stood at US$683 million in 1987, of which US$253 million was retired through the buyback operationthat ended in 1988. Bolivia also has swappedUS$204 million for investmentbonds and receivedUS$16 million as a donation,leaving a total of about US$210 million remaining. Further retirementof debt will depend on the willingnessof commercialbanks to offer the remainingdebt. Finally, the Paris Club granted Bolivia the concessional debt relief terms proposed at the Toronto summit, reschedulingUS$288 million due in 1990-91.

17. Altogether,these agreementshave had a substantialimpact on easing Bolivia'sdebt burden. Debt stood at 99% of GDP in 1988, and declined to 79% of GDP in 1989, despite net long-termborrowing of 6.5Z of GDP. We estimate that the Argentina and Paris Club agreementswill reduce debt serviceby about US$241 million in 1990 (comparedto scheduledpayments in the absence of these agreements),or 5X of GDP. Still, debt citstandingis projectedto equal 782 of GDP by end-1990,and debt service owed 441 of exports.

C. StructuralPolicies

18. Overview. The Governmentof Paz Zamora has maintained the basic commitmentto macroeconomicstability and minimal state interferencein market decisions initiatedby the previousGovernment. The agenda for reform remains considerable,however. The investmentcode should be adoptedby Congress to ensure equal treatmentbetween domestic and foreign investorsand simplify registrationrequirements. The laws governinghydrocarbons and mining investmentshould be revisedto provide for joint ventures between the public and private sectors,adopt a more efficienttax regime, and permit greater private sector participationin the exploitationof Bolivia'snatural resources. Work must progress on the privatizationprogram, to reduce actual and potential drains on public sector revenuesand improve efficiency. Much remains to be done to simplifyadministrative procedures, reduce the steps necessary for export approvals,and avoid other bureaucraticconstraints which slow productionand provide opportunitiesfor corruption. Reforms to the financial system are necessaryto facilitatea reductionin real interest rates and increase the supply of capital at longer maturities. A reallocation of social sector expendituresis essentialto improveefficiency and focus public sector efforts on assistingthe poor. Provisionsof the recently issued Supreme Decree 22407 directedat poverty alleviationremain to be clarifiedby regulations,and need to be reviewed in terms of their efficiency and implicationsfor expenditures.

19. InvestmentLaws. The Governmentrecently submitteda set of changes to the laws governingprivate sector investmentto Congress. An investment code would guaranteestable rules of the game for private investment,ensure equal treatmentto domesticand foreign investors,prohibit restrictionson profit repatriations,and simplifyprocedures for registrationof foreign investors. Passage of this code is essentialto reassure investorsof the public sector's long-termcommitment to encouragingprivate sector development. While most of the provisionsof the code are already in force, legislativesanction would increase the credibilityof the policy regime and greatly encourageincreased :nvestment. Codes for mining and hydrocarbons would provide legislativesanction for joint ventures between COMIBOL and YPFB and the private sector,thus increasingthe potential for private sector participationin developingBolivia's natural resources. The hydrocarbons code would also expand the areas eligible for private sector exploitation,and the mining code would authorizean optional tax regime that is consistentwith tax policy in the home countriesof most multinationalenterprises. In the past, monopolizationof promising reservesby relativelyinefficient public sector companieshas constraineddevelopment. These laws would facilitate access to foreign capital and technology,and encouragemore efficient exploitationof Bolivia'sconsiderable natural resources.

20. Public Sector Administration. The Governmenthas proposed necessary revisionsto laws governingpublic sector administration. The SAFCO law establishesuniform proceduresfor public sector accountingthat will enable the central administrationto controlexpenditures more effectively. The initial stages of the SAFCO system are already in place, and have proven invaluablein improvingthe efficiencyof administration. The recent approval by Congress of the law will ease the acceptanceof the new procedures throughoutthe public sector. The Governmenthas also proposed going forward with a privatizationprogram. Privatizationwould remove actual and potentialdrains on public sector revenues,particularly in the Regional DevelopmentCorporations which inheritedthe smallerstate enterprises decentralizedearly in the Paz Estenssoroadministration. Privatization also should be consideredfor some municipal services. The former Government created a commissionto study the potential for privatization,but its work was suspendeddue to failure to enact the privatizationlaw. Thus, considerablework remains to be done to identifycandidates for privatization, estimate their value, and establishprocedures for public auctions.

21. Little progresshas been made on efforts to rationalizepublic sector salary levels. The Bolivianpublic sector has a high level of employmentat low wages. Inadequatepublic sector wages imply poor administration,because the public sector can not attract sufficiently qualifiedpersonnel, workers are forced to undertakeadditional jobs to protect their standardof living, and the acceptanceof corruptionincreases. The generallylow level of salarieshas meant that high-priorityactivities, especiallyif financed by donors,have used wages outside the normal salary scale. For example, one of the reasons for the considerablesuccess of the Emergency Social Fund was that employeeswere paid higher salaries than in other central governmentagencies. Presently,donors financea significant proportionof high-levelpublic sector employees,mostly as local consultants serving in line positions. This ad-hoc system developedbecause it was impossibleto attract qualifiedpersonnel to carry out donor programs at normal salaries. However, this practicehas in turn contributedto the chaos in Bolivian salary policy, and competitionamong donors may have raised the cost of higher-levelpersonnel unnecessarily. As a preliminarystep to addressingthis problem, a recent agreementwas reached among donors in La Paz to ensure more uniform salaries in donor-financedactivities. As part of a more comprehensivesolution, IDA has proposed to assist establishmentof a unified scale of salariesfor a key group of professionaland technical personnel. Salaries for this group would be supportedby donor agencies,but in a transparentway that would eliminateexcessive job-switching in search of higher salaries. A concertedeffort to rationalizesalaries, in conjunction - 9 - with improvementsin management,is essentialto improve the efficiencyof public sector administration.

22. Reliance on foreign agencies for procurementhas speededprocessing and reduced corruption,compared to the previous system. However, further improvementsare necessary to make the present systemmore efficientand eventuallyto raturn responsibilityfor procurementto Bolivian agencies. In the short term, a number of changes should be consideredto reduce delays and lower costs for procurement,including: a) raisingthe thresholdbelow which goods do not need to go through the procurementagencies; b) encouragingall donors to accept the procurementagencies' fees as eligible expendituresfor financing;c) encouragingthe procurementagencies to specializein some technicalfields; d) requiringthe agencies to provide more informationon their prices and services;e) settingtarget periods of time within which key steps in the procurementprocess should be completed;f) reaching agreements with the procurementagencies on the amount of work (includingin which technicalareas) expected in the near future, to improveplanning; g) giving procureme-ntagencies the power to award contractstnemselves in exceptional cases whexe time is very short; and h) holding an annual seminar on procurementto discuss these measures. Over the long term (on the order of 5- 10 years) Bolivian public agenciesmust assume responsibilityfor procurement, and steps should be taken now to begin the transitionback to a Bolivian- managed procurementprocess. Measures which should be consideredto facilitatethis transitioninclude gradually raising the thresholdabove which procurementmust be entrustedto the foreign agencies,encouraging the agencies to hire progressivelymore Bolivians,and continuingefforts to strengthenaccounting systems and financialmanagement in public enterprises.

23. Financial System and Investment. The low supply of capital continues to constrainBolivian development. Real interest rates remain very high. Lending rates are now about 22Z in dollar terms,iJand most loans are made at very short maturities. (The Banco de Santa Cruz recently introduceda limited supply of longer maturity loans, but time will be required to judge the impact on overall lendingpractices.) It is very difficultto undertake even profitable investmentson short-term,high interestrate loans. High interest rates and short maturitiesare due to uncertaintyover t".e permanenceof recent policy reforms. Deposit rates of 5-6 percentagepoints above LIBOR are required to keep short-termdollar deposits in Bolivianbanks (see Table 1.3). The experienceof 30 years of state interventionin markets and the hyperinflationare too-vividreminders of the potentialfor a deteriorationin policy performance. A number of years of low and stable inflationwill be necessarybefore intere3trates decline to international levels.

24. Financial sectorweaknesses have contributedto the high level of interest rates by maintaininga large spread between deposit and lending rates. Some banks hold a significantshare of their assets in companiesin very poor financialcondition. These companiesare a strong source of demand

We refer to bank lending rates. Informal sector moneylenderscharge much higher interest rates. - 10 - for further loans to cover debt servicepayments and fnrestalldefault. Banks may accommodatethis demand as an alternativeto taking a loss on a noticeable share of their portfolio. Further, the weaker banks remain saddledwith high average costs as a result of the dedollarizationmea sure of 1982, the redu-tionin their scale of operationsince the early 1980, and the high infrastructurecosts remainingfrom expansionof personneland branches during the hyperinflation(although some adjustmentshave been undertaken).

Table 1.3: Financial Indicators (percent,end of period)

1986 1987 1988 1989

Lending Rate /a 22 26 22 22 Deposit Rate /b 15 18 16 16 Spread Ic 7 8 6 6

Real Lending Rate /d 19 22 18 17

LIBOR le 7 6 7 9 Difference Between Domestic and InternationalRates 8 12 9 7 la Average dollar interest rate on short-termloans. /b Average dollar interest rate on short-termdeposits. /c Differencebetween lending and deposit rates. /d Deflated by the US GNP Deflator /e Six-MonthLondon InterBankOffer Rate

Source: Superintendencyof Banks

25. It also is possible that the small number of banks has muted competitivepressures, permitting higher than normal spreads (line 3 of Table 1.3) and slowing the necessaryadjustment to present economic conditions. It is difficultto judge the extent of collusionamong banks, but the small number of banks dominatingthe system provides the opportunityfor anticompetitivepractices. Lack of competitionwill constrainefficiency improvements,even given effectivebanking supervisionand market determinationof interest rates. The return of the internationalbanks which left Bolivia in the early 1980s would increase competitionand help to lower spreadsbetween deposit and lending rates. This return would be facilitated by the retirementof the remainingcommercial bank debt, a project in which the Governmenthas achieved considerablesuccess and which deserves donor support (see above). - 11 -

26. This descriptionof the financialsector has disturbingimplications beyond the level of interest rates. While supervisionof the banking system has improved greatly over the past few years, the financialposition of banks remains precarious. Table 1.4 shows that some indicatorsof solvency and liquidityhave shown a deteriorationover time, although this may reflect improvementsin informationdue to the Superintendency'sprogram of audits. Still, it is disturbingthat capital and reserveshave declined relative to assets and to overdue loans. Consideringthat the deposit base of the banks is largely short-termdollar deposits and subjectto considerableinstability (as demonstratedin the run on deposits during last year's political transition),it is difficultto overstatethe problems affectingthe Bolivian financialsystem.

Table 1.4t CommercialBank Portfolios (Percent,end of period)

1987 1988 1989 1990 (March)

Overdue Loans/TotalLoans 11.8 9.7 9.3 11.7 Provisions/OverdueLoans 38.1 27.6 25.6 18.7 Capital+Reserves/Assets 12.9 7.5 6.1 5.5 Overdue Loans/Capital+Res. 56.2 82.9 98.7 138.5

Note: Refers to private commercialbanks only. Excludesbanks closed in 1987.

Source: Superintendencyof Banks

27. Thus, strengtheningof the financialsector is essentialto maintain stabilityand facilitatea reductionin interest rates. The Governmenthas made considerableprogress in this area. Creation of the Superintendencyof Banks has strengthenedsupervision and greatly enhanced the availabilityof informationon the banking system,while assistancefrom internationaldonors has been used to improvebank portfolios. These effortsmust be continued. It is particularlynecessary to move towardsmarket interestrates on developmentcredits to reduce distortionain the financialsystem. In addition,the eliminationor reorganizationof public sector banks would improve the soundnessof the banking system. The Governmenthas moved slowly in this area. Reorganizationplans for the Banco del Estado, the Banco Minero, and Banco Agricola were submittedby the previous Governmentto fulfillconditions relating to IDA's FinancialSector AdjustmentCredit, but little furtherprogress has been made. It appears now that the most efficient solutionwould be to eliminatethe two sector banks while limiting the operationsof Banco del Estado to serving the public sector. - 12 -

28. Social Sectors. The Government'spolicy statementshave stressed the need to improve the position of Bolivia'spoor. Some initiativeshave been undertakento addresspoverty. The creation of the Fondo de Desarrollo Campesinoholds some promise of assistancedirected at poor communities. The Ministry of Health, with assistancefrom internationaldonors, is beginningan ambitiousprogram to increasethe coverage of basic health services. The Governmenthas establishedthe Social InvestmentFund, the successor institutionto the EmergencySocial Fund, which will finance investmentin the social sectors. While these programs appear well-designed,it is too early to evaluate their impact.

29. Supreme Decree 22407 includedplans to expand public servicesto the poor. However, neither the proposalsnor the sources of financingare sufficientlyexplained. The Decree proposes that all Bolivians receivea minimum income, includingthose working in the informal sector. It is not clear how this would be administered;it would be extremelydifficult to collect objective informationon wages paid to inform:i sectorworkers. The implicationsfor expenditures,while unknown, could well be significant. Finally, setting a minimum income is not the most effectivemeans of assisting the poor, given the potentialfor abuse. The Decree also mentions expanding the coverage of the Social Security System. The Social Security system is inefficientand inequitable,suffers from a number of organizationalproblems, representsa drain on resourcesfor the underfundedpublic health system,is devoted to curative care rather than higher-priorityprimary care, and perhaps should be closed. At a minimum, a thorough review of proceduresand a radical reorganizationis necessarybefore expansioncould be done in an efficient manner. As stated in the Policy FrameworkPaper, the Governmentintends to evaluate a transformationof Social Security to a capitalizationsystem with private sector participation.

30. Instead of proposingnew programs with uncertainfinancing, the Governmentneeds to come to grits with the issue of improvingthe efficiency of social sector expenditures.2- Given the shortage of resources,a reallocationof expenditureswithin health and educationis essentialto ensure that efforts in these sectors address the poor. Subsidiesto universitiesmust be reduced and underutilizedhospitals closed, while increasingaccess to primary educationand basic health care.3/ In education, ghost teachersmust be removed from the books; personnelrules changed to provide more flexibilityin hiring, teacher assignments,and salary levels; and a rational system adopted for coordinatinginvestment and current expenditures. Expenditurereform is certain to be met by considerable politicalopposition, but is necessary to achieveany substantialprogress in alleviatingpoverty.

21 A discussionof efficiencyin social sector spending is included in Bolivia: Public Sector ExpenditureReview with a Special Emphasis on the Social Sectors (7746-BO),dated September15, i989.

3/ For an analysis of expenditureson higher education, see the Poverty Report in Bolivia (8643-BO). A discussionof investmentin the health sector is included in Chapter III of the present document. - 13 -

31. Conclusion. Maintenanceof low and stable inflation,improvements in the laws governinginvestment, and strengtheningof the financialsystem are all necessary for development. However, confidenceand sustainabil'tyof the economic program depend on more than these. For lack of alternatives, limiting the fiscal deficithas required strict controls on public sector wages and extremely low expenditureson social services. In addition, limitationson expenditureshas made it difficultto effect necessary infrastructureinvestments which would increase the productivityof private investment. There is a fundamentaldilemma that, while stabilityis a prerequisitefor growth,measures to achieve stabilitycan underminelong-term development. Private agents will not be ignorantof the potential for social disruptionand policy reversalsinherent in such a fragile stability. Since the budget constraintcan not be avoided, the only way out of this dilemma is to improve the efficiencyof expenditures. These measures in themselves entail risks, and are certain to be resisted by some groups. However, developmentdepends on such improvements,as much as it depends on reducing the public sector deficit and maintaininga liberaleconomic environment. - 14 -

CHAPTER IIs MEDIUM-TEBMPROSPECTS

A. Introduction

32. Bolivia over the past four years has reduced inflationto low levels and made importantprogress towards establishingan appropriate frameworkof incentivesto encourageprivate sector growth. However, recovery from the crisis of the early 1980s has been slow. Despite the high quality of the Bolivian adjustmentprogram, difficultstructural problems and uncertainty over the maintenanceof currentpolicies remain impedimentsto growth. Policy reforms discussedin this report,including a more efficientuse of investment funds, increasedexpenditures on health and education,more vigorous tax administration,establishment of an adequate legal frameworkto encourage investment,and improvementsin administrativeefficiency, are essentialto development. In this chapter,we discuss the link between these policies and the sustainabilityof fiscal and monetary policy, prospectsfor the growth and diversificationof exports, and the outlook for the balance of payments and debt.

D. Fiscal and Honetary Policy

33. Introduction. Providingthe public servicesnecessary for long- term developmentis a difficulttask in Bolivia. The public goods essential to growth are in extremelyscarce supply: infrastructureis inadequate;health and educationservices are insufficient;and low public sector salaries seriously impair the efficiencyof administration.Maintenance of a iow fiscal deficit at inadequatelevels of public sector expenditureswill ensure both stabilityand stagnation. Substantialopportunities exist for efficient reallocationof expenditures. Many areas of potentialsavings were discussed earlier in this report: privatizationof state enterprises,elimination of inefficientpublic sector investments,reduction in public sector employment, and more efficientmanagement of current expenditures. Still, even taking into account potential savings, it is likely that achievingan adequate level of public serviceswill require increasingexpenditures above present levels.

34. These expendituresmust be financedwithout either endangering price stabilityor incurringunacceptable levels of debt. Sources o' financing includetaxes, sales of goods produced by the public sector, external borrowing, internalborrowing, arrears, and inflation. While it is essentialto increase tax collectionsthrough more effectiveadministration, in Bolivia tax revenues tend to be highly inelasticwith respect to tax rates, due to the substantialopportunities for evasion. Thus, the rise in revenues to be expected from domestic taxes is strictlylimited. Efforts are underway to raise revenues through sales of goods, particularlythrough public sector exploitationof Bolivia'shydrocarbons reserves. However, these projects entail considerablerisks and could be managed more efficientlyby the private sector. The supply of externalborrowing at concessionalterms is limited, and Bolivia lacks the ability to service loans at harder terms. Few expenditurescan be financedthrough internalborrowing because capital markets are extremelythin in Bolivia. The value of Central Bank Certificates - 15 - of Deposit (the only form of Governmentborrowing in the internalmarket) traded is low, and domestic interest rates are high in real terms. Any expendituresnot covered by the measures listed above imply increasingarrears or money issuance. Private sector confidenceand efficientoperation of markets require strict limits on public sector arrears and the inflationary finance of expenditures. Given recent history, inflationaryexpectations in Bolivia are very sensitiveto money financingof deficits. The credibilityof the Government'seconomic program requireslow and stable inflation,with little opportunityfor resort to the inflationtax.

35. Public Sector Deficit in 1989. The deficit of the nonfinancial public sector was 5.0? of GDP in 1989, composed of a 1.32 primary deficit (total revenuesminus non-interestexpenditures) and 3.8Z of GDP in interest due on external debt (see Table 2.1). Additional demandson public sector resourcesresulted from some expansionof domesticcredit (probablytied to operationsto assist banks in difficultyduring the run on deposits last summer) and the need to repay arrears. The 5.2Z of GDP in long-termexternal loans was not sufficientto cover all of these expenses,so that changes in reserves financed3.1X of GDP. Further progress in deficit reductionwas achieved in the first half of 1990, when the deficitof the nonfinancial public sector fell below 3Z of GDP (at an annual rate). Even so, a shortfall in disbursementsfrom official donors resulted in a rapid expansionin domestic credit to finance public sector expenditures.

36. While the deficit fell both in 1989 and in the first half of 1990, this presentationof the public sector accounts raises some troubling questionsfor the future. The large fall in reserves is disturbing,as Bolivia'snet reserves reachedvery low levels in the first few months of 1990. Perhaps more importantly,the high level of the nonfinancialpublic sector deficit, and particularlyof the primary deficit, implies the need for further correctionsin fiscal policy to avoid an unsustainablerise in public sector liabilities. This issue can best be exploredby consideringmedium- term projectionsfor the public sector accounts. - 16 -

Table 2.1t Financingof the Public Sector Deficit. 1989

Million Bolivianos Percent of GDP

Need for Finance 978 8.0 Deficit, NonfinancialPublic Sector 613 5.0 Primary Deficit 161 1.3 Interest Owed 452 3.8 Net Domestic Credit la 182 1.5 Reduction in Arrearp 183 1.5

Financed By: Money Issuance -26 -0.2 Change in Long-TermExternal Debt /b 626 5.2 NonfinancialPublic Sector 258 2.1 Central Bank 368 3.0 Change in Reserves Ic 378 3.1

/a Also includes official capitaland surplus and unclassifiedassets. /b Does not include stock adjustmentsdue to exchange rate changes, the retirementof commercialbank debt, or the eliminationof the debt to Argentina. /c Includes IMF lending under the Enhanced StructuralAdj3stment Facility, and thus differs in definitionfrom the change in reserves shown in the balance of payments.

Note: Details may not sum to total due to rounding.

37. Base Case Proiections. Our base scenario illustratesa possible evolution of public sector accountswhich would achieve the rise in public sector expendituresnecessary for developmentwhile limitingthe increase in public sector debt and avoiding recourseto excessivemoney creation (see Table 2.2). The base case projectionsenvision an increase in total revenues of the nonfinancialpublic sector from 28.6Z of GDP in 1989 to 31.02 of GDP by 2000. This rise in revenues is accomplishedin the face of an anticipated fall in trade taxes of 0.82 of GDP, owing to a reductionin import duties. The rise in tax reform revenues from 5.72 of GDP in 1990 to 6.82 of GDP in 2000 is due to continuedefforts to improveenforcement, which would be a preferablemeans of raising revenues than increasingtax rates. However, the latter also may be necessary if the revenue gains from administrativemeasures are not suffi:ient. The Governmentalso is projectedto benefit from a rise in energy prices, which will increase revenuesfrom domestic and foreign sales of natural gas and liquid fuels. On the expenditureside, control of the public sector wage bill coupledwith reductionsin public sector employmentto permit payment of adequate salaries is essentialto achieve the base case projections. However, some savings in wages will be balancedby increasesin - 17 - operationsand maintenanceexpenditures. Altogether,non-interest current expendituresare projected to declineonly slightly,from 22.6? of GDP in 1989 to 22.32 in 2000. The increase in revenueswill permit a rise in public sector investmentrelative to income, from 7.42 of GDP in 1989 to 8.5? by 2000. This rise in investmentwill only make a real contributionto developmentif unnecessaryprojects of the kind discussedin Chapter III are avoided.

Table 2.2:s onfinwcial Public Sector Accouts. 1989-2000 (percentof GDP)

1989 2000

Revenues 28.6 31.0 Tax Reform Revenues 5.7 6.8 Trade Taxes 1.8 1.0 Sales of Public Sector Goods 17.8 19.6 Other 3.3 3.6

Primary Expenditures 30.0 30.8 Current Expenditures 22.6 22.3 (excludinginterest) Investment 7.4 8.5

Primary Balance -1.3 0.2 Interest Owed 3.8 1.7

overall Balance -5.0 -1.5

Notet Detailsmay not sum to total due to roundingerrors.

38. Assuming that the policy targets describedabove are achieved,the primary deficit of the nonfinancialpublic sector shou d fall from 1.3? of GDP in 1989 to a surplusof 0.2Z of GDP by the year 2000.41 The primary deficit averages 0.32 of GDP per year from 1990-2000. Other demands on public sector resources,on average over the next 10 years, would include: 1.O of GDP per year to finance the Central Bank's contributionto net domestic credit

4/ The primary deficit is the most relevant indicator of fiscal performance, since once the primary deficit is determined, the interest burden which results is largely independentof Governmentdecisions. - 18 - expansion,largely through credit lines funded by external donors; 0.5S of GDP per year to maintain a minimum level of net reserves;and 2.52 of GDP per year to meet projectedexternal interest obligations. Altogether,the demand for finance should average 4.3% of GDP per year from 1990-2000 (secondhalf of Table 2.3).

39. The public sector's demand for resourcesequal to 4.32 of GDP per year should be financed almost entirely though externalborrowing and revenues from seignorage. Net external lending to the public sector, largelyat concessionalterms, is projectedto average 3.3Z of GDP a year from 1990-2000. We assume that Bolivia borrows all it can in the external market at an average interest rate of about 3Z, rather than increasingdomestic debt at an interest rate of 152 (both interest rates are on dollar-denominateddebt). Since the rise in external debt necessaryto finance the deficit is slower than that of GDP, the external debt to GDP ratio improves from 792 in 1989 to 53? by the year 2000. Econometricestimates of the demand for money sbow that the increase in the supply of money base consistentwith low inflationwould average 0.8% of GDP per year.51 In conclusion,the public sector can finance the necessary increasein expenditureswithout an unsustainablerise in debt or resortingto inflationarylevels of money creation.

40. There are two reasonswhy the base case provides a rather conservativeestimate of the financeabledeficit. As time goes on, increased private sector confidenceshould raise money demand. The monetary base equals only about 9? of GDP in the heavily-dollarizedBolivian economy, so that substantialroom remains for monetization. Increaseddemand for money would representhigher seignorageto the Government,which would enable the public sector to run a higher deficitwithout increasingits liabilities. However, the increase in seignoragewould be a one-time gain only, whose magnitude is not clear. We thereforehave not included this potentialgain in the base case projections. In addition,the Governmentcould finance a higher level of expendituresthrough increasingdomestic debt, which is now equivalentto only about 2% of GDP. Still, given the excessiveinterest rates on domestic debt, it is more prudent to limit reliance on domestic borrowingand to finance increasedexpenditures through a moderate rise in revenues (relativeto GDP) and external borrowing.

41. These results show that the base case projectionsof public sector accounts are feasiblewhile maintainingthe economic program,but they do not imply that the projecteddeficit or expendituresare optimal. This latter judgmentwould depend greatly on the efficiencyof the expenditures undertaken,the productivityof alternativeuse of resources,the distortionaryimpact of taxation,and intertemporalconsumption choices. A more rigorous analysismay well show that a differentlevel or time path of expenditures,revenues, and financingwould be desirable. The purpose of this exercise is not to show how the economy should evolve,but rather to illustratethe constraintswhich must guide public policy.

5I The demand for money is estimatedas a function of inflation,interest rates, and lagged money (see Annex I). - 19 -

42. Implicationsof a Hither PrimaryDeficit. Fs-lure to achieve even the small primary surplusassumed in the base case projectionswould have serious implicationsfor public sector finances. It is possible that the improvementsin tax administrationand tight control of public sector wages underlyingthe base case would not occur. To illustratethe very thin margin for error facing the Bolivian public sector,we explore the implicationsof a continuationof present fiscal performance,represented by a primary deficit averaging 1.3Z of GDP (the 1989 level) for the next ten years.

43. Since the supply of concessionalloans to Bolivia is limited and the public sector is not creditworthyfor commercialbank lending, the higher deficitwould have to be financed through issuing some combinationof money or domestic debt. We do not believe that Bolivia could generate significant revenues through the inflationtax, because the experienceof hyperinflation has greatly increasedthe sensitivityof the Bolivian public to excessive money creation. Any indicationthat the Governmentintends to increasemoney issuance above the demand for real balances would immediatelyand sharply reduce the demand for money. Thus, the public sector would have to issue domestic debt to finance the increaseddeficit. To finance a primary deficit averaging1.3Z of GDP from 1990-2000plus related interestpayments, domestic debt would have to increaseby 2.6Z of GDP per year.

44. Increasesof domestic debt of this magnitudewould be unacceptable. Chart 2.2 shows the increasesin correspondingdomestic interestpayments, the overall deficit, and debt which would result, as a percentageof GDP. At present levels of interest rates on Governmentdebt (152 on dollar-denominated certificatesof deposit),domestic borrowing to finance the non-interest deficit and interestpayments on the additionaldebt would increase domestic debt to over 192 of GDP by the year 2000, compared to about 21 in 1989. Interest payments on domestic debt would reach 2.6? of GDP by 2000. Note that the private sector would have to be willing to lend the Governmentthe requisitefinance at the current real interest rate of 1OZ. This is doubtful, and in any event continuedhigh interestrates would stranglethe necessary recovery in private sector investment. - 20 -

Table 2.1S linanclnathe Public Sector. 1990-2000 (yearlyaverages, as a percent of GDP)

ContinuedPrimary Base Case Deficit at 1989 Level Projections (1.3% of GDP) (-0.12 of GDP)

Need for Financet 6.7 4.3 Deficit, NonfinancialPublic Sector 5.2 2.8 Primary beficit 1.3 0.3 External Interest 2.5 2.5 Domestic Interest 1.4 0.0 Central Bank Domestic Credit 1.0 1.0 Change in Reserves 0.5 0.5

Financed by: External Lending 3.3 3.3 Money Issuance 0.8 0.8 Domestic Debt 2.6 0.2

Memorandum Items Domestic Interest Payments,2000 2.6 0.1 Net Domestic Debt, 2000 21.0 1.0

45. This dramatic increase in domestic debt results in part from the abnormallyhigh real interestrates in the Bolivian economy. With continued macroeconomicstability, it is likely that interest rates would decline over time. It is useful to explore the implicationsof lower interest rates for the scenariodescribed above (firsthalf of Table 2.3), to demonstratethat a continuedhigh pimary deficitwould be unsustainableeven with relativelylow interest rates.-1 A primary deficitwhich averaged 1.31 of GDP with a real interest rate of 6? from 1990-2000 (insteadof the 102 assumed in the scenario)would imply a rise in debt to 15? of GDP by 2000. Thus, even assuming that interest rates fall substantially,debt still would increase at an unsustainablerate.

46. Conclusion. Further improvementsin fiscal performanceare requireu to ensure the sustainabilityof the public sector financialaccounts while achievingthe increase in expendituresnecessary for development. Improvementsin policiesmust involveboth the level of expendituresand revenues and their composition. Controls on current expendituresare essential,but can not be enforced at the price of a deteriorationin public

61 To some extent this is an artificialexercise, as interestrates would be unlikely to decline in the face of a continuedhigh rate of borrowing by the public sector. - 21 - sector admiuistration. The Governmenthas no choice but to reduce public sector employmentwhile increasingsalary levels for key personnel. The failure of the Governmentto make any progress in implementingthe public sector management scheme and reported increasesin the wage bill in 1989 and early 1990 (discussedin Chapter I) thus have disturbingimplications for the sustainabilityof fiscal policy over the long term. Similarly,increases in public sector investmentare necessaryto provide the public goods essential to development. However, the inclusionof unnecessaryand overly-expensive projects (discussedin Chapter III) would representan added fiscal burden with little contributionto development.

C. Export Prospects

47. Overview. Export growth and diversificationare essentialto Bolivian development. Historically,exports have been dominatedby the exploitationof Bolivia'svast mineral and hydrocarbonresources, along with occasionalexport booms in agriculturalproducts (for example rubber, cotton, and most recently,soya) which have been quickly reversedwith changes in market conditions. Bolivia needs a healthy, diversifiedexport sector to produce at efficient scale and assure a stable supply of foreign exchange,so that developmentof industrialand agriculturalexports (referredto hereafter as non-traditionals)is essential. However, the obstaclesto improvingexport performanceand increasingdiversification are considerable. Poor infrastructureand the difficultterrain impair the competitiveposition of Bolivian goods in the internationalmarket. Inadequatehealth and educational services,a history of labor disputes,and deep racial and class divisions limit the flexibilityof the economy to respond to changes in market conditions. The preponderanceof hydrocarbonsand minerals exports,heavy inflows of official capital,and the supply of foreign exchange from illegal coca exports have kept the market exchange rate below the level compatible with substantialincreases in industrialor agriculturalproduction.

48. Since 1986, low inflationand a liberal incentivestructure have provided the frameworknecessary for an expansionof private sector production and exports. These policies,along with a moderate depreciationof the boliviano and introductionof direct export incentives,contributed to the rapid growth of private sectormining and non-traditionalexports registered in 1989 (see Table 2.4). Boliviahas the potentialto achieve a radical shift in export compositionin favor of non-traditionalexports and non-tinmining. Realizing Bolivia'sexport potentialwill requiremaintenance of the present macroeconomicframework, along with institutionalreforms to remove bureaucraticobstacles to export development. - 22 -

Table 2.4s Elxort ReceiPts.1987-89 (US$ millions)

History Estimate 1987 1988 1989

Total Exports 519 542 723 Hydrocarbons 256 219 214 Minerals /a 158 215 305 Non-traditionals 106 108 204

Memorandum Item Export Volume Growth (Z) -9.4 12.9 21.7

/a Net of realizationcosts.

49. Hydrocarbons. Bolivia'sexperience with natural gas exports to Argentina demonstratesthe benefits and dangers involved in heavy dependence on a single export commodity,particularly to a si..gleconsumer. Bolivia supplied natural gas to Argentinaworth US$214 million in 1989, but received only US$119 million (not includingpartial payments on 1988 arrears). The total of US$314 million in arrears accumulatedby Argentinabetween 1986 and 1989 were swapped for US$803 million in Bolivian liabilitiesto Argentina, composed of Bolivia'sinterest arrears and the balance of Bolivia'slong-term debt to Argentina. This agreementdid little to improveBolivia's serious cash flow problem. Bolivia also accepted a 101 cut in the price of future gas shipments. However, the agreementdid eliminateUS$55 million per year in interest obligationsand cut Bolivia'slong-term debt by 162 relative to the stock outstandingat end-1988. The crucial issue remainsArgentina's willingnessand ability to make currentpayments in light of the chaotic economic conditionsin that country. While payments resumed immediately followingthe August 1989 agreement,as of end-June 1990 Argentinawas one month in arrears. Thus, the level of Bolivia'sexport receipts and public sector revenues remainsuncertain.

50. Bolivia'shydrocarbons reserves provide a significantopportunity for increasingexport receipts,albeit with considerablerisk. Bolivia and Argentinahave agreed to set up a new companywhich would undertaketo market Bolivian natural gas for the ten years followingexpiration of the present contract in 1992. Preparationof a projec; to sell electricity,urea, and polyethyleneto Brazil is also underway.7i A project to sell natural gas directly to the Sao Paulo market also has been discussed,although this would be a substituteto the latter project rather than an additionalsource of export revenues. Increasedexploration and developmentof natural gas fields

7/ Section 3 of this chapter explores the risks and benefits of the Brazilianproject. - 23 - to serve these projectswill provide greater opportunitiesfor liquids production,which may permit some increasein petroleumexports. The Brazil projects, as now conceived,involve heavy public sector participation,the borrowingof large sums at nonconcessionalterms, and dependenceon continued payments from Brazil. The risks involved in this scheme of developmenthave been dramatizedby the recent interruptionsin payments by Argentina. These risks should be reducedby obtainingsufficient guarantees of payment from the purchasersand by increasingprivate sector participationin investmentand managementof the projects.

51. Mining. Preliminary data indicate an increase in metals export revenues,from US$215 million in 1988 to about US$305 million in 1989, despite the sharp fall in the price of tin in the latter half of the year and slowness in reactivatingCOMIBOL's mines. This increasewas due to higher exports from private sector mining (includingcooperatives), which made up slightlymore than 50? of the value of mineral exports in 1989.

52. The decline in importanceof tin in minerals exports since the collapse of internationalprices in late-1985is likely to continue. Revenues from tin equalled 712 of total minerals exports in 1985, but by 1989 had fallen to 41Z. Tin exportershave fallen on hard times. Tin prices dropped to almost US$2 a pound in late 1989, well below the costs of productionfor most Bolivian tin mines. Failing a stronger recovery in prices than now anticipated,it will be necessary to close some of COMIBOL'smines. Exports of tin are projected to fall by 282 in currentprices in 1990.

53. Prospectsfor non-tin mining are brighter. Revenues from non-tin metals exports increasedby 30? in 1989, owing to a more than doubling of zinc exportswith the sharp increase in internationalprices. For the future,we expect significantincreases in silver, zinc, and gold exports, the two former products due to likely price increasesand the latter because of large investmentsnow being undertakenby the private sector. Presentlythere are at least 14 foreignbusinesses working or negotiatingcontracts with local mining interests;two large internationalfirms have bought shares of the most importantBolivian mining companies. These investmentsshow the likelihoodof continuinggrowth in non-tin mining for some years to come.

