Interpreting the Maritime and Overland Trade Regulations of 1882 between Chosŏn and the Qing: How logics of appropriateness shaped Sino–Korean relations

Item Type Article

Authors Park, Jung Mee; Wang, Chun-Ping

Citation Park, J. M., & Wang, C. P. (2020). Interpreting the Maritime and Overland Trade Regulations of 1882 between Chosŏn and the Qing: How logics of appropriateness shaped Sino–Korean relations. International Area Studies Review, 23(1), 114-132.

DOI 10.1177/2233865919871704

Publisher SAGE PUBLICATIONS LTD

Journal INTERNATIONAL AREA STUDIES REVIEW

Rights © The Author(s) 2019.

Download date 28/09/2021 15:27:27

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Interpreting the Maritime and Overland Trade Regulations of 1882 between Chosŏn and the Qing: How Logics of Appropriateness shaped Sino-Korean Relations

Jung Mee Park, University of Arizona Chun-ping Wang, University of Southern California

Do not cite this version of the paper.

Published in International Area Studies Review 2020, Vol. 23(1) 114–132

Word Count: 10,174 (including references and acknowledgements)

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Abstract Prior research on Qing China’s relationship towards Chosŏn Korea in the late 19th century suggested that China’s influence over Korea was a continuation of the tribute system. However, the Qing’s awareness of Westphalian laws altered the Qing’s relationship to Chosŏn. In 1882, Qing China signed the Maritime and Overland Trade Regulations with Chosŏn Korea. Unlike the previous treaties that China signed with western states, the Qing negotiated terms economically beneficial to China in the Regulations. The Qing had leverage over Chosŏn because China amassed cultural capital in Chosŏn through centuries of tributary exchanges. The Logics of Appropriateness (LoA) or “bounded rationality” of the tribute system shaped the Qing’s and Chosŏn’s responses, even in treaty negotiations. The Regulations reflected the Qing’s attempts to “modernize” tributary relations with Westphalian LoA in light of the Qing’s own domestic crisis. Domestic insurrections such as the Taiping Rebellion led members of the self-strengthening (Ziqiang) movement to focus on foreign affairs and adopt Westphalian international laws. The Qing’s goals to self-strengthen via an unequal agreement with Chosŏn, however, failed when westerners criticized China’s perceived suzerain authority over Korea. The criticisms highlighted the cleavages between the tributary and Westphalian systems as individuals attempted to justify their roles within these institutions.

Prior research on Qing China’s relationship towards Chosŏn Korea in the late 19th century suggested that China’s influence over Korea was a continuation of the tribute system. However, the Qing’s awareness of Westphalian laws altered Sino-Korean relations. In 1882, Qing China signed the Maritime and Overland Trade Regulations with Chosŏn Korea. Unlike the previous treaties that China signed with western states, the Qing negotiated terms economically beneficial to China in the agreement. The Qing officials determined much of the terms found in the Regulations. The Qing officials had leverage over Chosŏn officials partly because China had amassed cultural capital through centuries of tributary exchanges. The Logics of Appropriateness (LoA) or “bounded rationality” of the tribute system shaped the Qing’s and Chosŏn’s responses, even in treaty negotiations. We argue that the Regulations reflected the Qing’s attempts to “modernize” tributary relations with Westphalian LoA in light of the Qing’s own domestic crisis. Domestic insurrections such as the Taiping Rebellion led members of the self-strengthening 3

(Ziqiang) movement to focus on foreign affairs and adopt Westphalian international laws. The Qing’s goals to self-strengthen via an unequal agreement with Chosŏn, however, failed when westerners criticized China’s perceived suzerain authority over Korea. The criticisms highlighted the cleavages between the tributary and Westphalian systems as individuals attempted to justify their roles within these institutions.

Keywords Westphalian sovereignty, tribute system, self-strengthening movement, treaty relations, Bourdieusian capital

Introduction In the decades following the Treaty of Nanjing (1842), the Qing suffered many domestic rebellions including the Taiping Rebellion. The outgrowth of the self-strengthening movement led to multiple reforms including those in foreign affairs and international law. Korea’s treaty with Japan in 1876 challenged the Qing’s conception of Chosŏn as a dependency (fanfeng) (Cao, 2008:49-50; Institute of Modern History (IMH, hereafter), 1972). In April 1882, Qing officials argued that China would lose its economic interest in Korea if the Qing did not sign a treaty with Chosŏn (Wenqing et al., 1995, Tongzhi, Book 6, Vol. 55: 348). The Maritime and Overland Trade Regulations (September 1882) between Chosŏn (r. 1392-1910) and the Qing (r. 1644- 1912) outlined eight rules for commerce. In this article, we examined the Sino-Korean Regulations of 1882 and argued that the Qing’s domestic instabilities ushered in a western-style legal agreement between the Qing and Chosŏn governments. We discussed how the Regulations embodied a tributary intent in a Westphalian form, which made signees and observers of the Regulations question the Logics of Appropriateness (LoA) in East Asia. The 1882 Regulations illustrated the convergence of two institutions - the tributary and Westphalian systems. Late Qing policies changed diplomatic practice and larger structural reforms. The Qing’s domestic crisis led to the transfer of cultural capital for economic capital. The Regulations alluded to the Logic of Appropriateness (LoA) prevalent in the tribute system. However, the 1882 Regulations did not help China regain a privileged position in Korea. Instead, the Qing received negative attention from the westerners, which highlighted the cleavages 4

between tributary and Westphalian institutions. The paper has four major sections - (1) theoretical framework, literature review, and methods, (2) findings including the Qing domestic strife and the self-strengthening movement, (3) an analysis of the 1882 Regulations and the U.S.- Korea Treaty, and (4) western responses to the treaties and a discussion section.

