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This microfiche was produced from documents received for inclusion in the NCJRS data base. Since NCJRS cannot exercise control over the physical condition of the documents submitted, the individual frame quality will vary. The resolution chart on this frc:.me may be used to evaluate the document quality. The Importance of Bxperimental [tesearch in Deterrence Studies •

:: 11///2.8 111112.~ WI' 1.0 Paul Jesilow nnl.~ ~w W 22. Forensic Studies ~ ~ Indiana University" w Ii ~ Bloomington, Indiana 47405 r.:. 11111.1 Iln.:."" Gilbert Geis Program in ~Jocial Ecology University of California 111111.25 111111.4 111111.6 Irvine, California 92717

Mary Jane O'Brien Program in Social Ecology MICI.~OCOPY RESOLUTION TEST CHART University of California NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS-1963-A Irvine, California 92717

i } , ,

'his research was partially funded ~,the Law Enforcement AssistBll,ce ~ministration. The views containe4 within are those of the authors' Microfilming procedures used to create this fiche comply with lhd do not necessarily represent those of the fundi.l1g agency. ?7-/.n::-!J..I\-aOS() the standards set forth in 41CFR 101-11.504. 'resented at the American Society of Criminology Meeting, November, 1980 ian Francisco, California. Points of view or opinions stated in this document are , ;, If those of the author(s) and do not rep'tes~,ht the official position or policies of the U. S. Depah:m~nt of Justice.

National Institute of Justice Department of Justice Washington, D. C. 20531

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A panel of academicians convened to ,study the scientific status of

deterrence in the realm of criminal justice concluded "}Ie cannot yet

~ II assert that the evidence warrants an affirmative conclusion" that penalties

de~er (Blumstein et al, 1978: 7). Layman might well scoff at such social science equivocation. A freeway driver readily appreciates the deterrent effect of a polic3 car. The historian would also be puzzled by this ,. crimindlogical conclusion about deterrence. He might wonder to what, if not to the ability of penalties to alter behavior, the social scientist

would attribu~e'such outcomes as the conversion of Jevs in Spain following the governmental edict in 1492 prohibiting the practice of Judaism. The study of· deterrence need not strive to prove whether or not there is such a general thing as a "deterrent effect." As Johannes Andenaes (1971: 537-538) has pointed out: General propositions accepting or rejectingi{deterrence ought

to belong to the past~ The question is not vhether punishment has a deterrent effect, but rather under what conditions and , .; , to vhat extent the deterrence purpose is effected.••• Common sense tells us that the threat of puniShment does not play ··1 the same role in offenses as different as murder, ra~e, tax

evasion, shoplifting, and illega~ parkingl!. In line with Andenaes' suggestion, current research on deterrence

u.~. Depl!rtment of Justice . c Natronal Institute of Justice is apt to concentrate on particular forms of illegal behavior. This document has been re rod ine~~~n or organization origin~ting~~e~ofn~acl:Y .as received froin the i IS document are those of the' th s 0 view or Opinions slated History and Definitions ~~~~~ent Ihe official POSition or p;:,cI~~eso~ 1~:dNdO" not nec~ssarilY . jf" a lonal InSlilute of The basis of the deterrence doctrine is that crime rates are negatively Permission to reproduce tfl'ts. . .. granted by • c~ matenal has been , ,\ r~lated to properties of punishment, particularly llio the perceived certainty Publ~c Domain/LEAA / U.S. Department of f Justice of legal Punishment, ~~, toa lesser extent,. to .. the severity of the to the Nationa; Criminal Justice Reference Service (NcJRS). I F,UTther reproduction outside punishment. This relationship has be':ln sug~ested with respect to a variety Slon of the ~t owner. of the NCJRS system requires perm/s- I I '.) ...3- -2- j

