UNITED STATES AIR FORCE AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW SATELLITES, SENSORS, AND SPACE SPECIALISTS... PROJECT MANAGEMENT...PRESSURE SUIT DEVELOPMENT

JANUARY-FEBRUARY 1965

S atellites, S en so r s, and Spa c e Spe c ia l ist s— USAF’s S pa c e Surveillance Story...... 2 Maj. Gen. Horace A. Hanes, usaf

P roject Ma n a gemen t : A n I nnovation in Managerial T houcht and Theory...... 13 Maj. David I. Cleland, usaf

Pressure Suits—T heir Evol ution and Devel o pmen t ...... 23 Lt. Col. Frederick R. Ritzinger, Jr., usaf (mc) and Capt. Ellis G. Aboud, usaf (msc)

A ir Hostilities in the Ph il ippin e s, 8 D ec ember 1941...... 33 Dr. Robert F. Futrell

E xercise Sky Soldier/Tie n Bin g VI...... 4 6

T he Computer Use of Human Being s...... 59 Maj. Robert L. Able, usaf

T he Constitutional Basis of the United States Air Force...... 63 Dr. Maurer Maurer In My Opinion F lexible Respon se vs. D et er mined Ret a l iat ion ...... 69 Maj. Gen. Dale O. Smith, usaf (Ret) Air Operations in Viet Nam Air l if t in Southeast Asia ...... 72 Col. Thomas B. Kennedy, usaf Paratroop Training, A R V N ...... 83 Air Force Review G round Electronics En gineer ing and I nstallation...... 87 Col. Charles U. Brombach, usaf T ec h n ica l Data Ma n a gemen t ...... 91 Lt. Col. William O. Rennhack, usaf

T he Contributors...... 94

the cover Address manuscripts to the Editor, Air Uni- When construction was under way on the versity Review, Aerospace Studies Institute, Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala. Printed by the 140-foot “golfbaH” radomes of Ballistic Government Printing Office, Washington, Missile Early Warning System Site III at D.C. Subscriptions are sold by the Air Uni- Fylingdales Moor, England, the maze of versity Book Department, Maxwell Air Force wires and girders formed an intricate Base, Ala.: yearly $4.50, back issues 75 tracery against North Sea skies. Major cents. USAF recurring pu bl ic a t io n 50-2. General Horace A. Hanes, in “Satellites, Sensors, and Space Specialists,” tells about BMEWS and more recent space sur- Vo). XVI No. 2 J anuary-F ebr ua r y 1965 veillance developments and techniques. SATELLITES, SENSORS, AND SPACE SPECIALISTS

USAF’s Space Surveillance Story HROUGH the ages storytellers who One of the first steps into this new dimen- set themselves down to recite strange sion in aerospace defense was taken in 1958 Tand wondrous tales have commenced with the establishment of an interim filter cen- with the classic phrase, “Once upon a tim e---- ” ter called “spa c et r a c k” a t L a u r e n c e G . H a n s - Only a short time ago the subject of this story com Field, Massachusetts. The facility was would have made an excellent plot for an ad- placed under the control of the Geophysics venture comic strip. Since the chain of events Research Directorate of the Air Force Cam- which have taken place may significantly bridge Research Center. To provide military/ change our lives, it is fitting and proper that civilian program coordination and continuity, we employ the time-honored opening. So, several special agencies were created. The De- “once upon a time” the habitual study of the partment of Defense established the Advanced heavenly bodies in the universe around us was Research Projects Agency (arpa) and assigned confined largely to astronomers, navigators, it the responsibility for conducting a research and young lovers. Then in October 1957 the and development program. The National Aer- Soviets abruptly upset this comfortable state onautics and Space Administration ( nasa) of affairs. With the explosive hurling of Sput- was given responsibility for the civilian scien- nik I into orbit around the earth, the infinite tific space efforts. Operation of the spa c et r a c k ocean of space above was no longer the exclu- filter center was handed to the Air Force. The sive preserve of theorists and poets. It had Army and Navy were directed to establish been successfully invaded by the twentieth portions of an electronic radar fence across century scientist and engineer. the southern United States to detect satellite In the roughly 90 minutes required for crossings. Sputnik I to make a complete circuit of the The heart and brain of the aerospace sur- earth, a new frontier for human conquest and veillance system was the Hanscom Field filter competition opened up. Around the globe, center. Cooperative arrangements with other people who had heretofore looked skyward agencies, both military and civilian, brought for comfort or a hint of tomorrow’s weather all sensor detection data to spa c et r a c k. A c e n - now did so with a sense of uncertainty, even tral data-processing unit was installed in 1958 alarm. This spectacular achievement by a for- to receive, process, and store satellite observa- eign power did produce one immediate result. tion information. High-speed electronic com- It made the entry of the United States into puter systems, beginning with the ibm 650 space, and in particular the aerospace defense and progressing through the Philco 2000, were business, inevitable. used for data processing. Among the first to recognize the vast mili- In October 1960, three years to the month tary potential of man-made earth-orbiting sat- after Sputnik I was launched, operation of ellites was General Thomas D. White, then what was to be known as the Space Detection Chief of Staff of the United States Air Force. and Tracking System (spadats) was assigned The launching of the 184-pound Sputnik I to the North American Air Defense Command. package clearly demonstrated the inadequacy An initial cadre of twelve hand-picked usaf/ of existing detection and surveillance equip- adc air defense specialists was dispatched to ment. As a counter to this new threat, General Hanscom Field to attend what was then sched- White ordered the establishment of a system uled to be a two-year training program. The which would provide for the detection and curriculum included celestial mechanics, ra- continuous surveillance of all man-made ob- dar, radiometric and optical sensor devices, jects in space. What followed was one of the high-speed computer operations and mainte- most intensive and compressed joint Depart- nance, satellite tracking procedures, and or- ment of Defense and civilian industry scien- bital computation techniques. An order also tific and engineering efforts in our peacetime went out to the Air Force to construct a per- history. manent spadats/spa c et r a c k Center for cinc-

Eye camera, Holloman AFB, New Mexico norad at Ent Air Force Base, Colorado Springs, of our present usaf spa c et r a c k System, he Colorado. also added impetus to the Ballistic Missile Astonishing progress by both the U.S.S.R. Early Warning System (bmew s), which was and U.S. space programs by this time prompt- steadily approaching operational capability. It ed a swift change in our aerospace defense was to be comprised of very long-range, ultra operations and planning requirements. In Jan- high-speed radars capable of providing the uary 1961 there were 35 man-made satellites brief but vital warning time necessary to take in orbit around the earth, and the celestial defensive and offensive measures in the event population was doubling every ten months. of a hostile missile attack launched against Top defense officials in the Pentagon directed the North American Continent by way of the that the new center under construction in polar approaches. Thule, Greenland, and Colorado Springs be completed and ready for Clear, Alaska, were selected as the first two full operation by 1 July. The already com- site locations in the system. The Thule site be- pressed two-year training course for the original came operational late in 1960 and the Clear twelve students in training at Hanscom Field site in early 1961. Although not specifically was accelerated. By attending classes ten to designed as a satellite sensor, it was quickly twelve hours a day, they completed the course discovered that bmew s was an extremely effec- in the incredibly short period of five months. tive and reliable source of space satellite ob- At the same time that General White took servations. Thus an unexpected and entirely the actions which resulted in the establishment welcome supplement to the spa c et r a c k net The Ballistic Missile Early Warn- ing System station at Clear. Alaska, has been operating since 1961. It is in the interior, along the broad Nenanna River valley between Anchorage and Fair- banks, just northeast of Mount McKinley. . . . The final link. Site III. in the teaming net blanketing the top of the world became operational in 1963 at Fylingdales Moor, England. It is operated and maintained by the Royal Air Force Fighter Com- mand. USAF personnel of the 71st Surveillance Wing (BMEWS) work side by side with their RAF counterparts to provide inptits to the XORAD Combat Opera- tions Center at Colorado Springs. presented itself at a most opportune time. As mentioned earlier, the growth rate in From the beginning it was obvious that the man-made satellite population circling the an “aerospace” defense operation must be earth has been phenomenal. On 29 June 1961, worldwide in scope. To directly supervise the the day before the spadats/spa c et r a o k Cen- operations of an already far-flung and rapidly ter was officially scheduled to commence op- expanding space surveillance network, the 9th erations, one of our U.S. satellites known as Aerospace Defense Division was activated “1961 omicron” exploded in space. The satel- under the Air Defense Command in mid-July lite inventory of some 30-odd objects literally 1961. Its headquarters was collocated with doubled with a bang. For the sake of clarity that of adc in Colorado Springs. The mission and definition, the center views all man-made of this, the first and only military organization objects in space as satellites whether they be of its kind in the free world, is to detect, iden- payloads, booster packages, or bits and pieces tify, track, catalogue, and predict the future of vehicles which have disintegrated in orbit. orbits of all man-made objects in space, in- The latter particles are referred to as space cluding ic bm’s and deep-space probes. These debris or space junk. tasks are being accomplished in response to During the training months of our space and under the operational control of cinc- surveillance operations, about 12,000 space norad, whose responsibility' it is to provide satellite observations were being received and warning of any hostile ic bm attack against the processed. Compare this with the current rate, North American Continent. which fluctuates between 190,000 and 215,000 Space Camera

The Baker-Nunn camera is one of the optical sensors providing the SPADATS/SPACETRACK Center with precision data on orbiting objects. In its shelter with sliding roof, this prodigy of “box Brownies” can pick up a six-inch sphere at 2400 nau- tical miles. By identification and correlation of the star back- ground in the photographs, an object's geographical position can be determined with great precision and its future orbital path predicted. Twelve Bakcr- Nunns are operated by the Smithsonian Astrophysical Ob- servatory and five by the USAF, this one at Edwards AFB. SATELLITES, SENSORS. AND SPACE SPECIALISTS 7

observations received, processed, and cata- ern it was necessary. It is through spa da t s that logued each month. This averages out to one norad exercises operational control over the every twelve seconds around the clock, seven complete and integrated military aerospace days a week. defense operations on the North American To further illustrate the population explo- Continent. sion in outer space and the effect it has on Pursuant to a dod memorandum of Octo- aerospace defense operations, on 1 October ber 1960, the terminal facility of this system 1964 there were 477 man-made objects circling was officially designated the “spadats/spa c e- the earth. As of that date there had been a track Center.” The usaf serves the center in total of 887 such objects under surveillance at two ways. First, when receiving and process- one time or another. The difference in these ing data provided by the usaf portion of the two figures is accounted for by objects which sensor system, the 1st Aerospace Control were in orbit but which decayed, fell back into Squadron functions as the spa c et r a c k Center the earth’s atmosphere, and destroyed them- and is the control element for the usaf/adc: selves. In this day and age when everything Spacetrack System. Second, when receiving from budgets to bosoms assumes seemingly and processing data from non-usAF sensors, astronomical proportions, the statisticians in which is accomplished by the same personnel the 1st Aerospace Control Squadron, which and employs the same computers, the 1st Aer- operates the spadats/spa c et r a c k Center, can ospace Control Squadron and a norad com- come up with some startling figures of their mand representative constitute the spadats own. Since commencing operations, these Center. This defines an arrangement which, space-age sentinels have processed nearly although difficult to explain, works well in 7,000,000 observations through the center. practice. It is estimated that by 1970 there will be The non-usAF space surveillance elements between five and seven thousand man-made and systems over which spa da t s exercises op- space objects in earth orbit. All of them will erational control include U.S. Army, Navy, have to be continuously identified, tracked, civilian, and Royal Canadian Air Force sensor and catalogued. It is readily apparent that the facilities. The best known of these is the U.S. task of our aerospace defense system will be- Navy space surveillance fence (spa sur ) situ- come increasingly complex. ated east and west across the southern U.S. The question might well be posed here as These observations reach the center by to why we must keep constant tabs not only on all types of communications methods, ranging payloads but on all the bits and pieces of junk from electronic impulses fed directly into the in space. The answer is that if we did not we central computer facility at millionths of a sec- would be unable to detect and identify new ond to postcards and photographs delivered additions to the space inventory. by regular mail. How is this huge task being accomplished The sensor devices used in aerospace sur- now? The basic elements of our space surveil- veillance operations are highly diverse. The lance system include a string of sensors serving goliaths of them all are the parabolic fixed- as the eyes. These feed data through a vast beam bmew s radars at Thule, Greenland and web of communications lines to the terminal Clear, Alaska. These huge, curved screens are facility and keystone of the system, the over 400 feet long and 165 feet high and weigh spa da t s/spa c et r a c k Center at Ent afb. over 1500 tons. They are held upright by Since this network of space sensors, which nickel-steel pipes twelve inches in diameter, at the present time number more than 650 stressed to withstand 185-mile-per-hour winds sprinkled around the world, includes facilities and a six-inch coating of ice. Officially desig- owned and operated by other U.S. military nated the AN/FPS-50, this super surveillance services and foreign countries, establishment radar includes 290 king-sized black boxes full of a joint command-type organization to gov- of electronic equipment, ten monitoring con- 8 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW soles, 704 feedhorns, and 440 miles of connect- space package at a range of approximately ing cables and wave guides. All of this is in- 2400 nautical miles. This doesn’t sound too im- stalled in four scanner buildings, two trans- pressive until one recalls that Vanguard I is a mitter buildings, and a combination transmit- six-inch sphere. Comparatively speaking, this ter-computer building. Four of the reflectors, feat is equivalent to photographing a .30- each the size of a 40-storv building laid on its caliber bullet at 200 miles. The Baker-Nunn, side, are used at Thule, and three at Clear. by photographing orbiting vehicles against a The bmew s radar system is capable of star background, makes possible pinpoint po- scanning space to ranges in the neighborhood sitioning of the vehicle. Through star identifica- of 3000 miles. In terms of target resolution, it tion and correlation, it is now possible to could pick up and track an ordinary house determine the geographical position of a man- door at this range over Siberia. made satellite in space within two-thousandths Another type of long-range radar used in of a degree in azimuth and two-thousandths both the bmew s and spa c et r a c k systems is a of a second in time. Accuracy of this nature dish-shaped rotating antenna approximately also makes possible the prediction of the exact 85 feet in diameter, with a 360-degree azimuth future orbital path of the object. scan capability and from ground level through Other optical sensors in use are the Boston the vertical. It has a range of more than 2000 University and Facet Eye cameras. The former nautical miles. The dish assembly or moving unit, designed and built at Boston University, portion of the equipment weighs 106 tons. It is the only mobile sensor in the system. It is can operate either in an automatic search mounted on an antiaircraft gun mount. It was mode or be directed at and locked onto one designed for taking configuration-type photo- specific target. The switch from automatic graphs and has been used with marked success search to single target lock-on is accomplished in missile photography. The unit is air-trans- in a fraction of a second. portable and is carried around the world for 1 he Thule bmew s site is equipped with use on special spacetrack projects. both the tracker and fixed-beam types of equip- The Facet Eve camera at first glance tends ment. This combination provides a maximum to resemble either a bank of rocket launchers degree of satellite-tracking flexibility and effi- or the wildest dreams of a tv addict. It is ciency. comprised of 24 long-barrel telescopes, each Another member of the electronic-type of which is connected to its own television sensor family which feeds a large volume of receiver. The specific advantage of this par- data into the spa c et r a c k system is a radio- ticular instrument is the extension of aerospace metric device. This type requires a cooperative photography into the daylight hours. Data are satellite, one which emits signals of one kind thus acquired which are not normally obtain- or another from a transmitter installed within able from other systems. Most space photo- the space vehicle itself. Chains of these radio- graphic devices require the sun’s reflection on metric devices, which are highly accurate, are the object to be effective. As this reflection located along both the Atlantic and Pacific occurs only at dawn and dusk, the usable missile ranges. Radiometric devices are em- time intervals for instruments such as the ployed to track our manned space capsules. Baker-Nunn camera are restricted. Finally, the spa c et r a c k system makes ex- In addition to the military-owned and tensive use of optical sensor equipment. One -operated optical devices mentioned, civilian of these devices is the Baker-Nunn camera. and educational astronomical observatories Standing ten feet high and weighing three feed much valuable data into the system. tons, these great gran’daddies of all the box Cooperating agreements are in effect with Brownies are not only superbly accurate in- many internationally recognized organizations. struments but provide truly remarkable tar- Among them are the Mount Palomar Ob- get resolution at extreme ranges. For example, servatory in California, the Smithsonian this camera picked up the U.S. Vanguard I Astrophysical Observatory, and similar organ- First of a new generation of space sensors, AN/FPS-85 being built near Eglin AFB, Florida, will be completed and incorporated into the USAF SPACETRACK System by January 1966.