Theoretical Framework Institutions. Institutions were formal social structures that governed a set of actions (Scott, 2008). Within institutions, actors enforced behavior based on patterns and rules (Clemens and Cook, 1999). New institutionalism focused on entrenched behaviors and symbolic actions that could lead to inefficiencies (March and Olsen, 1983: 734). Instead of perceiving every action as “calculated self-interest” (March and Olsen, 1983: 734), March and Olsen emphasized “the role of rule-driven behaviour” in political life (March and Olsen, 2011: 478). Logic of Appropriateness (LoA). Logics that developed through institutional theories emphasized context for determining appropriate actions. LoA was an interpretative framework set to understand why individuals choose certain sets of actions (March and Olsen, 2011). LoA emphasized social practices centered around roles, situations, and rules (Sending, 2002:445). Laws prescribed appropriate actions before behaviors become “internalized rules” (March and Olsen, 2011:487). In the case of 19th century treaty relations, LoA often preceded legalization. Differences in LoA illustrated how institutions such as the tributary or Westphalian legal systems had distinctive norms. For example, the tributary system prioritized China’s will over Korea’s. Whereas Westphalian systems espoused equality among polities. LoA, however, remained “untenable” as a “theory of individual action” because if actors cannot escape the structure, then institutions would determine individual action (Sending, 2002: 445). We linked LoA to Bourdieu to add a theory of action to institutions.

Bourdieu in 19th Century East Asia In the Outline of a Theory of Practice (1977), Bourdieu discussed how studying daily practices could help bridge the micro-macro gap in sociology. Bourdieu’s key concepts such as fields, habitus, doxa, and capital connected individual-level actions to existing social structures, and structures created local logics. Social actors existed within fields of specialized goals. For instance in The Field of Cultural Production, Bourdieu (1993:48-49) surveyed the field of 19th 5

century French literature to discuss the authors’ positions based on their genre and status in the academy. Habitus represented the “habits of the head and heart” (Nexon and Neumann, 2018:666) and the actor’s position and their perceived status within the field. Habitus was the “strategy-generating principle” that enabled “agents to cope with unforeseen and ever-changing situations” (Bourdieu, 1977:72). Doxa was the taken-for-granted or common sense knowledge of the field (Nexon and Neumann, 2018:670). Bourdieusian doxa dovetailed into the LoA. Like LoA, doxa was built on a bounded rationality. The LoA established within institutions influenced fields and the arrangement of capital within fields.1 Capital was exchangeable and existed in multiple forms - economic, cultural, social, and symbolic (Bourdieu, 1977:171). Economic capital represented material goods, property, or profits. Cultural capital represented prestige markers such as “educational qualifications” (Bourdieu, 1986:243). Cultural capital could exist in three states - embodied, objectified, and institutionalized (Bourdieu, 1986). Social capital meant interpersonal connections or “social obligations” (Bourdieu, 1986:243). Symbolic capital attached meaning to rituals such as gift-exchanges, visits, and ceremonies (Bourdieu, 1977:171). Other capitals were often converted into economic capital (Bourdieu, 1986). Actors negotiated their position in a given field based on how much and what kind of capital they possessed. Exchanges between nations and domestic spheres represented fields; capital existed within fields (see Figure 1). Westphalian and tribute systems were examples of institutions. LoA and doxa were modes of actions available across institutions. Fields, including bilateral relations and the domestic spheres of Qing China, Chosŏn Korea, and the United States, came from institutions. Bilateral relations between the Qing and Chosŏn were part of the tribute system.

1 A collection of individual human actions made fields (Bigo, 2011:238). Bourdieu found limitations of the field when particular institutions had little effect on actors (Bourdieu, 1996:132; Neumann and Nexon, 2018:670). 6

INSTITUTIONS Tribute System and Westphalian System

FIELDS LoA; doxa Domestic, Bilateral Relations

CAPITAL exchange; Cultural, Economic, Social,

practice and Symbolic Capital

Figure 1. Nested Model of Institutions, Fields, and Capital with Social Action In this model, we combined March and Olsen’s institutional model into Bourdieu’s model of field and capital. We nested capital within fields and fields within institutions. LoA and doxa influenced social action that occurred across institutions and into fields. The types of social actions across fields that involved the arrangement of capital included practice, negotiations, and interpersonal exchanges.

Tribute System: in Brief The tributary system was immensely complex (refer to Kang, 2010b; SY Park, 2017; Zhang, 2015 for detailed accounts). In brief, the tributary state system in Asia existed from the 14th through the 19th century but elements of the tribute system existed before the 14th century (Lee and Lee, 2016; Zhang, 2015:50).2 China was the central state that received tributes from Korea, Japan, Vietnam, and other kingdoms. Trade or other material gains were not sole motivations for China, Japan, and Korea to maintain the tributary system (Kang, 2012). Chinese cultural hegemony maintained peace for centuries in East Asia (Kang 2010b).3 China held substantial cultural capital in Korea because knowledge of classical Chinese was required for the Korean civil service exams. Korea’s administrative branches were modeled after the Chinese

2 The tribute system lasted from 1368-1841 (Kang, 2010a:592). 3 Zhang noted that “every hegemony is incomplete” (Zhang, 2015:155). 7

court (Deuchler, 1992). China’s cultural achievements became an organizing mechanism for order and stability in East Asia (Kang, 2010a:592). Previous research on Sino-Korean relations within international relations often viewed the tribute system through constructivism (Kang, 2012, 2013, 2014; Lee, 2016a; Zhang, 2015). Other scholars discussed the instrumental (Zhou, 2011) and symbolic importance (Zhang and Buzan, 2012) of the tribute system. The inter-state relations transcended the “rational” behaviors of contemporary international relations. East Asian states relied on interdependence (Hevia, 2003), which contradicted the notions of equality in Westphalian sovereignty. The tribute system was framed as “an interesting contrast to the Westphalian system” (Kang, 2010a:592). The transitional period in the 19th century when tributary and Westphalian logics mixed deserved further scholarly attention.4 Non-western states interpreted Westphalian sovereignty laws (Gong, 1984; SH Park, 2017; Suzuki, 2009). Japan and China’s induction into the international society varied (Suzuki, 2009).5 Japan “modernized” while China superficially adopted international law (Suzuki, 2009:81). Even though western-style treaties expanded during the 19th century, the ideals of sovereign equality did not accompany the treaties (Larsen, 2013:247-250). Western states applied a Janus-faced approach, where laws of Westphalian sovereignty applied differently to western and non-western states (Suzuki, 2005:137). We focused on intra-Asian interpretations of the law. The Qing helped Chosŏn transition to Westphalian-style treaties and the “new international order” (Larsen, 2013:243). Larsen (2008, 2013), Van Lieu (2010), and others contextualized how treaties disrupted and reformed Sino- Korean relations (Han, 2010; Yu, 2016, 2017). In this paper, we add to the literature on late 19th century Sino-Korean international relations. We examined how the Qing’s domestic crisis urged the Qing to exchange their cultural capital for economic gains in Chosŏn.