54. Non-traditionalEMDorts. Non-traditionalexports (in Bolivia meaning all goods exports other than mining and hydrocarbons)rose well above expected levels last year. Official data show a near doubling of non- traditionalexport revenues,from US$108 million in 1988 to US$204 million in 1989, and to 282 of total export revenues compared to 202 in 1987-88. Major export products included timber (US$44million), soya (US$54million), sugar (US$19million), hides (US$15million), and coffee (US$13million). These increasesare a welcome sign of a more diversifiedexport base and the growing importanceof the private sector in Bolivian exports. However, higher non- traditionalexports do not necessarilyimply a transitionfrom extractionof raw materials to greater local processing. More than 702 of the value of non- traditionalexports are consideredprimary goods, 20? semi-processedgoods, and only 10? are final goods. For example,exports of food are generallyof basic crops, Bolivia'swood exportsare mostly logs, and skins are exported after applicationof a simple preservative. - 24 -

55. The increase in non-traditionalexports was due to a number of factors. The bolivianodepreciated by 4.5? in real terms in 1989 and by 5.1Z in 1988, and anecdotalevidence indicatesthat competitivenesshas improved. Two years ago, interviewswith private sector representativesemphasized the exchange rate as the key constrainton domestic production,while this year there was a general perceptionthat the exchange rate was at a reasonable level. Improvementsin river transporthelped to remove one of the principal constraintson soya exports. Exports of various products rose sharply to both Peru and Argentina, perhaps aided by shortagesin the former country. However, the most important influenceon raisingnon-traditional exports was implementationof the CertificadoReintegracion Arancelaria (CRA), under which exportersof non-traditionalproducts receiveda payment equal to 102 of the gross value of their exports, intended to compensatefor import duties on their inputs (see below).

56. Short-termprospects for non-traditionalexports appear good. The area under cultivationof soya has increasedrapidly, in part thanks to rotationwith winter wheat which permits much higher profits than soya alone could generate. However, this potentialwill not be realized if the drought affectingparts of the county persists this year. Plans exist for increasing productionof coffee in a number of regions,although some recovery in internationalprices will be necessary. The United States agreed to more than double Bolivia'ssugar quota in 1990 (worthabout US$5 million in revenues), although the US sugar quota is scheduledto be eliminatedin September1990. The US will also permit a larger number of products from Andean countriesto enter without payment of tariff,under the GeneralizedSystem of Preferences. Bolivian firms have improved their cutting and preparationof skins, and some companieshave the capacity to increase their productionof more processed goods, which may have a significantrole in raising exports in the next few years.

57. Medium-TermProspects. Bolivia has the opportunityto achievean historic shift in the compositionof its export products,from an export sector dominatedby state-controlledtin mining and natural gas to private sector non-tin mining, agriculturalproducts, and semi-industrialgoods. This more diversifiedstructure would, in turn, provide the base from which Bolivian firms could increase the level of processingand the technological sophisticationof productionprocesses. The beginningsof this change are already apparent:private sector productionof metals has eclipsed that of the public sector, and the importanceof agriculturalproducts in exportshas grown significantly.

58. Our base case export projectionsillustrate the potential of this shift in export composition. While growth in tin exports will remain limited due to internationalmarket conditions,Bolivia could rapidly increase exports of gold, silver, tungsten,antimony, and lead. Exports of natural gas are assumed to remain at present levels,due to the recent agreementto extend the contract to sell gas to Argentina. The agreementto sell electric power to Brazil is not included in the base case projections,but is consideredin the scenario in section IV. Some increase in the volume of hydrocarbonsexports results from projected sales of petroleum. Among non-traditionalexports, the - 25 - brightestprospects are for soya, coffee, sugar, and skins. Export revenues will be further increasedby an expected improvementin the terms of trade. Table 2.5 provides a summaryof the base case projections.

Table 2.5& Medium-TermExport Pro1ections (percent)

Commodity Volume Growth Composition

1986-88 1989 1990 1990-2000 1988 2000

Total Exports 2.3 21.7 6.9 5.5 100.0 100.0

Metals la -0.1 25.0 10.6 4.9 39.7 36.4 (of which)s Tin -19.8 35.0 -5.2 -0.5 10.9 7.6 Gold 164.8 -15.3 52.7 7.6 8.9 8.8 Silver 19.1 48.4 5.4 7.5 6.4 9.8 zinc 23.1 47.2 -12.6 4.5 8.6 13.7

Hydrocarbons 0.5 -2.5 0.8 0.2 40.3 23.3

Non-traditionals 7.5 84.5 15.5 9.3 20.0 40.2

Memorandum Item 1987 1988 1989 1990 2000

Export Revenues 519 543 723 738 1990 (US$ millions)

59. GovernmentPolicies. Reforms in public sector policies,beyond the basic necessityof maintainingmacroeconomic stability and avoiding controls, would improve export performance. Some further increase in the real exchange rate would facilitateexport growth. To encourageincreased metals exports, it is essentialthat the Governmentpermit private sector participationin the more promisingminerals deposits,such as the Bolivar mine, and that the new tax code and joint venture provisionsof the mining code be approvedby Congress (see chapter III).

60. Improvementsin infrastructureare needed. Greater investmentis required (and is underway) in Bolivia'stransport links to Brazil and to Chile, which handle the bulk of legal exports. Improvementsin the administration of the railway could have a significant impact in reducing costs by avoidingunnecessary delays and reducingopportunities for corruption. The Government should consider permittingthe private sector to operatewagons on ENFE's tracks. This would provide some healthy competition to ENPE's operationsand lower the costs of transport,although it raises - 26 - difficultproblems concerningcoordination between public and private sector operations. Improvementsin the supply of power also are necessary. Interruptionsin electricalservice are common in areas of the country not served by the main power grid. To ensure continuousservice and avoid damage to machinery,some companieshave had to invest in relativelyexpensive energy sources, such as oil. Adequate and continuousavailability of hydroelectric power would lower costs significantly. Of course, energy investmentswould have to be evaluated on an individualbasis to determinetheir profitability.

61. One difficult issue of public policy concerns the CRA, an export subsidy under which the exportersof non-traditionalproducts (excluding lumber) receive a certificateworth 1OX of the gross value of exports. This certificatecan be used in payment of taxes, and is a negotiabledocument. Little difficultyis involved in obtainingcash for the CRA on the secondary market, at a varying discountwhich appears, on the basis of interviews,to average about 5? of the face value of the CRA certificate. As most non- traditionalexports involveminimal processing,a 102 subsidy on gross value can be a very significantsubsidy on value added.

62. Export subsidiesof this type have a number of troubling implications. If all entitledexporters received the CRA and all of the certificateswere redeemed last year, the programwould have cost the Governmentabout US$17 million, or about 5X of domestic tax revenues. Further, providingwhat may well amount to a considerablesubsidy on value added will distort resource allocation. The often-expressedview that the CRA was essential to the boom in non-traditionalexports in 1989 is evidence that a significantefficiency loss occurredby encouragingthe export of goods that otherwisewould not be produced or would be consumed at home.81 We also heard reports of fraud related to the CRA, for example cattle moving across the border to Bolivia in order to be re-exportedto Brazil, and unknown firms appearingon the lists of exporters. The exportersassociations are responsiblefor enforcementof the CRA system. While they have some incentive to catch cheaters,because a perceptionof widespreadfraud would lead to cancelling the entire system, it is not clear how effectivethese organizationsare in enforcement. Interviewswith private sector representativesconfirmed the likelihoodof some violations,but it was felt that the number was minor compared to the level of export revenues covered.

63. A number of argumentsare often presented for maintainingthe CRh. Abrupt changes in the rules of the game lessen public confidenceand penalize businessmenwho invested on the basis of the former policy. Export diversificationprovides some benefit to the societyas a whole by reducing the risk of a sharp reductionin foreignexchange due to changes in commodity prices. Governmentintervention may be necessary to enable firms to compete with the illegal coca trade for labor and capital inputs (althoughit is not clear why all legal products are not then subsidized). However, given the costs and distortionaryimpact of the CRA, it would be preferableto eliminate

8/ Bolivia exported 67 products in 1989 with a value greater than US$100 last year, compared to only 20 such products in earlier years. - 27 - it or replace it with some other system. The Policy FrameworkPaper agreed to by the Government,the World Bank, and the INP provides for a phased eliminationof the CRA in line with the reductionin import duties, and its replacementby a duty drawback scheme. This process is to be completedby December 1990.

64. Considerablescope exists for improvementsin public sector administrationto reduce impedimentsto exports. Presently,exporters must receive a number of approvals from differentoffices, all of which require time and provide the opportunityfor corruption. Table 2.6 provides a summary of the administrativeprocedures involved. - 28 -

Table 2.6t Reauired APDrovals for EXport

Requirement Office

Company Registrations

List of Tax Contributors Internal Revenue, Ministry of Finance Municipal Registry Municipality Commercial Registry Ministry of Industry (Directorate of Commercial Registry) Export Registry Ministry of Industry (Directorate of External Trade) Central Bank Export Registry Central Bank Health Certificate Ministry of Agriculture (Directorate of (agricultural products) Health) Coffee Certificate (Coffee) Bolivian Coffee Committee Artisans Registry (handicrafts) Bolivian Institute of Small Industry and Artisans (INBOPIA) Cooperative Registry National Institute of Cooperatives

Individual Exports

Commercial Invoice Ministry of Industry (Directorate of External Trade) Certificate of Origin Ministry of Industry (Directorate of External Trade), Customs Sanitary Certificate Ministry of Agriculture (Directorate of (agricultural products) Health) Sanitary Certificate Ministry of Agriculture (Directorate of (meat and skins) Health) Wood Certificate Forestry Center Artisans Certificate Bolivian Institute of Small Industry and Artisans (INBOPIA) Inspection Certificate Bureau Veritas Notice of Conformity Bureau Veritas

Customs Reauirements

Export Papers Ministry of Finance Cargo Manifest Ministry of Finance

(If transport by rail, various other papers required)

Approval Required After Export

Deposit of Foreign Exchange Central Bank

Source: Manual del Exportador, Camara de Comercio e Industria - 29 -

65. The importanceof these requirementsin suppressingpotential exportersor in increasingcosts is difficultto determine. The larger exporters,while not in favor of the system,generally felt it did not disrupt their activitiesunduly. However, requiredapprovals probably representa significantbarrier to smaller firms interestedin expandinginto export markets. One issue concerns the requirementto deposit foreignexchange earned with the Central Bank. This is not a seriousdisincentive to legal exports (as similar requirementsare in some other countries),because the exchange rate is determinedby an auction system and there are no restrictions on purchasing foreign exchange. Still, firms calculate that payments to banks to manage this service come to 1? of gross revenues,a substantialtax on exports. On the other hand, the requirementdoes increasethe stabilityof the auction system by providingthe Governmentwith the foreign exchange necessary to avoid excessiveshort-term fluctuations in the exchange rate. It is neither desirablenor feasiblefor the Governmentto use these resourcesto maintain an inappropriatelevel of the exchange rate. However, given the potential for volatility in the Bolivian economy, it may be desirableto ensure that the Governmentremains a major actor in the market, which may not be possible in the absence of mandatory depositof export earningswith the Central Bank. The Governmentshould consider the pros and cons of this issue and determinewhether it would be feasibleover the long term to eliminate this requirement.

66. £n,meimprovements have been made in reducingadministrative requirements. Agreementswere reachedwith exportersof perishablegoods to allow blanket export authorizations,rather than imposing delays for each export which could harm such products. Supreme Decree 22407 provided for a simplificationof some of the approvalprocedures listed above. However, the Decree did not eliminateany of the necessary approvalslisted in Table 2.6, but simply reduced the number of steps in each office required to obtain the required documents.

67. A more comprehensivesolution to the problemwould involve eliminatingrequirements that do not serve any legitimategoal of public policy. For example, the Governmentcould reduce the role of customs in checking exports, beyond that necessaryfor statisticalpurposes or for refundingof import taxes. Consolidationof requiredexport approvals, particularlythe multiple export registries,into one agency would facilitate simplification. Rather than travel to numerous offices, the exporterwould go to one office staffedby personsknowledgeable in export procedures,with a system of compensationdesigned to provide incentivesfor speedy approvals. It would appear that all the purely administrativefunctions could be carried out by one office. The more technicalapprovals (for example the health certificates)probably would have to remain separate,but the staff of the export office could assist exportersin obtainingthose approvalsas well. The system would have to be consistentwith administrativerequirements imposed on firms producingfor the domesticmarket.

68. It is not possible to eliminateall the administrativerequirements associatedwith exporting. The state has a legitimateinterest in assuring - 30 - that perishableproducts meet certainminimum st.ndardsof hygiene, if only to protect the reputationof Bolivianproducts in the internationalmarketplace. Registrationfor tax purposes is clearly necessary. Importingcountries require some of the documentationlisted in Table 2.6 to ensure that various exemptionsfrom tariffsand quotas based on country of origin are administered fairly. Still, considerableroom remains for simplification.

D. The Bolivian Economw Throuah 2000

69. Overview. Previous sectionsof this reporthave describedthe difficult challengesfacing the Bolivian economy. The maintenanceof stabilityand a liberaleconomic environmentare necessary,but not sufficient,conditions for development. Further policy reforms to assure a stable frameworkof incentivesfor private investment,improvements in the efficiencyof public sector expenditures,a favorableinternational economic environment,and strong support from official donors will also be required to achieve even moderate rates of growth. Our base case projectionsillustrate the conditionsunder which the Bolivian economy can grow by 42 a year, achieve a moderate rise in per capita consumption,and eventuallyreduce dependenceon external capital inflows.

70. Output and Investment. GDP rose by 2.7! in 1989, and is anticipated to increaseby about 32 in 1990. GDP growth is expected to average slightly above 42 per year in the 1990s, compared to about 2.5Z from 1986-89. Confidence in the economic program should increaseover time, which would encourageincreased private savingsand higher levels of private sector investment. The public sector could help stimulateprivate investmentby continuingwith improvementsin infrastructurenow being undertaken, particularlyin the transportationand power sectors;by removing bureaucratic impedimentsto investment;and by proposed changes in laws which would guaranteethe rules of the game for private sector investors. In the face of the expected decline in external savings relativeto output,high marginal savings rates will be necessary to financea rise in investmentfrom 122 of GDP in 1989 to 172 in 2000. A strong savings effort would imply growth in per capita consumptionoi less than 12 per year from 1990-2000. - 31 -

Table 2.7: Base Case Projections.1988-2000 (percent)

1988 1989 1990 1990-95 1995-2000

Constant Prices

GDP 2.8 2.7 3.0 4.0 4.3 Consumptionper Capita -3.8 -2.1 -3.1 0.4 1.2 InvestmentlGDP l 1.9 12.1 14.0 16.1 16.3 Domestic SavingsJGDP 6.3 8.2 11.1 13.7 15.4 External Savings/GDP/a 5.5 3.9 2.9 2.5 0.9

Current Prices

Current AccountlGDPlb -9.8 -8.8 -9.6 -6.6 -4.0 Public DebtlGDP lb 99.3 78.8 78.2 67.9 53.1

MemorandumItem GDP in billion US$ lb 4.4 4.5 4.5 6.9 10.2

/a Trade balance. lb Data under annual averages refers to last year of period.

71. ExternalAccounts. Table 2.8 provides the base case projectionsfor the balance of payments. The discussionof export prospects (see section III of this chapter) concludedthat Bolivia could raise export volumes by 5.5X per year from 1990-2000,assuming that the contractwith Argentina is renewed at present levels in 1992, proceduresfor approvingexports are simplified,and an appropriateexchange rate policy is pursued. Coupledwith some recovery in the terms of trade from present low levels, this volume performancewould enable Bolivia to finance the importsnecessary for growth while limitingthe rise in the trade deficit. - 32 -

Table 2.8: Base Case Balance of Payments Prolections (millionsof US$)

1988 1989 1990 1991 1995 2000

Exports of Goods & NFS 673 868 886 984 1433 2298 Imports of Goods & NFS 915 1034 1093 1204 1687 2461 Trade Balance -242 -166 -207 -220 -254 -163

Net Factor Services -264 -249 -246 -209 -229 -275 of which: Interest /a 206 190 175 159 168 178

Net Private Transfers 13 22 22 23 28 33

CurrentAccount Balance -493 -393 -431 -405 -455 -406

CapitalAccount 572 370 456 326 341 373 Net Official Transfers124 134 138 146 176 205 Private Capital lb 16 35 90 50 76 126 Net LT Lending 349 285 228 130 89 42 other Flows /c 83 -83 0 0 0 0

Change in Reserves -57 83 -118 -44 -18 -67

ExceptionalFinance /d -22 -60 93 123 132 100

/a Interest on external debt on an accrual basis. /b Mostly net direct investment. /c Includes short-termcapital, private non-guaranteed,errors and omissions,and unpaid gas receipts from Argentina. 1d Includes required reschedulingof amortizationfrom bilateralcreditors and changes in arrears.

72. While continuedsupport from official donors at concessionalterms is essential to the success of the economicprogram, an importantelement of the base case projectionsis a decline in external lending relative to output. This decline is inevitable. The high levels of gross project disbursements received from official donors in the past few years (9.1 of GDP in 1988-89) were a necessaryand appropriateresponse to the difficultiesfaced by Bolivia and the high quality of the adjustmentprogram. However, it is likely that assistancewill decline significantlycompared to GDP (see Table 2.9), and the expected increase in private capital inflows (largelydirect investment)will not fully compensatefor the slowing in donor assistance. Thus, the current account deficit should fall from 9.8Z of GDP in 1989 to 4.0Z by 2000. The expected decline in debt-creatingcapital inflows is desirable,as long as it - 33 - is accompaniedby acceptablelevels of output growth and consumption. Indeed, this decline is necessaryif Bolivia is to reduce its dependenceon foreign donors.

73. The base case projectionsassume considerabledebt relief from official creditors. Expected capital inflows and the increase in domestic savingswill not be sufficientto financethe necessary rise in investment plus all debt service due. Reaching the base case investmentand output growth rates will require reschedulingof 2.7Z of GDP (aboutUS$175 million) per year (see Table 2.9). While the amount of reschedulingrequired falls over the period, note that Bolivia is expected to need some amount of debt relief even in the year 2000. Repaymentof all scheduleddebt servicewould be futile for Bolivia and its creditors,as it would make it impossibleto finance the investmentnecessary to produce the output and exports essential to service the debt in the future. This principlehas been recognizedin reschedulingof bilateral debt servicewith the Paris Club, which provided Bolivia the so-calledToronto terms in the March 1990 meetings. The recent agreementswith Argentina and Brazil (see Chapter I) have reducedthe projected ratios of debt to GDP and debt serviceto exports from what was expected one year ago. Despite the consiaerablerescheduling of bilateral debt service due (whichhas the effect of raising future debt ratios), strong export performanceand moderate GDP growth result in a fall in the ratio of public sector debt to GDP to 53? in the year 2000, compared to 79Z in 1989, and in the debt service ratio to 30?, compared to 412 in 1989. - 34 -

Table 2.9s Financinaof Investment.1990-2000 (percentof GDP at current prices)

1988 1989 1990 2000 1990-2000

Uses of Funds 23.2 20.1 27.9 22.8 24.8

Investment 11.9 12.2 15.6 16.9 16.7 ScheduledDebt Service /a 10.3 9.7 10.7 5.3 7.5 Reserves Increases 1.0 -1.9 2.6 0.7 0.6

Sources of Financing 23.2 20.1 27.9 22.8 24.8

Domestic Savings 7.9 8.5 10.0 15.3 13.3 Project Disbursements 9.3 8.8 8.6 2.6 4.8 Capital Inflows lb 1.3 -0.5 4.9 3.6 4.1 Required Rescheduling from BilateralCreditors /c 4.8 3.3 4.4 1.4 2.5

Memorandum Items

Debt Service Ratio /d 55.3 41.3 44.4 18.7 30.1 Debt to GDP Ratio /d 99.3 78.8 78.3 53.1 66.9

/a Includes other net factor servicepayments. Ib Net of capital outflows Ic Reschedulingnecessary to reduce externalpayments such that projected investmentlevels can be financed from domestic and external savings. All reschedulingexpected to come from bilateralcreditors. /d Long-termpublic sector debt only.

74. Brazil Power Proiect Scenario. This scenario shows the impact on output and external accounts of the proposedproject to sell natural gas products to Brazil. The Governmentof Brazil has agreed to purchase electricityand petrochemicalproducts from Bolivia. The Boliviansare undertakingan investmentproject which would constructa gas-fired thermoelectricplant to produce 450 megawattsof electricpower, a petrochemicalcomplex to produce urea and polyethylene,and a gas pipeline from the Santa Cruz area to Puerto Suarez (near the border with Brazil)where the projectwould be located. In addition,investments to develop additional sources of natural gas will be required to ensure that sufficientgas is availablethrough the life of the project. The projects are discussedin the review of the hydrocarbonsinvestment program in Chapter III. - 35 -

75. The impact of this project on Bolivian investment,exports, and Government revenueswould be substantial. Given the greateruncertainty concerningthe petrochemicalcomplex, we consider only the gas pipeline and power plant. The total amount of investmentis estimatedat US$605 million, or more than one and a half times public sector investmentin 1989. US$570 million would be borrowed from official creditors,and the Governmentwould contributethe balance. Projectedexport revenues from the project average US$169 million per year from 1994-2000,not includingpossible revenues from liquids generatedthrough developmentof new sourcesof natural gas. Assuming that most of the financewould be borrowed at nonconcessionalterms, the net foreign exchange receipts (gross revenuesminus debt servicepayments and operationalcosts) from 1994-2000would average US$86 per year, or 5.3% of exports.

76. The projectwould increaseGDP growth,both during the investment and productionphases of the project. Results of simulationsof a computable general equilibriummodel by UDAPE, the governmentresearch unit, show that the increase in output due to greater investmentexpenditures during the constructionphase of the projectwould be about 12 per year. We expect that only 25Z of the investmentwill be spent in Bolivia (the projecthas a high import content),which is equivalentto almost 12 of GDP per year. If constructionis underway by 1991, productioncould begin in 1993 and reach its maximum level by 1997. At that point, the rise in Government revenueswould permit an increase in domestic expendituresof 12 of GDP per year above the base case projections. If most of this is spent on investment(by the public sector and through increasingcredit lines to the private sector), an ICOR of 4 implies that a rise of investmentequivalent to 12 of GDP would raise GDP growth by roughly .25Z per year. This, plus the short term rise in demand due to the higher level of domestic expenditures,would increaseGDP growth by about 0.5Z per year through the latter half of the 1990s, compared to the base case (see Table 2.10). - 36 -

Table 2.10: lm_act of the Brazil Scenario.1991-2000

Relative to Base Case/l Absolute Level/b 1990-93 1994-2000 1990-93 1994-2000

Percentage Change GDP 1.1 0.5 5.1 4.7 Exports 1.3 0.7 6.8 6.2 Imports 2.4 0.1 9.2 4.0

Percentage Investment/GDP 1.9 1.0 17.3 17.8 CurrentAccount/GDP -1.7 0.2 -10.9 -6.5 Debt Service/Exports/c 1.5 0.6 34.9 23.2 Debt/GDP Ic 6.9 -0.8 83.9 64.3

/A Change in indicatorin comparisonto base case. Positive sign indicates scenario is higher than in base case. For example, the table shows that GDP in the scenariois grows one percentagepoint more rapidly from 1990-93 than GDP in the base case. /b Level in the scenario. /! End of period.

77. Overall, the Brazil project, if successfullycompleted, would result in a significantincrease in economicactivity. Investmentwould be higher. both during constructionof the project and because of increased revenues during the productionphase. Importsand the current account deficit would jump relative to the base case during construction,since the projectwould require about US$200 million in additionalimports in each year. The debt service ratio is slightlyhigher in the scenario than in the base case by the year 2000, because the percentagechange in debt service exceeds the percentage change in exports. However, both the debt to GDP and debt to exportswould decline in the scenario comparedto the base case. Also, the expected life of the project is about 25 years. Thus the likely incrementto output and investmentthroughout the life of the project (even in present value terms) are greatly understatedby projectionswhich end in 2000.

78. The major uncertaintyconcerns what happens if Bolivia undertakes the project but never receives the expected flow of foreign exchange,either due to failure to complete constructionor because Brazil doesn't pay for receipt of the electricity. In the absence of some form of insuranceagainst such an event, Boliviawould be left with about US$570 million in debt at hard terms, much of it owed to multilateralcreditors and hence not subject to rescheduling. Beginning in 1996, expected debt servicepayments would be about US$75 million per year, averaging62 of export revenues and 32 of Government revenues per year from 1996-2000. It is difficultto calculate the impact of such a calamity on the Bolivian economy. The Governmentwould have - 37 - to choose between immediatelycutting imports,expenditures, and thus output, or abrogatingits internationalagreements and drasticallyreducing official aid flows. The high risk dramatizesthe need for'equityparticipation by private sector firms and sufficientthird-party guarantees of repaymentof the debt service in case of failure of the project.

79. Conclusion. These projectionsshow the conditionsunder which Bolivia can achieve significantincreases in output while reducing dependence on external donors. Under the base case, the Bolivian economy in the year 2000 would be very different from today. GDP per capita would have risen above US$700 (in constant 1988 prices), compared to US$570 in 1988. Debt and debt servicewould have fallen significantlyin relation to output and exports. The capital stock would have risen to levels sufficientto achieve even higher output growth in the future. Domestic savingswould finance the bulk of-investment. Considerablediversification in exports and in production for the domesticmarket would have been achieved,reducing Bolivia's vulnerabilityto primary product prices and, more generally,increasing the flexibilityof the economy.

80. The downside of this vis' a of the future is that per capita consumptionwould increaseonly slowly from the current, depressedlevels. Reducing consumptiongrowth today to permit faster growth in the future will present an enormous politicalchallenge to the Bolivian Governmentand society. The public must believe that this sacrificeis necessaryto avoid long-termstagnation, must perceive that public sector expendituresare necessary and efficient,and must have confidencein the Government'slong- term commitmentto the policy framework. Further, the poor can not be asked to pay an excessiveprice for development. Thus, within the budget constraint elaborated in section II, effortsto redistributeGovernment services from the middle class and the wealthy to the poor are essential. All of these goals add up to a daunting policy agenda for BolivianGovernments over the next decade. - 38 -

CHAPTERIII: PUBLIC SECTORINVESTMENT REVIW

A. Investment Programina

81. Proiect Selection. Managementof the public sector investment program improved greatly in the secondhalf of the 1980s. The Government eliminatedmany of the wasteful and over-dimensionedprojects which characterizedthe pre-1985 program,began to focus investmentresources on public goods while reducing state interventionin productiveactivities which could be undertakenmore efficientlyby the private sector, and greatly expanded the availabilityand improved the qualityof informationon investment. These reformsprovided the frameworknecessary for the efficient managementof investmentresources.

82. Further improvementsin project selectionare necessary. The Governmenthas supporteda few projectswhich either are too expensiveor would involve the state in productiveactivities better left to the private sector. These undesirableprojects make up only a small percentageof programmedexpenditures for this year. Some are only in the pre-investment phase, while others have not yet been included in the budget. Nevertheless, it is importantto highlightproblems at an early stage to avoid potentially large expenditureson inappropriateprojects over the next few years. The Governmentand interesteddonors should review programmed investmentsto eliminateprojects which are overly expensiveor inconsistentwith limiting the public sector's role in productiveactivities. The followingprojects are particularlyworrisome: constructionof the Misicuni water project in Cochabamba;development of the Villamontes-Sachaperaagricultural project; constructionof the Oruro-Pisigaroad; building new terminalsfor the Cochabamba and La Paz airports;and constructionof the new hospital in Potosi on the scale progosed. Table 3.1 lists the doubtful projects and amounts of money involved.9y

91 The estimatesof investmentfunds to be devoted to each project are subject to considerableuncertainty, particularly as the scale of many of these investmentshas not been determined. The figures in Table 3.1 reflect proposals obtained from the Ministry of Planning or sectoral ministries. - 39 -

Table 3.1a Questionable Proiects

Proiect Amount Comments (USSmil)

Misicuni 69 This is minimum level. Investment recommendedin feasibilitystudy is US$129 million.

Villamontea 217 Governmentis reducingplanned investmentbut final figure not available.

Oruro-Pisiga Unknown Would duplicateother road.

CochabambaPhase II 40 Mostly for terminalconstruction.

La Paz Airport 62 Only US$14 million justifiable.

Potosi Hospital 7 Present demand could be met with US$1-2 million investment.

83. The above list can not be used to evaluate the investmentprogram prepared by the Ministry of Planning. Some of the projects mentioned are not in the formal investmentprogram, or are only included as preinvestment studies. Some are under ceasiderationby sectoralministries or decentralized agencies,and it is likely that many will be scaled down or eliminatedonce a thorough review is done by Planning. The purpose of citing these projects is to alert the Governmentand the donors to inappropriateinvestment expendituresnow being consideredat various levels of the Bolivian Government. The Governmenthas indicatedsupport for all of these projects, either through public statementsor by includingthese investmentsin their proposalsto donor agencies. We strongly recommendthat the Governmentand donors reallocatethese funds to more productiveuses.

84. Overview of the InvestmentProgram. Table 3.2 provides summary informationon the investmentprogram. Investmentin 1989 fell slightlybelow the 1988 figure, owing to a shortfallof disbursementsin external funds. The allocationof investmentexpenditures across sectorshas not changed greatly over the past two years. Transportationand hydrocarbonstraditionally have taken up a large share of investmentresources, the former due to the particularlydifficult problems Bolivia faces in the sector and the relatively large investmentsnecessary to effectivelytackle critical areas, the latter because of the significantrevenues earned by the state in hydrocarbons. It is necessary to raise private sector investmentin hydrocarbons,and the Governmentshould return as many of YPFB's responsibilitiesto the private sector as possible. Investmentin the social sectors remained at about 2Z of - 40 - total expenditures(not includingexpenditures by the Emergency Social Fund). Given social conditionsin Bolivia, increasedspending in the social sectors is a high priority.

85. The 1990 investmentprogram envisionsa 372 rise in expenditures, but whether this amount actuallywill be spent is open to question. A substantialincrease from the 1989 level should be feasible,as long as last year's severe fiscal problems (due to the Argentine arrears and political difficultiesrelated to the elections)are not repeated. However, the programmedfigure is suspectbecause it includesUS$156 million for hydrocarbons,which reflectsthe overly-ambitiousinvestment program maintainedby YPFB, the state enterpriseresponsible for the hydrocarbons sector. For the past three years, programmedinvestment in hydrocarbonshas averagedUS$160 million per year, while actual expenditureshave averagedonly US$90 million. Assuming that hydrocarbonsinvestment in 1990 equals the 1989 level, and that the rest of the program is fully executed,total public sector investmentwould reach about US$400 million.

86. The investmentprogram for 1991-92has limited usefulnessas a guide to the level or sectoral distributionof public sector investment. The program is based on the availabilityof donor funds and proposals from sectoral entities rather than developmentpriorities. For example, the troublingfall in prograimmedinvestments in the power, water and urban sectors may not occur if additionalprojects are approved by donors. Note that the increase in investmentin hydrocarbonsin 1991-92 reflects the plan to sell natural gas-basedproducts to Brazil. - 41 -

Table 3.2: n_vestmentProgram. 1987-92 (US$ millions)

Actual Programed 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992

Agriculture 23.2 51.7 34.7 44.0 59.0 49.4 Mining 4.0 12.9 13.1 19.0 19.2 20.2 Hydrocarbons 87.9 92.3 89.7 156.4 222.0 386.1 Power 21.4 22.5 23.9 27.4 13.6 3.1 Transportation 86.0 118.2 120.2 127.6 105.8 94.8 Health 5.4 3.2 5.7 13.0 14.8 15.4 Education 4.8 1.1 1.4 1.2 5.5 1.5 Water and Urban /a 18.0 27.5 24.2 39.6 16.4 5.6 Others lb 21.2 22.7 28.3 38.7 27.3 23.4

Total Investment 272.1 352.3 341.3 466.9 483.6 599.5

Memorandum Item Actual Expendituresas a Percentageof Program 47.2 90.6 64.4

/a Includes sanitation,water resources,urban projects,and housing. lb Includes industry,communications, multisectoral, and unallocated projects.

87. Investmentftogramai-xl In the CentralMinistries. The collection, organization,and presentationof informationon public sector investmenthas improved greatly. Prior to 1986, the Governmenthad only partial knowledge of the allocationof investmentexpenditures, owing to chaotic economic conditionsand administrativeweaknesses throughout the public sector. Over the past three years, the PlanningMinistry has elaborateda computerized system for organizinginformation on public sector investmentprojects. The first step focused on financialinformationt what projects are planned or being undertaken;how much will they cost; how much has been spent; what shara of costs must be covered by Governmentresources, and by which agency; and how much will be financed by external donors, and by which donor. Used effectively,this informationcan assist the Governmentin avoiding inefficientor unnecessaryprojects, in controllingcosts, and in better organizingnegotiations with foreign donors. The strategyhas been to begin operationof the system at the Ministry of Planning and then to decentralize the system to involve sectoralministries. decentralized agencies, and regional developmentcorporations in the collectionand processingof data.

88. Work is now underway in expandingthe Ministry of Planning'ssystem to include informationsufficient to evaluate investmentprojects. New componentsof the system have been developedto track physical indicatorsof - 42 - project execution,as opposed to the purely financialinformation provided until now; to evaluate the likely rate of return of investmentprojects; and to measure the impact of investmenton growth, employment,and foreign exchange receipts. These impruvementsshow great promise in providing effectivetools for managing invastment. Most importantly,standardized informationon the profitabilityof individualprojects will alert the Governmentto bad projects,while physical indicatorsof executionwill assist the Government to address bottlenecksto implementation. Effectiveuse of these systemswill require that informa'ionon projects be provided to the Ministry of Planning in a more uniform format than in the past. For example, preinvestmentstudies should include a standard form with summary information on project costs and benefits,using definitionsprovided by Planning. This would increase the ease of processingthe large amounts of data involved,and improve the reliabilityand comparabilityof the results.

89. Investmentand the Budget. Coordinationof informationhas improved between the investmentprogram managed by the Ministry of Planning and the budget managed by the Ministry of Finance. In past years, budgeted investment levels far exceeded execution,largely due to politicalpressures to include projects at the budget programmingstage. From 1987-89,the budget included investmentexpenditures exceeding US$500 million per year, while actual expendituresaveraged about US$320 million. To respond to pressuresto budget investmentswhile maintainingan effectiveplanning tool, the Planning Ministry developeda core program,which includesprojects for which financing is available,and a complementaryprogram, for which finance is uncertainor under negotiation. A problemwith the core programwas that it reflectedthe availabilityof funding rather than investmentpriorities, but at least it provided a realisticview of likely investmentexpenditures. Some progress was made in this rather artificialarrangement in preparationof the 1990 budget, in which the core programwas expanded and incorporatedin the budget document.

90. Investmentat the SectoralLevel. Despite these improvementsin central planning,the selectionand evaluationof investmentprojects at the sectoral level (by sectorministries, decentralized agencies, regional developmentcorporations, and municipalities)remains weak. These difficultiesare describedin each of the sector discussions. To summarize, many sectors lack the financial,administrative and technicalresources necessaryto evaluate or propose projects. In some sectors, agencies responsiblefor coordinationdo not know what investmentprojects are underway in their sector. Project selectionis largely determinedby donor proposals, leading to a lack of coherence in investmentplanning, inadequate supervision of projects,and poor coordinationamong projects. In other sectors,agencies may have detailed investmentplans and sufficienttechnical expertise, but the sharing of informationwith the centralministries is limited. Consequently, investmentplans do not take into account limitationson resourcesfrom the central ministries and are not subjectto independentevaluation. Weakness in the informationprovided at the sector level severelyimpairs the effectivenessof investmentprogramming by the centralministries. The effectivenessof the improvementsin informationsystems describedabove depends on the quality of data provided from the sectors. Improvementsin the - 43 - planning and evaluationof investmentsat the sector levels are thus essential for investmentprogramming to have a real impact on the quality of investment projects undertaken.

