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Attachment J

Summary ofOpen Source Materials

AFGHANISTAN

a. Noor was captured 28 March 2002 in Pakistan. He was detained by U.S. forces at Kandahar then transferred to Bagram Collection Point ("BCP"). By August of2002, Noor had been transferred to Guantanamo Bay Naval Station, Cuba (GTMO or Guantanamo).

b. From June 2002 to April 2004 the U.S. formation that directed all Enduring Freedom operations in Afghanistan was designated Combined Joint Task Force-180 (CJTF-180), a corps­ level headquarters. Prior to the arrival ofCJTF-180 at Bagram, there was very little guidance on detainee operations or policy through technical channels. 1

Detention operations in Afghanistan

c. Generally concurrent with Noar's detention by U.S. forces in Afghanistan, the 211 th Military Police Company (211 th MP Co) was assigned to detention operations at Kandahar (approximately February 2002 to July 2002) and Bagram (approximately July 2002 to September 2002). In August/September 2002, the 211 th MP Co was relieved in place by the 377th Military th th Police Company (377 MP Co). Prior to deployment to relive the 211 t\ the commander of377 th obtained copies ofthe standard operating procedures (SOP) for the 211 , rewrote portions ofthe SOP, and distributed copies ofthis revised SOP to members of37ih while they were still mobilized at Ft Dix. 2 Once members ofthe 377th MP Co arrived at Bagram, members ofthe 211st MP Co spent approximately two weeks training members ofthe 377th MP Co on local practices for detention operations.

d. During one week in December 2002, two detainees died in U.S. custody at the BCP as the result ofabusive detention and interrogation practices.

The patterns ofdetainee abuse in the two incidents share some similarities. In both cases, for example, the [detainees] were handcuffed to fixed objects to above their heads in order to keep them awake. Additionally, interrogations in both incidents involved the use of physical violence, including kicking, beating and the use of"compliance blows" which involved striking the PUCs legs with the MP's knee. In both cases, blunt force trauma to the legs was implicated in the deaths. 3

e. Following the detainee deaths, the U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command (CID) conducted a homicide investigation. The record ofthis investigation includes approximately 200 interviews with military police, intelligence personnel, interpreters, detainees, camp overhead

I See CLAMO Legal Lessons Learned (2004), at 53. h 2 See CID Report Habibullah and Dilawar (Oct 2004), at 449 (Exhibit 120). The 37i Commander apparently rewrote the SOP again while at Bagram. 3 Church Report (2005), at 235.

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personnel, and others. The record includes copies ofclassified SOPs and descriptions of recordkeeping practices. Investigators looked for the "source" ofabusive detention practices conducted by members ofthe 377th MP Co, and questioned which practices originated with the 211 th MP Co, the unit with whom Noor interacted at Kandahar and Bagram. The final report addressed practices and leadership problems that directly led to the deaths.4 Despite ready availability to the Government, records ofthis investigation have not been made available to the defense.5 f. Following the detainee deaths, "LTG McNeill ordered a broad AR 15-6 investigation into conditions at the BCP. In February 2003, after reviewing the results ofthe investigation, LTG McNeill prohibited several interrogation techniques implicated in the detainees' deaths....,,6 The AR 15-6 charter specifically required the investigator to leave the investigation ofthe deaths to cm, but to investigate "tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) as well as standard practices, which were dangerous, contrary to legal standard, or ill-advised.,,7 Despite ready availability to the Government, records ofthe subsequent administrative investigation (AR 15-6) into detention and intelligence operations at BCP ordered by LTG McNeil have not been made available to the defense. The defense is able to provide additional classified information about this investigation. g. Bagram guards and other US personnel have made sworn statements that they conducted, witnessed, or heard about the following activities:

• Use of pressure point control tactics to inflict pain on complaint detainees;8 • Use ofloud music to disorient detainees;9 • Routine hooding and shackling ofdetainees; 10 • Use of"compliance blows" on restrained detainees; • Rough physical handling and medical exams during detainee in-processing; • Hooding detainees during movement, transportation, and interrogations; • Use ofextended isolation; • Corporal punishment for non-compliant detainees; • Shackling for punishment; • Throwing a detainee wearing three sets ofshackles against wall;guard threw detainee around "like a rag doll" because he "felt like it" and that was "why he was there"; 11 • Ensuring escapee from group cell was "fucked Up;,,12

4 See Church Report (2005), at 236. 5 Public versions ofthe CID report exclude names ofpersonnel, classified information, and other sensitive material. See, generally, CID Report Habibullah and Dilawar (Oct 2004). Records ofthe resulting courts-martial are only partially available to the public. See generally McClatchy Newspapers, Documents from McClatchy's Investigation, Court-Martial Files for the Following Soldiers (posted on 15 June 2008) available at http://wwwmcclatchvdc.com/2008/0GI15/40737IdoclIlllents- from-mec lat chys-investi galion htm I. 6 Church Report (2005), at 235. An "AR 15-6" is an administrative investigation ordered under Army Regulation 15-6, Proceduresfor Investigating Officers and Boards ofOfficers. See generally AR 15-6 (/996). 7 ClD Report Habibullah and Dilawar (Oct 2004), at 1206 (Exhibit 308). 8 See, e.g., ClD Report Habibullah and Dilmllar (Oct 2004), at 582 (Exhibit 148).. 9 See, e.g., ClD Report Habibullah and Dilawar (Oct 2004), at 1421 et seq (Exhibit 344) (Cm interview with former interrogator 519th MI, describing loud music used during initial detainee screening). 10 See, e.g., ClD Report Habibullah and Dilawar (Oct 2004), at 487 (Exhibit 128). II Jd. at 751-752 (Exhibit 190).

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• Shoving detainees into wall during movements; 13 • Compelling detainees to perform meaningless physical tasks, like constantly cleaning; 14 • Forcing detainee to pick bottle caps out ofhuman waste; 15 possibly on direction of military intelligence personnel; 16 • Forcing detainee to hold stress positions; 17 • Beating mentally handicapped Afghan detainee because he screeched like character on cartoon "South Park'", 18 • Picking up detainee by the neck; 19 • Having growling dogs walk on bound, hooded detainees "as a big joke,,;20 • Threatening detainee with a dildo;21 • Squeezing detainee's shoulders while escorting, striking detainee in groin area;22 • Sidekicking detainee; 23 • Repeatedly punching shackled detainee in the chest;24 • Isolation guard lets members of37ih 3d platoon into detainee's cell so they can take turns striking him to hear him cry out, "Allah!,,;25 detainee later dies. h. In 2002, Bagram guards believed they were authorized to, and did as a matter ofpractice, deliver strikes and blows to detainees who were restrained. Guards sometimes struck detainees to neutralize an immediate security threat, but also beat detainees as "punishment" for non­ compliance. "Compliance blows" used on restrained detainees included the "common peroneal strike", an extremely painful blow from the guard's knee to the common peroneal nerve along the detainee's upper femur. Non-compliance ranged from actively fighting or resisting guards, to talking, refusing to stand or sit, touching concertina wire, or generally disregarding any instructions given by a guard, whether the detainee understood the instruction or not. Some guards apparently struck restrained detainees as a form ofamusement or revenge.26 Two detainees at Bagram died in December 2002 from complications arising from repeated common peroneal strikes; medical personnel later testified victims' legs were "pulpified," similar to injuries from being run over by a bus, and would have required amputation.

12 1d. at 751 (Exhibit 190). 13 See, e.g., CID Report Habibullah and Dilawar (Oct 2004), at 753 (Exhibit 190). 14 See, e.g., id. at 815 (Exhibit 205). 15 See, e.g., id.at 815 (Exhibit 205). 16 See id. at 824 (Exhibit 207). 17 See, e.g., CID Report Habibullah and Dilawar (Oct 2004), at 832-33 (Exhibit 209) (specific incident involving "roman chair" stress position led to guidance prohibiting its use). 18 1d. at 842 (Exhibit 211). 19 1d.at 890 (Exhibit 221). 20 1d.at 886 (Exhibit 220). 21 CID Report Habibullah and Dilawar (Oct 2004), at 898 (Exhibit 226). 22 1d.at 899 (Exhibit 226). 23 1d.at 913 (Exhibit 229). 24 1d. at 1240 (Exhibit 311). 25 See, e.g.,CID Report Habibullah and Dilawar (Oct 2004), at 1349-1350 (Exhibit 324). 26 See, e.g., id., at 842 (Exhibit 211) (describing beating ofmentally handicapped Afghan detainee who screeched like character on cartoon "South Park"); id., at 1349-1350 (Exhibit 324) (describing isolation guard letting MPs into detainee's cell so they could take turns striking him to hear him cry out, "Allah!"; detainee later died).

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i. In 2002, Bagram guards used forced standing to punish detainees for non-compliance. Detainees were also forced to stand for extended periods oftime in order to enforce sleep deprivation at the request ofmilitary intelligence personnel ("MI personnel"). Guards forced detainees to remain standing by restraining them to fixed surfaces. For example, a guard could bring a detainee into the entry section ofthe general detention area ("airlock") to stand: "Ifthey refused to stand in the airlock, then they could be handcuffed to the airlock in a manner to keep them from sitting down.,,27 Policy and practice regarding whether guards could shackled a detainee's hands over his head versus eye or waist level varied and was sometimes inconsistent.28

29 j. Guards routinely hooded and shackled detainees for first days oftheir detention. Guards also routinely hooded or goggled detainees during movements, for force protection, and to deny detainees knowledge ofthe detention facility.3o

Intelligence operations in Afghanistan k. The 202nd Military Intelligence Battalion (202nd MI Bn) ofthe 513th Military Intelligence Brigade established interrogation operations in Afghanistan. The 202nd MI Bn reportedly produced nearly fifteen hundred Intelligence Information Reports (URs) in just over seven months, in a reports database that was called "superb" by CJTF-180's first director ofcounter­ intelligence (CI) and human intelligence (HUMINT).31

I. Generally concurrent with Noor's detention by U.S. forces at BCP, the 202nd MI Bn staffed the interrogation cell at Bagram that was responsible for conducting detainee interrogations. Two military intelligence personnel from the 519th Military Intelligence Battalion (519th MI Bn) were assigned to augment the 202nd MI Bn. In August/September of2002, the 202 nd MI Bn was replaced by the 519th MI Bn, and the two augmentees stayed on to train their unit on local practices developed by the 202nd MI Bn. m. At Bagram, intelligence personnel who were part ofthe Joint Interrogation Facility (JlF) at BCP conducted initial screening and interrogation, while personnel assign to the Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Center (JlDc) conducted follow-on exploitation.32 JlF and JlDC personnel at Bagram conducted their own detainee interrogations.33 Personnel from the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) set up the JlDC at Bagram around late June /early July 2002,34 and

27 CID Report Habibullah and Dilawar (Oct 2004), at 1256 (Exhibit 312). 28 See, e.g., id., at 1255 (Exhibit 312) (interview with SJA who said he told MPs do not shackle detainees' arms overhead, yet detainees' arms were shackled overhead). 29 See, e.g., CID Report Habibullah and Dilawar (Oct 2004), at 487 (Exhibit 128). 30 See CJTF-I80 Interrogation Techniques (24 January 2003), at 3,7. 31 Ron Stallings, Michael Foley, CI and HUMINT operations in support ofOEF (Oct-Dec, 2003) available at http://wwwmilitarvphotos.net/forums/showthread.php?28026-CI-and-HLIM tNT-operations-in-support-of-OEF. 32 See generally DAIG Report (21 July 2004), at 32 (Interrogation facilities in OEF identified themselves as JIFs and JlDCs, and their organization and command relationships were structured accordingly); AFM3-31 (2001), at A-II (describing roles ofJIF and JIDC). 33 See, e.g., id., at 1212 (Exhibit 309) (ClD interview with former CJTF-180 J-2X). 34 See CID Report Habibullah and Dilawar (Oct 2004), at 1212 (Exhibit 309).

