•'1

INFORMAL CENSORSHIP OF THE PRESS IA VIETAVAI BY

THE U.S. MILITARY

by

CHARLES BENTON MOORE, B.G.S.

A THESIS

IN

MASS COMMUNICATIONS

Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of Texas Tech University in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

Approved

Accepted -r 2

PREFACE /Jo,^5 f' "^ The author would like to express his appreciation for the invaluable assistance and cooperation given by his thesis committee of the Department of Mass Communications at Texas Tech University. Thanks and gratitude are extended to Dr. Alexis Tan, my committee chairman, who suffered through endless ques­ tions on format, style and content; to Dr. Billy I. Ross, my committee member, who continually offered sound advice and guidance; and to Professor Robert Rooker who steadfastly encouraged me to maintain scholarly yet articulate expression A special thanks goes to the many survey respondents who took the time and interest to offer their opinions on the military-press conflict in Vietnam. Their experienced opinions provided the depth to the survey chapter on informal censorship. Credit must be given to Department of Defense officials who gladly opened their files and provided background data needed for this study. Space does not permit listing all military officials who assisted in this study but special thanks are extended to Major General VJinant Sidle, Army chief of information, and Colonel Philip Stevens, a long­ time personal friend and the Army's chief of public informa­ tion. Both of these gentlemen were invaluable in their • • 11 assistance in opening doors to information which v/ould other­ wise have been unavailable.

Historians may never fully resolve the debate on whether or not the military censored the press in Vietnam and whether or not the press performed its role in Vietnam in a profes­ sional and responsible manner. Yet, historians cannot fail to note the unheralded bravery of civilian and military journalists who shared death to tell the war's story.

It has been said that a journalist owes nothing to those who govern his country; he owes everything to the people of his country. This thesis is dedicated to the 35 civilian correspondents and the unknown number of military journalists who gave their lives in covering the war in Vietnam.

The names that follow represent just a few of those who paid the utmost price in upholding the oft-quoted yet still meaningful concept—the people have a right to know. Robert Capa Huynh Thanh My Life Magazine Associated Press Killed by Viet Minh, 1954 Killed in Mekong Delta, 1965

Peter Thiel Dickie Chapelle Killed in Mekong Delta, 1965 Killed by booby trap, 1965 Jerry Rose Margaret Higgins Associated Press Garden City Newsday Killed in air crash, 1965 Died of suspected hepatitis, 1966 Bernard Kolenberg Associated Press Charlie Chellappah Killed in air crash, 1965 Freelance Killed near Cu Chi, 1966

111 Sam Castan Tatsuo Sakai Look Magazine Nipon Keizai Shimbun Killed by mortar fire, 1966 Killed by rocket, 1968 Bernard Fall Paul Savanuch Author Stars and Stripes Killed by suspected booby trap, Killed, 1968 1967 Ollie Noona Ronald Gallagher Associated Press Freelance Killed in helicopter, 1969 Killed by artillery, 1967 Gerald Miller Felipa Schuyler CBS Correspondent Killed, 1970 Killed in helicopter, 1967 George Syvertsen Horomichi Mine CBS International Killed in Cambodia, 1970 Killed by mine, 1968 Rene Puissesseu Robert Ellison ORTF French TV Freelance Captured, later reported Killed in air crash, 1968 killed, 1970

Bruce Pigott Raimanik Lekhi Reuters CBS Killed by Viet Cong, 1968 Captured, later reported killed, 1970 Ronald Laramy Reuters Frank Frosch Killed by Viet Cong, 1968 United Press International Killed in Cambodia, 1970 John Cantwell Time-Life Kyoichi Sawada Killed by Viet Cong, 1968 United Press International Killed in Cambodia, 1970 Michael Birch Associated Press Francois Bailly Killed by Viet Cong, 1968 United Press International Killed in Cambodia, 1970 Charles Eggleston United Press International Francois Sully Killed in street fighting, Newsweek 1968 Killed in helicopter, 1971

Ignacio Ezurra Larry Burrows La Nacion Life Missing, assumed dead, 1968 Killed in helicopter, 1971

IV Henri Huet Associated Press Killed in helicopter, 1971 Kent Potter United Press International Killed in helicopter, 1971 Keisaburo Shimamoto Jiji and Pana Press Killed in helicopter, 1971

V CONTENTS

PREFACE ii

I. INTRODUCTION 1

Purpose of the Study 2

Limitations of the Study 3

Related Studies 3

Method and Organization 5

Significance of the Study 6

II. THE MILITARY'S PRESS ROLE IN VIETNAM 9

Introduction 9

The Flow of Military News 10

Rules for Discussion with Correspondents 14

Military Assistance to the Press 16

Military Restrictions on the Press 23

Summary 32

III. THE INDICTMENT AGAINST THE PRESS 38

Introduction 3 8

Are We Getting Through 39

Why Aren't We Getting Through 4 3

The Military 59

Summary 59

IV. THE INDICTMENT AGAINST THE MILITARY 67

Introduction 67

The Case Against the Military 68

vi In Defense of the Information Officer 90

Summary 93

V. FORMAL CENSORSHIP AND THE VIETNAM WAR 102

Introduction 102

Absence of Formal Censorship in Vietnam 103

Summary 107

VI. SURVEY OF INFORMATION CENSORSHIP IN VIETNAil 111

Introduction 111

Scope and Purpose of the Survey 112

Method and Procedure 113

Limitations of the Survey 115

Related Studies 119

Significance of the Survey 120

Survey Results 120

Summary 152

VII. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

FOR FURTHER STUDY 161

Introduction 161

Summary 162

Conclusions 169

Implications for Further Study 17 2

BIBLIOGRAPHY 174

APPENDIX 182

A. COVER LETTER AND QUESTIONNAIRE SENT TO MILITARY INFORI'lATION OFFICERS 183

Vll C. COVER LETTER AND QUESTIONNAIRE SENT TO NEWSMEN 190 D. RULES GOVERNING PUBLIC RELEASE OF US MILITARY INFORMATION IN VIETNAil (Annex A to Military Assistance Command Vietnam Directive 360-1, March 27, 1970) 197

E. POLICIES AND PROCEDURES FOR RELEASE OF INFORMATION (Section II, Military Assistance Command Vietnam Directive 360-1, March 27, 1970) 203

Vlll LIST OF TABLES

Table Page 1. Complete Roster Versus Selected

List Replies 118

2. Whether or Not Formal Censorship Imposed 122

3. Whether or Not Informal Censorship Imposed 122

4. Newsmen and Military lOs Replies on MACV Ground Rule Impairment 130 5. Security Reasons Used to Deny Newsmen

Legitimate Information 134

6. Preferential Treatment of Newsmen 140

7. Newsmen Ratings of News Sources in Vietnam 14 6

8. Military Ratings of News Media in Vietnam 149

IX LIST OF FIGURES

Figure ^^ ^ Page 1. Dual Flow of Combat News 12 2. Newsmen's and Military Information Officers' Biggest Problems in Vietnam 143 CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The United States, either directly or indirectly, has been involved in the Indochina war for most of the past 20 years. The death toll has claimed more than 45,000 Ameri­ cans, more than 95,000 men "of various nationalities in the former French colonial army" and estimates of one to two million Indochinese.

War always raises troublesome and even dangerous ques­ tions between the government and the press. The Vietnam war raised more than most. Even more so than in previous wars of strict wartime censorship, the government has been vehe­ mently criticized for its press policies in the Vietnam war.

Despite press criticisms of censorship, news management and government lies, the amount of information that poured out of Vietnam about the war was staggering. More had been written and filmed about this conflict than during any other

American war. It was television's first extensive coverage of a war. In less than 24 hours battles fought in Vietnam were viewed in living color in homes across the nation. In the opinion of Fred W. Friendly, former president of CBS

News, the war in Vietnam was "... the best reported and 2 least understood war in history."

1 The Vietnam war was the military's first significant press war. In previous wars, formal censorship was imposed upon the newsmen with the military reading and editing all copy or film prior to broadcast. In Vietnam, however, press freedom, at least in respect to formal censorship, was virtually complete. The military information apparatus in Vietnam was com­ plex and proved to be both an asset and a liability to news­ men. Without military support the war could not have been "the best reported war" in history. Yet, because of mili­ tary press barriers, many writers have echoed Friendly's concern that the Vietnam war was "the least understood" war in history.

Purpose of the Study The purpose of this study is to examine the degree, if any, of informal censorship imposed by the military over the press corps in Vietnam. This includes an investigation as to the extent of military control over the news in Vietnam, whether the military exercised formal censorship, type re­ strictions imposed, and whether or not such censorship or restrictions hindered newsmen from informing the American public about the war. In addition, this study will highlight military support to the press and briefly review indictments against both the press and the military. Limitations of the Study

This study is limited only to the examination of in­ formal censorship as applied by the U.S. military in the

Republic of South Vietnam. It does not include the military elsewhere, nor does it include press activities of the U.S. or South Vietnamese governments. In addition, analyses of military support, press restrictions and indictments against both the press and military are limited only to Vietnam.

Related Studies

Although a number of scholarly works have been written about the military-press conflict in Vietnam, none examined for this study addressed the specific subject of informal censorship of the press by the military in Vietnam.

Raymond Funderburk, in a University of Alabama Master's thesis, discussed in great detail military restrictions im­ posed upon the press. However, Funderburk's analysis repre­ sented primarily the viewpoints of only a small number of correspondents whom he knew personally and a limited number 3 of quotes taken from various publications.

A Master's thesis by Thomas A. Quinn, University of

Texas, reviewed the military ground rules and press restric­ tions but without analysis or presentation of opposing positions. 4 5 Other theses examined for this study suffered pri­ marily from presentation of one-sided accounts, either for the press or for the military. Most were written earlier in the war and thus are outdated and did not include the recent military-press conflict generated by the Cambodian invasion and the Laotian incursion. A number of books have mentioned the military-press conflict. David Halberstam's Making of a Quagmire illus­ trated early U.S. effort to control the press yet is dated prior to the U.S. military and subsequent press buildup in 7 1965. The late Bernard Fall's book. The Two Viet-Nams examined government press controls in general but not spe­ cific military restrictions. The Information War, by Dale o Miner, discussed specific military press restrictions but presented an obviously one-sided and biased account in favor of the press. Professor DeWayne B. Johnson, San Fernando Valley State College, conducted an opinion survey asking participants their opinions on how well the press covered the war but did not address specific military restrictions. Professor Johnson's respondents were senior, tenured faculty members at a major West Coast college and news editors, copywriters and other editorial personnel on a major West Coast metro­ politan daily newspaper. None of the respondents reported by Johnson had served in Vietnam either in the military or 9 as newsmen. As will be illustrated throughout this thesis, an abundance of material has been written in newspapers, news magazines, and periodicals on the topic of the military- press relationship in Vietnam. Most, however, addressed only a small part of the total military-press relationship, most represented only the writers' opinions, and none would meet tests of scientific scrutiny.

Method and Organization Although an extensive literature review was made, the basic vehicle for the study was a survey of newsmen and mili­ tary information officers who had served in Vietnam and were the grass-root participants in the military-press conflict. Personal interviews, correspondence with newsmen and research of pertinent Department of Defense documents were used to supplement the literature review and survey. For source ma­ terial, the author drew upon his experiences in Vietnam as an Army Information officer, 1967-1968. Chapter II is devoted to a factual presentation of the military's press support role without evaluative conclusions or comments. Chapters III and IV present a compilation of charges against press performance and military restrictions respec­ tively. Drawn from a wide variety and large number of sources, specific indictments as expressed by ncvrsmen and military participants are offered against the press and against the military. These subjective selections of com­ ments and opinions serve as a background to the survey chap­ ter on informal censorship. The subject of formal censorship is examined in Chapter V and only in the context of whether or not it should have been imposed for the Vietnam war. Opinions for this chapter were drawn from a wide variety of sources and do not pretend to exhaust all possible opinions. Chapter VI, the survey chapter, presents candid opin­ ions of both newsmen and military information officers who had served in Vietnam on the subject of whether or not the military imposed informal censorship over the press corps. These opinions were quantified and subjected to scientific analysis. This survey chapter solicited opinions by means of two mailed questionnaires from both newsmen and military informa­ tion officers who had served or were serving as of May 31, 1971, in Vietnam. As with the entire study, the survey was limited only to newsmen and military participants in Vietnam.

Significance of the Study No other scholarly works examined by this author re­ vealed an in-depth look at the question of press censorship in the Vietnam war. As stated earlier, several theses reviewed specific aspects of military control over the press but none addressed informal censorship by allowing both the military and the press to support or deny such charges. Newspapers, magazines and books have displayed a con­ tinuing interest in the military-press conflict of the Vietnam war yet none devoted more than episodic treatment to the subject of military censorship. The significance of this study lies in its broad look at the total picture of press and military war news report­ ing and its specific analysis of military informal censor­ ship during the Vietnam war. Historically, this study encompasses the military-press conflict of the total Vietnam war. As of the cutoff date of this study, the U.S. was rapidly withdrawing its troops from Vietnam and, except for occasional television broadcasts of U.S. air operations or Vietnamese actions, the war ap­ peared to be of less and less press interest. Historically and descriptively, this study brings to­ gether the opinions of newsmen and military information officers who were grass-roots participants in the military- press conflict. The study represents firsthand accounts of the complex question of the presses' right to know versus the military's right to conceal in time of armed conflict. NOTES

Neil Sheehan, Hedrick Smith, E. W. Kenworthy, and Fox Butterfield, The Pentagon Papers (New York: Banton Books, Inc., 1971), p. ix. Death toll figures are as of July, 1971. 2 Fred W. Friendly, "TV at the Turning Point," Columbia Journalism Review, IX, No. 4 (Winter, 1970-1971), 19. 3 Raymond Funderburk, "News Coverage in Vietnam: An Analysis of the Barriers in the News Gathering Process" (unpublished Master's thesis. University of Alabama, 1969). 4 Thomas A. Quinn, "Reporting Vietnam" (unpublished Master's thesis. University of Texas, 1968). 5 These theses include: Thomas R. Hagley, "An Evalua­ tion Of Information Sources in South Vietnam by United States Correspondents" (unpublished I4aster's thesis, Ohio University, 1968); Gilbert Kindelan, "A Study of United States Government Controls on Combat News from Vietnam, January 1, 1962 through January 1, 1967" (unpublished Mas­ ter's thesis, Pennsylvania State, 1968); James Ahrens, "War Reporting from Vietnam" (unpublished Master's thesis, Boston University, 1968); Robert A. Schultz, "Military News Prior­ ities" (unpublished Master's thesis, Boston University, 1968) David Halberstam, Making of a Quagmire (New York: Random House, 1964). 7 Bernard Fall, The Two Viet-Nams (New York: Praeger, 1963) . p Dale Miner, The Information War (New York: Hawthorn Books, Inc., 1970). 9 DeWayne B. Johnson, "Vietnam: Report Card on the Press Corps at War," Journalism Quarterly, XLVI, No. 1 (Spring, 1969), 9-19. Methodological data concerning this survey is given in the preliminary sections of Chapter VI.

8 CHAPTER II

THE MILITARY'S PRESS ROLE IN VIETNA:-!

Introduction

The focal point of the military press role in Vietnam was in the Military Assistance Command's Office of Informa­ tion (MACOI). Headed by a brigadier general or colonel,

MACOI was the Military Assistance Command Vietnam (^iACV) commander's official representative for news dissemination and press support.

The magnitude of MACOI's press support role became apparent in the millions of words, thousands of photos and television newscasts released via the Vietnam press corps to the American public. Summarizing the support for only one year—October 1965-October 1966--Arthur Sylvester, former

Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, said that

MACOI had:

1. Arranged more than 4,700 in country trips by news­

men, to include ground and air transportation.

2. Arranged for or conducted almost 6,900 briefings

and 108 background meetings.

3. Answered -ore than 32,000 telephone queries from newsmen.

4. Been consulted individually by newsmen on 3,300

occasions. 10

5. Conducted daily press briefings in Saigon, 7 days a week; average attendance 130 correspondents. 6. Conducted the U.S. portion of accreditation for all correspondents arriving in Vietnam. In 1968, MACOI arranged a total of 4,079 in country flights for news media representatives on U.S. military air­ craft. Also in 1968, MACOI issued MACV accreditation and gave briefings to 720 newsmen. In 1970-1971, MACOI arranged flights for 1,549 newsmen and issued accreditations to 1,008.^ This chapter will review the military's press role in Vietnam. It is not intended to provide evaluative comments, either for or against the military's press support. Rather, it is to serve as background to the following chapters of highly opinionated indictments and the survey chapter on informal censorship. Specifically, this chapter will examine: the flow of military news; rules for discussion with correspondents; military assistance to the press; and military restrictions on the press.

The Flow of Military News Collection of Mili-.ary News When a unit engages in combat with the enemy, informa­ tion of the action was not releaseable news until it made its way to the MACV Tactical Operations Center located in 11 Saigon. Combat information, a required report each time a unit was in action, was forwarded by the combat commander through his intermediate commanders until it reached MACV. After security evaluations by MACV intelligence personnel and clearance by MACOI, it was released to the press. Paralleling the flow of tactical information, most major combat units had information personnel who also for­ warded this combat information, if unclassified, through intermediate information officers to MACOI. In Saigon, MACOI personnel monitored data collected in the Tactical Operations Center and from information channels. Figure 1 illustrates this dual flow of combat news. This illustration depicts the flow of Army combat news where no newsman was present on the scene. A reporter on the scene, who complied with security classifications or other military restrictions, e.g. ground rules, could use the in­ formation as he observed it. Other military services had a similar news flow. After MACOI verified the facts of the information, e.g. compared information received through information channels with that received through tactical channels, the informa­ tion was cleared and released to the press.

Clearance and Release of Military News Most major units in Vietnam (Army brigade or larger) had an information officer assigned who coordinated press 12

COMBAT NEWS Noncombat news

J^^ Combat Unit Unit Info. Officers 1^ I ± All Intermediate r" Intermediate Information Commanders Officers T K MACV Tactical Opns MACOI Center

X Press

-> Combat News Flow > News Release Flow > Monitoring

Fig. 1,—Dual Flow of Combat News 13 activities and prepared releases on his unit's operations. However, release authority, except in specified items, was restricted to MACV. The commanding general of MACV was the "sole authority for clearance and release of information concerning U.S. military operations in Vietnam (north and south) or adjacent 3 waters." Thus, all military news concerning operations or other actions in Vietnam of general news interest had to be cleared with ^iACOI. While the majority of news had to be submitted to MACOI, local commanders were delegated the authority to clear and release noncombat information and unit news items. These included: religious, recreational, sports and similar activ­ ities; construction of new mess halls, post exchanges and similar buildings; VIP(Very Important Persons) visits on an after-the-fact basis unless otherwise specified; personnel actions such as promotions, assignments, awards and educa­ tional achievements; pacification support activities which were separate from military operations; and local command policies of local interest not pertaining to combat opera- tions. 4 There were two other exceptions to the "sole authority for release" of MACV: (1) the Joint United States Public Affairs Office (JUSPAO), acting for the U.S. Ambassador to South Vietnam, retained authority and responsibility for 14 release of U.S. military information to foreign language news media published in Vietnam, and (2) materials pertain­ ing exclusively to the South Vietnamese armed forces were released by appropriate South Vietnamese sources. MACV had no control over information released by the South Viet- namese. 5

Rules for Discussion with Correspondents MACV prescribed certain rules which military sources were required to follow in their discussions with correspon­ dents. Essentially, there were two types of discussions-- unofficial and official. A military person who engaged in discussions with news­ men as an individual and not as an "official spokesman" for MACV, was an "unofficial source." He had to limit his dis­ cussions to those matters about which he had personal knowl­ edge, providing that such knowledge was not classified or violated the ground rules. The purpose behind such a limitation was to protect the individual from making "ill- formed and incorrect statements about U.S. national policy . . . " or relations between the U.S. and South Vietnam. An "official spokesman" was a commander or his desig­ nated representative who conducted discussions with newsmen q as an "official spokesman for MACV." For example among information officers, only those at MACV were "official 15 spokesmen." Other information officers, because of the "sole authority for release" clause, were not MACV spokesmen. Official spokesmen could discuss matters with the press in one of several types of discussions: 1. On-the-record for attribution--spokesman's remarks may be quoted directly or indirectly either by a personal attribution (name, rank and position) or by a general attribution (U.S. military spokesman, U.S. military official, U.S. military commander). 2. On-the-record for background--spokesman's remarks may be reported but the source may not be identified The purpose of such a discussion was to give corre­ spondents a better understanding of a situation and only a "general attribution" may be used. 3. Off-the-record--spokesman's remarks may not be used publicly in any form. The purpose of this discus­ sion was to insure correspondents' understanding of a situation, to avoid inaccuracies, to avoid inad­ vertent disclosures that could be harmful to an operation or program, or, in some cases, to facili­ tate their (newsmen) news coverage of military oper­ ations or activities. Off-the-record remarks were limited t: senior commanders or their representa- tives. 9 16

In any discussion, official or unofficial, classified or sensitive information (of the host country) could not be

discussed. A commander was required to confine his remarks

to matters pertaining to his command. And most importantly,

no source could violate MACV's "sole authority to release."

Military Assistance to the Press

In 1962, a world-wide survey revealed only 10 resident

correspondents representing all media in Saigon. By July,

1965, an estimated 50 newsmen were assigned to broadcast

operations in Vietnam. In early 1966, more than 300 news-

men for all media were reporting the war. 12 And in November,

1967, more than 530 correspondents were accredited to MACV. 13

As of May 31, 1971, there were 346 correspondents in

Vietnam, representing 18 countries. Of these, 146 were U.S.

newsmen. 14

It is axiomatic to state that with the introduction of

U.S. combat troops in 1965, press interest intensified. As

the number of correspondents grew, so did the assistance offered by the military. Military assistance to the press ranged from the subtle "tip" newsmen received from a friendly information officer about a forthcoming but classified oper­ ation, to the necessary means of transportation.

For discussion purposes, military assistance can be grouped into several broad categories: (1) press briefings 17 and releases, (2) transportation, (3) field support, (4) press camps, and (5) communications support.

Press Briefings and Releases Although technically outside the scope of this thesis,

JUSPAO, an agency of the Minister-Counselor for Public

Affairs of the U.S. Embassy, conducted daily press briefings 15 on the current 24-hour period of the war. However, a sub­ stantial part of the briefing was conducted by I4AC0I brief­ ers . Until mid-1968 the "five o'clock follies"—as they were

called by most newsmen and military alike--usually began at

4:45 p.m. daily. Interested correspondents assembled in

JUSPAO's auditorium to receive briefings concerning U.S.

Mission and military activities which took place throughout

the country during the previous 24 hours.

After a 1968 fire in the JUSPAO building, briefings

were held in Vietnamese press facilities at 4:15 p.m. daily.

A Vietnamese military briefer usually led the briefings con- 16 cernmg Vietnamese operations. The U.S. Mission spokesman usually followed the Viet­

namese briefer and discussed mission activities. A MACOI

briefer followed the Mission spokesman with air and ground

briefings of all major U.S. military actions throughout the

country. MACOI briefers were the "military spokesmen in 18 Saigon" often mentioned in press accounts of the war. Brief­ ing officers usually had no firsthand knowledge of the action they were reporting since most of their material was obtained from I4ACV Tactical Operations Center. In addition to the briefings, MACOI representatives distributed official morning and evening military communiques summarizing the previous 24 hour period of all major Ameri­ can actions. These communiques, released under the MACV "imprint" with a MACV dateline, were prepared by MACOI based on operational reports and condensed releases from unit in­ formation officers. In addition to the regular briefings, JUSPAO also had provided press policy directives to MACOI, "thus helping assure coordination of U.S. civilian and military official information. Although JUSPAO briefings represented the official U.S. Mission and MACV report of the war, unit information offi­ cers conducted informal briefings for visiting newsmen on what their units are doing.

Transportation Perhaps one of the most critical requirements for news­ men in Vietnam was transportation. Throughout the war, travel by road was extremely hazardous except in heavily guarded and escorted convoys. For newsmen meeting deadlines. 19 both with copy or film, air transportation from a distant battle site to a distribution point in Saigon was often the difference between the report reflecting "today's action" or "old news."

In the early days of the war, before I4AC0I started

scheduling air transportation for newsmen on a regular basis, one newsman said, "Reporters employ almost every form of 18 locomotion except water skiing to get to stories."

In 1964, transportation for newsmen, especially air

transportation, was virtually non-existent. Peter Kalischer,

a veteran CBS newsman, put it this way: "We make our own

deals with American or Vietnamese pilots." 19

It was not until late 1965 that the military assigned

the press corps a shuttle aircraft to ferry newsmen and

equipment to and from major points in Vietnam. 20

In early 1966, MACOI discarded the shuttle flight con­

cept and instituted a system of reserving seats for newsmen on each of nine daily aircraft flights leaving Saigon for major air bases throughout the country. The Special proj­ ects Division of MACOI had the mission of coordinating and 21 reserving these seats for newsmen. Once the correspondent reached a major air base, he became dependent on unit infor­ mation officers to provide further transportation. MACOI reserved transportation included only regular Air Force flights to and from Saigon. 20

The official military policy on transportation support for newsmen was to provide only in country and outside

Saigon support. Out-of-country transportation, except to

Navy ships located off the coast of Vietnam, was prohibited.

Concerning in country transportation, the official military policy stated:

. . . correspondents are to be furnished whatever transportation is reasonably available to assist them [newsmen] in the performance of their mis­ sion. They are to be afforded the highest prior­ ity possible next to requirements for tactical emergency troop movement, emergency resupply, and movement of high priority personnel such as those on emergency leave or TDY [temporary duty] . . . MACV Press Cards are to be accepted as competent travel orders.22

Despite Department of Defense (DOD) statements such as:

"We run a shuttle airline to the major towns everyday and 23 provide free reserved seats for newsmen," aircraft m most demand by newsmen were those at the unit level. Local unit transportation, normally resupply or tactical helicopters, enabled newsmen to go to the battle scene for firsthand reports and subsequently get that report back to Saigon for release.

Field Support

Special Projects Division coordinated newsmen's visits to field units with Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Media

Liaison Officers. Many correspondents leaving Saigon for field units normally checked with these officers first for 21 assistance in getting to the unit and informing the unit of the correspondent's visit so the information officer could receive him and provide other assistance.

At the unit level, the information officer if assigned, otherwise the commander, assisted the correspondent by pro­ viding transportation to elements engaged in combat or other areas of interest to the newsman. Unclassified briefings were given as well as escort officers to accompany him while in the unit's area of operation. Other field support in­ cluded: military communications systems where no commercial system existed; messing and billeting; and emergency medical 24 care.

Unit commanders were directed to provide correspondents unrestricted movement in tactical areas except when in the commander's opinion "the nature of an operation warrants such action [restriction]." However, restrictions were not to be 25 imposed "solely to protect the lives of newsmen concerned."

Correspondents accompanying troops in the field were

"encouraged to wear U.S. military field clothing" which may 2 6 be purchased through military outlets. Many did and, in the interest of safety, units usually provided the newsman 27 with a steel helmet and perhaps an armored vest.

Press Camps

The military operated five press camps in Vietnam which provided lodgings, food, local transportation (vehicle), air 22 flight arrangements, and limited communications facilities. Manned and operated by information personnel, press camps also assisted newsmen in arranging flights, coordination with units to be visited, dispatching reports to Saigon, or as a facility to relax or write copy.

Static press camps were usually too far from major actions and were seldom used by newsmen. Since mid-1971, the military stopped operating press camps except special press camps set up for major opera- tions. 28

Communications Support When transportation difficulties precluded the newsman from physically returning from the field to file his story, he had to rely upon military support in communications. Except when civil communications were adequate, accredited correspondents were authorized to use: 1. In country military telephone service if such use did not interfere with military operations. 2. MACOI sole-user teletype circuits. MACOI operated a 24-hour per day teletype system which connected all major military headquarters and press camps with MACV. This system permitted field corre­ spondents to communicate with their bureau chiefs in Saigon and vice versa. 23 3. Military courier services within the limits of operational requirements. 29 As with most support for newsmen, the commander was the final on-scene authority as to what facilities are to be made available to correspondents and rules for use of such facilities.