Methods We analyzed the text of the Sino-Korean Regulations (1882) and then incorporated additional sources to contextualize the Regulations. We compared the Regulations to the Treaty of Amity and Commerce that Chosŏn signed with the United States in 1882 to assess how the

4 Shogo Suzuki is a notable exception. Zhang and Lee highlighted the complexities of the tribute system during the Ming (r. 1368-1644) and early Qing dynasties (Lee, 2016b; Zhang, 2015). 5 Japan’s success often aligned with a rationalist perspective in that Japan adopted European norms for self-interest and material gains (Okagaki 2013:101). 8

Qing tried to profit from trade with Chosŏn. We referenced primary sources such as the Diplomatic Materials in Late Qing (Qing ji wai jiao shi liao; L Wang and Wang, 1964), Records of the Sino-Japanese-Korean Tripartite Relations in Late Qing (Qing ji Zhong Ri Han guan xi shi liao, IMH, 1972), The Draft History of Qing (Qīng Shǐ Gǎo, EX Zhao et al., 1976-1977), and Huang Zunxian’s (1848-1905) Policy for Korea (K. Chosŏn ch’aengnyak, Ch. Chaoxian celue (1880), Hwang, 2007). We analyzed diplomatic records from the late 19th century to understand China’s political motives. We used official Qing documents such as The Complete Account of the Management of Barbarian Affairs (Chouban yiwu shimo: 260 juan, Wenqing et al., 1995) to discuss the Qing’s deliberation over adopting international laws.

Findings The 1840s were an inflection point for China’s domestic instability. China and Great Britain fought in the first Opium War (1839-1842). Great Britain defeated China. China lost significant revenue and declined in national prestige (Cassel, 2012; Mühlhahn, 2012). The Qing’s challenges with the negotiations were partly due to their lack of awareness for the LoA of the Westphalian system. The British refused to start negotiations for the Treaty of Nanking (1842) until a Qing official of high rank was sent to negotiate the terms (Wakeman, 1978:196). The Qing sent in officials of low rank wearing insignia that indicated higher rank to negotiate (Wakeman, 1978:211). China’s adoption of international law was superficial and meant to appease westerners (Suzuki, 2009:179). After the Treaty of Nanking, China lost territories including Hong Kong, dismantled the Canton cohong merchant system, paid the British $21,000,000 (in silver dollars) in indemnities, granted British extraterritoriality, and acquiesced to other demands such as allowing British customs officers to reside in Asia (Hertslet and China, 1908). China conceded trading rights via the most-favored nation clause. The treaty expanded Britain’s commercial capacity in China. The trading privileges of the Canton merchants diminished after British merchants were granted access to the Chinese inland in 1842 (Wang, 2005: 13). The treaty had weakened the Qing government and ushered in other unequal treaties with western states.

Taiping Rebellion and other Domestic Crises 9

China’s treaties with Great Britain and European nations disadvantaged China economically and politically. China lacked the LoA applicable to the Westphalian institution to negotiate for better terms. The damage to China extended after the Qing faced several domestic crises. In the late 19th century, the Qing fought off three major rebellions - the Taiping in the Southeast, Nian in the Northeast, and Muslim revolts in the Northwest. The Taiping Rebellion (1850-1864) affected 17 provinces and killed 20 to 40 million people (Cao, 2001: 455; Wright, 2011: 107-111). The Taiping Tianguo (“Heavenly Kingdom of Great Peace”) was a religious sect loosely based on Christianity. The charismatic leader, Hong Xiuquan (1814-1864), envisioned himself to be the son of God and the brother of Jesus (Spence, 1996). As a marginalized Confucian scholar, Hong of Hakka descent created the Taiping Tianguo after failing the civil service exam for the fourth time (Spence, 1990: 171). By 1849, Hong amassed 10,000 followers (Spence, 1990: 171). In the late 1850s, Hong and his followers killed Qing soldiers sent to capture him (Spence, 1990: 172). The Taiping Rebellion promulgated sectarian violence based on religious and ethnic differences (Lim, 2008: 32). Taiping Tianguo targeted the Qing as foreign attackers (Lim, 2008: 38). After killing 40,000 Manchu men, women, and children in Nanjing, Hong moved into the “former Ming dynasty imperial palace” in 1853 (Spence, 1990: 174). Hong’s reign in Nanjing ended with his death in 1864 (Spence, 1990: 178). After the Taiping Rebellion, other insurrections devastated different regions of China. The Nian Rebellion (1851-1868) started near the “southwest Shandong, northwest Jiangsu, east- central Henan, and northern Anhui” (Spence, 1990:184). The rebels opposed the Qing’s monopoly on salt sales (Spence, 1990:185). To suppress the Nian rebels, Qing officials such as General Senggelinqin (1811-1865) of Mongol origins permitted his troops “free rein over the civilian population” (Spence, 1990:188). Muslim revolts (1862-1873) started in 1862 when Muslim and Chinese merchants disputed over the price of bamboo poles (Spence, 1990:191). The incident exacerbated into attacks against Muslim families and retaliatory killings. Afterwards, building national unity was paramount to the Manchu-led Qing. To combat the rebellions, Qing provincial officials recruited and trained local troops. During the Nian Rebellion, Li Hongzhang (1823-1901) took-over as commander after Zeng Guofan (1811-1872, during the Taiping). Li defeated the remaining Nian forces in Shandong to solidify his status as “one of the most powerful officials in China” (Spence, 1990: 188). The rise of Han Chinese 10