B. Transportation

91. Overview. Bolivia faces a difficultchallenge in transportations the mountainousterrain and extreme climatic conditionsmake the unit cost of transport constructionvery high; lack of direct access to the sea increases Bolivia's dependenceon neighbors for internationalcommerce; and the low populationdensity means that traffic levels are unusually low, further increasingunit costs. These barriers have been compoundedby low levels of investmentand neglect of existing infrastructure.As a result of these difficulties,transport costs within Bolivia and between Bolivia and maritime ports are much higher than in other countries.

92. The highest return on transportexpenditures at this time can be found in upgradingexisting infrastructurewhich serves relativelyproductive areas. Therefore,priorities in the investmentprogram include: a) maintenance and rehabilitationof the existing road and rail network; b) integrationof the three main populatedareas of the country by rehabilitating and paving sections of the La Paz-Cochabamba-SantaCruz highway; c) upgrading of two priority export corridors,one to the Atlantic and one to the Pacific; and d) constructionof penetrationroads in the lowlands to areas of high agriculturalpotential.

93. Proceduresfor Approval of InvestmentProlects. Procedures for selectinginvestment projects need improvement. The transportstrategy developedby the Ministry of Planning in 1988-89 does not take sufficient account of investmentbudget constraintsand has ri3tbeen implementedby the operationalagencies. Economic and financialanalyses of proposed investments are not adequate,insufficient attention is paid to alternativeways to achieve a given objective,the Governmentlacks independentevaluations to check the conclusionsof studiesperformed by donor agencies,and more effectivecoordination among the various public sector entities involved in transportationis necessary. Project costs are frequentlyexcessive, even taking into account the special problems faced by Bolivia. All too often, projects are designed to standardsthat are too high given the unusuallylow traffic levels and high constructioncosts in Bolivia. Lack of adequate, objective analysesof project costs and benefits means that decisionsare more responsiveto politicalpressures than to economic considerations.

94. The investmentprogram prepared by the Ministry of Planning is generally sound, althougha few projects are either seriouslyoverdimensioned or unnecessary. However, the PlanningMinistry's investment program may not reflect all planned investments,particularly as in past years money has been spent on investmentsnot included in preliminaryversions of the investment program. This reflectsdifficulties in obtaininginformation or. investment plans from the regional developmentcorporations and some decentralized - 44 - agencies. Therefore,the followingdiscussion includes projects which are being consideredby some public entity,even if they are not in the Planning Ministry's investmentprogram.

95. Roads. As a first step in evaluatingthe many road projects in the investmentprograms prepared by the ServicioNacional de Caminos (SNC) and the Planning Ministry,we have roughlyclassified construction projects according to their expected rates of return,based on the expected traffic level and cost. Projectionsof traffic levels are from SNC. Since reliable information on costs is not availablefor most projects,expected costs have been estimated on the basis of the type of project and location. Projectshave been classified into eight types, and the terrain in which the project is located into three types.1 0Y For the average cost of a projectwith each combinationof type and terrain, a minimum projectedtraffic level has been estimatedfor the project to earn a rate of return of at least 12X. This calculationhas been adjusted for projectswhere the proportionof trucks or buses is higher than usual, implying smaller levels of trafficnecessary to achieve the minimum rate of return. This minimum traffic level is then compared to the expected traffic level. Table 3.3 shows this ratio for constructionprojects included in either the SNC or Planning Ministry program. A ratio of more than one implies that the expected traffic exceeds the minimum traffic necessary for a 122 rate of return.

10/ The types are basic earth road, earth to gravel surface, gravel to paved surface, earth to paved surface,reconstruction, resurface, and bridge construction. The types of terrain are altiplano,valleys, and lowlands. - 45 -

Table 3.3s Road Construction Projects

Investment Proiect USS Million Ratio Unit Cost Program (Thous.US$)/a

Ratio Greater than 1

La Paz - Cotapata 2.0 2.5 200 MP, SNC Confital - Caihuasi 50.0 2.0 1250 MP, SNC Panamericano- Villamontes 120.0 1.3 500 MP, SNC P. Rico - Nueva Ethea 0.6 1.2 8 MP, SNC Rio Seco - Desaguadero 31.5 1.1 328 MP, SNC Rio Yata - Santa Ana 1.2 1.0 8 MP, SNC P. Japones - Tambo Quemado 16.2 1.0 100 MP, SNC Cotapata - S. Barbara 126.8 1.0 3019 SNC

Ratio Between 0.7 and 1

Patacamaya- P. Japones 43.8 0.9 768 MP, SNC Machacamarca- Challapata 45.0 0.9 523 MP, SNC San Borja - Trinidad 71.7 0.7 393 SNC Challapata- Tarapaya 81.0 0.7 440 SNC S. Buenaventura- Ixiamas 4.9 0.7 44 MP, SNC

Ratio Less Than 0.7

Sucre - Tarabuco 38.8 0.6 606 SNC Tiquina - Khasani 45.1 0.6 1128 SNC Padcaya - Bermejo 166.0 0.6 1038 SNC Palmer Grande - Yacuiba 27.2 0.5 453 MP, SNC Totocoa - P. Mendez 11.0 0.5 137 MP, SNC Palmer Grande - Camiri 71.0 0.4 341 SNC Santa Cruz - Trinidad 55.2 0.4 101 MP, SNC Ruta de los Libertadores 255.0 0.3 557 SNC Villa Tunari - San Ignacio 168.2 0.3 570 SNC Quiquibey- Yucumo 46.8 0.1 1113 MP, SNC

/a The unit cost estimatesare derived by dividingthe proposed investmentby the number of kilometers. Given the lack of detailed analysis for many investmentproposals, the unit cost estimateswere not used in calculating the expected rate of return. Rather, the procedureoutlined in paragraph 5 was used for each project.

96. By these admittedlyrough criteria,the investmentprogram provided by the Ministry of Planning looks pretty good. Note that most of the Planning Ministry'sprojects have ratios of expected-to-minimumtraffic levels of greater than 0.9, implyingacceptable rates of return. Of the larger projects - 46 -

(greaterthan US$25 million),only Palmer Grande-Yacuiba,Santa Cruz-Trinidad, and Quiquibey-Yucumohave ratios less than 0.7. By contrast,the SNC budget contains a number of projectswith unacceptablylow rates of return and very high levels of investment,particularly Sucre-Tarabuco, Tuiquina-Khasani, Padcaya-Bermejo,Ruta de los Libertadores,and Villa Tunari-SanIgnacio. These projects alone amount to planned investmentof US$673 million, or more than is programmedto be spent on investmentin transportationfor the next three years. As stated above, these calculationsare quite rough, and should be used only as indicatorsof potentialproblems. Still, it appears that the SNC budget could use a very thorough review. Finally, the unit cost estimates for Confital-Caihuasiand Cotapata-SantaBarbara appear excessivelyhigh. The studies for these projectsneed to be reviewedto determinewhether less expensivedesigns are possible.

97. We have not applied a similarmethodology to feasibilitystudies, given the greater uncertaintyconcerning adoption and ultimate design of the project. However, we should point out our concern over the US$1.3 million which is budgeted for 1990 to finance the feasibilitystudy for the Oruro- Pisiga road, which would duplicatethe proposed Tambo Quemado-Patacamayaroad. There does not appear to be any economicjustification for investigatingthis project.

98. Railroads. The investmentprogram presentedby the Ministry of Planning for railroadsshows an appropriatefocus on maintenanceand repair of existing capital stock. Major projects include the Bank-financedExport Corridorsproject, rehabilitationof locomotives,and the purchase of maintenanceequipment. As in the case of roads, investmentproposals under discussion in ENFE, the state railroad company, are less desirable. Some of these latter projects appear to be over-dimensioned,with requests for more equipment than would be requiredby an efficientlyoperated railway.The planned purchases of 150 multi-use cars and 50 containerwagons might be profitable,but it would be preferableto allow the private sector to perform this service. Most of the other capitalpurchases are probably not necessary. The purchase of new locomotivesshould be reconsidered,as rehabilitated locomotivesshould provide sufficientadditional capacity for at least the next three years. It is particularlytroubling that additionalpurchases of locomotivesare consideredafter the considerableexpenditures (financed under IDA, OECF and KFW credits) on spare parts to maintain existing locomotives. Similarly,the proposal to purchase five containercranes is excessive. For example, among the proposed sites for the cranes is Guaqui, the rail - 47 - connectionbetween Bolivia and Peru, despite the fact that there are presently no containermovements between these two countries. Finally,purchases of wagons and passengervehicles should be reviewedusing commercialcriteria.

99. Besides changes to the investmentprogram, it is essentialthat ENFE's operationsbe revamped to increaseefficiency. Railroad operations were a common subject of complaintby the private sector,particularly in interviewsin Santa Cruz. That region is heavily dependenton rail services as the major link with Brazil. Private sector representativescited a high level of inefficiencyand corruptionin the railroad,and are pressing for the constructionof new roads which would competewith the railroad,fer example from Santa Cruz to Puerto Suarez. They believe that a road would be a preferablemeans of transportation,despite the much lower unit costs involved in efficiently-operatedrail transportof bulk goods, owing to the inadequaciesof ENFE's administration. In view of the high cost of road construction,however, there is little alternativeto improvingthe railway's efficiency. In this respect,the Governmentmay also consider privatizing portions of ENFE's operations. One proposal is to allow the private sector to operate trains using facilitiesowned by ENFE. Coordinationbetween private sector operatorsand ENFE would have to be carefullymanaged, and explicit standardsfor maintenanceand operationswould be required to prevent deteriorationof facilities. Another idea is to lease cars to private sector firms which would then sell the space. These proposalswill require further study, in conjunctionwith efforts to reorganizeENFE and streamline operations.

100. Airports. The Ministry of Planning'sinvestment program includes only limited sums for airport development,which is appropriategiven the much greater benefits to be gained from rail and road investments. The major exception is the Cochabambaairport, a project on which work has already started and which will cost US$46 million for the first phase of development. This is a waste of scarce investmentfunds. Since work on the new runway has already begun, the Governmentshould spend the minimum amount of money necessary to make it operational. It is essentialthat the Governmentput a stop to plans for Phase II of the project, under which a new terminalwould be constructedfor an additionalUS$61 million. In this context, it is unfortunatethat the Governmenthas proposed that Italy finance the second phase of the project. We urge the Italian and Bolivian Governmentsto reallocatethese funds to higher-priorityuses.

101. Initial expenditureson the La Paz airport are also included in the investmentprogram. Improvementsin runwaysand equipmentare necessary to overcome deferredmaintenance and bring the airport up to the minimum standardsrequired by the InternationalCivil Aviation Organization,at an estimated cost of US$13 million. However, AASANA is consideringa proposal to spend US$62 million, which would include completelyrebuilding the terminal. The benefits from this latter proposal are not clear, and should be rejected by the Government.

102. AASANA has a number of ambitiousplans to increaseairport developmentwhich are not included in the Ministry of Planning'sinvestment program. Projects to build or improve airports in Potosi, Cobija, and - 48 -

Riberaltatogether would cost US$40 million. These projects either should be eliminatedor considerablyreduced in size. One problem in airport developmentis that MASANA lacks the expertisenecessary to properly evaluate proposals from donors or to develop alternatives. At a minimum, new proposalsfrom donors for airport development,including the work envisioned for La Paz, should be accompaniedby technicalassistance to AASANA to develop an independentcapability to evaluate projects.

103. The Governmentshould clarify its position concerningwhether to privatizeLloyd Air Boliviano (LAB). LAB would be an excellentcandidate for privatizationon economic grounds,as the Governmentcould probably get a good price for the airline and private sector managementwould improve service. If privatizationdoes not turn out to be feasible,LAB could study the feasibilityof changing its strategy for servicingsecond-tier airports. Rather than the proposed purchase of 727's, the airline could consider obtaininga fleet of P27's, smallerplanes that could be operatedat lower cost. Using smallerplanes for the second-tierairports would also avoid the need for some of the expensiveairport improvementsmentioned in the preceding paragraph. This projectwould require study, but it provides an example of the potential for more efficientuse of investmentfunds.

104. Rivers. The investmentprogram includes limited funds for river development,largely in the Beni. This region lacks basic transport facilitiesand proposalsfor improvementsto river navigationand to river ports would be an attractiveand relativelyinexpensive means of increasing commerce. In addition,the Ministry of Defense is still consideringthe developmentof Puerto Busch, a port on the Paraguay River, at a cost of US$80 million for developmentand an additionalUS$100 million for related infrastructure. The market for the iron ore which would be transported through this facility is far too uncertainto warrant such a large investment, particularlywhen smaller quantitiescan be shipped out from Corumba at reasonablecost. Further studiesare necessaryto see if the expected output of iron ore in the area would justify a limited investmentin facilities. A proposal to build a second port at Quijarro (also on the Paraguay River) is premature. The two latter proposalsare not includedin the Ministry of Planning's list of investmentprojects, and may not be seriouslyconsidered by the Government.

C. Agriculture

105. Overview. Bolivian agricultureis in crisis; agricultural production in 1988 was 42 below the 1985 level. With the exceptionof soybeans (and possibly coca), there has been no significantincrease in yields over the last decade. Key constraintson agriculturalproduction include inadequateinfrastructure, the confused land tenure situation,low levels of investment,weak administrativesupport, lack of applied researchcapable of formulatingeffective technology packages and lack of effectiveextension services,except for those organizedby the commercial farmers in the lowlands. These difficultiesare particularlysevere in the altiplano,where - 49 - productivity,incomes, and welfare remain severely depressed. Any successful program to alleviatepoverty in Boliviawill have to address the extremely difficultproblems which beset agriculturein the altiplanollt

106. Programs to assist the agriculturalsector are hampered by lack of consensuson the directionof Bolivian development. Basic issues remain unresolved,for example: can the altiplanosupport its presentpopulation at an acceptable standardof living? are there differentcrops or techniques which could increaseproductivity? what are the benefits and costs of encouraginggreater migration to the lowlands?and what are the appropriate roles of the government,foreign donors, non-governmentalorganizations, and the private sector? Given the extreme uncertaintyconcerning such fundamental issues, governmentefforts have tended to be scattered,uncoordinated, and frequentlyineffective.

107. InstitutionalProblems. The lack of a clear developmentstrategy is furthercompounded by the severe institutionalweaknesses in the public sector. The Ministry of Agricultureand CampesinoAffairs (MACA)has a shortage of qualified staff due to the very low salariespaid, particularlyat technicaland middle-managementlevels. Inadequatesalaries make it impossibleto competewith the private sector for qualifiedpersonnel and impairs the morale and productivityof MACA employees.

108. MACA's weakness has made it difficultto effectivelyorganize investmentwithin the sector. Low salarieshave meant that the Ministry can not hire sufficientquantity or quality of personnelnecessary to evaluate investmentprojects. Further, the exchangeof informationon investment projects among the agencies involved in sector planning (MACA, its decentralizedagencies, the Ministry of Planning,the Ministry of Finance, and the Regional DevelopmentCorporations) is inadequate. For example, there is no formal system for MACA to be informedof agriculturalprojects agreed to between donors and other Governmentagencies. It also appears that the informationon investmentprovided by MACA to the Ministry of Planning is of poorer quality than in other sectors. In 1987, actual public sector investmentin agriculturewas only 37Z of the amount programmed,while in 1988 it was 1841 of the programmed level, because a number of projects were left out of the program initially. In 1989 94Z of the programmedinvestment level was executed.

109. The sector is now undergoinga reorganizationto strengthenMACA's planning,programming and budgetingcapabilities and to improve the decision- making and implementationcapabilities of the RegionalDevelopment Corporations. As a part of this process, a Projects Directoratehas been created in MACA which will evaluate investmentproposals prior to submission to the Ministry of Planning. It is presentlytoo early to tell how well this new systemwill function.

llJ Efforts to improve the incomesof the poor in the agriculturalsector are addressedin the Poverty Report for Bolivia. - 50 -

110. InvestmentProlects. The inherent difficultiesof the sector, lack of a coherent developmentstrategy, and institutionalweaknesses have severely limited the effectivenessof the public sector in designing,evaluating or managing investmentprojects. As a result, public sector investmentin agricultureis determinedby the interestsof donors. This trend is strengthenedby the availabilityof salary supplementsworth many times the normal Ministry salary for work on donor projects. The better officialsthus tend to seek out donor projects, and tend to follow the directivesof aid agencies,particularly in the absence of clear guidanceon strategy from the Ministry. This strong role for donors is the inevitableresult of a weak public sector. If donors had not assumed this role, investmentwould be in even worse shape than it is at present.

111. Donor determinationof investmentprojects also imposes significant costs. Donors may have specific intereststhat are not appropriatefor Bolivia. For example, donor requirementsfor the use of funds may direct efforts away from the most promisingareas towards subjects favoredby the donor, or project selectionmay be affected by the interestsof exportersin donor countries. The government'sinability to effectivelyevaluate investmentprojects permits the operationof ineffectiveprojects and consequentwaste of investmentresources. In some cases, projectswith little benefit continue to operatebecause the donor agency is too far away, and MACA has too little resources,to oversee operations. For example, a project to control erosion in the Cochabambavalley by planting trees and building earth dams may have increasederosion through building a road to the project site. Technologyprovided by donors may not be appropriatefor Bolivia. For example, hatch rates at the fish farm in Lake Titicaca are very low, because the water is not of sufficientquality. The technology,which worked well in the donor country, simply does not work in Lake Titicaca,although it might be appropriatein some of the smallerBolivian lakes. This project also illustratesthe dangers of startingwith a large investmentproject without first testing an idea through small pilot projects.

112. The pitfalls in the supply-drivenapproach to investmentprojects also can be seen in the lengthy period required for proposalsto be translated into projects. The Alto Beni DevelopmentProject was designed to provide credit, technicalassistance, infrastructure, and marketing assistancefor settlers in the Beni. An initial study was done 6-7 years ago, but no progress has been made since then. The project was finally dropped from the investmentprogram submittedfor the 1990 budget. Studies of the Ulloma ConstructionProject were initiallydone in the mid-1970s,and then resubmittedin 1987. The latter projectmay not be desirablebecause of environmentalconcerns. Still, the point remains that the Government lacked the ability to either accept or reject these projects leading to substantial delays and perhaps reducing the supply of investmentfunds to Bolivia.

113. The public sector investmentprogram is characterizedby a large number of relativelysmall projects managed by decentralizedagencies, non- governmentalorganizations, and regionalgovernments. These projects have provided a wide variety of experienceon what works and what doesn't, although it does not appear that this informationis collectedand organized so as to be useful for policy decisions. This distributionof projects is preferable - 51 - to a small number of large projectsmanaged by a strong centralministry, particularlygiven the uncertaintyover the most effectivestrategy for agriculturaldevelopment in Bolivia. Also, many of the high priority investmentactivities probably work better on a smallerscale. Technical assistancecan best be adapted to the needs of specific communitiesif extensionworkers have a high degree of flexibility,best achieved by smaller projects. Small-scaleirrigation projects have achieved greater success than larger projects: large irrigationprojects may have unforseen effects, as for example in the case of the irrigationproject in the altiplanowhich is blocking up the DesaguaderoRiver; small projects tend to have greater success in cost recovery,because the free-riderproblem is less and small communities have more effective sanctionsfor non-paymentthan do regional governments; and the management skills necessary for efficientoperation of a large enterpriseare often lacking. Administrationof many small projectshas been particularlyeffective due to the participationof non-governmental organizations,many of which have a good record and the resourcesto become intensivelyinvolved in a limitednumber of small efforts. At the same time, it is importantto have an efficientcentral ministry to set standardsfor projects and ensure effectivecoordination of decentralizedactivities.

114. The potentialfor problemswith large projects can be seen in one of the ambitiousagricultural development projects which remains in the investmentprogram. US$1.6 million is programmedfor 1990 for a feasibility study for Villamontes-Sachapera,an agroindustrialproject in Tarija. In its present form (which is not yet included in the investmentprogram), US$216 million would be spent over ten years to clear 17,500 hectares of forest and construct a factory to process the timber; supportwheat, corn and soya farms; constructplants to process these agriculturalproducts; construct a turbine for energy generation;and undertakerelated developmentprojects. The Governmenthas evaluatedthe internal rate of return on this project as 7.3Z, indicatinga very low return since financialcosts are not taken into account. This is the kind of effort which failed during the unhappy experiencewith large, integratedagricultural development projects in the 1970s. While the Governmentis consideringscaling down the size of the project, it would be preferableto eliminate it, as the public sector should not take on this kind of productive enterprise. Even undertakingthe feasibilitystudy may be dangerous,as it tends to create pressures for continuingwith implementation, which the Governmentmay find hard to resist.

115. This discussionemphasizes the need for MACA to use its scarce managerial resourcesto collect informationon agriculturalprojects and build a capacity to evaluate investments,both as proposalsand during operations. MACA should take advantageof the opportunityoffered by ongoing improvements in the control of financialinformation within the Government (reforms undertakenby SAFCO, improvementsto the PlanningMinistry's information systems,and studiesundertaken under the Economic Management Strengthening Operation) to collect informationon agriculturalinvestment. Organizationof the Project Directorateshould move forward to provideMACA an independent capabilityto evaluate projects. Presently,the governmentsimply does not know whether the projects in the agriculturalinvestment program are beneficialor not. The above discussionhas relied on anecdotalevidence because more comprehensiveinformation on investmentis not available. The - 52 - first step to improvingthe efficiencyof public sector investmentin agriculture is to collect the informationnecessary to form an independent judgment on ongoing and proposed investmentprojects.

D. Minin

116. Background. Mining in Boliviahas long been a major source of production,foreign exchange earnings,and Governmentrevenues. Rising prices and large-scaleinvestments fueled a public sector mining boom in the 1970s, which was then sharply reversedduring the early 1980s. COMIBOL, the state mining company, deterioratedmarkedly because of decliningmetal prices, the distortedofficial exchange rate, runaway inflation,labor unrest and Government interferencein labor decisions. From 1980 to 1985, productionper employee dropped from .7 tons to .4 tons and costs jumped from US$3 a pound to US$10, while the price of tin fell from US$8 a pound to US$5. COMIBOL built up huge operating losses even before the dramatic fall in tin prices with the collapse of the InternationalTin Council in late 1985. When the price of tin fell to below US$3 a pound in October of 1985, the Governmentof Paz Estenssoro reacted forcefullyby halting COMIBOL operations,firing approximately23,000 public sector miners, and adopting a new strategy for the mining sector.

117. Sector Stratef. The new strategy emphasizedthat the private sector should take the primary role in developingBolivia's mineral resources. The key elements of this strategywere: a) COMIBOLwas closed and then reopenedon a much smaller scale; b) areas reserved for future state exploitationwere opened to the private sector and mineral purchasing monopolies abolished;and c) a mining law was prepared which would improvethe tax system, provide for joint ventures, and simplify licensingprocedures. One impedimentto mining sector reform is the constitutionalprohibition on private sector exploitationof areas within 50 kilometersof the border. Since a number of promisingdeposits are locatednear the border, it is importantto explore alternativesfor private sector participationin these areas which would comply with the constitutionalrequirement.

118. Institutionalreforms were begun, with assistancefrom a number of foreigndonors, to support this strategy. In COMIBOL, all mines with little potentialwere closed,work was begun on modernizingthe more promisingmines, and it was agreed that COMIBOLwould open new propertiesonly with equity participationby the private sector. This approach is essentialto avoid the extreme levels of waste and inefficiencywhich have characterizedpublic sector mining in Bolivia since the nationalizationof the mines in 1952. Efforts are also underway to strengthensector institutions. The cadastral system is now in a chaotic condition. It is essentialto improve cadastral surveys to more accuratelyposition mining ventures &nd to establisha comprehensiveregistry of mining properties. These steps would improve governmentmanagement of the sector and avoid the potentialfor disputes over claims. A reorganizationof sector institutionsis also importantto improve efficiencyand increasethe availabilityof geologicaland technical informationon the mining sector. - 53 -

119. Events in 1989 had mixed implicationsfor the mining sector strategy. The recent decline in tin prices, followinga moderate recovery during 1987-88,has complicatedefforts to restructurethe state mining sector. The price of tin fell to almost US$2 a pound, and projectionsfor the price in 1990 are now around US$3 a pound. As a result, some of the mines operated by COMIBOLwhich were thoughtof as having good potentialcan no longer be operatedwith a profit. It thereforewill be necessary to review the five-yearplan to determineif more mines need to be closed. On the other hand, prospects are improvingfor non-tin mining in Bolivia, as Government efforts to encouragegreater private sector investmentare beginningto bear fruit. Two large foreign companieshave purchased substantialshares of Bolivian companies,which should facilitateincreased investment and more rapid absorptionof foreign technologyinto the sector.

120. InvestmentProgram. Recent Governmentdecisions on investment projects have reinforcedthe central strategyof reliance on private sector development. The Governmenthas decided that, contrary to some earlier indications,development of the Bolivarmine deposit would be accomplished through joint ventureswith private companies. Similarly,the Governmenthas announcedthat Karachipampa,a lead/silversmelter, also will be operated through the private sector. The Governmentalso will expand private sector operationof COMIBOL deposits to includethe so-called 'core'mines, which traditionallyhave been operated by COMIBOL. This latter proposal is particularlywelcome, and should further bolster private sector confidenceand improve efficiency. It is essentialthat these commitmentsare put into practice. State responsibilityfor mining operationshas been an extremely unfortunateexperience in Bolivia, and contributedgreatly to the economic disaster suffered during the early 1980s. There are a number of problemswith state management of minerals properties:COMIBOL lacks the administrative capacity to manage new projects effectively;public sector productionis not responsiveto profit incentives;and public sector monopolizationof the most promising ore deposits stiflesprivate sector activity and further erodes confidencein the Government'scommitment to a more liberalizedeconomic environment. We stronglysupport the Government'sdecision to rely on private sector developmentof Bolivia'sminerals resources.

E. Hydrocarbons

121. Overview. It can be argued that hydrocarbonsis the most important sector for Bolivian development. Hydrocarbonsprovide the major source of foreign exchange earnings (312 of export revenues in 1989) and of Government revenues (442 of Governmentrevenues in 1989). Since 1987, the state has spent about US$90 million per year in investmentin hydrocarbons,which has varied between one-thirdand one-quarterof the entire investmentbudget. The importanceof hydrocarbonsin the public sector investmentprogram reflects the country'ssubstantial reserves and the history of state involvementin the sector. In contrast to many other state enterprises,YPFB is run on a relativelyefficient basis and has provided large and regular transfersto the central administration. Still, YPFB is not in a position to manage extensive investmentsin explorationand developmentby itself. The Governmentis thereforecommitted to increasingprivate sector investmentin exploration, - 54 - and increasingprivate sector managementof distribution. The recent Supreme Decree 22407 provides for joint ventureswith private sector firms; a number of internationalfirms have entered into negotiationswith the Governmentto participatein exploration. The hydrocarbonscode, which is presentlyunder considerationby Congress,would provide a legal frameworkfor the joint venture agreementsand remove constraintson private sector investment, particularlyin pipelines. Passage of the code by the Congress is of primary importanceto the developmentof the hydrocarbonssector.

122. InstitutionalIssues. YPFB has achieved some improvementsin investmentprogramming. It has begun to use a model to design the optimal investmentprogram for the hydrocarbonssector. The model takes information on two to three expected productionprofiles for each field and produces the minimum-costsector investmentprogram for the productionnecessary to meet expected demand. Still, investmentplanning remains at a rudimentarylevel. The informationon expected productionused by the optimizationframework often does not reflect the best judgmentof techniciansresponsible for field development. Rather, investmentplanning has become a self-containedexercise of the central departments. PresentlyYPFB has two sections responsiblefor planning with substantiallyoverlapping duties, both of which have little impact on actual operations. Each of the operationaldepartments in Santa Cruz and Cochabamba (includingexploration, development, production, pipelines,gas, and industrialprojects) carries out its planning and budgeting separatelywith its own technicalstaff, without instructionsfrom centralizeddepartments. The operationaldepartments are reluctantto provide informationtc- the centralplanning units. Thus, while YPFB has the administrativeand technicalcapability to effectivelymanage projects,lack of coordinaticnhas greatly impairedinvestment programming. Investment planning within YPFB has little relevancefor actual investmentsmade, and typicallyincludes expendituresof at least twice the amount feasible in terms of managementcapability and availablefinance. In the pact three years, the Ministry of Planning'shydrocarbons investment program has averaged almost US$160 million per year, but executionhas averaged about US$90 million per year.

123. Lack of organizationin investmentprogramming has profound implicationsfor the sec.c. and the economy as a whole. Failure to integrate informationon expectedproduction levels and costs into a coherent investment plan means that the central administrationcan not evaluate the appropriatenessof YPFB's investmentdecisions. It is not known whether the level of productionimplied by the programwill fall short of, meet, or exceed the hydrocarbonsresources necessary to meet projecteddemand. Thus, we can not forecastwhether Bolivia in any given year will be a net importeror exporter of liquid fuels. Nor can we determinewhether YPFB's transfersto the centraladministration can be increasedto raise expendituresin other areas, or whether the present level of transfersendangers the long-run sustainabilityof hydrocarbonsproduction.

124. Sector Strategy. The Governmenthas made substantialprogress in its strategy for hydrocarbons,which includes:a) encouragingprivate investmentin the sector;b) increasingexports; and c) increasingdomestic use of natural gas and using private distributionsystems. The hydrocarbons - 55 - code should encourageprivate investmentby providingfor explorationand developmentthrough joint ventures. While the productionof liquidshas increased,production levels remain about equal to domestic demand,with no surplus availablefor export. Greater private investmentin the sector is essentialin order to increase reservesand development. A small surplus in LPG has developed,and a pilot projecthas begun to ship LPG to Chile. If the surplus increases,LPG could emerge as a significantsource of foreign exchange earnings. Efforts to increasedomestic use of natural gas through cooperationwith the private sector have begun to bear fruit. YPFB has constructedabout 95X of the primary natural gas pipeline distribution network, which now reaches 7 major cities. Work has begun on the secondary (intra-city)natural gas pipelines,necessary to bring gas from the primary network to consumers. These pipelineswill be constructedwholly by the private sector. It is necessaryto develop regulationsclearly defining the responsibilitiesof YPFB and private contractors,and the Ministry has requestedBank assistanceto do this. The program to privatizegasoline service stations is operatingwell, and a number have alreadybeen sold to the private sector. It is essentialthat the rules governingprivatization remain transparentand designed to ensure that YPFB approves the most attractive offers.

125. InvestmentProgram. Public sector investmentin hydrocarbonsis managed by YPFB, and focuses on maintenanceand expansionof existing fields, developmentof new fields,exploration, and the project to sell natural gas products to Brazil. The latter is discussedseparately because of its large size.

126. The two principal sourcesof investmentfinance in the hydrocarbons sector are the Inter-AmericanDevelopment Bank and YPFB's own operations. The IDB program covers a wide variety of projects in explorationand development, production,and technicalassistance. Work in explorationincludes seismic studies and drilling of exploratorywells in the Boomerantarea, and geochemicaland seismicwork plus stratigraphlcdrilling in the Altiplano. Productionand developmentcovers drilling and productionfacilities in a number of fields, plus reinjectionfacilities and pipeline construction. The investmentprogram funded by YPFB includesexploration and developmentof various fields. A few other donors provide smaller amounts of money to the sector, largely for purchasesof spare parts and equipment. Given the large role of donors in the sector, it may be useful to suggestnew mechanisms to ensure greater coordinationamong donors.

127. Investmentin the sector has repeatedlybeen subject to severe delays owing to slowness in procurementprocedures and organizationalred tape within YPFB. Proposalsare now being consideredto improve YPFB operations through drawing up a managementcontract betweenYPFB and the Governmentand strengtheningcorporate and strategicplanning. The procurementprocess has been a particularheadache in this sector, owing to the large volume and highly technicalnature of procurementrequests. A considerabledispute has developedover the adequacy of the internationalfirms responsiblefor overseeingprocurement in Bolivia. At times, these agents lacked the expertisein Bolivia to properly evaluateYPFB procurementrequests, resulting in substantialdelays. We understandthat this process has improved recently. - 56 -

In any event, the present systemworks better than the former one, which was subject to considerabledelays and excessivecosts. The renewal of the procurementagent contracts should provide an opportunityto revise procedures to speed procurementwithin the sector.

128. The Government,in conjunctionwith a number of donors, is now planning a huge project to sell electricityand other natural gas-based products to Brazil. As presentlyconceived, the projectwould includes 8) a pipeline from the natural gas fields in Santa Cruz to Puerto Suarez on the Brazilianborder; b) a power plant to generateelectricity from the natural gas; and c) explorationand developmentof the gas fields to ensure a sufficientsupply of natural gas through the lifetime of the project, as well as a replenishmentof reserves. The agreementbetween Brazil and Bolivia also calls for constructionof two additionalplants to produce urea and polyethylene. The return on these latter projects is not yet clear. In any event, it would be preferableto attract private capital to take the larger risks these plants would involve. For that reason, the discussionof the Brazil project includesonly the developmentand transportationof the natural gas and constructionof the electricalplant.

129. The major uncertaintywhich must be resolvedprior to initiationof the project concerns financing. A number of donors have expressedinterest in providing the estimatedUS$570 million in external financewhich may be required,including the World Bank, Japan (OECF and EXIM Bank), the IDB, and CAF. Given that Bolivia is not creditworthyto receive IBRD loans, World Bank participationwould require a third-partyguarantee. The issue of who would provide such a guaranteehas not yet been resolved. More importantlyfrom the standpointof Bolivia, it is essentialto limit the risk of failure of the project, which would saddle Boliviawith a huge debt, in part nonreschedulable. If for some reason Boliviawere to borrow this money but not receive the expected foreignexchange earnings from the project, re ayment of the debt would threaten the sustainabilityof the economicprogram.- /

F. Power

130. Overview. The principalchallenges facing the power sector are to raise the level of service and to cope with rapid changes in the distribution of demand. Per capita consumptionof power (260 kilowatt hours) and share of populationserved (252) in Bolivia are among the lowest in South America. Large areas of the country receiveonly inadequateservice, forcing companies to generate their own power (with relativelyexpensive fuels) to ensure an adequate level and uninterruptedsupply. Key improvementsrequired over the next few years include increasingprivate sector responsibilityfor the distributionof power, raisingelectrical rates to reflect long run marginal costs, and implementationof an investmentprogram based on the least-cost expansionplan. This program representsa sensiblestrategy for exploiting Bolivia'sabundant hydroelectricand geothermalresources.

121 See Chapter 1I for an analysis of the implicationsof this project for the economy as a whole. - 57 -

131. Structureof the Power Sector. The bulk of electricelusers are served by one of the two major power grids. The northisouth/central(NCS) interconnectedgrid serves La Paz, Cochabamba,Oruro, Potosi, and Sucre. While this system can meet effectivedemand at this time, provisionof redundantsources of supply is not adequate to deal with potential interruptions. The eastern system serves Santa Cruz, as the departmentsof Chuquisaca,Beni, and Pando use locally-generatedpower. Effectivedemand for power has shifted to the easternpart of the countryover the past decade, due to the decline of mining and some of the older industriesin the west and central areas and the rapid populationgrowth in the east. The connectionof the eastern and NCS systems in 1989 should facilitatea more efficient distributionof power throughoutthe country,but further investmentswill be necessary to meet the projectedincrease in demand. In addition,several small systems, isolated from the main power grid, serve a number of smaller cities. These systemshave a very small reserve capacity and will require investmentsin generation. However, their interconnectionwith the major power grids would not be justifiedat this time. Less than 102 of the rural populationhas access to electricity,either in areas near urban centers that can hook into subtransmissionlines or throughhundreds of small, isolated systemswhich generatepower with diesel engines,mostly in precarious conditions.

132. The Governmenthas begun to correct some of the institutional problems facing the power sector. The roles of the DireccionNacional de Electricidad(DINE, the state regulatoryagency), the Empresa Nacional de Electricidad(ENDE, the state generation/transmissioncompany), and the regional power companieshave to be clearly specified. Distributionshould be entrustedto private sector companies,with ENDE restrictedto the generation and transmissionof power. DINE lacks the resourcesto carry out its responsibilitieswithin the power sector,which includereview of investment plans, tariff rates, and safety procedures. DINE should undergo a reorganizationand considerableexpansion in staff to serve as an effective regulatoryagency. An importantissue which should be resolved shortly concerns the extensionof the contractwith the Bolivian Power Company (COBEE, a US firm) for the generationof power and distributionwithin La Paz. The remaining issues to be negotiatedinclude the extent of COBEE's investmentin new generationfacilities, the review and eliminationof electricitytariff distortionsaffecting COBEE, and coordinationbetween COBEE and the ENDE system.