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presumably maintained separate records and routinely communicated with other, off-site elements ofDIA and other members ofthe intelligence community. n. The government has not certified which agencies interrogated, took custody of, or interviewed Noor at Kandahar or Bagram. The government has provided the applicable DIA SOPs for interrogations.35 Nor has the government provided DIA records to the defense. o. Numerous other intelligence agencies interrogated detainees at Bagram. "[A] host of national level intelligence agencies participate in the interrogation process utilizing a wide array oftactics, techniques and procedures.,,36 In addition to conventional military forces, Other Than Conventional (OTC) military forces and other government intelligence agencies (OGA), conducted detainee operations and/or interrogations in Afghanistan. Military Special Mission Units (SMUs) serving in Afghanistan conducted their own interrogations under separate guidance,37 and passed detainees to conventional forces. At one point, SMU Afghanistan requested a dedicated interrogation facility co-located at Bagram Collection Point. 38 OGA interrogated detainees held by military forces, and conducted detention operations. 39 p. Members ofOTC military forces and OGAs would "show up" and demand access to detainees in military custody at BCP.40 JTF-180 subsequently established coordination practices, and, in order to ensure outside agencies did not physically abuse detainees, a rule that no outside organization could conduct an interview/interrogation ofa detainee without a JTF-180 .mterrogator present.41 q. OTC military forces and OGAs presumably maintained separate records and routinely communicated with other, off-site elements ofthe intelligence community. The government has neither provided such records to the defense, nor certified OTC military forces and OGAs, did not interrogate, take custody of, or interview Noor at any point in US or foreign custody. r. In late 2002, CJTF-180 ordered an administrative investigation (AR 15-6) oftwo A/519th interrogators who physically abused detainees. A male and a female military intelligence agent

35 See, e.g., DIAM58-1 I. (U) DOD HUMINT Policies and Procedures (S//NF) (August 1993), cited by DlA Policy on Interrogation Operations (undated, staffsummary sheet dated 19 March 2004) (redacted) available at http://www.dia.mil/Foia/Detai neeAblise/D IA %20Pol icy%20for%20Interrogation~'0200peratiol1s.pdf (includes direction on interrogating detainees; by at least 2004, updated to provide direction on interrogating Guantanamo detainees); DIAM58-12. (U) DOD HUMINT Management Systems (S//NF) (June 1997), cited by Headquarters, Department ofthe Army, Field Manual 2-22.3: Human Intelligence Collector Operations (September 2006) available at https://rdl.train.anny mil!soldierPOI1allatiaiadlsc/view/pliblic/231 67·l/FM/2-22.3/FM? 22X3.PDF, at Bibliography-3 ("relevant supplemental information"). 36 CJTF.I80 Interrogation Techniques (24 January 2003), at 10. 37 See SASC Detainee Report (November 20,2008), at 153 (describing Jan 2003 SMU TF Afghanistan SOP that included use of isolation, multiple interrogators, stress ositions and slee de rivation ; id., at 158 SMU TF Iraq ado ted SMU TF Afi hanistan SOP "verbatim" .

ee etainee eport ovem er, at, cltlng redacted in original] Interrogations Operations Decision Briefing (undated) (describing request for SMU interrogation facility for high value detainees co-located at the Bagram Collection Point). 39 DoJ OIG FBI & Detainee Interrogations (rev 2009), at 19. 40 CID Report Habibullah and Dilawar (Oct 2004), at 1305 (Exhibit 318). 41 See id. at 1305, 1306 (Exhibit 318).

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reportedly assaulted the detainee they were interrogating: stepped on his legs, pushed him against the wall, kneed him, grabbed his ears. 42 The AR 15-6 report discussed a number ofinterrogation techniques, including sleep deprivation.43 As a result ofthe AR 15-6 investigation, two A/519th interrogators were denied access to detainees.44 It appears as though the chain ofcommand did not act to initiate internal MI procedures required when MI personnel are suspected of misconduct. Records ofthis investigation have not been made available to the defense. st. Following the detainee deaths in December 2002, members ofthe 519th MI Bn were placed under investigation. While the investigation was ongoing, 519th MI Bn was transferred to Abu Ghraib, Iraq. The 519th MI Bn conducted detainee interrogations at Abu Ghraib during a period ofnow-infamous detainee abuse. A subsequent investigation determined approaches and practices used at Abu Ghraib "clearly" came from documents and personnel in Afghanistan and Guantanamo, to the point where an intelligence SOP for Abu Ghraib created by the same 519th commander "was remarkably similar" to the Bagram SOP.45 t. Bagram intelligence operations personnel have made sworn statements that they conducted, witnessed, or heard about the following activities associated with interrogation:

• Use ofstress positions;46 • Sleep deprivation;47 • Beating and other forms ofphysical assault;48 • Sexual assault and other forms ofsexual humiliation;49 • Taking pants offdetainee;5o • Interrogator displayed penis to detainee;51 • Detainee held while interrogator simulated sexual acts;52 • Female interrogator kicked detainee in buttocks to force him back into kneeling stress position;53 • "The screaming technique;,,54 • Forced physical training;55

42 See CID Report Habibullah and Dilawar (Oct 2004), at 1340 (Exhibit 322) (Cm interviewing CJTF-180 legal advisor). 43 See CID Report Habibullah and Dilawar (Oct 2004), at 1236 (Exhibit 311) (interview of former deputy SJA for CJTF-180). 44 See id, at 1236 (Exhibit 311). 45 Fay Report (2004), at 29. 46 See, e.g., CID Report Habibullah and Dilawar (Oct 2004) .at 1052 (Exhibit 263); 1440 (Exhibit 344); 1094 (Exhibit 278); 409 (Exhibit 109). 47 See, e.g., id, at 410-411 (Exhibit 109). 48 See, e.g., idat 1261 (Exhibit 312); 1435, 1438 (Exhibit 344); 1435, 1437, 1440 (Exhibit 344) (describing dragging detainee by shirt and pinning him to wall). 49 See, e.g., CID Report Habibullah and Dilawar (Oct 2004), at 1051 (Exhibit 263) (describing taking pants off detainee); 1261 (Exhibit 312); 1438 (Exhibit 344) 50 See, e.g., id, at 1051 (Exhibit 263); 1261 (Exhibit 312). 51 Idat 1435, 1438 (Exhibit 344). 52 CID Report Habibullah and Dilawar (Oct 2004), at 1438 (Exhibit 344). 53 See idat 1435, 1438 (Exhibit 344). 54 Jd. at 1051 (Exhibit 263). See also id., at 1118 (Exhibit 284). 55 See, e.g., idat 1052 (Exhibit 263).

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• Detainee forced to roll across floor and kiss interrogator's boots;56 • Detainee forced to sweep the floor;57 • Threat that other interrogator with bad reputation would come;58 • Interrogator pulls on detainee's shackle chain, rubs hands in detainees' hair;59 • Interrogator grabsrab detainee's beard to turn his head;6o 61 • Interrogator lies on detainee on floor, steps between detainee's legs near his crotch. u. FBI personnel surveyed by the Department ofJustice Office ofthe Inspector General affirmed they observed or heard about the following forms ofrough or aggressive detainee treatment in Afghanistan: 62

• Depriving a detainee offood or water; • Depriving a detainee ofclothing; • Depriving a detainee ofsleep, or interrupting sleep by frequent cell relocation or by other methods; • Beating a detainee; • Threatening action to cause physical pain, injury, disfigurement, or death; • Treatment or action causing significant physical pain or injury, or causing disfigurement or death; • Placing a detainee on a hot surface or burning a detainee; • Using shackles or other restraints in a prolonged manner; • Requiring a detainee to maintain, or restraining a detainee in, a stressful or painful position; • Forcing a detainee to perform demanding physical exercise; • Hooding or blindfolding a detainee other than during transportation; • Subjecting a detainee to extremely cold or hot room temperatures for extended periods; • .Subjecting a detainee to loud music; • Subjecting a detainee to bright flashing lights or darkness; • Isolating a detainee for an extended period oftime; • Using duct tape to restrain, gag or punish a detainee; • Using rapid response teams and/ or forced cell extractions; • Using a military working dog on or near a detainee other than during detainee transportation; • Threatening to use military working dogs on or near a detainee; • Disrespectful statements, handling, or actions involving the Koran; • Shaving a detainee's facial or other hair to embarrass or humiliate a detainee; • Touching a detainee or acting toward a detainee in a sexual manner;

56 ClD Report Habibullah and Dilawar (Oct 2004), at 1094 (Exhibit 278).. 57 See, e.g., dat 1097-1098 (Exhibit 278). 58 Mat 1395 (Exhibit 334); id, at 1439 (Exhibit 344). 59 ClD Report Habibullah and Dilawar (Oct 2004), at 1395 (Exhibit 334). 60 Mat 1434 (Exhibit 344). 61 Mat 1434-1435,1437 (Exhibit 344). 62 DoJ DIG FBI & Detainee Interrogations (rev 2009), at 213-215.

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• Holding detainee(s) who were not officially acknowledged or registered as such by the agency detaining the person; • Sending a detainee to another country for a more aggressive interrogation; • Threatening to send a detainee to another country for detention or more aggressive interrogation; • Threatening to take action against a detainee's family; • Other treatment or action causing severe emotional or psychological trauma to a detainee.63 v. At Bagram in 2002, intelligence personnel sometimes placed detainees in stress positions during interrogation.64 A stress position may be an abnormal human position, such as suspension or inversion, or a normal human position, such as sitting, standing or lying, that a subject is forced to hold for an abnormal period oftime or with an impediment to the position, such as an injury. Stress positions may be bound or unbound, and restraints can inflict pain or injury if misapplied or otherwise manipulated. w. Military personnel sometimes referred to stress positions as "safety positions.,,65 A "safety position" was an awkward physical position from which a detainee could not easily physically hurt other people or himself, meant to be used for the safety of US personnel and as a substitute for shackling a detainee to a fixed object.66 Even though "safety positions" were supposed to be used to protect US personnel, they were routinely "used to facilitate cooperation, instead ofa true protective measure.,,67 "Safety positions" should be evaluated as stress positions, even if not called so by guards or interrogators. x. Stress positions reportedly used at Bagram in 2002 included, inter alia, forcing a detainee to:

• lean against a wall with his weight supported only by his arms or head;68 • sit with only the wall for support in a "roman chair," "invisible chair," or "dream seat" position; • kneel with his arms raised overhead69 or hands locked behind his head; 70 • sit on the floor with no chair; 71 • stand with a chair next to him, not allowed to sit down on it; 72 and

63 DoJ DIG FBI & Detainee Interrogations (rev 2009), at 213-215. "FBI agents were only present at a small percentage ofdetainee interrogations in the military zones, most ofwhich were conducted by personnel from other agencies." Jd. at 171. 64 See generally CID Report Habibullah and Dilawar (Oct 2004), at 1430-1434 (Exhibit 344). 6S CID Report Habibullah and Dilawar (Oct 2004), at 1394 (Exhibit 334). 66 See, e.g., C1D Report Habibullah and Dilawar (Oct 2004), at 1235 (Exhibit 31 I). 67 Id, at 1237 (Exhibit 311) (describing findings ofAR 15-6 conducted after detainees' deaths); id., at 409 (Exhibit 109) (describing "safety position" as tool ofinterrogators); id, at 1398 (Exhibit 334) ("not used for safety"). But see id, at 1264 (Exhibit 312) (AR 15-6 said safety positions were only used for security, even though they had also been used on occasion solely to cause detainee discomfort in interrogation). 68 CID Report Habibullah and Dilawar (Oct 2004), at 336 (Exhibit 85) (describing detainee forced to lean on wall with weight supported by arms or head.) 69 See, e.g.,idat 409 (Exhibit 109) (describing "safety position" as tool of interrogators). 70 See, e.g., idat 1422 (Exhibit 344). 7\ See, e.g., idat 1422 (Exhibit 344).