izations in Norway, Canada, South Africa, results. In the summer of 1962 orbital analysts Australia, and the Middle East. Some of the in the 1st Aerospace Control Squadron pre- observations from these sources received in dicted that the Russian vehicle Sputnik IV, the spadats spa c et r a c k Center read and view launched in May 1960, was reaching the end like science fiction. One which was certainly in of its life span. They estimated that it would this “way out” category was a picture taken by decay in the month of September and re-enter the Mount Palomar Observatory in the sum- the atmosphere and that surviving pieces, if mer of 1962. It was a photo of the U.S. Mariner any, woidd land in the general vicinity of the II, a deep-space probe, on its third day of state of Wisconsin. This information was for- travel, or at a range in excess of 350,000 miles. warded to a team of astronomers in Wisconsin, As mentioned earlier, the optical sensor who did in fact witness the re-entry and fiery is an invaluable asset not only in the detection destruction ol Sputnik IV. and tracking phases of spacetrack operations Connecting the space surveillance sensor but equally so in the decay phases of man- network with the center in Colorado Springs made satellites. A vitally important part of is a communications net with lull backup sys- the job of the spadats/spa c et r a c k Center is tems. The major communications channels are the accurate prediction of the time and place redundant or have a memory capability which at which an artificial satellite will fall back provides for the storage and rapid transfer of into the earth’s atmosphere and be destroyed. data from a primary channel, if it has failed, The state of the art in decay predictions to its backup circuit without loss of any of the has progressed to the point where imminent information in transit. casualties in the space satellite population are An input of data on some 5600 space forecast regularly and accurately. Some of satellite observations per day precludes any these events produce unusual and dramatic possibility of processing this information man- 10 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW ually. Both the correlation of incoming data Look Angle list. This document is tailored for and their display on the great plotting boards specific sensor sites around the world. In other in the norad Combat Operations Center are words, space surveillance personnel at any- accomplished by electronic computers. A given site can consult this guide and obtain the Philco 2000 digital computer and a matching exact position in space of a given satellite rela- Philco 212 Central Data Processor make up tive to their site location in terms of range, the brain and nerve center of the spa c et r a c k azimuth, elevation, and time. More simply, terminal facility at Ent afb. The following per- this procedure is not unlike a gunnery instruc- formance factors will provide a general ap- tor on a firing range telling a shooter on the preciation of the capability of this computer line exactly where and when to point his system. weapon in order to hit the bull’s-eye. Arithmetic ('amputations. The system can The rapid increase in the inventory of make a total of 626,950 additions and subtrac- man-made earth-orbiting satellites in the past tions per second, a total of 199,400 multiplica- seven years, plus the predicted continued tions and 79,680 divisions per second. growth in this area, poses a continuing re- Data Storage. The system has a core stor- quirement for more and better surveillance age capacity of 32,768 computer words with a equipment and techniques. The most recent total of 48 binary bits per word. It has 19 addition to the family of bmew s aerospace de- magnetic tape units, each of which can record fense units is the site at Fylingdales Moor, a total of 19 million alphanumeric characters England. Perched on the heather-covered per 3600-foot reel of tape. These tapes are Yorkshire moors near the North Sea coast, used for program storage and record files. this installation serves as the eastern anchor and final link in the bmew s system. Unlike its Data Processing and Output. The mag- sister sites in Greenland and Alaska, the Fy- netic tapes are capable of reading or writing lingdales facility does not employ the huge 90,000 alphanumeric characters per second; fixed-antenna type of radar. Rather three the high-speed printer reproduces data at a FPS-49 tracker radars provide aerospace sur- rate of 900 lines per minute with up to 120 veillance. This site is owned, operated, and characters per line. maintained by the Ro\ral Air Force Fighter Access Time. The access time for infor- Command. A contingent of usaf personnel mation stored in the Philco 212 is one and a from the 71st Surveillance Wing works side half microseconds. by side with their raf counterparts to provide The end product of this nearly unbeliev- inputs into the norad Combat Operations Cen- able maze of electronic gear takes several ter at Colorado Springs. The 71st Surveillance forms. The first is a current catalogue of all Wing is the subordinate unit of the 9th Aero- man-made objects in space, including deep- space Defense Division charged with the man- space probes. This list, as mentioned previ- agement of the bmew s activity. ously, includes debris such as rocket motors Although the primary missions of the Fy- and aluminum panels. The catalogue contains lingdales site are to provide ir bm warning for the object number, official designation or name the British Isles and ic bm warning for the given it, national origin, and launch date. North American Continent, this installation is A space object bulletin is also produced. a prolific source of space satellite observations, This document provides current and predicted as are those at Thule and Clear. orbital data on all space objects. The informa- Future additions to our spacetrack system tion is in the form of the geographical point scheduled to become operational in 1964 will on the globe at which each space object crosses greatly increase our ability to observe and dif- the equator and the precise time of its ferentiate space traffic. A new and unprece- crossing. dented phased-array radar to be known as From the space object bulletin a further the FPS-85 is nearing completion at Eglin refinement is made which is called the Sensor afb, Florida. This is the first radar system The first Air Force sensor specifically designed for wide-angle space surveillance is the electro-optical AN/FSR-2. It will detect satellites at ranges of 20,000 miles or more, well beyond the normal range of radar equipment. Under construc- tion at a site near Cloudcroft, New Mexico, it is to be operational by July 1965. 12 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW specifically designed, developed, and built for to gain pre-eminence in world affairs. For re- the surveillance of objects in outer space. cent examples, both the airplane and subma- Also scheduled for completion in 1964 is rine were invented in peacetime but were first an electro-optical system to be known as the exploited in war. The missile and nuclear weap- AN/FSR-2. It will be located in Cloudcroft, on were “born" during World War II and New Mexico, and will be capable of probing have now reached a state of maturity. space to distances of 20,000 miles or more. Once again the nations of the world are confronted with a medium which presents a great opportunity for economic, scientific, po- W e have in-being today a fully operational litical, and military growth. That medium is space satellite detection, surveillance, and cat- outer space. Space technology is still in a state aloguing system. W e have attempted to indi- of infancy but is rapidly advancing. Man’s cate on an unclassified basis some of its capa- potential in space is infinitely large, as large bility and scope of operations. W hile progress as the universe itself. The goal of the free in this area of activity in three short years is world is the exploring and developing of this noteworthy, the skyrocketing population of new frontier for the benefit of all mankind. man-made objects in space and the advent of Our ambitions in outer space are peaceful maneuvering space vehicles will place much ones. To ensure these good intentions, we greater demands upon the spa c et r a c k system. must maintain a position of perpetual aware- The average layman may well ask, and ness of every element in the satellite popula- logically so. Why must we be so deeply con- tion. Not only must we know what is there, cerned with the rapidly increasing space popu- we must also have knowledge of the charac- lation? Why is such extreme accuracy required teristics, function, behavior, and intended use. in our space surveillance operations? Extrap- International competition for outer space re- olation from the pages of history provides the quires not only a mutually agreed-upon set of answers to such questions. At given times in rules but also—equally important to us—the the past, the physical mediums of land, water, means to enforce them effectively. Space sur- and air have offered opportunity for national veillance is an essential element of such an expansion and conquest. Ambitious nations enforcement capability. historically have recognized and taken full ad- The means of enforcement is another story, vantage of a new medium at the proper time which may well begin, “Once upon a time . .. 9th Aerospace Defense Division, ADC PROJECT MANAGEMENT

An Innovation in Managerial Thought and Theory

Major David I. Cleland

LTIMATE authority within the De- large development and production programs. partment of Defense rests with the Within the national military establishment U Office of the Secretary of Defense. certain weapon acquisitions became so vast and This authority' has its origin from Title II, The demanding that it was impossible to assign to Department of Defense, the National Security one single organization total responsibility for Act of 1947 (Public Law, 80th Congress). This successful accomplishment of the objective. act reflects the intent of Congress to centralize The increasing demands for more advanced and strengthen the management of the military, weaponry and the increasing propensity of the economic, and social aspects of national de- Department of Defense to depend on the pri- fense. Subsequent legislation in 1958, under vate industrial complex for research and devel- stimulus of President Eisenhower’s defense re- opment efforts intensified the requirement for organization message, clearly portended subse- a management philosophy that went beyond quent recentralization of authority within the the traditional management theories. Office of the Secretary of Defense. This increas- Unfortunately expertise in the science and ing centralization has been accomplished in an art of management lagged the state of the art environment of: in development and engineering. The military (1) Changing roles and missions of the mili- manager, engaged in the development and ac- tary establishments with respect to the tradi- quisition of weapons, was confronted with the tional separation of areas of operation; begin- coordination and integration of large aggrega- ning erosion and merging of parochial divisions tions of human and nonhuman resources, the of military operations into land, sea, and air greater part of which, were outside the tradi- employment; continuing unification of certain tional concept of line command. Traditionally, functions of the armed forces, with indications management practitioners and scholars have of a single national system of defense evolving. approached the management function through (2) Increasing and dynamic acceleration in the medium of the line and the staff. Line func- the conception and development of weaponry.0 tions are thought of as those activities which Technical breakthroughs, incremental and pro- have a direct and constitutional role in the tracted development cycles, and increasing accomplishment of organizational objectives. costs stimulated the need for a distinct type of Staff, on the other hand, refers to the special- managerial innovation in the management of ized assistance and counsel provided the line manager. Traditional management philosophy *W vapoury, a gmcr.il fenn, ennnotrs th«* varird instruments inti'iidft! to inflict dam.iiic to .in enemy throimh the (Intrmtiou nf is pervaded with vertical flow of authority and physical nr mental capabilities. The term icvapon mjstrm means a highly sophisticated wcn|x>n M‘

of defense resources from inception to opera- proach to management, yet it has provided a tional employment. How did this concept de- way of thinking with respect to the manage- velop? Is it a further refinement of traditional ment of highly technical and costly weapon management thought and theory, or is it a revo- systems, the development and acquisition of lutionary new development which portends which have spread across several large au- radical changes in organizational theory and in tonomous organizations. The project manager the management of activities by the functional within Department of Defense organizations approach? has been established to manage across func- In the aerospace industry Government re- tional lines in order to bring together at one lationship there has developed a tendency focal point the management activities required towards greater and greater use of ad hoc offices to accomplish project objectives. The project concerned exclusively with the managerial inte- manager has certain characteristics which tend gration of a single weapon system or subsystem. to differentiate him from the traditional man- The increasing use of this managerial innova- ager: tion indicates that it is becoming sufficiently (1) As project manager, he is concerned ingrained in management thought and theory with specific projects whose accomplishment so that serious questions are being raised about requires a great amount of participation by the ability of the pure functionally oriented organizations and agencies outside his direct organization to manage more than one major control. project successfully. This is particularly so (2) Since the project manager’s authority where nonrepetitive production programs are cuts through superior/subordinate lines of au- being conducted and in those military and in- thority, there is a deliberate conflict involved dustrial organizations where basic and applied with the functional managers. The functional research programs are undertaken. The estab- manager no longer has the complete authority lishment of a project manager in a functional with respect to the function; he must share organization permits managerial concentra- the authority relative to a particular project tion of attention on the major considerations in with the project manager. the project or program. This concentration is (3) As a focal point for project activities, the particularly valuable when the producer is project manager enters into, on an exception competing in a market system where the prod- basis, those project matters which are signifi- uct price is largely determined by reimburse- cant to the successful accomplishment of the ment of costs actually incurred or where the project. He determines the when and what of contract involves, on the part of the producer, the project activities, whereas the functional a total commitment of company resources over manager, who supports many different projects an extended period of time and, on the part of in the organization, determines how the support the buyer, a monopsonistic situation where an will be given. intimate dependence upon the producer to ful- (4 ) The project manager’s task is finite in fill the contract commitment increases the risk duration; after the project is completed the and uncertainty factors. It is a market where personnel directly supporting it can be assigned the financial and managerial risks of the busi- to other activities. ness center around only one or a few ventures. (5) The project manager manages a higher Consequently there is a much greater pro- proportion of professional personnel; conse- pensity on the part of the buyer to enter into quently he must use different management the active management of the program in the techniques than one would expect to find in seller’s facility. the simple superior/subordinate relationship. His attitude regarding the traditional functions characteristics of project management of management must of necessity be tempered by increased factors of motivation, persuasion, In a sense project management is compat- and control techniques. For many professionals ible with the traditional and functional ap- the leadership must include explanations of the 16 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

rationale of the effort as well as the more obvi- tic missile program, and the Polaris program. ous functions of planning, organizing, directing, The need for a unifying agent in these and controlling. large projects motivated the development of a (6 ) The project manager is involved in man- project-type organization superimposed on the aging diverse and extraorganizational activities traditional and functional organizational struc- which require unification and integration di- ture. This unifying agent idea reflects con- rected toward the objective of the project. He temporary thinking about project management. becomes a unifying agent with respect to the The forerunners of project managers, designat- total management function. In effecting this ed project expediters, did not perform line unifying action he has no line authority to act functions but instead informally motivated per se but rather depends on other manifesta- those persons involved in doing the work. The tions of authority to bring about the attainment project expediter was mainly concerned with of the objective. Thus the directing function is schedules and depended upon his personal of somewhat less importance from the perspec- diplomacy and persuasive abilities to remove tive of the project manager. What direction he bottlenecks in the management process. The does effect is accomplished through the func- project expediter was perhaps the earliest kind tional managers who support him in the proj- of project manager. Slightly above him in terms ect endeavor. of time and responsibility appeared the project (7) The project manager does not normally coordinator, who had a more formal role in the possess any traditional line authority over the organization and was concerned with the syn- line organizations involved in creating the chronization of organizational activities direct- goods or services. His motivational tools be- ed toward a specific objective in the oyerall come different than those available in the more functional activities. This type of coordinator prevalent superior/subordinate vertical rela- had some independence, reflected by his free- tionship. dom to make decisions within the framework of the overall project objectives, but he did not actively enter into the performance of the evolution of the project manager management functions outside his own particu- One major difficulty in adjusting to the lar organization. The project coordinator had concept of project management is caused by a specific functional authority in certain areas, failure on the part of management to under- such as in budgeting, release of funds, and re- stand this new and evolving role. The concept lease of authority to act as in the dispatching of project management is still evolving. Its evo- function in the production control environment. lution has gone through stages where different Today’s project manager is in every sense titles and degrees of responsibility have been a manager. He actively participates in the associated with the position. The construction organic functions of planning, organizing, and industry early recognized the need for a man- controlling those major organizational activities agement process which permitted the introduc- involved in the specific project. He accom- tion of a unifying agent into the ad hoc activi- plishes the management process through other ties involved in the construction of single, cost- managers. Many of the people that feel the ly projects such as dams, turnpikes, and large force of his leadership are in other departments factories and buildings. or organizations separate and apart from the During World YVar II when large aircraft project manager’s parent unit. Since these contracts came to the airframe industry, a new people are not subject to his operating super- method of management arose which integrated vision and owe their fidelity to a superior line the many and diverse activities involved in the manager, unique conflicts of purpose and development and production of large numbers tenure present themselves. The project manager of aircraft. In the military establishment one has real and explicit authority but only over sees evidence of the project manager in such those major considerations involved in the endeavors as the Manhattan Project, the ballis- project plan. One of the project managers big- PROJECT MANAGEMENT 17