military leaders, such as Zeng Guofan, Zuo Zongtang (1812-1885, Taiping), and Li precipitated the Qing’s legitimacy crisis (Chan, 2018:275; Rowe, 2009:195-196; Spence, 1990:177, 194). Han Chinese leaders of the Xiang and Huai armies later became governors and viceroys (Guo, 1979:177-178; Jin, 2015:580; Yeung, 2007: 24). Although the Han military leaders were loyal to the Qing, the threat of a political reconfiguration concerned the Qing officials. Li’s opponents spread rumors that he was plotting a new regime (Guo, 1979:288). Furthermore, the agricultural yields declined and transportation routes slowed down after the Taiping and the Nian Rebellions (Rowe, 2009: 198). In the 1870s, Qing officials sought to gain “economic sovereignty (liquan)” (von Glahn, 2016: 378). The Qing court issued “unbacked paper currency” and imposed commercial transit taxes such as the likin (Rowe, 2009: 199). The decisions were unpopular. The decisions symbolized the Qing’s implementation of centralized top-down policies to combat domestic and external threats.

The Emergence of the Self-strengthening Movement The Qing officials’ responses to domestic threats (rebellions), external threats (wars against foreign states), and declining status incited the outgrowth of several political factions.6 One faction was the Ziqiang or the self-strengthening movement. The generals who suppressed the domestic rebellions, including Li Hongzhang, ascribed to the Ziqiang movement (Chan, 2018: 277; Cho, 2002: 2). They fought alongside European allies and experienced modern weaponry firsthand.7 In 1860, Prince Gong (1833-1898) and the Xinfeng emperor (1831-1861) emphasized domestic cohesion. Prince Gong, Guiliang (1785-1862), Wenxiang (1818-1876), and members of the Grand Council wanted to curb foreign military interventions in China and Korea through legal means (Rudolph, 2008: 55; Zhu, 2015: 305).8 The Ziqiang movement hoped to manage

6 One group was the Purist Party (qingliu). The Purists avoided foreigners and were against modernization (Chan, 2018:264; Hao and Wang, 1980:180; Larsen, 2008:86; Westad, 2012:100; Zarrow, 2006:22). Commercial leaders near the treaty-ports formed a different political interest group. They demanded reforms in tariff, extraterritoriality, banking, and railroads. 7 British and French troops intervened to support the Qing (Chappell, 2016:539). In 1860, British military support improved Qing-British relations (Chappell, 2016:540), which led to arms trades and the British officers to train Qing troops (Chappell, 2016:534; Platt, 2016:52). 8 Wenxiang later became the head of the Zongli Yamen from 1861 to 1876 (Zhu, 2015:302-303). Ma Jianzhong (1845-1900) introduced the western concept of “balance of power” to the Zongli Yamen in 1878. This influenced officials like Li to “Open Korea” to trade and diplomacy (Hao and Wang, 1980:198). 11

China’s foreign affairs better (Bailey, 1998: 1; Wong, 2015: 381). Also known as the yangwu yundong (foreign affairs movement), Ziqiang officials urged the implementation of international law for Qing interests (Rudolph, 2008: 5; Wenqing et al., 1995a: 315; Wong, 2015: 380–381; Zarrow, 2012: 17). The Ziqiang officials encouraged building infrastructure to avoid future military conflicts (Paine, 2003: 127).9 Ziqiang officials invested in military technologies and received support from Prince Gong, the Grand Council, and the Zongli Yamen.10 The Qing officials supported domestic naval technologies through government contracts and tax concessions (Reinhardt, 2018: 82). The Qing government expanded factories in the 1860s and 1870s to support the military (Wong, 2015: 381; Elman, 2004). The Ziqiang worked with western officials to consolidate national organizations (Halsey, 2014: 81). After the Suez Canal opened in 1869, trade increased between Europe and Asia. Foreign vessels frequented vassal states and Qing frontiers after 1870. Industries building armaments and shipping vessels grew to protect the Qing against “foreign political demands” (Wong, 2015: 381).11 Li Hongzhang founded the China Merchants' Steam Navigation Company in 1872 (Elman, 2004: 290; Reinhardt, 2018: 78) and prepared for “commercial warfare” (shangzhan) (von Glahn, 2016: 378). Li proposed for no foreign investors in the China Merchants Company (Reinhardt, 2018: 78) to protect Qing holdings.

The Treaty of Kanghwa (1876) To protect the Qing against “foreign political demands” (Wong, 2015: 381), the Zongli Yamen debated their involvement in the foreign affairs of former tributary states. In 1872, the Zongli Yamen wrote to Soejima Taneomi (1828 - 1905), “Chosŏn used to be independent both domestically and diplomatically” (EX Zhao et al., 1976-77: 14597). The Zongli Yamen’s statement clarified to the Japanese that Korea was responsible for its actions at sea (Ch’oe, 2010: 29). The Un'yō incident resulted in the Treaty of Kanghwa (1876), Korea’s first “modern” treaty.

9 The leaders of Ziqiang movement were classified as “Progressives” due to their implementation of reforms (Leung 1995:28-29). Feng Guifeng wanted China to “strengthen itself” through studies in foreign languages and science (Spence, 1990:197). 10 The coalition between Prince Gong and Han Chinese generals of the Ziqiang movement posed a threat to Empress Dowager Cixi (JZS, 1979:288). The empress’s initial acceptance of western nations was partly to limit the powers provincial leaders. The empress disputed with the Ziqiang leaders (JZS, 1979:289) and cut their budget to slow down building projects (Liu, 1978:481). 11 Light textiles and other consumer goods helped the Qing emulate European wealth (Wong, 2015:381). 12

Kanghwa signaled Korea’s status as an independent nation to the international society.12 In the treaty, Korea was called “Great Chosŏn" granting it an equal status to Japan (Ch'oe, 2010: 33; Van Lieu, 2010: 86). In article 1 of the 1876 treaty, Chosŏn was an autonomous nation (Ch'oe, 2010: 33). Chosŏn signed the Treaty of Kanghwa under Qing supervision (Van Lieu, 2010: 85), which represented Chosŏn’s strong alignment to the LoA of the tribute system.13