133. Increasesin tariff rates are essentialto reflect the incremental cost of electricitygeneration. ENDE has not recoveredfrom the impact of the economic crisis on its operations. In 1988-89,ENDE's rate of return averaged only about 2?, which compares poorly with the 72 rate of return obtainedby COBEE, a private firm. DINE recentlyauthorized two increasesin tariff rates, which boosted ENDE's averagetariff to 3.9 US cents per kilowatt hour. This tariff will yield an estimated4.5S rate of return in 1990, well below the 72 rate of return requiredunder the Bank power sector loan. At this time, a tariff increase of about 15Z (to about 4.5 US cents per kilowatt hour) is required to achieve an adequate rate of return and cover the long run marginal cost of power generationand transmission. DINE and the Ministry of - 58 -

Energy need to formulatea pricing policy for electricitywhich reflectsthe long run incrementalcost of power, and could make use of ESMAP funds to hire consultantsto assist in this project.

134. InvestmentProgram. ENDE's investmentprogram is based on a least cost expansionplan, developedwith internationalassistance. This plan lists the minimum-costinvestments necessary to meet projecteddemand through 2010, taking into account the costs of investment,fuela, operationsand maintenance,and service interruptions. Priority is given to the expansionof generation,transmission and distributionfacilities in areas where demand is growing most rapidly, and projects to substitutecheaper hydroelectricor geothermalenergy for reliance on liquid fuels. The scope for such projects is considerable,since it is estimatedthat Boliviauses only about 2Z of the economicallyfeasible hydroelectric power. For the period 1990-95, the plan calls for investmentsof US$162 millioni-I (in 1988 prices) for;

(a) installationof 220 megawatts in new capacity (about 1/6 of existing capacity),through gas turbines in Santa Cruz and Cochabamba,and hydroelectricpower from the Zonga river;

(b) installationof 610 kilometersof transmissionand subtransmission lines; and

(c) constructionof 25 MWA transformersto enhance the Potosi system.

135. The investmentprogram reflectsan appropriateallocation of resourcesto the highest priority projects. Most importantly,the program does not include the dual purpose power/waterprojects of Rositas,Misicuni, or Icla. Their high investmentrequirements (considering only the power componentof these projects)would imply power generationcosts per kilowatt hour of 6. 16, and 8 US cents respectively,while the incrementalcost of investmentsincluded in the program is about 4.5 cents per kilowatt hour.L4' A few studies in ENDE's investmentprogram are not in the least cost expansion plan, and hence will require further justification. These includephase II of the geothermalproject (US$6.3million) being negotiatedwith Italy; the Las Pavas feasibilitystudy (US$2.7million) under negotiationwith the IDB; and the Banda Azul hydroelectricproject (US$0.6million).

131 The 1990-92 investmentprogram for power shown in Table 3.2 shows a much smaller figure. It aoes not includeall of the investmentsenvisioned under the least cost expansionplan because the source of financingfor many of these projectshas not been identified.

14/ An analysis of the Misicuni project is provided in the next section. - 59 -

G. Water

136, Overview. The availabilityof water and sanitationservices is far below the level necessary to serve demand in Bolivia. Only 452 of the populationhas access to piped water. Serviceto rural and peri-urban communitiesis particularlyinadequate. The public sector investmentprogram in water for the most part reflectsa sensibleallocation of resources. However, the developmentof Misicuni, an excessivelycostly and overdimensionedwater supply project for Cochabamba,would be unwise. Greater efforts are necessary to strengthenmanagement of the sector. Despite the importanceof ensuring adequate levels of water service,effective cost recovery is essentialto maintainingwater systemsand promotingconservation. Decentralizationcf operationalresponsibilities would improve efficiency,but the central administrationwill have an importantrole to play in issuing guideiinesfor design standardsand cost recoverypractices.

137. InstitutionalIssues. The Governmentis consideringa decentralizationof managementrespc,isibilities in the water sector. Decentralizationis desirablebecause national agencieshave proved largely ineffectivein maintaininginvestments and overseeingcountrywide operations. It is also desirablethat local agencies assume an increasedshare of financingof services,to provide incentivefor increasesin cost recovery. However, the central administrationshould provide standardsfor technical designs and help local agencieswhich are unable to fully shoulderthe administrativeburden of water projects. The Governmentshould define more clearly the responsibilityfor water projectswithin the central administration,particularly relating to the roles of the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Housing and Urban Development,and the Ministry of Planning. Improvementsat all levels of water managementare required to strengthen operationand maintenanceprocedures, improve informationsystems, and reduce the high levels of water lost throughoutthe sector. As in other parts of the public sector, these improvementswill require increasesin salariesto retain qualified staff, along with reductionsin employmentto keep within budgeted expenditures. A particularproblem in the water and sanitationagencies is that during the 1980s the share of planning and administrativestaff rose from 25Z to 402 of total employment,mainly at the expense of technicaland operationalpositions. This imbalanceneeds to be corrected.

138. InvestmentProgram. The investmentprogram largely reflectsa sensibleallocation of resources. Prioritywill be given to investmentsin water supply compared to investmentsin sewerageand investmentsin rehabilitationas opposed to new construction. However, differentareas of Bolivia face varying problems and opportunitiesfor developmentof water services. Since the transportationof water among regions is prohibitively expensive,it is necessaryto evaluate separatelythe investmentstrategy of each of the major populationcenters.

139. The water supply to La Paz is adequate to serve the existing population. The distributionof water to some densely-populatedareas is poor, however, with frequent interruptionsin service. Investmenthas not kept up with the rapid growth of the city during the past few decades, and - 60 -

financialproblem* have reducedmaintenance expenditures below desirable levels. Problems facing parts of the network include broken pipes and pipelines that are too small to carry the current load. A comprehensiveplan is required to integratethe many piecemealinvestments which have been made in past years, improvemanagement of reservoirs,control excess system pressures, and design investments. Priority investmentsare expansionand repair of the water distributionnetwork and constructionof treatment facilities. Other useful investmentsinclude treating the Milluni Lake, an importantsource of water for the city, to remove pollution from mine tailings;and constructinga collectoralong the Rio Choqueyapu,through which flows much of the city's sewage.

140. The most seriousproblem facing El Alto is inadequatesewerage coverage. Plans are underway to expand the seweragenetwork using a low-cost technology,to constructa new treatmentfacility using stabilizationponds which are relativelycheap to operate and maintain,and to introducelatrine and septic tank systems for areas where sewers are not justified. The latter project may have a high return,as it will serve relativelypoor areas where there is a potentiallylarge improvementin health conditions. However, latrineprograms require extensivework at the grass roots level and a heavy commitmentof administrativeresources.

141. Cochabamba faces a crisis in water supply. While sewerage facilitiesare adequate,water serviceis subject to frequent interruptions and rationing. Some areas of the city are served only by trucks, and competitionfor water between city use and for irrigationis a growing problem. In part, these difficultiesstem from lack of control of water resources. Uncontrolleddrilling of wells and use of groundwaterhas impaired the efficiencyof water allocationand led to a rapid depletionof scarce vater resources. The IDA projectwill finance a much-neededstudy of water sources and uses, and design an improveddistribution system. The potential return from improvedwater administrationis great, but the difficulties involved in controllingwater depletionare enormous. Therefore,while we can and should expect to achieve a more rational allocationof existingwater sources, it also will be necessaryto increasewater supply. Projects are now underway to expand wells and reduce loss from filtrationof existingwater systems. High priority for additionalinvestments to increasewater supply include reconstructionof the Wara Wara dam, rehabilitationof the Vinto wellfield, expansion of treatmentfacilities, construction of additional storage tanks, expansionof the distributionnetwork, expansionof the El Paso wellfield, and constructionof small systemsto providewater to fringe settlements. Altogether,these investmentswould provide sufficientwater to supply Cochabambaat adequate levels through the year 2010, even if no improvementswere made in conservationand uncontrolleddepletion of water.

142. The other major investmentunder considerationis Hisicuni,an extremelyexpensive and overdimensionedproject. There are a number of proposals for design of this project,which generallywould involve constructionof a dam, a long tunnel, canals, supply lines, and a treatment plant, as well as road constructionand related infrastructure. The minimum scale of the projectwould requirean investmentof US$69 million, and the scale recommendedin the feasibilitystudy would cost US$129 million, or about - 61 -

five times the amount spent by the public sector on all water, sanitation,and urban projects in 1989 for all of Bolivia. The water produced by the project would cost much more than alternativesources of water for Cochabamba. The recommendedscale (US$ 129 million investment)would involvea cost of almost US$3 million per 100 liters per second,compared to costs of between US$1-2 million in alternativeprojects. The minimum scale version (US$69million investment)would be even more prohibitivelyexpensive on a per unit basis, costing over US$6 million per 100 liters per second. These figures do not include the likely cost overruns and delays which one would expect for a complicatedwater project involvingtunnel construction. Further, the recommendedscale of the projectwould produce, when fully operational,two and a half times the amount of water which is projectedto be needed in Cochabambaby the year 2010. Attempts have been made to justifyMisicuni in terms of using the water provided for irrigation. However, the area to be irrigatedin the Cochabambavalley is relativelysmall, and the drainage problems associatedwith irrigationhave not been adequatelyconsidered, particularlyas water salinity is already a problem. In short, the Misicuni project can not be justifiedon either technicalor financialgrounds.

143. Santa Crux is a relativelynew city with an effectiveinstitution responsiblefor water and sewerage. Consequently,the water and sewer systems have developedin a more orderly fashionand are in better repair than in the older Bolivian cities. Water facilitieshave not kept pace with the extremely rapid growth of population,however. Also, the sewage system has laggedwell behind provisionof water, so that the former reachesonly 282 of the populationwhile the latter serves 722. Clearly, a major expansionof sewer facilitiesis essentialand is alreadyplanned. A pilot projectwill be undertakento explore the feasibilityof low-costsewerage technologyin Santa Cruz. Considerablesavings are possible through reducingmanhole construction,changing maintenance procedures, and reducing the diameter of pipe compared to traditionalmethods. Improvementsin water supply are also necessary,and sufficientwater can be made availableby drilling new wells.

144. The smaller Bolivian cities also face severe water problems. Sucre suffers from a shortage of water. Unfortunately,a source of water which can be delivered to the city at reasonablecost has not been found. Some improvementin the water situationcan be achieved through repairingleaks in the canal, and further gains may be made through reforestationof some areas to reduce water evaporation. However, these improvementsare unlikely to ensure sufficientwater to meet demand. Therefore,more vigorous efforts at conservationneed to be enforced. Water charges should be reviewed to see if they reflect the long-run scarcityvalue of water to the city. In Oruro, mine tailings in the soil have corroded the outside of cast iron pipe laid in the 1960s. Repair of the pipe system is necessary,along with repair of house connectionsand replacementof broken water meters. Given these measures, the city has sufficientgroundwater sources to meet projecteddemand. The Inter- American Development Bank is preparinga projectwhich -ould improve services in small and medium Bolivian cities. This project is ptrticularly important because little has been done to aid the smallercities over the past few years. - 62 -

145. Efforts are underway to increasewater and sanitationservices in rural communities,with assistancefrom USAID, UNICEF,UNDP, IDA, the European Economic Community,the InternationalFund for AgriculturalDevelopment, and various non-governmentalorganizations (CARE is particularlyactive in this sector). Such programs are essentialto address the most pressing needs of poorer areas. However, they are undertakenby a variety of governmentaland non-governmentalagencies. 'Whilea decentralizedapproach to serving rural areas is appropriate,the central governmentshould set design standardsand cost-recoverypractices to maximize the benefits from such projects.

H. Social Sectors

146. Overview. Indicatorsof health, nutrition,and literacy in Bolivia are among the worst in the Western Hemisphere. However, investment expenditureson health and educationhave been and are projectedto remain low, averagingonly 2X of the executed investmentsin 1987-89, and 3Z of programmed expendituresover 1990-92. The Government'sobjectives in health are to increase the share of expendituresserving the poor; to improve maternal and child survivalby increasingthe coverage of basic health care services,giving priority to maternal and child care; and to improvethe efficiencyand effectivenessof health services. The bulk of the investment program closely follows these priorities. However, better coordination between capital and recurrentexpenditures is essentialto avoid waste, and some investmentsshould be reviewed for their consistencywith the overall strategy. The educationsector is in considerabledisarray, owing to an oversupplyof teachers,low salaries,and poor administration. Fundamental reforms are necessarybefore investmentexpenditures can usefully be increased.

147. Health InvestmentProgram. The Ministry of Health has made progress in monitoringthe investmentprogram, although further improvementsare necessary,particularly regarding coordination with the Ministry of Planning. The Ministry of Health's investmentprogram for 1990 is US$17.5 million (see Table 3.4), a considerableincrease compared to the 1989 level. Higher investmentreflects executionof severalprojects which were in preparation the year before and improvementsin the availabilityof informationon executed investments. The investmentprogram prepared in Planning includes only US$13 million in expenditures,as a few projects for which foreign financinghas been securedare omitted. Further progress is necessary in integratinginvestment by decentralizedagencies into the program and ensuring that the Ministry is informed concerningnegotiations by the regional developmentcorporations and sanitaryunits with foreign donors. The Emergency Social Fund and the Social InvestmentFund are expected to spend US$4.4 million in 1990 on health projects.15/ These are in additionto the investmentfigures given above.

15/ Not includingUS$.7 million in SIF expenditureson infrastructure financed by the IDA-supportedIntegrated Health Project,which are included under the Health Ministry budget. - 63 -

Table 3.4: 1990 ProgrammedInvestments in the Health Sector

USS Millions Percentage

Ministry of Health 17.5 79.9 Basic Health Services 12.6 57.5 Hosp,.talsand Special Programs 2.1 9.5 Other Programs 2.8 12.8

Emergency Social Fund 2.9 13.2 Infrastructure 1.8 8.2 AssistancePrograms 1.1 5.0

Social InvestmentFund 1.5 6.8 Nutrition 1.0 4.6 Services and Infrastructure 0.5 2.3

Total 21.9 100.0

Note: Data reflectmore up to date data than containedin the Planning Ministry's investmentprogram, and hence are not consistentwith the health sector investmentprogram presented in Table 3.2.

148. The 1990-92 investmentprogram focuses on improvingthe provisionof basic health care, includinga major effort to increasehealth servicesto mothers and children. The bulk of investmentexpenditures will be spent in the departmentsof Santa Cruz, Cochabambaand La Paz, as these areas will serve as tests of the Ministry'smaternal and child care model before extensionto other regions. Feasibilitystudies are now underway for implementationof the model in Potosi, Oruro, Tarija, Chuquisaca,Beni, and Pando, with executionplanned for 1991. In general, the program holds great promise for achieving significantimprovements in basic health services,and well merits the supportof the donor community.

149. The major weakness in both existing and programmedinvestments is the imbalancebetween capital expendituresand recurrentcosts. The Ministry of Health lacks the budget to adequatelystaff and provide sufficientsupplies to existinghospitals. Hospitals in Coroico, Cobija,Villazon, and Santa Cruz, built through bilateraldonations, all lack sufficientsalary slots in the Ministry'sbudget. For example, Coroico is a 60-bed facility for which only 101 of the necessarypositions are allocatedin the budget; Villazon needs about 150 positionsand only 23 are allocated. The problem is compoundedby the relativelylow salariespaid, which have reducedmorale and reportedlyresulted in employeesoccupying more than one position. Health care services are further impairedby a shortageof medical supplies. While cost-recoveryin the sector as a whole increasedstrongly in the 1980s (in - 64 -

1988 40Z of operatingexpenses were financed through fees, a relativelyhigh share),this has not fully compensatedfor the lack of public sector financing of recurrentexpenditures. In hospitals, fees generallycover only a portion of medical supplies,with little left over to finance salaries. Inabilityof the hospitalsto provide adequate levels of care probably is one reason for the many reports of extremely low utilizationrates.

150. Recent and planned investmentsare likely to increase the discrepancybetween recurrentand capitalexpenditures. The EmergencySocial Fund will build hospitalsin the rural areas of Cochabambaand Santa Cruz. It is not clear whether resourceswill be available (eitherfrom the ministry or through cost recovery)to finance the recurrentexpenditures implied by these projects. In addition,a 100-bed hospital is planned for Potosi to replace the existing,inadequate facility, with an estimatedcost of US$6.5 million. A study conductedby the IDB concludedthat the hospital should provide for no more than 60 beds, at an estimatedcost of US$1.3 million. The US$5.2 million could be spent more effectiyelyon other projects. Further, the personnel working in the facilitiesto be replacedwould be sufficientto cover the needs of a 60-bed hospital,while the availabilityof staff for the larger project is uncertain. The Ministry should scale down the planned facility.

151. Improvementsin integratingrecurrent and capital expendituresare planned. The IDA IntegratedHealth Project will require full staffingof the financedhealth districtsand inclusionof these recurrentcosts within the national budget. The Social InvestmentFund will require commitmentsof salary slots before undertakingany new constructionin the health sector. A major priority for investmentprogramming efforts in the Ministry is to establisha system for analyzingthe recurrentcost implicationsof capital expenditures. The Ministry of Planning should ensure that the Health Ministry is consulted in all negotiations with foreign donors in the sector, to avoid planning investmentsfor which resourcesare not adequate to finance implied recurrent expenditures.

152. A major issue for both capital and current expendituresconcerns the health care services provided by the Social Securitysystem. The efficiency of the system is generallylow. The occupancyrate for Social Security hospitalswas reported in 1983 as only 36Z, 9 percentagepoints below the very low average for the Ministry'shospitals. Anecdotalevidence suggests that occupancyrates may have declined even furthersince the early 1980. due to the reductionin resourcesto the health sector. Further, health care provided by Social Security is largelycurative care, thus draining resources from lower-costand higher-priorityprimary care. Social Security provides health care to 21? of the populationof Boliviabut absorbed 44? of health expendituresin 1988. A thorough reorganizationof the Social Security system is essentialto improvethe efficiencyof health care expenditures. - 65 -

153. A number of projects for current and capitalexpenditures have been proposed which presently lack financing. First priority is to provide district health teams16 Ito unserved areas. A substantialnumber of the 84 health districtsare not served by health teams. To provide health teams in all districtswill require, in addition to financingalready identified,about US$1.3 million per year. The Ministry has proposed the financingof a health service system for the very poor Amazonia areas of Beni, Pando, Santa Cruz and Cochabambadepartments through the use of water transport,at an estimated cost of US$400,000per year. The Ministry also is proposing initiationof a national school lunch program to improvenutrition and learning capacity of primary school children. The programwould requireexpenditures of US$6 million in the first year to reach 280 thousand children in high risk areas, rising in the fourth year to US$10 million to cover 500 thousand children. School-agechildren do not constitutethe highest priority group to receive nutritionalassistance, since the impact of malnutritionon developmentis much greater at a younger age. Still, this projectmay be worthy of consideration,as at least a portion of the resourceswhich would be devoted to a school nutritionprogram are not easily transferableto other projects (for example donated foods) and the schoolsare a convenientdistribution system. In addition,the proposalneeds to be reviewedto ensure that resourcesare effectivelytargeted to poor areas. Lower costs and higher nutritionalcontent may be feasible throughproviding traditional grain products rather than the proposed lunch of bread and milk. Funds for these projects could be found by reallocatingmoney from less desirableprojects, for example reducing the scale of the new hospital for Potosi (see above) and eliminatingthe US$1.5 million planned for a mental health project in La Paz, which does not address the most pressing health needs.

154. The EducationalSystem.171 Bolivianeducation is in serious difficulties. An oversupplyof teacherswhich the system must hire (graduates of teacher training schoolsare guaranteedemployment) has meant that despite sharp reductionsin materials and investmentexpenditures, salaries must be kept low to meet budgetary constraints. Low salariesseverely impair the quality of education,as teachers take additionaljobs to protect their standardof living,more qualifiedteachers leave the profession,and schooling is interruptedby frequentstrikes in protest of inadequatepay. An inequitabledistribution of resourcesis institutionalizedthrough separate administrationof rural and urban schools. Infrastructureis inadequateowing to lack of resourcesfor maintenanceand an inappropriategeographical distributionof school buildings. Administrationis overly centralized,and

161 The basic districthealth team consists of a doctor, an administrator, and a nurse, with a combinedannual wage bill of US$13 thousand.

17! A more comprehensivediscussion of necessary reforms in educationcan be found in the Poverty Report on Bolivia (8643-BO). - 66 - staffing levels in the Ministry of Education are clearly excessive. The distributionof funds among educationallevels is questionable,as the share of expenditureson secondaryeducation has increasedrelative to primary education,and earmarked funds subsidizea highly-inefficientuniversity system (in terms of the number of students graduating)which serves the middle and upper classes.

155. Measures that would begin to alleviatesome of these problems are under consideration. A number of decentralizationproposals exist that would increasethe responsivenessof educationalservices to local concerns. A schoolmapping will be undertakenthis year to compare the location of school buildingsand the allocationof materials to the distributionof the student population. This projectwould permit the analysis of potentialgains from consolidatingor relocatingschools and is fundamentalto determiningthe appropriateallocation of recurrentand investmentexpenditures.

156. Investmentin Education. Expenditureson education in the investmentprogram are minimal. Expendituresby the Ministry of Education reported by the Ministry of Planning averagedUS$1.2 million per year in 1988- 89, and only US$1.2 million is programmedfor 1990. This low level of expendituresmay be desirable,given the lack of informationon vhere schools are really needed, the urgency of increasingexpenditures on the maintenance of existing facilities,and difficultiesin administrationin the Ministry. Much larger amounts of money have been spent on investmentin educationby the EmergencySocial Fund (not includedin the Planning figures). The ESF spent approximatelyUS$11.2 million a year on educationin 1988-89,and the Social InvestmentFund is expected to continue this work at a level of US$14 million per year in 1990-91. Reliance on ESF has begun to correct an urban bias in school constructionapparent in the program of the Ministry. While undertakinginvestments through ESF and SIP makes sense in terms of improved efficiency,it is essentialthat investmentdecisions made by these agencies adequatelyreflect the present and future availabilityof recurrent expenditures,which are administeredby the Ministry. Clearly, the educationalsystem in Bolivia is in need of radical changes. We would recommendavoiding significantincreases in investmentexpenditures until many of these changes are implementedand more informationis availableon the most pressingneeds in the sector. - 67 -

ANNEX1: Estimation of the Demand for Money

The discussionof sources of financingfor the public sector discussedin Chapter 3 include projectionsof revenues from issuing base money. We argue that the increase in real money base consistentwith low inflationis small (about12 of GDP per year), on two grounds:

(a) The recent experienceof hyperinflationhas made Boliviansextremely sensitiveto the potential for inflationdue to excessivemoney issuance. Therefore,any attempt by the Governmentto increase money significantlyabove transactionsdemand will be reflected quickly in increasedinflation, resulting in minimal real revenues to the Government.

(b) Projectionsof the demand for real money base based on an equation estimatedwith data from the past three years also lend support to the view that expected revenues from money issuanceare low. This annex shows how the projectionsare derived.

The optimum level of the money base (fromthe viewpoint of the private sector) is assumed to depend on the rate of inflationand the rate of interest on competingassets. The level of money base is expressedas a percentageof GDP, and all variables are in real terms:

(1) m* = f(r,p)

where m is real money relative to output, r is the real interest rate on bolivianodeposits, and p is the rate of increase in consumer prices.

We assume there is some cost in adjustingmoney holdings, so that the actual demand for money base dependson the optimum level, the level in the previous period, and an adjustmentfactor, A:

(2) m - A(m*-m(-l))

Since m* depends on the two independentvariables in equation (1), equation (2) can be expanded (ignoringcoefficients):

(3) m = f(r,p,m(-l)) - 68 -

Equation (3) was estimatedusing monthly data from April 1986 to December 1988. A relativelyshort time span was used to eliminatethe hyperinflationand the initial remonetizationof the economy as a result of the etab.lizationin September1985, in order to ensure that the equation is estimatedover a consistentmonetary regime. Estimationof equation (3) using OLS yields the followingresults (t-statisticsare in parentheses):

(3) m - -.34 - .31r - .54p + .83 m(-l) (-2.26) (-2.26) (-3.07) (14.42)

R-squared .95 Durbin Watson 1.94 F statistic 126.45

All variablesare statisticallysignificant and have the expected relationshipwith the dependentvariable. One issue with the estimated equation is the choice of a proxy for the rate of return on assets other than money. We have chosen the interest rate on bolivianoassets as the closest substitutefor money. Given the high level of dollarizationof the Bolivian economy, it would have been desirableto take into account changes in the return on dollar assets. However,estimates of equation (3) using an additionalinterest rate term yielded poor results due to multicollinearity between the two interestrate variables,and the rate of interest on boliviano deposits clearly yieldedmore significantresults than did alternative interest rate variables. - 69 -

ANNEX II

HistoricalData

This annex or statisticalappendix consists of various tables of historicalinformation on gross domestic product;balance of payments and merchandiseexports and imports;consumer price index and monthly inflation rates. TABLE 2.1: BOLIVIA - GROSSDOMESTIC PRDUCT BY SECTOROF ORIGIN AT COSTANT1980 PRICES, 1978-198

1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1986 1986 1967 1988(e)

112,604 Gross Domestic Product *t m.p.1/ 124,490 124,668 122,948 124,084 118,876 110,942 119,811 110,446 107,211 109,478 1,071 Indirect, Taxes on Imports 8,689 3,288 8,288 8,764 1,091 428 382 927 1,248 1,403 GrossDomestic Product at p.p. I/ 120,901 121,418 119,658 120,330 117,684 110,616 110,279 109,518 106,965 108,676 111,438

25,708 Agriculture 21,490 22,282 22,688 22,854 23,900 19,981 24,662 26,789 26,634 26,488 Mining 21,140 19,478 19,407 20,189 19,526 18,814 16,336 14,284 12,082 12,265 14,820 Hiydrocarbons 6,978 6,423 8,728 7,072 7,476 6,888 6,869 6,736 6,488 8,654 6)786 Minerals 14,164 13,066 12,879 13,067 12,060 11,776 9,488 7,649 6,594 6,691 8,034 Manufacturing 18,8el 18,678 17,974 16,681 14,631 13,863 11,926 10,816 11,038 11,423 11,873 ElectricityGas and Water 714 784 806 907 980 938 938 948 987 928 964 8,246 Construction 8,681 6,479 4,621 4,068 3,698 3,689 8,666 8,168 2,918 2,896 12,990 Commerco 18,283 18,622 18,261 14,418 18,484 11,798 11,662 12,110 12,896 13,634 8,026 0 Transport Storage and Communication 6,666 7,577 7,821 8,174 7,799 7,069 7,204 7,337 7,657 7,971 Financial Services (Banking) 7,641 7,496 7,189 6,704 6,126 6,629 6,068 4,716 4,480 4,573 4,481 Gener I Government 11,098 11,288 12,940 13,193 13,749 14,888 15,149 15,643 14,648 15,171 16,022 14,303 Other Services 18,407 18,909 13,676 13,802 13,861 14,161 18,901 13,708 18,848 13,844 - ______--l------

(e) Estimates. 1/ m.p. market prices. p.p. producers prics. In Bolivian national accounts these Include *11 Indirect taxes except on Imports. Source: Central Bank of Bolivia, National Accounts Department and National Institute of Statistics. TAIEU2.2: BOLIVIA - GROSSDOMESTIC PRODUCT BY SECTOROF ORIGINAT CONSTANT1980 PRICES, 1970-1988 (Growthrates)

1979 1980 1981 1982 1968 1984 19 198 1987 19M8(e)

-0.2 -2.9 2.1 2.8 Cross DoometicProduct at *.p. 1/ 0.1 -1.4 0.9 -4.4 -6.6 -o.8 12.6 -23.7 Indirect Taxoson Imports -9.6 1.6 14.2 -79.9 -41.0 -22.1 179.2 84.4 2.0 8.1 GrossDomestic Product at p.p.1/ 0.4 -1.4 9.6 -2.3 -8.0 -4.2 -0.7 -8.2 -0.2 0.9 Agriculture 8.8 1.4 -0.9 8.9 -16.4 22.9 9.1 -4.? -16.8 1.6 20.9 Mining -7.9 -0.4 3.6 -8.9 -4.7 -12.2 -12.8 1.5 8.4 Hydrocarbons -7.9 4.7 6.1 6.7 -8.6 0.5 -2.0 -4.0 -25.9 1.7 41.2 Minerals -7.8 -2.9 8.1 -7.8 -2.8 -19.6 -29.8 8.5 8.9 Manufacturing -1.6 -3.3 -7.8 -12.4 -4.8 -14.0 -9.8 2.1 4.1 EloctrleiyGas and Water 2.8 9.8 12.6 2.6 0.9 O.0 1.1 4.1 -6.2 -0.9 12.1 Construction -8.0 -80.2 -10.2 -8.9 -1.6 -2.8 -10.9 -7.9 6.5 6.0 -4.0 I Comoere 2.6 -2.7 .7 46.6 -12.4 -1.2 8.9 6.6 0.7 TransportStorage and Commnecation 18.7 -8.4 11.7 -4.6 -9.5 2.1 1.8 3.9 -5.0 2.1 -2.0 FinancialServices (Banking) -4.6 -4.1 -8.7 -B.8 -4.1 -19.9 -4.9 8.6 -1.0 GonoralGovernment 1.7 14.7 2.0 4.2 7.9 2.1 3.8 -6.4 1.0 0.0 8.8 OtherServices 8.7 -1.7 0.9 0.4 2.2 -1.8 -1.4

(o) Estimates 1/ m.p. market prices p.p. producersprices. In Boliviannational account. these lnclude oll Indirecttaxes oxcept on imports. Source: CentralBank of Bolivia,National Accounts Department, unpublished worksheets dated July 87. Indirect import taxes, Georal Governoent' in currentpriaes and datafor 1988 and 1987are staffestimates. TABLE2.8: BOLIVIA - GROSSDOMESTIC PRODUCT BY SECTOROF ORIGINAT CONSTANT1980 PRICES, 1978-1988 (Percentage distribution)

1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988(e)

Gross Domestic Product at m.p. 1/ 103.0% 102.7% 102.7% 103.1% 106.9% 100.4X 100.3% 100.8% 101.2% 101.3% 101.0% Indirect Taxes on Imports 3.0% 2.7% 2.7% 3.1% 0.9% 0.4% 0.3% 0.8% 1.2% 1.3% 1.0X Cross Domestic Product at p.p. 1/ 100.0o 100.9% 100.0X 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0 100.0% 100.% 190.0%

Agriculture 17.8% 18.3% 18.9% 18.06 20.3% 18.1% 22.3% 24.SX 24.1% 23.6% 23.1% Mining 17.5% 16.0% 16.2% 18.7% 16.6% 16.8% 14.8% 13.0% 11.4% 11.3% 13.3% Hydrocarbons 5.8X 6.3% 6.8X 6.9X 8.4% 8.2X 8.2X 8.1% 8.1% 8.1% 8.1X Minerals 11.7% 10.8% 10.8% 10.9% 10.2% 10.7% 8.8% 6.9% 5.3% 6.3% 7.2% Manufacturing 15.8X% 1.3X 15.0% 13.8% 12.4% 12.6% 10.8% 9.9% 10.4% 10.6% 1O.7X Electricity Gas end Wate- 0.6% 0.6% 0.7% 0.8% 0.8% 0.8X 0.9% 0.9% 0.9% 0.9% 0.9% I Construction 6.6X 6.3X 3.8X 3.4% 3.1% S.3X 3.2X 2.9% 2.8% 2.7% 2.9% .4 Coamerce 11.0% 11.2% 11.1% 12.0% 11.6% 10.7% 10.S% 11.1% 12.2% 12.S% 11.7% 9 TransportStorage and Comnunicatlon 6.6% 8.2x 6.1% 6.8% 6.8% 6.4% 6.5% 8.7% 7.1X 7.4% 7.2X FinancialServices (Banking) 8.2% 6.2% 8.0% 6.8% 6.2% 5.1% 4.6% 4.3% 4.2% 4.2% 4.0% GeneralGovernment 9.2X 9.3X 10.8% 11.0% 11.7X 13.4% 13.7% 14.3X 13.8% 14.0% 13.5 Other Services 11.1X 11.6% 11.4% 11.6% 11.8% 12.8% 12.6% 12.6% 13.1% 12.8% 12.8X

(a) Estimates 1/ m.p. market prices p.p. producersprices. In Boliviannational accounts these includeall indirecttaxes except on imports. Source: CentralBank of Bolivia,National Accounts Depart.ment, unpublished worksheets dated July 87. Indirectimport taxes, %eneral Government'in currentprices and data for 1988 and 1987 are staff estimates. TABLE2.4: BOLIVIA - GROSSDOMESTIC PRODUCT BY EXPENDITURECATEGORY. (In Millions of Bolivianos)

1980 1987 1988(0) 1980 1981 1982 1988 1984 198S

2,224,776,449 7,311,369,658 8,658,353,260 10,208,198,482 GDPat M.P. 122,946 170,366 875,009 1,329,417 19,827,828 1,770,714 380,140,127 1,683,522,912 1,890,742,560 2,149,727,900 Imports of Goods and NFS 20,718 28,820 45,607 167,885 2,405,887 321,944,123 1,349,879,789 1,344,779,34s 1,682,020,000 Exports of Goods and NFS 26,685 24,990 80,6e8 190,086 834,953 (38,198,004) (213,643,143) (551,963,211) (687,707,900) Resource Gap 4,887 (3,830) 14,981 38,341

18,992,673 2,262,972,453 7,62S,002,801 9,210,318,41 10,776,900,382 Available Resources 118,079 173,986 360,048 1,291,076

17,576,829 2,036,938,342 8,948,366,466 8,248,214,682 9,659,244,683 Consumption 99,898 160,338 308,215 1,175,823 4,701,112 300,409,000 855,600,000 1,060.400,000 1,501,800,000 Public 17,330 18,628 61,479 246,064 12,874,517 1,736,538,342 8,092,868,485 7,187,814,582 8,067,444,683 Private 82,658 131,812 248,738 929,769

1,417,044 227,034,111 678,636,336 982,101,899 1,218,661,699 Investment 18,181 23,647 61,833 115,253 1,884,382 181,083,480 894,995,736 893,218,728 1,381,159,408 Fixed Investment 17,837 18,8S 61,776 114,199 709,429 79,798,283 356,967,642 662,625,826 839,703,317 Public Sector 8,593 12,186 26,717 68,143 954,933 81,287,197 338,170,398 340,890,903 641,468,169 Private Sector 9,044 8,478 28,058 48,058 (247,318) 85,950,831 (118,369,400) 88,886,171 (164,497,787) Changes in Stocks 544 4,982 s8 1,054

2,061,997 188,838,107 382,993,193 410,138,688 e48,963,799 Gross Domestic Savings 23,048 20,017 88,794 153,594 (191,247,749) (691,877,730) (633,214,180) (820,922,840) Net Factor Income (7,250) (9,883) (29,788) (98,483) (1,288,090) 6,470,117 32,673,394 38,874,000 30,082,660 currentTransfers 311 328 1,071 9,237 47,478 811,383 4,08o,476 (198,311,143) (88,201,492) 58,113,619 Gross NationalSavings 16,109 10,460 38,077 84,3e8

27 Aug 1990 e/ Estimated.

Source:Central Bank and mission estimates. TABLE2.5: BOLIVIA - GROSSDOMESTIC PRODUCT By EXPENDITURECATEGORY (In MUillionsof 1980 Bolivian Posesoo)

i198 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988(e)

CDP at M.P. 122,946 124,084 118,676 110,942 119,811 110,446 107,211 109,478 112,604 Terms of Trade Effect 0 367 (1,442) (1,878) (8,11) (8,138) (7,913) (9,177) (10,979) CoY 122,948 124,451 117,238 109,084 107,480 107,312 99,298 100,301 101,625