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• lie on his back with hands and feet in the air. 73 y. Some interrogators reportedly tested their own stamina in the positions to establish limits for their use,74 or set case by case limits based on their subjective perception ofwhether the detainee made enough effort to hold the position, i.e., "attempted to do the task" or "just quit".75 These practices suggest lack ofsupervision and an environment where abuse was more likely to occur. CIA interrogators used stress positions. 76 U.S. personnel sometimes struck detainees who fell out ofstress positions. 77 z. Military intelligence personnel subjected detainees to sleep deprivation for interrogation purposes. Sleep deprivation may have been common as early as April 2002.78 aTC military used sleep deprivation.79 CIA interrogators also used sleep deprivation. 8o

The MP's would be authorized to keep the detainees awake based on the direction ofM!. During the execution ofthe mission, the MP's would employ various techniques to keep someone awake. That would include yelling at the individual, [sic] keeping the lights on; forced standing; and ultimately to enforce the forced standing, handcuffing the individual 8 to something to keep them from sitting down. ! aa. Sleep deprivation was meant to place detainees "in a vulnerable state-of-mind, causing confusion and disorientation...".82 IfNoor did not comply with instructions to stand or do some other activity that served as an "interruption or periodic awakening" for sleep adjustment, or ifhe physically resisted or acted out during sleep adjustment, then he may have been struck to compel compliance or as punishment. bb. Interrogators at forward locations and at BCP routinely used isolation and considered it among the most effective interrogation techniques. 83 aTC military also used isolation. 84 CIA interrogators used isolation. 85

72 See CID Report Habibullah and Dilawar (Oct 2004), at 1422 (Exhibit 344). 73 See idat 1422 (Exhibit 344). 74 See, e.g., id, at 1422 (Exhibit 344). 75 Id at 1423 (Exhibit 344). Note the interrogator who admitted to doing this appears to have been farther along the "nice" end ofthe personality spectrum.Id, at 1424. 76 See generally CIA OIG Special Review (May 7, 2004) (describing role ofCIA in interrogating terrorism suspects held by the CIA and by military forces). 77 See CJTF-I80 Interrogation Techniques (24 January 2003), at 6 ("mild physical contact" "used to enforce safety positions during intense interrogation designed to elicit emotional response."). See, e.g., CID Report Habibullah and Dilawar (Oct 2004), at 1435, 1438 (Exhibit 344) ("SGT _ [redacted in original] said she kicked a detainee in the butt because he would not stop sitting on his heels during an interrogation".). 78 See CID Report Habibullah and Dilawar (Oct 2004),. at 1273 (Exhibit 313). 79 See SASC Detainee Report (November 20, 2008), at 153 (describing Jan 2003 SMU TF Afghanistan SOP that included use of isolation, multiple interrogators, stress positions, and sleep deprivation). 80 See generally CIA OIG Special Review (May 7, 2004) (describing role ofCIA in interrogating terrorism suspects held by the CIA and by military forces). 8\ See CID Report Habibullah and Dilawar (Oct 2004), at 1252-1253 (Exhibit 312) (legal advisor for BC? from late Nov 2002 - June 2003). Note detainees were sometimes cuffed with hands overhead. Id, at 1255 (Exhibit 312). 82 Id, at 3. 83 See CJTF-I80 Interrogation Techniques (24 January 2003), at 2-3,6-7,8.

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cc. Interrogators at forward locations and at BCP routinely used hoods and considered their use among the most effective interrogation techniques. 86 Hooding could interfere with a detainee's breathing, particularly ifhe was excited or hyperventilating. 87 "[W]hen used in conjunction with isolation, the hood disoriented the [detainee] and distorted his sense of place and time.,,88 CIA interrogators used hooding and other forms ofdeprivation of light. 89 dd. Interrogators at Bagram considered deprivation oflight and sound among the most effective interrogation techniques.9o "It was effective in quickly breaking individuals that have immediate force protection information... This technique erodes a [detainee's] mental willingness to resist. When used with sleep deprivation, this techniques extends the disorientation period rendering the [detainee] more susceptible [to] other techniques.,,91 ee. Interrogators at forward locations routinely used female interrogators or guards specifically to induce "shamelhumiliation", "evoke[] deep feelings ofshame," "reduce... feelings ofpride."n BCP also used female interrogators and guards. ff. Military Intelligence personnel reportedly asked MPs to implement interrogation strategies outside the interrogation booth, ranging from a general "softening up" to specific forms ofabuse. These included but were not limited to:

• restrained or unrestrained sleep deprivation;93 • forced physical training (aka "smoking sessions");94 • humiliating activities;95

84 See SASC Detainee Report (November 20,2008), at 153 (describing Jan 2003 SMU TF Afghanistan SOP that included use of isolation, multiple interrogators, stress positions, and sleep deprivation). 85 See generally CIA OIG Special Review (May 7, 2004) (describing role ofCIA in interrogating terrorism suspects held by the CIA and by military forces). 86 See CJTF-180 Interrogation Techniques (24 January 2003), at 3; id., at 7 ("use ofhood during interrogation" among effective interrogation techniques used by CJTF-180 interrogators at BCP, but changes "currently underway" to substitute blacked-out goggles for hoods). 87 See, e.g., CID Report Habibullah and Dilawar (Oct 2004), at 1256 (Exhibit 312) (after detainee deaths, legal advisor for BCP learned that chaining a detainee's hands over his head, combined with the hood, could cause breathing problems potentially exacerbated by the detainee getting excited and hyperventilating). 88 CJTF-I80 Interrogation Techniques (24 January 2003), at 7. 89 See generally CIA OIG Special Review (May 7, 2004) (describing role ofCIA in interrogating terrorism suspects held by the CIA and by military forces). 90 See CJTF-I80 Interrogation Techniques (24 January 2003), at 8 (deprivation oflight and sound in living areas used "in the past" at Bagram" not "currently used" circa January 2003; used again later. See also Church Report (2005) (S), at 224-225. 91 CJTF-180 Interrogation Techniques (24 January 2003), at 7, 9. 92 CJTF-I80 Interrogation Techniques (24 January 2003), at 3. See id., at 4 93 See, e.g., CID Report Habibullah and Dilmvar (Oct 2004),. at 433 (Exhibit 117) ( MPs chained detainees in standing position; forced them to perform "extra chores"; enforced isolation with MP checking every 15 minutes; etc.); id., at 832-33 (Exhibit 209) (MI instructed MPs to enforce stress positions, such as having detainees put their hands in the air, chaining detainees to the cages in kneeling or standing position "whichever was most uncomfortable", forcing detainees to sit in "roman" chair", i.e, squatting against the wall as if seated but with no chair; etc.). 94 Id. at 736 (Exhibit 187) (guards told by MI to "PT" a couple ofdetainees for 24 hours); id., at 1398 (Exhibit 334)(knew of2-3 'smoking sessions' conducted between Sept 2002 - Jan 2003).

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• "extra chores·,,96, and • enforced silence.97

MPs sometimes subjected detainees to these and similar forms oftreatment as punishment for detention operations infractions, independent from intelligence gathering efforts. gg. On January 24, 2003, CJTF-180 Deputy StaffJudge Advocate (SJA) LTC Robert Cotell produced a memorandum describing "current and past" interrogation techniques used by CJTF­ 180 interrogators, distinguishing between those on the battlefield and at BCp.98 LTC Cotell identified interrogation techniques used by CJTF-180, including:

• up to 96 hours ofisolation; • the use offemale interrogators to create "discomfort" and gain more information; • sleep adjustment, defined as "four hours ofsleep every 24 hours, not necessarily consecutive;" • use ofindividual fears; • removal ofcomfort items; • use ofsafety positions; • isolation; • deprivation oflight and sound in living areas; • the use ofa hood during interrogation; and • mild physical contact. 99 hh. LTC Cotell's January 24, 2003 memo also recommended use offive additional techniques, including:

• "deprivation ofclothing" to put detainees in a "shameful, uncomfortable situation;" • "food deprivation;" • "sensory overload--loud music or temperature regulation;" • "controlled fear through the use ofmuzzled, trained, military working dogs;" and • "use of light and noise deprivation. 100 ii. The January 24, 2003 memo was drafted in consultation with interrogators at BCP, and conventional and non-conventional military task forces. 101 In 2004, the BCP legal advisor

95 E.g., guards allegedly forced detainee to pick bottle caps out ofhuman waste, possibly at MI request. See CID Report Habibullah and Dilawar (Oct 2004),. at 815 (Exhibit 205); id, at 824 (Exhibit 207). % E.g., idat 832-33 (Exhibit 209) (MI told MPs to give detainees extra chores such as picking up water bottles, scrubbing floors with tooth brushes, pulling the "shit buckets", etc.); id, at 1420 (Exhibit 344) (detainees given extra duties such as taking out the trash, seperating meals for detainees, etc.). 97 1d.at 1258 (Exhibit 312) (the "no talking" rule was devised by MI and enforced by MP). 98 CJTF-180 Interrogation Techniques (24 January 2003). 99 SASC Detainee Report (November 20,2008) at 155, citing Memorandum from CJTF- 180-0PS LAW for CENTCOM SJA, CJTF 180 Interrogation Techniques (January 24, 2003). "The Church Report called the distinction between stress positions and safety positions at the Bagram Collection Point 'largely academic.''' Id at FN 1200, citing Church Report (2005) at 200. 100 Id,at 155, citing Memorandum from CJTF- l80-0PS LAW for CENTCOM SJA, CJTF 180 Interrogation Techniques (January 24, 2003).

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provided computer files to CID agents investigating the December 2002 deaths oftwo detainees at Bagram; working documents compiled in January 2003 as this document was produced are reportedly among those files. 102 jj. CJTF-180 did not receive any response to its January 24, 2003 memorandum from either CENTCOM or the Joint Staff, and interpreted this silence to mean that the techniques then in use were unobjectionable to higher headquarters and therefore could be considered approved policy.l03

Law eriforcement operations in Afghanistan kk. Detainees at BCP were at all times the subject ofpractice and policy concerning detention operations. Detainees at BCP undergoing a course oflaw enforcement interviews or interrogations were also sometimes subject to a simultaneous course ofmilitary intelligence or OGA interrogations. "The military had custody and control over the detainees throughout Afghanistan, and FBI agents were required to arrange access to the detainees through military police and military intelligence personneI."I04

II. According to the DOJ OIG:

DOJ witnesses told us that from the outset, there was an operating viewpoint dictated at a very high level that this was a military situation and the military approach should prevail, in part because the military controlled the detainees and locations... Several witnesses told us that the dispute over the best approach was exacerbated by the fact that the DOD interrogators were often inexperienced and not particularly well trained about al­ Qaeda. 105 mm. According to the DOJ OIG:

[I]n May 2004 an FBI supervisor stationed in Afghanistan sent a series ofe-mails to senior Counterterrorism Division officials in FBI Headquarters stating that although the military had temporarily restricted the use ofaggressive interrogation techniques such as stress positions, dogs, and sleep deprivation, military interrogators were likely to resume such methods soon. The FBI supervisor stated that even ifthe FBI was not present during such interrogations, FBI agents would inherently be participating in the process because they would be interviewing detainees who had either recently been subjected to such techniques by the military or who would be subjected to them after the FBI interviews were completed. 106

10\ See CJTF-I80 Interrogation Techniques (24 January 2003), at 1. 102 ClD Report HabibulJah and Dilawar (Oct 2004), at 1265 (Exhibit 312). 103 Church Report (2005),at 7. See also id., at 201. 104 DoJ OiG FBI & Detainee interrogations (rev 2009), at 21. 105 Id., at 64-65. 106 id., at xv.