Although not military controlled, newsmen could file copy from Saigon to the United States via the RCA Telex facility or the Republic of Vietnam Telephone and Telegraph Company. On a limited basis, international telephone ser- vice was available in Saigon. 31

Military Restrictions on the Press Newsmen accompanying military units in any war have done so under certain conditions which could be labelled as restrictions on the free flow of information about that war. As mentioned before, in the Vietnam war newsmen did not face a military censor as in World War II. Instead, newsmen were asked to adhere to a series of voluntary guidelines when covering events of the war. And, as in previous wars, newsmen were required to have some kind of official authori­ zation when accompanying military units. In the Vietnam war, this authorization was accomplished under a dual system of Vietnamese and U.S. military accreditation. 24 Accreditation Receiving accreditation as a correspondent to cover the war was a relatively simple procedure. The first step was to obtain accreditation from the Government of South Vietnam Vietnamese accreditation was a formality consisting of newsmen applying for a visa and then presenting evidence to Vietnamese accreditation officials that they are employed by a Free World press agency. Vietnamese accreditation was a first prerequisite for MACV accreditation. 32 Prior to 1967, newsmen were accredited either by Depart- ment of Defense (DOD) in Washington or by MACV in Saigon. 33 This resulted in most American correspondents receiving their accreditation through the Public Affairs Office, DOD, while the majority of Free World newsmen applied directly to MACOI. This dual application did not relieve U.S. newsmen from obtaining a MACV accreditation; however, those with DOD credentials needed "... no additional documentation." 34 In November, 1967, DOD stopped accrediting and MACOI became the sole military accreditation agency for all news­ men. After that, newsmen needed only to apply to one U.S. agency for accreditation. Specific requirements for MACV accreditation as a cor­ respondent were: U.S. citizens and Vietnamese citizens employed by U.S. or other foreign agencies (except Vietnamese agencies) will be accredited based on a letter. 25 prepared on agency letterhead and forwarded by the agency direct to the Office of Information, MACV. This letter must state that the individual is in fact employed, that the agency assumes full re­ sponsibility for his professional conduct, in­ cluding financial responsibility and personal conduct as these affect his professional actions and that immediate written notification will be provided the Office of Information, MACV, upon termination of his employment. All Free World correspondents must, in addition, . . . present a letter from their respective embassies or dip­ lomatic representatives vouching for their identity.36

While agency-employed newsmen had little difficulty in obtaining MACV accreditation, freelance journalists had to meet additional requirements for both accreditation and re­ newal of accreditation. These were: Applications received from freelance writers are examined by the Office of Information, MACV, on a case-by-case basis. It is not the policy of MACV to accredit people who are writing on a part-time, speculative basis for a single agency. Only full- time, paid employees of a news agency or estab­ lished professional freelance writers who derive more than fifty per cent of their income from jour­ nalistic efforts and have firm commitments for the purchase of their material from two or more publi­ cations are eligible. Consequently, applicants must insure that letters indicating a definite intent to purchase their material are forwarded from at least two of their agencies (on agency letterhead) direct to MACV Office of Information. In order to maintain accreditation, freelancers who do not have an established reputation will be ex­ pected to demonstrate that they are in fact submit­ ting material for consideration by appropriate agencies . . . Freelancers will not automatically be re-accredirid at time of expiration of their MACV Press Cards. Freelancers must submit new letters of 'intent to purchase' from their agen­ cies prior to re-accreditation.37 26

MACV directives did not indicate why freelancers must undergo greater requirements than agency-employed newsmen.

In 1968, Barry Zorthian, then U.S. Information Agency spokesman in Saigon, may have been alluding to freelancers when he addressed a meeting of the National Press Club:

Over the years, about 2,000 different individ­ uals were accredited and, including second and third and fourth visits by many of these, about 4,000 accreditations were registered. These correspondents covered the full spectrum of com­ petence—from many of the best journalists avail­ able, to those for whom the label was only a thing camouflaged for partisan evaluation, to the inevitable adventurers who somehow obtained the necessary letter of endorsement. To lump all of these into a single group labelled the 'press' is obviously unwarranted and mislead­ ing. 38

In July, 1968, 36 freelance correspondents were accred­ ited to MACV while as of May 31, 1971, only 18 freelance correspondents were in Vietnam.

Upon accreditation, a correspondent was issued a MACV

Press Card for varying periods of validity, based primarily 41 on the length of his Vietnamese visa.

In general, the MACV Press Card indicated that the cor­ respondent had been duly accredited by MACV and thus was authorized certain privileges. Most of these privileges-- transportation, field support, communications, briefings, press camps—were discussed earlier in the "Military Assis­ tance to the Press" section. Other privileges include: 27 limited military exchange privileges and use of military postal system. 42

Area Access Once a newsman had been accredited by MACV, his move­ ment or access to any area was not to be restricted by the military unless: (1) his movement endangered the lives of others, (2) his movement or presence would hamper rescue or military operations, or (3) his movement was otherwise pro-

A O hibited by the local commander concerned.

Ground Rules Without censorship, the military faced problens in Viet­ nam of how to provide maximum release of information without disclosing information which would be of immediate tactical value to the enemy. The solution adopted by MACV consisted of voluntary reporting guidelines to which reporters were asked to ad­ here in covering the war. Referred to by many newsmen as "voluntary censorship," these guidelines were usually called simply "ground rules." While newsmen were asked to abide by the rules, they were also required to sign a form acknowledg­ ing receipt of the rules and acknowledging that violations

of such "may lead to suspension or cancellation" of their MACV accreditation. 44 28 The basic philosophy on the release of information in Vietnam stemmed from principles established by former Secre­ tary of Defense Robert S. McNamara and later became formal­ ized in military directives. During the course of the war, this philosophy has remained essentially unchanged. For example, in 1966, MACV's policy on the release of information was: The basic principle governing the public release of military information in Vietnam is that the maximum amount of information will be made avail­ able consistent with the requirement for security.4^ And in 1970, the policy was changed only slightly in wording: "A maximum amount of factual military information IS to be released consistent with security requirements." 46 (Emphasis added). Prior to 1966, rules and guidelines on what was to be reported were left largely in the hands of local public in­ formation officers of U.S. or South Vietnamese armed forces. On April 21, 1965, Barry Zorthian, then Minister- Counselor for Public Affairs, U.S. Embassy, released "volun­ tary ground rules" for newsmen as a memorandum: . . . information that will 'normally be released as soon as available' includes target hit, na­ tionality of striking force, whether the planes were land-based or not, a general characterization of the success of the mission, tonnage ordnance used, the number of striking aircraft, enemy anti­ aircraft, ground fire and pilot sightings of un­ friendly aircraft.47 29

While the first ground rules pertained to air action, it was not until July 15, 1965, that ground rules were issued for ground action:

There will be no casualty reports and unit iden­ tification on a daily basis or related to a specific action except in general terms such as 'light, moderate or heavy.' Casualty summaries will continue to be reported on a weekly basis without unit identification in the weekly brief­ ings in Saigon and the statistical summary re­ leased at the Pentagon. Troop movements or developments will not be announced nor confirmed until such time as military evaluation deter­ mines such information is clearly in the hands of the Viet Cong. When battles have been joined, units participating therein will not be identi­ fied by specific types or number although the general magnitude of friendly involvement will be announced.4 8

After several revisions and changes, the ground rules were formalized and issued to the press on October 31, 1966.

The 1966 rules, as well as those revisions which followed, contained the provision that violation of the rules would be regarded as basis for suspension or cancellation of accreditation.

The 1966 rules categorized information as "releaseable" and "not releaseable." Later revisions and memos to the press listed only what "may not be used" until cleared and released by MACV. There were 15 major areas of news which could not be used -ntil released by MACV:

1. Future plans, operations, or strikes. This material is never to be released until after the plan, operation, or strike has taken place. 30 2. Information concerning rules of engagement. Rules of engagement are the prescribed 'do's' and 'don'ts' under which commanders operate in combat, particularly tactics and tech­ niques which would be of assistance to the enemy, if known by him. They include the con­ ditions under which aircraft units, or indi­ viduals may fire upon the enemy under various given circumstances.

3. Amount of ordnance and fuel moved by support units or on hand in combat units or depots. Ordnance includes weapons, systems and ammu­ nition. This ground rule is designed to deny the enemy knowledge of the combat readiness of units. 4. During an operation, unit designations and troop movements, tactical deployments (scheme of maneuver), name of operation and size of friendly forces involved. 5. Intelligence unit activities, methods of oper­ ations, or specific locations. This rule applies to all types of intelligence units and operations. 6. Exact number and types of casualties or damage suffered by friendly units. This information is often released by MACV, but is not useable until so released. The criteria used are the value of the information to the enemy and how much he can expect to know if the information is not released. 7. Number of sorties and the amount of ordnance expended on strikes outside of the RVN [Repub­ lic of Vietnam]. 8. Information on aircraft taking off on strikes, enroute to, or returning from the target area. Information on strikes while they are in prog­ ress. 9. Identity of air units and locations of air bases from which aircraft are launched on com­ bat operations. 31 10. Number of aircraft damaged, or any other in­ dicator of effectiveness or ineffectiveness of ground anti-aircraft defenses.

11. Tactical specifics, such as altitudes, courses, speeds, or angle of attack (General descriptions such as 'low' and 'fast' may be used.)

12. Information on, or confirmation of, planned strikes which do not take place for any rea­ son, including bad weather.

13. Specific identification of enemy weapons sys­ tems used to down friendly aircraft. General terms such as 'ground fire' may be used. This rule is not designed to preclude analysis of specific enemy weapons.

14. Details concerning downed aircraft, including pilots and crews, while search and rescue (SAR) operations are in progress. 4 9 15. Aerial photos of fixed installations.

The primary purpose of the ground rules, according to

the military, was the security and safety of U.S. forces.

Few newsmen argued with the basic purpose of the rules; how­

ever, many complained that it was in their (the rules) inter­

pretation that the military withheld legitimate information.

A basic weakness in the system of ground rules was that

no set of rules can cover every tactical situation encoun­

tered by newsmen in the field. Recognizing this, MACV estab­

lished a 24-hour service for any newsman who obtained

information which he felt was subject to interpretation or

if newsmen needed assistance in correctly interpreting any ground rule "gray area." 51 32 Summary The military's press role in Vietnam increased in pro­ portion to the increase in the number of newsmen covering the war. As a function of MACV's Office of Information, the military's press role consisted of collecting military news, checking its accuracy and insuring no information of value to the enemy was given and then releasing this information to the press either in press briefings or in MACV press releases.

Not all news was obtained from briefings or releases; many newsmen went to the field or other news sources. Mili­ tary news sources, however, had to be guided by the "Rules for Discussion with Correspondents" which established offi­ cial and unofficial sources. Official sources spoke for MACV while unofficial sources spoke only for themselves in areas in which they had personal knowledge. Military assistance to the press was varied but gener­ ally consisted of briefings, interviews, releases, transpor­ tation, field and communication support and press camps, and mail privileges through the military postal system. As in any war, certain restrictions were applied to the press. In the Vietinam war, these restrictions included: accreditation--a requirement that allowed newsmen to receive military assistance; area access--provided newsmen access 33 and freedom of movement except as limited by tactical situ­ ation; and ground rules--a form of "voluntary censorship" which specified what cannot be released without MACV approval. Throughout the war, friction developed between the mili­ tary and the press. As often described by both newsmen and military information officers, a "true adversary relation­ ship existed." The press has charged the military denied transporta­ tion, covered up unfavorable or embarrassing information, used the ground rules and security classifications as a means to withhold legitimate news, and, in general, were less than candid in their "maximum disclosure with minimum delay consistent with security." On the other hand, the military charged the press with sensationalism, biased reporting, violating security require­ ments in disregard for U.S. lives, and being unprofessional in their actions in Vietnam. The purpose of this chapter was to present the mili­ tary's press support role as it was officially stated. Charges and counter-charges of how the military actually performed its press role are the subjects of the chapters to follow. NOTES

Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, "News Policies in Vietnam," August 17, and 31, 1966, p. 67. 2 Philip H. Stevens, Colonel, USA, Deputy Chief of In­ formation, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Saigon, Viet­ nam, personal letter, Sept. 5, 1971. 3 U.S. Military Assistance Command Vietnam, Directive 360-1, "Public Information Policies and Procedures," March 27, 1970, p. 4. (Hereinafter referred to as MACV Dir. 360-1. ^Ibid. 5 Ibid., pp. 6-7.

Ground rules are discussed later in this chapter under "Military Restrictions on the Press."

^MACV Dir. 360-1, p. 10.

Ibid., p. 11.

^Ibid.

John Wilhelm, "The Re-Appearing Foreign Correspondent: A World Survey," Journalism Quarterly, XL, No. 2 (Spring, 1963), 168.

Albert Kroeger, "Television's Men at War," Television Magazine, July, 1965, pp. 38-39. (Hereinafter referred to as Television's Men). 12 Jack Raymond, "It's A Dirty War For Correspondents, Too," New York Times Magazine, February 13, 1966, p. 32. (Hereinafter referred to as It's A Dirty War). 13 U.S. Military Assistance Command Vietnam, "List of Accredited Newsmen," Office of Information, Saigon, Viet­ nam, November, 1967. 14 U.S. Military Assistance Command Vietnam, "List of Correspondents Accredited to MACV, 1 April-31 May, 1971, Office of Information, Saigon, Vietnam. (Hereinafter referred to as List of Accredited Correspondents). 34 35 15 Much of the following data on JUSPAO was collected by the author when he served as Army Media Liaison Officer at JUSPAO, May-June, 196 8. Stevens, personal letter. 17 U.S. State Department, "JUSPAO Vietnam: General Briefing Book," Bureau of Public Affairs, Saigon, Vietnam, 1967, p. 3. 18 Charles Mohr, "This War—And How We Cover It," Date­ line, X, No. 1 (1966), 20. 19 Kroeger, "Television's Men," p. 38. 20 Raymond, "It's A Dirty War," pp. 32-33. 21 U.S. Military Assistance Command Vietnam, "Mission Statement/Functions," 1968, p. 32. ^^MACV Dir. 360-1, p. 14. 23 . Richard Fryklund, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), in an address delivered to the Buffalo Chapter of the Public Relations Society of America, Buffalo, New York, January 10, 1968. 24 As far as facilities permitted, correspondents were treated as commissioned officers with the simulated rank of major or comparable grade in such matters as messing and living accommodations. See MACV Dir. 360-1, p. 14. 25 Ibid., Restrictions on the movement of newsmen are explained in greater detail later in this chapter, "Military Restrictions on the Press." Ibid., p. 16. 27 Author's personal observations as a press escort officer in Vietnam, 1967-1968. 28 Stevens, personal letter.

^^MACV Dir. 360-1, p. 15.

^Qlbid. 31 Department of Defense, "Information for Use in Plan­ ning A Visit to Vietnam," Memorandum for the Press, January, 1971, p. 4. 36 32 U.S. Military Assistance Command Vietnam, "MACV Accreditation Criteria," Enclosure to Memorandum for the Press, DOD, Washington, D.C. January, 1971, p. 6. (Herein­ after referred to as MACV Accreditation Criteria). 33 U.S. Military Assistance Command Vietnam, Annex B to Directive 360-1, February 28, 1967, p. 1. Ibid. 35 Official letter to U.S. press agencies from Phil G. Goulding, former Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), Department of Defense, Washington, D.C, December 21, 1967. 3 6 MACV Accreditation Criteria, p. 6. Ibid. 38 Barry Zorthian, "Press Performance in Vietnam," The Quill, December, 1968, p. 20. 39 U.S. Military Assistance Command Vietnairi, "Press List," July, 1968. 40 .

List of Correspondents Accredited to MACV.

'^•'•MACV Dir. 360-1, p. 13.

"^^Ibid. , pp. 14-16

^"^MACV Dir. 360-1, p. 14. 44 MACV Dir. 360-1, Annex C, MACOI Form 20, "Correspon­ dents Data," p. 1. 45 U.S. Military Assistance Command Vietnam, Directive 360-1, Annex A, "Rules Governing the Public Release of Military Information," October 31, 1966, p. 1. (Hereinafter referred to as Ground Rules, 1966). 4 fi MACV Dir. 360-1, Annex A, "Rules Governing the Public Release of Military Information," p. 1. "Set-Up in Saigon Described," New York Times, April 21, 1965, p. 4. 4 8 "New Curbs on War News," New York Times, July 16, 1965, p. 2. 37 49 MACV Dir. 360-1, Annex A, pp. 2-3. 50^^ . This will be examined in detail in the survey chapter where opinions of both newsmen and military information officers' were collected. ^•^MACV Dir. 360-1, p. 3. CHAPTER III THE INDICTMENT AGAINST THE PRESS

Introduction On March 7, 1968, the number of correspondents in South Vietnam peaked at 647. Although 647 represented the highest number of correspondents in Vietnam at any one time, the average number of correspondents was more than 4 50 per month for the years 1967 through 1969, an average of 425 monthly in 1970 and by mid-1971 the monthly average was 353. The amount of information written, filmed and broadcast about the war was staggering. As the war intensified, so did the media coverage of the war. As the press intensified its coverage, so did critics of how well the press covered the war. For discussion purposes, the war in Vietnam could be considered as being three separate wars: (1) the fighting war in the rolling highlands, the sweltering jungles and the flooded delta region, (2) the political war in secret inner circles of Saigon, Washington, Hanoi and other capitals around the world, and (3) the information war which attempted to put the other two wars into an understandable relationship

There were three combatants in the information war: (1) the press, (2) the U.S. government, and (3) the U.S. military. Unlike a conventional military war of conditional

38 39 or unconditional surrender, the victors in the information war may never be known.

Some newsmen were not content to wait for historians to tell the story of the information war and one of the most agonizing questions some newsmen asked themselves was "Did we get through to the American public about the war?" A number of newsmen answered this question with a qualified "no." These qualifications generally fall into three categories: (1) the American public, for a number of reasons have not absorbed the mass of information given about the war, (2) the government and military, by various machinations, have prevented full access to information about the war, and (3) the press corps failed to inform fully the American public about the war. Only qualification number three above falls into the purview of this chapter. As stated in Chapter I, this thesis focuses only on the grass-roots participants in the informa­ tion war. This chapter will examine the indictment against the press and explore some of the reasons why the press may not have fully informed the American public about the war.

Are We Getting Through? A common complaint among journalists in Vietnam in 1966, and one which still persists today, is that they are not "getting through to the readers." Despite the millions of 40 words, photos, broadcasts and miles of film relayed to the public, newsmen felt they [the public] were lamentably ignorant about the war. One of the earliest and most bitter charges was made by Malcome Browne, a Pultizer Prize-winning Associated Press reporter, an ABC correspondent and later a freelancer. Said Brown, "None of us really has gotten across to the American public." As evidence, he cited a Stanford University poll which showed that seven out of ten Americans (in 1966) could not correctly identify the Viet Cong as South Vietnamese Com- 2 munists. Support for Browne's charge came almost a year later when 50 percent of 2,075 university professors (from 17 colleges) could not name any Geneva conference signatories without naming an equal number of nonsigners, and only 18 per­ cent could correctly name the three countries then supplying 3 troops to the war effort. War critic Senator J. W. Fullbright accused the press in Vietnam of suffering from "necrophilia," the love of death, by concentrating too much time on casualties, death and destruction. 4 Vice President Spiro Agnew said he was frustrated because "only one side of the Vietnam war is be­ ing told by some of our most influential newspapers and television networks . . . ." He added that "overall, their [press] coverage comes off slanted against American involve­ ment in that war without any attempt to balance." 41 Although Wes Gallagher, general manager of the Associated Press, lauded correspondents for "the best war reporting we've ever had," he believed criticisms of news reporting from Vietnam could be traced to "confusion and division among the American people." There were "hawks" and "doves" in the U.S., he said, but "most people are neither. They are just confused." One of the most publicized attacks on the press came from retired Brigadier General S. L. A. Marshall, historian and war correspondent: . . . the overwhelming majority of correspondents do not get to the front; and in that regard at least, the American press continues to be dere­ lict in its main responsibility. The story of the war is not being told in its daily columns; there we find only the tangents and sidebars.^ Furthermore, said Marshall, the war was covered pri­ marily for "all bleeding hearts and for Senator Fullbright who casts about for a way to stop it by frightening the citizenry." War reporting, charged Marshall, was not for "simple souls" who wanted to know how it was being fought or the chances of success. Francis T. Leary, vice president and executive editor of UPI, countered Marshall's charges by saying "the war in Vietnam is better and more accurately reported, with more close-up eyewitness detail on battles, than any previous .,9 war. 42

Contending that the war coverage was too fragmentary and war-oriented. Ward Just of the Washington Post, said: "Through it all, the impression persists that it is not an especially distinguished press corps doing a not especially distinguished job." Agreeing that more perspective was needed, Vermont Royster, Wall Street Journal, said: You may get a vivid description of a cut-up bat­ talion with names and addresses of hometown boys. Rarely, though a perspective description of the whole day's war much less a thoughtful analysis of how stands the army in the field.H The worst press failure, according to some critics, was television because "television's coverage of a war . . . carried the highest emotional--if not cerebral--impact of any reporting medium." 12 Its weakness, said Marshall, was "though the camera trains only on one luckless fighter or pans past a few palms, the illusion abounds that it is get- ting the whole thing." 13 A senior Army information officer upon his return from Vietnam, told a mixed audience of military and local commu­ nity leaders that television gave the public a distorted picture of the war. "We see the sensational, the bizarre, the unusual. We don't see a balanced picture of the good 14 and bad." In 1966, James Hagerty, an ABC vice president, defended television by saying: 43 Our people are traditionally the best informed people in the world. They expect the news media to present all the news—the good and the bad, the pros and cons—and then, on the basis of such information, they form their opinions. This is what we in television are doing with the Vietnam war.l^ But in 1968, Howard K. Smith, ABC news commentator, said: "The American press is contributing to the confusion and frustration now damaging the nation's spirit . . . Viet- 1 6 nam coverage is full of one-sided journalism." Perhaps alluding to both government secrecy (The Penta­ gon Papers) and a failure of the press, Richard Oliver, formerly of UPI, said: As a newsman who 'covered' that war, I am deeply disturbed with my own profession because I be­ lieve that if the American people had been told the truth this national tragedy would have been ended by now.17

Why Aren't We Getting Through? If the preceding indictment against the press were true, then the most troublesome question is "Why?" Was it the very nature of the war itself? Was it government and mili­ tary roadblocks? Was it stateside editors with preconceived biasnesses? Was it an apathetic public? Or, was it a fail­ ure of battlefield reporters? Although each of these propositions will be discussed separately, a possible answer may be found in all of these working in unison. While one may have been more dominant 44 than others for a period of time, the most satisfactory answer may have been in their collective impairment.

The Confusing War All wars are confusing and difficult to report. The so-called "fog of war" enveloped both the combatants and the most professional observer alike.1 8 In normal newspaper work, said Walter Lippmann, the "first rule for a reporter is, of course, to see and hear from everyone concerned with the event," but in the Vietnam war this was just v/hat a re­ porter could not do. "This essential and irremediable one- sidedness makes it necessary to read very skeptically the reports on the condition and progress of the war as a whole "•'•^ The problem, said Wes Gallagher, was that the "reader would like a clear, simple explanation of who's winning and what he, as a citizen, is paying for in blood and taxes." But, he noted, this problem cannot always be resolved because: It is the war itself, confusing and the most con­ troversial in American history. First there is the fighting. There are no measuring rods who is winning and losing each day. No towns are cap­ tured, occupied and put behind the lines. There is no front and few large battles by the standards of every other war . . . And when a reporter re­ ports the confusion accurately, he satisfies neither the readers nor the government, but that's his job.20 45 One military information officer reported that the problem was one of instantaneous reporting of a lot of small incidents, none of which had any serious bearing on the out­ come of the total effort. As one Saigon bureau chief re­ ported to him: "The war out there, in total, was too big to be covered in one story." 21 If the war were confusing to the print media, it was as equally, if not more, confusing to TV reporters. "On TV news pictures make their own frontpage context ..." and it is all but impossible to try to put pictures of one burn­ ing village in context and balance with all other activity that makes up a war. 22 In this respect. Pentagon officers were quoted as saying: . . . the camera's eye is all too myopic and its angle of vision too narrow to convey the full truth of a military action involving large forces, and the cameraman thus becomes an 'editor' as he chooses to record the action's more violent and dramatic aspects.23

A war as big, as confusing, and as complex as the Viet­ nam war "goes to the heart of limitations of journalism and the limitations of journalists," reported Charles Mohr, New York Times. "It begins to strain the limits of the talents that journalists have for clarity, exposition, just our abilities. And sometimes it's too much for us." 24 46 An Apathetic Public

A number of newsmen disagreed with Vice President Agnew's statement that "the public given sufficient informa- tion can make a sound decision about the war."2 5 According to Malcome Browne, the public had sufficient information and still did not absorb it: There have been millions, possibly billions, of words written about Vietnam. An American who really wants to know about Vietnam has had it in the newspapers, magazines, books, all sorts of things—and a lot of it good--over the last five to ten years. It's all been there, and he just failed to absorb it.26

Many journalists, said one observer, were aware that a number of intelligent Americans all too often had their mind "rigidly made up" about the war. They simply refused to accept the complexity of the war and for these, who "proclaim magnificently clear-cut solutions to the problems, what is reported from Vietnam is of less and less impor- tance." 27 Two former Saigon TV bureau chiefs believed the public dictated the news about the war. "The American public is interested in the fact that their boys are over here fighting and dying," reported Dick Rosenbaum, former -BC bureau chief in Saigon. "The war is fighting and killing—that's what it's all about. We do not report the other things if they are not new and dif- ferent .... "28 47

Responding to a question of why CBS took a negative

outlook on the war, Dan Bloom, former CBS bureau chief in

Saigon, answered: "It's a gloomy war. Bad news, sadly

enough, is usually the hottest news and that's what viewers 29 want to see . . . ."

Government Credibility

For many reporters, a number of whom are still reporting

from Vietnam today, the government's credibility gap began

during Ngo Dinh Diem's regime 30 and still persists today.