Importsof Goods and NWS 20,718 28,534 17,803 18,618 16,512 21,978 21,469 23,246 21,850 Exportsof Goods and NFS 26,586 24,648 26,086 26,024 24,205 22,780 28,448 26,868 27,059 ExportsTOT adjusted 26,686 24,916 23,843 23,148 21,074 19,847 18,636 18,481 16,080 ResourceGap 4,867 (3,986) 7,282 8,408 8,693 802 4,979 2,418 6,209

AvailableResources 118,079 128,070 111,393 104,638 101,918 109,643 102,232 107,086 107,295

Consumption 99,898 110,123 97,861 98,724 95,882 103,173 97,979 100,783 190,867" Public 17,330 13,690 17,100 15,706 14,666 10,780 11,791 12,040 14,728 Private 82,668 96,433 80,761 81,018 81,218 92,393 86,188 88,723 86,139

Investment 18,181 17,947 13,642 7,812 8,036 6,470 4,263 8,302 8,428 Fixed Investment 17,637 14,270 13,629 7,7686 ,637 4,970 5,253 6,802 7,428 Pubilc Sector 8,593 9,816 8,720 4,834 2,829 2,482 2,698 3,689 4,S18 Privato Sector 9,044 4,963 6,809 3,132 8,808 2,508 2,668 2,213 2,912 Changos In Stocks 544 3,877 13 46 (801) 1,900 (1,000) 90e (1,000)

Gross Domestic Savings 23,048 13,961 20,824 14,218 14,729 7,272 9,232 8,716 11,837 Not Factor Income (7,260) (7,230) (9,749) (8,680) (8,128) (10,181) (8,873) (8,682) (6,807) CurrentTransfers 811 237 a39 771 288 321 478 466 33 Gross National Savings 16,109 8,988 11,414 6,409 8,871 (2,688) 1,387 2,699 6,083

------…--- …_-- _------______------_… ______--_ ------_ e/ Estimated. 27 Aug 1980

Source: Central Bank and mission estimates. TABLE2.8: BOLTVIA- GROSSDOMESTIC PRODUCT BY EXPENDITURECATEGORY (Growth Rates)

1987 1988(e) 1981 1962 1988 1984 1985 1986

-0.2X -2.9X 2.1% 2.8% GDP at M.P. 0.91 -4.4X -B.6X -0.8X 0.1X 162.6X 16.0% 19.6X Termsof Trade Effect .. -493.OX 386.8 66.7 -0.2X -7.5X 1.0% 1.2X coY 1.2% -5.61 -7.0X -1.5X 41.71 -2.8% 8.3X -6.0X Importsof Goodsand NFS 87.7X -37.81 4.61 -18.71 -S.91 16.11 -3.0% 6.6X Exports of Goodsand NFS -4.11 2.2X -0.2X -8.8x -8.8X -5.71 -11.1 -2.41 Exports TOTadjusted -2.6% -5.1X -2.11 -8.9X -90.8X 620.81 -61.6X 116.91 ResourceGap -181.9X -282.7X -12.0X 35.7X 7.6X -8.8X 4.7X 6.21 Avallable Resourceo 8.5X -18.0X -6.2X -2.65 -0.9X 7.68 -6.01 2.8X 0.1X Consumptlon 10.2X -11.1X -1.2X -26.61 9.41 2.1X 22.38 Public -21.0X 24.9X -8.2X -6.6X 0.2X 13.8X -8.7X 2.9X -2.9X Private 16.8X -16.81 0.81 7.2X -34.31 48.21 2.01 Investment -1.81 -24.65 -42.8X -22.71 -26.1X 6.7X 10.65 28.01 FixedInvestment -19.11 -5.21 -42.6X -14.51 -13.01 9.61 83.01 26.8X PublicSector 8.41 -27.9X -31.0X -89.01 -84.1X 1.9% -13.4X 31.86 PrivateSector -45.2X 87.6x -S4.01 21.61 -349.81 -168.7X -160.0X -800.01 ChangesIn Stocks 57S.9X -99.6x 253.8 -1408.5X -60.6X 27.01 -6.86 88.5x GrossDomestic Savings -39.4X 49.21 -81.7X 8.eX 26.8X -17.8X -21.41 0.41 Net FactorInco -m.8% 84.8X -12.01 -5.8X 19.81 48.9X -2.65 -92.91 CurrentTransfers -23.8X 43.0X 127.41 -65.2% -187.7X -161.11 94.4X 94.8X Gross National Savings -68.71 63.8% -48.8X 7.21

______------__…------______-- _-- -- …______------…-…-- --- 27 Aug 1990 e/ EstImated.

Source:Central Bank and missionestimates. TABLE2.7: BOLIVIA - GROSSDOMESTIC PRODUCT BY EXPENDITURECATEGORY (As percent of ¢DP In current Bolivlanos)

1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1986 1986 1987 1088(e)

GOPat M.P. 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0X 100.0X 100.0X 100.0% 100.0S

Imports of Goods and NFS 18.9% 18.8% 12.2% 11.9% 9.0% 16.2% 21.4% 21.9% 21.1% Exports of Goods and NFS 20.8% 14.7% 18.2% 14.7% 12.3% 14.6% 18.6% 15.5% 15.6X Resource Gap 4.0% -2.1% 4.0% 2.9% 3.2% -1.7% -2.9% -8.4% -6.8%

Available Resources 98.0% 102.1% 98.0% 97.1% 9B.8% 101.7% 102.9% 108.4% 106.6%

Consumption 81.3% 88.2% 82.2% 88.4% 89.5% 91.5% 96.0% 95.3% 93.8% Public 14.1% 10.9% 16.4% 18.5% 24.0% 13.5% 11.7% 12.2% 14.7% Private 87.2% 77.4% 86.8% 69.9% 85.6% 78.0% 83.3% 83.0% 78.9%

Investment 14.8% 13.9% 13.8% 8.7X 7.2% 10.2% 7.9% 11.1S% 11.9% Fixed Investment 14.3% 11.0% 13.8% 8.6% 8.S% 7.2% 9.6% 10.3% 13.5% Public Sector 7.0% 7.2% 8.9% 6.1% 3.6% 3.6% 4.9% e.4% 8.2X Private Sector 7.4% 3.8% 6.9% 3.6% 4.9% 3.7% 4.6% 3.9% 6.3% Changes In Stocks 0.4% 2.9% 0.0% 0.1% -1.3% 3.0% -1.6% 0.8% -1.8%

Gross Domestic Savings 18.7% 11.8% 17.8X 11.8% 10.5% 8.5% 6.0% 4.7% 8.4% Net Factor Inco -6.9% -S.8X -7.9% -7.4 -8.6% -8.6% -8.1% -6.2% -6.1X current Transfers 0.3% 0.2% 0.3X 0.7% 0.2% 0.3% 0.4% 0.4% 0.3% Gross National Savings 13.1% 8.1% 10.2% 4.8% 4.1% 0.2% -2.7X -1.0% 0.8%

e/ Estimated. 27 Aug 1990

Source: CentralBank and mission estimates. TABLE 3.1: BOLIVIA - BALANCE OF PAYME6, 1970-1988 (Millions of US9)

1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 197S 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 19S8(-)

Trade Balance 31.8 16.8 24.9 30.3 190.3 -130.6 -25.5 15.4 -139.9 -134.5 263.8 -63.0 250.2 166.0 231.2 -62.9 -86.5 -248.5 -223.7 Esporta$1`F8) 191.0 186.4 197.9 260.5 556.4 444.0 568.2 634.3 628.8 759.8 942.2 912.4 827.7 755.1 719.7 628 3 587.5 S18.7 642.4 Ir.porb.CIf) 159.2 169.8 173.0 230.2 366.1 674.6 593.7 618.9 768.7 894.3 678.4 975.4 577.5 589.1 488.5 691.2 674.0 767.2 766.1 Bclancs oi NFS -6.2 -5.0 -11.8 -12.4 -6.7 -6.6 -9.5 -31.8 -39.2 -26.3 -35.6 -47.0 -26.9 0.7 -18.0 -12.6 -25.0 -19.3 -18.0 Receipte 14.6 16,4 21.6 26.4 49.4 60.8 68.6 70.8 85.0 98.0 81,4 87.2 76.3 97.1 87.5 98.0 117.0 134.0 130.7 PaymentS 20.8 21.4 33.4 38.8 56.1 67.4 78.1 102.6 124.2 124.3 117.0 134.2 103.2 96.4 105.5 110.6 142.0 153.3 148.7

Balance of Coods and NFS 25.6 11.8 13.1 17.9 183.6 -137.2 -35.0 -16.4 -179.1 -160.8 228.2 -110.0 223.3 166.7 213,2 -75.5 -111.5 -267.8 -241.7 ------

Factor eervicsc tNet) -25.3 -17.2 -21.6 -22.9 -40.5 -36.9 -40.0 -75.2 -117.A -196.7 -295.0 *395.3 -459.1 -411.0 -431.2 -428.6 -308.9 -258.8 -264.2 Reeaipts 2.1 4.2 0.2 6.8 3.9 6.7 16.8 7.0 5.1 13.6 22.1 22.0 14.4 46.8 36.0 16.0 12.6 14.3 15.8 Into'est 2.1 4.2 0.2 6.8 3.9 6.7 16.8 7.0 5.1 7.4 14.1 14,5 6.7 38.9 28.5 16.0 12.6 14.3 15.8 Mtores 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 8.2 8.0 7.S 7 7 7.9 7.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 Paycent 27,4 21.4 21.8 29.7 44. 4 43.6 30.8 82,2 122.5 212. 3 317.1 417 .3 473 .5 457 .6 467 .2 444.6 321.5 273.1 280 .0 Interest 8.3 12.8 15.4 22.S 28.1 33.4 46.3 69.2 108.3 165.5 265.6 348.4 412,0 341.9 361.3 325.5 281.1 260.5 277.5 Interest Paid 1/ 8.3 12.8 15.4 22.6 28.1 33.4 46.3 69.2 108.3 165.3 261.0 331.2 290.5 300.3 292,1 151.6 99.1 85.7 150.4 Intereat Deforrod A ir.Arrears 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0,0 0.0 0.0 0.0 4,5 17.2 84.6 25.6 69.2 174.0 182.0 174.8 127.1 Interest Capitalized Short Term 0.0 O.O 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 36.9 16.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 Interest Capitatl;zedLong Term 0.0 0.0 0,0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 Otere 2/ 19.1 8.6 6.4 7.1 16.3 10.2 10.5 13.0 14.2 46.8 51.6 68.9 61.5 115.9 105.9 119.1 40.4 12.6 2.5

Net Private Transfers 1.5 2.1 4.8 4.9 3.0 2.6 4.2 5.0 7.8 12.0 12.7 13.3 16.7 40.2 21.8 14.5 17.0 17.9 12.8 Balence on Current Account 1.8 -3.3 -3.7 -0.1 146.1 -171.5 -70.8 -S86.6 -288.7 -345.5 -54.1 -492.0 -219.1 -204.1 -196.2 -489.6 -403.4 -508.7 -493.1

Net Official Troanafer 2.4 5.0 8.3 10.S 10.7 7.8 9.8 14.0 30.0 39.2 48.8 26.3 28.8 66.0 66.7 65.5 82.0 103.2 123.9 Direct Foroign Inveatount -75.5 1.q -10.6 4.6 25.8 35.2 19.8 22.0 23.0 37.5 43.9 75.6 31.0 6.9 7.0 10.0 10.0 36.4 16.0 Nat Official 1 A LT 37.8 46.fi 93.9 S.8 71.4 114.7 238.9 350.3 263.3 187.6 341.4 263.6 136.2 45.4 93.1 49.6 312.3 71.3 349.1 Diaburseeenteo 64.7 63.7 122.5 39.3 122.6 165.9 309.6 451.1 63S.0 337.3 467.7 373.4 244.2 132.2 210.6 193.7 417.2 349.9 530.9 Amortizations 16.9 17.1 28.6 30.5 51.1 51.2 70.7 100.8 274.7 149.7 126.3 109.8 108.0 106.8 117.5 144.1 104.8 278.6 181.8

Exceptional Financing 3\ 0,0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 4.5 17.2 121.5 41.8 69.2 174.0 182.0 198.1 -22.4 Other Long Term Capital 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.7 5.1 51.8 -29.1 5.3 -14.7 -1.5 -1.2 ...... Receipts 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.7 5.1 51.8 3.8 10.4 0.0 1.1 0.0 . Paysent 0.0 0,0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 32.9 5.1 14.7 2.6 1.2

Not Short Term Capital -0.4 7.3 -0.4 -1.9 -2.8 -2.4 0.7 3S.4 33.7 -33.5 -43.2 -88.9 -147.5 -113.9 180.5 24.5 99.0 0.0 0.0 Receipts 1.3 10.8 3,3 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.8 38.7 97.1 54.9 19.3 14.0 125.4 279.7 368.5 24.5 99.0 0.0 0.0 Paymente 1.7 3.5 3.7 1.9 2.8 2.4 1.1 1.3 63.4 88.4 64.5 102.9 272.9 393.6 368.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0

Errore end Omiscione 37.3 -66.5 -67.8 -23.8 -146.0 -33.9 -160.5 -306.6 -172.8 -85.3 -212.5 34.1 -9.4 448.0 -71.6 243.4 -261.0 93.7 9S.7 Unpaid Argentin CoeoRecelpts 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -20.5 -3.1 -35.0 -10.6 Chrage In Reserves -3.4 9.0 -20.0 1.9 -105.2 SO.1 -37.6 -31.2 106.4 148.0 -95.8 158.8 73.2 -288.5 -147.5 -56.9 -17.8 41.0 -56.6

Memo Itae -_____-___ Imports(FOB) 135.2 144.2 142,8 194.0 303.9 502.7 S17.1 537.9 659.1 673.6 576.4 836.5 519.3 485.5 412.3 665.4 S63.9 646.3 566.8 Crote Rfesrve Level 4/ 60.4 61.7 7686 88.6 208.9 175.5 211.3 287.4 229.8 2S9.7 128.5 136.4 182.0 176.7 171.2 228.1 338.5 415.0 408.8 27Aug90 1J 'aymenteon long-torm debt by the p.bl I c sector. 2/ Includee payments to petroloum cocopns." 3J Include. unpaid esortixation end thongs in arrears. 4/ Th. seeming inconsistency between the leevl of Cross Reserv-e nnd Changes in Reserves (Net) is due to the reduction of resrve liabilities of the Control Bank through the conversion of ahort ter d bt of US 62 wmllin ;n 1981 end US 369.9 million in 1983 into mdium term debt. Source: Central Bank of Boliv;a. YANA 3,2: BOLIVIA-MBtO4AlVIE EXPWT (CIP). 1970-1968 (Mil ion. of current US$)

1970 1I71 1972 197 1974 1978 1978 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1902 1968 1984 1988 1906 1907 l988(e) min.i.aI: 294. 9 173.8 174.1 225.9 387.8 814.2 89.5 491.4 815.0 891.7 686.5 $86.1 419.8 347.4 864.0 2638. 196.9 286.9 273.1 Metal. Tin metal I c .. 23.91 24.: 8.3 58.6 81.4 74.8 138. 21.0 228. 236. 2689 287.8 178.8 190.8 138.9 58.8 12.6 48.8 A4ntImony1/ 30.9 9. 9.1 17. 29. 17.1 81.4 18.1 16.6 29. 11. 14.1 6.7 6.3 1.9 2.2 2.8 8.2 2.0 Al dlt.y ...... 12.4 6.8 3.8 5.4 2.7 3.0 2.0 1.8 1.8 Concentrate.. Tin Concentwated 102.0 82.0 88.9 96.7 174.8 120.0 142.1 192.9 172.7 167.6 139.8 77.2 41.0 32.4 87.0 52.7 48.8 86.2 38.4 Z; rc 14.3 18.8 15.4 26.0 87.7 40.8 89.1 44.7 81.8 42.7 386.7 40.4 38.4 36.4 37.8 29.8 28.0 32.7 60.1 Copper 12.5, 6.8 6.8 13.4 16.0 7.8 6.5 4.1 4.0 8.3 8.8 4.4 8.1 8.0 1.6 1,7 0.8 0.0 0.1 Artimy...... 14.61 2.2 11.1 10.0 21.0 13.7 12. 1.6 54 SilIvor 10.5 8.8 7.6 12.6 26.8 28.5 24. 80.6 388.8 56.8 118. 71.7 87.1 588.8 21.4 10.2 27.3 88.8 45.1 Lead 7.8 6.0 8.7 8.8 11.8 7.7 8.4 12.4 10.7 18.0 14.8 11.8 6.8 4.0 1.0 0.8 6.0 4.2 8.9

Othors, /2 9.8 6.9 8.7 6.1 15.0 19.6 82.6 #i 849.8: i. 1.1 0.9 0.8 1.1: 10.2 0.4 0.6 1.0 6.5

Iwdrocarbone: 111.2 28.9 41.6 67.0 198.1 188.9 167.5 184.0 122.8 149.7 248.1 846.5 898.4 420.1 3898.9 376.8 884.1 2586.1 218.6 Gasoline 8/ ...... 22. 8.8 4.8 4.9 0.1 0.1 .- 6.7l 8.7 Mhetral One . .. 9.9 18.1i 29.2 42.8 84.9 066. 78.5 108.0 220.9 886.7 381.6 38762 878.7 874.4 391 286 214.9 propane ,...... 0.6 1.5 0.7 1.6 3.1 8.9 8.7 2.8 0.9 0.2 outan.l"...... 0.1 8.4 6.4 4.0 2.4 0.9 0.:2 : 0- Crude Petroloem 4/ 13)2 28.9 81.7 48.9' 168.9 111.4 112.6 67.4 42.8 440 . . . 29.8 8.4 .. 46 0. 0.

Agricultural Producte: 7.6 13.1 18.4 38.8 61.8 54.4 80.1 74.8 60.9 97.7 1283.8 54.9 82.6 "4. 26.1 31.2 62.0 98.8 97.6 Cotton o. 7 8.6 7.6 9.7 22.0 16.1 12.0 17.7 14. 10.6 0.9 . . . . . leaer 1.0 1.0 0.4 12.4 21.9 17.4 42.8 22.9 14.2 80.6 81.2 8.7 8.1 12.8 6.6 1.8 8.2 6.6 6.8 Leather . . . 7:.. :.. 18: ..: 7.2 4.9 8.2 8.2 0.6 0.8 1.4 6.1 8. 19,8 Coffee 3.8 8.8 4.6 8.9 4.8 70 152 1.7 1. 19.7 20.8 15. 15.8 12. 86 13. 18.0 116 16.9 cosetn ...... 6 2.9 2.5 2.2 1.8 2.3 1.4 8.1 6,6 8.4 Gomsno...... 1.9 4.7 8.2 4.2 2.7 0.8 0. 8 .2 1.6 2.0 0 MetadCattle0 0.8 2.0 1.6 8.1 0.2 0.8 2.1 8.0 2.6 8.0 1.8 0.9 0.6 1.2 1.8 1.2 12.8 6.7 2.0 Timber I1.9 2.6 8.6 7.7 12.9 11.1 10.0 12.0 12.6 21.7 81.1I 18.0 11.6 7.6 6.0 5.6 21,3 80.9 28.8 SoW...... 6.1 38. 7.4 4.6 1.5 5.8 17.8 19.2 28.2 Other Producte 1.1 5.7 6.8 6.6 8.6 8.6 6.5 15.6 28.7 18.1 62.2 41.4 38.1I 10.6 8.1 1.8 24.6 15.0 10.8 Metaiechagnic Producte - ...... 4.8 68: 6. 4.9 .. .. . 8,6 0.0 Arteemnime.- ...... 2.8 4.2 4.8 1. 0.6 0.1 0. 4. 1.0 1.7 Other 8/ $A. 5.7 6.8 6.8 8.8 6.6 8.5 18.6 28.7 10 .6 19 .2 281.7 29.11 10.0 8.0 1.0 14.1 12.0 9.1

Total MhechandleeExport. (CMF 220.8 216.0 240.4 888.8 650.8 581.1 849.6 719.8 72.9 857.2 £089.6 996.9 908.6 822.0 782.2 672.8 687,8 869.5 600.1 preight end Incurance Of 87.8 29.6 42.5 77.6 94.1 67. 1 81.4 68.0 95.1 97.4 97.4 66.5 77.9 86.9 62.8 44.2 60.8 50.6 457.7 Total Merchandise Export. (FOB) 191.0 188.4 197.9 260.8 8661.4 444.0 866.2 684.8 6298. 789.8 942.2 912.4 827.7 788.1 719.7 628.8 867.8 818.7 842.4 Non-Factor Servbcee 7/ 14.6 16.4 21.6 26.4 49.4 60.8 68.6 70.8 85.0 90.0 81.4 87.2 76.8 97.1 87.8 90.0 117.0 134.0 180.7 Total Exports and NWS(FM8 M~.0 202.8 219.8 266.9 606.6 804.6 636.6 705.1 71.8. 887.6 1028.6 999.6 904.0 652.2 807.2 726.8 704,5 65.7 678. 1

o1 Eatiwate. 27Aug1 1/ include Antimony concentretee 1970-1919. 2/ Includes mlloy2. 1970-1979. MDev.idence of gold export, before 1968. 3/ Includoe diemel oil 4/ 2nclude. Gomolin. 1970-197n. 5/ Inclode, other agricultural products; include. 0mea.Catmen wnd Leather 1970-197. There were no eoy exports before 1960. 6/ Oifferenme between CIF and F08 price of exprt.. 7/ Men-factor eervlcee include ehiPment. Other trmneport, other Sead", services and rent so it appears in the Central Benik of Bol ivia's vbalance of payments. From 1979 to £988 a breakdownon other good.. eervicee and rnt wee wade to remvoe the latter. Fro. 1986 an the woorksheate show the eervicee without factor receipts. Sources: Central Sank o Bolivial and eteff eatiwatee. TAKLE83.8 SOUVIA - HERO4ADISE XPORT (CMF,*1970-1908 (Ml I i;onsof constant 1960 US$)

1960 1961 198 1983 1964 1986 1966 1967 1988(e) 197 1971 197 1978 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979

474.3 37.1 473.0 611.5 812.4 7784 711.0 638.5 63.9 596.2 490.0 508.2 368.5 Minerals: 786.06 7620 727.9 728,7 747.7 703.8 227.4 262.4 19. 179 08 0. 106. 111.6 118.6 168. 211.4 267.9 257.4 288.8 314.6 313.4 2.21S Tina"eta IH .. 107.7 108.8 29.0 22.0 84.3 11. 14. 7.7 9.'.9 13 . Antleony 1/ 24.2 ~~~~~~~24.327. 31.1 27. 24. 86. 5.4 4.9 5.8 ...... 12.4 9.0 5.8 Al loys ...... 143.1 186.4 73.2 Concentrates 316.1 804.7 289.6 189.2 139.3 92.8 64.3 42.1 78.2 73.2 Tin Concentrated 444.7 378.0 880.2 344.4 880. 1 276.2 28.2 31.3 42.7 39.0 48.6 41.0 42.3 36.7 88. 38.4 32.5 29.2 2e.e Zinc 36.9 36. 1 81.4 39.4 38.9 39.3 2.6 1.3 . . 0.1 12.7 9.8 6.7 6.4 3.7 8.8 8.4 4.8 4.1 2.6 Cop89, I8.6 16.85 17.8 17.8 16.7 34.1 21.8 20.8 16.4 1.8. 3 6.1 85.2 48.1 89.0 39.4 86.8 47.4 42.6 48.1 38.6 Tungste 33.3 86.4 36.0 88.1 19.8 14.0 18.4 22.5 15.8 . . . 14.6 2. 14.6 1...... 99.8 109o AntAimony 140.8 133.3 121.6 11.3I 187. 1014 16.2 53.8 38.0 166.3 1280 115.1 96. 111.8 120. 187.0 116.9 11.8 6.6 9.1 SilIver 18.0 18.0 15.0 14,2 14.8 14.2 10.3 6.6 2.2 1.3 Lead 28.8 21.3 17.2 18 2 17.6 16.0 0.6 1. 7.6 64.0 14.6 6.6 10.6 1.1 0.8 0.6 1.4 14.0 0.4 Others /2 326 29. 18.7 20.4 29.1i 42.1 241.9 261.8 249.7 258.8 488.8 449.8 834.1 273.2 288.1 245.1 246.2 268.0 214.3 253.1 rb,drocarbaw:t 161.8 293.0 488,8 881.1 541.5 8.4 0.2 0.1 . . 18.7 12.6 . . , . 22.6 8.1 8.7 OnaslIno ...... 289.2 239.8 239.7 229.4 241.2 167.8 168.7 170.1i 177.4 171. 166. 220.9 237.5 248.6 240.7 Natral a"ne. 109.2 170.1 6.3 3.32 2.1 1.0 0.3 . . . 11I. 2.6 0.9 1.6 2.6 pr"pene . . . : . ~~~~~ 2. ~ 84~~~~~~~~~~~~0.1 3. 2.2 1.0 0.3 But&" .. 11.2 1.6 0.0 279.7 188.5 99.2 47.3 .. . . 1.7 9.5 Crude Petroleum 3/ 161.5 293.0 879.3 411.0 874.1 267.1 82.0 48.4 88.4 103.0 1.23.6 127. 88.3 91.5 102.9 119.1 138.2 108.9 99. 184.4 123.6 84.0 78.4 Agricultural Product*: 28.6 39.0 , . I. 33.1 37.1 18.9 14.2 21.8 18.7 0.9 . . . Cotton 3.2 8.8 15. 6 23.4 24.7 9.9 8.1 8:.7 18.3, 11.6 33.1 23.2 26.4 72.5 58. 1 37.6 62.4 51.2 9.7 18.8 Sugar 8.8 8.4 1.4 6.8 2.7 2.8 8.7 13.9 16.9 31.5 ...... ~~~~~~~~~4,9 ~~~~ 4.9 ~~~~~~~13.6 Letther ...... 25.8 12.6 286a 1~ 8 22.8 27.8 18IS8 12.6' 19,6 19.5: 17.1 20.6' 28. 20.6 19.4 26.2 Coffee 14.1 13,7i 16.1 6.0 4.8 7.1 13.8 11.8 .. . . 80 2.9 1.7 2.2 4.2 costan ...... 6.9 5.9 3.9 8.7 2.9 3,4 . . . 4.0 4.7 2.6 4.3 . . . , . . 7.0 3.2 0.9 Goes 1.3 0.9 0.7 0.8 2.8 1.3 0.9 0,7 0.6 1.0 0.6 Meat and Cattle 0.4 1 a 1.7 2,1 2.4 8.0 9.0 19.6 22.4 20.6 31.6 84.7 31.3 15.7 18.3 26.7 31.1 12.2 8.9 8.4 Timber 7.3 11.8 16.4 17.1 3.5 6.2 21.8 23.6 20.2 . . . .. 6.1 2.6 7.8 9.1 Say ...... 21.3 20.2 12.6 5.4 8.1 16.4 14.6 10.3 3.5 28.4 16 8 14.2 18.6 11,1 8.1 9.6 11.1 14.8 32.2 Other Products 7.7 3.8 . . . .. 0.0 . . . . . 3.3 8.6 "eta ImeChan Ic Products . . . 3.4 1.3 0.9 0.4 4.8 2.8 0.4 0.7 . 11: . . . .. 21 4.2 ,. .. . 1: IS: 14.1 14.1 9.7 Arteesnias .1 9. 11. .0 19.2 10.3 18.2 11.7 5.0 a.6 Other 4/ 3.5 28.4 1. 142 86 1.1

1039.6 1010.4 983.9 869.0 810.2 694.0 845.2 766.1 864.8 932.2 112.8 1208.8 1418.6 1407.6 1289.8 1404.6 1261.9 1156.8 1114.6 Total Merchandise Exports (CIF) 106.8 97.4 86.1I 78.6 693 63.9 46. 44.4 40.5 42.4 S/ 108.3 80.7 106.3 167.7 166.5 158.7 126.0 121.6 118.1 Freightand Incurance 1008.0 942,2 924.8 675.3 799.7 744.8 647.7 800.8 725.6 822.4 (FOB) SZ.1 1041.8 1179.3 1247.9 1241.1 1151.1 1276.6 1140.3 1038.7 96.1 Total Merchondise Export* 106.6 107.5 81.4 36.8 77.0 100.6 92.3 102.8 103.2 106.8 6/ 41.8 44.7 84.0 56.9 87.4 96.8 107.9 101.3 904.0 932.4 918.5 Non-Factor Services 1364.5 1241.6 1144.3 1115.4 1023.6 1011.0 982.3 900.3 636.6 780.4 Total Expor-teand NPS (FOB) 86S.7 1086.5 1233.3 1304.6 1328.8 1247.9 ------…-…------…------…- - - - - a/ Estimates. I/ Include Antlwxny concentratee 1970-1979. 2/ Includes alloys 1970-1979. No evidoen of gold exportsbefore 1985. 1970-1979. 3/ IncludesOnsollna There nero no soy exportsbefore 1960. 4/ Includesothor agriculturalproducts; includoe Gome.Caatona and Leather1970-1976. price of exports. 8/ Differencebetwee CIF and FOB it appears,in the Central Include ehipment.other trersoport,*ther goods, servicesend rent as 6/ Non-.factorservices servicesand rent was of Bolivia'sbalance of payments.Free 1979 to 196 a breakdownon other goods, sank factorreceipts. made to remwvethe latter.froe 1936 om the woorkaheetsehow the cerviceswithout

Sour,.es:Central Bank of Boliviaand stafirsativates. TASLE3.4: SOLIVIA - M01OWA1SE EXPORTSCIP). 1970-1988 (Price indices 1980100)

1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1962 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988(e)

14inernl-:metralst Tin Metallic 22.2 2S.7 29.8 49.8 43.3 45.0 683.3 75.0 88. 8 100.0 84.5 75.7 77.2 72.7 68.0 40.1 41.6 42.4 Antimony 127.8 37.0 33.0 S6.0 106.4 68.7 86.1 62.4 75.4 85.0 100.0 94.9 86.0 66.4 97.7 164.2 155.4 148.1 137.0 Al loye 100.0 75.6 68.8 62.5 54.2 52.1

Concentrates Tin Concentrated 22.9 21.9 23.4 28.7 49.8 48.1 45.0 63.8 72.0 88.6 100.0 83.4 76.5 77.1 72.9 72.0 34.1 41.2 42.7 Zine 58.8 42.4 49.0 66.1 98.9 102.7 100.8 91.9 76.4 99.7 100.0 113.9 108.3 102.8 127.8 109.9 99.4 104.3 140.7 Copper 67.1 SO.4 49.3 77.4 95.8 S7.S 66.0 61.2 62.9 89.8 100.0 81.3 68.8 72.9 64.6 66.2 60.2 78.2 Tungrtn 52.0 37.4 27.1 29.2 58.4 63.4 77.1 116.5 100.4 96.3 100.0 100.8 74.9 56.1 55.6 47.2 32.7 31.2 Antimony 100.0 91.4 75.3 58.1 106.1 97.7 79.0 87.0 100.9 Silver 8.4 7.2 7.9 11.3 22.3 20.8 20.4 22.0 25.4 47.9 100.0 52.3 36.5 54.9 39.9 29.1 28.7 338. 29.9 Lead 53.4 28.1 33.2 45.7 65.4 48.1 0.1 68.8 71.4 126.9 100.0 S0.5 68.4 46.3 4603 42.0 42.3 61.9 65.0 Bieuth 107.2 Cold 85.1 97.8 120.0 116.8 Others 1/ 28.5 25.2 23.S 29.9 S16 46.6 50.9 68.1 61.6 85.6 100.0 105.9 129.9 80.9 72.9 100.0 100.0 71.4 8S.3 I+ydrocarbors± 100.0 123.1 118.1 119.9 111.0 93.4 78.1 Casoline 100.0 107.5 79.0 90.9 51.9 51.2 35.8 29.4 Natural CGe 9.1 10.6 17.4 25.2 32.3 57.6 45.9 56.2 100.0 141.7 158.S 157.1 157.1 156.1 137.3 108.4 69.1 Propsne 56.0 53.5 77.9 100.0 110.9 111.0 118.1 107.3 94.8 80.8 Sutane 100.0 123.1 118.1 119.9 111.0 93.4 78.1 Crude Petroleum 8.2 8.2 8.4 11.9 43.8 38.8 40.3 43.5 42.6 93.1 92.5 868.S 40.7 51.0 0.0 Agricultural Products: 26.6 38.6 34.5 42.4 59.6 45.7 56.0 70.2 61.4 63.3 100.0 101.7 70.0 53.7 54.0 53.4 79.6 75.S 76.4 CWbton 22.0 43.0 48.6 41.4 66.5 48.8 86.2 124.3 68.0 77.1 100.0 Sugar 27.4 29.1 28.4 37.4 94.3 65.9 59.0 89.4 37.8 49.3 100.0 58.3 48.5 49.8 67.2 56.5 60,3 47.0 S4.2 Leather 53.1 100.0 104.7 46.5 30.7 80.4 38.0 43.7 48.0 61.0 X Coffee 24.9 28.S 26.5 37.3 34.1 85.7 67.6 109.3 80.9 69.1 100.0 81.6 59.2 51.1 52.3 53.9 6S.9 51.0 60.7 0 Caetena 92.2 100.0 153.2 102.3 42.0 46.8 83.2 43.9 48.0 47.0 Coam 47.4 100.0 124.8 96.6 39.0 12.7 13.0 56.0 62.0 68.0 Meat and Cattle 131.8 131.9 105.9 149.4 8.3 62.5 230.3 448.1 315.3 122.4 100.0 105.1 87.8 151.5 150.0 187.0 182.3 209.4 222.2 Timber 25.9 24.3 23.1 45.0 40.8 32.0 32.0 76.8 68.9 81.3 100.0 147.0 180.6 92.9 75.0 64.9 109.0 137.8 123.8 Soy 100.0 139.3 96.0 49.9 43.5 65.0 81.5 81.4 99.9 Other Products Metlmechanic Products 147.2 100.0 104.4 129.6 0.0 Artesanlas 121.3 100.0 141.3 83.9 71.0 36.3 6.6 210.1 229.5 250.0 other 2/ 88.8 20.1 40.0 46.4 56.5 77.7 16S.S 196.8 230.9 119.8 100.0 279.0 191.7 88.0 S9.7 27.5 99.8 85.0 94.2

Total Merchandlee Exports (CIF) 24.5 19.2 18.7 23.9 46.2 41.2 48.2 57.0 62.6 78.9 1000. 98.9 94.9 94.6 98.5 ff.9 7S5. 74.3 69.4 Freight and Incurance 34.9 86.7 40.0 46.4 56.5 62.8 63.6 69.9 80.5 91.2 100.0 100.5 99.1 96.5 94.8 95.5 113.4 125.5 136.0 Total Merchandise Exports (F08) 23.2 17.9 16.8 20.9 44.8 88.6 44.5 55.6 60.5 75.4 100.0 98.7 94.6 94.4 96.7 97.0 73.4 71.5 66.0 Men-Factor Services 34.9 36.7 40.0 46.4 56.5 62.8 63.6 69.9 80.6 91.2 100.0 100.5 99.1 96.5 94.8 95,5 113.4 125.5 186.0 Total Export. and NFS (FOM) 23.7 18.7 17.8 22.0 45.6 40.5 46.0 56.8 62.4 76.9 100.0 98.9 94.9 94.7 96.S 96.8 77.9 78.4 73.3 s/ Pmtimates. 1 Indeoxof market preces In US I terms for metals *nd phesphate rock exported by developing countries used froe 1983 on. 2/ Index of market prices in US 1 ters for agricultural raw materials used from 1983 on. Sources: 1970-79 Date: Central Bank for minerele and for tho rest mission estimtes based on volues and prices also given by the Central Bank. 1900-as Data: Central Bank for Bolivia, unpublished worknheets dated April 25S1986. 1986-87 date: Central Bank worksheets dated Oec.23. 1966 and July 27, 1987. TABLE3.5: BOLIVIA- MEROS#CSE EXPOIRTS(CIF) 1970-1988 (Real Croth Ratte - bated on 1980 priceo)

10SS(r) 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1960 1981 1982 1983 1964 1985 19b6 19S7