The Qing’s Interventionist Policy towards Chosŏn The Ziqiang movement strategically used international laws through treaties, including the Qing’s supervisory role in Chosŏn’s treaty negotiations. Li Hongzhang initially opposed the idea of Korea writing treaties since China suffered damages from treaties at Nanjing (1842) and Tientsin (1858) (IMH, 1972: 449) but reconsidered after the Treaty of Kanghwa (Van Lieu, 2010: 85). The Qing urged “Chosŏn into multi-state treaty relations to create a regional balance of power” (Van Lieu, 2010: 84). In Huang Zunxian’s Policy for Chosŏn (Chaoxian celue) (1880), Huang proposed a four-pronged approach to achieve a “balance of power” in Asia (Hwang, 2007 [1880]: 72-76). The four strategies included Korea developing closer relationships with (1) China, (2) Japan, (3) the United States and (4) China self-strengthening.14 The debate around Chosŏn's autonomy grew in the Zongli Yamen. In 1880, He Ruchang (1838-1891) proposed to the Zongli Yamen that the Qing should direct Chosŏn's foreign affairs since it was a dependent state (Yu, 2017: 98) or "semi-independent state” given the norms of the treaty system (IMH, 1972: 440).15 However, Li and other Qing officials wanted to supervise Chosŏn’s affairs. The Qing officials validated their involvement in Korea as a ploy to protect Korea from external colonizers, including Russia and Japan (Wang and Wang, 1964: 21-23; Yi,

12 The Un'yō was a Japanese imperial vessel that neared the Korean island of Kanghwa in 1875. The Koreans rebuffed the vessel with fire which provoked a battle (Ch’oe, 2010:29; Dudden, 2005:51). Lee, Hee-Hwan (2015:203) called the Treaty of Kanghwa an unequal treaty because the Japanese gained entry into strategic Korean ports. 13 Japan’s strategy with the treaty was to reinstate kyorin relations and to distance Korea from China (SH Park, 2017:56; Van Lieu, 2010:85). Li advised Choson officials during the negotiation stages of the Kanghwa treaty (Larsen, 2013:243). 14 Years after writing the Policy for Chosŏn, Huang “rejected the Self-Strengthening Movement’s narrow approach to China’s problems” (Schmidt, 2007:18). 15 He Ruchang (1842-1917) received letters from Yi Tongin (1849-1881) and Kim Hong-jip (1842-1896) in December 1880 regarding Korea’s new goals to contact western polities actively. In February 1881, He reported to the Zongli Yamen that he denied the Qing’s suzerainty over Chosŏn to Hanabusa Yoshitada, Japan’s first envoy to Korea (IMH, 1972:457). 13

2004: 142). The Qing promoted an interventionist policy (Kim, 2016: 284; Van Lieu, 2010: 84; Yi, 2004: 157).16 The Qing’s goal was not to regain suzerain authority over Korea (Rowe, 2009: 228) but to implement the Zongli Yamen’s understanding of the Westphalian system (Chang, 2009: 260; IMH, 1972: 451). Li planned for Chosŏn to become responsible for much of its own economic and military needs (IMH, 1972: 461-462). Li “constructed a plan to urge Chosŏn to... adopt technological and commercial reforms along the Qing model to maintain territorial integrity” (IMH, 1972: 461-462; Van Lieu, 2010: 81). Though members of the Purist party promoted annexing Korea, Li and others of the Ziqiang preferred using treaties to protect their interests in Korea (IMH, 1972: 461-462; Suzuki, 2009: 68; Wang and Wang, 1964: 549-550). In 1882, Chosŏn with Qing supervision concluded with the United States and Japan (Rowe, 2009: 227; Spence, 1990: 220).17

Maritime and Overland Trade Regulations between the China and Korea (September 1882) The Regulations for Maritime and Overland Trade exemplified the Qing’s leverage over Chosŏn. The Regulations attempted to redefine the claims of autonomous sovereignty found in the 1871 Sino-Japanese and 1876 Korean-Japanese treaties (IMH, 1972: 267-268, 270, 273-274, 284, 292-293, 295-296).18 Li, the architect of the 1882 Regulations with Korea, wanted to replace the tributary system with a “closely cooperative yet still hierarchical partnership” (Van Lieu, 2010: 82). Korea was not considered a vassal state (shuguo) (Cao, 2008:49-50; Chang, 2009; China, 1917:851; Hyŏn, 2011:25; Zhao, 2015: 968).19 The Regulations for Maritime and Overland Trade (1882) recalled Korea’s past as China’s tributary state (China, 1917:847). The 1882 Regulations included the traditional term for boundary states (fanfeng) which granted Korea domestic autonomy (IMH, 1972) and also suggested a return to “ritual-based suzerainty”

16 Qing China had not intervened in Korea’s jurisdiction except before 1691 and from 1762-1768 (Liu, 2013). 17 From 1876 to 1899, Chosŏn signed 15 international agreements with eight different nations but was slow to establish diplomatic ties with foreign nations (Patterson and Choi, 2017:12). Many of Korea’s treaties were with Japan or China. Treaties with the United States, Great Britain, Germany and other European polities continued until 1910. 18 The official records over Sino-Japanese debates over the status of Korea from December 1876 to January 1877 are found in Qing ji Zhong Ri Han guan xi shi liao (IMH). 19 But some Korean scholars argued that Chosŏn was “a semi-dependent state” (sokkuk) (Han, 2010; Yu, 2016:172). 14