gest problems is how to get full support in the control the expenditure of the funds within the project effort when the functional people are specific authority granted when they were ac- responsible to someone else for pay raises, cepted. Other aspects of the de facto authority promotion, and the other expected line su- include the project manager's persuasive abili- perior/subordinate relationships. ty, his rapport with extraorganizational units, and his reputation in resolving opposing view- authority and responsibility of points within the parent unit and between the the project manager external organizations. Other factors that influ- ence the degree of authority which the project Since the project manager acts as the focal manager can exercise include: point within the organization through which (1) Influence inherent in the rank, organiza- major decisions and considerations flow, he tional position, or specialized knowledge of the must be given a special kind of recognition incumbent. with respect to the authority and responsibility (2) The status or prestige enjoyed by the involved in his relationships with other manag- project manager within the informal organiza- ers in the organization. Authority is the legal tional relationships. or rightful power to command, to act, or to di- (3) The priority and obligation existing rect. Ultimate authority derives from the soci- within the organization for the timely and effi- ety in which the organized effort exists. Au- cient accomplishment of the project goals. thority is de jure in the sense that it exists by (4) The existence of a bilateral agreement rightful title, i.e., specific delineations of the with a contracting party for the completion of authority of an organizational position are con- the project within the terms of the contract in tained in the unit’s documents such as policy such areas as cost, performance (quality, reli- and procedural instruments, job descriptions, ability, technology), and schedule. and organizational charters.0 Not to be neg- (5) The integrative requirements of the lected is the de facto authority that can be ex- project manager’s job in the sense that he has ercised by the project manager, i.e., the im- the sole responsibility within the organization plied authority reflected in the organizational to pull together the separate functional activi- position. It is the intrinsic and necessary power ties and direct these diverse functions to a co- to discharge fully the responsibilities inherent ordinated project goal. in the task or job. Thus an organization receiv- The project manager’s authority and re- ing public funds has de facto authority to create sponsibility flow horizontally across the vertical administrative policy stipulating how the funds superior/subordinate relationships existing will be maintained, to appoint a custodian to as- within the functional organizational elements. sume pecuniary responsibility for the safe- Within this environment the authority of the guarding and legal obligation of the funds, and project manager may often come under serious to take other necessary measures to adequately question, particularly in cases involving the °Within the Air Force specific and forceful authority has allocation of scarce resources to several proj- been delegated to the project manager, or in Air Force parlance the system program director. Air Force Regulation 375-3, dated ects. Generally the project manager has no 25 November 1963, states: explicit authority to resolve interfunctional An SPD (System Program Director) is appointed by AFSC ( Air Force Systems Command) for each system pro- disputes through the issuance of orders to func- gram not later than receipt of the formal document requiring application of system management techniques. tional groups outside his office. However, since He manages the collective efforts of participating field organizations in preparing system program documentation, the project manager is the central point through and revisions as requested. which program information flows and total His mission with respect to an approved system program is to: project executive control is effected, this indi- (1) Manage (plan, organize, coordinate, control and direct) the collective actions of participating organizations in vidual comes to exercise additional authority planning and executing the system program. (2 ) Propose and/or prepare modifications of, or over and above that which has been specifically changes to. the system program within the limits of guidance received from participating organizations or higher authority. delegated. His superior knowledge of the rela- (3) Make changes to the system program consistent with ms authority, as required to maintain internal balance of the tive roles and functions of the individual parts system program. of the project places him in a logical position 18 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW to become intimately involved in the major the project manager’s role, extraordinary mani- organizational decisions that might alFect the festations of authority will be required. It will outcome of his project. As the focal point be an uphill struggle because of the threat that through which major project decisions flow, the project management poses to ingrained func- project manager’s input into the decision tional management practices and thinking. process cannot be ignored or relegated to a The project manager requires a clear de- subordinate role. The unique position of the lineation of authority and responsibility in order project manager inherently gives him knowl- to balance the considerations involved in the edge superior to that of the personnel respon- proper development and successful conclusion sible for any subsystem or subactivity function- of the project objective. He is frequently faced ing as part of the integrated whole. ( But this with major and minor “trade-offs” involving superior knowledge does not exist as the single factors of cost, schedule, and performance of authority within the total organization but only the product. Many times these trade-offs lack as the single authority with respect to the par- clear-cut lines of demarcation and foster in- ticular project involved.) ternal and extraorganizational conflicts of pur- Organizational rank carries both explicit pose. Referral of the problem for resolution to and implied authority. The project manager the proper functional managers may not resolve should have sufficient executive rank within it in the best interests of the project, since the the organization relationship to enable him to functional manager tends to be parochial (and exercise a subtle and pervasive authority by rightly so) in his view and less concerned with virtue of his position or the trappings of his individual project objectives than with provid- office. lie should have sufficient rank (through ing the services of his particular function across evidence of seniority, title, status, prestige, etc.) all the projects. to provide general administrative leverage in The creation of the position of project man- dealing with other line officials, with supporting ager in an organization requires careful plan- staff personages, and with those in authority ning to prepare existing management groups. but external to the parent unit. This implies that Certain criteria are offered for delineating the there should be some correlation between the authority and responsibility of project man- rank of the project manager and the cost and agers ; complexity of the project he manages. The more (1) The charter of the project manager costly the project, the greater the degree of risk should be sufficiently broad to enable his active involved; and the more complex the internal participation in the major managerial and and external organizational structures involved, technical activities involved in the project. He the higher the rank of the project manager should be given sufficient policy-making au- should be. Within the military services there thority to integrate the functional contributions has been a tendency to increase the authority to the project goals. of a project manager’s position by assigning (2) The project manager must have the higher ranking officers to it. A brigadier general necessary executive rank to ensure responsive- would be expected to exercise more influence ness to his requirements within the parent (and thus authority) over his subordinates, his organization and to be accepted as the unques- peers, and extraorganizational elements than tioned agent of the parent organization in deal- would a lieutenant colonel or major occupying ing with contractors and other external entities. a similar position. (3) He should be provided with a staff that Management literature has neglected any is sufficiently qualified to provide administra- real definition or discussion of the authority of tive and technical support. He should have the project manager. This is to be expected be- sufficient authority to vary the staffing of his cause of the near universality of the functional office as necessary throughout the life of the approach to management education and prac- project. This authorization should include tice. Until contemporary management thinking selective augmentation for varying periods of has fully conceptualized the unique nature of time from the supporting functional agencies. PROJECT MAN AC, EM ENT J9

(4) He should participate in making tech- of a special project office in both the buyer’s nical, engineering, and functional decisions organization (e.g., the Government) and the w ithin the bounds of his project. seller’s organization (e.g., an aerospace com- (5 ) The project manager must have suffi- pany) permits a focal point for concentration cient authority and capability to exercise con- of attention on the major problems of the proj- trol of funds, budgeting, and scheduling in- ect or program. This point of concentration volved in the project accomplishment. forces the channeling of major program con- (6) Where the project management task siderations through a project manager who has involves the use of contractors supporting the the perspective to integrate relative matters of project effort, the project manager should have cost, time, technology, and system compati- the maximum authority possible in the selection bility. of these contractors. After the contractors are This managerial model is not meant to selected, the project manager should have di- stifle the interfunctional lines of communication rect involvement in the direction and control or the necessary and frequent lateral staff con- of the major contractors involved in his particu- tacts between the functional organizations of lar project. His should be the only authority the defense contractor and the military organi- recognized by the official in the contractor’s zation. Rather, what is intended is the estab- organization who is charged with contractual lishment of a focal point for critical decisions, actions. policy-making, and key managerial preroga- tives relating to the project manager when focal position of the project manager trade-offs between the key elements of the re- search or production activity are involved. By The typical relationship that would be being in a face-to-face relationship the two desirable for a situation involving two organiza- project managers can control and resolve both tions having a mutuality of interest in a large interfunctional and interorganizational prob- project is shown in Figure 1. The establishment lems arising during the course of the project.

lateral staff contacts as required

interfunctional lines of communication

defense contractor Department of Defense (buying agency) functional elements functional elements

marketing • • program control finance • • configuration management

manufacturing • • contract administration industrial relations • • test and deployment research • • engineering contract administration • • budget & financial management

Figure 1. Interorganizational project manager relationships. Critical decisions involving policy and managerial prerogatives are directed through the central focal point. Decisions involve cost and cost estimating, schedules, product performance (quality, reliability, maintainability), resource commitment, project tasking, trade-offs, contract performance, and total system integration. 20 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

This organizational relationship precludes any sibilities exceed his authority. If he is relegated one functional manager from overemphasizing to a staff position, his ability to act decisively his area of interest in the project to the neglect depends almost solely upon his grant of func- of other considerations. tional authority, his personal persuasive abili- ties, or some specialized knowledge he has. A functional organization exists in which organizational arrangements the project manager reports to the chief execu- for project managers tive officer in a line capacity (Figure 3 ). In this organizational and authority relationship the The organizational arrangements for man- project manager’s immediate office staff may agement of industrial projects can vary con- vary from a single manager to several hundred siderably. One example is the functional organi- people, depending upon the degree of centrali- zation with the project manager reporting to zation of the project activities. As the project the company president or general manager in manager’s responsibilities increase and more a staff capacity (Figure 2 ). Under this concept and more of the operating facets of the project the project manager functions as an “assistant are centralized under his control, the organiza- to” the chief executive officer in matters involv- tion may seem to have a new company or ing the project, relieving him of some of the organizational division formed to manage each burdensome detail of the project. As a staff major program or project independently. The official the “assistant to” type of project manager project manager has authority over the func- investigates, researches, analyzes, recommends, tional managers with respect to the when and and coordinates relative to the project. Major what of the project activities. Functional man- decisions are made by the chief executive offi- agers in turn are responsible to both their func- cer. Although the project manager does not tional supervisors and the project manager for function in a line capacity in this arrangement, adequate support of the project." The authority he usually has wide use of functional authority °This appears to violate the scalar principle described by and by being in close proximity to the chief Henri Fayol in General and Industrial Administration. Fayol executive wields significant influence with re- envisions the scalar chain as the chain of superiors ranging from the ultimate authority to the lowest rank with the line of author- spect to the project. ity following every link in the chain. He also discusses the unity of command principle, i.e., an employee should receive orders Placing the project manager in a staff from one superior only. The author of this article believes that these principles can easily be upheld in small organizational capacity degrades his ability to function as a arrangements where the management process operates through the vertical superior/subordinate relationship. In today’s large true integrator and as a decision-maker with organizations where the management of a single project may cut across many internal functional lines of authority and extend respect to the major factors involved in the work into outside organizations, these management principles lack of the project. With this arrangement there is ubiquity. What is required is a discrete differentiation of mana- gerial functions between the functional manager and the project the risk of having the project manager’s respon- manager as to respective spheres of influence.

President or General M anager

Executive Secretary Project M anager

Contract . Research and Industrial Finance Administration Marketing Manufacturing Development tngineermg Relations

Subfunctional elements Subfunctional elements Subfunctional elements

Figure 2. Functional organization with jirojcct manager in a staff capacity President or General Manager

Executive "Assistant To" Secretary Long-Range Planning

------1 .___J------. |----- 1------Legal Contract Industrial Customer Office Administration Relations Relations

Figure 3. Functional organization with project manager in a line capacity. This organizational structure allows for vertical flow of functional authority and re- sponsibility as well as horizontal flow of project authority and responsibility.

of the project manager in this organizational project management in DOD relationship flows horizontally throughout the The Department of Defense has something organization. It is tempered, however, by direc- over 100 weapon and support systems managed tion from the functional managers, who are by project managers. Practically all these proj- concerned with the how accomplished portion ect managers are officers with the rank of of the project. colonel or lower, though in some of the larger The type of functional organization, the programs (e.g., the F-lll System Program) the iize and complexity of the project, and the project manager has the rank of brigadier gen- philosophy of management held by the chief eral. As military officers, these project managers executives of the firm will affect the type of are subject to permanent change of station in project management to follow. The proponents and out of the system program offices. Usually pf total project management would desire to their tenure in any one project manager position lave all project people working directly for is considerably shorter than the four to eight he project manager. The choice of organiza- years required for the development and acqui- tional arrangement, whether pure functional, sition of a major weapon system. Ostensibly, ompletely projectized, or an organizational these project managers plan, organize, and con- orm in between these extremes, should be trol the activities involved in the development nade after the effects of the unique environ- and acquisition of weaponry. They are support- nent on the particular project are evaluated as ed by subsystem managers and other project o basic advantages and disadvantages. managers throughout the research, develop- 22 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW ment, and production complexes of both Gov- fense funds have placed constraints on the ernmental and industrial organizations. Within project manager. The delegations of authority the Governmental structure, project managers to the project manager vary widely in then- are identified as the symbol of leadership of charters and perhaps even more widely in prac- the project. Unfortunately, in some cases this tice. One could not reasonably expect the leadership is symbolic only, because of the project manager to have complete control of active participation in upper organizational his funds or the final decision on technical prob- echelons of advisers, delayers, debaters, inspec- lems when his project is part of an overall tors, and coordinators. These specialized staff defense development effort. Logically, a su- personnel become involved in providing such perior organizational unit that has a greater support as budget, audit, contract surveillance, perspective of the total resources to be allocated technical advice, programing, procurement re- should retain sufficient control over the project view, facilities control, etc. The proliferation of manager to ensure unanimity of national goals. these special support agencies leads one to fear W hat does become suspect is the use of multi- that the project manager is becoming merely layers of line managers and staff specialists a symbol of leadership for whom there is a lack between the project manager and the point of of authority and responsibility, in both degree decision in the Department of Defense. and clarification. The use of project management techniques T he project manager may be located in an had its inception in the military/industrial organizational position several echelons down complex. It has enabled the management of the managerial hierarchy of the Department of large aggregations of resources across function- Defense. In this position he finds it difficult to al and organizational lines directed toward be selective in the acceptance of the abundant unifying all effort to the common objective. special staff assistance that is made available— Project management is a relatively recent and in some cases directed—to him. The in- phenomenon; as business and military organi- creasing trend toward centralization in the zations continue to become larger and more Department of Defense and the establishment interdependent, the role of the project manager of certain thresholds in the expenditure of De- will come into clearer focus. Air Force Institute of Technology PRESSURE SUITS - THEIR EVOLUTION AND DEVELOPMENT*

Lt . C olonel Frederick R. Rit z in c er , J r ., and Captain Ellis G. Abo ud

URING the last four decades the efforts of aviators to explore the D upper regions of the atmosphere and military requirements for high-altitude fixing have resulted in the development of a variety of high-altitude pressure suits. The first pressure suits were developed to enable a crewmember to ascend to altitudes exceed- ing that which could be supported by oxygen equipment alone. Later, when pressurized cabins had been perfected, suits were used as an emergency backup system, should the cabin pressurization system fail. Present Air Force policy requires that pressure suits be worn when a pilot anticipates that his flight plan will involve flying above 50.000 feet. The concept of the pressure suit orig- inated with J. S. Haldane and J. G. Priestley in 1922. By 1940 five separate nations had established programs for developing pressure suits. By 1945 several models which appeared practical had been constructed. Since 1949 eighteen t\pes of pressure suits and helmets, together with individual and special support equipment, have been developed in the United States. Between 1947 and 1963 thirty-nine dif- ferent projects were contracted by the usae to different manufacturers for applied research in this area, at a total cost of $4,803,107. In anticipation of the space suit requirements for the Gemini, Manned Orbiting Laboratory ( mo l ), and Apollo programs, considerable research continues to be programed. a

Early Pressure Suits

In 1934 Wiley Post, in a suit made for him by the B. F. Goodrich Company, became the first man to fly an airplane wearing a pressure suit. He made at least ten high-altitude flights in it before his death in 1935. . . . German developments included an airtight coverall for wear in a pressurized cabin in case of pressure failure. . . . An Italian pressure suit, with back aperture, proved impractical because of weight and immobility.