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nn. FBI agents told the DOJ OIG that "they either observed or heard that military or CIA personnel had falsely represented themselves as FBI agents in Afghanistan. One OIG survey respondent stated that he observed the impersonation ofFBI personnel by others, and five agents reported that they head about such conduct from others.,,107

Medical operations in Afghanistan

00. Generally concurrent with Noor's detention by U.S. forces at BCP, 339th CSH, a reserve unit from Pennsylvania, was deployed in June 2002 as the first U.S. hospital in Afghanistan. The 339th CSH was replaced by the 48th CSH in late 2002. pp. The then-ChiefofPatient Administration for the 48th CSH described the disposition of medical records to a CID investigator in 2004. S/he said all inpatient records for the 48th and 339th CSH (Bagram, 2002-2003) were shipped to Germany, to end up under the control ofthe Landsthul Regional Medical Center. 108 The records apparently included nursing notes, and records from the sick call area "which includes the outpatient and CRO [carded for record only] records from the EMT [emergency medical treatment] area.,,109 qq. Some detainee medical records may also have been recorded in the Joint Theater Trauma Registry at Ft Sam Houston, Texas. In 2004, CID agents requested and received detainee medical records from Brooke Army Medical Center, PASBA, FSHTX, utilizing DA Form 4254. 110 rr. The Government has not provided medical records for Noor generated at Bagram.

Additional record-keeping at Bagram ss. As noted above, numerous agencies were involved with interrogations at Bagram concurrent to Noor's detention there. The defense is unable to specify which agencies interrogated Noor because the prosecution has provided neither records from these organizations, nor certification that these organizations did not come into contact with Noor, nor detention records regarding implementation of interrogation strategies outside the interrogation booth associated with these organizations tt. When 211 th MP Co arrived at Bagram in June 2002, there was a working copy ofa "Bagram Collection Point Standard Operating Procedures (BCP SOP)" from the previous unit. 111 The BCP SOP reportedly "reflected the duties and responsibilities that assigned personal [sic] need to perform and adhere to while working at the BCP." 112 While primarily a military police document, the BCP SOP also addressed medical and intelligence-gathering functions, with sections drafted by the other functions and eventually incorporated into the BCP SOP.

107 Id., at 228. 108 CID Report Habibullah and Dilm4lar (Oct 2004), at 1057-1058 (Exhibit 265) (detailing disposition ofrecords). 109 Id., at 1059 (Exhibit 265). 110 Id., at 1059, 1410, 1411-1412. III Jd., at 1072 (Exhibit 269). 112 CID Report Habibullah and Dilawar (Oct 2004), at 261 (Exhibit 58).

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uu. An Army LTC who served as the Director ofCounterintelligence and HUMINT for CJTF-180 from May-November 2002 told a cm investigator that he wrote "Annex 2" ofthe BCP SOP, and DIA personnel working with his office wrote "Annex 4".113 He said his draft was 114 never meant to be a stand-alone document, but was to be part ofthe MP's BCP SOp. "The mission ofa BCP SOP was that the MPs, our slice of it was to contribute the MI portion, Interrogations Operations...The purpose ofmy SOP was to collect what would ultimately be the "nuts and bolts" ofthe intel piece ofthe MP BCP SOP.,,115 vv. The Fay Report (2004), a report on intelligence activities at Abu Ghraib, Iraq, includes an undated copy ofthe classified BCP SOP as an attachment. The Fay Report (2004) references "CJTF-180 Bagram Collection Point SOP (undated)" as "Annex J, Appendix 4" ofthe report. I 16 ww. The 2004 final report ofthe CID investigation into detainee deaths at Bagram in December 2002 makes multiple references to detention operations policy in a classified "Bagram Collection Point SOP." The CID report indicates agents obtained two classified copies ofthis SOP, one dated 1 August 2002 and the other undated (but apparently completed sometime after Nov 2002). The classified SOPs were not attached to the final unclassified report, 117 but copies should be available in records for this investigation. Some or all items ofevidence in this investigation were submitted to the controlling Evidence Repository, Washington DC Metro th 118 Fraud Unit, MPFU, USACIDC, 6010 6 Street, Ft. Belvoir, VA 22060. xx. Despite the ready availability to the Government ofmultiple versions ofthe BCP SOP and its Security, Use ofForce, Interrogation Operations, and DIA-specific annexes, only one version ofthe BCP SOP without annexes has been made available to the defense. yy. CJTF-180 did not issue a formal interrogation approach techniques policy until 16 March 2004. 119 From the beginning ofOEF on October 27,2001 until January 23,2003, the only official guidance for interrogation approaches in OEF was the doctrine contained in Field Manual 34-52: Intelligence Interrogation (28 September 1992) (AFM 34_652).120 However, interrogators at BCP appear to have received guidance on other aspects of intelligence operations much earlier. 121 Guidance for intelligence operations procedures and responsibilities may have covered activities like monitoring interrogations, developing detailed interrogation plans,

113 Jd., at 1212 (Exhibit 309). The J-2X said "XVII Abn Corps 02 brought back a copy" ofAnnex 2. He also referred to "Annex 1", as the "Security BCP SOP". Id., at 1213. 114 Id.,at 1213, 1214 (Exhibit 309) (former J2X reviews BCP SOP with portion addressing "intelligence operations and procedures"). 115 Jd., at 1213,1214 (Exhibit 309) (former J2X reviews BCP SOP with portion addressing "intelligence operations and procedures"). 116 Fay Report (2004), at 29. 117 CID Report Habibullah and Dilawar (Oct 2004), at 261 (Exhibit 58). 118 See id., at 665 (Exhibit 167). 119 DAIG Report (21 July 2004), at 35, 40. See also SASC Detainee Report (November 20,2008), at 165-166 ("interrogators lacked written guidance."); CID Report Habibullah and Dilawar (Oct 2004), at 1313 (Exhibit 318). 120 Church Report (2005) at 6. 121 CfD Report Habibullah and Dilawar (Oct 2004), at 1213 (Exhibit 309) (former J2X reviews BCP SOP with portion addressing "intelligence operations and procedures"). "The portion ofthe BCP SOP (MP document) which addressed Intelligence Operations and Procedures has a high degree of specificity and would have had to come from CPT_ [redacted in original)." Id., at 1213-1214.

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delegating interrogation plan approval authority to the Interrogation Officer in Charge (OIC), and report writing. 122 Applicable guidance for intelligence operations procedures and responsibilities at Bagram has not been made available to the defense. This guidance presumably would describe with some specificity the record-keeping practices in use at Bagram. zz. Guidance for intelligence operations procedures and responsibilities at Bagram would likely have required the creation and maintenance of interrogation records in accordance with Army HUMINT collection doctrine as put forth in AFM 34_52,123 including but not limited to:

• Analyst Support Package (ASP). • Records relating to selection and prioritization ofdetainees for interrogation. • Interrogation schedules. • Knowledgeability briefs, for each interrogation. • Interrogation Plan (IP) for each session. AFM 34-52 states that an interrogation plan must have "at least" the following items: o Interrogation objective. o EPW's or detainee's identity, to include visual observation ofthe EPW or detainee by the interrogator. o Interrogation time and place. o Primary and alternate approaches. o Questioning techniques to be used or why the interrogator selected only specific topics from the basic questioning sequence. • Means ofrecording and reporting information obtained. 124 • Interrogators' notes. 125

Production ofthese records to the defense has been woefully inadequate. aaa. Detainees first arriving at Bagram were formally "in-processed" by Military Police (MPs) prior to interrogation by MI personnel. "This in-processing include[d] an introduction to the rules for that BCP, a strip search, medical screening, evidence collection, and identification procedures

122 Fay Report (2004), a report on intelligence activities at Abu Ghraib, Iraq, refers to both a 2003 SOP for Abu Ghraib written by Capt Wood, and a Bagram SOP. Id., at 29. MG Fay intended the comparison to show approaches and practices used at Abu Ghraib "clearly" came from documents and personnel in Afghanistan and Guantanamo:

The JIDC October 2003 SOP [for Abu Ghraib], likewise created by CPT Wood, was remarkably similar to the Bagram (Afghanistan) Collection Point SOP. Prior to deployment to Iraq, CPT Wood's unit (A/519 Ml BN) allegedly conducted the abusive interrogation practices in Bagram resulting in a Criminal Investigation Command (CID) homicide investigation. The October 2003 JIDC SOP addressed requirements for monitoring interrogations, developing detailed interrogation plans, delegating interrogation plan approval authority to the Interrogation Officer in Charge (OIC), and report writing ...

Id. 123 See generally AFM34-52 (1992), at Chapter 3, esp. 3-7 - 3-IO ("Planning and Preparation"). 124 AFM34-52 (1992), at 3-10. 125 See, e.g., CID Report Habibullah and DilawarJQE. 2004), at 1392 (Exhibit 334) (personnel notes for each interrogation kept in file locally); id., at 99("SPC _ [redacted in original] related his job during the interview [interrogation] was to write notes on [detainee's] body position or anything else he noticed.").

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(photograph, fingerprints, and saliva and hair samples).,,126 MPs at Bagram were provided guidance for standard procedures for in-processing detainees into the facility.. Various sources available in the public record refer to documents that "should" have been created upon a detainee's arrival at Bagram:

• Circa 2001-2002: "Every PUC goes through formal in-processing by Military Police prior to any interrogation by MI personnel. This in-processing includes an introduction to the rules for that BCP, a strip search, medical screening, evidence collection, and identification procedures (photograph, fingerprints, saliva and hair samples)." 127

• The OIC ofthe MP platoon escorting detainees arriving on aircraft to the detention facility was to "sign for the detainees and their property, ensuring to keep a copy ofthis paperwork".128 "All propert~, once signed for, is put into the back ofthe vehicle with all accompanying paperwork." 29

• MPs handling detainee "reception" were required to catalog and bag items found on detainees for future use by interrogators. 130

• Interrogators were required to screen the detainee to determine whether he would be placed in segregation, medical, or general detainee population by the crash team. 13 ! Doctrine required interrogators to create an intelligence "screening report" for each detainee. 132 Based upon the screening report, the interrogator assigns a priority code to the detainee that indicates levels ofcooperation and knowledgability. 133

•A screener must use a screening report to record information as it is obtained from the source... Source screening ends when the screener is sure he can make an accurate assessment ofthe source's potential cooperation and pertinent knowledge. At this time, the source is returned to the control ofthe guards, and the screener records his assessment on the screening report. 134 bbb. Various sources available in the public record refer to forms that might have been used:

• DD Form 2708 (Receipt for Inmate or Detained Person).!35 Custodial transfers of detainees out ofcollection points or facilities may have been recorded on DD Form 2708. 136

\26 CJTF-I80 Interrogation Techniques (24 January 2003), at 5. \27 CJTF-I80 Interrogation Techniques (24 January 2003), at 5. 128 See 377TH MP CO Detention SOP (12 September 2002), at A(l)(h). 129 Id., at A(I)(h)(3). 130 Jd., at 8(2)(d). 13\ Jd., at 8(3). 132 See, e.g., AFM34-52 (1992), at 3-6 (screening report format). 133 Jd., at 3-5. 134 Jd., at 3-5. 135 See, e.g., DD FORM 2708, Nov 1999, Receipt for Inmate or Detained Person, available at http://www.dtic.millwhs/directives/infol112:t/forms/eforms/dd2708.pdf.