than severity. Beccaria argued that penalties must be certain. Moderate of offenses, from criminal homicide to parking violations (Tittle and penalties that are consistently applied will have more effect than more Logan, 1973; Zimring and Hawkins, 1973)., severe penalties that are only occasionally utilized (1963: 64). The principles of deterrence were first delineated in some detail Analysis of Aggregate Data . by Cesare Bone sana, Marchese de Beccaria (1738-94) and Jeremy Bentham fhe most po?ular contemporary research method for studying deterrence (1748-1832). These two intellectUal leaders of the Classical School in the United States has been to use states, counties, or cities as theorized that individuals could be controlled by their fear of puniShment. .. to units of analYl;lis. An att.empt is made to establish a link between crime Beccaria believed that "[p,:1u ain ~., ... ·d pleasure are the only springs of action rates and measurements of certainty of puniShment for different crimes. in beings endowed wi t h senS1o bili"t y (1963·• 31) ." Man. was viewed as 0--an; ded If deterrence principles are valid for a given criminal behavior, the by r~ason, endowed with "free rlll," and ~esponsible for his acts. The expectation is that there will be a negative relationship between certainty Classical School held that man could be controlled by making the pain from - <. of punishment B-~d crime rates. The more likely it is for an offender to punishment exceed the pleasure Ob\oCU.U6~- .. - d from th e c riminal act• The rational_ be puniShed .for his crime, the lower the crime rate Should be.. Jack Gibbs man would then choose "the desirability of non-criminaI conduct, (Vold,1958: (1968), for example, applied this technique to murder rates as reported 25).n in the Fin I s Uniform Crime Report for each state, and. concluded that certainty Ben'\,1J..,aut.\.\. an\...~ Beccarl." a n°eued "}J1AUoI. the ..... -.'* shments of the time as illogical. of punishment effected the murder rate. Similar studies, with few exceptions, The penalt.y for murder was death and the penalty for theft was death. Under (Forst, 1976; Greenberg et al, 1979; Pontell, 1978), hav~ consistently found such a system of sanctions, they argued, there vas no incentive for the (! that the data supports the deterrence philosophy (see Gray and Martin, 1969; thief' not to kill his victimo Beccaria urged that there should be "a scale Tittie, 1969; Logan, 1972; Antunes and Hunt, 1973; Chiricos and \~a1do, 1970; of crimes ....of which the· first degree snould consist of those Which EP-rlich, 1973; Logan, 1975; Geerken and Gove, 1975). Recent studies have immed.iately tend to the dissolution Qf society: and the last of the smallest employed sophisticated analytical techniques and models combined with possible injustice done to a private member of society (196.3: 25)." increased variables. (Greenbert et al, 1979). l.fembers of the Classical Scmool believed that. the purpose of punishment Such studi~s have been criticized for not accurately measuring the two should be crime preven1iion.. Punishment is desirable only if' it deters others important, variables -- (1) certainty of puniShment and (2) incidence of from criminal behavior. To accomplish this goal, Beccaria maintained that crime. Certainty of puniShment is generally measured by: the public Should be made aware of all lavs;that trials should be swift; and , r "(1) the risk of police apprehension which is measured by the that certainty and swiftness of puniehment viII ha.ve greater deterrent effect clearance rate or by the. ratio o£ arrests to reported offenses;