-18.9 -17.4 2.7 -23.4 23.0 -20.3 25.1 11naralnl 3.2 -4.8 0.1 2.8 -5.9 15.8 0.1 -4.8 -8.1 -10.2 7.9 "ate Ia _3.6 4.6 2.8 6.2 39.4 27.9 26.8 -4.9 -7.2 31.7 -0.4 -27.S 15.4 -25.0 -2C.9 -78.0 238.9 Tin MetalIt 22.2 -?9.5 -31.1 10.4 43.9 -32.4 mny 0.6 13.8 12.7 -12.0 -9.0 46.3 -20.4 -24.1 58.2 -66.0 25.8 -47.9 Anti -38,8 -1.2 -10.1 19.0 -100.0 0.0 0.0 Alloys 0.0 0,0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -27.6

Concentrate. -41.3 -22.5 e5.8 -6.3 95.5 _4.7 -42.7 Tin Concentrated -18.7 1.4 -9.4 1.6 -20.5 iS.6 -3.6 -21.3 -21.1 -26.4 -38.6 -3.2 -0.1 -8.4 -10.2 -8.0 3.0 11.3 36.3 Zine -2.1 -13.0 25.3 -1.1 0.9 -0.7 24.7 -15.8 4.5 -14.3 -3.6 -23.9 -22.S -31.9 -5.1 -42.2 -3.6 53.2 -16.1 -10.2 -30.4 -9.3 -50.0 -100.0 0.0 Copper -11.S 8.3 -3.0 -16.7 9.2 4.5 0.2 -5.2 -2.6 28.3 -13.5 0.8 -7.4 29.9 -10.0 S.8 -21.0 -4.3 -36.0 -6.2 -20.0 Tungsten 10.4 45.9 -32.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 S1.2 -33.2 17.0 14.9 -29.4 Antimony -26.0 4.7 .49.4 -34.9 203.9 -6.3 51.6 Si lvvr -7.9 -16.4 1S.6 8.0 13.9 -13.2 18.0 -5.0 -8.6 -2.8 13.9 8.8 -8.3 -8.9 4.8 7.4 -16.0 -5.3 1.9 -1.5 -27.6 -16.2 -74.9 -41.1 824.2 -42.7 33.9 L"d -8.5 -19.6 325.7 63.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 13.5 Cold -27.3 120.8 929.0 -97.1 100.0 75.0 457.1 oher -8.9 -47.0 29.5 42.7 44.6 52.2 -77.2 -39.9 21.2 -89.7 -22.7 3.9 -0.7 1.6 81.4 66.7 18.9 -6.8 -15.8 -1.3 -25.7 -18.2 -13.9 4.3 0.4 7.7 7.3 -11.0 -4.4 tydrarb,ons: 84.3 -5.S -96.5 -27.S -100.0 0.0 0.0 Canol In. 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -86.3 0.7 0.9 4.3 -S.5 9.2 18.2 7.5 4.7 -3.2 -0.6 0.3 -0.1 -4.3 5.1 Ntural C_ 65.7 -1.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 161.9 -67.9 81.4 71.0 89.3 -39.1 -33.9 -54.1 -69.7 -100.0 Propane 0.0 -100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 4861.1 96.0 e9.1 -33.9 -64.1 -69.7 Butane 0.0 0.0 -70.2 -100.0 0.0 -86.0 -100.0 Crude Petroleum 81.4 29.5 8.4 -9.0 -23.2 -2.6 -44.4 -36.2 -52.4 -100.0 0.0 71.7 12.4 15.8 16.0 -23.4 -6.3 65.8 -19.8 -56.4 39.7 8.8 -41.0 20.8 76.2 20.2 3.2 Agricultural Products: 36.3 36.7 0.0 49.7 41.3 12.2 -62.S 2.3 52.9 -36.9 -93.2 -100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 Cotton 177.2 77.1 176.7 111.4 -36.5 -S.9 -S9.0 2254.4 -20.9 13.8 174.5 -19.8 -35.3 66.1 -18.0 -81.0 90.2 33.2 -69.9 -68.4 Sugar 1.4 38.8 -61.2 -5.4 48.2 274.2 21.2 87.5 Leather 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -64.2 -20.4 55.7 -0.4 -12.4 20.6 38.1 -27.1 -8.7 33.2 -3.6 -50.3 103.4 -22.6 15.0 22.38D Coffee -2.5 32.3 -12,7 93.3 -16.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -8.8 -42.0 32.2 90.7 18.5 -12.5 64.1 Cactana 0.0 -49.4 1S.$ 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 17.2 -44.7 65.5 61.6 -14.4 -S4.2 46.7 -Oa 23.2 24.2 -39.1 1022.5 -54.3 -71.9 Most and Cattle 29.5 12.1 22.1 16.5 -4.6 -28.7 -2S.6 23.2 197.3 -47.8 -31.8 -23.3 -60.6 -27.3 -6.0 -4.6 12.5 117.7 14.8 -8.2 Timber 67.0 42.7 4.1 84.5 9.8 -9.9 -49.8 16.6 43.8 16.5 17.5 -61.5 133.6 1S9.1 11.1 -14.3 Soy -58.1 203.3 -9.7 9.5 -20.9 -$3.7 86.3 16.5 2S.8 124.7 -33.9 -4.9 -37.8 -66.9 49.8 102.1 -11.4 -29.0 Other Products 714.3 -44.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 170.2 -13.2 -50.4 -100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 metelmachanic Product. 0.0 -48.9 -80.9 54.S 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 103.9 -19.7 -62.3 -30.4 -54.8 1025.0 Artesenia. 47.7 -22.8 -57.1 -27.8 289.2 -0.1 -31.6 Other 714.3 -44.6 -9.7 9.5 -28.9 -53.7 86.3 16.5 -19.0 112.9 -46.S

14.5 10.1 -0.6 -8.4 8.9 -10.2 -8.3 -3.6 -6.7 -2.8 -5.6 -8.9 -6.8 -14.3 21.8 -9.4 12.9 Total Merchandise Export (CM1) 20.4 -4.2 -8.8 4.9 -23.5 51.7 S7.8 -0.7 -16.7 -7.7 -5.0 -2.8 -9.8 -8.8 -11.6 -8.7 -11.8 -4.9 -29.8 Froight and Incurance -13.0 23.6 -9.4 13.3 (FMB) 26.4 13.2 5.8 -0.5 -7.3 10.9 -10.7 -8.9 -3.0 -6.5 -1.9 -6.3 -8.6 -6.9 Total M.rchandia Eaporto -8.3 11.2 0.S 3.5 -10.0 Services 6.8 20.8 5.4 S3.7 10.7 11.4 -6.1 4.2 1.8 -24.2 6.6 -11.3 30.7 Non-Factor -5.5 -7.1 -10.3 20.5 -7.9 10.3 Total Eports and NFS (FOB) 25.5 18.5 5.8 1.8 -6.1 10.9 -10.3 -7.8 -2.5 -8.2 -1.2 -5.8

------_------_- __------______--- 27Auq90 e/ Estitee.

Source: Table 8.3. TABLE3.6: BOLIVIA - M8XOWNISE IHPORTS(CXF). 1970-88 1/ (MII ions af curront US1.)

1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1960 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1967 1988(s)

Coneuonr Goode 32.3 84.2 41.8 45.9 78.8 108.8 102.6 122.1 1S8.6 154.9 172.2 248.4 100.0 66.9 94.9 133.4 133.7 126.2 1S6.1 Durablo 22.5 24.7 29.9 S0.6 49.6 61.2 59.6 73.1 96.1 73.2 65.6 125.2 40.6 19.6 52.9 46.0 61.9 58.2 62.7 ion Durablo 9.8 9.5 11.9 15.3 26.7 44.1 43.1 49.0 62.5 111.7 106.6 128.3 S9.2 47.3 42.0 87.4 71.8 70.0 93.4

RawMhterale and Int rmdiato Goods 68.7 68.8 71.4 90.6 168.2 242.4 248.5 232.7 267.1 325.3 255.4 363.6 258.9 288.4 203.1 278.0 235.3 320.5 265.3 Fuel 1.1 1.2 1.1 1.2 2.4 9.6 9.3 7.7 7.2 9.7 1.8 14.8 9.4 4.2 1.5 2.4 2.7 3.3 1.7 For Agricuture 2.4 2.0 4.3 6.6 6.1 9.0 7.5 7.9 9.4 9.9 11.4 16.7 7.7 11.6 17.5 18.4 15.8 21.6 13.2 For Induetry 86.4 S0.2 54.9 70.6 126.9 180.9 169.1 171.7 198.8 267.6 209.6 280.8 204.9 228.5 152.4 231.0 183.2 252.2 214.7 For Con truction 8.8 15.4 11.1 12.2 22.9 42.9 60.6 45.4 41.7 38.1 S2.6 52.4 37.0 44.3 31.7 26.2 33.6 43.4 35.7

Capital Good St.4 S5.7 68.8 92.1 129.9 225.9 243.2 268.5 349.0 S77.6 247.2 356.1 206.9 226.9 185.1 253.3 281.6 305.9 334.0 For Agriculture 3.2 5.0 3.9 7.2 9.7 17.3 13.2 16.5 21.5 16.6 13.8 21.7 S.4 7.5 13.5 27.3 40.1 27.4 36.6 OD For Industry 26.4 31.3 30.7 80.6 56.4 98.2 128.3 156.5 216.6 214.1 130.9 207.7 144.7 159.6 103.4 136.7 151.7 177.1 178.7 Transport and Equipmnt 27.8 21.4 24.2 34.3 63.7 110.5 101.7 865.6 111.0 146.8 82.5 126.6 56.8 59.9 68.2 89.3 89.8 101.4 118.7

Othor Goods2/ 0.8 10.9 1.0 1.6 1.7 1.0 1.4 5.5 3.9 6.6 3.6 7.2 11.6 6.8 6.4 26.5 23.4 14.6 10.7

Total PlorchmndleeImports (CIF) 159.2 169.8 173.0 230.2 866.1 674.6 593.7 618.9 768.7 894.3 678.4 975.4 577.5 889.1 488.5 691.2 674.0 767.2 766.1 Freight and insuranco 24.0 25.4 30.2 36.2 82.2 71.9 76.6 81.0 109.6 220.7 102.0 188.9 68.2 103.6 76.2 125.8 110.1 120.9 99.3 Total Nsrchandise Import. (FOB) 135.2 144.2 142.8 194.0 308.9 502.7 617.1 S37.9 659.1 673S. 576.4 836.5 519.3 485.6 412.3 666.4 563.9 646.3 666.8 Man-Factor Ssrvices 20.8 21.4 33.4 38.8 56.1 67.4 78.1 102.6 124.2 124.3 117.0 134.2 103.2 96.4 105.5 110.6 142.0 153.3 148.7 Total Import nd i (CIF) 180.0 191.0 206.4 269.0 422.2 642.0 671.8 721.5 892.9 1018.6 795.4 1109.6 680.7 685.5 594.0 801.0 816.0 920.5 014.8

- __-__- -- ___---- ______.______-

1/ In Bolivia the three bieet cuetoms office. are not on the frontier, thu. there *xtsto the 27 Aug so called CIF-Fronterm nd CIF Aduren values. This to one equivalent to the ueual un 2/ Includes wheat and other governeent imports. e/ Eatimtee.

Source: Central Sank of Bolivia. National Institute of Statistics and staff etimteo. TABLE8.7: BOLIVIA- ID56 IN CONSTANT1980 PRICES 4i I I ions of cnetnt 1980 US6)

1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1976 1976 1977 178 1979 1980 1981 1982 1988 1984 1988 1986 1987 1988(.)

19.1 93.9 120.8 206.9 164.8 142.7 166.6 Consweer oe 77.1 00.4 89.6 80.8 105.4 140.1 138.5 181.9 196.7 221.4 172.2 283.7 85.9 48.8 85.6 45.9 47.3 Durable 64.5 67.2 74.7 66.0 97.9 97.8 93.4 104.8 119.4 80.2 68.6 124.4 41.8 20.3 157.0 109.0 96.8 119.1 Non Durable 12.7 13.2 14.9 14.8 17.8 42.6 48.1 47.4 77.8 141.2 106.6 159.3 97.3 73.6 64.4

214.5 295.2 211.3 262.2 200.3 Rtw Materials and Intermdilate Goods 218.9 204.7 193.2 206.8 282.8 897.7 897.1 840.2 827.5 361.9 258.4 860.0 264.8 299.2 2.7 2.S 2.8 1.3 Fuel 25.3 20.7 17.6 13.8 6.8 26.8 24.4 18.3 17.1 15.9 1.8 13.2 8.6 4.4 1.6 212.9 292.5 208.8 259.4 199.9 Other Intermedateo Coedo 193.6 E14.0 17S.7 192.7 275.8 870.9 372.7 821.8 310.4 346.0 253.6 348.9 255.7 294.8

235.3 195.5 268.9 252.8 280.1 252.1 capital Goods 164.4 151.6 148.9 198.6 229.8 359.9 382.1 369.8 43S.5 413.8 247.2 S64.1 212.1

8.7 28.1 21.0 11.9 8.1 CA Other Coods 2/ 2.3 29.7 2.5 3.4 3.0 1.6 2.2 7.9 4.8 7.2 3.6 7.2 11.9 7.0

638.4 536.0 798.1 649.6 668.9 626.9 Total Nerchandis lmoerte (CIF) 462.8 466.4 432.2 489.3 620.5 899.2 919.9 869.8 962.S 1004.8 678.4 1006.0 627.4 80.5 133.5 98.8 98.9 74.9 Freight and ineurance 68.8 69.1 75.8 78.0 110.1 114.8 120.4 118.9 186.1 241.9 102.0 138.1 69.6 107.4 488.5 664.3 880.8 568 1 5S2.0 Total Merchandier Isport. (FOB) 394.0 397.2 356.7 411.3 610.4 784.7 799.6 753.9 826.4 762.4 576.4 866.9 867.7 528.0 111.4 117.4 127.5 125.3 112.2 Non-Factor Services 69.6 s8.2 83.5 88.6 99.8 107.4 122.7 146.8 164.2 136.3 117.0 133.4 105.7 100.0 647.4 915.4 777.1 792.3 739.1 Total Iporets and NFIS(CIF) S22.4 524.6 81S.7 373.0 719.8 1006.6 1042.7 1016.6 1116.8 1140.6 795.4 118.4 733.1 735.4

27 Aug 1/ Atleeted using NV only as surrogats for veiqhted PN and Food Indicies. 21 Fntelmtd using KN only tn place of weighted MN and Fuel Indicies. */ Estimate

Source: Central Bank of Bolivia. Nak1onal Institute of Statistics ad staff ceates. TABLE3.8: 81_OIVIA- MtOK4WISE X6,7. 1970-198B Import Price Indic*& (1980 * 100)

1988(o) 1970 1971 l972 1973 1974 197S 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 190 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987

78.9 64.8 81.3 88.4 93.8 ConaumerOcod. 41.9 42.8 48.7 W6.8 72.4 78.2 74.1 80.4 80.7 83.S 100.0 87.6 71.9 71.8 94.7 94.2 111.4 122.3 132.8 Durable 34.9 36.7 40.0 46.4 86.S 62.8 63.6 89.9 80.5 91.2 100.0 100.6 97.6 96.4 68.2 65.7 65.9 72.4 78.A Non Durable 77.4 72.2 80.0 103.8 152.2 103.8 95.7 103.8 80.9 79.1 100.0 77.4 60.9 84.3

94.7 94.2 111.3 122.2 132.S Raw Ilteriala and Int*rmeJ1x-., Qoodii 31.4 3a.6 87.0 43.9 86.1 61.0 62.1 68.4 78.5 89.9 100.0 101.0 98.0 96.4 93.2 89.9 106.4 116.8 126.S Fuel 4.3 5.8 6.3 8.7 36.7 35.7 38.2 42.0 42.0 60.9 100.0 112.1 108.7 96.2 94.7 94.2 111.4 122.3 132.5 Other Intermediate aood4 84.9 36.7 40.0 46.4 56.8 62.8 63.6 69.9 80.5 91.2 100.0 100.6 97.6 96.4

94.1 94.2 111.4 122.3 132.5 Capital Goods 34.9 36.7 40.0 46.4 6.8 62.8 63.6 69.9 80.6 91.2 100.0 100.6 97.6 96.4

94.7 94.2 111.4 122.3 132.s Other Coode 34.9 36.7 40.0 46.4 56.8 62.8 63.6 69.9 80.6 91.2 100.0 100.6 97.6 96.4

92.7 91.1 88.6 103.7 118.0 1.2 Total Yerchandi;e Importo (CtFj 84.4 36.4 40.0 47.0 59.0 63.9 64.5 71.2 79.9 89.0 100.0 97.1 92.0 94.7 94.2 111.4 122.3 t32.5; Freight and Insurance 34.9 36.7 40.0 46.4 S6.8 62.8 63.6 69.9 80.5 91.2 100.0 100.6 97.6 96.4 90.5 865.1 102.4 113.8 120.8 Total MOrchandimeImports (FIf8f 34.3 36.3 40.0 47.2 59.5 64.1 64.7 71.3 79.8 88.4 100.0 96.5 91.S 92.0 94.7 94.2 111.4 122.3 l12.5 Non-Factor Servlca 34.9 36.7 40.0 46.4 88.S 62.8 83.6 69.9 80.5 91.2 100.0 100.6 97.6 96.4 91.8 87.6 105.0 116.2 123.8 Total Imorta and NFS (CIF) 34.5 3W.4 40.0 46.9 88.7 63.8 64.4 71.0 80.0 89.3 100.0 97.8 92.8 93.2

27 Aug */ Eat;iat.e.

Sowre: IXR. Commodity Price )ata. TABLE8.9: 6OLUVIA- M>OUWNISE DSOI. 1970-1988 (Groeth Rft. Percentagee. con.tant 1980 perceo)

L9711972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1976 1979 1980 1981 1982 1988 1484 1985 1988 1987 198a(o)

71.2 -20.1 -18.8 16.7 Conumer Goods 4.2 11.4 -9.0 30.5 82.9 -1.1 9.7 29.4 12.6 -22.2 64.8 -51.0 -32.5 28.1 Ourable 4.3 11.1 -11.7 35.2 10.9 -4.2 11.9 14.2 -32.8 -18.8 89.7 -66.4 -51.4 17S.0 -12.6 18 . -17.3 8.0 143.9 -30.6 -11.2 23.1 NonDuraleb 3.9 18.0 -0.6 18.5 143.1 5.8 5.2 63.1 82.6 -24.5 49.4 -8.9 -24.4 -12.5

37.6 -28.4 24.1 -23.6 Raw toteriale andIntermd'ate Cooda *-6.5 -5.6 8.9 36.7 40.9 -0.1 -14.8 -3.7 10.l -29.4 41.0 -26.6 13.2 -28.3 Fuel -18.2 -15.4 -21.2 -52.7 311.1 -9.0 -25.0 -6.5 -7.0 -88.9 645.9 -34.5 -49.0 -63.8 67.8 -4.9 11.3 -52.4 -23.3 Other Itterardiate Goods -5.0 -4.5 9.7 48.1 34.5 0.5 -13.8 -3.6 11.S -26.7 38.8 -26.3 15.3 -27.8 37.4 -28.6 24.2

CapitalCood -7.8 -3.1 35.1 1S.7 56.6 6.2 -3.2 17.2 -4.5 -40.3 43.2 -40.1 11.0 -16.9 37.5 -6.0 -1.1 0.8

-18.3 389.4 -25.3 -a.2 -32.4 00 Other Oooda 1194.6 -91.6 38.0 -12.9 -47.0 S8.6 257.9 .48.6 49.4 -S0.6 101.5 64.9 -40.6

2.7 -6.0 Totol Merchandi;e Leporta (CIF) 0.8 -7.3 13.2 26.8 44.9 2.3 -S.. 10.7 4.S -82.5 48.1 -57.6 1.3 -18.7 48.9 -18.8 -26.1 65.9 -26.0 0.0 -24.2 Freight and Ineuranco 0.6 9.2 8.4 41.0 4.1 5.1 -3.7 17.5 77.7 -47.8 35.4 -6.8 80.1 -13.7 45.9 -17.1 3.1 -2.8 Totalm.rchandie Import (F0M) 0.8 -10.2 15.3 24.1 58.7 1.9 -5.7 9.6 -7.7 -24.4 S0.4 -34.5 -7.0 5.4 8.8 -1.7 -10.5 Non-Factor Servicoe -2.2 43.3 0.2 18.7 8.1 14.3 19.6 5.1 -11.7 -14.1 14.0 -20.7 -&.5 11.4 41.4 -15.1 2.0 -6.7 Total Import. and WS (CIF) 0.4 -1.7 11.1 25.6 39.9 3.6 -2.3 9.9 2.1 -30.8 43.1 -38.6 0.3 -12.0

1 Et)mtoe. 27 Aug

Scurce: Table 8.8. TABLES.1: WILIVA - CONSUMERPRICE INDEX

(1976 * 100)

1907 1988 cPX 9iem 1979 1980 1981 1962 1low 1984 198a 1986

52,493,888.2 6.44.000.0 January a78.6 431.0 683.2 866.9 989.2 8,848.4 17,989.9 629,971.8 41,050.237.0 53139.102.0 57,544.000.0 February 878.9 440.1 685.5 88s.5 1,148.1 4,248.0 22,091.9 1.781.884.8 44,314,302.9 53.500,884.8 s8.027,000.0 tbrch 874.1 438.1 648.1 881.0 1,241.7 4,744.8 26,761.9 2,223,674.6 44.84a,478.3 54,351,.63.6 60,775,000.0 Apr;l 874.9 484.8 651.7 e81.9 1,390.3 5,147.3 48,614.1 2.487.922.8 45,937,004.4 54,544S.91.5 61.634,000.0 fty 872.1 445.8 671.4 901.4 1,454.5 5,617.0 64,121.1 3.375.313.9 46.381,628.9 54,426.928.6 62.902.099.0 June 388.0 458.7 708.5 902.6 1,S23.0 8,796.8 66,730.1 6,023,641.8 48,357,006.1 54,397,849.0 6S,414,000.0 July 400.9 467.4 718.9 915.6 1,851.7 8,880.3 70,184.4 10,017,502.2 49,219,576.6 S4,988,108.2 66.988,000.0 1 Am"" 406.7 476.5 742.9 970.s 2,182.8 8,083.1 80,709.2 18,67s,225.7 49,5s3,872.9 66,785.000.0 0 September 409.9 482.3 725.3 965.7 2,607.8 9,388.7 110,88.7 28.0998,26.4 80,661,880.1 85,255,270.9 68,121.000.0 1 October 425.5 490.3 785.2 972.4 2,984.4 10,432.8 176,871.1 25,611,915.8 50,980,s0s.0 66,409.000.0 56,249,000.0 67,92,000.0 Nvember 42S.7 511.7 748.6 271.1 8,80.1 18,018.2 232,025.7 26,481,706.3 50,906,684.1 6s,8O.,000.0 Oc..ber 427.7 822.1 771.0 964.8 8,825.6 16,92.4 878,298.5 80,878.811.6 61,288,418.0 56,702,000.0

27 Aug 1990 Source: Nation Inat" tubt of Statistice TAKE 5.1: BLMVA - MONTHLYINFlATION RATES, 1974-1988 YOM TABLE la

MONTrLYINFLATION 1974 1976 1978 1977 1978 1979 198 1981 1982 1983 1984 1986 1988 1987 1908

January 10.91 1.8% 1.21 8.2X 0.41 0.81 1.81 12.4X 2.sX S.6% 9.-6 66.8x 88.09 2.4X -0.51 Fobruary 12.4% -0.1X 1.2X -4.5 -1.2X 2.1X 9.41 1.9X 18611 10.8% 23.6% 182.8% 8.60 1.2% 1.9% March 1.8% 0.9X -1.6% -2.1% O.1X -0.4X 1.7% -9.8% 8.2% 11.%X 21.1% 24.9X 9.1% 0.7X o.sX April C.0 - 4X.7%0. 0.4X 0.2% -9.8%x C.X 9.1X 12.8% s.5% 88.9X 1l.sx 8.8X 1.8% 4.7X May 0.7X 9.Ot 0.7 9.1% -O.6X 2.SX 8.9X 2.2% 4.CX 9.1X 47.9% 85.7% 1.X o.8x 1.4% Jun. 2.811 1.8% 1.X 8.7x 8.7X 1.8% 5.65% 9.1 4.7t 8.2X 4.1X 78.5X 4.8x -9.21 2.1X July 9.8x 2.2X 0.8% 1.0X 8.9x a.e% 1.5% 1.4% 21.6% 10.1X 5.2% 8s.8x 1.8X -0.1X 4.9% August 9.8% 1.8X 0.X 1.8X 1.4X1 1.9 8.sx 6.OX 17.9X 26.9x 16.0% 86.5X 9.6X 1.09 2.4% Sept_mbr -2.1% 0.2% 9.9X 9.9% 0.8X 1.2X -2.4% -0.%X 19.5% 16.4% 87.8% 56e.W 2.sx 9.6% -0.4% October -0.8 4.SX 9.8% 1.651 .8x 1.7X 1.4% 0.7X 14.4% 11.5X 59.1X -1.91 C.8X 2.1X 2.X Novembr 2.8x -0.8x a.6% 0.6% C.OX 4.4% 1.l1X -. 1X 19.09 24.sX 81.6% 8.2% 4.1X -0.3% -4.2% Docebr 9.8% -o.9s 1.9% 9.8X 0.6X 21.6% 3.7% -9.8X 7.8% 26.9% 80.9% 16.8% 0.7% o.sx 1.a8

Source: National Instltut of Statistics 27 Aug - 88 -

ANNEX III

Public Sector InvestmentProgram

This annex lists all of the projects in the public sector investment program for 13990-93,along with informationon the sector,responsible authority,region, donor and amount programmed. RIO DE PLAUEAMIEWIOt COOROIuACtOW SUBSECREitAtA vE INVERSION PUBLICA Y COOPERACtONItIERHACIONAL SISTElA DE INFORMACION S5OREINVERSIOCES H E I C A 1990 - 1993 (S.I.S.11N.) P R 0 G R A H A 8 A S I C 0 0 E I H V E R S 1 0 P U 8 (En miles de d6lares americanos) HORA:04:49Ph FECHA: 26 DIC 1989 PAC: I CLASIFICACIONSECTORIAL 1993 ES FUENTE PROCRAKADO1990 PROCRDo 1991 PROCRADO 1992 PQOGR41U00 ---- .------.3 tCOIGO NOCMRE Of LA INVERSION SEC- TA EuT1OAD FA FIANC INTERNO EXTERNO TOR 00 EJECUTORALOC SE EXTERNA IttERNO EXTERNOI INTERNO EXTERNOjIN ERNO EXTERIOI ...... -.-...-. .,,,...... ,...... ,,,...... ,...... 30 80 30 80 30 80 0 0 13-0001-00 Deserrollo Rural Valles Interaridinos AGR E MACA LPZ I CIDA 279 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 13-0005-00 Prog.de Desarrol(o Fruticole techero del Va81e CBS AGR E MACA CB8 1 60 80 70 90 70 90 0 0 13-0007-00 Prodc'c4P de Semiltas AGR E MACA H4ALI PL-480 70 78 0 0 0 0 0 0 13-0010-00 Stb Proyecto de Producci6n Ovine ACR E MACA CHU I FIOA 10 70 10 70 10 70 0 0 13-0011-00 Slote. Kat.ede fnf.Tecnologics pare el Oes.Ruwel e ACR E MACA MAL I JUMAC COTESU 290 1,364 350 1500 350 1,500 0 0 13-0025-00 Prograe de Desarrollo Rural ACt E SHOC MAL I I 195 1,850 250 1,587 0 0 0 0 13-0026-00 Alttiptmno Vatls AGR E SuOC SOP KFl S7 130 0 ISO a 0 0 0 13-0028-00 Programe Macional de Plenteciones forestales AGR E Wf UAL I HOL 46 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 13-0031-00 Forestacidn y Conservaci6n Suetos Norte Chuquiseca AGR E CWf CHU I 81 SO 0 0 0 0 0 0 13-0032-00 Desaerrotlo Pisefcota del Attipteno ACR E CoP LPZ I JItA CAN 0 0 972 324 1.093 364 0 0 13-0036-00 Proyecto 01 Investigaci6n Agricola ACR E ITA MAL I 68 90 0 0 0 0 0 0 13-0039-00 Proyecto 02 loorte de Chuquisaca AGR E ISTA CHU I FIOA 195 190 100 4.00 100 *00 0 0 13-0042-00 Rest.Forest.Rehabilt.tierras Cuenca Cuadalquivie AGR E PERTI TAR I FAD PL-480 15 0 0 0 93 280 100 300 100 300 0 0 13-0051-00 lnvestigecldn Vegetal AGR E CtAT SCZ I C-SR 47 73 80 100 80 100 0 0 13-0052-00 Investigael6n Canadera AGR E CIAT SCZ I G-BR 75 44 80 0 140 0 0 0 t 13-0053-00 Ext.Vegetal, Prod.,Proc. y Comerc. de Semilles AGR E CIAT SCZ I G-SR 0 0 931 243 1,112 283 0 0 0 13-0054-00 Extensldn Agropecuarla AGQ E IOTA UAL I P1U0 5 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 %O 13-0060-00 Centros com tles de pesca del tago Poop6 ACR E CoP ORU I cOot 0 0 800 2,000 1,200 4,000 3.000 13,500 1 13-0111-00 Sanidad Animal y Vegetal ACR E MACA uAL I 010 137 720 180 750 0 0 0 0 13-0116-00 Progruna laclonal de ta Popa AGR E IBYA MAL I H101 102 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 13-0123-00 Estacl6n Bloldgica dot Beni ACR E MACA OEM 1 50 90 0 0 0 0 0 0 13-0130-00 Sanidad Vegetal AGR E MACA HDPP IICA 0 900 100 1,000 8 1,000 0 0 13-0132-00 Proyeeto Chlmsw6 Yapacanf Guabir4 AGt E MACA SOP I BID 128 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 13-Z!33-00 Cons, de Asent. de Peq. Agric. en et R. Sts. Crux ACR E MACA SCZ 1 245 791 120 520 0 0 0 0 13-0134-00 esarrolto Agropecuario PDA AGt E MACA MAL I HOt 80 450 80 - 500 60 300 0 0 13-0137-00 Nejorauiento Gen4tico Bovino AGR H MACA SCZ I JICA TA 340 700 700 1,208 0 0 0 0 13-0204-00 Produccidn y Dlfus14n Semi(las Pafrumani AGR E MACA CBSB t 0 4,395 0 2,500 0 3,549 0 0 0l3-0206-00 Oesarrotlo Regional del Chapare ACQ E SUSOA CBS I USAIO 0 1,828 0 1,000 0 0 0 0 13-0207-00Rehabiltitcldn parciat de riego Nro:l La Angostura ACR E MACA CBS I CHINA 5 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 13-0208-00 Oesarrotlo de pesca artesanat Ista det Sot ACR E COP LPZ I C-8R FIDA ri 368 350 0 350 0 0 0 21-0001-00 DESARROtLOAGROPECUARIO UOR1E CHUQUISACA AGR E CORDECH CHU I P14A 33 0 0 0 CARE 368 40 420 45 420 0 0 0 21-0002-00 PROGRAMFRUTICOtA ACR E COROECH CHU I 200 500 0 0 0 0 0 0 21-0002-05 Fomento Frutfcole Chuquisaca Centro ACR H COROECH CNU I ITA 325 821 345 913 362 497 360 0 21-0003-00 PROGRA"AFORESTAL AGR E CORDECH CHU I COTESU 133 97 4.2 8 44 9 334'IE 21-0009-00 PROGRAKAW INO DEPARTAMENTAL(a)LPINA) ACR E COROECH CHU 1 PL-480 428 0 390 0 400 0 0 D 21-0010-00 Centro de NeJoramiento Bovino Iboperenda AGR E COROECH CHU 1 327 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 21-0011-00 C.l.y I. S. Bovino Criotlo Et SALVADOR AMR E COROEC" CHU 1 '1,500 0 492 0 0 0 0 21-0012-00 FONENTOGARADERIA PORCItA ACR E CORECH CHU fIlA 226 28S 335 1,581 400 1,129 730 1I2m: 21-0013-00 OESARROLLOARICOLA DEL S9D DE Cm=UWISACA ACR E CORDECH CPU I OPEP 360 482 503 0 P9A 51 64 3S IL 200 80 80 800 80 444 0 0 21-0014-00 Proyocto Riego Cutpina AGR E COROECH CHU I ALEN Klhka.cR1O OE PLAIEAMIENIOY COORDIRACIOU SUSSECRETARIADE IWERSIOW PUBLItA Y COOPERACIONINTERIIAC1ONAL SISTEtA OE INFOR)ACIOW50RE INVERSIONES U 8 I C A 1990 - 1993 (S.I.S.IUN) P R O G R A W A A S I C 0 D E I NVERSIO P VA: 04:49p9 (En mlets de d6lares americafos) FECA1: 26 OIC 1989 PA: 2 CLASIFICACIOI SECTORIAL ...... ,_...... PROGRAMAOO1993 ES FUENTE PROGRmv,.) 1991 PRocRoAR!D 1992 ...... t0IRE LA tNVERSIOI SEC- rA ENTIDAD FA FINAN-. CODIGO OE INTERIO EXTERNO TOR 00 EJEaJTOItA LOC SE EXTERNA INTERNO EXTERItO INTERlo EXTERNO INTERNO EXTERNO ...... ,...... ,,,,,,...... ,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,.. .*..,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, ...... 349 0 7C0 0 720 0 0 0 21-0015-00 PROGRAI DE KICROAIEGOy RIEGO AGR E COROECH CHUI 0 0 144 1.000 148 1,000 1,064 3,126 21-0040-00 Kejormfmnto C.OMMfn Crlottl Chaco Ch. AGR E COROECH CNU I FOUPLATA 0 0 614 1435 353 337. 359 356 21-0044-46 Pr.*ecto tntegrard San Pedro - Tarvlta - Nolleni AR It CORDECH CNU I PtlA 175 693 0 0 0 0 0 0 Z1-0070-00 Proyecto Integral Escan 90x/89/003 AGRt COROECH CMN I FNWC 0 0 450 2,000 500 3,000 5,707 4,000 21-0079-00 Progra Neceonst Porcino AMR 11 CORDECH CHU I 810 89 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 22-0003-00 Desarrotto Agropeaorto Apoto ACR E COROEPAZ LPZ I 200 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 22-0005-00 RepobtmIento Gawdero Bovino del Norte AGtR E COROEPAZ LPZ t CEE 0 0 1.271 4,656 1.271 4,656 0 0 j42-0023-00 ProMr.a Nlcroproyectos Rurates PWPRIt AMR ' CORDEPAZ LPZ I 203 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 22-0024-00 Centro Gandero Porvenir AGR E CORDEPAZ LP2 1 31 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 22-0110-00 Oesarrotlo forestal AGR E CORDEPA2 LPZ 1 I 100 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 22-0115-00 Prbdu.df to4dcta Quinua AGR E CORDEPAZ tPZ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 22-0231-00 Intgrado Copeni AGR N CORDEPAZ EPz 1 48 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 22-0280-00 Centro Lechero de Patos tlances AGR ' CORDEPAZ LPZ I 101 34 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 22-0290-00 Carpas Sotares AR N CORDEPAZ LPZ 1 0 0 0 400 0 400 0 0 22-0600-00 fase estudio proyecto Ultoma AGR E COROEPAZ LPZ P ITA 452 282 0 0 0 0 0 0 23-0001-00 Programs de desarrotlo agropecuariode Ayopaya AGR E COROECO CO I 1ITA 485 0 0 0 a 0 0 0 I 23-0002-00 Produccion de Semilltts doe ortatlIzas AR E CORDECO CBS I 145 138 360 0 360 0 720 0 %o 23-0003-00 Proyecto doe esarrotto Agricote £ntegrado-Pocon iAGR E CORDECO C8B I 810 525 972 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 23-0004-00 Repoblauiento Forestal AGR E CORDECO COS I COTESU 1 130 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 I 23-0006-00 Oesorrotto Agrqxpcuario Voale Atto AGR E CORDECO C8S 171 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 23-0032-00 Desarrotto Aoropecuerio Distrito Sud AMR E COROECO CBS I 28 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 23-0503-00 Hanejo y Repb. Fofest.Trop.(Suto 8uto-Villa Tuns) AMR E CORDECO C8B I flOA 537 1,400 550 3,100 750 3.500 0 2,385 24-0001-00 Desarrotto Agrapecuarlo Cotoa"ita-San Juan det Ora AMR E CORDEPO PTS I OPEP 902 900 900 0 PMA 160 160 160 0 676 2,100 500 2.100 0 0 de Campesino - PAC AGR E CORDEPO PTS I CEE 609 594 24-0002-00 Programa Autodesarrollo 554 0 0 0 0 0 0 24-0003-00 Prograa Wicero Rtieo eot86/022 AGR E CORDEPO PIS I PNU 231 t 6S9 972 800 813 0 0 0 0 24-0004-00 Proy.de tnt9rac.y Oesarr.Norte PTS y Sud CBB AGR E CORDEPO PTS PNUD 31 189 35 203 37 203 0 0 24-0006-00 Desarrotto Rural Integrado ACR E CCROEPO PTS I UNICEF 92 185 96 so 101 83 0 0 24-0007-00 forestaci4n Departamentat ACR E CORDEPO PTS I PIA 65 195 70 200 76 209 0 0 24-0010-00 Apoyo a la Producc10n Agropecuaria AGR E CORDEPO PTS I PHA 75 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 24-0025-00 Recuperacidn de Tierras Rio Tarpaya AGR E CORDEPO PTS I UUFDAC 0 0 600 1,900 0 0 0 0 24-0037-00 Des5rrolto Integrado Cronkota-Turuchipa AGR N CORDEPO PTS I 0 0 0 300 0 0 0 0 24-0038-00 Plenteos Procesedoras do ouinua AMR N COROEPO PTS I UNFOAC CEE 90 117 89 117 0 0 0 0 25-0001-00 Produectdn do La Outnia (FPse Agricole) AGR E CORDEOR ORU I CfE 65 110 65 110 0 0 0 0 25-0002-00 Wejoroimlento y Repobtomlento de Camelidos AGR E CORDEOR ORU I CEE 61 101 60 101 0 0 0 0 25-0003-00 Psejorsaiento de Cris de Ovinos AGR E CORDEOR Of.UI CfE 69 132 70 133 70 132 0 0 25-0004-00 Forestaidon dot Attiptano AGR E CMRDEOR ORU I 80 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 25-0005-00 Desarrotlo Rural Integrado AGR E COROEOR ORU I t 120 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 25-0006-o00 Centro Agropecutro para et les. dot Altiptno AGR E COPOEOR ORU IFU 30 300 500 0 50 0 70 0 L-26-1003-00 Program Riego Santa Crux ACR E CORDECRUZSCZ I ALEW 0 4000 3,000 2.700 100 500 100 500 100 300 0 0 26-1004-00 Wejoramiento Gentico Ganado Sovino ACR E CORDECRUZSCZ I JICA 263 263 200 233 200 233 0 0 26-1005-00 Prog. DeSarrotto Aropxcuarlo Vallegrando AGR E OORECRUZ SCZ I G1Z MIMIS1ERIO DE PtA*EAHIENTO T tOCRDWACI0O SUSEtCRITARIAOf INWERSIONKI8SICA Y C0PERACIOw INTERNACIOMAL SISTEMAOf INFORRACIONSOMRE IMVERSIONES (S.1.S.IN.) PPROCRAMA BASICO DE I R V E R S ItOM P U 8 L I C A 1990 - 1993 (En miles de d6lares ericanos) fU: 04:491" FECIIA: 26 DIC 1989 CtASIFICACION SECTORIAl PAM: 3 ...... _...... ES FUENTE PROCRAMADO1990 1PROAKDO PROGR09993 PROCt O 193 CCDGO E DEON LlA INERSION SEC- TA ENTtDAD FA FIWANC...... TOR WO EJECUTORA LOC SE EXTERMA INTERMO EXTERNOJ INTERO EXTERMO INTERMO EXTERMOJ INTERMO EXTERNO ...... 26-1006-00 PLADERVE AGR E CORDECRUZ SCZ I GTZ 240 240 2w0 439 240 439 0 0 26-1007-00PRCDESA ACR E CORDECRUZSCZ I GTZ 200 160 120 120 120 120 0 0 26-1013-00 P.D. Agrapecuarlodet Orient. ACR N COROECRU2 SC2 I IDA 300 1,000 0 0 0 0 0 0 26-1014-00 SI5ts de rleo Crape (Moa. 3,600) ACR S ORDECRUZ SCZ I KFh 100 700 0 0 0 0 0 0 26-1035-00 Oeavvtto rurat baa AGsMA E COIECRUZ SC2Z 101 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 26-1036-00 OESARROLL0IANA NOltERO AR E CORDECRUZSCZ I 86 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 26-1037-00 Desarrollov?al SanJ vler AMR E COEtRUZ$CZ 1 32 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 26-1038-00 DOtsrol,o rtal Puerto Surm AMA E COROECRU2SC2 1 116 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 26-1039-0 Oetrollo rurwl Concepcion ACR E COROECRUZSCZ I 116 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 26-1040-00 earrorllo ruratl Sn Pedro AMR E COROECRUZSCZ I 99 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 26-1041-00 esrolo rurat Sr ACR E COADECRUZSCZ I 110 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 26-1042-00 esrrolto rural Icilto MR E COROECtRUZs2 1 119 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 26-1043-00 Desarrolttorural Florlda ACR E COORDECRUZsCZ 1 145 0 0 0 0 0 0 a 26-1044-00 Desarollo rur l Caballero ACR E COROECRUZSC2 1 154 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 26-104S-O0 Desarollo rural Cordiltra ACR E CORDECRUZSC2 1 182 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 26-1046-00 Desrrotlo rurol Ribo AGR E CORDECRUZSCZ I 122 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 26-1048-00 fotnto Gwwdera Porcfna AR E COROECRUzSCZ I 83 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 26-1049-00 De rollo fovnlo del Chaco MR E COROECRU2SCZ 1 97 0 0 0 0 0 0 0° 27-0035-00 Dwrollo Agropecuatlo Arc AGR E CWETAR TAR I PNA 257 80 121 85 142 95 0 0 " 27-0043-00 Dwearollo Agroperlo Comor ACR I CODETAR TAR I 248 0 90 0 100 0 0 0 1 27-0045-00 tesatolto Agrepecuarlo Valle Centrat de Tarija AGR E CODETAR TAR I CARE 0 0 107 112 0 0 0 0 27-0065-00 Deswrollo Agropecurlo Crtn Chamo AR E COGETAR TAR t 600 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 27-0077-0otwsrrotlo mgrpecuio mmona tts MR E COEAt TAR t 53 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 27-0l0S00 Procto Porclno SCZ-CNW-TAR MR E CDETAR TAR I 65 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 27-0113-00 Desawrollo Fouticol. Vatlt Central ACR N CODETAR TAR I DIN 0 50 0 0 0 0 0 0 28-0001-00 SemslMa.oejor*a& de Arrom_ AGR E CORDESEMI OEM I CH-MAC 100 224 0 0 0 a 0 a 28-0005-O Proyeto piloto de pesea AGR E CORDEBENI SEM I G-SR 60 120 0 0 0 0 0 0 28-0006-00 Dessatolto agropecurio a In*wstrial AGR E COAeSEI SEN I IICA 70 50 0 0 0 0 0 0 28-0008-00 Program Amtonfa ACR E )ORW8EEtI SEN I OEA 25 100 0 0 0 0 0 0 28-0062-O Proyeto de tonejo de Pastos de Forraje AGR E CORESENt SEN J 16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 28-0068-00 Const.y Kant. Casinos Vecinales AGR E CORDEBENI OEM I BID 346 49 0 0 0 0 0 0 28-0072-00 Coiwenlo MPisecola II.T.B.-COROE8ENI AGR E COROESENI BEN I 19 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 28-0302-00 CEINROIWNESt.? OIAGNOSTICOVETERINARIO AGR E CORDENI BEN I 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 29-0008-00 Desarrotlo AgrIcota Porvenlr AMR E CORDEPANDO PAN I ITA 500 800 250 800 650 1,000 0 4,300 21-O067-00 Desarrollo Agrfeola nachsretf (SOL/861033) AGR E CORDECH CHU P PMtD 181 157 53 0 0 0 0 0 26-1009-00 RIego .tas Ira Etspe AGR CORDECRtl SCZ P 81: 50 300 0 0 0 0 0 0 26-1011-00 P.O.A.O. Cacpcnente OR.NX. AGR N CORDECRUZSCZ P IDA 70 500 0 0 0 0 0 0 27-0001-00 Prograa Oesarrollo Agropecuorlo Gran Chaco ACR E CODETAR TAR P P1W 65 257 0 0 0 0 0 0 27-0102-00 Program Oesarrolto Agropecuarl Santa Aa AGR E CWETAR TMR P JICA 43 500 0 0 0 0 0 0 27-0103-00 Progrm de desarroltlo Agrpecuarfo AGR E CODETAR TAR P 37 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