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• DO Form 629 (Receipt for Prisoner or Detained Person).

• DA Form 4137 (Evidence/Property Custody Document). 137 The 377th MP CO Detention SOP (12 September 2002) gave specific instructions for the use ofthis form to document detainees' personal effects and evidence when they first arrived at Bagram. 138 The 37ih MP CO Detention SOP (12 September 2002) also required the form for detainee out­ processing. 139 According to the 2004 DAIG Team, when detainees arrived at Bagram I/R, MPs in-processed detainee's personal effects and accounted for the items on aDA 4137. 140

• DA Form 4237 (Detainee Personnel Record)141 and SF 600 (Chronological Record of Medical Care). 142 The 377th MP CO Detention SOP (12 September 2002) stated that, upon detainees' "reception" into the facility, interrogators/interpreters and doctors would complete these two forms and put them in the "interrogators packet.,,143 The 377th MP CO Detention SOP (12 September 2002) also required DA Form 4237 for detainee out­ processing. 144 DAIG Team cited "DA Form 4237-R, Detainee Personnel Record (August 1985)" among references for the 2004 report. 145 FM 34-52 (1992) advises interrogators that DA Form 4237-R contains additional information not required by the Geneva Conventions, and a detainee's willingness to volunteer that information is one indicator ofhis willingness to cooperate. 146

• DA Form 3881, Rights Warning Procedure/Waiver Certificate (Nov 1989). DAIG Team cited this form among references for the 2004 report. 147 ccc. While at Bagram, detainees were assigned Internee Serial Numbers (ISN). Reportedly, detainees were "thoroughly" screened for SECDEF criteria before receiving an ISN. Once they were assigned an ISN, their release required SECDEF approval, a long and difficult process;

136 Among the types ofdocuments reviewed by the DAIG Team in 2004. See DAIG Report (21 July 2004) at 10. See generally DA1G Report (21 July 2004) (describing how custodial transfers were documented at Bagram IIR and elsewhere in 2004). 131 See, e.g., DA Form 4137, 1 Jul 76, Evidence/Property Custody Document, available at http://www.armv mil/USA PA/eforms/pdf/A4137.PDF 138 See 377TH MP CO Detention SOP (/2 September 2002), at B(l)(c); B(2)(d) (MP identification number used to mark bag ofdetainee's clothes corresponds with the DA FORM 4137 number). 139 377TH MP CO Detention SOP (/2 September 2002), at D (4). See generally id., at C(19); D. \40 See DA1G Report (21 July 2004) at 52. See generally id. (describing how detainee property information was documented at Bagram IIR and elsewhere). \4\ See, e.g., DA Form 4237-R, Aug 85, Detainee Personnel Record, available at http://www.ann).mil/USAPA/eforms/pdf/A4237H..PDF;seealsoAFM34-52(/992).at 3-3 (sample DA 4237-R). \42 See, e.g., SF 600, REV. 6-97, Chronological Record ofMedical Care, available at http://www.ann\! milJusapa/efonns/pdf/S600.PDF. \43 See 377TH MP CO Detention SOP (12 September 2002), at B(2)(d). \44 Jd., at D (4). See generally id., at C(19); D. \45 See DAIG Report (21 July 2004), at A-2. \46 See AFM34-52 (/992), at 3-2. \47 See DA1G Report (21 July 2004), at A-2.

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hence the lengthy pre-ISN screening. 148 The defense has not received records associated with this process. ddd. CJTF-180 maintained a classified website on SIPRnet, at the address Materials regularly posted to this website reportedly

•A weekly detainee status report; 150 •A report written by the Bagram legal advisor after each visit by the International Committee ofthe Red Cross; lSI • Versions ofSOPs and annexes, including for interrogations. 152

These materials have not been made available to the defense.

Transfer to Guantanamo eee. The detainee was then sent from the front lines to a central holding facility, where he would undergo further screening and interrogation. Ifthis screening indicated that the detainee might meet Secretary ofDefense criteria for transfer to GTMO, a screening team ofU.S. government officials -- consisting ofmilitary lawyers, intelligence officers, and federal law enforcement officials -- would review the detainee's relevant information, including the facts surrounding capture and detention, the threat posed by the individual, and the intelligence and law enforcement value ofthe detainee. The screening team, after reviewing all available information, then made a recommendation to retain the captured fighter in-country or transfer him to GTMO. Next, a general officer designated by the Commander of US Central Command (CENTCOM), reviewed the team's recommendation and made a final recommendation to Department ofDefense officials in Washington, D.C.

A Department ofDefense review panel, including legal advisors and representatives from the Joint Staffand the Office ofthe Under Secretary ofDefense for Policy assessed this final recommendation and, ifnecessary, made additional inquiries regarding the detainee. Upon the review panel's recommendation and final authorization by the Secretary of

148 See. e.g., id, at 1307 (Exhibit 318). 149 CLAMO Legal Lessons Learned (2004), at 58. ISO "JAs in Afghanistan encountered consistent pressure to provide information on all aspects ofdetainee operations... CJTF-180 JAs largely stopped the consistent pressure for information by proactively "pushing" detainee-related information "up the chain" ofcommand. JAs wrote a weekly detainee status report and posted it to the CJTF-180 SJA classified website." CLAMO Legal Lessons Learned (2004), at 58. 151 CLAMO Legal Lessons Learned (2004), at 58. 152 J-2X for CJTF-180 also told investigators that versions ofthe SOPs and the annexes were posted on the CJTF­ 180 SIPR website. CID Report Habibullah and Dilawar (Oct 2004), at 1212 (Exhibit 309). LTC Diane Beaver, SJA at GTMO circa 2002-2003, told a Congressional Committee that she had seen a version ofa standard operating procedure for interrogations in use at Bagram "on a classified DoD internet system." SASC Detainee Report (November 20, 2008), at fn 391.

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Defense, the individual either remained detained in Afghanistan or was airlifted to GTMO. 153

The Government has not provided documentation associated with this process to the defense. fff. SOPs and command-level guidance associated with the process used to determine a detainee's legal status and eligibility for detention at Guantanamo have not been provided to the defense. Such guidance is believed to include:

• USCENTCOM, FRAGO 02-029, Detainee Handling Procedures, Operation Enduring Freedom (9 Dec 2001).154

• Chairman Joint Chiefs ofStaff(CJCS), Implementing Guidance on Detainee Screening and Processing for Transfers to Guantanamo Bay Naval Base (GTMO) (8 January 2002).155

• USCENTCOM, CFC Detainee Operations Guidance (25 February 2002).156 Described as "guidance concerning criteria for potential detainee transport to Guantanamo Bay, Cuba (Guantanamo) for potential criminal prosecution." 157

GUANTANAMO ggg. By August of2002, Noor had been transferred to GTMO. hhh. In August 2002, responsibility for detention operations and intelligence operations at GTMO was split between two units: Joint Task Force 160 (JTF-160) administered the detention camp, and Joint Task Force 170 (JTF-170) conducted intelligence operations, including interrogations. A series ofassessments and evaluations conducted at GTMO in 2002 concluded that the intelligence-gathering mission would be enhanced by careful coordination with the detention operations mission. iii. In November 2002, the Pentagon reorganized the camp structure and merged the administrative and interrogation task forces as JTF-GTMO under the command ofMG Geoffrey Miller. MG Miller's goal was to functionally integrate military intelligence with military police detention operations. jjj. MG Miller purposefully engineered detention operations as an "enabler" for intelligence- gathering.

153 Church Report (2005), at 100. 154 Cited by CJTF-180 Detainee Operations SOP (27 March 2004) as USCENTCOM, 0901382 Dec 01, FRAGO 02­ 029 Detainee Handling Procedures, Operation Enduring Freedom, SecretIINOFORN. 155 Cited by id. as CJCS, 0823152Jan 02, Modification 1 to SECDEF Implementing Guidance on Detainee Screening and Processingfor Transfers to Guantanamo Bay Naval Base (GTMO), SecretIINOFORN. 156 Cited by id. as USCENTCOM, 2513142 Feb 02, CFC Detainee Operations Guidance, SecretIINOFORN. 157 CLAMO Legal Lessons Learned (2004), at 54.

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Simply stated, the most significant aspect ofthe ... organization [ofJTF-GTMO] is that it places both intelligence and detention operations under the command ofa single entity, designated Joint Task Force GTMO (JTF-GTMO), whereas the original organization had separate chains ofcommand for intelligence and detention operations. This new structure has permitted greater cooperation among the military intelligence (MI) units that are responsible for interrogation and the military police (MP) units that are responsible for detention. In essence, this organization recognizes the primacy ofthe human intelligence collection mission at GTMO in support ofthe Global War on Terror, by ensuring a unity ofeffort between MI and MP units. This unity ofeffort between MI and MP units has been the subject ofrecent controversy, in li~ht ofMP participation in many ofthe abuses perpetrate at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq.... I 8

In his September 2003 report on intelligence operations in Iraq, MG Miller, then­ Commander ofJTF-GTMO, stated that detention operations 'must act as an enabler for interrogations,' by helping to 'set conditions for successful interrogations.' Furthermore, he argued it is 'essential that the guard force be actively engaged in setting the conditions for successful exploitation ofthe internees,' and that'[j]oint strategic interrogation operations are hampered by a lack ofactive control ofthe internees within the detention environment.' 159

Detention operations at GTMO kkk. Detention operations came to serve a key role in the intelligence-gathering process at GTMO. The frequency and manner in which MPs conducted operations such as cell moves, control ofcomfort items, transfer to and from the interrogation booth, Immediate Reaction Forces and Forced Cell Extractions (IRFs/FCEs), use ofmilitary working dogs, and strip searches affected detainees physically and mentally, establishing conditions for subsequent interrogations. Military police personnel themselves implemented interrogation techniques meant to be employed outside the interrogation room, such as environmental and dietary manipulation, provision ofincentives for cooperation, and sleep deprivation. 160

Ill. Army Regulation 190-8, Enemy Prisoners ofWar, Retained Personnel, Civilian Internees and Other Detainees (1 October 1997) (AR 190-8) and other doctrine specified records that should have been created and maintained on individual detainees for units operating "by the book". GTMO operated with local policies that were meant to implement such doctrine, insofar as it was believed applicable to the detainees at GTMO. mmm. The Government provided the defense with a copy ofan early Camp Delta SOP, "Rev 29Aug02" (Camp Delta SOP (29 Aug 2002)). Camp Delta SOP (29 Aug 2002) was a punitive

158 Church Report (2005), at 103-4. 159/d., at 148.

160 See generally Church Report (2005) (describing the relationship between military police and military intelligence; describing MP involvement in events that happen outside the interrogation room that are done in preparation for interrogations, including the role ofMP record-keeping systems, and the MP role in applying techniques employed in the cellblock that set the conditions for subsequent interrogations in the interrogation room.). Jd., at 146, et seq. ("MPs are very involved, however, in events that happen outside the interrogation room that are done in preparation for interrogations.").