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The u~e of official aggregate data, particularly the FBI's Uniform (2) the risk of conviction, vhich is the ratio of convictions Crime Report, reinforces the class bias in the study of crir.e. It is to reported crimes; (3) the risk of imprisonment, Vhich is the noteworthy that the "index crimes" vere established by a .;!ommittee of ratio of prison commitments to reported crimes; and (4) the the International Chiefs of Police in 1927 (President.s Commission on severity of prison punishment, which is usually measured by Law Enforcement and Administration of ;ustice, 1967: 94) __ twelve mean or median time served (Blumstein et al., 1978: 22)." years before first raised the issue of white-collar These data fail to account for (1) behavior ~efined as criminal by to crime in his presidential address to the American Sociological Society. one observer but not by another, (2) failure to detect criminal acts, 'Experimental Research (3) failure to report detected crimes, (4) failure to record crimes, Blumstein and his colleagues argue that n[tJrom a scientific perspective, (5) failure of all arrests to lead to conVictions, and (6) individuals controlled experimentation is the ideal approach to test for any effe~tsp Yho are convicted for a lesser offense than the one for Which they were including those of deterrence (20)." 1m example of such work is Buikhuisen's arrested (Kaztisar, 1972; Wheeler, 1967; Wolfgang, 1963; Nagin, 1978; (1974) study in the Netherlands ~f efforts to deter the use of vorn tires and Pepinsky, 1980). The analysis of such data also has often been biased on cars., For two weeks the police and press in the town of Groningen in favor of 'th~ 'new that sanctions affect crime _rates. Only recently publicized n police effort to control the behavior under study. The has attention been paid to the probability that crime may a:ffect sanctions town of Leeuwarden was used as a control. Cars with vorn tires vere ".-,' (Pontell, 1978, Pepinsky, 1978; Greenberg et al, 1979). Increased crime, -. - enumerated in both towns prior to the publicity campaign. After the for example, may produce overcrowd~ jails which may lead to reduced tvo week effort, previously inspected cars vere again located and reinspected. sentences. TIle result was a 54 percent replacement rat~ of tires in Groningen com- The validity of the cited studies of deterrence is further clouded pared ~ith a'27 percent rate in Leeuvarden (see also Schwartz and Orleans, by the compounding effect of incapacitation since the imprisoning of 1964; Decker, 1972; Chaiken, Lawless, and Stevenson, 1974; Chamblis~, crimina] s may reduce the crime rate without deterring. Jack, for example, 196~; and Tittle and Rowe, 1973 for additional experimental stUdies). is' committing all the robberies in a small tow. His arrest elimina.tes all Replication of such inquiries" can provide strong evidence in favor such behavior. Jack was not deterred by the threat of imprisonment and no or against deterrence of a given behavior that could be used for purposes additional individual is deterred because of Jackls incapacitation, yet of puplic policy. Such considerations led us to focus on experimental the robbery rate drops. Finall,__ Y such studies may underestimate or bias i- research when we sought to understand the effects of deterrence upon IIcertainty of punishmentn since some persons, for example, juveniles, may automobile repair fraud. show up in offense data but not adult arrest, conviction, or incarceration figures. :1

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increase (509)." It Hhite-Collar Crime and Deterrence has been suggested that high status may be susceptible to' evel1; minimal d.eterrence efforts Marshall Cl· ard t ( The study of automobile repair fraud is a rich source of information • . ~ s research 1952) of Violations. by businessmen' of wartime gu1 for the more general topic of white-collar crime: a crime co~itted by re ations led him to conclude that

an individual (or a corporation) in the course of his occupation (Sutherland, "because of th3ir reputation, a short [jail] sentence may be as effective 1949). Insights regarding the illegal practices of repair dealers might ~.rith businessmen as a long sentence with lower class criminals (91)." be applicable to other white-collar crimes. Certain factors common Hhite-pollar crimes are rational behavior ra~er than impassioned to many white-collar occupations, may be crimogenic -- that is, there or impulsive outbreaks, an~ therefore also are likely to be particularly is a greater likelihood of illegal behaviors when these forces are in susceptible to deterrence efforts (Chambliss, 1967: 709) .• The record nlace than when they are not. . of the antitrust violations in the heavy electrical equipment industry

Beccaria's belief that there should be "ascsIe of crimes -- of shows ~usine~sJ.:len rationally planning, their crimes (Geis, 1967).

~mich the first degree should consist of those Vhich immediately tend Robert Lane's research revealed that businessmen and government officials "believe that businessmen run afoul f th 1 to the dissolution of societyll talks directly to the ·matter of wite-collar o e av for economic reasons ~ _ they . crime (Hagnuson and Carper, 1968: 62; Mintz and Gohen, 1971: 265-266; want to 'make a fast buck' (1953)." Lane concluded that most profitable President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, companies do not violate a.s easily and quickly aa their leas fortunate 1967: 158). Gilbert Geis(1973: 189), for example,· argues for increased counterparts -- the same conclusion as Clinard' a more recent research (1979). (\ prosecution of .Thite-collar crimes on the grolmd that "they threaten Such conclusions of£er further evidence-' of the rational economic nature of Yhite-collar crime. the integrity of society." Hethod The literature suggests that white-collar criminals may be more