(Larsen, 2013: 243). The Qing did not impose a western-style imperialism in Chosŏn (Rowe, 2009: 228). The Qing, however, influenced Chosŏn based on the tribute system’s LoA.20 The Qing court articulated the esteemed role of commissioners and superintendents in the Regulations. The first article of the Regulations emphasized the lower rank of the Korean King in relation to the Chinese emperor. Article 1 stated, “The superintendent of trade at the Northern Ports will hereafter appoint Commissioners of Trade” in Korea “for the special purpose of exercising jurisdiction over Chinese merchants resident there. The said officers will in their dealings with Corean officials be on the footing of perfect equality” (China, 1917: 847). Article 1 noted, “The King of Corea will also depute a high official” in Tianjin, “and such officers are likewise to be treated on a footing of equality...with the local authorities, vis, the Taot’ai, the Prefect, and the Magistrates of the place” (China, 1917: 847-848). The article continued, “If any such officer should cause disagreement by persisting to act on his own authority, the Superintendent of Northern Trade will communicate with the King of Corea as to his speedy removal” (China, 1917: 848). Article 1 suggested the superiority of the Chinese emperor above the Korean king since the King of Chosŏn’s direct point of contact were superintendents of the Northern Provinces (Lee, 2008: 22). The recognition of roles remained pertinent within the LoA framework. The high status of commissioners in Korea represented the evolution of roles in the Regulation-Treaty systems. Qing China exercised its influence over Korea through the commissioners, especially under Yuan Shikai (1859-1916) (Larsen, 2018: 170). Article 1 regulated that both countries shall mutually accredit commissioners as consuls. The status of Qing China’s commissioners in Seoul were superior to those of Chosŏn Korean’s commissioners in Tianjin.21 The Chosŏn officials’ LoA based on the tribute system elevated the prestige of the Qing’s commissioners. Traditionally, China's Minister of Rites was in charge of Sino-Chosŏn relations (Son, 2014). But the Qing commissioners sent to Korea were not under the jurisdiction of Minister of Rites. Instead, Qing commissioners reported to the Minister of Beiyang (China, 1917: 848; Han, 2010: 117). The Qing officials exercised more autonomy than Korean officials.

20 The Sino-Japanese Treaty of 1871 was considered an equal treaty (Fogel, 2009:6), yet the Regulations economically benefited China more than Chosŏn. 21 Chosŏn wanted to send a minister to Beijing but that attempt failed (Han, 2007:52; Son, 2014). 15

The 1882 Regulations differed from Korea’s previous arrangements of extraterritorial jurisdiction with China (Han, 2010: 117). Prior to the Regulations, extraterritoriality rights for Qing citizens in Chosŏn did not exist (Larsen, 2018: 170). According to article 2, Qing officials had sole jurisdiction over the cases involving Koreans in China (IMH, 1972:990-991). Extraterritoriality affected how Koreans could conduct themselves in China and how the Chinese could act in Korea. Article 2 of the treaty granted China three extraterritorial rights in Korea (China, 1917: 848; Wang, 2010). First, at a Korean port, if a Chinese subject was the plaintiff or defendant in a case, the Chinese Commercial Government Agent became the judge (China, 1917:848).22 Second, in China, Chinese authorities could try Koreans as defendants or plaintiffs. Third, in China, the Chinese officials would try Koreans under Chinese law (Hamashita, 2002:67; Han, 2010:119).23 The Regulations demonstrated how the Qing used the LoA of Chosŏn through negotiations to create new privileges for Chinese citizens.

Comparing the Regulations to the Treaty of Amity and Commerce between the United States and Korea (May 22, 1882) The Qing clarified their interventionist efforts in the United States–Korea Treaty of Peace, Amity, Commerce and Navigation. Chosŏn signed the 1882 U.S.-Korean Treaty under the Qing’s request. The Qing officials demanded approving each draft of the treaty between U.S. and Korea. Early drafts stated that “Chosen, being a dependent state of the Chinese Empire, has nevertheless hitherto exercised her own sovereignty in all matters of internal administration and foreign relations” (Dennett, 1922: 460; Lee and Lee, 2016).24 Although the final wording of article 1 changed, American officials lamented how Korea’s “foreign office is absolutely under Chinese control” (Dinsmore, 1951: 13). Li advised Korean officials on various governmental affairs (Motegi, 2012: 35). In a letter attached to the text of the Korean-American Treaty in 1882, Korean officials stated that Korea was a “dependency of China” (Larsen, 2008: 76). The note confused Western officials such as Parkes and Shufeldt (Han, 2010: 100; Larsen, 2008: 79). By interfering, the Qing made their supervisory role in Chosŏn explicit to other polities. Preserving Korea as a dependency

22 In previous arrangements, foreign officials intervened in cases where Koreans were plaintiffs. 23 Qing officials notified Korean officials of the trial. 24 Additional descriptions of the treaty’s drafts can be found at http://www.instrok.org/instrok/lesson2/page04.html?thisChar=4. 16

(sokkuk) via treaty relations promoted China’s self-strengthening process (Van Lieu, 2010: 94). In doing so, China wished to present itself equivalent to Great Britain and United States, if not stronger. The Regulations differed from the United States–Korea Treaty in terms of Chosŏn’s concessions. The Chinese benefitted from the extraterritoriality clause more than the Americans. Article 4 of the U.S.-Korean treaty allowed the Americans to have a U.S. consul until the “Corean Government can bring the laws and legal procedure of Corea into harmony with those prevailing in the United States” (Ch’oe, 2010: 783). If Chosŏn updated the laws, then jurisdiction will lie in the hands of “native local authorities” (The Times, August 19, 1882: 104). After the Regulations, Chinese merchants had greater access to Chosŏn than the Americans. Qing merchants traded freely within Korea (JW Kim, 2012: 285). The laws allowed Chinese merchants to open stores in Seoul, despite Korean oppositions (China, 1917: 850-851; Liu, 2013).25 Although the Regulations allowed Chinese merchants to travel into the interior of Chosŏn, “American citizens [we]re not permitted either to transport foreign imports to the interior for sale, or to proceed thither to purchase native produce” (Ch’oe, 2010:785).26 China’s uncertain economic future related to the Qing’s domestic crisis (Brandt, 1985; Rowe, 2009: 198; Suzuki, 2009: 104; Wong, 2015: 382). The beneficial trading terms helped the Qing expand industries and support a growing population. According to the Regulations, the Qing had to pay an additional 5% ad valorem import tax when entering a Korean port, while domestic ships would pay 2.5% ad valorem (Hamashita, 2002: 64; China, 1917: 851).27 The provisions granted the Qing better rates than the U.S. According to article 5 of the U.S.-Korea Treaty, the tariff on daily use items were 10% ad valorem and up to 30% for luxury goods (Ch’oe, 2010: 786). The Regulations prescribed Korea’s reliance on China for economic stability (JW Kim, 2012: 287). The Qing guided its social capital into economic capital. To keep Chosŏn economically dependent on the Qing, Li Hongzhang and Yuan Shikai encouraged Korea to borrow money from China (Larsen, 2008: 186). Increased loans from China prevented Koreans from seeking outside loans. In addition to economic support, Chosŏn accepted help from the