In the early 1930’s, man’s critical altitude dane and Priestley pointed out: limitation was 40,000 feet. Although flights ex- If it were required to go much above ceeding this altitude had been achieved, they 40,000 feet, to a barometric pressure below 130 stretched man’s physiological ceiling beyond mms of mercury, it would be necessary to en- safe limits. This physiological ceiling is based close the airman in an airtight dress somewhat on the utilization of 100 per cent oxygen, which similar to a self-contained diving dress, but is required at this altitude, and is directly re- capable of resisting perfectly safely an internal lated to the reduced barometric pressure in pressure of about 130 mms of mercury. This ambient air at 40,000 feet. To enable man to dress could be so arranged that even in a venture safely above 40,000 feet, he needed complete vacuum the contained oxygen woulc some form of counterpressure device that could still have a pressure of 133 mms of mercury. There would then be no physiological limit to maintain his pressure environment within safe the height obtainable. physiological limits. The full pressure suit, which is essentially a miniaturized cabin, was The first pressure suit was built in 1933 developed to serve this purpose. In 1922 Hal- by an English firm for an American balloonist, fThe initial German pressure suit for use in an hressurized cabins was made of laminated silk and mubber with reinforcing silk webbing. Ballooning \wnd rigidity caused abandonment of this idea. . . . i\ German pressure suit of World War II featured It metallic covering over a cloth suit, with mov- able, airtight joints, but its weight was excessive.

dark Ridge, who wanted to use the “diving high-altitude flying. He believed that the alti- !ress’’ method for high-altitude balloon flights. tudes at which the pressure suit would permit Experiments were conducted in a low-pressure him to fly would give him a decided advantage hamber with Mr. Ridge in the suit until a pres- in his attempt to break the world altitude record ure of 17 mm Hg was reached. This pressure and also in a series of races he was planning to equivalent to 84,000 feet. In these exped- enter. Post had in mind a suit similar to a ients Ridge experienced no abnormal symp- diver’s suit that could be pressurized. Working >ms, for owing to the added pressure within with him, B. F. Goodrich engineers constructed ,ie suit he was actually never exposed to a a model suit using double-ply rubberized para- mulated altitude above 36,500 feet. chute fabric, to which pigskin gloves, rubber In 1934 Wiley Post, either independently boots, and an aluminum helmet were joined. t by reading of Ridge’s suit, conceived the idea During tests at Wright Field this model proved * a high-altitude pressure suit. From his suc- unsatisfactory because of its extreme rigidity fessful 1930 Bendix race, Post had gained expe- when inflated, leakage at the waist joint, and dience and technical insight into the values of rupture of a reinforcing piece. 26 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

A second suit was modified to correct the Post made his first flight in this suit in late deficiencies of the first. Post’s experience with August 1934. This was the first time any man the second suit is classical, as indicated by a had flown in an aircraft using a pressure suit. historian’s account of the episode. He made at least ten documented flights in this suit before his death in 1935. On an especially hot and humid day late in July 1934, Wiley attempted to try on the revised suit and helmet. It was a tight squeeze and he got stuck. It was strikingly hot and ex- W it h in a year following Post’s ceedingly uncomfortable for him, immobilized untimely death, interest in pressure suit de- as he was with his arms, shoulders and neck velopment was apparent in several European tightly bound by the suit. Understandably, he was very anxious to get out of the garment as countries. In England, the raf continued the quickly as possible. He expressed this feeling development of Ridge’s suit and with its help loudly and distinctly. Despite the help of sev- twice succeeded in breaking the world’s air- eral strong assistants, Wiley, who was an un- plane altitude record. In France in 1935, Dr. usually powerful man, remained incarcerated M. Rosenstiel, a naval surgeon, and Dr. Paul A. in it. He grew restless, expressed at least a low Garsaux of the French Air Ministry, with the anxiety, and directed that he be extricated at backing of the Potex Airplane Co., introduced a all costs. The project team led Post from the full pressure suit. Like Wiley Post’s first suit, main building to another containing a refrig- Dr. Rosenstiel’s creation ballooned when pres- erated golf ball storage room where they could surized. Also, the designers were plagued by all be more comfortable and work with more joint leakage, inflexibility of the suit material leisure. Even then, they were only able to re- move the upper suit by cutting it off. at low temperatures, and valve malfunction due to icing. Continued efforts to perfect this Before another suit was made, the previ- suit were made during the years which fol- ous suit designs were restudied. The first and lowed, but they were terminated by the out- second ones had been essentially a one-layer break of World War II. The Italians also de- fabric suit which was joined at the waist. The veloped a pressure suit and flew it to 51,000 feet one layer had to serve a dual task: when in- in 1937, but they discontinued their research flated under pressure it had to conform to a in favor of a pressurized cabin development particular shape and simultaneously prevent program. the gas from leaking through the fabric pores. Germany’s first efforts in high-altitude re- This approach had not been sufficiently success- search were concentrated on pressurized cab- ful. When inflated, both suits had been volu- ins. This program was initiated in 1928 and minous, and the joints in the first one were ob- continued throughout World War II. In 1935 served to be too stiff and restrictive during a the German Air Ministry, paralleling Great static test. It was therefore decided to design a Britain's course, entrusted to a manufacturer suit with two separate layers, each designed to of diving suits and oxygen equipment the task: fulfill different functions. Post would enter the of designing a pressure suit for use in unpres- suit through a large neck opening in lieu of the surized aircraft. Its initial model was fabri- waist entrance. The suit was to have an inner cated of laminations of silk and rubber, rein- rubber bag that would contain the gas and an forced with an external net of silk cord. 1 he outer cloth fabric to retain its anthropomor- same ballooning and rigidity encountered by phic shape under a pressure of at least 7 psi the other countries in their early suit designs (564 mm Hg). This suit was fabricated in a also confronted the Germans. After several un- sitting position with arms fashioned to reach successful attempts to improve their initial the stick and throttle. No movable joints were model, they abandoned this idea and devel- incorporated, although limited leg movement oped a model with a metallic outer covering to operate the rudder pedals was attained by over a cloth suit. The metallic covering would bunching the material between metal bands eliminate the fishnet characteristics of the ear- above and below the knee. After extensive tests, lier designs and provide an anti-elongation tea- PRESSURE SUIT DEVELOPMENT 27

ture. This suit required easily movable, airtight vest showed the value of a mechanical coun- joints at the various hinge points of the body terpressure device. It demonstrated that me- and extremities. After many difficulties were chanical counterpressure applied directly to resolved, the suit was finally built. It could the body provided the same physiological effect maintain 11 psi pressure without sacrificing as gas pressure. In 1943 investigation at the mobility, but even though the metal was of University of Southern California resulted in fight weight, the weight penalty was too great the use of inflatable tubes or capstans to sup- to be practical. ply mechanical counterpressure to the extrem- The Germans developed also a lightweight ities. This principle, originally designed for use one-piece coverall pressure suit to be worn in in anti-G suits, when applied to the design of pressurized cabins and serve as an emergency pressure suits permitted successful use of an or escape apparatus in the event of cabin pres- emergency garment in altitude chamber tests sure failure. Entrance was gained by means of to 80,000 feet. a fold in the back, which was laced to provide The mechanical counterpressure principle an airtight closure. In contrast to the full pres- was an entirely new approach to pressure suit sure suits of other countries, this design sup- development. In the ensuing years these suits plied breathing oxygen by means of a standard were improved, as were associated items such mask and regulator. The suit was designed for as helmets, resulting in the partial pressure short periods of inflation and consequently did suits now in our inventory. not incorporate many of the features of the true Theoretically, the full pressure suit is the full pressure suit. The joints that facilitated ideal type of protective garment for high-alti- movement of the limbs in the metallic suit tude use. A number of technical difficulties in 'were not used in the escape suit, nor was the design would have to be overcome, however, shape retained as well. Consequently, when before such a garment could be perfected. Of inflated the suit ballooned considerably, re- prime importance was the problem of provid- stricting limb movement to an unacceptable ing adequate internal ventilation to dissipate level. Development of this escape suit never excessive perspiration and body heat that col- reached that of the pressure suit, and the war lects within the gastight suit. In addition, the ended before an acceptable model had been problem of preventing the inflated suit from produced. Nevertheless Germany was far ahead becoming unduly rigid and virtually immobiliz- of its time in pressure suit development. She ing the wearer had to be solved. A considerable had introduced the concept of using pressure amount of work and technical ingenuity was suits as a secondary or backup system for pres- clearly needed in the design of a full pressure surized cabins should loss of cabin pressure suit and helmet that would remain flexible )ccur at high altitude. She also introduced a when pressurized to the necessary 2 to 5 psi suit design which separated the breathing gases and yet permit enough mobility and dexterity :rom the suit-pressurizing gases, a feature for the flyer to complete his mission. Because ,vhich considerably reduced the oxygen eon- the solution of these difficulties was not antici- uimption of pressure suits. pated in the near future, it was necessary to take an alternative though less desirable ap- proach to pressure suit development and ex- I n the United States work in this ploit the possibilities of a partial pressure suit field lagged from Post’s death in 1935 until design. 1.941. With the advent of World War II, high- In 1947 the U.S. Air Force and Navy com- lltitude flying became an operational require- bined their efforts in a pressure suit develop- ment, and interest in improving high-altitude ment program. The Air Force undertook the lupport equipment was renewed. In 1941 the task of developing the partial pressure suit. technique of positive-pressure breathing was The Navy concentrated on full pressure suit discovered and led in 1942 to the development development. |f die pressure vest. Testing of the pressure Although the partial pressure suit was an 28 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW interim compromise toward the development ardized in 1948. This suit was a form-fitting of the ideal garment, it has served and con- garment made of nylon-cotton twill. It was fur- tinues to serve a useful purpose. Certain prob- nished with a full-head helmet containing ear- lems had to be overcome, however, before the phones, a microphone, and a removable face- mechanical counterpressure principle could be plate. A small hose attached to the faceplate utilized. Breathing oxygen under increased delivered oxygen under pressure from the regu- pressure appreciably increases man’s tolerance lator. In altitude chamber tests it was flown to to altitudes above that which is achieved by a simulated altitude of 106,000 feet. In actual breathing oxygen at ambient pressures. Over- flight it was worn in all high-altitude flights of distention of the lungs and thorax by positive the X -l series and the Douglas D-55811 air- breathing pressures can be prevented by me- craft. In one of Lieutenant Colonel Charles E. chanical conn ter press ure about the chest. But Yeager’s Bell X -l flights, cabin pressure was without counterpressure to the rest of the body, lost at peak altitude. His suit inflated auto- a breathing pressure of 50 mm Hg can be tol- matically, preventing the loss of his life and erated for only a few minutes (150 mm Hg is a multimillion-dollar aircraft. As a “get-me- desirable). This limited tolerance to pressure down” garment, it served a useful purpose. breathing when only the chest is protected is However, the suit when inflated restricted mo- caused by the shunting of blood into the dis- bility, produced breathing fatigue, and pro- tended veins and capillary beds of the arms vided protection for only six minutes. Since and legs, sufficient so as to reduce the effective the Air Force wanted a “mission completion” blood volume almost immediately by as much suit, i.e., one that would be capable of pro- as 500 milliliters. If pressure breathing is con- viding adequate protection for an entire mis- tinued, an additional quantity of blood and sion flight profile, efforts were continued to body fluids would be gradually lost from the improve this suit for increased comfort, mobil- effective circulation by the accumulation of ity, and time tolerance. fluid within the tissue spaces in the unprotected In 1954 a second model, the MC-1 partial parts of the body. For this reason the partial pressure suit, was introduced, but it was never pressure suit was designed to cover the arms more than a limited standard item. This design and legs as well as the trunk, even though some had a cloth-covered chest bladder and smaller mobility is sacrificed. capstans. The chest bladder was incorporated The basic components of the partial pres- to minimize breathing fatigue by equalizing sure suit are a helmet and neck seal, a pneu- the internal and external thoracic pressures. It matic bladder seal covering the chest and ab- provided adequate counterpressure to equalize domen under a close-fitting fabric suit, and the mask pressure but caused blood pooling pneumatic tubes or capstans which run down and loss of fluid from the vascular system in the sides and along the arms and legs. This other parts of the body, and therefore it had a system is arranged in such a manner that when limited time tolerance. the helmet and lungs are pressurized, the cap- A third model was constructed in which stan tubes also inflate and tend to draw the the thoracic bladder was extended to the groin. material tightly over the surface of the body. This modification considerably improved the The higher the helmet pressure the tighter the suit’s performance but still did not fully com- suit becomes, so that the pressure within the pensate for the pressure effects on the circula- body is more or less perfectly counterbalanced tion. Finally, when the “torso bladder was by the mechanical pressure of the suit. In the extended to cover the thighs nearly to the event of decompression above 40,000 feet, the knees, the suit’s performance was considerably partial pressure suit would be automatically improved, allowing some subjects who had activated by an aneroid-controlled regulator poor time tolerance in the MC-1 suit to remain designed to maintain an altitude equivalent without difficulty at 100,000 feet for several of 40,000 feet in the pressurized suit. hours. Protection to 198,770 feet for extended The first partial pressure suit was stand- periods was also demonstrated. With the ex- PRESSURE SUIT DEVELOPMENT 29