TOTALACPRCtIARIO 18,773 31.683 15,799 43,211 12,898 36.521 12.344 31,776

12-0091-00 Poli.otalurgico solivar "IN E CONISL OC4U I 810 2,179 1,261 890 0 1,113 0 1,780 0 NtIsloE DIOPLANEA"I9IEtO Y ADINACIO SSSECREIAAIA0E IWERSIOSIPUSlICA V COOPEftACIONINTERACIOIAL SIStEtA 0E ItRIUFACWIOSOItRE MRSIOlES BASICO Of INVERSION PU8LICA 1990 - 1993 (S.l.S.II.) PROCRANA VORA:06249PH (En miles de d6lares emericonos) FECIU: 26 PlC 1909 PAG: * 4 CIASlfICACIONSICTORItA ...... _ -.-...... ,_,,...... 1992 _POMAO 1993 ES FUEIITE PROWA"0IOO 0 1991 PROAK4O ...... TA ...... 1 LA INVERSION SEC- EIITIOAD FA FINAUC. tCOD 10WIE EXTERllOIhTERWO EXTE£tO IIT1150 EXTERIIO1IITER1I0EXTERUO OR 00 EJECTUIRALOC SE EXTERNA INTERIIO ...... _...... KIll i.018 0 0 0 0 0 OW I IDA 0 28 0 0 0 0 Ef s-selr Praye.to Integral - PeOp6 Him E COSISL 0 0 12-0092-00 MAlP 31 0 0 0 0 0 12-Q0904 Program Crto 6eelogI c4 de f llvi1 MIN E CEOSOL 0 0 0 0 KIN I GEOSOL MALP 45 0 0 0 12-0097-0 LentM_ento detl Edaftolgice de Bolivia 0 0 0 0 0 KIlN E EOBOL AL I 10 0 0 12-01040 PgeO de floc n de I wersi.nesde Pr"y. 80l. 80 89 107 45 0 89 NIN E CONISOL 0W I IDA 0 32 12-013948 Plant In6tdW il alceaye* 385 363 I' 503 1.103 178 1.103 0 San Vicente INi E ClI30L PT$ I IDA 0 0 12-060040 Rdhabilltosln PTSI IDA 27 0 89 303 0 0 12-120140 Rehabltitacidn Teteui KIN E COS1S0L 0 0 0 8 E CCeIu. PT$ I 0 0 134 0 lZtOa4-0e0 a_titaeidn TaaEIbI 1,506 2,142 1,024 0 890 0 601 0 Unitiicaem MIN E COIIOL PTS I 810 12-020640RetMbIIitscidn 0 712 1,335 712 IDA 0 BID 2,029 l,956 712 0 712 0 596 Ro_bitsclen Son Jos MIN E CONISOL ORV I 267 12-020740 IDA 0 890 178 0 0 0 0 0 NlW E C01i8OL OQUI IDA 0 35 45 12-02OSOkdoilitecidn Santa 2.438 1.095 1,602 1.29 1.602 1,21 2,403 _ N1N E COSISOL OWU I IDA 673 12-009-40 Redabttacidn 246 134 614 32S5 614 44S 579 0 Caracetes IM E CONIO LPZ I IDA 0 0 I 12-021040 RehAbiit.cidn tP2 I IDA 0 162 29 134 0 4S Rehdbititacidn Vitoco Nil E Co0I1OL 5S %0 12-0211-00 IDA 417 2,140 1,157 44S 1,246 312 1,246 Reawbilitc16n tolquiri INi I C1IS0L LPZ I 0 12-0212-00 ORU I XIV 45 2w25 45 2.225 4S 2,403 45 12-014-UO httwgieo Vinto NIl E EAF 134 890 0 01 "IN E GEOsO. t I ITA 89 890 116 1.S13 12-CRt500Poltb dtlicos 267 58 267 45 223 preclos.. KIN E 0E10ot PTS I CTZ tO7 267 5B 12-0217-00 Proapeccldn de wetalus hisicoSy 198 0 134 0 0 0 0 0 CNIOROLGE "II a CoGlSoL PTS I 12-050 C015u oLL YPIRoOUCCION 0 0 267 1,157 267 1.1S7 0 0 minworulttisetorial "IItNII3OL MNIPI IDA 0 12-051040 Pro_ OWI IDA 0 36 0 0 0 0 0 E. M. On" NHil E ONlSeOL 0 0 12-051140 I IDA 0 1,960 0 0 0 0 Entided NIbtri: NHI E CONI90L LPZ 0 0 0 12-051240 cOMIcL ORUI IDA 0 36 0 0 0 12-05130 tar,.q ._ HimNINE 0 0 0 0 NIS E CONIBOL O1UI B10 0 91 0 0 12-0S1440 Planta Rio Yura 90 0 0 0 IDA 0 0 PTSP 0 0 45 0 0 0 12-002640D stUdio eotolco Chorolque Him M CONIBOt 0 107 0 EO6 UALP 0 0 49 0 53 12-0096-0OPrograsCsCta eolo.gce de Botivia "li E 98 0 98 0 GEOBOL UA P 0 0 49 0 12-0097-GOLevantiento det aps Edafolegico de 9olivia Nlt E 0 0 0 0 E GEOBOt PTSP BID 0 0 18 27 12-0102-00 Pr.grwa de Samime4mnizacl6nde ta liners Chico NIM 0 0 0 0 e COUIBOL LPZ P 0 0 67 0 12-0124-00 Inestigaldn y lNtenimiento Natitda NKil 0 0 0 0 NHI E COISOOL ORUP I10 0 134 0 0 12-0141-0 Reaves - Itos 0 0 0 0 45 0 0 0 TOSIoDEt RIo HNI " CCmUiIL PAXP 334 0 12-0501-O0SANA P IDA 0 0 0 45 334 *5 EXPt. Y PoNOClIONEL ASIENTO NHim M Ca#ll8o PtS 668 C 12-050S-00 PTSP IDA 0 0 223 45 1,780 267 EP1. Y PRONOCIOWCERRO RICO POTOSI NIl U CONI8O0 890 C 12-0506-00 PTSP tDA 0 0 0 0 890 267 12-0507-00 EXPtOR.Y PROCIOU PuLAC&TO NIN N COMlBOL 8,079 17,730 8,699 10,480 10,m 9,434 9.5Q0 4.139 OAL NOW110NEtAUttRCIW 1,335 0 1.335 0 1.780 0 2.492 16.0t- Porte lID E 1P91 "IP I ND-EXT 0 14-0034-0 Exptoracin BID 1,335 3,5£0 1.780 8,010 1.335 5,073 0 PraPeto Explorecldn Altiptano KID E YPf8 soPI 1.33S 4,450 14-0035-00 toP I 8I1 2,225 14,685 4,005 16,020 1.780 26.904 14-003640 ramps Estratigraficas tl1 E YPF8 HIHISIERIO DE PtlIEltO YrrlC00lIUACION SUSECREtAIA DE INVERSIONF3ICA r COPELRACtOIINTERUACIOAL, SISTENA DE INlOfCtIOI SOUR!EIUWRSIoUS tS.l.S.III.) PROCRANA BASICO DE I N V E R S I 0 1 P U Lt I C A 1990 - 193 (En miles de d6lares aericanos) 0-4t9P4: FECIIA: 26 SIC 1989 CASIFICCION SECTORIAL PAG: 5 ...... ES FUENTE PRMAKAW 1990 PROCRAKUDO1991 PROGRANADO192 Pj MWAO 1993 CODIGO HOME DE LA IIVERSI0 SEC- TA ENTIOAD fA FIANC...... TOt SO EJECUTORA LOC SE EXTERHA INTERNO EXTERNO INTERNO EXTERIO INTERNS EXTER1OI IJITERN IXTInRO ...... _e...... 14-003T-00 Exploraod6n Centro est HID E YPFS SOP I 12,638 0 3.560 0 3,560 0 8,722 0 14-0038-00 Exptori6n Areas Sud HI0 YPFeB SOP I 6,141 0 3.115 0 3,560 0 7.56 a 14-0039-00 Capo Cascabet - Vlbora HVI E YPFB SC2 I BID 2,403 3.560 3.115 5,340 1,78p 11,570 2.314 5.340 t4-0040-00 Caipo Sant Cruz KID E YPfB scZ I BID 4,272 4,895 1,335 3.560 1,780 3,540 2,670 0 14-0041-00 Copo Son Rqe HID E YPF8 TAR I 2,982 0 1,335 0 1,424 0 2,136 0 14-0042-00 Caspo NarmnjIltos HID E YPfB SCZ I . 1,780 0 178 0 89 0 445 a 14-0043-00 Campo VilItmntes H10 E YPFB TAR I 1,424 0 1,157 0 1,157 0 2,492 0 14-004-00 Ca"q Ionteugtdo HID E YPfB CIHUI 890 0 356 0 178 0 445 0 14-00C5-00 CaIop H. Suwez - Yapecani NIb E YPFB scz I B1o 2,848 8,099 2,225 5,785 t,335 7,202 5,340 0 14-0046-00 Co"po Slrarl 51o E YPfe SCZ I 81o 2,670 3,471 3,026 5.785 2,670 10,235 2,670 5,340 14-0047-00 Campo Vuetta Crandk enS E YPFsC CHU I CAF 1246 44 1,157 8,633 623 0 7,120 0 14-0048-00 Caspo Patacios RIO E YPf8 cCz I 0 0 3,560 0 S,785 0 13,350 0 14-0049-00 Copo Palometas HIS E YPF8 SCZ I 0 0 3,560 0 5,785 0 13,350 0 14-0050-00 Copo Cniri H10 E YPfB SCz 1 267 0 178 0 445 0 0 0 14-0051-00 Conpo La Pefla HID E TPF8 SCZ I BID 3,560 6,230 1,202 2,670 1,068 2.136 2,136 0 14-0053-00 fabtica de Tabos HID E YPFB Cos 1 134 0 134 0 45 0 89 0 14-0054-00 Envasadoa Ltiricantes (Plantas) HMI E rPFB CUB 1 89 0 89 0 89 0 178 0 1 14-005S-00 Ga Natural Cmprimido HID E SCPFz 1 445 0 401 0 267 0 267 0 JO 14-005V-00 Plantas Alm1anje y blstrlbucldn 01C "ID D YPfB HP I 623 0 267 0 178 0 267 0 w 14-0057-00 AmpIsciln de Oe fdtltadora HID E YPf8 CBS I CAf 534 1,780 473 2,248 0 0 0 0 14-0058-00 Esfer de GLP HID a YPfB Cos8 890 0 356 0 356 0 356 0 14-0061-00 Casodebto Santa Csiaz - Attiptanwo HIS E YB "OP I 910 0 2,470 0 0 0 0 0 0 14-0065-00c s0owcto COT - SCZ HiSb E YPfB SCZ 71 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 14-0066-00 Gasodecto Santa Cnsn - Brasi HID H YPF6B SCZ I NO-EXT 107 10,680 9,790 71,200 13,795 89,000 0 0 14-0067-00 Gesocto Redes Urbaa - Occidente HID E YPf8 scZ 1 267 0 312 0 178 0 356 0 14-O06-00 G6soduchto Redes Urbana - Oriente Sur HID E WPFB SCZ1 134 0 134 0 89 0 312 0 14-0069-00 Proyectos Ienores - Tabog HID E WPFB HOP I ITA 1,424 534 445 0 890 - 0 - 267- 0 14-0074-00 Cesoducto Tapacanf N.Suarez-Carand HIS E YPfB SCzI 1,958 0 1,335 0 1,424 0 623 0 14-0076-00 Variacdn y ulejoras en ilncas HID E WPFB DP I OECf 1.335 890 1,335 a 89 0 267 0 14-0078-00 Ptantas de AtmacenajeV Dlstrlbucidn Yabog HID E YPFB toP I 44S 0 445 0 445 0 356 0 14-0D09- OtPantas 8rWrrefadoras HID E YPFB HOPI 134 0 134 0 134 0 45 0 14-0080-00 Estaefone, Servicils, Aerepuertos IID E WPFB HDPI 89 0 45 0 45 0 45 0 14-0583-00 I.werteanes OfIcina Centiat HiS E YPFB HDP I 1,602 0 267 0 89 0 89 0 14-001Y-00 Segwidad tIntriat IIIO I Pf8 HP I 178 0 267 0 89 0 356 0 14-0085-00 Obas Cviloes y Equlpinentos GPM Nib e WeB OP I IDA 890 2,225 44S 0 44S 0 890 a OECF 3,560 4,005 0 0 ESP 1,335 0 0 0 K4-0086-00 Equipavionto y Otros C6 HIb E WEfB HDPI XFU 890 1,335 623 0 267 0 890 0 OECF 0 2,225 0 0 t4-00J7-00 Eqipos y Otrs GPOF 1 E YPFB SCZ I OECF 89 3,115 134 4,880 89 0 44S 0 ISA 890 0 0 0 KFU 2,670 0 0 0 14-01O-00 Centro de Tecnotogfe Petroetra HIS E fPFB SCZ I ITA 267 1,780 89 2,670 89 0 89 0 14-012S-00 Ceequiica - Kawtametria MItD E WPF UAL I 534 0 45 0 45 0 BP 0 tINblItbIODE PLANEAMIE10 Y COOROINACIOs SUSECRETARIA OE IUVERSIONPt4LICA V C00PERACION INTER1ACIONAt SISTENA Of I1FORNACIOIIS08E IHVERSICOHES CS.3.S.I11.) P R O C R A H AAS I C 0 E I N V E R S I O P U I C A 1990 - 1993 (En miles de d6lares americanos) H0RA: 0.:49pH FECHA: 26 DIC 1989 PAC: 6 CLASIFICACION SECTORIAL ...... , ...... _ _ ,.,... ,,,... ,,,... , ...... ES FUENIE PROGRAKADO1990 PRoGGAAAR11991 _ 0 1992 PROGRANADO1993 ------.. CODlO NOH4RE E LA INVERSION SEC- TA EHT0A0 FA FUNANC-- . TOR 00 EJECTORA LOC SE EXTERuA INTERuO EXTERHO IRTER0 EX7ERUGI tHTER0O EXTEQ00.I...... EXtERHO ...... 0 2,225 0 2,670 0 6,230 0 14-0126-00 Pospetcci6n Sismica HID E YPF8 MAL 1 1,335 0 623 0 623 0 1.335 0 14-0127-00 Prospeccin Ceol6gic RIo E YPf8 MAL I 0 1,24 890 0 0 0 0 14-0223-00 Casoducto Rio Crende - Santa Cruz dlD E YPFf SCZ I 8ID 1,068 554 0 2,670 0 6.230 0 16,020 0 14-0246-00 Csrpo Santa Rosa HI10 1 PFS SCZ I 0 0 3,382 0 6.230 0 16.020 0 14-0247-0' Caspo Encosuls "lO H YPFB SCZ2 0 0 0 0 0 0 111,250 14-0253-00 Planta de fertilizantes HID H YPfB SC2 I HD-EXT 0 0 0 0 0 142,400 0 142.400 14-0254-00 Planto de Potlmeros RID 1 YPFB SCZ I HO-EXT 0 0 851 4,845 1,424 7,120 0 0 14-025S-00 Plants Cracking Catalitica HID 0 YPF8 SCZ I 01D 0 0 7,120 1,335 7,120 0 0 14-028-00 Desearolto de Caqcps (Brasil) HID E YPFB MDP I 1D-EXT 0 0 1,335 0 0 0 0 0 0 14-0261-00 Equipos y Haterslaes G0t HID E YPF8 HAL I OECF 0 2.670 IDA 1,780 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 14-0262-00 Extraocion Licuables HID E YPFB C8O 1 142 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 14-0263-00 Plants de HNdrocarburosPesados HID E YPFO SCz 1 3,560 0 534 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 14-0264-00 Potidxcto Losa Suarez - Trinidhd HID E YPfB SC2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 14-0265-00 Oucto Sica Sicc - El Atto KID E YPFO LPZ 1 641 0 0 0 0 0 0 14-0266-00 Poliducto Vil(a Tuarri - Trinidad HID E IPFB CBS 881 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 14-0123-00 LevantamientoAeromagnetom6trico HI0 E YPfB MAL P O8D 0 858 66,072 155,886 73,781 312,300 120.462 284,C00e ' TOTAL HIDROCAR8URCS 69,304 84,070 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 21-0028-15 Naderas tratadas IND E CODECH CHII 150 57 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 22-0606-00 Infreewtructura Turatica Tiahuanacu IND E COROEPAZ LPZ 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 23-0015-00 Proyecto Agroindustristdel te IND E CORDECO C8BS 28 0 0 0 0 0 0 23-0016-00 Proyecto Agrirndustrisldel Tarlui IND0 E CORDECO COB I GrZ 106 266 0 0 100 160 100 0 0 0 23-0018-00 Programs Agroquimica IND E CORDECO CB8 I USAID 95 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 23-050400 0esarrollo Turismo Cochebamba 1ND E CORDECO Co8 1 150 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 24-0012-00 Restauracl6n Acondicionwmiento Noumentos Hist6r. IND E COROEPO PTS 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 24-0034-00 Proyectos ccuplementerios 110 E C0ROEPO PTS I 145 0 0 42 150 0 0 0 0 25-0011-00 Industriatizacidn de ta Ouinua (2d& fase) ID E CORDEOR ORU I PNUW 80 187 0 0 0 0 0 0 26-1025-00 Prcnocln Pequelia Irndstria I1D E CORDECRUZSCZ I GTZ 365 280 300 300 3S0 0 0 27-0050-00 Centro Vitivintcota IND E CODETAR TAR I ITA 125 0 a 0 0 0 0 0 28-0009-00 Acopfo de cereates IND E COR0EBERI DE" 1 50 610 400 300 0 0 TOTAL IMOUSTRIAY TURISHO 990 818 422 0 0 0 0 0 G 14-0002-00 Interconecci6n Central Oriental ERG E E10E HDP 1 555 0 0 0 0 0 0 14-0009-00 Consultorfa e Informaci6n Gerenmast EKG E EWDE CB8 I IDA 242 200 0 Colorada E5G E ENDE PIS I PNUD 108 34 0 0 0 0 0 0 14-0010-00 Factibilidad Geoterniia - Laguna 0 Santa Cruz E G E ENDE SCZ I IDA 20 932 0 0 0 0 0 14-0011-00 S4ptma Turbine - 0 0 S -estationes Fase 11 ENG EtOE HDP I IDA 0 0 28 716 0 0 14-0012-00 Amptlaedn 0 0 0 0 Tacutba-Villsmontes EBG E ENDE TAR I KFu 611 918 0 312 14-0013-00 Proyecto 0 0 0 214 0 14-0014-00 NuevoGrjpo Trinidad ENI B ENDE BEN I KFU 416 748 0 IID-EXT 0 0 0 1,927 2,225 187 940 0 C. 14-0015-00 Estudio Rehabilitacien Centrales Hldroet4ctnicas ERG E ElIDE MAL I tTA 137 0 890 KIIIStERIO OE PLAMIEAMIENtOI COORDINACIOI SUBSECREtARIA DE IWNERSIONPUSLICA Y COOPERACIONINIERMACIOAt SISTEMA OE INFORMACIOMSOSRE 1WVERSIOIES (S.I.S.IN.) P R 0 C R A N A S A S I C 0 0 E I N V E R S I 0 N P U 8 L I C A 1990 - 1993 (En mites de d6lares americanos) MONA: 04t49P FECHA: 26 OIC 1989 CLASlFICACIOt SECTORIAL PAC: 7 ,...... ES FUENTE PROGRARACo1990 PROCRAMADO1991 PROGRNADO1992 j PROCRADO 1993 CoolGo 1OMSRE DE LA INVERSION SEC- TA ENTSDAD FA FI.ANC.C. . TOR 00 EJECUTORALOC SE EXTERNA INTERNO EXTERO INTIRfO !XTERKOJ INTERKO EXTERNOlINT0ERO EXTERno ...... 14-0016-00 Grupo Electr6geno a gas Taritj ENG E ENDE tAR I KFU 196 1,007 0 0 0 0 0 0 14-0023-00 Prfmers Turbine - Cochabmbe ENG e EHOE CBS I ITA 476 3,738 0 1,679 0 0 0 0 14-0028-00 Ltnea v Subestaciones * Larecaja ENC E ENDE LPZ I ITA 1,065 2,670 284 5,360 0 767 1,055 767 14-0100-C0 Otres prayectos EnoresHC E ENDE N11AL I 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 14-0217-00 Plants Tenric Puerto SuareZ ENS E EIDE SCZ P ND-EXT e93 413 0 0 0 0 0 0 14-0218-00 Consultora t6cnica ENC E ENDE MAL I IDA 35 96 0 0 0 0 0 0 14-0257-00 Axptlicidn Subestaclones ERiC E EDE BOP I OECf 914 890 0 890 0 0 0 0 IDA 678 0 0 0 14-0267-00 Trastedo Worthington Sucre ENC E ENDE CHU I 142 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 21-0020-00 PROGRAMA Of ELECTRIFICACIOMRUtA ERGC E CORDECH C.U 1 935 0 1,200 0 1,200 0 0 0 21-0031-00 Electrtficacidn Nonteagudo EnC E CORDECH CKU I 105 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 22-0028-00 Micro Central Apolo ENG E CORDEPAZ tPZ I 67 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 22-0056-00 Electriftcaci6n Area ENG E CORDEPAZ LP2 I 100 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 22-0105-00 Electriffcocidn Rio Abajo KG E CORODEPAZLPZ I 70 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 22-0122-00 tenido Linea a LturIbey E1M E CCROEPAZ LPZ I 100 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 22-0123-00 Electrlficaci6n Los Andes ENS E COROEPAZ LP2 I 70 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 22-0283-00 Electirfliacln Suwisivi ENS N COROEPAZ LPZ 1 70 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 I 22-0284-00 Electrlficacion forte de La Paz ERG N CORDEPAZ LPZ I 100 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 'I 22-0285-00 Llectrlficacion Pobtlciones Menores Attipteno EIC N CORDEPAZ LPZ I 100 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 to 22-0286-00 Etectrificacion Provincia uwilto EIN N COROEPAZ LPZ I 100 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 22-0287-00 Electrificac1on Provinc a Comacho ENC N CORDEPAZ LPZ I 100 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 22-0611-00 Etectriflcacidn Torrepione racarG KG E CORDEPAZ .PZ I 100 0 0 0 0 0 0 ° 24-O0IS-00 Apoyo a to Electrlifcacidn Rural ENG E COROEPO PTS 1 148 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 25-0020-00 Energles no CtnencoInates EIC E CORDEOR ORU I CEE 16 38 17 38 16 38 0 0 25-0102-00 Progrn de etectrlfffccfdn rural EKG E CORCEOR ORtU 1 150 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 25-0103-00-E.ectriticaci6n 10 poblecines ERG I CORDEOR OQU I 103 0 0 0 0 0 a 0 26-0110-00 Interconexi6. Postervalle - Vallegrande EIG E CORDiCRiUZSCZ I 560 0 0 0 0°0 0 0 24-0129-00 Central Vfdroelectrica Postervaltle EG E COPDECRUZSCZ I 100 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 26-1017-00 Remod. y AIpi. Sistess Et6ctricos ENS E CORDECRU2 SCZ 1 1,421 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 28-0021-00 AsepliscIn y cenot. Sistema etectrico en prov. EKG E COODEBENI BEN I 50 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 29-0061-00 Auptiaci4n Sistema etUctrico ENC E CORDEPANDO PAR I 80 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 14-0018-00 factibilidadAdIcidn Potencta By Pass Coreni ENC N EWDE CBS P Kfu 106 637 0 0 0 0 0 0 14-0020-00 Inventarfacln Recursos Energ6ticos ENG E ENDE MALP 89 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 26-1018-OD Planif. Deptet. de Electrlficacl6n. EIR I COADECRUZScz P 100 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