25 This appeared in article 4 of the Regulations (1882). 26 Chosŏn was able restrict food exports if food scarcity was on the horizons in their trade with the United States (Ch’oe, 2010: 786). This appears in article 8 of Treaty of Amity and Commerce (Treaty of Jenchuan, 1882). 27 This appeared in article 5 of the Regulations (1882). 17

Qing to quell the soldiers’ revolt (Imo Gullan) in July 1882. The Qing sent 4,500 troops to the Chosŏn to protect the royal family (Yi, 1984: 274) as part of the Qing’s interventionism. In sum, the Qing did not place the Korean king on equal status to that of the Chinese emperor. The Regulations granted China the ability to trade freely within Korea. Extraterritoriality rights in the Regulations protected Chinese nationals in Korea from being tried under Korean law (Wang, 2010). Korea’s treaty with the United States established extraterritorial jurisdiction for Americans in Korea, emphasized mutually beneficial trading conditions, and encouraged academic exchanges. Compared to what the U.S. negotiated in the U.S.-Korean treaty, the Qing secured more legal advantages in the Regulations (see Table 1). For Chosŏn, the LoA of the tribute system, which meant accepting Qing supervision, persisted in treaty-writing.

Table 1. Summary of Key Differences in Chosŏn’s 1882 Treaty with the United States in May and Regulations with the Qing in September

United States Qing

Status of the Chosŏn King Equal to the president (art.1) Lower than the emperor; equality to the viceroy of Zhili (art.1)

Ad valorem import duties 10% and up to 30% for luxury 5% with additional 5% (art.5) goods (art.5)

Travel to the interior Not permitted (art.6) Free to travel (art.4)

Extraterritoriality U.S. consul until Chosŏn laws China’s laws in China and are updated (art.4) China’s laws for Chinese in Korea (art.2) Sources: China (1917) Treaties, Conventions, etc., between China and Foreign States, Vol. 2, pp. 848-851; Treaty of Amity and Commerce (Treaty of Jenchuan) May 22, 1882. In: Ch'oe, Tŏk-su (ed), Choyak ŭro pon Han'guk kŭndaesa (Modern Korean History through Treaties), pp. 779-788

Western Responses to the Treaty of Amity and Commerce between the United States and Korea American media and statesmen scrutinized the presence of Qing officials in Chosŏn. Americans criticized the U.S.-Korean Treaty because the treaty legitimated the “favorite Chinese theory of suzerainty over all the neighboring Asiatic States” (New York Times, July 12, 1882:100). The New York Times discussed how U.S.-Korean treaty was “so managed under 18

Chinese influences as to inflict a petty affront upon Japan by producing the impression that no convention with Corea is legitimate unless negotiated through Chinese guidance and authority” (NYT, July 12, 1882: 100). According to the Times, the Qing exploited Korea to have western polities and Japan “acknowledge the suzerainty of China over Corea” (The Times, August 19, 1882:103).28 The western media’s criticism of the Sino-Korean Regulations highlighted biases against non-western powers. The induction into the international society for East Asian states was Janus- faced (Suzuki, 2009). The application of international laws differed for when western states requested most-favored nation status versus when China did the same. The British valued economic capital when dealing with the Qing, and Chosŏn Korea valued social capital based on obligations towards China. The Qing’s domestic crisis and weakened position within Asia prompted the Qing to convert social and cultural capital into economic capital in Chosŏn. Qing officials misconstrued the inequalities of the Westphalian sovereignty model (Larsen, 2013: 235). Through diplomatic practices based on the LoA of the Westphalian system, the Qing adjusted their expectations of treaties.

Postscript to the Regulations King Kojong of Chosŏn wanted to remove the tribute protocols in 1882 (Van Lieu, 2010: 82) but had limited negotiating powers with China. The Kapshin Coup (1884) further weakened Chosŏn’s domestic legitimacy. Months following the signing the Twenty-four Rules for the Traffic on the Frontier between Liaodong and Korea on March 1883, the Qing suffered an economic depression. New joint-stock companies incited speculations (von Glahn, 2016: 379). China’s defeat in the Sino-French War of 1884 set back the Ziqiang (Larson and Shevchenko, 2019: 41). Korea sought to distance itself from China. Chosŏn had attempted in 1885 and 1886 to have the Russian Empire intervene (Tikhonov, 2016: 12, 38). The Russians refused to intervene, and the Qing further restricted Chosŏn's abilities to manage foreign affairs (IMH, 1972: 2145-2163; Larson and Shevchenko, 2019: 41). The Korean government acknowledged their inferiority to China but selectively complied to the Qing’s demands. King Kojong told Hugh Dinsmore of the United States on May 7, 1887