ception of minor improvements, this suit, the joints. A series of pressure-sealing zippers was MC-3, is essentially the same partial pressure incorporated in the suit to facilitate donning suit in use today. and doffing. Ventilation gases were distributed Although this suit serves a useful purpose, over the body by tri-loc tubes that were not it continues to have some operational deficien- integrated in the suit proper but were affixed cies. These center around the problems of to an undergarment. The helmet was attached comfort, mobility, ventilation, donning, fitting, to the neck ring of the torso. A face seal, fitting and integration with other flight equipment. across the pilot’s forehead, over his cheeks, and To overcome these problems, a new concept under his chin, was installed to separate the in partial pressure suit design was developed breathing gases from the suit gases. Oxygen in 1959. The resultant suit is a cloth-covered was supplied to the breathing cavity by a bladder that covers the torso and extremities. demand-type regulator. The breathing regu- It is designed to accommodate many types of lator was controlled by the suit pressure to helmets. It can be donned in two minutes and allow the pilot at any altitude to breathe with provides protection for two hours or more at a normal pressure relationship between the simulated altitudes in excess of 100,000 feet chest and the oral/nasal cavity. The exhaust while delivering a maximum helmet and blad- gases were discharged into the suit and vented der pressure of 150 mm Hg. It is called the overboard by the controller. The control valve, “get-me-down" altitude suit or csu 4/P Quick which was altitude-sensitive, monitored the Donning Suit. The csu 5/P is an improvement discharge of exhaust gases to maintain that of the same design with added insulation for increment of pressure in the suit which, when exposure and immersion protection. This equip- added to the atmospheric pressure, would pro- ment has not yet gained complete acceptance vide an absolute pressure of 3.4 psi at any alti- for operational use by the Air Force because tude above 35,000 feet. Also, the control valve full pressure suits were proved superior in was equipped to supply oxygen to the suit to mission-completion and survival capabilities. maintain the required pressure if at any time ventilation air was absent and leakage from the suit coidd not be replaced by the gases expired during breathing. D urlvc the period the Air Force This suit went through a series of modifi- was perfecting the partial pressure suit, the cations between 1955 and 1957. The most im- \avy was making remarkable progress in its portant change was the incorporation of an full pressure suit development program. By external tie-down system for the helmet which the mid-1950 s a host of suit systems designed allowed the suit to be constructed in a semi- by Navy engineers and civilian manufacturers standing position. After limited issue of this had been evaluated and, for the most part, system, it was apparent that the equipment rejected. By the end of 1955, however, a full was too heavy and bulky for operational use. pressure suit design had emerged which had In fact some of the pilots objected so vehe- operational possibilities. This model had two mently that the entire development program layers. The inner layer was formed with a was endangered. To accomplish a reduction nylon fabric coated with natural rubber to pro- in weight, a new approach to suit construction vide an envelope impermeable to gas and water. and an extensive materials study were needed. The outer layer of nylon fabric provided a re- But the Navy wanted a lightweight suit imme- straint cover to minimize ballooning of the diately, meaning a development program in inner bladder under pressure. The torso sec- terms of a few months rather than years. Mate- tion was formed in a sitting position and ex- rial studies and suit structure studies had been tended from the neck to the wrists and below in progress for years, and no unusual break- the knees. Insulated boots were cemented to through appeared imminent. Therefore the the inner bladder at the leg endings, and gloves Navy decided that the mission-completion con- were attached to the wrists by watertight cept would be discarded for the time being 30 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW and an emergency-type pressure suit would be mally carried by the pilot in the lightweight developed. full pressure suit is 25 pounds, cutting in half In a little over six months the emergency- the weight of the original Mark IV system. This type suit was completed. Its performance was had been accomplished with little or no loss in far better than had been anticipated. The torso performance or protection provided by the weight had been reduced more than ten heavyweight system. pounds, and the form fit of the torso greatly In 1959 the Air Force adopted the Navy reduced much of the objectionable bulk. Elim- Mark IV lightweight full pressure suit, desig- ination of the rotatable bearings had not sacri- nating it the A/P22S-3 Full Pressure Suit, and ficed mobility as much as had been expected. in 1962 standardized a more advanced model, Almost before initial evaluation of the suit had the A/P22S-2 Full Pressure Suit. Both suits been completed, the emergency-only concept are essentially the same design except that the had lost its meaning because the system met the A/P22S-2 contains four functional layers in- requirements for a mission-completion full stead of two, lending greater mobility and pressure suit. comfort when the suit is inflated. These im- The construction of this suit was quite dif- proved features were achieved by using a re- ferent from that of its predecessors. The inner straint layer of link net mesh of nonstretchable or gas-impermeable layer was made of nylon dacron cord, to minimize ballooning. The fabric spread-coated with neoprene. The outer A/P22S-2 suit was used in the X-15 Project restraint layer was made of nylon fabric. It and now is slowly replacing the A/P22S-3 suit was attached to the inner layer at the neck in our inventory. ring, wrists, entrance closure, etc., but other- wise the inner and outer layers were free from each other. An arrangement like this allowed A lthough present-day operation- the outer layer to be adjusted to fit the indi- al pressure suits still leave something to be vidual and the inner layer to bunch into the desired in terms of comfort, ventilation, and desired envelope. The torso was built to allow mobility, they are fully reliable and physiolog- for full standing position. Neoprene-coated ically compatible with our current operational fabric socks were permanently affixed to the flight profiles. The concept of pressure suit leg endings. Standard leather boots were worn design has emerged from that of a futuristic over the socks. Only one rotatable bearing re- curiosity to an important backup life-support mained in the suit. This was located in the system for high-altitude flying and earth orbi- neck ring, to which the helmet was attached. tal flights. Throughout the years the technology The helmet pressure control and ventilation in suit design has kept pace with the advance- systems were unchanged. ments in aviation technology. When the Mer- Since 1957 this system has undergone eight cury program was inaugurated, the basic Navy modifications, to become the full pressure suit Mark IV full pressure suit could be modified now being used by the Navy. These changes to meet the requirements of the Mercury space included a ventilation system for distributing suit. vent air over the pilot’s body, an improved Future space programs, however, are gen- helmet tie-down system, adjustment lacings to erating new requirements for pressure suit de- improve sizing and fitting, and numerous minor sign. Since the Gemini, mo l , and Apollo flight modifications. Otherwise, the system remains profiles include extravehicular excursions, the essentially the same. In keeping but not quite requirements imposed on pressure suits for in step with the lightweight torso development, these programs are considerably advanced over the helmet had undergone an evolution. The those imposed on the suits we have in our basic design was retained, but a weight de- inventory. Unlike the Mercury suit, which was crease was gained by reducing the overall con- sheltered from the space environment within a figuration and the number of laminae of fiber pressurized capsule, these suits will be directly glass in the hard shell. The weight now nor- exposed to the vacuum of space and to ther- mal, ultraviolet, and corpuscular radiation from the sun. They will have to be ruptureproof and impervious to micrometeorite strikes. They will have to provide for greater mobility and tac- tile dexterity than current models. These and other technical design problems will have to be solved before the goals of these space pro- grams can be realized. Considerable effort is being exerted in the United States to meet this challenge. The National Aeronautics and Space Administra- tion developed a suit for Gemini which is an advanced modification of the Air Force’s A/P22S-2 suit, and nasa’s Apollo extravehicular suit program has been in operation since 1962. The Air Force’s Advanced Extravehicular Pro- tective Technology Program ( adept) is a “crash’ project to identify and study the most up-to-date techniques and principles that can be applied to the design of operational extra- vehicular protective assemblies. Today the least understood and most diffi- cult aspect of suit design is mobility. The conventional fabric full pressure suits now available when pressurized do not provide the desired mobility for extravehicular operations. Several techniques are being studied which may solve this problem. One is the develop- ment of a pressure-retaining homoform, which is a close-fitting net garment designed not to deform according to lines of nonextension over the surface of a body. ( “Lines of nonextension are those lines over the surface of the body that do not deform as the joints of the body per- form. ) This concept may help minimize the interference from ballooning of the suit when pressurized. Another approach to solving the mobility problem is the cord restraint principle. This concept involves utilization of the scis- sors effect and pulley action of restraining cords when they are anchored through eyelets at strategic points about a joint. This principle provides the unique quality of permitting movement of the joint in any plane and holding he selected position without continued effort. Concurrent with fabric or “soft suit” de- velopments, design study and construction of In 1962 the A/P22S-2, adapted from the Navy’s .‘xperimental “hard assemblies” are being un- Mark IV, became the Air Force’s most advanced lertaken. The hard-shell concept may be attrac- full pressure suit. Easy to put on and off, it en- ive as a protective cocoon to establish a less sures survival in water as well as at high altitudes. 32 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW severe environment in which the soft suit may morphic pressure garment including a back- function. This would permit a dual-purpose mounted, portable, life-support system and a suit, i.e., intravehicular as well as extravehicular thermal protective garment that isolates the protection with a greater margin of safety, and entire assembly from the external environment. eliminate the need for spectral coatings on This suit has not yet met and may not meet all cloth for extravehicular exposures. If the mo- the design criteria required to provide a reli- bility problems of the soft suit cannot be solved, able, habitable environment for extravehicular it may be necessary to use rigid protective as- excursions, nor does it have the required mo- semblies for extravehicular activities. An all- bility for extravehicular tasks. More work and metal suit has been devised, utilizing welded perhaps a new design are necessary before the metal bellows to provide flexibility for limbs Apollo suit will be ready for operational use. and torso. Mobility is achieved through the geo- The mo l garment, on the other hand, will be metric properties of a restraint leakage system selected at some future point in time from the which permit the pneumatic forces of the gases latest design developments at that particular contained within the suit to contract the spring time. What its configuration will be is anyone’s forces of the metal bellows. When these forces guess, but when the mo l vehicle is launched are balanced, the joints move without restraint. its crew members will have the most advanced, W hat the final configuration of the mo l the most sophisticated, and the most reliable and Apollo suits will be has not yet been de- life-support system that the vast resources of termined. The original Apollo suit, which has the United States can provide. been undergoing testing, is a fabric anthropo- Aerospace Medical Division, AFSC AIR HOSTILITIES IN THE PHILIPPINES 8 December 1941

D r . R obert F. Futrell

HE PURPOSE of the historian,” stated surrounding them remain unanswered. Now Professor Homer Carey Hockett, “is to that the case has been reopened there is ample ascertain facts, which become the basis justification for a new attempt to place these of all generalizations or conclusions ( these be- events in their historical setting and to seek to ing also facts of a higher order, serving to give settle at least a part of the misunderstanding history its meaning and value). But the raw that has surrounded them. materials with which the historian works are With the emergence of Japan as a major statements, and the first lesson which he must world power, defense of the Philippines became leam is that statements must not be mistaken an increasingly difficult task for the military for facts. . . . His task is, if possible, to make planners of the United States. Separated from such a use of statements that he will through the coast of California by 6000 miles of Pacific them arrive at facts.”1 Who fired the first shots waters, studded in their central reaches by of the American Revolution at Lexington, the Japanese bases in the Caroline and Marshall reasons for Pickett’s charge at Gettysburg, the Islands, the Philippine Islands were a badly purpose of President Lincoln in deciding to exposed American possession. From 1928 to begin battle at Fort Sumter are problems in 1938 the basic U.S. war plan for the defeat of historiography that have long defied a determi- Japan—the orange Plan—visualized a long and nation of precise historical fact. costly war in which a Philippine garrison of Much closer at hand and still within the Army troops would attempt to deny Manila and pnemory of living witnesses, the story of the other key defenses to the enemy until the U.S. initiation of air hostilities in the Philippines on Fleet could force through the Japanese man- } December 1941 and of the handling of the dates and establish a secure line of communica- J.S. Far East Air Force on this first day of tions to the Far East. As such, the Philippines apanese attack there provides another case were no longer an element of American strength tudv in the difficulty of determining precise but rather a liability. In 1935, the Chief of the listorical truth. With the publication of the Army War Plans Division suggested the desir- late General of the Army Douglas Mac Arthur’s ability of undertaking some negotiation by neminiscenses,2 these events are once again which the Philippines would remain neutral in described, but, unfortunately, the questions case of a war with Japan, thus freeing American 34 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW forces to fight along the line Alaska-Hawaii- General MacArthur that an offensive employ- Panama.3 The immediate prewar rainbow 5 ment was to be expected from the new B-17’s. plan, approved by the Joint Board on 14 May By utilizing Singapore, Darwin, Rockhampton, 1941, did not appreciably change the mission Rabaul, Davao, and Aparri for operating bases of U.S. forces in the Far East: the Army was for B-17 types of airplanes,” Arnold wrote, “it assigned the mission of protecting the territory is our opinion that the sea routes between Japan of the associated powers, preventing the exten- and Singapore, and Japan and the Dutch East sion of Axis influence, and supporting naval In d ie s can b e very well covered . . . . F u r th e r - forces. The U.S. Navy would advance through more, B-24’s operating out of Aparri can cover the Carolines and Marshalls to the western the south section of the Japanese Islands as far Pacific.4 north as Nagasaki.”7 In Washington, Army and Although the Army mission in the Philip- Navy planners undertook the necessary re- pines remained defensive, the German attack vision of rainbow 5, and General Brereton against Russia in June 1941 and the mounting carried a copy of the new tasks assigned to evidences of Japan’s warlike intentions de- usaffe to MacArthur. Changes in the revision' manded a strengthening of American forces in of the basic war plan were officially mailed to the Philippines. General Douglas MacArthur MacArthur on 21 November 1941, with an ad- was recalled to active duty on 26 July 1941 and ditional word of advice from U.S. Chief of Staff given command of the United States Army George C. Marshall. “Heretofore,” Marshall Forces in the Far East ( usaffe). The Philip- wrote, “contemplated Army action in the Far pine Department Air Force gave way to an en- East Area has been purely of a defensive na- larged Far East Air Force ( feaf) on 16 Novem- ture. The augmentation of the Army Air Forces ber 1941 under the command of Maj. Gen. in the Philippines has modified that conception Lewis H. Brereton, who had arrived in Manila of Army action in this area to include offensive thirteen days earlier. Modern planes were dis- air operations in the furtherance of the strategic patched as they became available: P-40B’s and defensive, combined with the defense of the P-40E’s were allocated to the pursuit force, the Philippine Islands as an air and naval base.”8 latter being shipped directly from the fac- In the event of hostilities, MacArthur was now tories. Given priority in the assignment of the directed by rainbow 5 to execute “air raids few B-17 Flying Fortresses available in the against Japanese forces and installations within Army Air Corps, the 19th Bombardment tactical operating radius of available bases.”9 Group managed a pioneer Pacific flight to Lu- The new concept of the defense of the Far zon’s Clark Field in October and November. East involved exploitation of the strategic mo- As soon as they could be equipped from cur- bility of air power from Philippine, Malay, rent production, four heavy bomber groups Netherlands East Indies, and Australian bases, were projected for the Philippines. The second and General Brereton’s immediate duty was to of the scheduled groups—the 7th Bombard- coordinate the preparation of air facilities at ment—began leaving California on 6 Decem- these places. While Brereton was in Australia ber 1941. The men of an A-24 dive bomber negotiating for base accommodations, hi}' group—the 27th Bombardment—reached the staff busied itself with the preparation of addi- Philippines on 20 November, but the group’s tional air facilities in the Philippines, where planes were following in a slow convoy. Oi until then Clark Field had been the only avail- modern combat aircraft the feaf possessed on able heavy bomber base. Colonel Francis Ml 1 December 1941 a total of 35 B-17’s and Brady, feaf chief of staff. Colonel Harold EBi about 105 P-40B’s and -E ’s.'* George of the V Interceptor Command, and Arrival of modern heavy bombers in the Captain Harold Eads, the feaf engineer, drey Philippines gave the Army forces an ability to up a plan for the relocation of air units. At thi participate in strategic offensive operations.6 Del Monte plantation on Mindanao they fount On 14 October 1941, General Henry H. Arnold, a site where a temporary heavy bomber bad Chief of the Army Air Forces, emphasized to could be speedily prepared.10 According t< AIR HOSTILITIES IN THE PHILIPPINES 35