John Hohenberg, a correspondent who covered the war dur­

ing Diem's control had this to say on the government's

credibility problems:

They [McNamara and Sylvester] were heavily handi­ capped by the existing situation in Saigon during the early 1960's where the charming but inexperi­ enced Ambassador Fredrick Nolting and the blunt- spoken General Paul Harkins put all their trust in what they were told by Ngo Dinh Diem . . . Diem was full of glowing claims of victories . . . At that stage, unfortunately, both the American Embassy and the top-ranking American military believed him.31

While some correspondents during this era were content

to remain in Saigon and report the war from there, others

such as David Halberstam of the New York Times and Peter

Arnett of the Associated Press were on field operations re­ porting failures while the U.S. government was reporting victories• a. • . 32 48 The problem, said John Mecklin, American Embassy press officer in 1962-1963, "was the fact that much of what the newsmen took to be lies was exactly what the (American) Mission genuinely believed and what was reported to Washington . . . ." 33 Taking exception to Mecklin's statement that the "Mission genuinely believed" what it was reporting to Washing­ ton, Neil Hickey, who wrote a series of investigative articles on the press in Vietnam, said the credibility gap was "part of an unfortunate hangover from the Ngo Dinh Diem regime and the period after, when the press was indeed misled and even lied to by both Vietnamese and American officials" about the suc- cess of the war. 34 (Emphasis added). In 1966, Wes Gallagher charged: "An examination of the record in the past four years and what government officials have said about Vietnam in the same period leaves no doubt that reporting has been more accurate than official state- ^ ..35 ments. As a consequence. Jack Raymond, New York Times, felt an "undercurrent of doubt greets much of the news from Vietnam." In summary, Peter Arnett, Associated Press, did not be­ lieve the public was confused because the press failed: "It 37 is more of a failure of government explanations." Arnett, who covered the war for eight years since 1962, said the 49 Embassy used the "hard sell" and "attempted to shove the good news down our throats like toothpaste."^^

Editorial Bias

Editorial bias, a possible cause for the press failure in Vietnam, may have been unavoidable. Said Professor Verne E. Edwards: So long as mere humans write and edit the news, bias is inevitable. The question, of course, is whether those who process news and views try to be fair and how talented they are in their attempts. Like beauty, bias is often in the eye (or ear) of the beholder. Yet, there is no deny­ ing that bias, far beyond avoidable limits, does K ' I- •> show up too frequently.39 I, a

Any indictment of the press must also look at the edi­ ! s i 5 tors because, according to Peter Arnett, "any critical analysis of the Saigon press corps must also take into con­ sideration that . . . the reporters were surely a reflection of the organization that sent them over." 40 In this respect, a senior Army information officer said: I firmly believe that the editors in the states concluded a couple of years ago that the U.S. should get out of Vietnam no matter what hap­ pened and they devoted their resources to con­ vincing the American people of the validity of their conclusions.41

Malcome Browne, a critic who dealt at length with the question of "Are we getting through?" felt that editors, news directors and producers catered too much to a "boobus 50 Americanus" with vignettes and the traditional Ernie Pyle World War II reporting. As a reporter, Browne said that "whenever he would toucli on economic or political problems" people would either turn off their sets or "the producer switches you off and cuts in footage that he deems most

A O illustrative of what you're talking about." Browne felt that preconceived notions of editors dis­ torted the picture of the war. The reason, said Browne, was: . . . editors and news directors and so forth at the desk level back in the States are very little above the average level of information than the rest of the American public . . . and it isn't that these people are not intelligent, it's just that they're viewing the Viet Nam war in the con­ text of other wars that they do know about-- World War II and Korea and in some cases the Algerian war . . . .43

Although the Vietnam war was our most difficult war to interpret, said Hanson Baldwin, there were "very few editors who are willing or able to allocate the space or time re­ quired for real indepth reporting. Too often the day-by-day reporting is brief, episodic and partial."4 4 Echoing Baldwin's charges. Jack Raymond reported that "one serious flaw in the coverage of the war was that many newspapers devote insufficien*: space to it." He added that interpreta­ tive pieces about the war were sacrificed to "straight news" or "color stories" without interpretative background. 45 51 In som.e cases, a "color story" or a "sensational" piece may have been too good to pass up. V7alter Cronkite, CBS newscaster, and Ernest Leiser, executive producer of CBS, reported that they hesitated and worried for hours whether or not to run the Morley Safer (CBS Vietnam correspondent) film sequence showing U.S. Marines burning huts in a Viet­ namese village (August, 1965). They considered such ques­ tions as "Were the pictures fair to the U.S.?" "To the Marines?" "Or was their message somewhat out of balance?" The final decision was that "the pictures were sinply too good to pass up." While some stories or film may have been "too good to pass up," there was also the matter of cost. In 1966, it cost $3,000 an hour to lease a line from the West Coast to New York for film transmission. This cost did not include getting the film from Vietnam or developing it on the West Coast. Even if the film did not live up to the expectations cabled in by the Vietnam correspondent, the cost may have an 47 overbearing effect on the news editor's judgment. Too many times, a reporter received a query from a stateside editor without being told why a particular story was wanted, said an information officer for the Americal Division. After the editors edited the story he said that he "could not recognize it as the one filmed in the Americal Division. . . . „48 52

In 1969, Brigidier General L. Gordon Hill, Jr., then a colonel and chief of information for General Creighton

Abrams, said a common question he often received was: "Why don't we get a true picture of Vietnam back in the States?"

He admitted he did not have the answer. However, he cited a case where one news agency in Vietnam filed "a fascinating story of a province in the Delta where few people had ever heard a shot fired in anger—a real contrast to the general picture of South Vietnam." Yet, in the two weeks after the story was filed. Hill said, not one of the 100 largest papers 4 9 in the United States had carried the story.

The Vietnam Correspondent

In 1967, Richard Fryklund wrote:

. . . without trying to detract from the perfor­ mance of the officials who conned the public over the U-2, the Bay of Pigs, the missile crisis and the Vietnam war, I would like to give recognition to the men and women who contribute to the gov­ ernment's credibility gap--me and my fellow reporters.50

The moral, said Fryklund, is simple: "Never believe everything your public officials say; they're often wrong.

And so are the reporters who purport to tell you what those 51 officials are saying."

The Vietnam correspondent, if for no other reason than being a constant source of war news--both the good and bad-- became a major candidate for criticism. As in previous 53 sections, the indictment will generally accentuate the bad, but this is not to imply that the criticisms apply to all or even the majority of newsmen who have served in Vietnam. In many cases, all the previous "reasons" seemed to have con­ verged with the battlefield reporter becoming a convenient whipping boy. The press in Vietnam, said Peter Braestrup, who covered the war in 1966-1967 for the New York Times and later for the Washington Post, was a "motley crew" consisting of the best and the worse. At one point, rosters of newsmen in country included a "demented old lady from an evangelical journal in Duluth, a brace of dogmatic pacifists, an Irish Catholic priest, Koreans who doubled as spies, an American lady who indulged in black-market currency manipulations, a stalwart girl parachute jumper and Swiss photographers who 52 never took pictures." Peter Arnett reported that anyone could become a war correspondent and as a result all kinds were in Vietnam: "starry-eyed blondes just out of journalism school; alco­ holic Old China Hands trying to dry out; some reporters were working their way out of debt, and others working their way into it; some were looking for a wife, others trying to lose theirs. "^-^ A Newsday correspondent said the Vietnam press corps over the years have included a "startlingly large number of 54 inexperienced reporters who aren't competent to judge much 54 of anything." Correspondents in Saigon "simply are not capable of adequately reporting military operations," charged a New York Times writer.^^ An Army briefing officer wrote that not more than a dozen of the press corps were qualified to report this war.^^ If Vietnam correspondents were derelict, reported some observers, it was because of the war itself. Frank Stanton, president of CBS, said: "Besides its baffling intrinsic nature, the Vietnam war has also been a baffling one for our newsmen, our reporters and our cameramen." Alluding to a war of no fixed fronts, no safe rear areas, Stanton continued, "They [the reporters] have had to use ingenuity, persistence and sheer guts" to report the war. 57 Even a correspondent with a unit in battle was "hard put to keep the action in perspective," said Jack Raymond. "Even when he can see part of it, he is as dependent as a traffic cop at an accident on the coherence of the partici- 58 pants and other witnesses." Peter Kalischer, CBS, said, "Once you commit yourself to a company during a military operation, you're with them. You can't jump in a jeep and look someplace else for a battle . . . ." 59 General Hill reported that a problem arose when a news­ man returned from action in the field and got a different report than what he observed. As an example, he cited a 55

25th Infantry Division action where a newsman saw bodies of 21 U.S. dead being evacuated. However, when he returned that day to the JUSPAO briefings, the military reported only 6 U.S. killed. What the newsman did not know, and refused to accept after it was explained to him, reported Hill, was that the additional 15 Americans had been killed earlier in several other skirmishes and were brought in for evacuation. While these added losses were reported in perspective at a later briefing, "if this reporter is touring the country, he is probably still using this as an example of military lying," Hill said.^° Competition, and "animalistic . . . zeal to outdo one another, even to the point of physical contact," created "sheer muck-raking," reported a particularly bitter Army information officer. While pointing out that some Vietnam correspondents were "personable, ethical and strive to be fair and objective," others, he said, were so incensed with competition that "they believe they are there to uncover goof-ups" rather than responsible reporting. The "sensational, the bizarre and the unusual" reporting usually seen on television stemmed, in part, from intense competition, said a senior information officer. "The net­ works are competing not only with each other, but also inter­ nally . . • the NBC man in Saigon is competing with the NBC man in London, Tel Aviv or wherever he might be. Hence, he 56 looks for the kind of picture material which will increase his chance of exposure." For some newsmen, Vietnam represented a short-cut in establishing their careers. As one unnamed TV correspondent confided to Neil Hickey of TV Guide: "For TV newsmen of a certain age group, you've got to have Vietnam on your record if you want to succeed. It's like being knighted into full

3 correspondent status." ft

This desire to "make a name for themselves" caused some

newsmen to sensationalize and lose their "allegiance to ob­

jectivity," reported a Navy public affairs officer in Viet­

nam. He conceded, however, that since 19 66 more "mature,

responsible correspondents" were in Vietnam "trying to do 64 an objective, complete job of reporting."

Another Navy public affairs officer reported that in

the latter part of 1968, "as the war was winding down some­ what, many low caliber newsmen began showing up . . . and many young newsmen were there to try to make a name for themselves."

In the second of his four part series on television coverage of the war, Neil Hickey quoted an "older TV hand" as saying: "I'm appalled that some correspondents are allowed to come here for as little as three months. They have no interest in Asian affairs. They're here to make a 6 6 quick name for themselves and get out." 57 In 1966, S. L. A. Marshall said "the deplorable thing is that young writers too lazy to gather the facts for them­ selves sit around and sneer at all that is said." In 1971 an Army information officer echoed Marshall's charges: "Frequently newsmen are too content to stay in Saigon rather than go to the field and get the story. This results in an over demanding attitude for 'us' to do 'their' fi 7 work." According to a Navy public affairs officer, "the Saigon press corps has become fat and lazy, and unreasonably 6 Q demanding" that MACOI do their research for them. One Army information officer reported that the relation­ ship between the press and military deteriorated because the press sought the sensational and tended to report that which "supported their biases and predispositions. As a result, news stories and TV programs presented an inaccurate, unfair and unbalanced picture of the war." 69 Those newsmen with "prejudged positions about U.S. in­ volvement" in Vietnam were determined to be "first with the worst," reported an Air Force information officer. Further­ more, he added, "most of the media are so determined that we will lose the war that they are going to report it so, 70 even if they have to do so in advance of the event. While the previous indictments of the Vietnam corre­ spondent seem severe, Galvin Young of the London Observer said, "Fortunately, there is a hard core of expert reporters 58 of considerable experience and sensitivity—they tend to write off the rest as 'police reporters.'" These expert correspondents, he continued, are "painstakingly well- 71 informed about political as well as military developments."

NBC's Jack Fern reported that all correspondents worried about "achieving a proper balance between combat and background stories," but then admitted that "there's nothing more exciting than actual violence." Despite this. Colonel

Roger Bankston, former MACV Chief of Information, said: "I haven't seen a TV newsman yet who'll show something gruesome

just for the shock of it." 72

Commenting on Vietnam correspondents, military informa­ tion officers felt that older, professional newsmen reported objectively while young, inexperienced newsmen were prone to be "instant experts" about Vietnam and warfare m general. 73

"The fast-buck, anti-establishment newsman in Vietnam will turn out different accounts than the seasoned, honest, yet anti-establishment reporter," said a Navy public affairs 74 officer.

A field correspondent is not "infallible," said Elmer

W. Lower, president of ABC News, "or that from a single ac­ tion he instinctively grasps the so-called 'big picture.'"

But, he added, seasoned war correspondents "such as we have in Vietnam now, know how to give an unbiased reading to the public. 59

In defense of the entire press corps, a Navy public affairs officer said, "Some were very professional--others much the opposite. By and large, it was the finest group 7 6 of media with whom I have ever been associated."

The Military

The military, like the correspondents, were a major candidate for criticism for any press failures in the war.

It was the military that controlled the majority of war news and imposed restrictions upon the newsmen who were trying to report the war. Even for those reporters who traveled exten­ sively throughout Vietnam, military briefings represented a primary source of news about the "big picture" of the war.

And lastly, it was the military which held the key factor in war coverage in Vietnam--transportation.

Thus, the military, and especially its information appa­ ratus known as MACOI, were a possible cause for a confused public. The indictment against the military is the subject of the next chapter.

Summary

It has been said that truth—the whole truth—is an 77 inevitable casualty of any war. If this is true, at least partial fault can be attributed to the press who have always claimed the mission of defending the truth. 60 The Vietnam war has been perhaps the most covered war in the nation's history. With an average of 500 correspon­ dents per month during the war's peak blanketing the country, little should have escaped their scrutiny. In the opinions of such men as Wes Gallagher (AP) and Francis Leary (UPI) little did and the Vietnam war was the best covered war in history. Conversely, both from within and outside the media, a number of observers and writers felt the press had been derelict in their mission. A number of factors, however, may have been responsible for any press dereliction. For example, the Vietnam war v/as indeed a confusing war—small unit actions, isolated incidents, no front lines, no safe rear areas and no standard measuring rods of pre­ vious wars. For these reasons alone, it was a difficult war to put into proper perspective. As aptly put by Charles Mohr (New York Times) the Vietnam war strained the "limita­ tions of journalism and the limitations of journalists." A number of writers contended that it was not a failure of the press at all but rather an apathetic public who failed to absorb the millions of words, photos and miles of film about the war. Other writers cited the adversary relationship between the government and a free press as contributing to the con­ fusion about the war. The government's credibility gap 61 consisting of news management, news suppression, secrecy and cases of informal censorship added to the reasons for a press failure. "Bias is inevitable," said Professor Edwards. Charges were made that editors and their preconceived opinions on the war resulted in only one side of the war being told to the American public. Perhaps the most criticized "cause," however, was the individual correspondent. Criticisms ranged from the lazy or inexperienced reporter to those with preconceived "anti" positions or those seeking only personal glory at the ex­ pense of truth. And lastly, the military in Vietnam, through various machinations ranging from cases of outright censorship at the source to more subtle forms of barriers such as simply refusing to give newsmen transportation may have contributed to the press failure. The most logical answer to the assumption that the press did in fact fail in Vietnam would be that no single factor caused such a failure. Rather, all of the reasons listed previously acting in concert would seem to be the summary reason for the indictment against the press. NOTES

Stevens, personal letter. Colonel Stevens also stated that correspondent data prior to 1967 had been destroyed by fire. 2 "The Saigon Follies?" Newsweek, August 15, 1966, p. 10, 3 David J. Armor, Joseph B. Giacquinta, R. Gordon Mcintosh, and Diana E. H. Russell, "Professors' Attitudes Toward the Vietnam War," Public Opinion Quarterly, XXXI (1967), 163-164. 4 John Maffre, "Fullbright Doesn't Like the Way the War is Reported," The Washington Post, October 3, 1966. 5 H. L. Schwartz III, "Agnew Raps News Media," Lubbock Avalanche-Journal, June 15, 1970. (Hereinafter referred to as Agnew Raps). Stanton H. Perry, "War Coverage 'Best We've Had' Says AP's Gallagher," The Seattle Times, October 21, 1966, p. 8. 7 S. L. A. Marshall, "Press Failure in Vietnam," The New Leader, October 10, 1966, p. 25. ^Ibid. UPI wire copy, release 209B, October 12, 1966. Ward Just, "Vietnam," Washington Post, February 23, 1966, p. 1. Veinnont Royster, "Thinking Things Over," Wall Street Journal, October 27, 1966, p. 18. Neil Hickey, "Vietnam: Is Television Giving Us the Picture?" TV Guide, October 8, 1966, p. 27. •'" S. L. A. Marshall, "TV Covers Bits and Pieces of Frag­ mented Vietnam War," Philadelphia Inquirer, April 3, 1966. Greg Pinney, "TV and Press Accused of Distorting Viet News," Denver Post, May 16, 1968. Address was made by Colonel Joseph R. Meacham before the Armed Forces Week Lunch­ eon, Lowry Air Force Base, Colorado. Although text of Meacham's speech carried a disclaimer that these were his opinions and not those of the Department of the Army, the press report cited did not so indicate. 62 63 15 James C. Hagerty, "TV: Exposing the False Glory of War," New York Times, December 25, 1966, p. 27. 16 "Disillusioned with Journalism," Time, March 1, 1968, p. 42. 17 . Richard Oliver, New York Daily News reporter. New York, New York, personal letter, June 29, 1971. 18 Raymond, "It's A Dirty War," p. 33. 19 Walter Lippmann, "Reporting from Vietnam," Washington Post, December 27, 1966, p. 15. 20 Wes Gallagher, "The Press, The Truth, and The Vietnam War," San Francisco Examiner, June 3, 1966. 21 Comments from a military information officer respon­ dent to author's survey of May, 1971. Survey methods and results are presented in Chapter VI. (Hereinafter respon­ dents to this survey will be referred to as Survey respondent). 22 "Television," Time, October 14, 1966, p. 58. 23 Neil Hickey, "Keeping the War m Focus," TV Guide, October 15, 1966, p. 14. 24 "Are We Getting Through?" Columbia Journalism Review, V (Fall, 1966), 41-42.

^^Schwartz III, "Agnew Raps," p. 12C.

^^"Are We Getting Through?" p. 41. 27 Galvin Young (The London Observer), "Despite News Volume From Vietnam, Americans Seem Baffled About War," Salt Lake Tribune, December 25, 1966, p. 30. (Hereinafter referred to as Despite War News). 28 Mimeographed transcript of the United States Army, Vietnam, Information Officer's Conference, Joint United States Public Affairs Office, Saigon, Vietnam, June 3-4, 1968. (Hereinafter referred to as Army Information Con­ ference, Saigon). ^^Ibid. 30 Ngo Dinh Diem became the head of the government of South Vietnam in 1954 and was assassinated in 1963. 64 31 John Hohenberg, The News Media: A Journalist Looks at his Profession (New York: Hoik, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1968), p. 142. 32 For an excellent account of this see David Halberstams's The Making of a Quagmire (New York: Random House, Inc., 1964) , 33 John Mecklin, Mission in Torment (New York: Double- day and Co., Inc., 1965), p. 100. 34 Neil Hickey, "When TV Tries to Mirror the War . . . .' TV Guide, October 22, 1966, p. 37. 35 Gallagher, "The Press, The Truth, and The Vietnam War. " 3 6 Raymond, "It's A Dirty War," p. 33. 37 Peter Arnett, "A Time to Tell the Truth About War," Seminar, March, 1971, p. 18. (Hereinafter referred to as A Time to Tell the Truth). Ibid., p. 15. 39 Verne E. Edwards, Jr., Journalism in a Free Society (Dubuque, Iowa: Wm. C. Brown Company, 1970) , p"] 53. "^^Arnett, "A Time to Tell the Truth," p. 18. 41 Survey respondent. Colonel Robert J. Berens, USA, formerly an information officer in Vietnam and currently an information officer with the Army Material Command, Washing­ ton, D.C. 42 "Viet War as TV 'Entertainment,'" Variety Newspaper, November 2, 1966, p. 28. Also see "Are V7e Getting Through?" Columbia Journalism Review, Fall, 1966. '^"^"Are We Getting Through," p. 42. 44 ... Hanson Baldwin, "The Information War in Saigon," The Reporter, February 24, 1966, p. 31. (Hereinafter re­ ferred to as The Information War). ^^Raymond, "It's A Dirty War," p. 33. 46 . . "Television," Time, p. 58. 65 47 Ibid., p. 57. Survey respondent, Ma^or Robert D. Baily, Jr. infor­ mation officer with the Americal Division, May 1970-May 1971. 49 Ma3or Bob Chick, "Military-Press Relations: Like It Is in Vietnam," The Quill, November, 1969, p. 22. 50 . Richard Fryklund, "Widening the 'Credibility Gap,'" The Washington Star, January 3, 1967, p. 8. Ibid. 52 Peter Braestrup, "Covering the Vietnam War," Neiman Reports, XXIII, No. 4 (December, 1969), 9. 53 Arnett, "A Time to Tell the Truth," p. 16. 54 Survey respondent, Nev7sday reporter who declined use of his name. 55 Baldwin, "The Information War," p. 31. Survey respondent. Army information officer who declined use of his name. 57 Frank Stanton, "The Face of War," The Quill, March, 1966, p. 13. ^^Raymond, "It's A Dirty War," p. 32. 59 Neil Hickey, "TV Guide Goes to the Battlefront," TV Guide, October 1, 1966, p. 8. Brigidier General Gorden Hill, Directorate of Defense Infomation, Department of Defense, Washington, D.C, private interview, March 23, 1971. Hill was a colonel during this interview and later was promoted to Brigidier General. As of this report, he was serving again as MACV Chief of Informa­ tion. 61 Survey respondent. Army information officer who de­ clined use of his name. 6 2 Joseph R. Meacham, Colonel, USA, an address delivered before the Armed Forces Week Luncheon, Lowry Air Force Base, Colorado, May 15, 1968. 66 63 . , Hickey, "TV Guide Goes to the Battlefront," p. 10. 64 Survey respondent. Lieutenant Commander R. Dale Klinkerman, Navy public affairs officer. 6 tr Survey respondent. Navy public affairs officer who declined use of his name. 6 6 Neil Hickey, "Meanwhile, Back in Saigon . . . ," TV Guide, October 8, 1966, p. 32. 67 Survey respondent. Major Jack H. Oswald, Army informa­ tion officer. 68 Survey respondent, Lieutenant Commander George P. Beinstadt, Navy public affairs officer. 69 Survey respondent. Army information officer who de­ clined use of his name. 70 Survey respondent. Air Force information officer who declined use of his name. 71 Young, Despite News Volume," p. 30. 72 Hickey, "Keeping the War m Focus," p. 14. 73 Survey respondent. Major Robert Masters, Army informa­ tion officer. 74 Survey respondent. Commander Jim Eaves, Navy public affairs officer. 75 Elmer W. Lower, President of ABC News, "Field Corre­ spondents and the Laos Incursion," an address delivered to Alpha Epsilon Rho, Chicago, Illinois, March 27, 1971. 7 6 Survey respondent. Navy public affairs officer who declined use of his name. "^"^"The War," Time, August 19, 1966, p. 18. CHAPTER IV THE INDICTMENT AGAINST THE MILITARY

Introduction In the early days of the war, from 1962-1965, the small number of newsmen in Vietnam dealt with the Chief of the United States Information Service who was also the U.S. Embassy press attache. The few Vietnamese Army public rela­ tions officers were also psychological warfare officers and political education officers. In mid-1965, the military expanded its information organization. In addition to MACOI, each major unit had at least an information officer and many had a full staff of military reporters, writers, photographers and artists. For most newsmen, military commanders and their infor­ mation officers in Vietnam represented major sources of news about the war. As news sources, both frequently in­ curred the wrath of the Saigon press corps. A Navy public affairs officer stated that upon his arrival in Saigon he went to dinner with an American newsman The newsman informed him that "you and your command are my enemy, not Hanoi." The reason, explained the newsman, was because he had to fight the information officer and the U.S. 2 command for what he got in the way of news, not Hanoi.

67 68 The Case Against the Military The indictment against the military's information effort in Vietnam can be reduced to specifics rather than the broad generalization that the press 'had to fight the information officer and the U.S. command' for what they got in the way of news.

Many of the specific indictments against the military can be traced to the absence of support. A general press attitude existed that military information officers acted first as public relations officers with their press support role receiving only secondary emphasis. For discussion purposes, indictments against the mili­ tary can be grouped into seven major areas: ground rules, briefings, informations officers, commanders, escort officers, transportation, and enemy body count.

MACV Ground Rules The basic philosophy behind military ground rules on release of information was to protect U.S. lives. A form of "self" or "voluntary" censorship by newsmen, the ground rules listed specific areas of information which could not be re­ leased without MACV approval. Before becoming accredited by MACV, corresponder-3 were required to sign that they agreed to the rules and understood that violations could result in loss of accreditation and subsequent loss of all military assistance. 69

"Ground rules are common sense," said General Winant

Sidle, former MACV Chief of Information. "All a reporter has to do is ask himself, 'Will this help the enemy?'"^

A French reporter in Vietnam, who was reported not in sympathy with the U.S. position in the war, said:

An Army has the right to protect itself. I think the ground rules are fair. They may delay you a bit in telling the story to your readers, but you can tell it eventually. If there were censorship, the censors could edit out anything embarrassing to the United States.4

"Voluntary censorship" or ground rules was accepted by most newsmen as a reasonable alternative to formal censor­ ship. In July, 1965, newsmen were asked to comply with the rules voluntarily and no action would be taken against vio- 5 lators. However, one month later, when the military felt the rules were violated. Colonel Ben Legare, then MACV Chief of Information, announced that "any future violations of security rules would be punished by canceling the military accreditation of the offending journalist." Since this announcement, ground rules were a major source of friction between newsmen and the military.

The initial purpose of the ground rules have not changed substantially since 1965. With the intensification of U.S. military involvement in Vietnam, the military felt that "in­ formation on the movements to actions and our losses in those actions give the enemy a tremendous advantage in making tac- 7 tical decisions." 70 As stated in Chapter II, there were 15 areas of non- releaseable information requiring MACV approval. (See supra, p. 29). However, the two most persistent press complaints centered on how military information officers interpreted the ground rules and embargoes placed on future plans, oper­ ations or strikes. Newsmen frequently charged that military information officers interpreted the ground rules in such a manner so o as to deny newsmen legitimate information about the war. Said Jack Walsh, former UPI bureau chief in Saigon: I think the thing which restricts the press is the ground rules. The press is not trying to go out and give aid and comfort to the enemy, but the ground rules are very interpretive. The mat­ ter of what can and can't be released is at the entire discretion of MACV, and using these ground rules MACV is able to answer questions with such comments as 'I have no knowledge of that' or 'we have no report on that.' And that doesn't mean it didn't happen. And we're asking honest ques­ tions about American troops or something like that, and we can't always get an honest answer.^ Even military information officers were critical of MACV's interpretation of the rules. An Air Force information officer said that interpretation of ground rules by "non­ qualified but assigned public information officers" inhibited full disclosure of information to the press. "One of the biggest problems m any type of 'censorship' I encountered was the individual interpretation of the ground rules," said an Army information officer. "Something 'o.k.' one day 71 would be a 'no no' the next day and 'o.k.' two days later." A Navy public affairs officer said that MACV in­ terpretation of the rules was what he thought to be censor­ ship. He reported: I wrote daily news summaries on fleet activities for distribution at the follies . . . often di­ rect quotes from pilots would be changed at MACV to say something different. When the pilot would say 'village,' it would be changed to 'staging area' or 'transhipment point.' This might have been true but they were still villages.-^ Perhaps the most troublesome ground rule area for both newsmen and the military was non-releaseable information concerning future plans and operations. The ground rule on future plans stated that the follow­ ing information may not be used until released by MACV: Future plans, operations, or strikes. This mate­ rial is never to be released until after the plan, operation, or strike has taken place.13 In effect, a correspondent must agree to accept a volun­ tary embargo on such information—even if the newsman ob­ tained such information independently of military sources. While embargoes allowed newsmen to cover an operation while it was in progress; written copy, photographs and motion- picture footage had to be withheld until MACV announced the operation. One of the first major operations embargoed by the mili­ tary was in April, 1965. A U.S. force initiated a tactical operation against the Viet Cong in the Ashau Valley. 72

Newsmen were allowed to accompany units but were under an embargo not to release any information until announced by

MACV. Although the military normally announced an operation after one or two days, the Ashau Valley operation remained embargoed for 11 days.

According to Gene Roberts of the New York Times, news­ men "suspected the command of having embargoed the operation to avoid 'embarrassing' the United States while it was try­ ing to get peace talks under way." Roberts added that other newsmen could see "no valid military reason for not writing that the Americans were in Ashau inasmuch as the enemy was shooting at them."

On the fifth day of the operation. General William C

Westmoreland announced the embargo would remain in effect for days, possibly weeks, in order to protect American lives. 15 Yet, six days later, on the eleventh day of the operation, the embargo was broken in Washington by columnist

Joseph Alsop. MACV then followed suit with the announcement in Saigon. Vietnam correspondents were enraged over Alsop's ground rule violation and especially so because Alsop, then on tour in Vietnam, was never disciplined for having broken the embargo. Gene Roberts described Alsop as "a strong advocate 1 6 of United States involvement in Vietnam . . . ." Another wr iter said Alsop was "... the super-hawk of American 73 journalism . . . the Pentagon's best friend—and Westmore­ land's bitter-end supporter. "'''^ Less than two months later, John Carroll, the Baltimore Sun's only correspondent in Vietnam, had his accreditation suspended for two months for violating an embargo on the Marine's abandonment of its garrison at Khe Sanh. Carroll went to Khe Sanh and observed Marines disassembling the metal runways and dynamiting bunkers. Convinced the enemy troops, who then encircled Khe Sanh, could see all this from their nearby positions, Carroll returned to Saigon and released the story. 18 Carroll's disaccreditation, coming shortly after Alsop's violation with no discipline, embit- tered many Vietnam correspondents. 19 In the history of the Vietnam war, few allied opera­ tions generated as much confusion and bitter press com­ plaints as did the joint U.S./Vietnamese drive into Laos in February, 1971. A Washington Post page one headline illus­ trated the confusion: "News of Embargo is Embargoed, Un- 20 Embargoed, Re-Embargoed." As the headline suggested, the fact that an embargo was in effect was embargoed. Temporarily, Jerry W. Friedheim, deputy assistant secretary of defense for public affairs, lifted the MACV embargo in Washington only to re-embargo it during the same press conference. 21 74

The Laotian news problem started, according to General

Sidle, when MACV decided that the Vietnamese were "ready to

stand alone" on their own information program. "When the

Laos thing came along, it was decided at the top MACV level

to let the ARVN (Army, Republic of Vietnam) handle the infor­

mation aspects," said Sidle. "They had a good plan too, but

at the eleventh hour for some reason, word came down--no ,.22 press."