sensitive to deterrence efforts. "tIJt seems likely," Frank Zimring and First, womon werc sent to rando~y selected repair facilities in two matched California metropolitan areas. \I Gordon Hawkins (1973: 127) write, "that those who attain high status 'omen vere used because there is some c evidence that they are more likelv to be the '~ctl.·ms ,f.Lll possess many of the ch~acteristics that. may be associated with ~ w. of repair fraud. It vas the intcntion of the researchers t ta . max5;mum threat influence, such as a sense of the significance of the o es bliSh a situation where fraud might accur. future and a strong loyalty to a social system that has been responsible

for much of their :mccess.1l Similarly, Michael Geerken and t~alter Gove

hypothesize that lithe effectiveness of [aJ deterrence system will increase

as the individual's investment in and rewards from the soci81 ~stem -8- -9-

The ~omen approached the appropriate people at the garages ~ith the report of the "v.ictim" helped mini' th . . m~ze e poss~bility that the researchers story that they ~ere moving and their cars did not start, again, to maximize were measuring incompetence, that is, they were better able to recognize "fraud." ~l'thin d the opportunity for fraud. The assumption Yas that a person about to leave .~ ays following the "battery test" , surveyers approached the town made a particularly vulnerable target for exploitation. The potential shops. Managers and owners were asked questio·ns regarding the structure victims further explained that their car battery ~as in the trunk of the of their business, the sj,ze f' h b , 0 "jj e usiness or if the owner is present borroved cars they were driving. They requested th~ shops to test the items that;i:;he literature suggests might be relat~d to compliance. "!hey batteries. were also requested to agree d" or ~sagree ~ith attitudinal statements al 0, so The above measure (the "battery testll) minimized a major problem -- the suggested by the literature. These included perceived certainty and 't sever~ y separation of standard operating procedure and incompetence from fraud. Previous of Punishment. The intent was to e tabl' sh . s ~ a set of ~dependent variables studies of repair facilities had not attempted to delineate bet~een the to predict the dependent variable _ _ l'h ' one sty. II Approximately 80 percent behaviors. For example, one measure that had been used on previous studies vas of the shops responded to the survey. to disconnect the vacuum advance hose. "This defect causes poor acceleration The experimental area was then subjected to an intervention. First,' and, if one has a very sensitive ear, a hissing noise. A driver took a car Public Service Announcements informing the public of the existence of a nth these Jcomplaints to a number of place~~ for pilot-testing in the state agency to which they could report t ques ionable repair dealers vere California study. A standard facility response vas "aoundE? like a vacuum broadcast on radio and television. Second, the countyfs district attorney filed a civil uit . t leak, but I'll have to put it on the scope." The cost of connecting the s aga~s a nat~onalfirm for alleged illegalities in their carr s engine to the scope (a piece of diagnctstic equipment) vas, on the auto repair outlets. F' all th -} ~ y, e Bureau of Automotive Repair (the CalifOrnia ave,:~ge, $20. It is industry practice to use the scope wenever possible. state licensing agency for autom~bile repair shops) sent the dealers in the This practice exists despite (1) the fact that the vacuum advance "hose is area a letter reminding them of the duties under la'. th . ~, e reasons for the easily visi'~le once the hood is open and (2) the results of a l?UTVey the law, and the consequences of violatJ."on. N th·- o ~g unusual vas done in the researchers conducted of California Community College auto Shop teachers control area. , " } in ~hich 90 percent of those vho responded said they ~ould check the Finally, the researchers post llbatt t ery- este

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Preliminary Results of the California study The above project attempted to test deterrence principles with regard The pre-test "honesty" rate (the percentage of shops that did not to the Cal¥,ornia auto repair industry. The initial analysis suggests recommend a new battery) for the experimental group was 92.5 percent a deterrent effect may have been accomplished, that is, the experimental (n equals 67). For the control group, the rate was 94.1 percent (n equals groupi s post-test "honesty" rate is not significantly di'fferent from the 68). At the post-test, these groups had IIhonesty" rates of 85.9 percent areats pre-test score (92.5% to 91%). The simil~ groups for the control (n equals 64) and 85 percent (n equals 60) respect.i-vely. The "honesty" rate for the post-test only group in the experimental area was 91 percent area shoy. a significant difference in their ~'honesty" rates (94.1% to 80.7%). . . The suggestion is that the intervention held "honesty" constant in the (n equals 90). The rate for the post-test only group in the control area experimental area while it plummeted elsewhere as evidenced by. the drop was j 80.7 percent (n equals 88). in honesty in the control area. Alternative explanations for the r~sults Table 1 shows the IIhonestyll rates.