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policy.161 Personnel signed statements of understanding/acknowledgment Camp Delta SOP (29 Aug 2002) and all Camp Delta SOPs. 162 This SOP noted: "Strict control and continuous records management is critical to ensure thorough accountability ofall information concerning detainee records, other administrative documents, and accountability ofequipment. .. The record will not be removed from the facility without authority from the Commanding Officer." 163 nnn. Camp Delta SOP (29 Aug 2002) references numerous detention records required throughout the period ofNoor's detention. These include, inter alia:

• Military Police Desk Blotter, as either "Daily StaffJournal or Duty Officer's Log" (DA Form 1594) and "Military Police Desk Blotter" (DA 3997).164 Electronic; finalized at end ofeach shift. 165 "[D]ata such as detainee movement, work order requests, notable problems, head count, refusals for medical, chow, showers, rec., uniform change and linen, discipline actions, etc.... At the end ofshift, the log will be closed out, printed, signed by the DCF and filed with the appropriate paperwork from the daily activities.,,166 At end ofeach shift, CP will:

Attach all ofthe daily tracking sheets including; the Manning Roster, 4 head count sheets, Detainee tracking sheets, Detainee medical request sheet and supply requests to the Military Police Desk Blotter. The daily packet will be filed in the top drawer ofthe operations filing cabinet under "Military Police Desk Blotters". 167

• Block Logbooks. 168 "[L]ogs maintained by the facility shall be in bound ledgers. The admin section will be responsible for issue, collection ofcompleted ledgers and storage of post logbooks.,,169 "The following will be entered into the block logbooks: "(1) All detainee movements. "(2) Shower/rec start and end times. "(3) Detainee request for chaplain, ICRC, JTF-170 visits. "(4) Work orders. "(5) Discipline incidents. "(6) Visits by non-battalion personnel (VIPs, etc.)" 170

• Duty Officer and Guard Commander log books. 171 Guard Commander Pass-On Book. m "(a) Emergency Drills.

161 Camp Delta SOP (29 Aug 2002), at Introduction (9). 162 Id., at Introduction (10). 163 Id., at 2002(l)(a). 164 Id., at 2002(2),3006(17), 2002(7)(a). 165 Camp Delta SOP (29 Aug 2002), at 2002(14)(c). 166 1d., at 2002(2). 167 Id., at 2002(14)(d). 168 1d., at 4003. 169 Camp Delta SOP (29 Aug 2002), at 4003. 170 Id., at 4003(l)(c). 171 Id., at 3002(3),3003(12). 172 Id., at 3003(7).

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"(b) Disorders and actions taken. "(c) Record ofofficial visitors and purpose ofvisit. "(d) Any unusual occurrences. "(e) Receipt ofSOPs and Memorandums. "(t) Other items ofinterest to other shifts.,,173

• "StaffJournal.,,174 "StaffDaily Journal." 175 Each post maintained a log book; the command post ofeach camp maintained a daily journal. 176 Detainee requests for intelligence personnel maintained by CP. 177

• Records ofroutine detainee movement. 178 Includes to and from all areas, including: JIIF, Medical, ICRC, Detainee Hospital and GTMO Naval Hospital. 179 "Moves made at the request ofJTF-170 [intel] will be directed through the Battalion or JDOG and may not be approved or authorized by the DFC.,,180 "Any movement, such as an overnight stay at GTMO or Fleet Hospital or a permanent movement must be updated in the Camp Delta Detainee Database, Alpha Roster, ISN # Roster and Refusals spread sheets.,,181

• Records ofpermanent movements. 182

• "Daily Detainee Medical Requests/Complaints" form, passed to medical staffAND stored in "the file cabinet" at Cp. 183

• Detainee escort. 184

• Maximum Security Log for India, November, and Oscar blocks. 185 Alpha roster for MSU, which also listed which detainees could [not] meet with ICRC. 186 DD 509 (either a Navy form for inspection ofdetainee in isolation, or an Army form for use of restraints). 187

• Disciplinary Measures: SIR report, notifications, Sworn Statements, recommendations for Discipline (DD508). 188

173 Camp Delta SOP (29 Aug 2002), at 3002(3),3003(12). 1741d., at 2002(12). 175 Id., at 4003. 176 1d., at 1004(a)(2). 177 Camp Delta SOP (29 Aug 2002), at 2002(12). 178 ld., at 2002(7)(a), (e). 179 1d., at 3006(13). 180 1d., at 2002(8)(d), 4003(1)(e). 181 Camp Delta SOP (29 Aug 2002), at 2002(7)(e). 182 Id., at 2002(7)(b),(e); 2002(10); 3006(20); 4003(1)(e). 183 1d., at 2002(13)(b). 184 Id., atJ013(1)(h), (k). 185 Camp Delta SOP (29 Aug 2002), at 2002(11). 1861d., at 4007(5). 187 Id., at 4007(1). 188 Id., at 3001(6).

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• Detainee Alpha Roster Binder. 189 Blocks also kept Alpha Rosters. MSU kept Alpha Roster noting which detainees could [not] meet with ICRC. 19o

• Detainee medication. RTOs log which detainees take or refuse medication. 191

• Detainee requests: medical, chaplain, ICRC, intelligence personnel. 192

• "Discipline Log.,,193 "Detainee individual tracking sheet" for discipline. 194 "Discipline incidents" entered into the block logbooks. 195

• Visitors. Camp Delta visitors' logbook, at Sally Port #1. 196 "All visitors including those that are escorted will be positively identified and entered into the logbook. The logbook will contain the following information: Name, Rank ofvisitor, Organization, Escort Name, Rank and Organization, DatelTime In, Date/Time Out, ID ofGuard entering data." 197

• Block NCO paperwork. "(a) Detainee refusal form-track chow, rec, shower, linen and haircut refusals. (b) Detainee discipline log. (c) Monitor meal refusal log to identify Detainees who qualify for hunger strike conditions.,,198

• At the end ofeach shift, CP Operations Admin NCO collected these materials into a packet which was "picked up by Battalion": (a) DD 508s (b) DA 2823s (c) SIGACT sheets [Significant Activities Sheet] (d) Work order requests (e) Supply requests. 199

• At the end ofeach shift, CP Operations Admin NCO collected that materials into a packet which was "placed in filing cabinet": (a) DFC Checklist (b) Military Police Desk Blotter printouts (c) Manning Roster (d) Copy ofSIGACT sheets [Significant Activities Sheet] (e) Copy ofsupply requests (f).Copy ofwork orders

189 Camp Delta SOP (29 Aug 2002), at 3006(4), 2001(1). 190 1d., at 4007(5). 191 Jd., at 3007(2)(c). 192 [d., at 3006(28)(29), 4003(1)(c). 193 Camp Delta SOP (29 Aug 2002), at 3007(2)(d), 3014. 194 1d., at 4003. 195 [d., at 4003(1)(c). 196 [d., at 3010(5)(a). 197 Camp Delta SOP (29 Aug 2002), at 3010(5)(a), 4003(1)(c). 198 [d., at 3014. 199 [d., at 3006(30)).

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(g) Copy of refusal logs (h) Permanent moves form (i) Copy ofmedical request form G) Copy ofreservation requests [could be reservations for interrogation] (k) Copy ofID bracelet requests.200

The Government's production ofthese records has been absolutely dismal.

000. This SOP describes detention operations record-keeping before the system became automated in 2003, with the advent ofthe Detainee Information Management System (DIMS). "Detainee Information Management System (DIMS) is a web-based intranet application running on a dedicated and isolated server. It provides real time visibility to all essential elements of information needed for detention operation.,,20' DIMS was implemented in 2003, is used to track "nearly every" aspect ofeach detainee's daily life. 202 ppp. By 2005, information tracked in DIMS included, inter alia:

• Tracking info on individual detainees (country oforigin, the types ofcomfort items he's allowed, and medical and behavioral notes; detainee refusals and requests); • Cells (cell maintenance issues) and cellblocks (number ofdetainees assigned, number present, and if medical personnel or other visitors have been on the block or are scheduled to be on the block); • Posting messages to the guards and changes to SOPS;203 • Detainee requests (requests to see a Red Cross representative, a chaplain, an interrogator, a psychiatric technician, the camp librarian or an interpreter; 204 • Significant activities and noteworthy events in each cellblock.205 qqq. Camp Delta SOP (29 Aug 2002) references numerous other SOPs applicable required throughout the period ofNoor's detention. These include, inter alia:

• Hunger Strike SOP; 206 • Key Control SOp;207 • In-Processing SOP;208 • Discipline Measures SOP;209 • Immediate Reaction Force SOP;210

200 fd., at 3006(3f)). 201 Walsh Report (2009), at 55. 202 Kathleen T. Rhem, Automated System Helps Guantanamo Guards Track Detainees, American Forces Press Service, Feb. 17,2005, available at http://wv..w.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=25866. 203 Jd. 204 Jd. 205 fd.

206 Camp Delta SOP (29 Aug 2002), at 2002(5)(d). 207 Jd., at 2002(6)(a). 208 fd., at 2002( 17). 209 fd., at 3001(6). 210 Camp Delta SOP (29 Aug 2002), at 3009.

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• Access Control SOP; 211 • Detainee Hospital SOp;212 • Suicide Watch SOP·, 213 • ICRC SOP. 214

These SOPs would likely describe additional record-keeping practices. rrr. JTF-GTMO implemented a discipline and reward system for detainee behavioral management as early as November 2002.215 The detainee classification system was a multi-level system ofreward based on the premise that a detainee's behavior determined the privileges he was allowed.216 SOPs for the discipline and reward system describe the records that should have been kept. 217 Records indicating a detainee was recommended for a reward or privilege (like photos of his family, a mirror and comb in the shower, cold water after recreation, etc.) may indicate he was rewarded for providing information, or that interrogators used rewards to confuse him. sss. The Immediate Reaction Force (also known as "Immediate Response Force" or "Emergency Reaction Force") (lRF or ERF) was intended to be used primarily as a forced cell extraction (FCE) team, specializing in the removal ofa detainee who was combative, resistant, or possibly armed.218 Detainees who refuse to come to military commissions proceedings may be subject to FCE (check current rules.) IRFs mayor may not use an appropriate level offorce, given the circumstances; it appears some IRFs could have been extremely violent. 219 It is not clear ifinterpreters have routinely accompanied IRF or FCE teams.220

2111d., at3010 (5)(a). 212 Id., at 3012. 213 Id., at 4007(1). 214 Camp Delta SOP (29 Aug 2002), at 4007(5). 215 See, e.g., GTMO Reward and Classification SOP (18 Nov 2002). A redacted version ofthis SOP had been publicly released. Se also Camp Delta SOP (28 March 2003); Camp Delta SOP (I March 2004). 216 Camp Delta SOP (28 March 2003), at 8.2. 217 See, e.g., GTMO Reward and Classification SOP (18 Nov 2002). 218 See Camp Delta SOP (28 March 2003), Camp Delta SOP (I March 2004). See also Paisley Dodds, Videos Show Guantanamo Prisoner Abuse, Associated Press (February 2, 2005) available at http://\V\V\V.com !nondreams.org/headIi nes05/0202-03. hIm. 219 See Paisley Dodds, Videos Show Guantanamo Prisoner Abuse, Associated Press (February 2, 2005) available at hup:l/h uman ri gillS. ucdavis. edli/proiects/the-guantan amo-testi manial s-proiectltesti moni es/testi!nonies-of- th e­ defensc-departnientivideos-sho\V-gliantanamo-prisoncr-abuse. Consider the story offormer MP Sean Baker, who was severely injured as the subject ofa cell extraction training drill. Rebecca Leung, 60 Minutes, G.I. Attacked During Training: u.s. Soldier Brutally Beaten By Soldiers at Guantanamo (3 November 2004) available at hup:llww\V.cbsnews.com/stariesI2004/1 1/02/601l/main652953.shtm!. 220 Open source government documents from 2003 and 2008 do not indicate lRF or FCE teams were assigned linguists to interpret instructions to the detainee during the lRF or FCE event. See Camp Delta SOP (28 March 2003) at Chap 24 (interpreter shall be used to tell the detainee ofthe discipline measures to be taken against him and ask whether he intends to resist, but linguist not listed among required members ofIRF team and no requirement for linguist to interpret commands ofIRF to detainee); Walsh Report (2009), at 42 (linguist duties not described).