MACV officials decided that since President Thieu was

scheduled for a press conference on the second day of the

operation, he could make the Laotian announcement. For some

reason, however. President Thieu did not make the announce­

ment, said Sidle, and on the third day of the operation one

of two Vietnamese helicopters used by the press was shot

down and newsmen killed. Finally, on the fifth day, MACV

felt it had to get back in the act but according to Sidle,

it was too late. "It started bad and never got better,"

Sidle said.

Sidle went on to explain that the South Vietnamese Army

commanders had the same authority as did U.S. commanders in keeping the press out of their operation areas. As a result, said Sidle, "the press views on this was that the Vietnamese were trying to hide something. We really lost the public 23 affairs battle on this one." 75 The Saigon press corps were furious from the beginning of the Laotian campaign because never before had the U.S. slapped an embargo on a combat operation of such size, dura­ tion and scope. To most, the military security imposed was

O A an excuse to "cloak a politically explosive decision." As press criticisms mounted, MACV and Washington firmly held to the embargoed status for eight days. Among the many press complaints, the following were common: 1. While the intent of the embargo was to deny informa­ tion to the enemy about the operation, the Soviet Union's Izvestia and Tass had been reporting the action for days. Japan's Kyodo News Agency reported the operation and even Saigon's Vietnamese newspapers were carrying the stories. While Hanoi had access to what the U.S. and South Vietnamese were doing, the American press could not tell the U.S. pub- 25 lie that even an embargo was m effect. 2. At the outset of the Laotian operation, newsmen were barred from flying in U.S. helicopters into Laos. This prompted the Associated Press to charge "censorship at 2 6 the source of the news." A Washington Post reporter wrote that one reason given by MACV for refusing to fly newsmen across the border was international commercial aviation agreements, "even though the command showed no compunction about doing so during last May's Cambodian incursion." 27 76

Even when a correspondent managed to slip aboard a U.S. helicopter, he was thwarted in his news gathering efforts.

A South Vietnamese cameraman working for NBC managed to slip aboard a U.S. helicopter but when he began to film the

American door gunner, the soldier seized the cameraman's

$700 camera and threw it into the jungle below. "I've got 2 8 my orders," the soldier explained.

After four civilian photographers, including Life's

Larry Burrows, were killed in a Vietnamese helicopter which had become lost over Laos and shot down, most newsmen stopped riding in what they termed "unreliable Vietnamese aircraft." Concerned about the "bad press" the Laotian cam­ paign was receiving, MACV later modified its ban and autho­ rized one U.S. and one Vietnamese helicopter to carry 29 newsmen across the border into Laos.

3. Another major complaint was that the U.S. was not candid about its aircraft losses in Laos. MACV reported that between February 8, 1971, and March 3, 1971, 22 heli­ copters were lost in Laos. Yet, Holger Jensen, Associated Press, reported U.S. pilots said four or five times that number were shot down. The U.S. command, said Jensen, did not consider any helicopter lost if it were eventually re­ covered. "Their crews might be dead or wounded, their structure so badly damaged they would have to be sent back 77 to the U.S. to be made operative again, but they're not lost," Jensen said."^^

4. Throughout the Laotian campaign, newsmen complained that sources either refused to talk or were ordered not to talk. Jensen reported that U.S. helicopter pilots flew 31 1,000 sorties daily over Laos but were ordered to "keep

(their) mouths shut," by their commanding officers.^^ Two

Air Force fighter-bomber pilots, rescued from Laos after being shot down, were "absolutely unavailable" to newsmen said the Air Force chief of information at Da Nang, because they are undergoing medical observation in a hospital. Jensen reported a newsman found the pilots drinking beer in 33 an officers' club. Still another case cited by Jensen was when an Air Force pilot refused to tell newsmen whether the enemy had radar-controlled anti-aircraft guns. His refusal was based on "that's classified information." The newsman, said Jensen, tried unsuccessfully to explain to the pilot that the enemy knows what kind of anti-aircraft guns they have. 34 (Emphasis added).

5. A number of newsmen complained about unreliable

South Vietnamese information on Laos. For example, ABC's

Nick George said, "... the ARVN reports 13,668 enemy killed . . . There's got to be at least three wounded for each killed in action. That would make a total K.I.A.

[killed in action] and wounded of 54,672 for the enemy 78 today. Yet, high U.S. authorities said last Sunday there were 11 enemy regiments—or about 33,000 men in Laos."^^ In summary, the press castigated the military for offi­ cial censorship and ambiguity during the Laotian campaign. From the beginning, said Don Farmer, ABC, "coverage of the Laos invasion has been a nightmare of misinformation, lack of information, inability to get to the story and apparent reluctance by the military of both countries to let us do our jobs . . . ." A persistent question asked by newsmen was "why?" Why did the U.S. diminish its credibility by denying informa­ tion already known? Part of the answer, said George McArthur, Los Angeles Times, was in the "recollection of the furor" caused by the Cambodian operation nine months earlier among the American public and Congress. 37 In any event, MACV seemed to have tacitly, although belatedly, recognized press failure in the Laotian offense. As reported in the semi-official Army Times newspaper: Although late in the game, the Army has one of its top press officers in Vietnam trying to sell senior officers on the wisdom of talking (when possible) to reporters in Vietnam . . . V7ashington officials are known to believe some flaps in Vietnam could have been avoided if senior commanders were more receptive to reporters. A major example is the alleged lack of cooperation with Vietnamese news­ men during the Laotian invasion.38 79 Briefings

Military press briefings were a constant source of friction between newsmen and military information officers. The "five o'clock follies," held at JUSAPO until a 1968 fire caused the briefings to be moved to a Vietnamese press building in Saigon, represented one way newsmen could get the story of total war, at least as it was seen and re­ ported by the military. For this reason, most newsmen tol­ erated the briefings and tried to get as much extra information from them as they could. The value of the briefings was illustrated by Time's bureau chief in Saigon in 1965: "There is no way of knowing where the news may be. It is a fact of life which has led to the necessity for daily Saigon briefings ..." 39 Although noting some improvements in the briefings, Hanson Baldwin commented in 1966 that: Information was inadequate, late or inaccurate. Correspondents who had returned from a battle area found they often knew more about what was actually happening than the briefing officer.40 Many newsmen in 1966 felt the briefings were too pre- emptory. "You can't possibly rely on them," said ABC's Roger Peterson. "I don't feel any animosity to the briefers; they're doing what they're told." In 1971, Peterson's 1966 charges were echoed by Newsweek which reported that the Saigon briefings "have become so tense and empty" that one 80

correspondent remarked, "It's like watching silent movies—

the effect would be the same if they hired mutes as

briefers."

Jack Foisie, Los Angeles Times, reported, "However well

the war is going at the moment, the American high command

seems unable to speak with candor on battle activity, even

A ^ after the battle is over." A Detroit News correspondent

said it was entirely possible to spend three months travel­

ling throughout Vietnam and find a depressing picture "only

to return to Saigon for an official briefing for the press 44 or visiting VIP that gave an opposite picture." A basic complaint against the briefings was lack of

information on basic subjects such as bombing missions,

casualties and background details to flesh out stories.

"The reports we get these days [1971] are just too

vague," said George Esper who has been in Vietnam more than

four years for the Associated Press. "There is no depth to

the briefings and when you try to find out on background basis what's happening, so many guys don't know anything-- 45 or at least say they don't."

Alvin Shuster, Saigon bureau chief of the New York

Times, said, "The lack of briefings on specific and vital subjects is a serious gap in the military information ..46 policy. 81 Joe Fried of the New York Daily News, who may have spent more consecutive time in Vietnam than any other news­ man, described the information situation in early 1971 as "the worst I've seen in 7 1/2 consecutive years here, cer-

A T tainly the worst since the (Ngo Dinh) Diem days." In general, most newsmen condemned the briefings but were inclined to forgive individual military information officers on day-to-day battle briefings. Jack Foisie, Los Angeles Times, said information officers "are more often guilty of withholding news than falsifying it."4 8 Charles Mohr, New York Times, said, "They [briefers] themselves don't have a clear idea of what happened" since they can only pass on information which field commanders report to the military headquarters m Saigon. 49 Summarizing newsmen's attitudes toward MACV briefings and briefing officers, Elmer W. Lower, President of ABC News, said, "... I will take the word of a field corre­ spondent over the word of a briefing officer every time. The correspondent doesn't have a vested interest; the brief- ing officer does." 50

The Information Officer The military information officer, who had almost daily contact with the press, received a considerable share of press criticisms. 82 Many newsmen felt that information officers were pri­ marily public relation officers. CBS newsman Morley Safer said that "no government or military press agent ever gives the whole truth." 51 Agreeing, Malcome Browne reported that it was the news media's task "to unmask him [the information officer] when he's lying, which they do." 52 Criticisms of the information officer ranged from lazi- ness, 53 "uselessness to the newsman save for organizing transportation," 54 to more bitter comments such as "military information personnel are idiots that cannot make it in an- other branch of service." 55 Even information officers were critical of their own. Said an Army information officer, "I think that 10's fre­ quently are not objective, sometimes are dishonest and very 56 frequently cannot or will not provide timely information." An Air Force 10 said: "... all the information media [military] made it so tough . . . withholding, lying, re­ stricting, that the newsman lost his sense of responsibil- ity•4. . ,.5" 7 Commenting on the professionalism of information offi­ cers, a Navy public affairs officer said, "When I arrived in the MACV newsroom there were four briefers, none of whom had had previous press experience and let their personal feelings temper their actions with regards to the media." 58 83 In early 1971, newsmen were complaining about being given an official run-around by MACOI officials. Newsmen charged that military information officers, instead of answering questions, referred reporters to someone else who was likely to say he didn't know the answers or was not authorized to give out the information.^^

Military Commanders In many cases, press criticisms against military infor­ mation officers stemmed indirectly from the lOs' commanders. All information officers, at all levels, worked for or car­ ried out specific policies of their commanders. As one senior information officer put it: "The information officer is caught in the middle between the commander who doesn't want to tell the press anything and the reporter who wants everything4-u • . ..6 0 The information officer is a "victim of his boss, the commander," said George Wilson, Washington Post. "If the commander doesn't want to speak to the press, the 10 is limited in what he can say." A primary press complaint stemmed from commanders re­ stricting their talks with newsmen only on background, mean­ ing that newsmen r,<^st attribute their sources as "military sources" and the like. Commanders refusing to talk on-the- record, said Holger Jensen, Associated Press, allov/ed them 84 to be quoted as "sources" and thus avoid responsibility for their statements."^^

A freelance reporter said senior officers are afraid of the press. "Middle and junior officers are afraid of lousing up a career and say nothing" which results in a 63 "rigid, if informal, de facto censorship." An Army infor­ mation officer reported his commander "was afraid of his shadow and wouldn't have released anything unless told he had no choice." 64 General Sidle reported that commanders were one of two major factors responsible for the bad press in Vietnam. 65 "The truth of the matter," said Sidle, "was that we had too many commanders who didn't understand the press." 6 fi Peter Arnett, Associated Press, said some commanders distrusted the press and this distrust was evident in the actions of the commander's subordinates: Those [commanders] who are suspicious of our [press] intentions don't exactly obstruct us, but they generally set the tone and that generally means non-availability of helicopters, uncoopera­ tive staff officers in the intelligence and op­ erational fields and powerless information officers.67 Defending commanders from overt interference with the press, Don Farmer, ABC, charged that commanders' incompe­ tence caused the same results: I do not think that American commanders deliber­ ately tried to prevent coverage of the action [Laotian offense]. They may have but I cannot 85 prove it. But if they did not, then their incom­ petence in dealing with the press and their appar­ ent resentment of press coverage resulted in the same end.6 8

Escorts Although no formal written policy existed on military escorts for newsmen, such a policy unquestionably existed, at least for television newsmen. 69 General Sidle reported that military escorts for TV crews originated early in the war when a U.S. force was conducting a reconnaissance in force in a valley near Ashau. The operation was to gain information necessary for a later offense. A TV reporter with the force filmed a two-minute firefight in which two U.S. soldiers were killed. According to Sidle, no one had briefed the reporter on the purpose of the operation (a probing action to gain information) and as a result, the films and narration of the event depicted "a needless and senseless way to fight a war" with two men killed for no reason. Immediately, MACV ordered that every reporter had to be briefed and every TV crew escorted by knowledgeable persons who could explain what was going on. 70 The presence of escorts for TV crews, reported a senior military information officer, "was frequently the difference between the crews getting transportation, food and other forms of assistance and getting the cold shoulder from peo­ ple who are not inclined to be helpful without being ^ "71 pressured. 86 Newsmen disagreed with such logic by saying that escort officers inhibited and discouraged sources from talking to reporters.

Concerning escorts, Hyman Kurzner, chief of the Saigon bureau of ABC, said, "What I don't like is the way they [escort officers] make me feel like a CIA agent to cover a story . . . they think we are not to be trusted."^^

Transportation MACV's policy was to provide newsmen transportation when (1) the travel itself was part of the story being cov­ ered and (2) commercial transportation to the site of the story was not available.7 4 The need to transport the press by military aircraft to the immediate vicinity of tactical operations was obvious; simply no other way existed to get to the fighting. Despite the voluminous flow of information about the war from Vietnam, aided in part by the military's transpor­ tation system, many newsmen remained highly critical of this support. Most criticisms centered upon the fact that denial of transportation served as a means of censoring the press. If a newsman could not get to the battle site, he could not give a firsthand account of it; thus, he would have to ac­ cept MACV's version of the action. A number of survey 87 respondents reported denial of transportation was the most common type of censorship imposed by the military.

While transportation, especially aircraft, was a common press complaint throughout the war, newsmen criticisms inten­ sified during the Laos invasion in early 1971.

Keyes Beech, Chicago Daily News, reported that corre­ spondents were denied transportation "both on the ground and in the air" during the Laotian invasion. 75 Barney Seibert,

UPI, said the most common type of censorship was "simple denial of access to transportation to allow the correspondent 7 6 to obtain his information."

Another UPI reporter said that in the past year (1970-

1971) the denial of transportation from rear to front bases 77 by military information officers rose alarmingly.

Newsweek reported that MACV barred correspondents from

American helicopters flying into Laos "to guarantee a limi- 78 tation on battlefield reporting."

Enemy Body Count

The most widely used method by the military to show the war's progress was statistics. MACV used statistics to show percentage of population under government control, numbers of enemy soldiers seeking amnesty, casualties and even the tons of rice captured on operation. Of all the progress in­ dicators shown by statistics, enemy body count received the most skepticism from the press. 88 The body count system, in theory, was simple. After each operation or air strike, the enemy dead were counted and reported. However, in actual practice, it was not that simple. As early as 1964, writers were reporting that many of the body counts deserved suspicions, as the counts were usually made by observation aircraft and fighter-bomber pilots surveying the battlefield at several hundred miles an hour. 79 The October, 1966, ground rules differed only slightly in wording from the 1970 ground rules which explained MACV's rationale in determining enemy casualties. (In 1970, the word "enemy" was used in lieu of "viet cong"). The 1966 rules were: Any 'Viet Cong Killed' figure released by I^CV will have been verified on the scene by US person­ nel to the extent permitted by the military situa­ tion. It cannot be an exact figure, but it is probable that duplications and other errors on the high side are more than offset by the number of Viet Cong dead who are carried away or buried nearby, by those who subsequently died of wounds and by those killed by artillery concentrations and air strikes not followed up by ground action. Thus, when the briefer announces a specific num­ ber of Viet Cong killed in a particular operation or over a given period, that figure is not as pre­ cise as the popular term "body count" would imply. Neither is it a guess or loose estimate. It is the best figure that can be developed and as noted, probably is conservative in the long run.°^

Seldom did newsmen accept enemy casualty figures given by MACOI or commanders in the field. Associated Press re­ porter Peter Arnett was quoted as saying, "... any man who has ever been in the field in Vietnam knows that there 89 is no such thing as a body count. "^"^ Jack Raymond wrote that correspondents referred to MACV enemy casualty figures as "WEG's"—wild-eyed guesses. ^^ During the 1968 enemy Tet offensive, enemy units, nor­ mally hard to find, exposed themselves throughout the coun­ try and became easy targets for massive U.S. firepower. When MACV reported high enemy casualties, newsmen were highly skeptical. A New Yorker reporter wrote, "There is considerable doubt about the accuracy of the Allied claim of thirty-six thousand Communists killed between January 29th and February 18th."^^ Newsweek cautioned that official estimates of enemy casualties during Tet should be viewed with the "utmost skepticism." Said Newsweek: Body counts of enemy dead are at best always open to doubt; almost every reporter in Vietnam has his own personal example of inflated reports of enemy dead in battle that he himself has ob­ served. To think that in the midst of last week's chaos and the breakdown of communications, a careful tabulation of such an enormous number of bodies was actually made, defies logic and contributes further to the credibility gap. "The Vietnam war was the only U.S. war where the body count became a major yardstick of victory or defeat," said Hansen Baldwin. "It never should have assumed such signifi- 85 cance." One author contended "the flick of a pen in Saigon's office or field headquarters can transform a grin defeat into the most astonishing of victories . . . "^ 90 Perhaps the most well known example of distorted re­ ports was printed in the 23rd Infantry Division's newsletter which read: "Contacts through the morning and early after­ noon resulted in 128 enemy killed, 13 suspects detained and 8 6 3 weapons captured." The report was dated March 16, 1968, and the battle took place at My Lai under the command of Lieutenant William Galley.

In Defense of the Information Officer All information officers, whether in the field or at MACOI, suffered from an "official spokesman" nemesis. Their answers became official government or command statements and thus a matter of public record. While other military per­ sons could engage in estimations or personal viewpoints, the information officer had to be certain his answers were accu­ rate and represented what his commander wanted released. As a result, the information officer appeared to many newsmen as being evasive and censoring or concealing information the press should have received. To a number of newsmen, labels of good or bad would not be applicable to information officers. As one reporter put it: "One candid officer who tells the truth, and they can 87 always be found, is worth X number of the other kind." Jack Reynolds, former NBC bureau chief, defended field lOs (those not serving with MACOI) by saying: 91 When you get out into the field, people level with you much more quickly. You get more back­ ground information and more briefings. People are up where the action is, and by and large, the guys in the field are very good. Occasion­ ally / you find some foot-dragging among lOs, but this is much less true in the field than in Saigon. Once it gets in the pipeline and it gets back to Saigon you find an understandable fear of getting black marks because you didn't play a particular piece of information the right way. In the field, however, the guys are just as honest and reliable as they ever were ... 89

Also defending field lOs, former UPI chief John Walsh said: lOs in the field are pretty cooperative because when you have a man out there with them then you're not so concerned with what repercussions of a particular thing will be, and they just give the facts; but when it gets into Saiqon, there are some political considerations. ^(J

A number of military lOs reported that the 10 was the man in the middle. He was not trusted by the press because he was military and commanders didn't trust him because they were never sure what the 10 would pass on to the press. Said a Navy public affairs officer: "Many military command­ ers distrust, dislike and fear the press . . . And these people are hard to convince that the briefing they give the PAO today won't appear on the front page tomorrow." 91 An Army 10, a former MACOI news chief, said that many times reports were not given to the 10 because commanders and staff think that all leaks of information came from the 10— "they picture the 10 as being in cahoots with the newsmen." 92 92

A number of newsmen excused evasiveness and news

management exercised by lOs on the grounds that the informa­

tion policies in Vietnam were dictated by Washington.

In early 1966, Hansen Baldwin wrote that "public-

relations policies in Vietnam are tightly controlled from 93 Washington," a viewpoint supported by many newsmen five years later.

Military information officers were especially vocal in criticisms of political interference in military press mat­ ters. A senior Naval officer reported, "In the final analysis, it was the State Department that laid down the basic public affairs policy for all of Southeast Asia

(Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, Vietnam)."^4 ;^ p^^^. Force 10

said that while control from Washington did not amount to censorship, the amount of control v/as excessive. 95 The

problem of MACV's restrictive interpretation of ground rules,

said another Navy public affairs officer, stemmed from "pol­

icy guidance" from Washington.

According to a U.S. News and World Report correspondent, the military did exercise censorship over the press in Viet­ nam but did so under orders of the U.S. Ambassador and the

U.S. President. The President, through the Ambassador, dictated press policies in Vietnam, said this correspon- 96 dent. 93

Concerning the Laotian embargo mentioned earlier, News- v^eek reported that General Creighton Abrams, MACV commander,

had been ordered to impose the embargo by Washington to muffle coverage of the expected bloody engagements in Laos--

"engagements that would have almost certainly sparked anti- 97 war dissent at home."

Summary

The military in Vietnam represented a major obstacle

between the press and the news. Either as a source of infor­

mation itself or as a source of essential support, the mili­

tary was seldom praised and frequently condemned for

interfering with or not supporting the press.

One of the most criticized obstacles facing newsmen was

the MACV ground rules which newsmen said were interpreted in

such a manner as to deny the press legitimate information.

Contending that information about operations should not be

released if such disclosure would endanger U.S. lives or

hinder the operation, the military often embargoed military operations.

Although the intent of embargoes was legitimate, news­ men reported that some embargoes were allowed to remain in effect far longer than necessary due to political reasons.

The Laotian embargo was often cited as being such a politi­ cal embargo and remained embargoed even after most of the world press had reported it. 94

Military briefings, although considered a necessity if a reporter wanted to get the total picture of the war, were frequently criticized as being inaccurate, vague and pre­ senting a rosy picture of a gloomy war.

Information officers were viewed by most newsmen as being basically public relations men and were helpful only in providing basic support such as transportation, food, lodgings, and general information about the war.

A number of newsmen felt that the information officer was a victim of his boss, the military commander. One of the most frequent complaints against commanders was that many commanders talked to newsmen only on background, mean­ ing that the name or position of the commander could not be used. Other newsmen reported that some commanders dis­ trusted the press and this distrust was evident in the ac­ tions of the commander's subordinates, especially in the actions of the commander's information officer.

Although the military claimed that escorts were assigned to television crewmen to provide assistance, news­ men felt that military escorts inhibited and discouraged sources from talking to newsmen.

Of all the support given to the press, the most essen­ tial and most criticized was transportation. Newsmen were totally dependent upon the military to provide transporta­ tion to and from battles or news events. According to many 95 newsmen, the military could simply refuse to provide trans­ portation, for any number of reasons and thus effectively censor the press.

Throughout the war, enemy body counts, commonly re­ ferred to by newsmen as WEGs (Wild-Eyed Guesses), provoked considerable adverse comment. The military's rationale on body counts was that such counts were verified on the scene if possible and while body counts could never be precise, neither were tliey loose estimates. Newsmen disagreed saying that enemy body counts were inflated depending on the size of victory MACV or Washington desired to depict. The credibility gap on the body count was further widened when, in March, 1968, MACV reported 128 enemy killed at My Lai. Subsequent investigations revealed the 128 enemy killed were in fact women and children. Despite the many indictments against the military, news­ men said that some information officers and commanders were honest, accurate and professional in their relationship with the press corps in Vietnam. In general, field lOs received more favorable comments than those lOs on duty at MACV head­ quarters. MACOI information officers, said many newsmen, were evasive and censored the press because they were given such guidance from Washington. Although it was a shooting war in the field, MACOI briefers were forced to report tne war according to political dictates from the State Depart­ ment or the Wnite House. NOTES

"Behind the Vietnam Story," Columbia Journalism Review, III, No. 4 (Winter, 1965), 17. 2 Survey respondent. Navy public affairs officer who declined use of his name. 3 United States Military Assistance Commany, Vietnam, U.S. Press Playbacks. Mimeographed excerpts of selected news stories by Vietnam correspondents, July 3, 1968. Quote taken from an article by Gene Roberts, New York Times correspondent, dated July 1, 1968. (Hereinafter referred to as MACV, U.S. Press Playbacks). ^Ibid. 5 "New Curbs on War News," p. 2.

"U.S. Warns Nev/smen on Security Rules," New York Times, August 13, 1965, p. 2. 7 "Military Asks Voluntary Censorship in Vietnam," Over­ seas Press Club Bulletin, XX, No. 30 (July 24, 1965), 1, 6. p This is discussed in greater detail in Chapter V, "Survey of Informal Censorship." 9 Chick, "Military-Press Relations," p. 22. Survey respondent. Colonel William I. Greener, a former Air Force information officer. Survey respondent. Army information officer who declined use of his name. 12 Survey respondent, Navy public affairs officer who declined use of his name.

"^"^MACV Dir. 360-1, Annex A, p. 2.

•'''^MACV/ "U.S. Press Playbacks," July 3, 1968. 1 5 Zalin B. Grant, "Alsop Lets His Friends Down," The New Republic, May 18, 1968, pp. 9-10.

•^^MACV, U.S. Press Playbacks. 96 97 17 Gray, "Alsop Lets His Friends Down." 18 MACV, U.S. Press Playbacks. 19 Author's personal observation after discussions with many newsmen at JUSPAO, Saigon, Vietnam, June, 1968. 20 Headline appeared in February 2, 1971, edition of the Washington Post, p. 1. 21 George C Wilson, "News of Embargo is Embargoed, Un- Embargoed, Re-Embargoed," Washington Post, February 2, 1971, p. 1. 22 Major General Winant Sidle, Chief of Information, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C, "Press Relations in Vietnam," an address to the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, June 3, 1970. 23 ^-^Ibid. 24 "The Case of the Leaky Embargo," Newsweek, February 15, 1971, p. 22. 25 "News Ban on Laos Binding Only for U.S.," Los Angeles Times, February 4, 1971, p. 9. 2 6 "Officials Throw Up Barriers to Laos News Coverage," Lubbock Avalanche-Journal, February 24, 1971, p. 12-A. 27 Peter Osnos, "Laotian Drive Continues Under Cloak," Washington Post, February 25, 1971, p. A-22. 2 8 "Information Freeze," Newsweek, March 1, 1971, p. 46. ^^"Frustration Near the Front," Time, March 8, 1971, pp. 45-46. 30 Holger Jensen, "Newsmen Complain of Curbs on Laos War Reporting," Lubbock Avalanche-Journal, March 3, 1971 p. 4-D. (Hereinafter referred to as Newsmen Complain of Curbs). 31 . . A sortie is one aircraft take off and landing. 32 Jensen, "Newsmen Complain of Curbs." ^^Ibid. 98 Ibid. 35 Lower, "Field Correspondents." ^^Ibid. 37 George McArthur, "Army Snafu? News Ban Stirs Ques­ tions," Los Angeles Times, February 5, 19 71. 38 "Cooperation with Reporters Backed," Army Times, September 1, 1971, p. 5. 39 Frank McCullock, "Facts of Life in Vietnam," Time, May 7, 1965, p. 62. 40 Baldwin, "The Information V7ar," p. 31. 41 . Hickey, "Meanwhile Back in Saigon." 42 "Information Freeze," p. 46. 43 Raymond, "It's A Dirty War," p. 95. 44 Survey respondent, Detroit News reporter who declined use of his name. 45 "Withdrawal Including Information," Abilene Reporter News, January 17, 1971, p. 4-A. Ibid. 47 . . "Newsmen Assail Curtain on War Information," Lubbock Avalanche-Journal, January 22, 1971, p. 12-B.

"^^"The Saigon Follies," p. 46.