General Brereton, the usaffe staff met these ing of a bomber base in the Visayan Islands, at plans for a Mindanao base with some reluc- the center of the archipelago, which would be tance: Brig. Gen. Richard K. Sutherland, Mac- well protected by coast artillery guns and Arthur’s chief of staff, pointed out that the war troops. But to provide immediate relief for the plan for the Philippines included no American congested air facilities on Luzon, MacArthur ground troops for the defense of Mindanao.11 permitted the construction of a bomber strip at On 29 November, MacArthur reiterated this Del Monte.12 same thinking in a letter to Marshall: “The While the scheduled defenses of the Philip- definitive location of the Bomber Command pines were marching toward a readiness date in base in Mindanao is not acceptable because the spring of 1942, worsening relations with that island is strategically a salient and its de- Japan necessitated intensified war preparations fense a difficult problem with the force now in for the force at hand. On 10 November 1941, contemplation.” MacArthur favored the build- Brereton ordered all air units on the alert, re-

On 8 December 1941, Clark Field—the major air base in the Philippines—looked much as it appears in this photograph taken in December 1937. The field was still turf- surfaced, the ground around it too wet to permit any extensive dispersal of aircraft. 36 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

quiring the 19th Bombardment Group to main- to move the 16 Fortresses to Del Monte “was tain one squadron at all times on two-hour obtained from General Sutherland only with readiness for reconnaissance and bombing mis- the understanding that they would be returned s i o n s . 13 O n 2 7 N o v e m b e r , G e n e r a l M a r s h a l l to the airfields to be constructed on Cebu and warned MacArthur that hostile action might Luzon as soon as the necessary operating facil- occur at any moment, but cautioned “If it is ities could be prepared.”18 According to Colonel impossible to avoid hostilities, the United States Eugene L. Eubank, commander of the 19th desires that Japan commit the first overt act.” Group, when interrogated on 2 July 1942: “We This policy, however, was not to be interpreted were planning to keep six squadrons on Del so as to jeopardize a successful defense of the Monte and two in Luzon.”19 Philippines, and MacArthur was specifically The usaffe version of these events was first authorized to take such reconnaissance and published in 1944 when Mr. Frazier Hunt, a other measures as might seem necessary prior press correspondent who had visited Mac- to Japanese hostilities. In case of war, General Arthur’s headquarters to gather material for a MacArthur was directed to carry out the tasks popular biography, asserted that General Suth- assigned in the revised rainbow 5 plan, which erland on three occasions before 8 December had been delivered to him by Brereton.14 Mac- had ordered Brereton to send all B-17’s to Min- Arthur immediately replied that air reconnais- danao and that only after a last and peremp- sance had been extended and intensified and tory order had Brereton finally dispatched two that within the limitations of deployment in the of the squadrons. When it was published, theater everything was in readiness for a suc- Hunt’s biography of MacArthur carried an in- cessful defense.15 In reply to a message from troduction by Brig. Gen. C. A. Willoughby, Arnold cautioning against sabotage, MacArthur Chief of Military Intelligence, chq Southwest on 6 December replied that all Air Corps sta- Pacific Area.20 In an interview with Mr. Walter tions were alerted, airplanes dispersed and D. Edmonds on 4 June 1945, General Suther- each under guard, airdrome defense stations land repeated the same account: manned, and counter-subversive measures had Gen. Sutherland began by saying all the B-17s started functioning.16 had been ordered to Del Monte some days be- In order to obtain greater dispersal, Gen- fore [8 December 1941]. On a check it was eral Brereton sent two squadrons of B-17’s to found that only half had been sent, chq wanted Del Monte airfield on the evening of 5 Decem- the planes in Del M onte because they would ber 1941. Under command of Major Emmett there h ave been safe from initial Jap attack s— O'Donnell, Jr., the 16 Fortresses of the 93d and they could not have been reached at all—and 14th Squadrons departed Clark Field after dark they could them selves have staged out of Clark Field to bomb Form osa. This direct order had in a secret movement. Here begins the first of not been obeyed. And it must be rem em bered the controversies regarding the handling of the that chq gave out general orders and that the Far East Air Force in the initial days of hostili- akhq were supposed to execute them.21 ties. “To the best of my memory,” O’Donnell wrote in February 1946, “it was never intended In September 1946, after The Brereton Diaries to send more than two squadrons of heavy appeared in print, General MacArthur broke bombers from Clark Field to Del Monte prior his silence: “I had given orders several days to 7 December 1941.”17 In The Brereton before to withdraw the heavy bombers from Diories, published in 1946, General Brereton Clark Field to Mindanao . . . to get them out of recorded that he was able to send no more than range of enemy land-based air. 2~ In his Remi- two squadrons southward because the B-17’s niscences, General MacArthur spoke more of the 7th Bombardment Group were leaving kindly of General Brereton: the United States early in Decem ber with A number of statem ents have been m ade criti- orders to push through as rapidly as possible cizing G eneral B rereton, the im plication being and they would need to use the field at Del that through neglect or faulty judgment he Monte. Brereton further stated that permission failed to take proper security m easures, result- AIR HOSTILITIES IN THE PHILIPPINES 37

ing in the destruction of part of his air force on —with Clark Field to be used as a staging base the ground. W hile it is true that the tactical for combat missions. It is possible that Suther- handling of his com m and, including all neces- land’s reluctance as described by Brereton was saries for its protection against air attack of his merely designed to establish the point that Del planes on the ground, was entirely in his own Monte was not to become the permanent hands, such statem ents do an injustice to this bomber base. Brereton noted that Sutherland officer.23 exacted the provision that the planes would be Examination of related contemporary writ- returned either to Clark Field or to a base con- ten evidence permits some evaluation of these structed on Cebu in the Visayas. recollections. Brereton’s account of Suther- While none of the Air Force officers have land’s reluctance to permit the movement of emphasized the fact, establishment of the en- B-17’s to Del Monte is partially reinforced by tire B-17 force at Del Monte would have been MacArthur’s statement on 29 November 1941 hazardous. At Clark the bombers could be de- that the Mindanao base “will give immediate fended by aircraft warning radar, fighters, and relief from the congested conditions on Luzon antiaircraft artillery. Del Monte was completely . . . [but] is not acceptable because that island lacking in airdrome defense, and the bombers is strategically a salient. .. In another letter had to be protected by dispersal and camou- on 1 December, MacArthur requested antiair- flage. The new airfield at Del Monte was sup- craft artillery to protect Del Monte, presuma- posedly a secret base and was believed to be bly against carrier-based air attack.-4 In nei- outside the range of Japanese land-based ther letter did MacArthur mention any imme- bombers, but neither of these possibilities could diate intention to move all B-17’s to Del be guaranteed, for there was a large settlement Monte, and in his message of 6 December he of dissident Japanese on Mindanao and the merely noted that all airplanes were dispersed enemy was expected to use carrier aircraft in and each under guard. his initial assault against the Philippines. In There are also some inconsistencies in the retrospect, it would appear that Brereton’s dis- recollection of the air officers. In his book. They position of his heavy bombers was sound: two Fought With What They Hacl, Edmonds does squadrons at Clark under protection of fighters not find Brereton’s explanation of why he sent and artillery and two squadrons camouflaged only half of the B-17’s southward to be “too and dispersed at Del Monte. A historian finds convincing.” Edmonds reasoned that the arrival here, however, two opposing statements, and of the new group of Fortresses from the United he must accept or reject one or the other of States would be stretched out over several them in the light of his own best judgment. The days.25 As a matter of fact, back in Washington Army historian Professor Louis Morton found it on 1 December, General Arnold planned that impossible to determine where “the responsi- a total of 48 heavy bombers would have de- bility lies for failing to move all the B-17’s parted for the Philippines between 3 and 10 south.” Morton thereby assumes that an order December and that the first 19 of these planes to move the Fortresses had been issued.27 In would arrive at Del Monte on 12-13 Decem- the absence of definitive contemporary evi- ber.26 The initial movement would actually be dence, the best judgment on the matter appears delayed, and the first flights would not begin to to be the statement of Colonel Eubank, made depart for Hawaii until 6 December. It is simi- in July 1942 before the events became contro- larly difficult to reconcile Sutherland’s sup- versial, when he said: “We were planning to posed reluctance to allow two squadrons to keep six squadrons on Del Monte and two in move to Del Monte with the inevitability that Luzon.” the whole 7th Group would soon have to be The beginning of hostilities in the Pacific based there. And while MacArthur was not found the Philippine garrison alerted and, with- satisfied with the Del Monte base, he appar- in limits, ready for a successful defense. The ently visualized it as the main bomber base—at timing of the Japanese attack at Pearl Harbor, east until a new Visayan airfield could be built shortly after dawn on 7 December 1941, fa- Del Monte airfield was hurriedly laid out in flat meadowland at the left of this prewar photograph of the Del Monte plantations. The Agusan River flows through the ravine.

vored the American defenses in the Philip- cer, answered and received the news from pines, since H-hour in Hawaii coincided with General Sutherland that Pearl Harbor had the very early morning hours of 8 December been bombed. Sutherland then told Brereton in the Far East. Japanese aircraft on Formosa, that the Japanese had attacked Hawaii at 2:35 moreover, would be weathered in during the a .m . Manila time and that a state of war morning and would not be able to manage an existed. -s Caldwell’s later recollection of what assault against Clark Field until shortly after then transpired is as follows: “I .. . was standing noon. The Far East Air Force was thus per- right beside the General when he told General mitted an opportunity to strike a first blow. Sutherland to tell General MacArthur that the W hy it did not do so is the subject of the sec- 19th Group would be ready to bomb Formosa ond and major controversy regarding the em- at daylight; Sutherland said that he would ployment of the U.S. heavy bomber force in have to contact General MacArthur before the Philippines on the first day of the war. such a mission could be authorized. He later General Brereton has written that a tele- called back and said that the mission would phone call awakened him early on the morn- not be flown.”20 After completing his telephone ing of 8 December, and he recalled that Lt. conversation with Sutherland, Brereton imme- Col. Charles H. Caldwell, feaf operations offi- diately ordered all air units notified of the Jap- AIR HOSTILITIES IN TI1E PHILIPPINES 39

anese attack and directed Colonel Eubank to feaf chief of staff, who may well have made come down to feaf Headquarters. He recalled this call ( although he remembered it as having that it was then around 4 a .m . and still dark.30 been put through at about 9:30 a .m .), later Brereton recorded that at about 5 a .m . he stated that Sutherland told him that feaf would reported to usaffe Headquarters in Manila, be properly informed of any new decision and where he found that General NlacArthur was in that he was not to call again.37 At 10 a .m . conference. Sutherland briefed him on all avail- Brereton again telephoned Sutherland who re- able information, and Brereton told Sutherland peated that “all aircraft would be held in re- that he wished to mount all the B-17’s at Clark serve and that the present attitude is strictly for missions to Formosa and to prepare the defensive.” Brereton said that he remonstrated Fortresses at Del Monte for similar missions to that if Clark Field were “taken out” by the be staged through Clark Field. He requested enemy the Air Force could not operate offen- permission to begin offensive action immedi- sively.38 ately after daylight. According to Brereton, Apparently at about this time Sutherland Sutherland agreed with the plans, authorized did authorize a reconnaissance mission to For- preparations, and said he would obtain General mosa, and at 10:10 a .m . Colonel Eubank left MacArthur’s authority for the attacks.31 At this for Clark Field to send out these planes. Ac- point begins a series of entries in a typescript cording to the feaf Summary, Brereton re- document, titled “Office of Commanding Gen- ceived a telephone call from General Mac- eral, feaf. Summary’ of Activities,” the authen- Arthur at 10:14 a .m . authorizing him to take ticity of which as a historical source will be sub- offensive action ( in his diaries Brereton records sequently examined. The first entry at 7:15 a .m . this call as having been received at “about 11 in this document records that General Brereton a .m .” and as having been from Sutherland). By visited No. 1 Victoria ( usaffe Headquarters) this time, Brereton had changed his plans. Since where he was “informed that for the time being no attack had been made against Clark, lie our role was defensive but to stand by for wished to hold the B-17’s there in readiness orders.”32 until the reconnaissance missions could return, In the meanwhile the feaf staff had been but, with or without photographic reconnais- Igathering in General Brereton’s office at Niel- sance, the B-17’s would attack Formosa late ison Field on the southern outskirts of Manila, that afternoon.39 To follow the plan of opera- iand the staff had been joined by Colonel Eu- tion outlined in the feaf Summary, General bank and his operations officer from Clark. Brereton had by 10:45 a .m . matured the follow- Captain Allison Ind, feaf intelligence officer, ing schedule: two squadrons of B-17’s would Was assembling target folders on Formosa. As attack known airdromes in southern Formosa to the state of the target information he would at the latest daylight hour permitting visibility; (observe: “We were as ready as we would be for the two squadrons at Del Monte would move to a long time to come.”33 According to the recol- a dry-weather strip at San Marcelino at dusk lection of Captain Harold Eads, all those pres- and then to Clark after dark, where they would ent were of the opinion that the Air Force prepare for raids against Formosa at dawn the (should “strike at the Japs in Formosa with next day. At 11:56 a .m . this plan was commu- everything we had without delay.” The feaf nicated to General Sutherland."' staff was preparing to proceed on that basis.34 The recollections of the Air Force officers— When he arrived at Nielson Field, Brere- while differing as to exact details—are remark- :on brought the news (as Eads expressed it) ably' consistent in regard to the events on the :hat “we couldn’t attack until we were at- morning of 8 December. Even Colonel Eubank, acked.”35 While war planning continued, who said that he did not wish to discuss the Sutherland was again contacted at 9 a .m ., and, matter when interrogated in July 1942, com- according to the feaf Summary', he again ad- mented that it was General Brereton’s plan to dsed “planes not authorized to carry bombs at bomb Formosa and that such had been firmly •his time.”36 Colonel Francis M. Brady, the recommended by him.41 But the delay had been 40 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW too long, and as the result of a series of unfortu- Brereton suggested to General Sutherland a nate circumstances a Japanese air attack at foray against Form osa. I know nothing of any Clark Field shortly after noon destroyed most interview w ith Sutherland, and Brereton never of the two squadrons of B-17’s based there. at any time recommended or suggested an at- Half of the B-17’s in the Far East having been tack on Form osa to m e. M y first know ledge of it was in a newspaper dispatch months later. eliminated, offensive action against Formosa Such a suggestion to the Chief of Staff must was no longer practicable. have been of a most nebulous and superficial The recollections of General MacArthur character, as there was no record of it at head- and General Sutherland as to the events on the quarters. The proposal, if intended seriously, morning of 8 December 1941 are at sharp vari- should certainly have been made to me in per- ance with those of the air officers. In June 1945, son. He has never spoken of the m atter to me Sutherland told Edmonds that “there was some either before or after the Clark Field attack.44 plan to bomb Formosa but Brereton said that These categorical statements made by he had to have photos first. That there was no Generals MacArthur and Sutherland necessar- sense in going up there to bomb without know- ily give the historian some pause, especially ing what they were going after. There were those parts of General MacArthur’s statements some 25 fields on Formosa.” Sutherland closed that refer to official records in his headquarters. the subject with a positive assertion: “Holding It appears, however, that both MacArthur and the bombers at Clark Field that first day was Sutherland must have been speaking from en tirely du e to B re re to n .”42 In an official r e - memory rather than from recourse to records. lease issued after the publication of The Brere- In May 1944, the Fifth Air Force chief of staff ton Diaries, General MacArthur stated that he originated a letter to MacArthur’s headquarters knew nothing of a Brereton recommendation asking for information regarding the employ- to bomb Formosa: ment of the ff.af bomber force on 8 December 1941 and received this reply: “There is no offi- I wish to state that General Brereton never cial information in this headquarters bearing recommended an attack on Formosa to me and I know nothing of such a recom m endation hav- upon the questions propounded in basic com- ing been m ad e; th at m y first know ledge of it munication.”45 It is entirely possible that Gen- was contained in yesterday’s press statement. eral MacArthur may not have been informed That it must have been of a most nebulous of General Brereton’s early-morning requests and superficial ch aracter, as no official record for authoritv to attack Formosa; the recollec- exists of it in h ead q uarters. tions of the air officers and the feaf Summary That such a proposal, if intended seri- attest that these requests were directed to Gen- ously, should have been m ade to m e in person eral Sutherland. by him; that he never has spoken of the m atter MacArthur’s reasoning that unescorted to m e either before or after the Clark Field B-17 attacks against Formosa would have been attack. “impossible” does not coincide with then-cur- That an attack on Form osa with its heavy air concentrations by his sm all bom ber force rent thinking or with other events that hap- without fighter support, which, because of the pened on 8 December. In the prewar period, great distance involved, was impossible, would the B-17 Flying Fortresses were believed to have had no chance of success.43 have great defensive capabilities. General Ar- nold envisioned that long-range B-17 missions MacArthur concluded this September 1946 re- would be conducted without fighter escort. This lease with the observation: “The over-all stra- was further borne out by the fact that the radius tegic mission of the Philippines command was of action of the P-40’s sent to the Philippines to defend the Philippines, not to initiate out- was only 285 miles.46 MacArthur, moreover, side attack.” In his Reminiscences, General apparently authorized the B-l 7 attack that was MacArthur wrote: supposed to have been sent to Formosa late on Sometime in the morning of December the afternoon of 8 December. At any rate, on 9 8th, before the Clark Field attack. General December he signaled the War Department AIR HOSTILITIES IN THE PHILIPPINES 41