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21 ttl. In 2005, SOUTHCOM completed an investigation and report about IRF action.2 The investigators reviewed videos that showed the guards punching some detainees, tying one to a ~for questioning and forcing a dozen to strip from the waist down. One squad was. ~traumatizingsome Muslim prisoners. 222 The report was classified. The Governm-:ttas not provided the defense with a copy ofthe report or the investigatory materials.

uuu. IRF teams were required to generate records for each incident, checklists and copies ofall statements. Records were supposed to be kept as evidence.223 GTMO SOPs from at least 2003 required that the Administrative NCO bring a video camera to record every IRF action. The Government has not provided the defense with records ofIRFs or FCEs involving Noar.

xxx. According to the DoJ GIG FBI & Detainee Interrogations (rev 2009):

22\ See Paisley Dodds, Videos Show Guantanamo Prisoner Abuse, Associated Press (February 2, 2005) available at hnp://humanrights.ucdavis.edu/projects/the-guantanamo-testimonials-project/testimonies/testimonies-of-the­ defense-department/videos-show-guantanamo-prisoner-abuse. 222 1d. 223

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yyy. At all times, military interrogators at GTMO were authorized to use interrogation approaches described in AFM 34-52. At various times, military interrogators were specifically authorized to use certain other techniques. Some ofthese required case-by-case documentation oflegal review, senior-level notification or approval, or some other authorization process. 229 zzz. By early October 2002, there was "increasing pressure to get 'tougher' with detainee interrogations." Ifthe interrogation policy memo did not contain coercive techniques, then it "wasn't going to go very far. ...230 aaaa. On 11 Oct 2002, JTF-GTMO J-2 requested approval for and described three categories of counter-resistance techniques:

• Category I: yelling, deception, multiple interrogators, false flag;

• Category II: stress positions, false documents, isolation, "change ofscene", sensory deprivation, hooding, 20-hour interrogations (sleep deprivation), removal ofcomfort items, dietary restrictions, removal ofclothing, forced grooming, exploitation ofphobias;

• Category III: imminent death scenario, cold, water to induce feeling ofsuffocation, physical contact; "and other aversive techniques, such as those used in U.S. military interrogation resistance training or by other U.S. government agencies...,,231 bbbb. On 2 Dec 2002, the SECDEF authorized the Commander ofUSSOUTHCOM to employ, at his discretion, categories I and II techniques, and one category III technique.232 The request and the approval process levied requirements for authorization and documentation ofuse ofthese techniques. The Government has failed to provide records relating to use ofthese techniques on Noor, or to certify these techniques were not used on Noor. ecce. On 15 Jan 2003, SECDEF rescinded his December 2002 approval. 233 However, SECDEF stipulated that ifUSSOUTHCOM determined that "particular techniques in either ofthese categories [II or III] are warranted in an individual case, [the commander] should forward that request to [SECDEF]. Such a request should include a thorough justification for the employment

228 DoJ OIG FBI & Detainee interrogations (rev 2009), at 30-31 (citations omitted). 229 An "exceptional technique" is "one that is more aggressive than routine techniques and is designated an exceptional technique by the SECDEF, requiring special procedures and levels ofapproval for use." DoD interrogation Working Group Report (4 April 2003), at fn. 61. 230 SASC Detainee Report (November 20,2008), at xvii, 38. 231 JTF-170 J-2 Memo (II Oct 2002). 232 SECDEF Approval (2 Dec 2002). The approved Category III technique was physical contact. The Schlesinger Report (August 2004) read the memo as requiring advance SECDEF notification for all techniques described in the memo. Church Report (2005), at i18. 233 SECDEF Memorandum (I5 Jan 2003).

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ofthose techniques and a detailed plan for use ofsuch techniques.,,234 The Government has failed to provide records relating to use ofthese techniques on Noor, or to certify these techniques were not used on Noor. dddd. On 16 Apr 2003, SECEF approved 24 techniques.235 All ofthem required "appropriate specified senior approval for use with any specific detainee (after considering the foregoing and receivin legal advice)" and other "safeguards",236 and four required SECDEF notification prior to use. 239In addition to techniques approved by SECDEF on 16 April 2003, SOUTHCOM could request "additional interrogation techniques for a particular detainee." 238 The Commander was required to provide, via CJCS, "a written request describing the proposed technique, recommended safeguards, and the rationale for applying it with an identified detainee.,,239 The Government has failed to provide records relating to use ofthese techniques on Noor, or to certify these techniques were not used on Noor. eeee. The April 2003 GTMO Policy continued in effect for GTMO until September 2006, when the U.S. Army issued Field Manual 2_22.3. 240 ffff. FBI personnel surveyed by the Department ofJustice Office ofthe Inspector General affirmed they observed or heard about the following forms ofrough or aggressive detainee treatment at Guantanamo: 241

• Depriving a detainee offood or water; • Depriving a detainee ofclothing; • Depriving a detainee ofsleep, or interrupting sleep by frequent cell relocation or by other methods; • Beating a detainee; • Using water to prevent breathing by a detainee or to create the sensation ofdrowning; • Using hands, rope, or anything else to choke or strangle a detainee; • Threatening action to cause physical pain, injury, disfigurement, or death; • Treatment or action causing significant physical pain or injury, or causing disfigurement or death; • Using shackles or other restraints in a prolonged manner; • Requiring a detainee to maintain, or restraining a detainee in, a stressful or painful position; • Intentionally delaying or denying detainee medical care;

234 Id. 235 SECDEF Memorandum (I6 April 2003), at Tab A. Sometimes referred to as "the A-X memo." 236 SECDEF Memorandum (I6 April 2003), at Tab B. Text from this part ofthe SECDEF memo supports the argument that use ofthese techniques was closely planned and documented, and that information about treatment by detention operations a well as interrogators is relevant to the question ofwhether a detainee was coerced in interrogation. 237 SECDEF Memorandum (I6 April 2003) (incentive/removal ofincentive; pride and ego down; Mutt and Jeff; and isolation). 238 I d. 239 Id.

240 AFM 2-22.3 superseded AFM 34-52. 241 Dol GIG FBI & Detainee Interrogations (rev 2009), at 172-173.

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• Hooding or blindfolding a detainee other than during transportation; • Subjecting a detainee to extremely cold or hot room temperatures for extended periods; • Subjecting a detainee to loud music; • Subjecting a detainee to bright flashing lights or darkness; • Isolating a detainee for an extended period oftime; • Using duct tape to restrain, gag or punish a detainee; • Using rapid response teams and/ or forced cell extractions; • Using a military working dog on or near a detainee other than during detainee transportation; • Threatening to use military working dogs on or near a detainee; • Using spiders, scorpions, snakes, or other animals on or near a detainee; • Disrespectful statements, handling, or actions involving the Koran; • Shaving a detainee's facial or other hair to embarrass or humiliate a detainee; • Placing a woman's clothing on a detainee; • Touching a detainee or acting toward a detainee in a sexual manner; • Holding detainee(s) who were not officially acknowledged or registered as such by the agency detaining the person; • Sending a detainee to another country for a more aggressive interrogation; • Threatening to send a detainee to another country for detention or more aggressive interrogation; • Threatening to take action against a detainee's family; • Other treatment or action causing severe emotional or psychological trauma to a detainee • Other religious or sexual harassment or humiliation ofa detainee; • Other treatment ofadetainee that in their o~inion was unprofessional, unduly harsh or aggressive, coercive, abusive, or unlawful. 42 gggg. AFM 34-52 provided doctrine for MI interrogation operations, but only addressed general interrogation approaches and techniques, and did not address "new" approaches authorized by the SECDEF. Guidance for employing interrogation techniques would have been especially important for techniques that pushed the limits or were outside ofAFM 34-52. In 2008, former DoD General Counsel William Haynes testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee about the extent to which the interrogation techniques were subject to "limits" and "controls" to help keep them legaI. 243 Former GTMO SJA Diane Beaver testified along similar lines.244 In

242 DoJ DIG FBI & Detainee Interrogations (rev 2009), at 172-173. "FBI agents were only present at a small percentage ofdetainee interrogations in the military zones, most ofwhich were conducted by personnel from other agencies." Id. at 171. 243 William Haynes 11, Former General Counsel, DoD, Testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Origins ofAggressive Interrogation Techniques (June 17,2008) (Federal News Service).

[T]here were interrogation plans that were supposed to be designed for each individual detainee who was to be interrogated -- that would involve a psychological review; there had to be medical care associated with it; there had to be a legal review; there had to be substantial command monitoring. There was a step process that they were supposed to go through. There were -- they were supposed to stop ifanything came up. There were -- there were all sorts ofconditions...".

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some cases, there is no doubt that techniques adopted later directly contravened SOPs adopted earlier; it is reasonable to surmise that either those SOPs were amended or superseded, or commanders allowed their interrogators to operated in direct contravention to the previously­ established policy.245 Ifpersonnel conducting interrogations relied upon a document for guidance, it should not matter whether it was in a draft form or not. hhhh. The following documents are known or suspected versions ofguidance for interrogation approaches relied upon by interrogators at GTMO when Noor was detained there:

• (at least by August 20, 2002, later versions possible) JTF-170 J2 Interrogation Section Standard Operating Procedures. 246 This SOP may have regulated procedures and responsibilities, employment ofinterrogation techniques, or both.

• (multiple drafts by December 2002) Guidelines for employing interrogation techniques authorized by the Secretary ofDefense on December 2, 2002. In late 2002, ICE drafted guidance for interrogators employing interrogation techniques that were not authorized under 247 AFM 34-52 but were authorized by the Secretary ofDefense on 2 December 2002. When SERE instructors visited GTMO,2002, "for the purpose ofproviding "physical pressures" training", "LtCol Moss ... provided [them] with a draft ICE SOP for utilization ofphysical pressures...".248 Two versions ofa "draft" document titled "JTF GTMO SERE Interrogation SOP" were given to SASC, which partially released one version to the public, dated 18 December 2002. 249 Another document with the same title, dated 10 December 2002, is also publicly available.25o It is possible ICE kept the guidance in draft form,251 and/or

244 Diane Beaver, Former SHA, GTMO, Testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Origins Of Aggressive Interrogation Techniques (June 17,2008) (Federal News Service). 245 JTF-170 had an interrogation SOP in place at least by August 2002, which, inter alia, prohibited at least one SERE-derived technique approved by the SECDEF in December 2002, stress positions. SASC Detainee Report (November 20, 2008), at 41, citing JTF-170 J2 Interrogation Section Standard Operating Procedures (August 20, 2002) (emphasis in original) (Detainees being interrogated will "remain seated and secured to the floor. DETAINEES WILL NOT BE PLACED IN STRESS POSITIONS"). 246 Cited by SASC Detainee Report (November 20, 2008), at 41. 247 See id, at 97-103. The techniques authorized by the SECDEF are discussed at greater length below. See generally SECDEF Approval (2 Dec 2002). 248 SERE Training Memo. See also SASC Detainee Report (November 20, 2008), at 97-103. 249 SASC released what appears to be a cover sheet and extracts from a draft ofthe SOP dated 18 December 2002. See First Page and Extracts, JTF GTMO "SERE" Interrogation Standard Operating Procedures, Subject: Guidelines for Employing "SERE" Techniques During Detainee Interrogations (18 December 2002), available at Tab 16 of SASC Detainee Report Documents (June 17, 2008), at 43 et seq. SASC also received an undated version, which it has not released. SASC Detainee Report (November 20, 2008), at 97. 250 A memo from a CITF agent dated 17 December 2002 describes a 10 December 2002 "draft JTF GTMO SERE Interrogation SOP." See Memorandum from CITF-O/SAC to TF-GTMO/J-2. Re: JTF GTMO "SERE" Interrogation SOP DTD 10 Dec 02 (17 Dec 02), available at Tab 16 ofSASC Detainee Report Documents (June 17, 2008), at 45 et seq., also available at http://www.aclu.org/projects/foiasearch/pdfiDOD045202.pdf. The National Security Archives at George Washington University released what appears to be a version ofthis 10 December 2002 draft. See JTF GTMO "SERE" Interrogation Standard Operating Procedures, Subject: Guidelinesfor Employing "SERE" Techniques during Detainee Interrogations (10 December 2002), available at http://wwvv.torturingdemocracY.org/doculllents/200212ID.pdf. 251 See SASC Detainee Report (November 20,2008).