Ibid. 50 Lower, "Field Correspondents." 51 Kroeger, "Television's Men at War," p. 72. 52 Malcome Browne comments- on At Issue, "The Information War," National Education Television, August, 1966. 53 Survey respondent, Terry L. Reynolds, freelance. 54 Survey respondent. Tine reporter who declined use of his name. 99 55e Survey respondent, CBS reporter who declined use of his name. 56e Survey respondent. Army information officer who de­ clined use of his name. 57 Survey respondent. Air Force information officer who declined use of his name. 58^ Survey respondent. Navy public affairs officer who declined use of his name. 59 "Withdrawal Including Information." 60 Survey respondent. Army information officer who de­ clined use of his name. George Wilson, Washington Post, address to the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, April 30, 1971. 62 Survey respondent, Holger Jensen, Associated Press. 63 Survey respondent, Robert Schwab III, freelance. 64 Survey respondent. Army information officer who declined use of his name. 65 The second factor cited by General Sidle was the military's insistence on showing progress--"not just the Army's but for the whole administration." See footnote 4 for reference. 6 fi Major General Sidle, "Press Relations." 6 7 John O. Koehler, "The Press-Military Relationship in the Field," address delivered to the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, April 10, 1970. 6 Q Lower, "Field Correspondents." 69 Stevens, personal letter. 70 Major General Sidle, "Press Relations." 71 Stevens, personal letter. 72 Comments made by a number of survey respondents. 100 73 "Information Flow on V7ar Clogged by Army Brass," Odessa American, January 17, 1971, p. 3-A. 74 Stevens, personal letter. 75e Survey respondent, Keyes Beech, Chicago Daily News. 76e Survey responaent, Barney Seibert, UPI. 77 Survey respondent, UPI reporter who declined use of his name. 78 "Information Freeze," p. 46. 79 Mecklin, Mission in Torment, p. 101. ^^"Ground Rules, 1966," p. 1. 81 Lieutenant Colonel Richard A McMahon, "Bury the Body Count for Good," Army Magazine, June, 1969, p. 66. ^^Raymond, "It's A Dirty War," p. 34. 8 3 Robert Shaplen, "Letter from Saigon," The New Yorker, March 2, 1968, p. 45. 84 Everett G. Martin, "Man on the Spot," Newsweek, February 12, 1968, p. 29. 85 Baldwin, "The Information War," p. 30. p c Minor, The Information War, p. 49. ^^Ibid., p. 49. 88 George McArthur, Los Angeles Times, Saigon, personal letter. May 21, 1971. pq Chick, "Military-Press Relations," p. 22. 90-rIbid, -^ . 91 Survey respondent. Navy public affairs officer who declined use of hi£ name. 92 Survey respondent. Army information officer who declined use of his name. ^^Baldwin, "The Information War," p. 21. 101 94 Survey respondent. Navy public affairs officer who declined use of his name. 95 Survey respondent. Major Jack Oswald, Air Force information officer. 96 Survey respondent. Navy public affairs officer who declined use of his name. 97 Survey respondent, U.S. News and World Report corre­ spondent who declined use of his name. 9 8 "The Case of the Leaky Embargo," p. 22. CHAPTER V FORMAL CENSORSHIP AND THE VIETNAM WAR

Introduction Press censorship in World War II and the Korean War was almost total with censors reading and editing copy prior to broadcast or publication. The reporter in World War II was required to wear a uniform, operate from press camps and was totally dependent upon the military. In World War II, an estimated 10,000 persons were classified as "covering the war," yet as noted by historian Joseph J. Matthews, "even with the most elastic of definitions, nothing like all of these could be counted as war correspondents . . . ." According to some writers. World War II censorship bordered, at times, on the ridiculous. Correspondents were required to have their copy cleared by every military ser- vice 2 mentione. d i.n thei.r reports. For example, a dispatch that mentioned both ground and air units required clearance by both services. Dispatches were again censored at Washing- ton after being cleared by field headquarters. 3 In the first year of the Korean war, more than 230 reporters were accredited to the United Nations Command. 4 Press censorship in Korea, said Matthews, experienced the same problems with the military unprepared to impose censor­ ship. The government and the military "had to work out all over again" the problems of censorship, Matthews said. 102 103

Absence of Formal Censorship in Vietnam Despite a history of wartime censorship, the United States officially did not impose formal censorship in Viet­ nam, although in retrospect, former President Lyndon B. Johnson was reported to have said it was a mistake not to have done so. In a Time magazine interview concerning the "Pentago Papers" published by the New York Times, Johnson admitted that failing to institute censorship was a mistake in Vietnam "not to cover up mistakes but to prevent the enemy from knowing what the U.S. was going to do next." A number of officials and newsmen have advocated, or at least hinted, that formal censorship should have been imposed in Vietnam. With the buildup of U.S. forces in Vietnam in 1965, increased curbs were placed on what the press could and could not report. Part of these restrictions prevented 7 , ^ . newsmen access to certain U.S. air bases. These restric­ tions prompted Wes Gallagher, Associated Press, to state: ... so far as the Associated Press is concerned, our correspondents would be prepared to submit . . . copy to formal censorship if the United States Army installs it . . . But correspondents should be free to see and cover all aspects of the war as was done in World V7ar 11.^ In early 1966, then Secretary of State Dean Rusk said he did not want anymore censorship in Vietnam than there already was but added that to impose formal censorship in 104

Vietnam would also require it be imposed in Washington.

Hinting at formal censorship. Representative Richard Ichord told the House of Representatives in 1966 that "the country simply cannot afford distorted, biased, inaccurate, incom­ plete or irresponsible war news coverage" and among controls imposed in Vietnam might be a "scrutiny" of copy filed.

Also in 1966, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,

General Earle G. Wheeler, said the United States will have to "take a very hard look" at the possibility of formal cen­ sorship in Vietnam. In 1967, Daniel Z. Henkin, deputy assistant secretary of defense for public affairs, said the

Department of Defense is hopeful "censorship will not have to be imposed in Vietnam." 12

Columnist Alice Widener became particularly bitter about the lack of censorship during the U.S. withdrav/al from

Khe Sanh. She said: "It is impossible to win a war without censorship. If you spill your guts to the enemy in war, you feed him the ammunition to murder you." What specifically upset Ms. Widener was a New York Times front page story head­ lined "Marines At Khe Sanh Find Flaws in Their Defense"

(February 22, 1968). The Times story went on to disclose that the trenches at Khe Sanli were not deep enough, not enough mines and barbed wire on the perimeter and "above all, the bunkers do not have enough overhead protection." And if this were not enough help to the enemy who were then 105

surrounding Khe Sanh, said Ms. Widener, the Times story

pointed out that the First Cavalry Division, which was to

rescue Khe Sanh, "faced a shortage of manpower and heli­

copters." In summary, she appealed to the President and

Congress to declare a state of clear and present danger and

"impose military censorship on the war in Vietnam. "•'"'^

Jack Foisie, Los Angeles Times, correspondent and vet­

eran reporter of World War II and Korea, advocated censor­

ship in Vietnam in 1962 "and since." Keyes Beech of the

Chicago Daily News, said, "Personally, I think formal cen­

sorship should have been instituted in 1965 when U.S. ground 15 troops were committed." George Wilson, Washington Post,

told a class of military officers that he would certainly

have used different procedures on censorship. "I doubt if

World War II type [of censorship] would do, but I agree we

need something better and different this time . . . ," 1 6 Wilson said.

Advocates of formal censorship listed "freer access"

as a primary reason. Colonel William T. Coleman, the Air

Force chief of public information in the Pentagon, said "We

should never go into any war without field press censorship because (1) censorship insures the security of troops,

(2) newsmen get better and more accurate information,

(3) reviewed copy forces newsmen to be accurate, and (4) cen­ sorship would greatly reduce 'flaking' which is public rela- tion promotion of units." 17 106 Foisie said that formal censorship would have allowed newsmen to talk to those in command and would have allowed briefings on forthcoming operations so "we could be in the right places when they occurred." Also, he added, it would have taken some "of the judgment burden off us, and, frankly, I think it would have helped the White House gents by more objective reporting by us and counterpressures upon the President to be more forthright with Congress and the peo- pie." 18 John Randolph, also of the Los Angeles Times, felt formal censorship would allow a greater access to intelli- gence and operations news. 19 A military information officer felt it was an error when formal censorship was not imposed because "tidbits" of information were very valuable to the enemy who was not in­ terested in grand plans as much as trying to do spectacular damage "which will influence public opinion in the United States." He added, "The enemy in this war goes to the news columns for information and for a place to spread his propa- 20 ganda instead of the battlefield." Despite theoretical reasons for censorship, practical reasons probably would have prevented censorship. In an address, Phil Goulding said: . . . From a practical standpoint, I do not see how press censorship could work in Vietnam under today's [1968] conditions. There are, on occa­ sion, inaccurate, irresponsible, and unreliable news stories on the war, but the imposition of 107 censorship would have no effect on most such stories, and it is not the role of the govern­ ment to monitor the opinions of the press.21 Although he believed news releases from Vietnam un­ wittingly assisted the enemy. Major General Winant Sidle (then Brigadier General and MACV chief of information) said in 1968 he did not advocate censorship. He said, "I don't see how it would work. How do you keep a guy from going to Hong Kong to file his story? And, if the United States im­ posed censorship, this wouldn't affect foreign newsmen. How 22 are you going to censor television films?" In 1971, Gen­ eral Sidle reiterated his 1968 position by saying: This war is unlike Korea or World War II. We rec­ ognize and honor South Vietnam's sovereignty and could not legally impose censorship without them doing so first. Field press censorship would not work in other countries. Newsmen would go to an­ other country and file their stories. Bureaus could run men in and out with the news.23 Total censorship would have been extremely difficult in Vietnam. At one time, there was one correspondent for every 1,000 U.S. troops. Reading and editing the copy of 500 news­ men daily, altliough not a physical impossibility, would have been a monumental task. Unlike in previous wars, censors would have had to view and edit thousands of feet of televi­ sion films daily.

Summary The United States did not impose formal censorship dur­ ing the Vietnam war, although a number of observers, writers 108 and politicians, including former President Johnson, be­ lieved it should have been imposed. Advocates of formal censorship listed security of troops and greater access to detailed news as benefits of censorship. Other reasons for censorship included the elimination of biased, inaccurate and irresponsible war news; taking the burden of decision off newsmen; allowing commanders to brief newsmen on all operations in detail thus permitting newsmen to be present when the action started rather than after-the-fact. Despite the reasons why censorship should have been im­ posed, practical reasons would have prevented it. As General Sidle said, censorship would not apply to foreign newsmen and U.S. reporters would simply fly to another country to file their stories. In addition, bureaus could have run people in and out to replace those who lost their accreditation for releasing uncensored material. NOTES

Joseph J. Matthews, Reporting the Wars (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1957), p. 254. The term "military service" was broadly used in World War II. It meant the U.S. Army, U.S. Army Air Corps, U.S. Navy, U.S. Marines. In addition, it meant any Allied ser­ vice as well as certain field headquarters. 3 Paul Mowrer, "Bungling the News," Public Opinion Quarterly, II, No. 1 (March, 1943), 118-123. 4 John Hohenberg, Foreign Correspondents: The Great Reporters and Their Times (New York: Columbia University Press, 1964), p. 391. 5 Matthews, Reporting the Wars, p. 216. "Three Principals Defend Themselves," Time, June 28, 1971, p. 15. 7 On March 24, 1965, the Danang Air Base was closed to newsmen by joint agreement of the U.S. and South Vietnamese. The reason cited for this closure was "because recently the Saigon press corps had seriously breached security" by alerting the enemy, through its releases, of aircraft launch­ ing, thus placing pilots in jeopardy. See "News Curbs Con­ sidered," New York Times, March 13, 1965; "The Lid in Vietnam," Newsweek, March 29, 1965; and "U.S. Newsmen Are Barred from Big Danang Air Base," New York Times, March 25, 1965. p "Newsmen Report U.S. Imposes Curbs on Coverage in Vietnam," New York Times, March 18, 1965, p. 4. 9 Geoffrey Gould, "Many want censorship of wartime news," Birmingham News, March 4, 196 8. •'"UPI wire copy, number 203B, March 3, 1966. •'••'"Raymond, "I^-ls A Dirty War," p. 32. 12 Daniel Z. Henkin, assistant secretary of defense for public affairs, speech to the Pennsylvania News Broadcasters Association, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, May 22, 1967. 109 110 13 Alice Widener, "Censorship Could Save GI Lives," Denver Post, February 27, 1968. 14 Jack Foisie, Los Angeles Times, Bangkok, Thailand, personal letter, June 26, 1971. Foisie, who is former Secretary of State Dean Rusk's brother-in-law, temporarily lost his accreditation in 1966 for an alleged security vio­ lation. See "U.S. Reporter in Vietnam Is Suspended for Month," New York Times, February 1, 1966, p. 14. 15 Survey respondent, Keyes Beech, Chicago Daily News. 16^ George Wilson, Washington Post, an address to the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leaven­ worth, Kansas, April 30, 1971. 17 William T. Coleman, Colonel, USAF, personal inter­ view, Washington, D.C, March 23, 1971. 18 Foisie, personal letter. 19 Army Information Conference, Saigon. 20 Survey respondent. Navy public affairs officer who declined use of his name. 21 Phil G. Goulding, assistant secretary of defense for public affairs, an address at the Government Relations Work­ shop of the National Newspaper Association, Washington, D.C, March 15, 1968. ^^MACV, U.S. Press Playbacks. 23 Major General Winant Sidle, chief of information. Department of the Army, Washington, D.C, personal interview, March 23, 1971. CHAPTER VI SURVEY OF INFORx^LATION CENSORSHIP IN VIETNAM

Introduction Previous chapters in this study have been basically historical and descriptive in nature. Taken from a wide variety of literature, several major areas were examined: the military's press support role in Vietnam, an indictment against press performance in Vietnam, an indictment against military restrictions on the press and whether or not formal censorship should have been imposed in Vietnam. One weakness in a literature review of an emotionally- laden subject such as censorship in Vietnam is in the patently one-sided nature of arguments, accusations and counter-charges presented. In an effort to overcome this one-sided weakness, a survey was conducted to allow both the military and the press to express their opinions on the subject of informal censorship and related topics. In addition to presenting both sides, the survey also quantifies responses so that broad conclusions may be made. As with the entire study, the survey concentrates on analyzing informal censorship only as it existed at the grass-roots level--between the military and press in Vietnam, While it is recognized that considerable public affairs

111 112 guidance emanated from much higher levels than the military-- the U.S. Ambassador to South Vietnam, the Department of

Defense and the White House—the survey was limited only to the military-press relationship.

Scope and Purpose of the Survey The general scope of this survey was to analyze informal censorship of the press by the military in Vietnam during the period June, 1965, through May, 1971. It was not intended to provide predictive evaluations.

Specifically, the survey examines (1) v/hether or not the military imposed formal censorship over the press corps in

Vietnam, (2) whether or not the military imposed informal censorship over the press corps in Vietnam and, if so, to what degree did such censorship impair the newsman's ability to get the story they or their editors wanted, (3) whether or not MACV ground rules impaired the newsmen's ability to get the story they or their editors wanted, (4) whether or not the military used security classifications to withhold legitimate news, (5) whether or not the military gave pref­ erential treatment to newsmen who favor U.S. policies in

Vietnam, (6) problems facing newsmen and military informa­ tion officers, (7; now newsmen rated news sources in Viet­ nam, (8) how military information officers rated media groups in Vietnam, (9) officials who imposed informal 113 censorship the most, (10) when informal censorship was im­ posed the most, (11) how newsmen found out about impending military operations and (12) military guidance on "handling the press."

Method and Procedure Two sets of mailed questionnaires were necessary to accomplish the purposes of this survey. One questionnaire was sent to military information officers of all services who were then serving or who had served in Vietnam as infor­ mation officers. A second questionnaire was sent to newsmen who had served or who were currently serving as newsmen in Vietnam. The survey cutoff date was May 31, 1971. Upon request the chiefs of information of the U.S. Army and the U.S. Navy provided current rosters of worldwide in­ formation officers with those noted who had served or were then serving in Vietnam. The chiefs of information of the U.S. Air Force and U.S. Marine Corps provided selected lists of officers to be queried. From these and the current roster of military informa­ tion officers in Vietnam, a mailing list of 190 military information officers was compiled. Of these, 29 were deleted for various reasons, principally, letters returned undelivered. This resulted in a revised list of 161 military 114 information officers of which 80 replied; a response rate of 49.7 percent.

Names of newsmen who had served or were serving in Viet­ nam were obtained from files in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, Department of Defense. All 146 U.S. newsmen serving in Vietnam as of the cutoff date were sent a questionnaire. In addition, 35 names were selected from rosters for the years 1964 through 1970. This resulted in a combined total of 181 of which 30 were deleted primarily because of undeliverable mail. The revised mailing list of newsmen totaled 151 of which 48 replied; a response rate of 31.8 percent. Samples of the military questionnaire and the newsmen questionnaire are at Appendices A and B respectively. The following definitions apply to the survey: 1. Formal censorship: A formal military policy with full-time military censors reading and editing copy prior to broadcast or publication. 2. Informal censorship: An act on part of a military commander, his representative, or military information per­ sonnel which precluded a member of the press corps from obtaining a story re wanted or was required to obtain; an act on part of a military commander, his representative, or military information personnel which precluded transmission of that story from the field to Saigon or from Saigon to the 115 United States. Informal censorship includes but is not limited to: sources refusing to talk to newsmen; denial of transportation except when military mission had higher prior­ ity, e.g., resupply of men, ammo, equipment, evacuation of wounded; denial of requests to visit units in the field; un­ reasonable interpretation of MACV ground rules. 3. Voluntary censorship: An agreement by newsmen to abide by MACV ground rules and security restrictions. 4. Military commander: Officers of the U.S. Armed Forces who are in charge of men. 5. Military information personnel: Any member of the U.S. Armed Forces, officer or enlisted, who had assigned duties in Public Information or support to the press. 6. Newsmen: A bureau chief, correspondent, reporter, or photographer of any media, i.e., print, radio, televi­ sion, etc. 7. Legitimate or public information: Information which would not benefit the enemy, jeopardize U.S. lives or national security or violates restriction imposed by MACV ground rules.

Limitations of the Survey A most significant limitation of the survey was the failure of many respondents to answer the questionnaire. An initial assumption was made that newsmen, who have been very 116 vocal on this subject, would respond well and military information officers, fearing impact on their military ca­ reers, would not respond well. The final response rate belied this assumption; only 31.8 percent of the newsmen replied while 49.7 percent of the military information officers replied. A second major limitation was that respondents were not selected randomly. Military information officer (10) respondents were not selected randomly because of the "selected lists" provided by the Air Force and Marine Corps and because of the time- cost difficulties in obtaining a list of names of all offi­ cers who had served in Vietnam. The only way such a list could be made would be through a time consuming and costly records check of all officers in the military. While the service chiefs of information maintain rosters of current- duty lOs, none professed to have rosters of past information officers who had served in Vietnam. The revised mailing list for this survey represented all military officers cur­ rently on duty as an information officer who served or were currently serving in Vietnam; it does not include those who are not presently :n duty as an 10 or those who have since resigned or retired.

Newsmen respondents were selected from rosters in the Pentagon. Prior to 1970, newsmen rosters were published by 117 MACV on a monthly basis, after 1970 on a bi-monthly basis. 2 Newsmen averaged almost 2 trips each to Vietnam and through

1968 about 2,000 different individuals were accredited with second, third and fourth visits by many of these. Nev/smen accreditations since 1968 would increase this figure signif­ icantly. To obtain a complete list of newsmen who had served in Vietnam would require a tedious cross-check of more than 86 rosters each containing 300-600 names. Using the smaller of this figure (300), more than 25,800 names would have to be cross-checked. It is doubtful that such a cross-check would have yielded a more randomized sample.

In addition, many newsmen have changed jobs since serving in Vietnam increasing the difficulty in obtaining mailing addresses.

Instead, the complete roster for the period ending

May 31, 1971, was used and names of five newsmen were selected for each of the years 1964 through 1970. Where possible, these five newsmen selected each year were from the same monthly roster (September).

The "selected lists" provided by the Air Force and

Marine Corps were initially considered to be biased. How­ ever, a comparison of selected responses between the "com­ plete roster" group (Army/Navy) and the "selected lists" group (Air Force/Marine Corps) revealed no significant 118 differences in their responses. As shown on Table 1, Chi

Square values did not reach acceptable significant levels.

TABLE 1 COMPLETE ROSTER VERSUS SELECTED LIST REPLIES

Whether or not informal censorship imposed Army/Navy Air Force/Marines "Complete Roster" "Selected List" (N-63) (N-15)

Yes 22 6 No 41 9

X^ = .36 df = 1 n.s.

Whether or not some newsmen given preferential treatment

Army/Navy Air Force/Marines "Complete Roster" "Selected List" (N-63) (N-15)

Yes 42 11

No 21 4

X^ = .15 df = 1 n.s.

Partially offsetting the two major limitations of this survey are the following factors:

1. The total, population of lOs and newsmen serving in

Vietnam as of the cutoff date were sent a questionnaire.

2. Newsmen respondents averaged 1.8 trips each to Viet­ nam for an average monthly stay of 26.7 months each. Military 119 respondents averaged only slightly more tlian one trip each for an average 12-month tour. 3. Both newsmen and 10 respondents represented duty in Vietnam for every year of the war beginning in 1961. 4. More than 37 percent of both newsmen and lOs re­ ported duty in one or more previous wars or conflicts. 5. Newsmen represented 11 different nev/spapers, all major television networks (CBS, NBC, ABC), both major wire services (AP, UPI), and 4 news magazines, (Time, Newsweek, U.S. News and World Report, Life), and free lance writers. 6. More than 60 percent of the newsmen had prior military service with 29 percent of these in duty related to public information or nev/s reporting. Military respon­ dents represented backgrounds ranging from actual civilian newsman experience to educational achievements from B.A. in journalism to a Ph.D. in mass communications.

Related Studies As stated in Chapter I, six M.A. theses related to this subject were reviewed. None of these studies surveyed lOs and newsmen to solicit opinions on the topic of informal censorship. Most were historical or descriptive in nature and those that touched on censorship at all presented only one side of the argument. Only the study by Hagley used a survey instrument (questionnaire). His purpose was to 120 determine how U.S. correspondents rated various news sources in Vietnam.

Significance of the Survey The basic significance of this survey lies in the fact that no other quantitative survey has been made soliciting opinions of both the military and press on the subject of informal censorship in Vietnam. This survey attempts to offer frank and candid opin- 6 ^ ions from grass-roots participants who exercised or felt the impact of informal censorship. The survey represents specific Vietnam-source replies rather than the glittering generalities normally stressed at the Department of Defense level or in editorial viewpoints of the news media. This survey represents the first such survey which allows the military to support or counter charges of censor­ ship in Vietnam. And lastly, the survey could serve to assist the mili­ tary in forming press policy for future conflicts where the military will again face the questions of imposing re­ strictions on the press.

Survey Results Survey results for this study are organized as follows: (1) formal censorship, (2) informal censorship, (3) MACV ground rules, (4) military security versus free flow of 121 information, (5) preferential treatment of newsmen, (6) problems facing newsmen and lOs, (7) newsmen ratings of news sources, (8) lOs' ratings of the news media, (9) officials imposing informal censorship the most, (10) when informal censorship imposed the most, (11) how newsmen found out about impending military operations, and (12) military guid­ ance on "handling the press."

Military respondents' names will not be used v/ith spe­ cific answers or comments on the questionnaire. While a number of lOs gave answers unfavorable to the military, it is not the intent of this study to expose a respondent to possible sanctions or criticisms by his military service. Newsmen respondents' names will be used if permission were given.

Formal Censorship Of all respondents, only five newsmen indicated formal censorship existed. Four of these five declined use of their names. The five respondents represented Time, The Washington Post, CBS, the Associated Press and freelance. However, a Chi Square analysis as shown on Table 2 illus­ trates that significantly more newsmen (5 out of 43) felt formal censorship was imposed as compared to military lOs (0 out of 78). 122 TABLE 2 WHETHER OR NOT FOR^iAL CENSORSHIP IMPOSED

Newsmen Military lOs (N-48) N-78)

Yes 5 0

No 43 78

X^ = 4.8 df = 1 P <.05

Informal Censorship

More than 89 percent of the newsmen and 35 percent of the lOs said informal censorship was exercised by the mili­ tary over the press in Vietnam. As shown on Table 3, these differences were significant at the .005 level.

TABLE 3 WHETHER OR NOT INFORMAL CENSORSHIP IMPOSED

Newsmen Military lOs (N-48) (N-78)

Yes 43 28

No 5 50

X^ = 34.7 df = 1 P <.005 123 While a large majority of newsmen felt informal censor­ ship existed, most said it did not impair their ability to get the story they or their editors wanted. A majority, 52.3 percent, reported that informal censorship had a "low" degree of impairment, 2 8.5 percent reported "medium" degree of impairment and 19 percent reported a "high" degree of p impairment. On a scale from 1 (greatly impaired) to 5 (did not impair) the mean score of newsmen respondents (N-4 3) was 3.2. One newsman defined informal censorship as: Conscious withholding of non-classified informa­ tion by military PIOs—they failed miserably to live up to their stated policy of maximum infor­ mation consistent with security. Instead, they acted as Army public relations men--constantly keeping us 'out of trouble' by any means of deception available. A "conspiracy of silence" was how another newsman de­ scribed informal censorship: In essence, the worst form of censorship being practiced in Vietnam is a conspiracy of silence. The Command and the U.S. Embassy intentionally withhold important information concerning the progress of the U.S. effort here (of course this is mainly embarrassing or detrimental material). MACOI briefers, for example, prepare answers for controversial questions which are issued only when some newsmen happens to stumble onto some­ thing which the Command is well aware of but might be detrimental to the U.S. reputation. Worse than that, it is next to impossible to get high ranking officials to comment 'on the rec­ ord' concerning events which are transpiring in Vietnam . . . .1^ 124 Still another correspondent used more graphic terms by labeling it "insidious bullshit":

MACV hiding behind ground rules, claiming no knowledge of information asked or insisting it must come from the Vietnamese even when Ameri­ cans are involved. Most important is the mili­ tary's insistence on 'giving information on background' which means it doesn't have to take responsibility for what's reported—but the reporter does. Insidious bullshit.1

Jed Duvall, CBS, termed "frightened colonels" as the source of informal censorship:

The occasional frightened 'lifer' or career officer with so little confidence in himself that the appearance of a newsman meant to him that something must be hidden. Colonels in MACV and USARV [United States Army Vietnam] were the most affected by these fears. They of course hid as best they could anything that needed hiding .... 12

Other comments on informal censorship were: 13

. . . denial of transportation when available . . . command­ ers telling men not to talk to newsmen . . . escort officers accompanying newsmen and intimidating sources . . . labeling public information as classified information . . . sources refusing to talk to newsmen . . . tacit or overt lying . . . limiting, preventing, and restricting newsmen from reporting on drugs, insubordination, mutinies, atrocities, etc., . . . failure to release what could be considered bad publicity

. . . a general lack of candor and frequent use of jargon to camouflage actions, e.g. protective reactions to mean air strikes against the North . . . the stock answer "that's 125 classified" whether referring to the number of known drug users in a unit or the number of swimming pools built for troop recreation ....

Barnet Seibert, UPI, said a correspondent can learn to live with formal censorship such as in Cambodia but: Informal censorship is the most insidious type on earth. . . . Informal censorship is like a guillotine poised, ready to descend without warning, often at the most inconvenient time.14 Not all respondents, including some of those who said informal censorship existed, condemned only the military. Glen McDonald, a former Army correspondent, now a free­ lancer, said: Military-press relations are at a very low ebb due to nearly ten years of deception on the part of some military commanders and briefing officers and on the other hand some very biased, slanted reporting from certain correspondents who had an axe to grind or 'reputation' to establish.15 While criticizing the military for "costly blindness" in its "blinder-like insistence on showing progress . . . ," a Detroit News reporter stated: "I think it's important to note that I was free to go almost anywhere and interview almost anyone at almost anytime during a year and a half in Vietnam." Hugh Mulligan, a 34-month veteran of the war for Asso­ ciated Press, conceded that informal censorship existed in Vietnam because officers would grant off-the-record type interviews "... a bad policy as the unscrupulous could 126 just match one set of blind quotes against the other . . . ."

However, Mulligan had this to say on censorship in general:

The U.S. at this date is much given to self- flagellation. After covering the wars in Biafra, Israel, Cambodia and Northern Ireland and experi­ encing various kinds of censorship, I can say that the U.S. in general and day in and day out lets you go where you want to go, even helps you get there, and doesn't really care a fiddle whom you get to see on your own initiative. A lot of this censorship crying is just sour grapes from guys who didn't take the generous transportation available to see for themselves. In my mind, the PIO is not obligated to hand you your story on a platter. The U.S. in Vietnam for all the com­ plaints of official covering up does less to hinder the reporter than any other war I have covered.17

A Newsday reporter stressed that "despite the occasional

annoyances, the overall freedom among the military in Vietnam must be very close to unprecedented for wartime." 18

Advocating formal censorship in Vietnam, Keyes Beech of the Chicago Daily News said:

It [informal censorship] did not prevent me from getting information; it merely made it more dif­ ficult. Personally, I think formal censorship should have been instituted in 1965 when U.S. ground troops were committed. Philosophically, I would make this observation: There have been conflicts of interest between the press and mili­ tary ever since the war began. There always will be.19

Problems in Vietnam are neither informal nor formal censorship, said Scanley Karnow of the Washington Post:

The main problem involving the military and press in Vietnam was not centered on censorship, either formal or informal. The basic problem was the difficulty of both the military and the press-- and everyone else—in interpreting what the war 127 was all about. The key challenge by the press against the military stemmed from the frequent views of newsmen that armed forces commanders and information personnel were misinterpreting the situation, often deliberately. The mili­ tary claimed, of course, that the press was do­ ing the same. This v/as the case in such instances as the battle of Ap Bac in early 1962, during the Tet Offensive, etc. This problem was a reflection of the fact that the war was so ambiguous. Its objectives were never clearly defined. Its strategies were often vague and contradictory (e.g., was the aim military vic­ tory?) . It was also intimately mixed up with Vietnamese politics. Thus, the faults incurred in reporting the war lay not in the military or the press, but in the war itself.20

As with newsmen, military respondents frequently men­ tioned sources refusing to talk and denial of transportation as common types of informal censorship. One 10 reported that for particularly "negative" reporters, transportation was "usually scarce." Also for "negative" reporters, an­ other said "the person to be interviewed was called out on 21 an 'emergency.'"