28 Western officials questioned whether Korea’s treaty with Japan in 1876 was valid if Korea was not fully autonomous (Han, 2010:101). 19

that Korea was “too weak to cope with China” (Dinsmore, 1952: 14). In 1887, the Qing court urged Korea to limit contact with foreign powers (Zhou, 2011: 468). Chosŏn officials went against Qing demands and contacted the United States. King Kojong sent an envoy, Pak Chŏngyang (1841–1904), to establish an office in the United States on August 18, 1887 (Kim, 2014:243; No, 2010:165-168). In 1888, Pak started his 10 month stay in Washington D.C. (Kim, 2014:246). Korean officials increased familiarity with American politics. Due to limited funds, the Korean government cut short Pak's visit (Kim, 2014:243). Pak was unable to create long- standing policies in Korean-American relations.29 When Korea sent diplomats to Japan in August 1887 and the United States in September 1887 (JZS, 1972: 2352-2353) without China’s permissions, China regarded Korea’s behaviors to be in violation of the post-1882 Sino-Korean relationship. As a result, the Chinese government dictated three principles (San Duan) for Korean diplomatic conduct on December 1887. Koreans had to (1) visit the Chinese embassy before visiting abroad for official diplomatic business, (2) physically stand behind Chinese officials in public, and (3) acknowledge their dependency to China in accordance to the San Duan (JZS, 1972: 2381). Korea’s inability to thwart China’s influences over Korean foreign policy demonstrated the Qing’s strategy to benefit from Korea’s previous obligations to China. Even though multiple political factions within Korea looked towards Japan, the U.S., Russia or China for alliances (Larsen, 2016: 27), the 1882 Regulations highlighted Chosŏn’s alignment with the Qing. Chosŏn’s LoA emphasized the duties defined within the tribute system, upended to fit into the economic calculus of the treaty system. The Regulations depicted how Chosŏn officials valued China’s cultural capital. Years of tributary and intellectual exchanges compounded to Korea’s affinity towards China and starkly framed Chosŏn’s LoA.

Discussion In this paper, we argued that the Regulations reflected the Qing’s attempts to quell internal crises, including the damages of war, unequal treaties, and domestic rebellions. In turn, the Regulations illustrated how East Asian states understood the Westphalian system in the 19th century. The Ziqiang movement was the outgrowth of internal rebellions. The Ziqiang also

29 In future works, we will explore U.S. treaties in East Asia and their effects on U.S. domestic policies such as the 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act. 20

demonstrated the Qing’s desire to overcome its perception of inferiority (Wong, 2018: 20). To self-strengthen, the Qing used the social capital of Han leaders to persuade Chosŏn into signing more international treaties under Qing supervision, which would help China reclaim a privileged status within East Asia. Despite China’s uneasy introduction to treaties, the Qing used treaties to enact a hierarchical relationship with Korea in the late 19th century. However, the Qing’s efforts to promote a relationship through the 1882 Sino-Korean Regulations was temporary. Western states disapproved of the Qing’s supervision over Chosŏn affairs. The Regulations and the 1883 Rules garnered harsh criticism from the western media. The Qing’s actions violated the LoA of treaty-writing within the Westphalian institution even though many European states also “did not neatly fit into the normative and legal system associated with that model” (Brook, 2018: 158). The criticisms reflected the implicit biases of the Westphalian system. In East Asia, Westphalian sovereignty did not instantaneously replace “traditional diplomatic practices” (SH Park, 2017: 14). In practice, “socialization” and “diffusion” were imperfect processes (March and Olsen, 2011: 489; March, 1981). From 1882 to 1895, Chosŏn Korea had dual status within the Sino-centric and Euro-centric treaty systems (Larsen, 2018: 173; SH Park, 2017: 14; Suzuki, 2009: 22). When the tributary and Westphalian systems intermixed, East Asian countries had to modify their LoA based on the situation. China’s perceived suzerainty over Korea was a key factor that led to the Sino-Japanese War of 1894. Japan swiftly defeated China. Li Hongzhang initially asked Russia and Great Britain to mediate the crisis of war (Guo, 1979: 258–260, 262; L Wang and Wang, 1964: 1620; EX Zhao, 1976–1977: 12019–12020). Li opposed the war because he was aware of the Qing’s weak armed forces. China’s defeat surprised many foreign leaders including the Koreans (Paine, 2002: 295; Parker, 1980: 366). The Treaty of Shimonoseki (1895) concluded the war. The loss diminished many improvements of the Ziqiang movement. China was required to open four more treaty ports, cede territories, and pay Japan 200 million silver kuping taels in indemnities (China, 1917: 590-591). Article 1 of the Shimonoseki treaty reiterated Korea’s independence. Soon after the Sino-Japanese War, King Kojong of Chosŏn proclaimed Korea to be an empire (Daehan Jeguk) in 1897. The move signaled Korea’s awareness of polity distinctions within the Westphalian system. As an empire, Korea independently signed treaties. The Treaty of Seoul signed on September 11, 1899 represented an “equal” treaty between Korea and China (Lee, 2008: 11). Korea rejected placing China to a higher status in this treaty. Article 1 of the 21

1899 treaty stated that the “Empire of Korea and the Empire of China… shall enjoy equally in respective countries” (China, 1917: 864). Article 2 reiterated the “mutual equality” of local authorities (China, 1917: 865). The Chinese granted Koreans most favored nation status (Korea, 1899: 48-52). The treaty ended the Qing merchants’ rights to reside in Seoul and the delimitation of borders between China and northern Korea (Lee, 2008: 31). After eight rounds of negotiations, Koreans agreed upon Gwangmu as an era name and called China the “middle kingdom” (zhongguo) as opposed to the “kingdom of the Qing” (Lee, 2008: 31). Korean officials explained the use of zhongguo as a mere continuation of customary practices (Lee, 2008: 31). The LoA of the Westphalian system emphasized equality. The nominal equality with China was short-lived. Korea’s status as an independent nation ended in 1910 when Japan annexed Korea. And Korea was not independent again until after 1945.

Acknowledgements The Overseas Leading University Program for Korean Studies supported this research through the Ministry of Education of the Republic of Korea and Korean Studies Promotion Service of the Academy of Korean Studies (AKS-2009-MA-2001). We also thank In Young Min, Ronan Tse-Min Fu, Saeyoung Park, David Kang, Sonali Mishra, Everett Schlawin, the anonymous reviewers, and editors of IASR for improving the paper. An earlier version of the paper was presented at the Social Science History Association annual meeting and the University of Arizona Sociology Colloquium series. We are solely responsible for any errors and omissions in the paper.

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