are being researchcd o It may be, for example, that a worsening economy TABLE 1 ·POST-TEST...QNLY PRE PRE-paST-TESTED was 'relateq. to the drop in ''hone styli in the control city. If true, it 85.9% . 91% experimental 92.5% is necessar,r to show that the two areas did not suffer eq~y, that is (67) (64) ... (90) . . ' that the recession was not felt similarly in the 6;~erimental and control 85% 80.'710 control 94.1% (88) (68) (60) areas. The only chi square that was significant (p<.OS) yas the difference The results concerning race differences are highly suggestive of between the pre-test group's' honesty rate in the control area (94.1%) greater victimization of minorities. and the post-test only group's honesty rate in the control area (80.7%). The researchers also found that the "crooked" repair dealers yere

The'chi square was .02770. unlikely to view the Bureau of Automobile Repair as being leniant - - a Post::;cript finding consistent with Beccaria's view that severity is not as important One week after the post-test, a black woman was sent to IIbattery- as certainty. test" twenty of the previously tested dealers. The twenty yere randomly Many of their findings, hovever, have only proved tantalizing. A

selected from those shops in the exp~rimental area that had been pre- &..""ld high correlation,. though one not. statistically significant at the .05 post-tested. Two of the tventy outlets stated they yould be unable to level of cori£idence, .. ras measured between any change (either up or dow) o test the battery. Eight shops reported the battery to be good. Ten in the size of the busL~ess (number of employees) and crooked behavior. dealers, hoyever, suggested that a new battery yas needed immediately or in

the very near future. ,~------~----

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It may be that an unstable economy is more likely to lead to white-collar Peter Berger (1963: 13) writes that some social scientists: crime than one that has little fluctuation. Such relationships have been have become so preoccupied ,lith methodological

fOUL~d in regard to other behaviors. 3uch a hypothesis, however, needs questions that they have ceased to' be int'erested further testing. in society at all. As a result, they have found Discussion out nothing of significance about any aspect of

The test praser..ted in this paper evidences the fact that natural social life, since in science as in love a con- • • experiments can be utilized in deterrence studies. Other efforts, such centration on technique is quite likely to lead as Buikhuisen's (1974), underscore the availability of this method. to impotence •

. Furthermore, natural experimentation appears to cut acr~ss class lines. Automobile repair dealers range from the owner-operated one p~~)on shop " to la.:-ge dealerships and mass merchanc:.isers, such as Sears and Montgomery

One cannot argue that automobile,reDair fraud is a trivial offense not worthy of study. fraud committed by auto repair dealers steals

both life and money from the public. Americans spend over ~40 billion each year tc', maintain their individualized transports: $2 billion allegedly is wasted on fraudulent repairs. In fact, it is estimated

that ~~12 to ~~20 billion of the American repair bill is for unnecessary, not done, or fraudulent repairs (Jones et aI, 1979). Such expenditures surely subtract from the total dollBJ;'s spent on necessary repairs -- both

of a mechanical and a safety natur~. The high cost of automobile repair

fraud combined with its white-collar crime status su~gests that it is the

very type behavior that Beccaria woultl ~ave wanted to control. Research on deterrenc.e should eliminate the use of aggregate data,

suci~:=,!l.s official crime rat,!,?s. StudieG employing this da.ta may build ,)

an interesting methodology but do little to provide social policy answers. ------~.------~"":~x.---- ...~-----

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REFERENC:!:S ".