As a gatekeeper, one 10 said:

I often set up interviews for the media with key members of the MACV staff. Some key staff offi­ cers would not talk to certain reporters with whom they had had a previous bad experience. In these cases, I told the reporter that the source with whom he wanted to talk was not available for interview.22

Commenting on why some sources refused to talk to the press, a senior Army information officer reported:

Every general officer and colonel that I have talked to about the Information Program can either cite a personal example of a close friend who has granted an interview to a 128 newsman and, either intentionally, accidentally, or due to editing by rewrite men, has been mis­ quoted or comments taken out of context and therefore indicating a different context. And the general officer, with his professional repu­ tation at stake, does not care why or how he was misquoted, the fact is he was misquoted or taken out of context. Therefore . . . many senior officers will not grant interviews.^3

Stating "we volunteer nothing," one respondent said "the military bends over backward to aid the press yet it has a very deep fear of the press actually finding out the truth of what is happening." He added that information will be given in most cases, but only "if the reporter pin-

O A points in detail what he wants to know." Other common remarks by lOs were: denying information in request to queries and in releasing false, misleading, inaccurate or incomplete information in official releases . . . denying visitors to certain ships . . . briefing Navy pilots and commanders on what they could and could not talk about, e.g., Laos bombing, Shirke missiles, 19th parallel bombing limit . . . evasion of questions from an individual who had 'broken faith' with me and referring him to someone else less qualified . . . covering up bad stories, e.g., ambush of 1st Battalion, 28th Infantry, 101st Division . . . keeping newsmen from scene . . . withholding information of interest to newsmen when, in fact, the information was not classified but might have made the Navy/DOD look bad . . . 129 commander's policy on haircuts precluded free access by some newsmen to base.

One respondent compared an 10's duties with those of public relations men:

The information officer is a proponent for his organization and commander. If he is other than that, he is receiving pay under false pre­ tenses. That's his job and to accomplish it, he follows many of the PR practices from the business world such as granting interviews to those he knows will be objective or possibly a favorable story and withholding information from those obviously antagonistic to your ef­ forts. When TV film crews arrive and you know in advance that they are looking for sensa­ tional material on drugs, the exposure of which will not assist your organization in solving the drug problem, the 10 denies them access to unit areas. The PRO [Public Relations Officer] for General Motors would do the same.2 5

And lastly, a senior information officer, who has served at high public affairs levels in both Vietnam and the

Department of Defense, felt the problems in Vietnam were not military but political in nature. He said:

It is a political war and the public relations was directed from the White House, not the Pentagon. Good soldiers, even PR men, follow orders. If we ever get in another one, the problems will be exactly the same. Political wars are new to the Americans and somehow sus­ pect. We'll never 'correct' the errors of this one. 26

MACV Ground Rules MACV ground rules, restrictions on what and when cer­ tain items can be reported, constituted a system of 130 "voluntary censorship" adhered to by the press. However, ground rules changed periodically throughout the war and, more importantly, interpretation differed not only among military officers, who enforced them, but also among news­ men who had to abide by them.

Newsmen were asked to state whether or not MACV ground rules impaired their ability to get the story they or their editors wanted. Military respondents were asked if the ground rules impaired their ability to provide maximum dis­ closure of information with minimum delay.

Survey results indicated lOs experienced more impair­ ment by the ground rules than did the newsmen. Almost 54 percent of the military respondents replied "yes" while only 34 percent of the newsmen replied "yes." As shown on

Table 4, these differences were significant at the .05 level

TABLE 4 NEWSI4EN AND MILITARY lOs REPLIES ON MACV GROUND RULE IMPAIRMENT

Newsmen Military lOs (N-47) (N-77)

Yes 16 40

No 31 37

X^ = 3.9 df = 1 P <.05 131 The Navy (60 percent) and the Air Force (50 percent) felt the ground rules impaired them more than did the Army (48.3 percent) or the Marines (33.3 percent). TV/Broadcast reporters (53.8 percent) reported a greater impairment than the other four media groups (free­ lance—40 percent; wire services--33.3 percent; newspapers-- 26.6 percent; and news magazines--00 percent). A common complaint from both newsmen and lOs against the ground rules was in how the rules were interpreted. One military respondent said: Ground rules as written are fine; however, inter­ pretation by MACV and higher commands was quite erratic, especially when they involved incidents with political overtones.27

Other military comments were: Clearance process was cumbersome and imposed unevenly on different services.28 Not allowing release of 'spot reports' at the battle, rather MACOI waiting for official con­ firmation. 29

Unnecessary time to clear 'hard news'—only features were possible.30 Ground rules were interpreted by timid incom­ petents .31 We felt MACV ground rules were stupid but MACV wanted all 'to speak with one voice.'32 Ground rules had the effect, if not intent, of impeding disclosure of information already held by the enemy. The rules, some of which were vague at best, were subject to seemingly arbi­ trary interpretation by MACV and intermediate commands.33 132 Ground rules are fair and strongly oriented in favor of newsmen.34

More than 21 percent of the newsmen mentioned that ground rules were used as an excuse for not releasing basic public information, used to deny information from the press that the enemy already knew about, and were subject to arbi­ trary, varying interpretations by the military.

One correspondent said:

The ridiculous blackout for eight days [Laos, 1971] barred any sensible reporting of troop movements already widely known to the enemy. Ground rules are often only verbal announce­ ments at briefings and were subject to widely varying interpretations. A burden to our job because of the pressure-type decisions to be made. If we guessed wrong, we are subject to disaccreditation.35

George Allison, NBC, thought the ground rules were fair, and in most cases fairly applied; however, he cited a case of a fellow newsman where the ground rules were applied unfairly:

One example of unfairness was the suspension of the credentials of an AP reporter in September, 1970, for writing about an ARVN [South Vietnamese] Army operation which the ARVN, but not the U.S., had announced.36

Other newsmen comments were:

Basically, ground rules were not so inhibitive as informal censorship.37

MACV ground rules, of course, limited what re­ porters could write. It goes without saying that there have to be some limits. Personally, I think the rules were tolerant and even gener­ ous, though they could sometimes be misapplied.38 133 Military Security Versus Free Flow of Information Both military and newsmen respondents were asked their opinions on whether or not military information officers withheld information on security grounds when such informa­ tion would not, in fact, benefit the enemy. Analysis of responses revealed that most replies could be placed in one of the following categories: (1) agree-- the information officer does use security as a means of denying public information from newsmen, (2) disagree—the information officer does not use security as a means of denying public information from newsmen, or (3) the reply was "too general" to place in either of the first two categories. Analysis of newsmen replies (N-42) placed 64.2 percent in the "agree" category, 19.1 percent in the "disagree" category with 16.6 percent "too general" for either cate­ gory. Military respondents (N-75) reported 69.3 percent in the "disagree" category, 12 percent "agree" and 18.6 percent "too general" for either category. Table 5 shows that newsmen and military lOs differed significantly in their replies. 134

TABLE 5 SECURITY REASONS USED TO DENY NEWSi^iEN LEGITIMATE INF0R:-:ATI0N

Newsmen Military lOs (N-35)* (N-61)*

Agree 27 9

Disagree 8 52

X^ = 37.5 df = 1 P <.005 * Uncodeable responses were discarded

In general, newsmen berated the military for using security as a means to withhold embarrassing military or political information. Addressing military embarrassment, Robert Goralski,

NBC, said: All they had to tell us is that certain informa­ tion would be of benefit to the enemy and we would have abided by voluntary censorship, but material distasteful to the military was sup­ pressed by them because it didn't want the information made public.39

Ron Milligan, former Westinghouse Broadcasting reporter

(now ABC) agreed that the military are normally in a better position to decide on this issue; however, "the decisions to withhold, althc ;gh officially made on these grounds, were made, in fact, for different reasons on the wrong occasions."

The enemy, said Milligan, was often the "political enemy in the American reading public." Too often, he added. 135

"unsophisticated press relations personnel" acted on the theory that "when in doubt, withholding is safer. ""^^

Political reasons, or what might embarrass the Adminis­ tration by showing increased U.S. presence in Cambodia or

Laos have accounted for a "significant increase in news being withheld for security reasons in the last 18 months," 41 said an ABC correspondent.

A UPI reporter felt that the military's use of security

classifications is to cover up U.S. losses and defeats be­

cause the military is "trying to salvage its tarnished 42 reputation and its congressional appropriations."

The commander on the scene, not the information officer, has a better feel for what should be released, reported a

Time correspondent. 43 Douglas Warren, UPI, reported that

some military information officers "dislike the hypocrisy of their position" on passing along security classifications, most of which should not be classified. He cited that "dam­ age from a rocket attack, for instance may be informative 44 to the enemy but should not be censored."

Warren Rogers, who covered the war for the New York

Herald Tribune, Hearst Newspapers and Look Magazine, stated:

It is a continuing battle with no end in sight-- we each see it from a different perspective. Usually an honest difference. Newsmen must constantly push against information people on this point, but they are not always wrong, just usually. The big clashes come when they attempt to substitute their news judgment for 136 ours, on grounds that the information may bene­ fit the enemy.4 5

Two favorable comments illustrate those who agreed that only the military can make the determination of what is to be classified. A U.S. News and World Report reporter said:

Only the commander responsible for his men, and the men he delegates this authority to, can de­ cide what would benefit the enemy and hurt allied personnel or activities. Journalists should learn to work to the best of their abil­ ity within the rules as they assume--rightly-- no responsibility for the lives of men in the field or for the success or failure of a mili­ tary mission.46

George Allison, NBC, stated:

I found military information personnel to be quite fair on this question. I can cite no example of unfairness.47

Military respondents, in general, supported their stand on this issue on grounds that withholding security informa­ tion saved U.S. lives which was the intent of the classifi­ cation in the first place. A senior Navy information officer put it this way:

The safety of uniformed personnel comes first. The needs of the newsmen come next. Newsmen do not have to answer to anyone if lives are put in jeopardy, or an operation fails because of dis­ closure of 'questionable' information. The PAO [Public Affairs Officer] has the duty to judge what should and should not be disclosed. There is no doubt that the public affairs officer is in a better position to judge.48 137 Citing that newsmen generally form their opinions from hindsight, while information officers must anticipate what information will aid the enemy, an Army information officer said:

Sometimes the information officer is wrong, but he would rather err on the side of withholding than cause harm to the Allied cause. Newsmen look back on the operation and see that the restriction was not necessary. This is an ir­ reconcilable dilemma. Also, newsmen tend to judge the gravity of information by stateside standards, several thousand miles from the threat. Military men judge from the proximity of the threat.49

An Air Force 10 felt that in almost every case where

the press received a "leak" or "speculated" on a combat

operation, it aided the enemy and caused needless casual- 50 ... ties. An Army 10 echoed his position by stating that a

delay of "two days or two weeks" in informing the world of

a pending action or action underway will "in no way hinder

or aid the course of battle . . . but that same information

released to the enemy could certainly do damage and cost U.S. lives."^-^ Other military respondents felt young, inexperienced newsmen are never in a position to know what would or would not benefit the enemy. Said an Army 10" The question is ridiculous. Anytime a young news­ man without any military experience, or maybe two years as a draftee, with an axe to grind against the military feels he knows more about military requirements of security and what is of value to 138 the enemy, he is simply indicating his complete lack of understanding of the military he is at­ tempting to cover.52

Information officers are definitely in a better posi­ tion to determine what information would aid the enemy, reported an Army 10, "since we have access to the advice and determinations of knowledgeable intelligence and operations personnel . . . . "-^~S3 '

Some lOs admitted using security as a means to cover up or withhold legitimate news. For example: Security is paramount, although, all too often this excuse is used to hide or cover-up legitimate news items without particular security implications.54 I agree . . . that in far too many cases, lOs and commanders are too conservative in their decisions on what will/will not benefit the enemy.55 Army information personnel sometimes are too sen­ sitive or overreact to possible news stories which they think might hinder their units.56 In the latter stages of the war, I would agree with the newsmen. A perfect example is the em­ bargo during Lam Son 719. The Saigon papers were carrying stories about the excursion. The embargo in my opinion was purely a political ploy to keep American public opinion from mounting against the move.5 7 Security classifications, real or otherwise, did not always apply to all newsmen. Some lOs stated that trusted media members would be "tipped off." One Army lO's method was to use a code name "Whiskey" to signal trusted newsmen to come to his unit. Others, he said, "would learn about 139 it from MACV briefers" after the operation had started or was over. 58

A Navy public affairs officer commented: "Some newsmen can be trusted with this information—PAOs have to know who can or cannot be trusted. There were some real bastards 59 with the media and some PAOs."

Preferential Treatment of Newsmen

Based upon the author's personal experience in Viet­ nam, discussions with most Vietnam bureau chiefs in 1967-

1968, and interviews with Department of Defense officials in Washington, an assumption was made that the military tends to give preferential treatment to those newsmen who favor U.S. policies in the war.

Military lOs were asked whether or not they agreed with this assumption. Of the respondents (N-78), 67.9 percent agreed that the military does give preferential treatment to newsmen who favor U.S. policies in Vietnam.

A breakdown of "agree" responses by each military ser­ vice is as follows: Army—61.2 percent; Navy—71.8 percent;

Air Force—66.6 percent, and; Marine Corps—100 percent.

Table 6 shows these differences were not significant.

The most frequent reason for giving preferential treat­ ment to certain newsmen was "It's only human nature." 140

TABLE 6 PREFERENTIAL TREATMENT OF NEWSMEN

Army Navy Air Force Marines (N-31) (N-32) (N-12) (N-13)

Agree 19 23 9 3 Disagree 22 9 4 0

y} = 1.23 df = 3 n.s.

Most respondents gave other reasons for preferential treatment than because the newsmen favored U.S. policies. For example, one senior Army 10 said: "It is damned diffi' cult to be nice to some slob who has proven that he con­ stantly looks forward to performing major surgery on you 61 without your consent." Comments of some who agreed were: I don't recall that the Vice President for Public Relations for General Motors ever granted an in­ terview to Ralph Nader and any commander with common sense will not talk to Ronald L. Ridenour. If you expect otherwise, you are so far from reality as to be ridiculous.62

One gets very tired of beating one's head against an unalterable 'anti' position--a true adversary relationship results.63 'Favorable' stand newsmen will not encounter transportation or lodging problems.64 The 'favorable stand on Vietnam' is not the key regarding preferential treatment. A newsman's 'track record' for balanced reporting is more important.6 5 141 It's not a matter of favoring representatives who take a favorable stand on U.S. policies but rather those who seem to sympathize with your po­ sition in a war zone and treat you with respect and courtesy.66

No question about it. 'Friendly' newsmen get preferential treatment. 'Hostile' newsmen get no special favors, no 'extra' information and as little cooperation as possible.67 Comments of some who disagreed were: Typical, unfounded allegation of a press corps almost entirely biased in their opinions and attitudes.68

Newsmen are susposed to be objective, despite the fact that many are not. An 10 though has but one ethical choice—treat all newsmen alike.69 Disagree, but ... I was personally more inclined to stay 'late' and dig deeper for a guy who had been fair—not favorable--to me in the past.70 This comment sounds as if it comes from 'some' of those self-annointed, non-pro 'newsmen' who op­ erated as free lancers and stringers.71 It is even more likely that certain favors are done to those 'bigger names' regardless of their position on the war.72

Problems Facing Newsmen and Military Information Offi'ce'rs Newsmen were asked to indicate their biggest and second biggest problems in accomplishing their mission in Vietnam. Problem categories were: (1) military control, (2) MACV ground rules, (3) transportation, (4) enemy action, (5) mili­ tary commanders, (6) military information personnel, and (7) other (write in). 142 Newsmen replies (N-4 6) were spread across all cate­ gories with "transportation" selected as the biggest problem (30.4 percent) and "military information personnel" (20.5 percent) as the "second biggest" problem. Military respondents were asked to indicate their big­ gest and second biggest problems in providing maximum sup­ port to the press. Categories were: (1) MACV ground rules, (2) transportation, (3) enemy action, (4) military command­ ers, (5) uncooperative newsmen, and (6) other (write in). As with the newsmen, military replies (N-7 6) were spread across all categories with "transportation" the big­ gest problem (38.1 percent) and "uncooperative newsmen" as the second biggest problem (19.4 percent). Figure 2 depicts newsmen and lOs' "biggest" problems. "Other" newsmen responses included: difficulty in finding knowledgeable sources . . . the confused war . . . no problems--we're paid to get around all of these . . . censorship . . . using information from good-guy sources without getting them in dutch . . . lack of phones (communi­ cations) . . . South Vietnamese censorship . . . apathetic, inefficient military information structure particularly at command level (MACOI) which obfuscates more than facili­ tates; rapid turnover of military and civilian personnel— very little accumulated perspective. 143 40 NEWSMEN'S BIGGEST PROBLEMS 35 (N-46) 30

25 23 20

15

10

5 06 0 —1-

w U .H fd o (U -P u cn >i o U u -H n O -H o n^ fd

38

MILITARY INFORMATION OFFICERS' BIGGEST PROBLEMS (N-76)

0_L • C Ol OcJ w >i 0 cn 0 B }-l Id Q) c: S-H h 0 cn

Newsmen Ratings of News Sources The press in Vietnam is dependent upon many things, one of which is news sources from which to obtain information about the war. A proposition tested in this survey was that "good news sources" would be rated high on the criteria of objectivity, accuracy, news value, accessibility, timeliness and reli- abilitywi-4- . 73 There are many news sources in Vietnam but those most directly related to the military's press support role are: (1) the military information officer, (2) U.S. military 145 commanders, (3) U.S. soldiers, (4) JUSPAO briefings, (5) official briefings (for attribution), (6) background briefings (not for attribution), (7) U.S. handouts, and (8) other newsmen not in same organization. Table 7 depicts how newsmen rated news sources on each criterion and shows that newsmen rated news sources signifi­ cantly different on all criteria except reliability. 74 In 1968, Hagley conducted a similar survey of news sources in Vietnam. In his study, newsmen (N-62) rated the "average soldier" higher than "military information persons" in the areas of "news value," "timeliness," and "objectiv­ ity." Only in "accuracy" did the military information person score higher than the average soldier. This survey supports Hagley's results. As indicated on Table 7, the "U.S. soldier" was rated a better news source than "military information officer" on all criteria except "accuracy" and "reliability." 75 "Other newsmen" were rated highest of all sources on all criteria except "accessibility" which went to the "U.S. soldier." Military information officers were given an opportunity to comment and sta^e whether or not they agreed with Hagley's results. More than 51 percent disagreed. Hagley's results challenged the information officers because, in essence, average soldiers were rated higher in 146

Ci4 •H o o r* r^ «x> <^ ^ ^ CN (N ro Q <^ f^ ro ro ro ro t^ t^ r^ r>- r^ r^ • • • in •H >H rH H rH tn o O O O O •H o o o o o d 0 (U ^ 13 iH (N ro ^ ro ro 0 fd 'J^ '^ ro rsi 00 o -p > * ^"^ h 1 rH § o cn 2: '^ ro tH in ro -M 0) 0 ^ H o s e CN OJ rsj ,H iH fN •H > O 1 < UH 2; «^ rH rH r- H rH H if) •r-\ ty,

f^ ro ro rH ro ro fro m W •-:) pq -H H U 1 (U « • ^d cn iH fd D C/3 a 4-> 00 rH cr> vD ro iH O • (d ^ u D ffi 0 ro ro ro rH ro (^ cn w 1 •P W 12 1 M-l d 1-1 W •H iH 0) cn LO CO a^ in rH rH •H pq S M-i fd -H tr> a0 ro CN CM CN ro ro 1 EH (X4 O U CQ -H O CU 1 > W •H TJ 1+-I MH O tn 0) cn o in in rH cT> r^ S ^^ -H tr> fd H O u C ro (N (N ro rNj CN EH pq CQ -H I c 0 S rH cn '^ PH iH r- 00 rH •H O IS ro ro ro rH fsj ro W cn w • U wer e :s W (U cn w • -H rH ro rvl VO rH rH s D n3 iH ro ro CN rH CM ro •H 0 4-> w (d cn (ii >H rH rd vjD r^ in ro cr» U3 • S u0 fO CN CM ro CM CM give n >i 4J cn rV -H >i 0) •'-' >i -H XI CU rH u '•1 y 5 -^ G -H cn -P 03 > cn -H i3 ^ h! cn ^ fd c 0) :3 cn (u (u -H fd •^ ,^ ^ O g rH 0) :^ U OJ O -H O O < 2 < EH « 147 areas in which the information officer was trained and being a good news source was a basic reason for the information officer's existence.

One information officer dismissed Hagley's results on the grounds that "disgruntled troops will bullshit the media shamelessly."

Along this same vein, another said: "GI's would say anything. Sometimes just to flap the newsmen." 77

The average soldier can be used by the media to say what the newsman wants to hear. It may not be true but will sell copy.78

Every reporter tries to be an Ernie Pyle and get the 'real' story from the GI's on the spot. Often, they are good color and make great reading but little knowledge of things beyond their scope.79

I am most critical of newsmen who look to the average soldier as a source. How often have we seen the TV guy stick his mike into the face of a chopper pilot just back from an air as­ sault mission and ask him, 'How's the war going?'80

Too many newsmen are prone to getting their news from 'unofficial,' 'usually reliable' or 'mili­ tary spokesman' sources (which is usually some private, sergeant or lieutenant who doesn't know the whole story or real facts) because they do not care to wait for an official, totally factual release from information officers, which would take longer and cost them a 'scoop.'°1

In defense, many information officers accounted for

Hagley's results in one of three ways other than the fact the individual soldier is good copy. 148 First of all, said several respondents, the information officer was a scapegoat caught in the middle. Military com­ manders were not prone to admit their mistakes, the press

challenged everything it heard, and the "poor information p 2 man was caught between these contentious points of view."

Secondly, the information officer rarely makes news

but does his best "when he brings the newsmen together with 8 3 the best available sources." "Public information persons

are really only technicians who ought primarily to be busy 84 getting newsmen and sources together."

The third defense of Hagley's results was, according

to a number of respondents, in the "official spokesman"

role of the information officer. Information officers are

more vulnerable because of this and do not "enjoy the 8 5 anonymity the others had."

Emphasizing this "official spokesman" role, a Navy 10

said:

More than anyone else, information personnel bear the weight of responsibility and accountability to the command for abiding by the rules. The morass accruing from ground rules which are often arbitrarily interpreted, lower level command translations laced with special additional pol­ icies, and the memory of being 'burned' in the press no doubt instills more caution and sensi­ tivity in the information personnel than in the average soldier, who is not familiar with the pitfalls of blabbing his brains out.86 149 Military Rating of the Media

Military information officers were asked to rate the

four general types of news media: (1) television, (2) news­

papers, (3) news magazines, and (4) wire services.

The rating criteria were: (1) accuracy, (2) objectiv­

ity, and (3) tended to sensationalize. A five point scale

from high (1) to low (5) was used.

As shown on Table 8, news magazines, wire services and

newspapers generally received high ratings on "accuracy" and

"objectivity with low ratings on "tended to sensationalize."

Television was rated low on "accuracy" and "objectivity" and

high on "tended to sensationalize." However, only ratings

on "objectivity" were significantly different.

TABLE 8 MILITARY RATINGS OF NEWS MEDIA IN VIETNAM* (N-76)

TV News- News Wire F papers Mags Svcs Value Sign. DF Accuracy 3.1 2.2 2.2 2.2 .6 n.s. 3,304 Objectivity 3.7 2.5 2.6 2.3 2.9 P<.05 3,304 Tended to Sensationalize 1.9 3.1 2.9 2.9 1.7 n.s. 3,303

*Mean scores given. Ratings were on a five-point scale from High (1) to Low (5). 150 Officials Imposing Informal Censorship the Most

Those newsmen, who felt informal censorship was imposed, were asked who imposed it the most, second most and the least. Of the newsmen who completed this section (N-33), 45 percent indicated "U.S. commanders" as imposing it the most, with "military information personnel," "JUSPAO offi­ cials (Military)" and "Vietnamese officials" in a three-way tie as imposing it the second most. "U.S. officials (civil­ ians)" were reported as imposing it the least.

When Informal Censorship Imposed Newsmen, who said that informal censorship was imposed, were asked if it were imposed "during," "before" or "after" major offensives or "during battle lulls." Of those who replied (N-29), the majority said it was imposed "most" "before major offensives," the "second most" "during major offensives," and the "least" "during battle lulls."

How Newsmen Find Out About Impending Military Operations Military information officers were asked how newsmen found out about restricted information such as an impending military operation. Of those who replied (N-60), 16.6 per­ cent said information was "leaked by military information personnel," 11.6 percent "other newsmen," 11.6 percent "leaked by Vietnamese officials," 05.0 percent "leaked by 151 military commanders" and 55 percent elected to write in "other" sources. "Other" sources frequently mentioned were: Leaked by low-ranking EM [enlisted men] showing off their knowledge or paid by newsmen for leaks.

Leaked by Embassy personnel. Most reporters can take bits and pieces and come up with what the big picture would look like. Everyone in Vietnam was a leak. No way to stop it. Most media had paid informers. In almost every case, bureau chiefs were briefed and asked if they wish to cover. It was never 'leaked'—ground rules make leaks unnecessary.

Military Guidance On Handling the Press Military respondents (N-79) were asked to state if they had received guidance, and from whom (position only), on "handling the press" which was counter to the military's policy of "maximum disclosure with minimum delay," excluding security matters or liACV ground rules. Only 34.1 percent replied "yes" listing the following type officials as giving such guidance: immediate command­ ers such as the division commander or commanding general; the MACV chief of information; other senior information officers; senior Naval officer afloat; the U.S. Ambassador to South Vietnam and; the President of the United States. 152 Summary The primary purpose of this survey was to analyze informal censorship of the press by the military in Vietnam. The survey allowed both newsmen and military information officers to express their opinions on this and related topics. Data collected for the survey came from questionnaires completed by 4 8 newsmen and 8 0 military information offi­ cers, all of whom had served or were serving in Vietnam. Briefly, the survey findings were: 1. Newsmen respondents appeared to be well qualified to express cogent opinions on censorship in Vietnam. Aver­ aging almost 2 trips each for an average of more than 2 years each in country, newsmen represented all major types of U.S. national news media. Newsmen respondents repre­ sented duty in Vietnam for every year of the war. 2. Military respondents also appeared well qualified. Respondents were information officers representing all military services and reported duty in Vietnam for every year of the war. Military respondents consisted of an Army and Air Force general, a Navy admiral, and all ranks down to the rank of captain. The majority were in the major- colonel bracket.

3. Formal military censorship did not exist in

Vietnam. 153 4. The large majority (89 percent) of newsmen and more than one-third of the military information officers (35 per­ cent) said the military exercised informal censorship over the press. Most newsmen reported, however, that informal censorship did not impair or only slightly impaired them in accomplishing their mission. The most common types of cen­ sorship reported by both groups were denial of transporta­ tion, sources refusing to talk and withholding legitimate information.

5. MACV ground rules proved to be more of a hindrance to the military, who had to enforce them, than to newsmen, who had to abide by them. The most common complaint by both respondents was that ground rules could be interpreted in such a manner so as to deny newsmen legitimate informa­ tion. 6. Most newsmen (64.2 percent) believed the military used security classifications as a means to withhold other­ wise legitimate or public news; most information officers (69.3 percent) disagreed. The most common reason given by newsmen for the military withholding information on security grounds was to hide military or politically embarrassing in­ formation. Information officers denied this on the grounds that security classifications are used primarily to protect U.S. lives and to deny vital information to the enemy. 154 7. A large majority (67.9 percent) of information officers admitted giving preferential treatment to certain newsmen although not necessarily because these newsmen favored U.S. policies in Vietnam. The most frequent reasons given for preferential treatment were that it was human nature to do so and because favored newsmen were fair, ob­ jective and friendly.