that “the intended attack on Formosa had to hostilities had begun, and that he was to exe- be canceled in view of damage reported at cute rainbow 5.52 In drawing his conclusion, Clark Field.”47 MacArthurs statement that the Morton ignored MacArthurs statement that his strategic mission of the Philippine command mission had been “to defend . . . not to initiate was “to defend . .. not to initiate outside attack,” outside attack.” MacArthurs Reminiscences was at variance with the amended rainbow 5 now reveal that usaffe was thinking defensive- plan which directed “air raids against Japanese ly. MacArthur states that initial reports of the forces and installations within tactical operat- Pearl Harbor attack left him with the impres- ing radius of available bases.” sion that the Japanese had suffered a setback When he published his Diaries in 1946, and that the failure of the Japanese to close General Brereton surmised that he might have against Luzon during the morning of 8 Decem- been unable to get authority for the early- ber supported this erroneous belief. “I there- morning attacks against Formosa because Mac- fore contemplated,” MacArthur wrote, “an air Arthur had been instructed not to attack unless reconnaissance to the north, using bombers ■ attacked first and that the Pearl Harbor attack with fighter protection, to ascertain a true esti- “might not have been construed as an overt act mate of the situation and to exploit any possible against the Philippines.”48 Although Mac- weaknesses that might develop on the enemy’s Arthur had been officially directed to imple- fro n t.”53 T h is statem ent adds weight to the ment the revised rainbow 5 plan by the Chief conclusion that the incubus of a long period of of Staff’s letter of 21 November 1941, the month defensive thinking, unfamiliarity with strategic or less permitted to change from defense to air capabilities, and the hesitation arising from offense was a short time in which to reorient the directive that the Japanese should attack planning and thinking, especially since Mac- first may well have contributed to the fatal Arthur (as he wrote Marshall on 29 November) delay in launching the heavy bomber attack had not previously planned to include heavy against Formosa, although more than one Air bombers in the Philippine Army because of Force officer has since observed that “the their cost.49 Hard on the heels of the revised bombing of Pearl Harbor was a first-class overt rainbow 5 came the 27 November directive a c t.”54 " that “the United States desires that Japan com- Under normal circumstances the existence mit the first overt act.” Literal interpretation of of contemporary documentary evidence en- this order led usaffe to refuse Brereton’s re- ables a historian to evaluate the statements of quest for a few high-level reconnaissance flights interested participants in the events they de- over southern Form osa on 1 D e ce m b e r,50 and scribe. Unfortunately, only a limited amount of Sutherland later cited this order when he ex- documentary evidence bearing upon the em- plained the exceedingly circumscribed author- ployment of the feaf bomber force in the ity granted the commander of the V Inter- Philippines can be found. With surrender ceptor Command against Japanese planes rec- imminent, Lt. Gen. Jonathan M. Wainwright, onnoitering Luzon: “We told him he could commanding on Corregidor, used two small leffect it,” Sutherland recollected, “but that he aircraft on the night of 12 April 1942 to trans- must act defensively; but if the Japs came in port some 150 pounds of what he described as fnear enough he could go to it.”51 “General Staff Section Journals, documents, Based upon personal interviews with Gen- and my diaries” to Mindanao, whence they eral Sutherland in November 1946 and June were taken by special courier to General Suth- 1951, Professor Morton concludes that Brere- erland in Australia. “These papers when they (ton’s surmise that the Pearl Harbor attack was arrive,” Sutherland directed, “are to be deliv- |not considered an overt act against the Philip- ered to me—not to staff sections.” Another nota- pines “must be dismissed ” In support of this tion on Wainwright’s message stated that the position. Morton further cites the fact that Mac- documents described were received on 19 April Arthur received a message from Washington 1942 and placed in a vault in the Chief of Staff’s at 5:30 a .m . on 8 December informing him that office.55 In September 1942, General Marshall 42 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW sent a message to Brisbane stating that it was The second report must have covered understood that the staff journals of the Head- feaf activities from 8 December 1941 through quarters Forces in the Philippines from the 24 February 1942. While the original of this beginning of the war to 1 April were in c iiq , report has never been located, the usaf His- Southwest Pacific Area, and that they should torical Division Archives contains a typescript be forwarded to the War Department without document which is either a carbon copy of the delay. The Brisbane headquarters replied that report or the working data from which the complete staff journals from the Philippines report was prepared. This document—entitled were “not available.”56 Although virtually com- “Office of Commanding General, feaf, Sum - plete G-4 records ultimately arrived in Wash- mary of Activities”—was discovered in the ington, the location of usaffe-usfip G-2 and retired files of the Tenth Air Force (Brereton’s G-3 journals was never discovered by Professor next command after leaving Java) in India, Morton, who wrote: “A careful search . . . has and it was routinely transmitted to the Archives failed to produce them, and the principals, in October 1945.1'1 Buried in a bulk shipment Generals Wainwright and Sutherland, assert of documents, this feaf Summary of Activities they have no knowledge of their where- was not noticed until the first volume of The abouts."57 Army Air Forces in W orld War II was nearing Very few Far East Air Force records sur- publication. The summary was of such im- vived the retreat from the Philippines. Generals portance that the editors of the Air Force his- Brereton and Brady have pointed out that two torical series immediately undertook to in- official reports were made to General Arnold, corporate its information wherever possible.62 one before feaf Headquarters left the Philip- In its form, this feaf Summary of Activities pines and the other shortly after the evacuation appears to be a detailed daily diary of feaf of Java. Diligent search of official records Headquarters, with time entries for the collections failed to disclose the original of events of each day between 8 December 1941 either report. General Arnold, moreover, made and 24 February 1942. General Brereton has no apparent use of the reports when he wrote recalled that he instituted the practice of keep- his Global Mission, but instead remarked that ing a detailed daily diary at feaf: “I t was my he had never been able to get “the real story invariable habit,” he stated, “to report for the of what happened in the Philippines.”58 record the substance of personal conferences That the two feaf reports were made is outside headquarters immediately upon my nevertheless fairly certain. General Brady re- return.”63 Lt. Col. Keith P. Siegfried, who as a called that the first report was carried out of warrant officer joined feaf Headquarters in the Philippines by Brig. Gen. Henry B. Clagett, Java, recalled that the format of the Summary the commander of the V Interceptor Command, was that generally employed in the Head- who was ordered to Australia to establish a rear quarters diary. “At that time,” Siegfried recol- base.59 The ff.af Summary of Activities notes lected, “the minute-by-minute recording of that a memorandum was prepared for General incidents, conversations, phone calls, and the Arnold on IS December 1941, giving a chrono- receipt or dispatch of messages as they occurred logical statement of events between 3 Novem- was an established so p.”64 In tern al eviden ce ber and 8 December 1941.60 General Clagett points to Major Norman J. Lewellyn (Brere- departed the Philippines on the following day, ton’s aide who was killed in India in 1943) as and it is to be assumed that he later forwarded the keeper of the portion of the Summary the report to General Arnold from Australia. If through 29 January 1942, and General Brady it could be located, this document might well remembers that Lewellyn went about ff.af clear up the dispute about the basing of the Headquarters each day collecting information. B-17’s at Del Monte. General Clagett died be- General Brereton has also stated that Lcw clhn fore replying to a request for information re- was the custodian of the feaf \\ ar Diary. garding his knowledge of this historical source. While the feaf Summary appears to be a AIR HOSTILITIES IN THE PHILIPPINES 43

day-by-day report of events, internal evidence it has been re-edited.” Reports of pursuit activ- makes it apparent that it was transcribed in its ity, Edmonds claimed, coincided more closely present form somewhat later than the events it with statements in the 24th Pursuit Group’s describes. The most certain evidence of this is history than did the recollections of the various the erroneous dating of many of the earlier personnel he interviewed.65 As a matter of entries as “1942” rather than “1941.” One rarely record, however, the 24th Croup's history was if ever makes an advance error in setting down written in Australia during October 1942, and a date, and it is likely that these misdated en- by this time the feaf Summary was already tries were transcribed early in 1942, when the resting in the files of the Tenth Air Force in harassed typist was overly conscious that a India. It may be noted, moreover, that the de- new year was at hand. Misspelled place names tails in the feaf Summary coincide generally scattered throughout the Summary ( not an un- but not exactly with the recollections of the usual feature in military records) indicate that Air Force officers regarding the happenings of the typist was transcribing unfamiliar material. December 1941. The Summary thus possesses Additional internal analysis also indicates that the precision and definition which usually the feaf Summary is a compilation of several characterize the difference between a contem- different diaries: ( 1) General Brereton is “posi- porary document and the memories of partici- tive that the entries from S December to 23 De- pants in events. Finally, both Generals Brereton cember are accurate transcriptions taken from and Caldwell accepted the authenticity of the . . . the Headquarters W a r D iary.” ( 2 ) From Summary after they had examined it in 1952. 24 December 1941 through 29 January 1942, “There is no doubt in my mind of the authen- the Summary’s entries follow the travels of ticity of the diary,” General Caldwell stated,66 Brereton’s headquarters to Australia and Java, while General Brereton wrote: “I am absolute- and this portion of the document unquestion- ly certain that the Diary is an authentic record ably represents the work of Major Lewellyn. of the facts as they were recorded at that (3) The portion of the Summary for 30 January time.”67 Additional criticism thus buttressed the through 22 February 1942 is a carbon copy initial conclusion of the Air Force historical identical to a similar portion of the feaf Head- editors that the feaf Summary “represents a quarters diary in the Kansas City Records valuable record compiled closer to the events Center. (4) The last page of the Summary described than any other known source of com- covers events on 24 February 1942, the date parable scope.”68 that General Brereton gave up command of It is not really within the province of feaf, and does not appear in the Kansas City proper historical reporting to speculate on file copy of the feaf Headquarters diary. what might have been the result of a heavy Two significant questions emerge from bomber attack against Japanese bases on For- this internal criticism: When was the feaf mosa in the opening hours of American partici- Summary transcribed in its existing form? Were pation in World War II. “As a matter of fact,” the sources edited before their transcription? General MacArtlnir suggested, “an attack on Watermarks of a Javanese bank on a portion of Formosa, with its heavy air concentrations, by the paper used in the Summary point to the our small bomber force without fighter cover, 'time and place of the assembly of the informa- which because of the great distance involved tion as late January or early February 1942 in and the limited range of the fighters was impos- Java. When asked about the matter, Generals sible, would have been suicidal.”69 On the other Brereton and Caldwell were certain that the hand, Japanese officers interrogated after iSummary was carried by Lewellyn when they World War II were less certain as to what the departed from Java for India on 25 February effect of such an attack might have been. With 1942. After what appears to have been a cursory 150 Army and 300 Navy aircraft crowded into examination of the Summary, Walter D. Ed- Formosa’s limited air facilities, depending on monds commented that he felt “fairly sure that overhead fighter cover for protection, Japanese 44 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

commanders knew many anxious moments dur- air operations in the Philippines involve not ing the morning of 8 December. Only the Navy what might have been but what actually hap- planes had range enough to reach Manila, and pened. Acceptance of the feaf Summary of the delicately adjusted attack plan called for Activities as a nearly contemporary and almost the launching of a strike from Formosa at certainly authentic source permits little doubt sunrise. When ground fog delayed the take-off, to remain that General Brereton did request the Japanese greatly feared that American air- and was denied authority to send a B-17 strike craft would initiate the first strike. This fear against Formosa early in the morning of 8 was increased at 8 a . m . when an American radio December. Complete resolution of the question message was intercepted indicating that an as to whether Brereton had been ordered to attack was being considered and that the B-17’s move all the B-17 s back to Mindanao well be- would arrive over Formosa at 10:10. At this fore the war’s beginning must await the location hour, a Japanese Army plane falsely reported of additional documentary evidence. One may the approach of the B-17’s, and, expecting the hope that as the passing of time diminishes the worst, the Japanese donned gas masks and keenness of the controversy the appearance of otherwise prepared for the American attack additional source material will allow historians that never came.70 to tear away the “conspiracy of silence” that has Actually, however, the facts that must be so long surrounded the beginning of the war in gathered about the initial phase of American the Philippines. Aerospace Studies Institute