TOTAL "ERAIA 10,f5O 13,000 2,419 11,218 1,403 1,725 1,268 2,669

03-0007-00 Limplea y SFializacidn de toe Ros tRA E SEMENA WOP I BE6 0 0 0 450 0 450 0 1,540 08-0018-0O Coptejo ferrovirio Santa Cwt TtRA E EIfE SCZ I ARG 0 290 0 0 0 0 0 0 08-wt19-0o Via Vied - GumqI TiRA 1EF1E LPZ I PERU 0 929 0 0 0 0 0 0 08.o0W0-o Repuestos r qulpo (Ric 11) TRA E ElFE IOPI IDA 0 1,631 0 0 0 0 0 0 08-0023-RD Repwraldv Notores aA tLocoatoras, RA E ElfE LPZ I KFW 0 3,663 0 2,d08 0 3,889 0 0 08-0024-00 LocaOtera Diesel Electrica 2 IRA a EtfE LPZ I OECf 0 2,500 0 0 0 0 0 0 08-0o0s-0o 2rra de Inspecldn IRA E ENFE 8P21 ItW 0 1,441 0 0 0 0 0 0 NIlISIERIO DE PLANEAHIENIOY COORDIHACION SU8SECRE1ARIADE ItNVERSIONPU8LICA Y COOPERACIOCINTERtACIOlAL SISTEMADE IHfORHACIOWS0BRE INVRSIOHES 1993 (S.I.S.IM.) P R O G R AA A A S I C 0 D E I NVERSIO N P U t I C A 1990 - (En ailes de d6lares americanos) tORA: 04:499W fECKA: 26 DIC 1989 PAG: 8 CLASIFICACIC1 SECIORIAL .. . -...... ,,,...... _,^,...... UOGRADO ES FUEtTE PROGR0A0AD1990 jPRCOGRAIADO1991 J.PRORAKADO1992 P 1993 ...... LA ItNERSION SEC- TA ENTIOAD fA FIDIANC...... --- J...... CODIGO ROMUREDE EXTER8O 1OR DO EJECaJORA LOC SE EXTERNA INTERNO EXTERtO ItIERNO EXTERltOjItTERtO EXTERttO INTERtO ...... 0 0 0 0 0 08-0029-00Equipo de Pniputpleo Servico Intett IRA E ENFE 8DP I ESP 0 2,500 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 08-0030-00 Ries y Accesorios de Via TRA tt E8FE NAL I G6-R 0 658 0 0 0 0 0 08-0031-00 Rietes y Acesoewos de Via TRA N EtfE LPZ I OECF 0 1,681 0 0 0 0 0 0 08-0043-00 NeIo?llento Aeropuerto de Trinidad TRA E MSASA SEN I 53 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 08-0044-00 Ihevo aetopuerto de Cocrbaim TR E MSAA CBS 1 22 0 0 0 281 0 0 0 08-0046-00 Heloramiento Aesodramo de Yacuiba TRA E AASANA TAR 1 115 0 285 235 0 230 0 0 0 08-0048-00 Constnucein obeos Conplementarias Tarija YRA E MSAAA TAR I 46 0 0 197 0 0 0 08-0082-00 Coimos Vecinales Yurgs to Paz TMA E SlC LPZ I PUW 450 640 510 tNFOAC 0 642 543 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 08-0087-00 Proyecto Viel Agropecuolo del Norte de Chuquisaca 1RA E SVC CNU I 385 0 2.000 1.300 2,300 2.295 3,980 08-0089-00 Toteeos - Puente I*n*de TRA t SNC CHU I FONPLATA 250 - 0 1,100 240 1S 119 0 0 08-0093-00 Cotacalta - San Jun del Oro IRA E SlC P1S I FIDA 300 247 60 2,156 0 0 0 0 08-o009-00 Somipeta - Tnuma 1i TRA E SttC SCZ I DID 519 3,300 47 12.683 0 0 0 0 08-0099-02 Proyecto Ouiquibey - Tucum RA E SttC 8OP I 81D 5,a6 7,680 3,992 0 0 0 0 0 0 08-0099-W Progr ttoclonal de Pentes IRA E SNC HALt I 8O 584 920 0 1,517 0 0 0 0 08-0o0s-04 Prwres de Nantenlmlento y Nejornamento tRA E StC UAL I 81D 650 3,000 570 0 570 0 0 0o 08-0107-00 Construcci6n Itcialt de Puentes TRA E SHC UAL I PE-480 1,370 1,352 0 0 0 0 0 0 .O 08-0109-00 Equlpo Hantenimiento (tRIC 11) *RA E SNC tOP I IDA 0 2,600 3,000 600 3.000 2,700 9,850 aO 08-0116-00 Resettado Le Paz - Oruro (C. de Exp.) *RA I S1C 8DP I IDA 500 2,750 600 3,915 6.905 24,428 10,900 24.428 7,995 24,428 08-011700 ACCJos Chtlr# - Yspcan TRA E StC ODP I 81D 301 0 3,430 0 0 0 08-0120-00 Santa Cnru - Trinidad TRA E SHC 8DP I FOMPLATA 3,583 4,162 3,463 0 0 0 0 0 0 08-0141-OOtlwr Guande - Yscuib TRA E SaC TAR I 250 0 7,360 11,193 11,040 16,764 0 0 /08-0143-00 Caihe1s - Confft.t (Pavilentecidn) TRA H S#C GOP I 810 2.338 1,793 0 2,000 0 0 0 08-014-00 caiws VYcinsles Santa Cnn TRA E SVC SCZ I 8so 0 2,623 0 0 0 0 0 0 08-0241-00 Hmvestci6n de Uytni TRA E ECFE PTS I 204 0 600 1,000 600 1,000 3,400 S,200 .08-o240OO Rehab. dViLes y Ne). de Oer. (C. de Exp.) v IRA 11 ElfE "DP I IDA 400 1,700 60 400 60 400 100 60-- 08-0250-00 Nantenliiento con Kano de Obra (C. de Exp.) / IRA I E11fE SOP I IDA 0 0 0 2,617 0 2,166 0 0 0 0 08-0251-00 EWipo pore Hoestranas (Sect. 1) TQA N EiFE MOP I KFW 700 60 700 100 1,1C0 08-0256-00 Wantenisiento con Ibnode Obro (C. de Exp.) TA t SVlC UAL I IDA 0 0 60 0 3,000 C 2,000 0 0 08-0303-00 Control de Tr6fico A0 TRA H KIH AER UAL I ITA 0 3,500 0 0 0 0 0 0 08-0305-00 Equipauiento de Iestranzes TRA H StC UAL I JICA 0 3,000 0 0 0 0 0 0 21-0022-00 Nejoremiento Infreesttuturco fIU - 8OL TPA E COROECH CHU I PHA 154 460 0 3,000 0 8,000 0 21-0023-00 EST.,NEJ.,y COI. de CONIHOSy PlU£TES RA C CORDECN CHU 1 2,729 0 3,000 0 0 0 0 0 0 21-0023-14 Construccln Puente Santa Roso TRA E CORDECC CHU 500 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 22-0030-00 CaminOs de Petracfdn ChorozanI - Apoto TRA E CORDEPAZ LPZ I 1,000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 22-0034-00 Cmlos vecinales Integrado -Copeni TA E COROEPAZ LPZ I PMK 100 77 0 0 0 0° 0 22-0040-00 Construcci6n de C"iaos Vecinetes TRA E CORDEPAZ LPZ 1 300 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 22-0052-00 Puentes TRA E CORDEPAZ LPZ I 100 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 22-0101-00 Camino IxIaMas-xadidi-ChIve TRA E CORDEPAZ LPZ 1 1,303 0 0 0 0 0 0 22-0102-00 Avenida Pnmetican El Alto - Rio Seco TRA C CORDEPAZ LPZ 1 619 0 0 0 0 0 0 u 22-0103-00 Caminos Vecinales Cotafaa-Areca TRA E COROEPAZ LPZ 1 120 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 22-0121-00 mant.y Nejoramiento det Camino S8V-IXIANAS. TRA E CORDEPAZ LPZ I JICA 385 1,000 0 0 0 0 0 0 22-0236-O0 Camino Cuspipata - Ctbavaollo TMA H CORDEPAZ LPZ 1 40 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 22-0282-00 Camino Wadidi tadre de Dlos TRA H CORDEPAZ LPZ I 500 0 tNItVER10 DE PLAMEANIENTOT COORDoIACION SU8SECRElARIA0O INVERSIONPUStICA Y COOPERACIONlltERNACIONAL SISTlEtA DE INFORMACIONSO0RE INVERSIoNES (S.St..111.) P R 0 G R A tt A 8 A S I C 0 0 E I N V E R S I 0 N P U 8 L I C A 1990 - 1993 (En mites de d6lares aswricanos) HORA:04:499H FECIA: 26 OIC 1989 PAG: 9 CLASIFICACION SECTORIAL ...... ~~~~~~~~~~~~~--...... ES tUENTE PROGRAKADO199C J PROGANADO 1991 PROCRAIUDO1992 PtOXADO 1993 C£ODIGO NORE DE tA tIVERSION SEC- TA ENTIOAD fA FINANC. -...... - ...... I...... TOR 00 EJECUTORA*OC SE EXTERNA INTERNO EXTERNO INTERtNO EXTEfRo -i-tERKO EXTERlO IFTEREO EXtERE0 0 0 0 22-0288-oo Aeroprto Norte de to Paz 1RA N CORDEPAZ PZ I 170 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 23-0011-00 Caino Aeecfo - Anze(do TRA £ COROECO CB8 I PN0 845 642 744 0 0 0 0 0 23-0012-00 Csminms Vecinates TRA £ CORDECO CoB 1 1,440 0 SOO 0 1.000 0 0 0 23-0020-W Terina de BSues TRA E ODEDCO C8B t 315 0 0 0 a 0 0 0 23-0022-00 Aapiacin Aereopuerto Cocbabspe TRA E ClOEDCO COB I ITA 2.086 2,086 0 0 0 0 0 24-0017-00 Casinos Vecinales TRA COROEPO PTS I PMA 420 114 441 120 463 126 0 0 0 24-0026-00 MeJoraminto Aeropuerto IRA E CORDEPO PTS I 200 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 24-0043-00 Equipo Pesado Casinos Vec.Manten. TRA N CORDEPO PTS I JICA 31 200 0 0 0 0 0 25-0031-00 Caminos Vecinates IRA E CORDEOR ORU I CEE 322 103 322 104 323 103 PPA 843 843 844 0 177 0 0 25-0032-00 Const.Mantenimlento Casinos Puentes Menores TRA E CORDEOR OtU I CEE 177 93 178 92 93 0 0 25-0066-00 CuistrucciEn ummino tijrco - Lagunas 1tA I CORDEOR ORU I CEE 207 190 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 25-0068-00 Construc. camino Pisiga-Bolivar TlA t CORDEOR ORU I CEE 308 195 0 0 0 0 0 0 26-0209-00 SEARPI IRA E COROECRUZSCZ I 1,000 0 0 0 0 0 0 26-1001-00 SE#4ENA(EX-CEPISA) TRA E CORDECRUzSCZ I BEL 0 0 55 1,000 50 1.000 0 a 0 26-1019-00 Coainos Vecinates Provincies IRA E CORDECJRUZSCZ 3 710 0 0 0 0 0 0 0D 26-1020-00 Puente Estrecho Santa Rosa TRA E CORDECRUZSCZ I 500 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 26-1023-0o San Netias - Las Petes TRA E CORDECRUZSCZ 1 600 0 0 0 0 0 0 ° 26-1024-O0 Santa Crut - Abep6 TRA E CORDECRUZ SCZ 1 1,500 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 26-051-00 Caeretera Santa Cruz - Yaculba tRA E CORDECRUZ SCZ t 45 0 0 0 a 0 0 0 26-1052-00 Carretera Paiton - Poto del TiVre TRA E CORDECRUZSCZ t 1,932 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 26-1053-00 Ooble-via Senta Ctuz - Viru Viru TRA E CORDECRUZSCZ t 249 0 0 0 0 0 26-1054-O CaWinos Vecinales Convenio BID - CAF TRA E CORDECRUZSCZ I 1,497 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 26-1055-00 Pentes MoI TRA E CORDECRU2 SCZ I 400 0 0 0 0 0 0 26-1056-00 Caminos Vecinales Provinciates TEA E CODRECRUZ SCZ 1 500 0 0 0 0 0 550 151 0 0 27-0OG2-00o Canpps-Vo.cinat!es TRA E CWoETAR 7AR I P#A 900 0 526 142 0 0 0 0 - 0 O 27-0114-00 Equipo Pesado Cmin. Vecinales I4antenim. IRA N CODETAR TAR 1 JICA 0 266 0 0 0 27-0124-00 Nejorasiaeto Aeropuerto Yacuiba TRA E CODETAR TAR 1 300 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 27-0125-00 Control Erosion Aeropuerto Tarija IRA E CODETAR TAR 1 310 0 0 0 0 0 0 28-0063-00 Pruytcto Casino Rlberatta-CachuetaEsperanza TRA E CORDEEtNI BOE I 106 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 28-0064-eo ConstruccionCamino Casarabe-EI carmen TRA E CORDEBENI SEM I 373 0 0 0 0 0 0 28-0065-00 ConstrcicdnAeropuerto Trinidad TRA E CORDESENI OEM I 532 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 28-0066-00 Construccidn Cerretera U.T.B. TRA E COROEeEUt OEM 1 206 0 0 0 0 0 0 a 28-0067-00 Proy. Carret. S.lsnacio-S.Lorenzo-S.francisco TRA E CORtEBENI OEN 1 188 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 28-0069-00 Canine Trfnidad-Cobija-S.Ramdn-s. Ana-Hag. TRA E CORDESENI BEN 1 462 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 O 29-0004-00 Nantenlaiento caoinos vecinales TRA E COROEPAIICPAN 1 200 0 0 0 0 0 29-0005-00 Navegabilidad tchilo-nasoe (Aporte a CEPINA) TRA E CORDEPANDOPAN I 0 0 50 0 0 0 0 0 0 29-0060-00 Aeropuerto Cobija TRA E CORDEPAnDOPAN P 1OO 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 29-0066-OO Camino Cobija - Trinidad TRA E CORDEPANDOPA P 14 0 0 0 0 0 C 0s-0072-0 Estudie Sucre - tpati TRA E SVC CHU P B1D 0 800 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 08-0073-OO Estudio Curo - Pisiga TEA E SNC oCU P ego o 1,300 0 0 0 0 0 26-1002-00 Rehqb. Casino Conceei6n - San Ignacio TRA E CODECRIUZ SCZ P GTZ 400 600 400 600 0 0 0 0 0 0 27-0tOS-00 Oisefio trao Entre Ries - Vitlamontes TRA E CODETAt TAR P 217 0 0 a 0 0 27-0123-00 Plan Vial Oeptrtasental TRA E COOETAQ TAR P 25 0 0 0 0 0 MINISTERIO oe PLAUEANIENTOY COOEBOINACION SUASECREIARIADE WNVERSIONPILICA Y COPERACION INKERtACIOWAL SISESEA OE INFORMACIONSOORE INVERSIONES (S.l.S.I.) P R 0 C R A N A 8 A S I C 0 0 E I N V E R S I 0 t P U a . t c A 1990 - 1993 (En mites de d6lares smericanos) HIuOA: 04:49Pr. FECRA: 26 DEC 198( CLASIFICACION 3ECTORIAL PAG: 10 ,...... ,,.___,,,,_,, ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~...... ES FUENTE PROGRHA?O1990 PR0RIAAOO 1991 _rPROGRADO19_92 tPROGRAMADO1993 CCDICO NIRE DE LA IIVERSION SEC- IA ENI7DAD FA FENAUC...... I I...... ------TMR 00 EJECUTORALOC SE EXTERI4A INTERNO EXIERtO IlTERNO EXTERAO INTERNO EXTERvMo 111TER2 EXTERMO ,...... ,.,,,, ...... ,,.______.__ ...... _...... ,,,._,...... 29-0065-00 Camino San Buenaventura - Cobija TRA E CORDEPAPOOPAN P CAF 20 66 0 0 0 0 0 0

TOTAL TRANSPORTES 46,701 67,504 34,686 71.084 36,e46 57,910 24,590 46,698

08-0007-00 Aptiacidn Telex y Adquisici6n 7eteirpresores COt E ERtEL MDP 1 378 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 08-0008-00 Integracf4n Oriente sotiviano CO" E EllTEL IAL I PROV 4,754 2,000 284 417 0 417 0 1.668 08-0010-00 Expansldn Red Mactonat de Telecomnzlcacfones CON E EtTEtL MAL I CAN 5,285 1000 3,004 2,603 3,879 0 1,749 0 PROY 0 4,560 8,863 6,115 08-0011-00 Red Troncat OIGITAL COt E ERTEL MA. I PROV 3.600 4,435 0 2,0?Z 0 2,072 0 6,216 08-0012-00 Energia no CoweniconatlNatmisa COt E ERTEL P1S I 322 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 08-0234-00 fdiffcio PuertoouiJario CON E DGC SCZ I 0 0 70 0 -- -0 - - 0 0 0 08-0235-00 Edificic Sucre Primere Ctase COt E DCC CHU I 258 0 0 6 0 0 0 0 08-0246-00 Concluci6n Edific-o Tarija COK E DGC TAR 1 344 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 08-0247-00 Inst. de equipo de transmisi6n via Satetite CON E ENTV LPZ I 356 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 08-0257-00 PLAN DE INFORMATICA CON E ENTEL tAL I 300 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 08-0269-00 INViSTIGACION, DESARROELO,CAFACITACION CON E ENTEL NAB I 500 0 250 0 250 0 0 0 08-0272-00 AMPIACION TRANESNISIONDE DATOS CO E EtlTEL HAL I PROV 470 830 390 370 0 370 0 370 t 08-0282-00 ENLACEINTERNACIOENAL 013VIA-CHILE COt E ENTEL MAL I 400 0 0 0 0 0 0 0*0 08-0285-00 tUEVA ESTACIONTERREIA CON E ERTEL LPZ I PROV 1,000 1.200 0 0 0 0 ° 0 00 08-0238-00 Consuttorta Atto ta Pat CN E OCC LPZ P 18 0 0 0 0 0 0 ° I 08-0280-00 PLAN MAESTROMACIOL DE TELECONUNICACIONES CON N ENTEL NAL 1 495 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 08-0306-W Edificio Correos Cobfjs CON DOGC PAN P 7 0 a 0 0 0 0 0 08-0307-00 Estudios,Coop.Tec, OEA/CONSSULTEE CON N ENTEL NAL P 20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 cccccccccnacccc==scccs-===t==s======ccc: s:c=cccccs======ec== mincr,cc,,== =:- cc== C..…======.==== …======s3==s=--s==ss- c TOTAL CGUlNICACIONES 18,507 9.465 3,998 10,022 4,129 11722 1,749 14,369

11-0001-00 Vatte Alto - Putata Kfw - Atemania SAL E MIN SALUD CBt I FW 160 883 334 2,100 50 100 0 0 11-0003-00 Construcci6n Nospital Cobija SAL E HlIN SALUD PAN I 53S 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 11-0006-00 Hospitat Brecamente SAL N MIN SALUD PTS I ITA 50 100 300 1,500 450 3,000 200 1,000 11-0015-00 Proyecto Sntegrado de Servicios de Saltu SAL E HIM SALWD HAL I IDA 1,020 2,500 1,200 3,000 1,600 3,800 1,300 9,210 11-0018-00 Proyecto Nifio-Nadre-PRONIMA III SAL E NtM SALUODMAL t UKFPA 0 378 0 0 0 0 0 0 11-0033-00 Plan Satud Integr. Areas Stburb. Santa Cruz SAL E NIH SALUD SCZ I BEL 0 600 0 0 0 0 0 0 il-0034-00 Proyrecto de Satud Mentat y Otros SAL N HUN SALUD LPZ I ITA 0 350 0 300 0 400 0 0 11-0036-00 Varics programas en satud SAL E NIM SALUD NAL I UNICEF 0 1,500 0 1,530 0 1,530 0 1,200 11-0037-00 Supervivencis Enfantit y Saitid materna SAL E MIN SALUD NALEI USAtD 0 101 0 0 0 0 0 0 11-0038-00 Satud Infantit y de to comunidao SAL E MIN SALUD NAL I USAtD 0 1,500 0 2,940 0 2,950 0 6,350 11-0039-00Sates Rehidratedoras SAL E NMI SAtUO MAL I USAID 0 300 0 0 0 a 0 0 11-0041-00 Servicios de Satud SAL N MIN SAtUD NAL I HOI 0 1,000 0 1,400 0 1,40t1 0 0 11-0042-00 Irwmnizaci6n en et Beni SAL H NtH SALUW BEN I ITA 0 150 0 200 0 100 0 0 26-1016-00 Refac. Conctus. y Equip. Postes y Hospitales SAL E CORDECRUZSCZ 1 366 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

TOTAL SALtD Y SEGJRIDADSOCIAL 2.13i 9,362 1,834 12,970 2,100 13,280 1,500 17,76*

07-0001-00Desarrotto de Ia Planificaci6n Educativa en Botivi EOU E NEC MAL I OEA 10 43 0 0 O 0 0 a HINItSTERIODE PLANEAIIEJIIOY COOROINACION SU8SECRETAIIADE tIVERSIOW PUSLICA Y COOPEQACIONINIERNACIOOAL SISTENA DE IMFORNACIONSOBRE INVERSIOWES 1993 (S.I.S.II.) P R O G R AA A S I C O D E I a V E R S I ON P U B L I C A 1990 - (En mnites de d6tares fnericanos) NORA:04:49P9 FECMA: 26 DIC 190 PAG: 11 CLASIFICACIOASECTORIAL ...... ,- ...... ES FUENTE PROGRANAOO1990 j PROGRAACDO1991 PQOGRANPO1992 PROCIWiDO 1993 ...... CODIGO NOMBREDE LA INVERSIONI S IAEC- ENTIOAD FA ftCN...... -...... TOR 00 EJECUTOPALOC SE EXTERNA INIERNO EXtERNOI INTERNO EXTERNO IIITERQO EXTERMIOINTERItO EXtERNO ...... _.... .-...... -....-.-...... 0 250 0 255 0 261 0 0 07-0017-00 Pr.oeto Educetivo * EDU E NEC MAL I UNICEF 76 0 0 0 0 0 0 07-0037-00 C*terveTcn y Valorlzacl6n Patrimonio Culturat EDU E 1IC HAL I UNESCO 0 529 224 0OO 61 a 0 07-0044-00 MeJoreniento de la Catided y Eficlencla de ta Edue EDU H NEC HAL I PlU 0 0 UNICEF 0 100 400 0 ESP a 178 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 07-00WOO Oe#rvollo Integr. de Zones Llaa(trofes EOU EI NEC MAL I OEA 4 26 0 0 0 0 0 0 07-0047-00 Regtonalizacin de la Educaci6n EDU E NEC HAL I OEA 6 21 30 0 0 0 0 0 0 07-0049-00 Centros de Edct16n a distancia EOU 0 NEC MAL I ESP 5 ZZS 850 100 535 0 0 07-0050-00 Siste.. de Informaci4ndel NEC EDU N NEC MAL I GTZ 0 0 37 201 0 0 0 0 07-0052-00 laptementaci6nde Sibliotec. en Normates EOU N NEC MAL I JICA 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 0 07-0054-OOiEducci6n Inicilat EDU N NEC MAL I UNICEF 0 34 0 0 0 0 0 0 07-0055-00 Educac'6n Atimentar. y Hutric. en Escuetas EDU H NEC HAL I UNICEF 10 25 0 442 2.454 0 0 0 0 07-0056-00 tape educativo y Niceo Ptanificaci6n EDU N NEC MAt I GCZ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 26-IOIS-00 Refec. Conclus. y Equip. Escuelas y Cotegics EDU E CORDECRUZSCZ I 854 0 0 0 0 a 0 0 26-1031-00 Escueta de Satud Pwiblica EDU E CORDECRUZSCZ 1 75 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 28-O024-00 Equipamlento Escueles T6cnicas Ageopecuaerls EDU E COROESEHIBEN 1 60 17 0 0 0 0 0 0 07-0024-00 Dlasn6stico Ftnico T6cnico EQU E NEC HAL P 810 0 1,233 4.262 200 1.257 0 o%v TOTAL EOt(ACION Y CUtTUItA 1,024 522 0 0 0 °0 0 0 IS-0007-00 Proyecto deAuA Potable San Sorjn SA t CORPAGUASBEN t 127 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 IS-OO0-00 Propecto Ague Potable Cwmrso (11 Fase) SAN E CORPAGJASCaU I 20 0 0 0 0 0 0 9 15-001O-00 Proyecto Agua Potable Nonteagudo SAN E CORPAGAS COU 1 55 0 0 0 0 0 0 1S-0012-00 Proyecto egua Potable Riberetta SAI E CO0PAWAS SEW1 93 0 66 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 15-0013-00 Proyeeto A54a Potable BermeJo SAN e CORPAGUAS TAR I 0 0 0 0 0 0 15-0018-00 Proyectq.kguojaPotable Yacuiba ,SA E CORPAGUASTAR I 71 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 15-0019-00 Proyecto Agua Potable Reyes SAN E CORPAGiASSEN I 127 0 0 C 0 0 0 15-0020-00 Esttdio Operaciores y Nantenlmiento SAN E CORPAGUASHAL 1 24 0 0 0 0 0 0 15-0025-00 tantenimiento y renovaci6n inst. egua potable SAN E SAnAPA LPZ I 2,628 0 1,500 0 0 0 0 0 0 15-0026-00 Abastecimiento agua potable 11 Fase,ll etpa. SAN E SAHAPA LPZ I 81D 2,105 2,773 0 0 0 0 0 15-0027-00 Nantenislento y constr. Suaideros y Colectores SAN E SAIAPA LPZ I 1.650 0 1,000 0 0 0 0 0 0 15-0028-00 Aptilacf6n del campo de poz2s en EtlPaso SAN E SENAPA CBS I 154 0 695 2,500 0 1,736 0 0 15-0032-00 Nejoreaiento canal Pe*elo SAN E ELAPAS CKU I KFU 251 1,500 126 0 0 0 0 0 0 1S-0101-00 Presa Inca Chace SAN E SAtAPA tP2 I CTZ 2,130 0 1,500 0 0 0 0 15-0130-00 Abestecimiento agu" potable Alto ta Paz SAN E SMAPA LPZ I JICA 883 3,684 600 0 1,667 0 0 0 0 15-0132-00 Progrsam Sameamlento Sisico Oruro SAN E OSA ORU I KFV 68 0 0 0 0 0 0 15-0136-00 Agua potsble Rio Abalo SAN E CORPAGUASLPZ I 36 0 950 300 900 300 0 0 21-0027-00 SISTEMA DE AGUA DE USO WiLTIPLE SAN E COROECH CHU I CARE 992 300 0 320 0 300 0 0 0 21-0034-00 Aleantariltls Sanitario en Provincias SAN E COROECH CHU I 140 0 0 0 0 0 0 22-0041-00 Agua Potable y Letrinas SAN E CORDEPAZ LPZ I CRE 142 115 364 0 364 0 0 0 22-0526-00 Agua potabte y stcenterillado SAN E COROEPAZ LPZ I 300 0 115 42 0 65 0 0 0 24-0021-00 Agu" Potable en Provincias SAN E CORCEPO PTS I CARE 78 42 100 0 1,260 0 0 0 0 24-0028-00 AbastecimSento ague Pob. rureles Disper. Altiplano SAN H CXHOEPO PtS I f01 51 0 54 0 0 0 24-0032-00 Agus Potable y Atcantarillado SAN E CORDEPO PIS I 164 0 IMISITERlODt PLANEASIENtO Y COMINACIO0 SUYECREMItAOEt tltwi;OwUUIUCA I COPERAKtCINtREQRCIIQIAL SISTElA DE lWIORACIONSOMRE INVERSIoNES m R S I 0 N P U I L. I C A 1990 1.93 (S.1.S.III.) P R 0 G R A N A 8 A S I C 0 0 f I V E milesde d6tares cricanos) IlORA:04:4WK (En fECtA: 26 OIC 1989 PAG: 12 CLASIFICACIONSECTORIAL ,,...... - ...... - ^...... FUENTE PROGRAKIDO1990 PROORANDO1991 PRO CttW1992 PROWKMO01993 ES ..... I...... I...... SEC- TA ENTIOAO FA FINANC...... COICO NNRE DE LA INERSION INTfERO EXTERINO 00 EJECUTORALOC SE EXTERNA INtERNO EXTEkiOoIRTERNO EXTENO INTERNO EXTERNO tOR ...... ,^...... 60 S67 0 0 SAN E CORDEOR ORUI KFV 599 600 150 1,500 25-0034-00 Proyecto agta Potable Ciudad Oruro 0 0 0 0 0 de Oruro SANl E CaRDEOR ORUI 184 0 0 25-0038-00 Est.Alcanterillado Sanitario Ciudad 0 0 0 0 0 0 Area Rural SAN EtCORDEOR ORUI CARE 133 51 25-0039-00 Abstecimlento Agu Potale 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 aCeM provincias SAN E O0RECRUt SCZ 786 26-1021-60 Reamd. y Ipl1acf SiSteS de 0 0 0 0 0 SANt E COROECRUZSCZ I 95 0 0 26-1022-00 Canat. tanqe Aduccin San laclo 0 0 0 0 0 SAN E CORECRUZ SCZ I CARE 400 140 0 26-1027-00 Obras Vidr6ulicas Corditlera 512 107 0 0 SAN t CODETAR TAR I CARE 250 237 495 103 27-0062-00 Agua Poteble Rural 0 0 0 0 0 SAI E CODETAR TAR I 810 935 1.254 0 27-0063-00 A"ua Potable y Alcnteritllado Tarija 0 0 0 0 0 SAt E CORDEPA00PAN P 50 0 0 29-0011-00 Estudlo Factibilidad Alcantarilledo y A"us 0 0 0 0 SAN I SAIAPA LPZ P BID 0 92 0 0 l5-0140-00 Agua P.y Alcat.cludades prates Bt Z (PIl) 0 0 0 0 N AAPOS PTS P 810 0 152 0 0 15-0141-00 Agua P.y Alcant.ciudades prales PTS (P1) SA 0 C CHU P BID 0 100 0 0 0 0 Agua P.y Alcant.cidades prales ciHi (PH) SAN I ELAPAS 0 a 15-0142-00 90I 0 130 0 0 0 0 P.y Atcant.ciaddes Prr(es. SCZ (PH) SAN N SAWAPAC SCZ P 15-0144-00 Agu 0 40 0 0 0 0 0 0 Prales. CBB (PH) SM N SENAPA COG P BID 15-0147-00 A"ie P.Y Alcent.ciades 0 0 0 0 0 0 Riberatta (PI) SAN N AROS-8ENI BEN P 810 0 15 15-0149-00 Aqu P.y Alcant.cl.aides Prales. 0 0 0 0 0 SANI E CCQ0ECRUZSCZ P B10 0 15 0 26-0079-00 Sistema Agua Potable Portachuelo 0 0 0 0 ° SAN N CCORDECRUZ SCZ P BID 80 120 0 26-1010-00 Plan maestro drenaje ptuvial 0 0 0 0 CORDESENI BEN P ITA 0 214 0 0 28-0307-00 A"u Potable y Atlanterillado Trinidad SAN N a 15,658 12,473 5,567 8,830 2,255 2,610 0 TOTAL ANtEANIENTO8ASItO 0 0 0 0 0 lRS E tCORDECH CtW I 200 0 0 21-0025-00 OBRASRtRALES 0 0 0 0 0 0 CoRWECI) UR8 E COROECv CHU t 0 0 21-0026-00 Sucre Ciudad Universftaria(Tranferencia 0 220 0 0 0 URB E COROECN cmUu 200 o 210 21-003800 Obres Ureas 0 0 0 0 0 URS E COROEPAZ LPZ I SJUAC 70 31 0 22-0114-00 Centre de Atencldn en Frontera 0 0 0 0 0 0 _ tl N COROEPAZ tPZ I 100 0 22-0289-00 Corst.Naestrasrza Centrat Equip poesdo 0 0 0 0 ° URB E CORDECRUZSCZ I 950 0 0 26-1050-00 Pavimentaclon Urbana 0 0 0 0 0 tlR8 E CODETAR TAR I 464 0 0 27-0071-00 Otras Obras de Urbanismo 0 0 0 0 0 tlRS E CODETAR TAR I 400 0 0 27-0074-00 Obras le desarrollo 0 0 0 0 ° UlR8 E CORDESENI BEN I 100 0 0 28-0010-00 Obras Pdticas en Provincias 0 0 0 0 0 UR8 E CORDEBENI BEN I 361 0 0 28-0070-00 Proy. Apoyo Obras Hejoramiento urbane 0 0 0 0 0 UR8 E COaROEBENIBEN I 15 0 0 28-0071-00 Estudio Hodelo Deserrollo Urbano 0 0 0 0 a UR8 E COROEBENISEN 1 50 0 0 28-0073-00 Diean6stico Plan de Desarcollo Regional 0 0 0 0 0 U8 E COD C88 CS 1 3,500 0 C 30-0008-00 Obras Deportivas Ccchsbabe 0 0 0 0 COD SCZ SCZ 1 3,500 0 0 0 30-0010-00 Obras Oeportivas Santa Cruz URS E 0 9,910 31 210 0 220 0 0 TOTALURBANISHO Y VIVIENDA 0 0 0 0 C RNI E COROEPAZ LPZ 1 83 0 0 22-0042-00 Nicrorieqo 9OL186/024 0 0 0 0 0 RNI f CORDEPAZ LPZ 1 50 0 C 22-0106-00 Construccl6n oefenslvos y Reg. de Torrentes 0 0 0 0 0 RtH E CORECO C88 1 709 0 O 23-0026-00 Recursos Nidricos Naturales 0 0 0 0 ° RHI E CORDEOR ORU I 33 0 0 250044-0( Perforeci6n de Pozos de Observaci4n Area Rural 0 0 0 0 CORDEOR ORU I PNE 342 293 0 0 25-0045-00 Riego y licroriego RNI E 50 e ORU I PKtA 0 0 50 18 50 0 25-0047-00 Estudio e Iaptemetaci6n de Cuencas Midrot6gicas RItt E CORDEOR NIMISIERIO DE PLANEA*IIENIOY COORDINACIOU SUSSECRETARIAOf IWVERSIONPUtlICA Y COOPERACIONINTERHACIONAL SISTENA DE INFORPtACIONSOBRE INVERSIONES I C A 1990 - 193 G R A M A A S I C O D E I i V E R S I ON P U S L tS.I.S.Iw.) P R O NORA: 04:49PM de d6teres americanos) (En miles FECHA:26 DIC 1989 PAC: 13 ,,...... CLASIfICACION SECTORIAL ...... 1992 PROGRAADO1993 FUENTE PROGRAMADO1990 PROGRAUADO1991 tPAADO j ES .I .------TA ENTIDAD FA FINANC .. COOIGO NOMBREDE LA IUVERSION SEC- INTERNO EXIERNO LOt SE EXTERNA I#TERNO EXtERNO INtERlO EXIERWO INTERNO EXlERNO TOR 00 EJECUTORA ...... ,...... _...... ,,,,,_.,,...... ,...... ___...... 346 140 1,250 o0 0 0 0 Desaguadero RHI E CORDEOR ORU I CEE 140 25-0048-00 Regulaci6n y Aprovechamiento det Rio 0 0 0 0 0 0 RHI E CODETAR TAR 1 124 0 27-0041-00 Control de Crecidas 0 337 0 0 0 RHI E COOETAl TAR l 350 0 323 27-0051-00 Nlcrorlego 0 0 0 0 0 0 RHI E COETAR TAR I CHINA 104 280 27-0075-00 Perforecldn de poz2s 0 0 0 0 0 0 RHI E CODETAR TAR P 43 0 27-0025-00 Proyeto tss Pavas 0 0 0 0 0 O- I RHI E C0ETAR TAR P PRUW 30 92 27-0037-00 Proyecto Alt. Cuenca del Rio Guaeslquivir 0 0 0 0 0 0 RNI E COETAR TAR P 81D 0 90 27-0081-00 tiego TMYapu 0 0 0 0 0 0 RHI E CODETAR TAR P BID 0 200 27-0082-00 Riego Pajonat 0 0 0 0 0 0 RHI E COOETAR TAR P 124 0 27-0121-00 Wanejo Cuenca Rio Totomosa 0 0 0 0 0 0 RUI E CUDETAR TAR P 31 0 27-0122-00 Progrema icroriego en el Chaco 0 2.162 1,301 513 1,268 38? 0 50 TOTAL RECURSOSlDIRICOS 0 104 0 0 0 0 0 0 DE DESARROLLODEL CHACO(SUB V) HUL N COROECN CHUP 0 21-0059-00 PLAN SUBREGIONAL 60 0 0 0 0 0 0 SUBREGIONIV HUL E CORDECII CHUP 0 21-0060-0 PLAN DE DESARROLLO 0 50 0 0 0 0 0 pot. infancis HIUL E COROEPO PTS I UNICEF 24-0040-00 Proy.Subreg.Atdino de Serv.Ses. y 0 0 0 0 0 0 I tUL E COROEOR ORU I 279 0 25-0104-00 Prograsw A todesarrotto Cam;pesino 0 0 0 0 0 HUL E2 COROECRUZSCZ I OEA 6 100 0 26-1026-00 Proyecto Chaco OEA 0 0 0 0 0 0 KUL E COROECRUZSCZ I PMA 250 372 26-1028-00 PRODECAF 0 0 0 0 0 E CORDECRUZSCZ I PIUD 47 124 0 26-1029-00 ligrec. y Reasent. Nunos KIUL 0 0 0 0 TAR I ITA 812 800 414 827 Proyecto Villamontes - Sechapera I HUL E CCDETAR 0 0 27-0011-00 TAR I ITA 900 2,300 1,800 8,500 500 5,500 MUL E CaDETAR 0 0 27-0032-00 Sn Jacinto PNUO 248 93 278 98 306 102 Gran Chaco MUL E CODETAR TAR I 0 27-0048-00 Muttiprop6sito 200 0 186 203 187 203 0 Integrado DRI - UNICEF HUtL CCOETAR TAR I UNICEF 0 27-0049-00 Desarrotlo rural 30 250 0 0 0 0 0 front. Bolivia-Peru MUL E CORDEPANDOPAN I 810 29-0063-00 Program, apoyo integraci6n 0 a 0 0 0 0 0 E._qL E2 KtN PLAN AL P 977 05-0006-00 Programa de Pre-itlersi6n (Contrapartes) 0 0 0 0 0 0 NUL E C6OETAR TAR P 31 0 27-0007-00 Plan Maestro del Rio Bermejo 0 0 0 0 E COOETAR TAR p 100 0 0 27-0010-00 Proyecto?Vjtlaeoftes - Sachapera II HUt 0 4,044 4,089 2,678 9,628 993 5,805 0 TOTAL NULTISECTORIAL 0 89 0 0 0 0 0 0 Conunimdades OTR E CORDECO C8B I 23-0013-00 Propauna de Asittencia a 0 0 0 0 0 0 OTR E COETARl TAR P 50 0 27-0078-00 Estudlos BBscos 0 139 0 0 0 0 0 e TOTAL OTROS

402,210 205,075 244,662 143,227 338,754 143,189 452.486 169,.46 INWVERSION 0 TOTAL GENERAL 3,497 7,386 902 716 3,200 579 2,096 TOTAL CENERALPREINVERSION

208,572 252,04 144,129 339,470 146,389 453,064 171,S52 402.210 TOTAL CENE ...... D8 ~~~~~~~~~~Mj 6e 65'

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