8. Both groups of respondents reported transportation as being their biggest problem. Newsmen said information officers were their second biggest problem while information officers reported uncooperative newsmen as their second big­ gest problem. 9. The best news source for newsmen in Vietnam was other newsmen not in the same organization. Overall, the information officer was rated below other newsmen, U.S. soldiers and background briefings as a news source. 10. Information officers rated wire services, news­ papers and news magazines generally high on accuracy and objectivity and low on sensationalism. Television was rated low on accuracy and objectivity and high on sensationalism. 11. Other findings were: newsmen felt U.S. commanders imposed informal c.nsorship the most and information officers the second most; newsmen felt informal censorship was imposed most before major offensives and least during battle lulls; information officers reported that most leaks about operations 155 were made by information officers with a variety of other leaks also responsible; about one-third of the information officers received guidance from higher level authorities which was counter to the "maximum disclosure with minimum delay" principle. NOTES

An exception to this statement is in the rosters pro­ vided by the Air Force and Marine Corps which listed two retired officers. 2 Survey results indicated an average of 1.8 trips each. 3 Zorthian, "Press Performance in Vietnam," p. 20. 4 Replies to two major questions were checked. As to whether or not informal censorship was imposed, 34.9 percent of the Army/Navy group replied "yes" while 4 0 percent of the Air Force/Marine Corps group replied "yes." As to whether or not the military gave preferential treatment to newsmen who favored U.S. policies, 66.6 percent of Army/Navy group replied "yes" while 7 3.3 percent of the Air Force/Marine Corps replied "yes." 5 Thomas R. Hagley, "An Evaluation of Information Sources in South Vietnam by United States Correspondents" (unpublished Master's thesis, Ohio University, March, 1968). (Hereinafter referred to as An Evaluation of Information Sources). To obtain frank replies, anonymity was offered to those respondents who so desired. Of the military respon­ dents, 62.5 percent declined to have their names used with their answers; 48 percent of the newsmen declined. 7 Of the 30 military respondents who said their names could be used, 9 stated they exercised informal censorship. Names of these respondents would add nothing to the report and could jeopardize the respondents' military careers. o Newsmen ratings were on a scale from 1 (greatly im­ paired) to 5 (did not impair). For final tabulations, the ones and twos were combined to yield a "high" degree of impairment and the fours and fives were combined to yield a "low" degree of impairment, resulting in a high (ones and twos), medium (threes) and low (fours and fives). 9 Survey respondent, Robert Hager, NBC correspondent. Survey respondent, Paul M. Steinle, Westinghouse Broadcasting Co. correspondent.

156 157 llo Survey respondent, TV newsman who declined use of his name. Survey respondent, Jed Duvall, CBS correspondent. 13 The frequency of similar comments precluded anno­ tating each with respondent's name or news agency. 14^ Survey respondent, Barney Seibert, UPI correspondent. 15 Survey respondent. Glen McDonald, freelance corre­ spondent. 16^ Survey respondent, Detroit Nev/s correspondent who declined use of his name. 17 Survey respondent, Hugh Mulligan, Associated Press correspondent. 18 Survey respondent, Newsday correspondent who de­ clined use of his name. 19 Survey respondent, Keyes Beech, Chicago Daily Nev.^s correspondent. 20 Survey respondent, Stanley Karnow, Washington Post correspondent. 21 Survey respondents, two Army information officers. 22 Survey respondent. Army information officer. 23 Survey respondent. Army information officer. 24 ... Survey respondent, Air Force information officer. 25 ... Survey respondent. Army information officer. 2 6 Survey respondent. Army information officer. 27 ... Survey respondent. Army information officer. 28 Survey respondent. Army information officer. 29 ... Survey respondent. Army information officer. 30 Survey respondent. Army information officer. 31 •^Survey respondent. Army information officer. 158 32 Survey respondent Navy public affairs officer. 33 Survey respondent Navy public affairs officer. 34 Survey respondent Army information officer, Survey respondent who declined use of his name or newspaper. 36 Survey respondent George Allison, NBC correspondent. 37 Survey respondent Robert Hager, NBC correspondent. 38 Survey respondent Newsday correspondent who de- clined use of his name. 39 Survey respondent Robert Goralski, NBC correspondent. 40 Survey respondent Ron Milligan, ABC correspondent. Survey respondent ABC correspondent who declined use of his name. Survey respondent UPI correspondent who declined use of his name. 43 Time correspondent who declined Survey respondent use of his name. 44 Survey respondent UPI who declined use of his name. 45 Survey respondent Warren Rogers, correspondent. 46 U.S. News and World Report who Survey respondent declined use of his name 47Surve y respondent George Allison, NBC correspondent. 48 Survey respondent Navy public affairs officer. 49 Survey respondent Army information officer. 50Surve y respondent Air Force information officer. 51,Surve y respondent. Army information officer. 52 Survey respondent Army information officer. 53 Survey respondent Army information officer. 159 54 Survey respondent. Army information officer. 55 Survey respondent. Navy public affairs officer. 56e Survey respondent. Army information officer. 57^ Survey respondent. Army information officer. 58 Survey respondent. Army information officer. 59 Survey respondent. Navy public affairs officer. The author served in Vietnam from July, 1967 to July, 1968, as an Army information officer in various positions at the U.S. Army headquarters at Long Binh, Vietnam, and as Media Liaison Officer in Saigon. 61 Survey respondent. Army information officer. 6 2 Survey respondent. Army information officer. 6 3 Survey respondent. Army information officer. 64 Survey respondent. Army information officer. Survey respondent. Navy public affairs officer. 6 6 Survey respondent. Air Force information officer. 6 7 Survey respondent. Navy public affairs officer. 68 Survey respondent. Army information officer. 69 Survey respondent. Army information officer. 70 Survey respondent. Navy public affairs officer. 71 Survey respondent, Navy public affairs officer. 72 Survey respondent. Air Force information officer. 73 A seventh criterion on the questionnaire "biased to­ ward the U.S." was. ieleted because upon re-evaluation a determination was .-.ade that it did not adequately describe a "good news source." Hagley, "An Evaluation of Information Sources." 160 75 "Reliability" was not a criterion on Hagley's study. 7 6 Survey respondent. Army information officer. 77 Survey respondent. Air Force information officer. 7 8 Survey respondent. Army information officer. 79 Survey respondent. Army information officer. 80 Survey respondent. Army information officer. 81 Survey respondent. Navy public affairs officer. 82 Survey respondent. Navy public affairs officer 83 Survey respondent. Army information officer. 84 Survey respondent, Army information officer. 85 Survey respondent. Navy public affairs officer. Q g Survey respondent. Navy public affairs officer. CHAPTER VII

SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

FOR FURTHER STUDY

Introduction

The war in Vietnam was known by many names. On the

fighting side, it was called the "shooting war." In early

efforts to win the hearts and minds of the Vietnamese

natives, it was called the "pacification war." It has been

called "LBJ's war," a civil war, and simply a guerrilla war.

And, by the press and military information officers, it was

called an "information war."

By whatever name it was called, the Vietnam war was perhaps the most debated war in our history. Public opinion polarized from one extreme to the other; giving rise to an

anti-war camp, a pro-war camp and the so-called Silent

Majority which did not seem to fit neatly into either camp.

The war was ambiguous to many Americans and was, at least initially, perplexing to the military who were charged with the mission of conducting the war. It was on this ambiguity that public opinion was molded. While public opin­ ion on war may be formed by many reasons, the most tangible in this war was tho daily diet of both good and bad news expressed by the press corps in Vietnam.

161 162 The battle cry and historical sword of the press are "the public's right to know." In war, the government's shield is "the need to know." The press contends that when the government uses its "need to know shield" the only in­ formation available to the public is what the government wishes it to know. The government counters that in a war situation, the "right to know" must, at times, be subdued by the "need to know." The "right to know" embraces the right to an uninter­ rupted free flow of information so every citizen will have a sound basis for understanding and evaluating government affairs. The military system of classifying information is at the heart of the "need to know" limitation. Most newsmen agree that the government and the military have a right to protect themselves in war by withholding in­ formation or data or value to the enemy. Disagreement re­ sults in the degree or how much information is withheld under a false shield of security. At the highest echelons of government, this disagreement is called the "credibility gap." At the grass-roots level in Vietnam, it was called "informal censorship."

Summary It was the purpose of this study to examine the degree of informal censorship imposed by the military over'the press in Vietnam. 163 In addition, this study examined how the military supported the press in Vietnam, restrictions imposed upon the press, whether or not formal censorship should have been imposed and indictments against both the news media and the military's press performance during the war. The study was limited to only military-press relations and did not include press-government relations. The military's press support role in Vietnam was exten­ sive and increased proportionately to increases in the num­ ber of U.S. troops and newsmen. The Military Assistance Command's Office of Information (MACOI) was the military agency charged with providing logistical and press support to newsmen. This support included but was not limited to collecting and releasing military news to the press, transportation, briefings, communications support and field support of food, protective gear and emergency medical aid. As in previous wars, the military imposed certain re­ strictions upon the press corps. One restriction was a requirement that newsmen receive MACV accreditation before they could receive any military support.

One of the requirements for accreditation was that news­ men agree in writing to abide by MACV ground rules which listed types of information which could not be released until cleared by MACV. 164 In 1968, more than 645 newsmen were covering the war and until 1970, the monthly average was more than 4 00 per month. Yet, despite the large number of correspondents in country, many writers condemned the press' coverage of the war. As Malcome Browne put it, "None of us really has got­ ten across to the American public." A number of writers contended that the press failure in Vietnam resulted because the war was as confusing a war to the newsmen as it was to the military who had to fight it. It was a war of isolated units, no fixed front or rear lines and no standard measuring rods as used in previous wars. It was a war which strained the "limitations of jour­ nalism and the limitations of journalists." Other reasons given for a press failure in Vietnam were an apathetic public who had received millions of words, photos, and miles of film about the war but remained igno­ rant about the war; government credibility consisting of news management, news suppression and censorship; unprofes­ sional correspondents or those with preconceived "anti" positions; and correspondents who sought only to make a name for themselve? at the expense of responsible reporting. A common reason given by newsmen for a press failure was that the military presented numerous barriers to the newsmen resulting in de facto if not de jure censorship. 165 It was said that a true adversary relationship existed between newsmen and the military. This resulted partly from the fact that newsmen were almost totally dependent upon the military for support and news about the overall actions of the war.

One of the most frequent press complaints against the military was MACV's ground rules. In theory, the ground rules were written to protect U.S. lives and military in­ stallations; however, many newsmen reported that the ground rules were used to deny the press legitimate information. Embargoes, a troublesome ground rule to the press, was often used by MACV to prevent the enemy from learning about American actions and operations. This ground rule specified that newsmen could not report any actions if embargoed until MACV released the information. Few newsmen argued with the theory behind embargoes but many charged that embargoes were used for political motives rather than for security reasons. Although all embargoes were criticized by the press, none received more criticism than did the en±)argo on the Laotian campaign. Even a number of military sources con­ ceded that the Laotian embargo was political rather than security oriented. Of all support given by the military, transportation was the most essential to the press. Only via military transportation, usually helicopters, could the press go to 166 the scene of battle and obtain a firsthand account. Accord­ ing to many newsmen, the military denial of transportation was a means of censorship. Other indictments against the military were: briefings, which presented only a rosy picture of the war; information officers acting primarily as public relations officers in­ stead of disseminators of news; military commanders who held almost absolute power over newsmen's freedom of movement; military escorts accompanying newsmen resulting in sources being afraid to talk freely; and use of distorted and in­ flated enemy body counts as a yardstick of the progress of the war. In World War II and Korea, formal censorship was imposed with military editors reading and editing copy prior to pub­ lication or broadcast. Yet, in Vietnam, no formal policy of censorship was in effect. Government and military sources reported that the im­ position of formal censorship in Vietnam would have been extremely difficult to enforce. Had formal censorship been imposed, editors and bureau chiefs could simply run newsmen in and out of Vietnam thus circumventing censorship rules. In addition, newsmen could leave Vietnam, go to another country, file their stories and return to Vietnam. Through­ out the war the United States had recognized that South Viet­ nam was a sovereign country and any formal censorship would 167 have had to have been imposed by South Vietnam. Histori­ cally, South Vietnam has been noted for its harsh censorship rules—a situation not desired by the U.S. government in an unpopular war. Some writers felt that censorship in Vietnam would have been effective only if censorship were also im­ posed in Washington.

Despite the difficulties of imposing formal censorship, many writers, including former President Lyndon Johnson, advocated such a policy. Wes Gallagher (Associated Press) said in 1965 that Associated Press correspondents would sub­ mit to formal censorship if such freed correspondents to see and cover all aspects of the war as was done in World War II. Jack Foisie (Los Angeles Times) advocated formal censorship in 1962 and as of this report, still believed formal censorship should have been imposed. Other writers agreed by saying that formal censorship would have provided greater access to the news, better security for U.S. troops, elimination of inaccurate report­ ing, permitted newsmen to be present at the start of opera­ tions rather than reporting after-the-fact, and would have eliminated the widening credibility gap between the military and the press, and the government and the press. A survey was conducted to allow both the military and press to express their opinions on a wide range of topics and specifically informal censorship. 168 Newsmen respondents averaged almost two trips each to Vietnam with an average two years' stay each. Both newsmen and military information officer respondents represented duty in Vietnam for every year of the war from 1962 to 1971. Except for five newsmen, survey respondents confirmed that formal censorship had not been imposed in Vietnam. However, a majority of the newsmen and more than one-third of the military information officers said the military had imposed informal censorship over the press. The most common types of informal censorship reported was refusal to provide transportation, sources refusing to talk to newsmen and withholding legitimate news on security grounds. Most news­ men respondents did not believe that informal censorship impaired their ability to cover and report the war. Both respondent groups said that MACV ground rules were frequently interpreted in such a manner as to deny newsmen legitimate information. In addition, newsmen charged the military with classifying information solely to hide mili­ tary or politically embarrassing information. Military respondents admitted giving preferential treat­ ment to those newsmen who were considered fair, objective and friendly. Other survey results were: newsmen rated military in­ formation low as news sources; information officers rated television low on accuracy and objectivity and high on 169 sensationalism; newsmen reported that U.S. commanders imposed informal censorship the most with information offi­ cers imposing it the second most.

Conclusions Conclusions for this study were based primarily upon the survey results in Chapter VI. Material presented in Chapters III and IV provided supportive data to these con­ clusions; however, material in these chapters were drawn from a wide variety of opinionated sources and did not pretend to exhaust all viewpoints. The following conclusions are in order: 1. Formal censorship with military editors reading and editing copy prior to broadcast or publication did not exist in the Vietnam war. Although five newsmen (11.6 per­ cent) reported formal censorship had been imposed, the large majority of newsmen (88.4 percent) and all military respondents did not believe formal military censorship had been exercised. In the literature review, few writers men­ tioned "formal censorship" although a number referred to

"censorship." 2. Informal censorship, as defined in this study, was exercised by the military over the press in Vietnam. Although newsmen and military information officers dif­ fered significantly in their replies to this question 170 (Table 3), 89 percent of the newsmen respondents and 35 percent of the information officers said informal censorship was imposed. Materials presented in Chapters III and IV tended to support this conclusion. The fact that 35 percent of the military information officers responded affirmatively to this question indicated an increasing concern among such military officers who would risk possible military sanctions to state their opinions about censorship. Although anonymity was offered, nine mili­ tary officers reported that their names could be used with their replies that informal censorship was exercised. 3. The most common types of informal censorship exer­ cised by the military were denial of transportation not re­ quired by the military mission, sources refusing to talk to newsmen, and military withholding of legitimate information under the guise of security reasons or ground rule restric­ tions . 4. Although informal censorship was imposed, such did not greatly impair newsmen from getting the story they or their editors wanted. 5. Ground rules were necessary in the absence of for­ mal censorship to protect vital military information from the enemy and did not impair newsmen in accomplishing their mission. 171 However, the embargo ground rule was frequently violated by the military in that information about opera­ tions remained embargoed even after it became obvious the enemy was aware of the operation and other world news media were reporting the action. Data presented in this study indicated embargoes were often used to avoid revealing politically embarrassing operations. This embargo ground rule appeared to be the basis on which newsmen respondents felt the military withheld infor­ mation on security grounds when such information would not in fact benefit the enemy. 6. The military gave preferential treatment to some newsmen. This was inferred from the admissions of a majority of military respondents. However, the reasons such prefer­ ential treatment was given resulted primarily for reasons other than whether or not the newsmen favored U.S. involve­ ment in Vietnam. These were: the newsman was accurate; he was objective; or he was friendly as an individual. 7. The military's support to the press appeared to be much greater than in previous wars, despite the conclusion that informal censorship had been imposed. Transportation, critical to newsmen receiving firsthand accounts of battles, was generally provided. Field support ranged from food and lodgings to risking U.S. lives to get newsmen to a desired location. Briefings, although criticized by newsmen, were 172 given daily and served to give the press their only overall picture of the total war for the previous 24 hours.

Implications for Further Study Time and expenses did not allow more than a superficial treatment of the broad question of military press censorship. As indicated in Chapter IV, the military received con­ siderable press support guidance from Washington. V7hether or not guidance from Washington caused the military to exer­ cise informal censorship warrants further study. Despite predictions of the past that only nuclear war­ fare faced the world, the Vietnam war did occur and other such wars may occur again in the future. The possibility of imposing formal censorship in any future wars should be studied now. Further studies could analyze why formal cen­ sorship was not imposed in Vietnam and whether or not such would work in similar wars. Military respondents frequently complained that newsmen arrived in Vietnam with preconceived opinions about the war and U.S. involvement. Further studies could attempt to de­ termine if such preconceived attitudes did in fact exist and whether these attitudes affected press coverage of the war. The entire system of ground rules should be re-evaluated to determine if they were too easily misinterpreted by 173 military information officers. If so, more definitive ground rules should be written.

The survey in Chapter VI revealed that two important areas of military press support need further study and eval­ uation: "Is military transportation a right or a privilege of newsmen?" and "Are military sources under any legal obli­ gation to talk to newsmen about information which is not classified?" Perhaps the most important question demanding resolu­ tion and one which impacts on most of the preceding comments is whether or not military information officers should serve as public relations officers in a combat environment where press interest is high and continuous. If the press rela­ tion role of telling only the good is dominant, the military- press conflict will continue. Conversely, no organization will willingly expose their "bad news." Further study should be devoted to resolving this wartime conflict. BIBLIOGRAPHY

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Young, Galvin. "Despite News Volume From Vietnam, Ameri­ cans Seem Baffled About War." Salt Lake Tribune, December 25, 1966.

Zorthian, Barry. "Press Performance in Vietnam." The Quill (December, 1968), p. 20.

III. Government Documents United States Senate. Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, August 17 and 31, 1966. 179 U.S. Army Vietnam. Mimeographed transcript of Information Officers' Conference, Saigon, Vietnam, June 3-4, 1968. U.S. Department of Defense. "Information for Use in Plan­ ning a Visit to Vietnam," Memorandum for the Press, the Pentagon, Washington, D.C, January, 1971. . Official letter to the press from Phil G. Goulding, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), the Pentagon, V7ashington, D.C, December 21, 1967. U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam. Directive 360-1, Annex A, "Rules Governing the Public Release of Military Information," October 31, 1966. . Directive 36 0-1, Annex A, "Rules Governing the Public Release of Military Information," March 27, 1970. Directive 360-1. Annex B, "MACV Accreditation Criteria," February 28, 19 67. Directive 360-1, "Correspondents Data," March 27, 1970. "List of Accredited Newsmen," November, 1967. "List of Correspondents Accredited to MACV, 1 "April-31 May, 1971." "MACV Accreditation Criteria," Enclosure to Memorandum for the Press, the Pentagon, Washington, D.C, January, 1971. "Missions Statement/Functions," 1968. . "Press List," July, 1968. "Public Information Policies and Procedures," March 27, 1970. U.S. Press Playbacks (Mimeographed), July 3, 1968 U.S. State Department. "JUSPAO Vietnam: General Briefing Book," Bureau of Public Affairs, Saigon, Vietnam, 1967. 180 IV. Manuscripts Ahrens, James. "War Reporting From Vietnam." Unpublished Master's thesis, Boston University, 1968. Funderburk, Raymond. "News Coverage in Vietnam: An Anal­ ysis of the Barriers in the News Gathering Process." Unpublished Master's thesis. University of Alabama, 1969. Hagley, Thomas R. "An Evaluation of Information Sources in South Vietnam by United States Correspondents." Unpub­ lished Master's thesis, Ohio University, 1968. Kindelan, Gilbert. "A Study of United States Government Controls on Combat News From Vietnam, January 1, 1962 through January 1, 1967." Unpublished Master's thesis, Pennsylvania State, 1968. Quinn, Thomas A. "Reporting Vietnam." Unpublished Master's thesis. University of Texas, 1968. Schultz, Robert A. "Military News Priorities." Unpub­ lished Master's thesis, Boston University, 1968.

V. Letters Foisie, Jack. Los Angeles Times, Bangkok, Thailand. Per­ sonal letter, June 26, 1971. McArthur, George. Los Angeles Times, Saigon, Vietnam. Per­ sonal letter. May 21, 1971. Oliver, Richard. New York Daily News, New York, New York. Personal letter, June 29, 1971. Stevens, Philip H. Colonel, U.S. Army. Deputy Chief of Staff, U.S. Military Assistance Command Vietnam. Personal letter, September 5, 1971.

VI. Interviews Coleman, William T. Colonel, U.S. Air Force. Chief of Pub­ lic Information, Department of the Air Force, Washing­ ton, D.C. Personal interview, March 23, 1971. 181 Hill, Gordon. Brigadier General, U.S. Army, Chief of Infor­ mation U.S. Military Assistance Command Vietnam. Per­ sonal interview, March 23, 1971. (At the time of interview. General Hill was a Colonel and Chief of the Directorate of Defense Information, the Pentagon). Sidle, Winant. Major General, U.S. Army. Chief of Informa­ tion, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. Per­ sonal interview, March 23, 1971.

VII. Speeches Fryklund, Richard. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs). An address delivered to the Buffalo Chapter of the Public Relations Society of America, Buffalo, New York, January 10, 19 68. Goulding, Phil G. Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs). An address delivered to the Government Rela­ tions Workshop of the National Newspaper Association, Washington, D.C, March 15, 1968. Henkin, Daniel Z. Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs). An address delivered to the Pennsylvania News Broadcasters Association, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, May 22, 1967. Koehler, John 0. An address delivered to the U.S. Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, April, 10, 1970. Lower, Elmer W. President of ABC News. An address, "Field Correspondents and the Laos Incursion," delivered to Alpha Epsilon Rho, Chicago, Illinois, March 27, 1971. Meacham, Joseph R. Colonel, U.S. Army. An address deliv­ ered to the Armed Forces Week Luncheon, Lowry Air Force Base, Colorado, May 15, 1968. Sidle, Winant. Major General, U.S. Army. Chief of Informa­ tion, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. An address, "Press Relations in Vietnam," delivered to the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, June 3, 1970. Wilson, George W. Washington Post. An address delivered to the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, April 30, 1971. APPENDIX

A. Cover Letter and Questionnaire sent to Military Information Officers 183

B. Cover Letter and Questionnaire sent to Newsmen 190

C Rules Governing Public Release of US Military Information in Vietnam 197 D. Policies and Procedures for Release of Infor: otion 203

182 183

APPENDIX A

LETTER TO MILITARY INFORMATION OFFICERS

May 10, 1971

Dear Sir:

I am conducting a graduate study to determine the degree of, if any, "informal" censorship imposed by the military on the press corps in Vietnam. Most studies in this area have been patently one-sided in favor of the civilian press. My study will objectively evaluate the question from both sides--the military and the press. Preliminary research indicates that some informal censorship did exist. However, the intent of my research is to deter­ mine how much, specific cases, whether or not such was delib­ erate and the means used. I realize this is a sensitive area for a military officer on active duty. For this reason, I visited OASD(PA) and your services' chief of information to explain my research. While your name and the names of other information officers were given to me by your chief of information, I carefully explained my ground rules to protect my sources. He was in­ formed that under no circumstances, whether the comments were favorable or unfavorable, would your name, the question­ naire, or other identifying data be given to anyone. He agreed to this condition. Only by the above safeguards can I be assured of receiving frank and objective replies. Your cooperation in completing the enclosed questionnaire will be appreciated and greatly assist me in my research in this confused but important area. Please feel free to elab­ orate on the questionnaire as you deem necessary. 184 -2- May 10, 1971

I have enclosed a return stamped envelope for your conven­ ience. Again, thanks for your cooperation. Sincerely,

Charles B. Moore Teaching Assistant CBM/s 185

QUESTIONNAIRE TO MILITARY INF0R:'J\TI0N OFFICERS

The purpose of this survey is to obtain information for a graduate thesis titled, "Informal Censorship in Vietnam." The survey has been approved by the Department of Mass Commu­ nications, Texas Tech University.

Please complete the questionnaire as thoroughly as time permits and return it at your earliest convenience.

This questionnaire has been shown to the Department of Defense and your military service's chief of information. ALL WERE INFORMED THAT UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES WOULD THIS QUESTIONNAIRE OR YOUR NAME OR OTHER IDENTIFYING DATA BE GIVEN TO THE MILITARY.

The intent of keeping your name completely confidential, should you so indicate below, is to obtain frank and objec­ tive answers. in either case, ONLY I WILL HAVE ACCESS TO THESE FOmiS. THIS QUESTIONNAIRE WILL BE DESTROYED AFTER DATA IS ANALYZED.

Section 1. Background Data Please check one:

^My name may be used with answers on this questionnaire I do not want my name used. (If this item is checked items 1-4 below are optional. Please complete item 5 in such a manner so as not to identify you.)

1. Name: 2. Current address 3. Current duty: 4. Unit in Vietnam: 5. Duty in Vietnam: 6. Inclusive dates served in Vietnam: 7. Please circle the wars/conflicts you have served in: a. WWII b. Korea c. Dominican Republic d. Others (write in) 8. How long have you been in the Information Program?9 186 9. Did you attend DINFOS? Yes No. If no, what training, civilian and military, qualified you for duty in the Information Program?

Section II. Definitions 1. Fcprmal censorship: A formal military policy with full- time military censors reading and editing copy prior to broadcast or publication. 2. Informal censorship: An act on part of a military com­ mander, his representative, or military information per­ sonnel which precluded a member of the press corps from obtaining a story he wanted or was required to obtain; an act on part of a military commander, his representa­ tive, or military information personnel which precluded transmission of that story from the field to Saigon or from Saigon to the United States. Informal censorship includes but is not limited to: sources refusing to talk to newsmen; denial of transpor­ tation except when military mission had higher priority, e.g., resupply of men, ammo, equipment, evacuation of wounded; denial of requests to visit units in the field; unreasonable interpretation of MACV ground rules. 3. Voluntary censorship: An agreement by newsmen to abide by MACV ground rules and security restrictions. 4. Military commander: Officers of the U.S. Armed Forces who are in charge of men. 5. Military information personnel: Any member of the U.S. Armed Forces, officer or enlisted, who had assigned duties in Public information or support to the press. 6. Newsmen: A bureau chief, correspondent, reporter, or photographer of any media, i.e., print, radio, televi­ sion, etc.

Section III. Questionnaire 1. Did you impose formal censorship over any newsman in Vietnam? ^Yes ^No If YES, please cite specific examples, i.e. date, place event, how applied 187

2. Did you impose informal censorship? yes no If YES, please cite specific examples

3. Did MACV ground rules impair your ability to provide "maximum disclosure with minimum delay?" ^yes ^no If YES, please explain

4. If you exercised informal censorship against newsmen, please briefly state the most common type used:

What was your biggest problem in providing maximum sup­ port to newsmen? (Please check one) MACV ground rules transportation enemy action military commander uncooperative other newsmen (write in) Please explain why this was the biggest problem.

