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RSA Certificate Manager 6.9 Installation Guide

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RSA Certificate Manager 6.9 Installation Guide RSA Certificate Manager 6.9 Installation Guide Contact Information Go to the RSA corporate web site for regional Customer Support telephone and fax numbers: www.rsa.com Trademarks RSA, the RSA logo, BSAFE and EMC are registered trademarks or trademarks of EMC Corporation in the United States and/ or other countries. All other trademarks used herein are the property of their respective owners. For a list of EMC trademarks, go to www.rsa.com/legal/trademarks_list.pdf. License agreement This software and the associated documentation are proprietary and confidential to EMC, are furnished under license, and may be used and copied only in accordance with the terms of such license and with the inclusion of the copyright notice below. This software and the documentation, and any copies thereof, may not be provided or otherwise made available to any other person. No title to or ownership of the software or documentation or any intellectual property rights thereto is hereby transferred. Any unauthorized use or reproduction of this software and the documentation may be subject to civil and/or criminal liability. This software is subject to change without notice and should not be construed as a commitment by EMC. Third-party licenses This product may include software developed by parties other than RSA. The text of the license agreements applicable to third-party software in this product may be viewed in the thirdpartylicenses.pdf file. This product includes software developed by The Apache Software Foundation (www.apache.org/). Portions Copyright © 1992-1996 Regents of the University of Michigan. All rights reserved. Note on encryption technologies This product may contain encryption technology. Many countries prohibit or restrict the use, import, or export of encryption technologies, and current use, import, and export regulations should be followed when using, importing or exporting this product. Distribution Use, copying, and distribution of any EMC software described in this publication requires an applicable software license. EMC believes the information in this publication is accurate as of its publication date. The information is subject to change without notice. THE INFORMATION IN THIS PUBLICATION IS PROVIDED "AS IS." EMC CORPORATION MAKES NO REPRESENTATIONS OR WARRANTIES OF ANY KIND WITH RESPECT TO THE INFORMATION IN THIS PUBLICATION, AND SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. Copyright © 2011–2012 EMC Corporation. All Rights Reserved. Published in the USA. December 2011 Revised: March 2012 RSA Certificate Manager 6.9 Installation Guide Contents Preface................................................................................................................................... 7 About This Guide................................................................................................................7 RSA Certificate Manager Documentation .......................................................................... 7 Related Documentation....................................................................................................... 8 Getting Support and Service ............................................................................................... 9 Before You Call Customer Support............................................................................. 9 Chapter 1: System Requirements for RSA Certificate Manager ......11 Minimum System Configuration on Windows ..................................................................11 Minimum System Configuration on Solaris ..................................................................... 12 Minimum System Configuration on Linux....................................................................... 12 Support on VMware ESX Server 4.1................................................................................ 13 Browser Support for Administration................................................................................. 13 Browser Settings ........................................................................................................ 14 Entering and Displaying International Characters..................................................... 15 Browser Support for Enrollment....................................................................................... 15 Cryptographic Support...................................................................................................... 16 RSA Public Key Technology..................................................................................... 16 DSA Public Key Technology .................................................................................... 16 Elliptic Curve Public Key Technology...................................................................... 16 Hardware Security Module Support ................................................................................. 17 Chapter 2: Installing RSA Certificate Manager .......................................... 19 Pre-Installation Checklist.................................................................................................. 19 Preparing to Install............................................................................................................22 Installing RSA BSAFE SSL-C Library Files ............................................................ 22 Enabling SSL 3.0 and TLS 1.0 .................................................................................. 22 Configuring the nCipher PKCS #11 Provider ........................................................... 23 Configuring Internet Explorer 8 or 9 Settings ........................................................... 24 Installing RSA Certificate Manager on Windows ............................................................ 24 Installing RSA Certificate Manager on Solaris or Linux.................................................. 26 Browser-Based Phase of the Installation .......................................................................... 27 Installing the License File................................................................................................. 37 Post-Installation Checklist ................................................................................................ 38 Post-Installation Tasks............................................................................................... 39 Starting RSA Certificate Manager on Windows Server 2003 .......................................... 39 Starting RSA Certificate Manager on Windows Server 2008 .......................................... 40 Starting RSA Certificate Manager on Solaris or Linux .................................................... 41 RSA Certificate Manager Failover ................................................................................... 42 Pre-Installation Modifications ................................................................................... 43 Startup Procedure....................................................................................................... 43 Failover to the Secondary Machine ........................................................................... 44 Restarting the Primary Machine ................................................................................ 44 Contents 3 RSA Certificate Manager 6.9 Installation Guide Chapter 3: Upgrading RSA Certificate Manager ....................................... 45 Upgrading RSA Certificate Manager................................................................................ 45 Preparing to Upgrade ........................................................................................................ 45 Creating the Upgrade Package.......................................................................................... 46 Creating the Upgrade Package on Windows ............................................................. 47 Creating the Upgrade Package on Solaris or Linux................................................... 48 Completing an Upgrade .................................................................................................... 49 Completing an Upgrade on Windows........................................................................ 49 Completing an Upgrade on Solaris or Linux ............................................................. 53 Upgrading Customizations................................................................................................ 56 Troubleshooting an Upgrade............................................................................................. 57 Converting from Software to Hardware Keys .................................................................. 59 Adding the PKCS #11 Library Path .......................................................................... 59 Converting the SSL Keys .......................................................................................... 60 Chapter 4: Post-Installation ................................................................................... 63 Server Configuration......................................................................................................... 64 Installed CAs..................................................................................................................... 65 Issued Certificates.............................................................................................................66 File Directory Structure ...................................................................................................
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