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promulgated a final version without direct references to "SERE".252 SASC determined the draft SOPs were based on the Navy SERE school manual,253 and released the following extract: 254

3. Degradation Tactics a. Shoulder Slap b. Insult Slap e. Stomach Slap d. Stripping

4. Physical Debilitation Tacties

a. Stress Positions I. Head Rest Index Finger Position 2. Kneeling Position 3. Worship-the-Oods 4. Silting Position 5. Standing position

3. Demonstrate Omnipotence Tactics

a. Manhandling b. Walling

• (January 2003 or later) Guidelines reflecting rescission ofDecember 2002 blanket approval for techniques. On 15 Jan 2003, SECDEF rescinded his December 2002 approval.255 It is reasonable to assume guidelines for employing interrogation techniques were changed accordingly.

• (April 2003 or later) Guidelines reflecting SECDEF approval of24 interrogation techniques. On 16 April 2003, SECDEF approved 24 interrogation techniques.256 SECDEF Rumsfeld issued the following instructions: "Operating instructions must be developed based on command policies to insure uniform, careful, and safe application ofany interrogations of detainees.... Strict adherence to policies/standard operating procedures governing the administration ofinterrogation techniques and oversight is essential.,,257 "All ofthe following techniques indicate the need for techniques-specialized training and written procedures to insure the safety ofall persons, along with appropriate, specified levels of approval and notification for each technique.,,258 It is reasonable to assume guidelines for employing interrogation techniques were changed accordingly.

252 The 18 December 2002 document released in part by SASC has handwritten notes stating, "All references to SERE will be removed as per LtCol Moss," substituting the word "management" for "SERE" in two places, and adding "coercive management techniques" along one side. See First Page, JTF GTMO "SERE" Interrogation Standard Operating Procedures, Subject: Guidelinesfor Employing "SERE" Techniques During Detainee Interrogations (18 December 2002), available at Tab 16 ofSASC Detainee Report Documents (June 17,2008), at 43 et seq. 253 SASC Detainee Report (November 20, 2008), at 97. 254 See First Page, JTF GTMO "SERE" Interrogation Standard Operating Procedures, Subject: Guidelines for Employing "SERE" Techniques During Detainee Interrogations (18 December 2002), available at Tab 16 ofSASC Detainee Report Documents (June 17, 2008), at 43 et seq. 255 SECDEF Memorandum (/5 Jan 2003). 256 SECDEF Memorandum (/6 April 2003), at Tab A. Sometimes referred to as "the A-X memo." 257 SECDEF Memorandum (J6 April 2003), at Tab B. Text duplicated from DOD Interrogation Working Group Report (4 April 2003), at 62. 258 DoD Interrogation Working Group Report (4 April 2003), at 64.

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• (September 2006 or later) Guidelines reflecting adoption ofnew intelligence interrogation doctrine. In September 2006, AFM 34-52 was superseded by Army Field Manual for Human Intelligence Collector Operations (FM-2-22-3). It is reasonable to assume guidelines for employing interrogation techniques were changed accordingly.

The Government has not provided any ofthese SOPs to the defense.

1111. The following documents are known or suspected versions ofguidance for interrogation operations procedures and responsibilities relied upon by interrogators at GTMO when Noor was detained there. Some ofthese entries may describe the same document, or different versions of the same document:

• (August 20, 2002) JTF-170 J2 Interrogation Section Standard Operating Procedures. This SOP may have regulated procedures and responsibilities, employment ofinterrogation techniques, or both.

(not later than November 2002) "Interrogation SOP. " Accordin~ to MG Miller, there was an • 2 interrogation SOP in place when he arrived in November 2002. 9 This SOP may have regulated procedures and responsibilities, employment of interrogation techniques, or both.

• (at least by January 2003, with revisions in June 2003, July 2004, andpossibly later) Tiger Team SOP. In May 2002, the military adopted the "Tiger Team" model for interrogating detainees?60 Under this concept, intelligence exploitation teams consisting primarily ofan analyst and an interrogator continuously work together during a battle rhythm cycle, and multiple agencies participate. Written guidance for Tiger Teams describing personnel, policies and records relating to interrogation at GTMO was implemented and revised over time in the form ofan SOP. A heavily redacted version ofExhibit 19 ofthe 2005 Schmidt­ Furlow Report made public through the ACLU's FOIA litigation is "Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) for the JTF GTMO Joint Intelligence Group (JIG) _ [redacted in original].,,261 The unclassified cover page indicates the SOP was initially promulgated on 21 January 2003, then revised on 12 June 2003 and 26 July 2004. 262

• (December 10, 2004) Joint Intelligence Group Operational Policy Memorandum. This memorandum is cited in a public document. 263 Among other tasks, it "Outlines the specific objectives and mission essential tasks for the BSCT".264

The Government has not provided any ofthese SOPs to the defense.

259 See Miller Statement. 260 DoJ OIG FBI & Detainee Interrogations (rev 2009), at 34. 26\ See GTMO Tiger Team SOP (26 July 2004). 262 Kuebler Affidavit. 263 GTMO Medical SOP 008: Detention Medical Interface with Behavioral Science Consultation Team (/5 February 2005). 264 !d.

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JJJJ. At various times, the GTMO commander ordered specific modifications to interrogation policy or practice, sometimes in response to events or problems. The Government has not provided copies ofthese orders to the defense.

• (2 May 2003) MPs may not 'participate' in interrogations. There were reported instances in March and April 2003 in which interrogators directed MPs to carry out forced physical exercise on a particular detainee during interrogation sessions as part ofapplying "fear up (harsh)".265 Following this incident, on May 2, 2003, MG Miller instructed the JIG Commander in a letter that '''Military Police personnel may not participate in interrogations,' except to safeguard the'security and safety ofall involved.",266

• (2 May 2003) no use Of "fear up (harsh). " Also on May 2, 2003, MG Miller prohibited use of"fear up (harsh).,,26 This was considered an FM 34-52 technique.

• Various orders regarding use ofstress positions. "Stress positions" were unauthorized at times, but prohibitions were variously interpreted. MG Miller has stated that he gave orders prohibiting stress positions.268 Circa August 2002, "lawyers, law enforcement agencies and J-2 personnel" agreed the limits included "no stress positions.,,269 In December 2002, the SECDEF gave blanket approval for use ofcounter-resistance techniques that included stress positions;27o in January 2003, blanket approval was rescinded and interrogators were required to request SECDEF permission. 271 kkkk. Military intelligence recordkeeping at GTMO was highly regulated, as illustrated by the public copy ofa redacted GTMO MI SOP from 2004 (GTMO Tiger Team SOP (26 July 2004)). The Government has failed to produce the vast majority ofrecords described therein:

• Analyst Support Package (ASP). The GTMO Tiger Team SOP (26 July 2004) describes ASPs and lists the required content.272 ASPs contain research and analysis from the analyst on the team that helps guide the interrogation process. 273

• Records relating to selection and prioritization ofdetainees for interrogation during relevant periods, including, inter alia:

o Records concerning the selection of specific detainees for interrogation. 274 o Scheduling requests.275

265 Church Report (2005), at 146-147. 266 1d. 2671d.

268 See Miller Statement. ("There were no stress positions. 1gave guidance."). 269 Church Report (2005), at 109. 270 See SECDEF Approval (2 Dec 2002). 271 See SECDEF Memorandum (/5 Jan 2003). 272 See e.g., GTMO Tiger Team SOP (26 July 2004), at para. 12(A), Appendix D. 273 See e.g., id., at para. 4(1). 274 See, e.g., id., at para 8. 275 See, e.g., id., at Appendix 8 (providing sample scheduling request).

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o Intelligence screening categories assigned to detainees. 276 o Detainee requests to meet with interrogators. o Knowledgeability briefs.

• Interrogation schedules. A detainee at GTMO may have been interviewed by multiple agencies, sometimes within the same 24-hour period. Law enforcement agents did not always know about military interrogation sessions, and military interrogation records may not indicate other agencies interrogated the same detainee. Some non-FBI interrogators reportedly led detainees to believe (or said) they were FBI. FBI agents may have knowingly or unknowingly benefitted from a detainee's lack ofsleep ifhe was interrogated by other agencies at night or during a rest period. FBI agents told the DOl OIG that detainees complained to them during FBI interviews about late night interrogations from other agencies or fake FBI.

Knowledgeability Briefs would have been updated regularly. The GTMO Tiger Team SOP (26 July 2004) provided guidance for writing KBs277 and required the Reports Officer to ensure "KBs" were properly archived in the "1-2 • [redacted in original] Drive."m • AFM 34-52 states that an interrogation plan must have "at least" the following items:

o Interrogation objective. o EPW's or detainee's identity, to include visual observation ofthe EPW or detainee by the interrogator. o Interrogation time and place. o Primary and alternate approaches. o Questioning techniques to be used or why the interrogator selected only specific topics from the basic questioning sequence. o Means ofrecording and reporting information obtained.279

• Intelligence Information Reports (UR) are DoD's primary vehicle for providing raw HUMINT information to analysts who in turn prepare products for their customers. It utilizes a message format structure which supports automated data entry into Ie databases. URs and accompanying message traffic may show the results of preliminary interviews that were done in places lik~nd Kandahar and then written up later. "Extracted from previously answered __[redacted in original]"28o

1111. The Government has failed to provide equipment and/or implements used in detainee's detention and interrogation, to include any shackles, recordings ofsounds or music, falsified documents or reports for purpose ofdeception, hoods, etc.,

276 See e.g., GTMO Tiger Team SOP (26 July 2004),~15. 277 Presumably at Appendix K. Jd., at Appendix K ('~ [redacted in original] Brief. [redacted in original] Writing Guide"). 278 See, e.g., id., at para.4(F). 279 AFM 34-52 (1992) at 3-10. 280 See, e.g.,GTMO Tiger Team SOP (26 July 2004), at para. 12(B)(2)(g).

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JJJJ. In January 2009, when the Government provided Amended Factual Returns to habeas counsel, counsel noted that it appeared that most, if not all, interrogation sessions were attended by representatives of more than one agency.281 For interrogations conducted under the Tiger Team model, "[t]here were several reports from each debriefing because each agency participating in an interview produced a report.,,282

Illl. Military intelligence and FBI personnel sometimes asked military officials to subject particular detainees to frequent cell relocations in order to disrupt their sleep.283 The Government should provide a full record ofall ofNoor's cells date/time/location, as well as documentation of these requests or certification such requests were not made. mmmm. In October 2002 BSCT drafted a memo recommending specific treatment in the cell blocks for detainees 84

This memo is not publicly available but has been described in open sources.286

281 See Petitioner's Motion to Compel Compliance with Section I.E. I. ofCase Management Order (January 13, 2009), Zaid v. Bush, 1:05-cv-01646, available at https://ecf.dcd.uscourts.gov/docl/045 12381615. 282 DoJ OIG FBI & Detainee Interrogations (rev 2009), at 34. 283 See id., at xxi. 284 SASe Detainee Report, at 52. 285 Id. 286 Id.

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