What was your SECOND biggest problem in providing maximum support to newsmen? (Please check one) MACV ground rules transportation enemy action military commander ^uncooperative pother newsmen (write in) Please explain why

Newsmen often complain that military information person­ nel withhold information on grounds that it would benefit the enemy, when according to some newsmen, it would not. Information personnel counter that they are in a better position to determine what information will benefit the enemy. What are your opinions on this?^

8. In a recent survey of 62 newsmen who had served in Viet­ nam, "military public information persons" were rated below U.S. military commanders, U.S. Embassy officials, and official briefings as news sources in the areas of "news value," "timeliness," "objectivity," and "accuracy." The "average soldier" rated above military information persons in all these areas except "accuracy" and then were only slightly lower than military information persons . 188

Do you agree with these results? yes no Please explain

Impending military operations represent one type of in­ formation not given in advance to newsmen, yet many times, newsmen still knew about the operation in advance In your opinion, how did they find out about such? pother newsmen leaked by military com­ manders leaked by military in- leaked by Vietnamese offi- formation personnel cials (military or civilian) other (write in) 10. Some newsmen complain that the military tends to favor representatives of the news media who take a favorable stand on U.S. policies in Vietnam. Do you agree? yes no Please explain:

11. Did you ever receive guidance on "handling the press" either verbal or written, which was counter to the "maxi mum disclosure with minimum delay" principle (excluding security matters or MACV ground rules)? yes no If YES, please write in who (position only) gave you such guidance 12 If you exercised informal censorship against newsmen, please state the approximate number of times 13 Please evaluate the following types of media coverage in Vietnam by circling as appropriate: TELEVISION High Low Accuracy 1 2 3 4 5 Objectivity 1 2 3 4 5 Tended to sensationalize 1 2 3 4 5 Unknown NEWSPAPERS High Low Accuracy 1 2 3 4 5 Objectivity 1 2 3 4 5 Tended to sensationalize 1 2 3 4 5 Unknown 189 NEWS MAGAZINES High Low Accuracy 1 2 3 4 5 Objectivity 1 2 3 4 5 Tended to sensationalize 1 2 3 4 5 Unknown

WIRE SERVICES High Low Accuracy 1 2 3 4 5 Objectivity 1 2 3 4 5 Tended to sensationalize 1 2 3 4 5 Unknown

I sincerely appreciate your time and interest in completing this questionnaire. I am very grateful for your contribution to my study in this area of journalism.

CHARLES B. MOORE

Please use this area (or additional pages) for any other comments you would like to make concerning informal censor­ ship or military/press relations in Vietnam. 190 APPENDIX B: LETTER TO NEWSMEN

May 10, 1971

Dear Sir: I am conducting a graduate study to determine the degree of "informal censorship" imposed by the military on the press corps in Vietnam. Preliminary research indicates that some cases of informal censorship were exercised by the military. The intent of my research is to determine how much, specific cases, whether or not such hindered the newsman in accomplishing his mission, and means used to censor. Your cooperation in completing the enclosed questionnaire will be appreciated and will greatly assist me in complet­ ing my requirements for a graudate degree in journalism. Please feel free to elaborate on the questionnaire as you deem necessary. To be objective in this research, I am attempting to get both sides to this question by sending other question­ naires to military information personnel of division or higher units who are serving or have served in Vietnam. I have enclosed a return stamped envelope for your con­ venience. Again, thanks for your cooperation.

Sincerely,

Charles B. Moore Teaching Assistant CBM/s 191 APPENDIX B: QUESTIONNAIRE TO NEWSMEN

The purpose of this survey is to obtain information for a graduate thesis titled, "Informal Censorship in Vietnam." The survey has been approved by the Department of Mass Communications, Texas Tech University.

Please complete the questionnaire as thoroughly as time permits and return at your earliest convenience. The data will be analyzed collectively and no reference will be made to you by name if you so indicate. All of the raw data will be kept confidential.

Section 1. Background Data Please check one: My name may be used with answers on this questionnaire I do not want my name used. 1. Name: 2. Current address: 3. Employed by (while in Vietnam) 4. Time spent in Vietnam: From to 5. Circle the wars/conflicts you have covered as a corre­ spondent: a. WWII b. Korea c. Cuba d. Middle East e. Others (write in) 6. If you served in the military, were your duties related to public information or news reporting? ^N/A ^yes ^no

Section II. Definitions

1. Formal censorship: A formal military policy with full- time military censors reading and editing copy prior to broadcast or publication. 192 2. Informal censorship: An act on part of a military com­ mander, his representative, or military information personnel which precluded a member of the press corps from obtaining a story he wanted or was required to obtain; an act on part of a military commander, his representative, or military information personnel which precluded transmission of that story from the field to Saigon or from Saigon to the United States. Informal censorship includes but is not limited to: sources refusing to talk to newsmen; denial of transpor­ tation except when military mission had higher priority, i.e. resupply of men, ammo, equipment, evacuation of wounded; denial of requests to visit units in the field; unreasonable interpretation of MACV ground rules. 3. Voluntary censorship: An agreement by newsmen to abide by MACV ground rules and security restrictions. 4. Military commander: Officers of the U.S. Armed Forces who are in charge of men. 5. Military information personnel: Any member of the U.S. Armed Forces, officer or enlisted, who had assigned duties in Public information or support to the press. 6. Newsmen: A bureau chief, correspondent, reporter, or photographer of any media, i.e. print, radio, television, etc.

Section III. Questionnaire 1. Did formal censorship by the U.S. military exist in Vietnam? ^yes ^no 2. Did the U.S. military exercise informal censorship? ^yes ^no If YES, please cite specific examples, i.e. date, place, event, how applied

3. Did MACV ground rules impair your ability to get the story you or your editor wanted? ^yes ^no If YES, please cite examples ^__ 193 4. Would you briefly state what "informal censorship" meant to you?

What was your biggest problem in accomplishing your mission? (Please check one) military control MACV ground transportation rules ^enemy action ^military COs military infor­ mation personnel other (write in) What was your second biggest problem in accomplishing your mission? (Please check one) military control MACV ground transportation rules ^enemy action military COs military information personnel other (write in) Newsmen often complain that military information person­ nel withhold information on grounds that it would benefit the enemy, when according to some newsmen, it would not. Information personnel counter that they are in a better position to decide what information will benefit the enemy. What are your opinions on this?

8. If informal censorship was imposed on you, who imposed it the most, the second most, and the least? (Please insert the numbers 1 for most, 2 for second most, and 3 for the least.) ^U.S. military commanders ^U.S. Officials (civilian) Military information ^Vietnamese officials "personnel (civilian or military) JUSPAO briefing officers ^other (write in) '(military) informal censorship not imposed. 194 If informal censorship was imposed by the military, when was it imposed the most? The second most? The least? (Please put 1 for the most, 2 for the second most, and 3 for the least.) during battle lulls during major offensives _before major offensives after major offensives other (write in) 10. Please briefly state the most common type of informal censorship imposed against you:

11. If informal censorship was exercised against you, to what degree did such impair your ability to get the story you or your editor wanted? (Please check one) Greatly Impaired Did not impair 12 3 5

Section IV. Source Evaluation

Please evaluate the sources below as "news sources" in Vietnam by circling as appropriate.

Military commanders High Low Objectivity 1 2 3 4 5 Accuracy 1 2 3 4 5 News value 1 2 3 4 5 Accessibility 1 2 3 4 5 Timeliness 1 2 3 4 5 Reliability 1 2 3 4 5 Biased toward U.,S . 1 2 3 4 5

Military information personnel High Low Objectivity 1 2 3 4 5 Accuracy 1 2 3 4 5 News value 1 2 3 4 5 Accessibility 1 2 3 4 5 Timeliness 1 2 3 4 5 Biased toward U..S . 1 2 3 4 5 195 3. Average U.S. soldier High Low Objectivity 1 2 3 4 5 Accuracy 1 2 3 4 5 News value 1 2 3 4 5 Accessibility 1 2 3 4 5 Timeliness 1 2 3 4 5 Reliability 1 2 3 4 5 Biased toward U.S. 1 3 4 5 Background briefings (not for attribution) High Low Objectivity 1 2 3 4 5 Accuracy 1 2 3 4 5 News value 1 2 3 4 5 Accessibility 1 2 3 4 5 Timeliness 1 2 3 4 5 Reliability 1 2 3 4 5 Biased toward U.S. 1 2 3 4 5 5. Official briefings (for attribution) Hi gh Low Objectivity 1 2 3 4 5 Accuracy 1 2 3 4 5 News value 1 2 3 4 5 Accessibility 1 2 3 4 5 Timeliness 1 2 3 4 5 Reliability 1 2 3 4 5 Biased toward U.S. 1 2 3 4 5

Daily JUSPAO t )rief ing s * Hi gh Low Objectivity 1 2 3 4 5 Accuracy 1 2 3 4 5 News value 1 2 3 4 5 Accessibility 1 2 3 4 5 Timeliness 1 2 3 4 5 Reliability 1 2 3 4 5 Biased toward ':. S. 1 2 3 4 5 196 U.S. handouts High Low Objectivity 1 2 3 4 5 Accuracy 1 2 3 4 5 News value 1 2 3 4 5 Accessibility 1 2 3 4 5 Timeliness 1 2 3 4 5 Reliability 1 2 3 4 5 Biased toward U.S. 1 2 3 4 5 8. Other newsmen not in same organization Hi gh Low Objectivity 1 2 3 4 5 Accuracy 1 2 3 4 5 News value 1 2 3 4 5 Accessibility 1 2 3 4 5 Timeliness 1 2 3 4 5 Reliability 1 2 3 4 5 Biased toward U.S. 1 2 3 4 5

I sincerely appreciate your time and interest in completing this questionnaire. I am very grateful for your contribution to my study in this area of journalism.

CHARLES B. MOORE

Please use this area (or additional pages) for any other comments you would like to make concerning informal censor­ ship or military/press relations in Vietnam. 197 APPENDIX C RULES GOVERNING PUBLIC RELEASE OF US MILITARY INFORMATION IN VIEWNAM

Annex A, ^iACV Dir 360-1 1. BACKGROUND

a. A maximum amount of factual military information is to be released, consistent with security require­ ments . b. In past wars a great deal of information was denied the enemy by not releasing it to the press in the presumption that the enemy did not have ready access to it. Although this generalization retains some validity in Vietnam, the very nature of the war makes it impossible to safeguard several types of information that once were carefully protected. Thus, the departures of major US units are normally announced prior to the time of their redeployment rather than after their last elements have left the country. Pinpoint datelines are permitted. In- country strength figures, by service, are released at regular intervals. c. In Vietnam the major problem in providing a full flow of information to newsmen and thence to the public is not that of deciding whether information is releasable, but that of physically gathering, transmitting, and checking facts from widely dis­ persed locations often linked together primarily by air transportation and a heavily used communica­ tions system. d. The prevailing situation in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) often enables correspondents to learn of US military information before it has been released officially in accordance with the ground rules indi­ cated belov. Such information is not to be trans­ mitted or released to the public until officially released by a US Military Assistance Comman, Vietnam (MACV) spokesman. f^iACV accreditation is issued on this condition. Violation of these ground rules is to be regarded as a basis for suspension or cancel­ lation of MACV accreditation. 198 e. Correspondents' movements may sometimes be re­ stricted in certain tactical areas. These restric­ tions are kept to a minimum but they may be applied by a commander when, in his opinion, the nature of an operation warrants such action. Correspondents are to be advised of such restrictions by the com­ mander of the unit, by the information officer (10) of the headquarters involved, or by another appro­ priate unit staff officer, if there is no 10 present.

2. GROUND RULES. a. The Commander, US Military Assistance Command, Viet­ nam (COMUSMACV), is the sole releasing authority for all information materials, including still photog­ raphy, pertaining to US military operations and other US military activities of general interest in Vietnam, gathered or produced by military individuals or organizations. Local commanders are delegated the authority to release home town news material and other materials of noncombat operational matters or of other than general news interest. As authorized by COMUSMACV, the Chief of Information or his repre­ sentative is the official MACV military spokesman. b. The MACV ground rules have been designed to keep intelligence information from the enemy until such time as it is of little or no value to him. Newsmen have been most cooperative in attempting to follow the rules, thereby stemming this flow of important intelligence information to the enemy. However, based on logic and the numerous queries received by the press, it is obvious that no set of ground rules can cover every tactical situation encountered by newsmen in the field. Although relatively few in number, gray areas in the matter cannot be eliminated.

c. Since the major problems involved with following the MACV ground rules in the past occurred in connection with what may not be used, rather than with what may be used, this annex is to confine itself to what may not be use I unless, and until, released by MACV. There are 15 major areas of news involved. (1) Future plans, operations, or strikes. This mate­ rial is never to be released until after the plan, operation, or strike has taken place. 199 (2) Information concerning rules of engagement. Rules of engagement are the prescribed "do's" and don'ts" under which commanders operate in combat, particularly tactics and techniques which would be of assistance to the enemy, if known by him. They include the conditions under which aircraft, units, or individuals may fire upon the enemy under various given circumstances.

(3) Amounts of ordnance and fuel moved by support units or on hand in combat units and depots. Ordnance includes weapons systems and ammuni­ tion. This ground rule is designed to deny the enemy knowledge of the combat readiness of units.

(4) During an operation, unit designations and troop movements, tactical deployments (scheme of maneuver), name of operation, and size of friendly forces involved.

(5) Intelligence unit activities, methods of oper- ration, or specific locations. This rule applies to all types of intelligence units and operations.

(6) Exact number and types of casualties or damage suffered by friendly units. This information is often released by MACV, but is not useable until so released. The criteria used are the value of the information to the enemy and how much he can expect to know if the information is not released.

(7) Number of sorties and the amount of ordnance expended on strikes outside of the RVN.

(8) Information on aircraft taking off on strikes, enroute to, or returning from the target area. Information on strikes while they are in progress.

(9) Identity of air units and locations of air bases from which aircraft are launched on combat operations.

(10) Number of aircraft damaged, or any other indi­ cator of effectiveness or ineffectiveness of ground anti-aircraft defenses. 200 (11) Tactical specifics, such as altitudes, courses, speeds, or angles of attack (General descrip­ tions such as "low and fast" may be used.). (12) Information on, or confirmation of, planned strikes which do not take place for any reason, including bad weather. (13) Specific identification of enemy weapons sys­ tems used to down friendly aircraft. General terms such as "ground fire" may be used. This rule is not designed to preclude analysis of specific enemy weapons. (14) Details concerning downed aircraft, including pilots and crews, while search and rescue (SAR) operations are in progress. (15) Aerial photos of fixed installations. d. To assist newsmen in correctly interpreting any ground rule gray areas, MACV provides 24-hour ser­ vice to anyone who obtains information which he feels is subject to interpretation. Any newsman in the I Corps Tactical Zone (CTZ) who is concerned about the intelligence value of material he wishes to use is to contact the Information Officer at the MACV Press Center, Da Nang (phone Da Nang 957-4025). Elsewhere in Vietnam, queries are to be addressed to the MACV Public Information Division, at 923-2865 or 2866.

3. GENERAL NOTES a. Casualty information, as it relates to the notifica­ tion of the next of kin, is extremely sensitive. (1) By executive direction, next of kin of US mili­ tary fatalities are to be notified in person by an officer or senior noncommissioned offi­ cer (NCO) of the appropriate service. There have been instances in which next of kin have first learned of the death or wounding of the loved one through the news media. The problem is particularly difficult for visual media. Casualty photographs can show a recognizable face, name tag, jewelry, or other identifying feature or item. The anguish that sudden 201 recognition at home can cause is out of pro­ portion to the news value of the photograph or film. Hence, photographs and films of recognizable US casualties are not releaseable until next of kin have been notified. Notifi­ cation of next of kin can be verified with the MACV Office of Information (MACOI) or the Directorate of Defense in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)

(2) An assessment of US casualties that a correspon­ dent actually sees in an action may be used. However, to protect security of the unit con­ cerned and to minimize anguish on the part of families at home, correspondents are requested not to identify units smaller than brigade, regimental or equivalent size, in connection with casualty figures. b. Three types of enemy personnel loss figures are released—"killed in action," "detainees," and "Hoi Chanh." (1) Enemy killed figures released by MACV are to have been verified on the scene to the extent permitted by the military situation. It can­ not be an exact figure. It is likely that duplications and other errors on the high side are more than offset by the number of enemy dead who are carried away or buried, by those who subsequently die of wounds, and by those killed by artillery concentrations and air strikes not followed up by ground action. Thus, when a specific number of enemy killed is announced, that figure is not as precise as the popular term "body count" would imply. Neither is it a guess or loose estimate. It is the best figure that can be developed and, as already noted, is probably conservative in the long run. (2) It is difficult, if not impossible, to get reliable enemy wounded figures. It is to be considered that wounded as well as killed figures are released in the case of US casu­ alties, whereas only killed figures are an­ nounced in the case of enemy casualties. Hence, any meaningful comparison between enemy and US casualties is to be based on killed figures. 202 (3) Enemy or possible enemy persons captured or taken into custody are called detainees until such time as their status (prisoner of war, returnee, civil defendent, or innocent civil­ ian) is finally determined by competent authority. c. The initial release of information pertaining to any US tactical operation in the field is to be made by MACOI when, in the opinion of the field force com­ mander concerned, the release of such information will not adversely affect the security of his com­ mand. This condition may exist when it can be presumed that the enemy is aware of the general strength and location of friendly forces. It may occur either before or after there has been signifi­ cant contact. The field force commander's recommenda­ tion for release does not constitute authority for commanders subordinate to MACV to effect release to news media. Initial announcement of an operation is to be made by ^iACOI only. d. Official total US casualty figures in Vietnam on a weekly and cumulative basis are released by the Department of Defense and MACV on the basis of reports from the individual services to the Depart­ ment of Defense. Because of unavoidable late casualty reporting, these figures are subject to updating. e. Questions concerning this directive should be ad­ dressed to the Chief of Information, United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, APO 96222, telephone numbers: 923-3163, 4989, or 3897. 203 APPENDIX D

SECTION II

POLICIES AND PROCEDURES FOR RELEASE

OF INFORMATION

MACV Dir 360-1 7. CLEARANCE AND RELEASE AUTHORITY.

a. COMUSMACV exercises the sole authority for clearance and release of information concerning US military operations in Vietnam (north and south) or adjacent waters. All military news releases concerning oper­ ations or other actions in Vietnam of general news interest are to be cleared with COMUSMACV. After clearance by COMUSMACV, originating commands may make distribution of the cleared material.

b. When operations in Southeast Asia involve US Forces other than those based in the RVN, commanders of forces involved are to provide COMUS^iACV with infor­ mation for release in Saigon. COMUSMACV is the releasing authority for information concerning such operations. Commanders of forces so involved are to be authorized to provide amplifying information on the participation of their forces as approved by CINCPAC All releases concerning operations are to be submitted to MACV for clearance as outlined in paragraph 8, below.

c. Local commanders are delegated the authority to clear and release home town news material, and other materials clearly of noncombat operational matters and of other than general news interest such as:

(1) Relicious, recreational, sports, and similar actiV Lties.

(2) Construction of new mess halls, post exchanges, and similar buildings.

(3) VIP visits on an after-the-fact basis unless specified otherwise. 204 (4) Personnel actions such as promotions, assign­ ments, awards, and educational achievements.

(5) Pacification support activities which are separate from military operations.

(6) Local command policies of local interest and not pertaining to combat operations.

8. CLEARANCE PROCEDURES.

a. General. To obtain COMUS^iACV clearance, materials proposed for release are to be submitted to Plans and Policy Division (PPD), MACOI. All materials are to be checked for security, accuracy, and propriety at the source prior to submission for clearance. Each story, fact sheet, outline, and audio tape cover sheet submitted for clearance is to have a heading to include slug, unit, phone num­ ber, and date of action and is to bear in the upper margin the signature and grade, or unit stamp and initials, of the responsible information officer.

b. Written Releases. Two copies of proposed written releases are to be submitted to MACOI.

c. Still Photographs. (1) Three prints of still photographs are to be submitted to MACOI. MACOI retains one copy, forwards one copy to the Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs) (OASD (PA)), and returns one copy to the originator. (2) Each print is to include or be accompanied by:

(a) Caption attached to the bottom of each print.

(b) Negative number.

(c) -ccompanying list of proposed recipients.

(3) Negatives or still photographs are to be trans­ mitted through service channels to respective photo repositories in accordance with appropri­ ate service regulations. 205 d. Audio Tapes. One copy of tapes to be cleared is to be submitted to MACOI. Each tape submitted is to be acpcompanied by a cover sheet indicating the originating headquarters or unit, topic, and a brief synopsis of the contents. e. Motion Picture Films.

(1) The ASD (PA) retains authority for clearance and public release of military motion picture (MOPIX) films. MACOI has delegated authority to release MOPIX film of spot news nature on a pool basis. MOPIX footage intended for pub­ lic release at the national level is to be sent by the most expeditious means, through service channels, to parent service processing installations for processing and forwarding to the OASD (PA) . V7hen MOPIX footage is for­ warded, three copies of film summary and data (on respective service forms) are to be fur­ nished Public Information Division, MACOI, which in turn forwards one copy to JUSPAO and one copy to the OASD (PA).

(2) Prior to shooting MOPIX footage intended for public release, other than home town news re­ lease, the proposed filming is to be coordi­ nated with the Public Information Division, MACOI. In connection therewith, the following information is to be furnished:

(a) Title.

(b) General theme and treatment of the story.

(c) Length.

(d) Technical details (e.g., size, color or black and white, sound or silent).

(e) Name of requestor.

9. RELEASABLE AND NONRELEASABLE INFORMATION.

a. The policy is to provide maximum information to correspondents, consistent with security. 206 b. Ground rules on release of information applicable to correspondents are contained at Annex A.

c. Release of information by military agencies and per­ sonnel is to be governed by both the ground rules and separate instructions issued by this head­ quarters and higher authority.

d. Security of military information is to be maintained at the source. In situations where a correspondent has been exposed to classified or nonreleasable in­ formation, the following policy is to govern:

(1) The correspondent is to be made aware of the fact and requested to cooperate in the protec­ tion of military security.

(2) In the event that the information learned is only temporarily nonreleasable, such as an operation which is planned or begun, but not yet released by MACV, the following policies govern:

(a) TV/motion picture film or still film in color may be placed under embargo and shipped to the correspondent's home agency. Public announcement by MACV is to constitute automatic lifting of the embargo.

(b) Written material and still black and white photos may be held by the Saigon bureau of the news agency concerned until the em­ bargo is lifted, but are not to be put on the wire to the US or elsewhere out of the RVN.

(3) If correspondents have been exposed to classi­ fied information or material at cordoned-off scenes, they are to be guided by the provisions of MACV Directive 190-1.

(4) In situations not covered above, the matter is to be referred to MACOI.

10. RELEASE PROCEDURE. a. V'Jhen COMUSMACV clears and releases, or authorizes release and dissemination, component and subordi­ nate commanders may disseminate the material. 207 b. JUSPAO retains authority and responsibility for release of US military information to foreign language news media published in the RVN. Mate­ rials recommended for dissemination to Vietnamese language news media are to be routed through MACOI to JUSPAO.

11. AIRCRAFT ACCIDENTS.

a. Concerned information officers are to report imme­ diately all significant aircraft accidents occurring within the RVN and territorial waters to the MACOI Public Information Division via the MACOI dedicated circuit teletype system, or by phoning 923-2865 or 2866. During the hours from 1800 to 0700 all re­ ports are to be phoned to the I4AC0I duty officer at 923-2865 or 2866. Such reports are to be in addi­ tion to those made through operational channels in accordance with the provisions of MACV Directive 335-12.

b. Significant aircraft accidents include all category I and category II losses involving one or more of the following:

(1) Heavy loss of life. (2) Conspicuous damage to military installations or civilian communities.

(3) The death or serious injury of a VIP, an 05 or higher ranking officer or the civilian equiva­ lent, a USO troupe member, or civilian correspondent. (4) Any other circumstances that have attracted, or are likely to attract, large numbers of media representatives to the scene.

c. The local information officer having jurisdiction is to assist the press at the scene of an accident, answer press queries, and make necessary releases pertaining to accidents.

d. Significant aircraft accidents occurring in the I Corps area are to be reported to the XXIV Corps In­ formation Representative at the Da Nang Press Center (Da Nang 957-4025), who is to in turn notify MACOI as prescribed in paragraph 11a, above. 208 e. News releases and responses to media queries regard­ ing significant aircraft accidents are to conform to guidance contained in paragraph 2c, Annex A.

12. RVNAF AND FWMAF INFORMATION,

a. Materials pertaining exclusively to the RVNAF or FWMAF are released by appropriate RVNAF or FWMAF sources.

b. Media queries regarding the RVNAF or FWMAF are ans­ wered by appropriate RVNAF or F\mAF officials. c. Releases or responses regarding incidents or activ­ ities involving both RVNAF and FWMAF personnel are provided by RVNAF and FV7MAF officials or their governments.

d. US military personnel are not to act as spokesmen for the RVNAF or FWMAF.

e. Materials prepared by US military personnel which pertain to combined operations, or to RVNAF or FWMAF operations supported by US units, are to be approved by appropriate RVNAF or FWMAF officials before they are released.

f. US military spokesmen are to coordinate with appro­ priate RVNAF or FWMAF officials before replying in detail to media queries regarding operations, inci­ dents, or activities involving US personnel and RVNAF or FW^iAF personnel.

g. If the exigencies of the situation, or common sense, indicate that preliminary uncoordinated responses are in order, responsible US military officials may respond, but are to restrict their comments as closely as possible to facts concerning only the US personnel involved.

h. Matters pertaining to North Vietnamese Army (NVA) and Viet Cong (VC) personnel who are prisoners of war (PW) fall within the purview of the RVNAF. Correspondents' requests to visit PW camps and re­ port on PW activities are to be approved by the Joint General Staff (JGS). MACOI, through its In- formaticpn Advisory Division (IAD) , may assist in processing correspondents' requests. References to 209

photographing PW, in consonance with the spirit of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 12 August 1949, are included in MACV Directive 190-3.

13. ACCUSED AND SUSPECTED PERSONS.

a. The release of certain information prior to the con­ clusion of an accused person's trial may prejudice his opportunity for a fair and impartial determina­ tion of the case. Information released before evidence thereon has been presented in open court is to include only incontrovertible factual matters and is not to include subjective observations,

b. Releasable. Subject to paragraph 13c, below, the following information concerning persons accused of offenses may be released by the convening authority:

(1) The accused's name, grade or rank, age, resi­ dence or unit, regularly assigned duties, marital status, and other similar background information.

(2) The substance or text of the offenses of which he is accused.

(3) The identity of the apprehending and investi­ gating agency, and the length of the investiga­ tion prior to apprehension.

(4) The factual circumstances immediately surround­ ing the apprehension of the accused, including the time and place of apprehension, resistance, and pursuit.

(5) The type and place of custody, if any.

c. Nonreleasable.

(1) Observations or comments concerning an accused's character and demeanor, including those at the time of apprehension and arrest or during pre­ trial custody.

(2) Statements, acimissions, confessions, or alibis attributable to an accused. 210 (3) References to confidential sources, investi­ gative techniques and procedures, such as fingerprints, polygraph examinations, blood tests, firearms identification tests, or other similar laboratory tests.

(4) Statements concerning the identity, credibility, or testimony of prospective witnesses. (5) Statements concerning evidence or argument in the case, whether or not it is anticipated that such evidence or argument is to be used at the trial. d. Photographing or Televising the Accused. No action is to be taken to encourage or volunteer assistance to news media in photographing or televising an accused or suspected person being held or trans­ ported in military custody. Photographs of an accused or suspect are not to be made available for public release unless a law enforcement function is served thereby. e. Fugitives from Justice. The provisions of this para­ graph are not intended to restrict the release of information designed to enlist public assistance in apprehending an accused or suspect who is a fugitive from justice. f. Photography at Court-Martial. Photographing of prisoners except for official purposes is discouraged Requests from news media for permission to take photographs during the period of a trial by court- martial are to be guided by the following:

(1) Photography of the interior of the courtroom may be permitted when personnel involved in the proceedings are not present.

(2) During the trial, photography of the accused may be permitted at such times as he is out-of- doors in public view. At their option, members of the court or the accused may be photographed in the room or rooms assigned to the press. Any photograph of the accused is to be accom­ plished only under appropriate circumstances; never in the courtroom, cell, cellblock, prison yard, or similar area. A military prisoner is 211 not to be photographed v.-hen other prisoners are present or be forced to pose for photo­ graphs, except for official purposes. Any photography permitted is not to impede or interfere with the progress of the trial.