EHRLICH, Isaac (1973) "Participation in illigitimate activities: A theoretical ANDENAES, Johannes (1971) "Deterrence and specific offenses." The University and empirical investigation." Journal of Political Economy 81 (3): of Chicago Law Review 38: 537-553. 521-565. FORST, B. (1976) "Participation in illigitimate activities: F.urther empirical ANTUNES, George and HUNT, A. Lee (1973) "The impact of certainty and severity findings," Policy Analysis 2 (3): 477-492. of pUnishment on levels of crime in American states: An ex1iended analysis." GElS, Gilbert (1967) "The heavy electrical equipment antitrust cases of 1961" Journal of Criminal Law and Cri~ology 64: 486-493. in Marshall Clinard and Richard Quinney (Eds.)· Criminal Behavior Systems: BECCARIA, Cesare (1963) On Crimes and Punishments. : Bo bbs4ferril. A Typology. Ney York: Hole, Rine~art and Win~trn; l39-l5l~ BERGER, Peter (1963) Invitation To Sociology: A Humanistic Perspective. GElS, Gilbert (1973) "Deterring corporate crime" in Ralph Nader and Mark Green New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc. (Eds.) Corporate Power in America. New York: Grossman: 182-197. BLUMSTEIN, Alfred; COHEN, Jacqueline; and NAGIN, Daniel (1978) Deterrence and GEERKm, Michael and GOVE, Walter (1975) "Deterrence: Some theoretical Incapacitation: Estimating the Effects of Criminal Sanctions on Crime cQl1siderations." La" and Society Reviev 9: 497-513. Rates. Washington, D.C.: National Academy of Sciences. GIBBS, Jack P. (1968) "Crime, punishment, and deterrence." Southwestern BUIKHUISEN, W. (1974) "General deterrence: Research and theory. a: Abstracts Social Science Quarterly 48: 515-530. on Criminology and Penology 14: .. 285-2~8. GRAY, Louis and MARTIN, David (1969) "Puniahllent and deterrence: Another CHAIKm, Jon; LAWLESS, Michael; and STEVEIlSON, Keith (1974) "The impact or . analysis of Gibble data." Social Science Quarterly 50: 389-395. police activity on crime: Robber.ies 0J1 the subway sys~elC." GREmBERG, D.avid; KESSLER, Ronald and LOGAN, (1979) IiA panel model The New York City Rand Institute Publication R-1424-NYC, January. Char1~s of crime rates and arrest rates." Aaerican Sociological Review CHAMBLISS, William (1967) "Types of deviance and the effectiveness of legal:: 44: 843-850. sanctions. II Wisconsin Law Raview (SUJIlIler): 703-719. JONES, Burton; PE:l'ERS, Joseph; SCHROER, Bernard (1979) "Selective survey CHIRICOS, Theodore and \fALDO, Gordon (1970) "Punishment and crime: An of the capability of representative automobile repair facilities to .'~ examination of aome evidence. II Social Problems 18: 200-217. diagnose and ~e~r automobi1es.- Huntsville, Alabama: Kenneth E. Johnson, CLINARD, Marshall (1952) The Black Mar~et. New York: Rinehart. Enviromaental and Energy Center, University of Alabama. CLINARD, Marshall (1979) nCorporate illegallti,es. Report prepared for the KAMISAR,Yale (1972) "How to use, abuse, and fight back with crime statistics." national insti~ute of law enforcement and criminsJ justice." Oklahoma Law Review 25. DECKER, John F. (1972) "Curbside daterrence1 An analysis of a s~,~-rejector

dev1~.~, coin-view window and warning labels on slug· usage in New York

City parking meter~.n Crimino1qgy 10:. 127-142. :;;;;0";;::, :;:;;;:;;:-:--'~------.--

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lJUiE, Robert E. (1953) nWhy businessaen violate the lav." Jo~~ of TITTLE, Charles and LOGAN, Charles (1973) "San t' c ~ons and deviance: Evidence and remaining questions." Criminal Law, Criminology and Police Science 44, Volume 2. Law and SOCiety Review 7: 371-392. LOGAN, Charles H. (1972) "General deterrent effects of imprisonment." TITTLE, Charles and ROWE, Alan (1973) "Moral appeal, sanction threat, and

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",,' : T.I'rl'LE, Charles (1969) "Crime rates and legal sanctions." Social Problems 16

(Spring): 409-423. ----~- r

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