Notes 1. Homer Carey Hoekett. Introduction to Research in 6 December 1941, in AAFRH-11, pp. 249, 252. American History ( New York: The Macmillan Co., 1935), p. 58. 17. 1st ind (ltr, C/Historical Office AAF to CG, Air 2. General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, Reminiscences Technical Service Command, 30 January 1946, subj: Air Defense (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1964). of the Philippine Islands in December 1941), Brig. Gen. E. 3. Maurice Matloff and Edwin M. Snell, Strategic Planning O’Donnell, CG ATSC to CG AAF, Attn: AAF Historical Office. for Coalition Warfare, 1941-1912 (Washington: Office of the 13 February 1946, in ASI IIA 168.274-3. Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1953), pp. 18. The Brereton Diaries, pp. 35-36. 1-3. 6-10. 19. Director of Intelligence Service, AAF, interview with 4. Wesley F. Craven and James L. Cate (eds.), The Army Colonel Eugene L. Eubank, 2 July 1942. Air Forces in World War II (Chicago: University of Chicago 20. Frazier Hunt, MacArthur and the War Against Japan Press. 1948-1958), I, 139-42. (New York: C. Scribner’s Sons, 1944), pp. 30-34; see also Her- 5. Ibid., pp. 177-193; memo for CofS WD from Maj. Gen. bert Asbury and Frank Gervasi, “ MacArthur—The Story of a H. H. Arnold, C/AAF, 1 December 1941, subj: Combat Status Great American Soldier,” Colliers, Vol. 116, 21 July 1945, p. 29; of Philippine Department Air Force, in Aerospace Studies Insti- and Clark Lee and Richard Henschel, Douglas Sine Arthur (New tute Archives (ASI HA) 168.274-3. York: Holt, 1952), pp. 132-43. 6. Memo for C Air Staff AAF from Lt. Col. II. L. George, 21. Interview with Lt. Gen. R. K. Sutherland at GHQ AC AS A-WPD, 21 October 1941. subj: Proposed drafts direct- Manila, 4 June 1945, in AAFRH-11. Appendix 9; see also Walter ing Army and Navy commanders in Far East, Hawaii, and Alaska I). Edmonds, They Fought With What They Ilad (Boston: Little, to prepare plans for joint operations, in ASI HA 145.95 (W P-4- Brown and Co., 1951), p. 88. F-l). 22. The New York Times, 28 September 1946. 7. Ltr, Arnold to MacArthur, 14 October 1941, in AAF 23. MacArthur, Reminiscences, p. 120. AG 3 2 1 .9C. 24. Ltr, MacArthur to Marshall, 1 December 1941, in 8. Ltr, Actg CofS WD ( Bryden) to CG USAFFE, 21 ASI HA 145.95 (W P-4-F-1) Bk. 2. , „ . November 1941, subj: United States-British Commonwealth Co- 25. Edmonds, They Fought With What They Had, pp. operation in the Far East, in ASI HA 145.95 (W P-II-C-5). 0-91. 9. Craven and Cate (eds.). The Army Air Forces in World 26. Memo for CofS WD from Arnold, 1 December 1941, War II. I. 184-85. citing JBWP-R5-A. Revision of RAINBOW ubj: Combat Stat 's of Philippine Department Air Force No. 5. approved bv Joint Board. 19 November 1941. 27. Louis Morton, The Fall of the Philippines (Waslung- 10. Lewis H. Brereton, The Brereton Diaries (New York: m: Office of the Chief of Military History. Department of the William Morrow and Co., 1946), pp. 31-32; interview with Limy. 1953). p. 163. Colonel Harold Eads, 6 April 1944, in History of the Fifth Air 28. The Brereton Diaries, p. 38. . , Force (and its predecessors). Part I, Appendix II, Document 10. ■>9 Memo for Air Force Historian from Brig. Gen. Charles 1 1. The Brereton Diaries, p. 32. I. Caldwell, 25 April 1952, subj: General Brereton s Head- 12. Ltr, MacArthur to Marshall, 29 November 1941, in uarters Diary. ASI HA 145.95 (WP-4-F-1 ) Bk. 2. 30. The Brereton Diaries, p. 38. 13. Ltr, Brereton to All Post, Group, and Separate Squad- 31. Ibid., pp. 38-39. _ _ i - ron Commanders, 10 November 1941, in AAF AG 381. 32. FEAF Summary of Activities, 0< :15, 8 Decemlnr 14. Msg, Marshall to CG USA FFE, No. 624. 27 November 941. in ASI HA 704.13, 8 December 1941-24 February 194:-. 1941, in AAFRH-11 : Army Air Action in the Philippines & 33. Allison Ind, Bataan, The Judgment Seat (New lork. Netherlands East Indies, 1941-1942, p. 249. lacmillan, 1944), p. 92. , .,<011 15. Msg, MacArthur to Marshall. No. 1004, 28 November 34. Interview with Colonel Eads, 6 April 1944. 1941. in AAFRH-11. p. 249. 16. Msg. TAG WD to CG USAFFE signed Arnold. No. 36. FEAF Summary of Activities. 09:00, 8 December 647. 28 November 1941; msg, MacArthur to AGWAR, No. 1105, 941. AIR HOSTILITIES IN THE PHILIPPINES 45

37. Unrecorded interview •ith Brig. Cen. Francis M. 56. Msgs, Washington to Brisbane, No. 1874, 17 Septem- Brady by Maj. Richard Watson 7 December 1944, cited in ber 1942. and GHQ SWPA to AGWAR, C-671, 10 October AAFRH-11. p. 53. 1942, in AG File 313, GHQ SWPA, Kansas City Records Center, 38. FEAF Summary of Activities, 10:00, 8 December SWPA Collection, BX-50756. 1941; The Brercton Diaries, p. 40. 57. Morton. The Fall of the Philippines, p. 586. 39. FEAF Summary of Activities, 10:14, 8 December 58. Ceneral of the Air Force H. H. Arnold, Global Mission 1941: The Brereton Diaries, p. 41. (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1949), p. 272. 40. FEAF Summary of Activities, 10:45 and 11.56. 8 59. Ltr, Brig. Gen. F'rancis M. Brady to Air Force His- December 1941. torian, 2 July 1952. 41. Eubank interview, 2 July 1942. 60. FEAF Summary of Activities, 18 December 1941. 42. Sutherland interview, 4 June 1945. 61. Ltr. Dr. H. L. Bowen, former member of Historical 43. The Sew York Times, 28 September 1946. Section, Hq AAF India-Burma Theater, to author, 20 November 44. MacArthur, Beininisccnces. p. 120. 1952. 45. Ltr, Col. R. E. Beebe, CofS Fifth AF to GHQ SWPA, 62. Craven and Cate (eds.), The Army Air Forces in 27 May 1944. 1st ind, Lt. Col. H. W. Allen, Actg AG GHQ World War 11. I, 206n. SWPA to CG Fifth AF, 7 June 1944, in History of the Fifth Air 63. Ltr. Lt. Cen. Lewis H. Brereton to Chief, USAF His- Force (and its predecessors). Part I, Appendix II, Document 20. torical Division, 3 April 1952. 46. Memo for CofS WD from Arnold, 1 December 1941, 64. Ltr. Lt. Col. Keith P. Siegfried to Chief, USAF His- subj: Combat Status of Philippine Department Air Force. torical Division, 24 October 1952. 47. Msg, MacArthur to WD, No. 1135, 9 December 1941. 65. See ltr. William F. Walsh, Jr„ Boston, Mass., to His- 48. The Brereton Diaries, p. 39n. torical Officer. USAF. 28 March 1950, in ASI HA 730.01 (4469- 49. Ltr, MacArthur to Marshall, 29 November 1941. 1); Edmonds. They Fought With What They Had, p. 92. 50. The Brereton Diaries, pp. 34-35. 66. Memo for Air Force Historian from Caldwell, 25 April 51. Sutherland interview, 4 June 1945. 1952. 52. Morton. The Fait of the Philippines, p. 82. 53. MacArthur. Reminiscences, p. 117. 67. Ltr, Brereton to Chief, USAF Historical Division, 3 54. Memo for Air Force Historian from Caldwell, 25 April April 1952. 1952. 68. Craven and Cate (eds.). The Army Air Forces in 55. Msgs. Wainwright, Fort Mills, to CG USAFFE. Mel- World War II, I, 206n. bourne. No. 212, 12 April 1942; No. 214, 12 April 1942; and 69. MacArthur, Reminiscences, p. 120. No. 261, 13 April 1942. with attached notes in AG File 370.05, 70. U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey, Interrogations No. GHQ SWPA, Kansas City Records Center, SWPA Collection, 601, Comdr. Ryosuke Nomura, 28 November 1945 and No. 74, BX-50759. Capt. Chihaya Takahashi, 20 October 1945. EXERCISE SKY SOLDIER TIEN BING VI

In early October 1964, the Republic of China (R.O.C.) forces noted increased recon- naissance activities by aggressor aircraft and also an increase in enemy ship sightings in the Taiwan Bay area. On 20 October an estimated 100 aggressor troops were observed land- ing in small boats on the coast near the mouth of the Ta Tit River. After coming ashore they deployed in a southwesterly direction toward Chaung Hau. The steadily improving economy and standard of living in Taiwan and the existence of the antiaggressor government arc believed to have caused the “aggressorland” to becom e more hostile toward the Republic of China. In the final days of October, an aggressor force, having made other successful land- ings on the coast, directed its forces north and south, to turn the friendly positions. The R.O.C. field armies contained the aggressor forces and prepared to execute a counter- attack plan to drive the enemy back into the sea. At the same time, the R.O.C. requested immediate assistance from the United States under existing treaties and security arrange- ments, in order to eliminate the international security threat. As a result of this request, planning was initiated for the employment of U.S. and R.O.C. airborne forces.

H IS was the hypothetical military/ to join their allied R.O.C. forces in repelling political situation on the island of Tai- the simulated aggressor. Twan and the setting for joint United Three Command Airlift Support Units States-Republic of China Exercise Sky Soldier/ (calsu s) were established to execute the or- Tien Bing VI from 27 October to 5 November ders issued by the Troop Carrier Command 1964. Post. The calsu at Naha Air Base controlled Sky Soldier VI Troop Carrier Command 315th Air Division flying units of the 6315th Post was activated at 1600 hours 25 October Operations Group, which is equipped with on Naha Air Base, Okinawa, by Brigadier Gen- three C-130 troop carrier squadrons. At Ka- eral Richard H. Ellis, Commander, 315th Air dena Air Base, Okinawa, the calsu supported Division, and Troop Carrier commander for the aircraft from the 22d Troop Carrier Squad- the exercise. Over seventy United States Air ron, 1502d Air Transport Wing (ma t s), and Force transport aircraft, under the operational crews from the Naval Air Transport Wing, control of the usaf 315th Air Division, had Pacific, flying Air Force C-130’s. The third been assembled on Okinawa, along with more calsu was located in west central Taiwan to than 3800 personnel and over 3,800,000 pounds monitor and control Sky Soldier airlift of cargo to be airlifted into the exercise area operations. * EXERCISE SKY SOLDIER/TIEN BING VI 47

Organizations directly involved in airlift port Croup and its assigned 22d Troop Carrier operations were the 315th Air Division and its Squadron, the 1502d Air Transport Wing aug- subordinate units: the 5th Communications mentation aircraft and crews, and U.S. Navy Squadron, 7th Aerial Port Squadron, 9th Aero- crews from vr 7 Naval Air Transport Wing, medical Evacuation Squadron, and 815th Pacific, flying Air Force C-130’s. Troop Carrier Squadron; also the 6315th Op- Exercise Sky Soldier/Tien Bing VI erations Group and its assigned troop carrier brought together a total of over 40 units and squadrons, the 21st, 35th, and 817th. supporting elements of the U.S. and Chinese Military Air Transport Service (ma t s) Army, Navy, and Air Force. In addition to the units under the operational control of the 315th Air Division and subordinate units men- 315th Air Division were the 1503d Air Trans- tioned above, other U.S. Air Force units in-

An informal conference is held during the joint United States-Republic of China Exercise Sky Soldier/Tien Ring VI. Conferees are Brig. Gen. Richard II. Ellis, Troup Carrier and 315th Air Division commander; Col. L. M. Tannenbaum, 315th deputy chief of staff for operations; and Brig. Gen. Ellis W. Williamson, 173d Airborne Brigade commander. 48 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW eluded Fifth Air Force, Thirteenth Air Force, hours, dropping 1000 paratroopers before high and 313th Air Division, all part of the Pacific surface winds prevented further drops for the Air Forces. The U.S. Army units participating day. were the 173d Airborne Brigade (Sep), Head- On Wednesday winds in the drop zone quarters IX Corps, 999th Signal Company, and had diminished, and the paratroop and cargo elements of the 97th Civil Affairs Group, 549th drops were completed. Airlanding of assault Quartermaster Company, and U.S. Army cargo started Wednesday afternoon, and C- Broadcasting and Visual Activity, Pacific. 124’s and C-130’s delivered over a million Sky Soldier/Tien Bing VI had several ob- pounds of cargo daily on Thursday, Friday, jectives, the more important of which were to and Saturday. improve the combat readiness of participating The C-130 aircraft were equipped with units; exercise the airborne capabilities of the 463L roller rail conveyer system, here used the U.S. airborne brigades; evaluate the effec- for the first time in any exercise of this magni- tiveness of marshaling plans, procedures, and tude. W ith this system, aircraft needed less techniques; and provide training in all phases than 10 minutes to offload airlanded cargo at of combat airlift and tactical air operations. their destination, while combat assault rolling Initial activity began early Monday morn- stock was offloaded in a matter of seconds ing, 26 October, with briefings on the exercise during the airland assault phase. Airdropped for all personnel involved in the operations. cargo utilizing the same system exited the air- Loading of the aircraft started at 0800 with craft in less than 10 seconds. members of the 173d Airborne Brigade (Sep), Aircraft-movement and weather informa- Camp Sukiran, Okinawa, rolling their trucks tion, vital in all exercises of this type, was of cargo up to the aircraft. Thirty-six 315th Air under the control of the 5th Communications Division and ten Naval Air Transport Wing Squadron. A 12-man team at a fixed site at C-130 Hercules were loaded with 600,000 Naha Air Base and a 12-man mobile commu- pounds of cargo for airdrop on D-day, Tues- nications team set up in Taiwan handled up to day, 27 October. 150 weather, aircraft-movement, and admin- For the paratroopers of the U.S. Army’s istrative messages each day during the assault 173d Airborne Brigade (Sep), Tuesday began phase, 27-31 October. Starting on D-day, 27 at 0500 when 2000 of them were loaded on 24 October, and during all aircraft movements, C-124 Globemasters of the 1502d Air Trans- squadron weather reports were broadcast over port Wing and the 1503d Air Transport Group the objective area every 15 minutes. The mo- (ma t s), for the flight of some 500 miles along bile communications team can be air-moved to the Ryukyu island chain to the airdrop site in any site and be fully operational two hours the west central Taiwan area. after landing. It can then tie into existing net- The Republic of China forces were the works or operate alone and communicate over first into the assault area, completing their air- long distances. drop of Chinese paratroopers at 1000 hours. Division-size airborne exercises such as Next in C-130’s came a 14-man combat control this have constantly improved the defense pos- team from the 7th Aerial Port Squadron and a ture and the combat and operational readiness 50-man Army assault team from the 173d Air- of the armed forces of the United States and borne Brigade. The C-124’s followed at 1100 its allies in the Pacific in recent years. Office of Information, Hq 315th Air Division The W ork on the Ground

The hub of airlift operations during the joint United States-Republic of China Exercise Sky Soldier/Tien Bing VI was the Troop Carrier Command Post at Naha Air Base, Okinawa. Staff officers worked around the clock to see that operations went according to plan.

Navigators of the 35th Troop Carrier Squadron do their preflight work. Navi- gators were responsible for getting their aircraft over the drop zone at the exact second called for in the operation plan.

j A 51st Organizational Maintenance Squadron crew refuels a 315th Air Division C-130. The 51st was kept busy throughout the exercise main- taining the divisions four squadrons of C-130’s at Naha Air Base. Aircraft movement information was transmitted by the 315th Air Divi- sion’s 5th Communications Squadron. Communicating between this fixed sta- tion and a mobile station in Taiwan, the squadron handled up to 150 messages each day on aircraft moves.

Proper loading of cargo by the 315th Air Division loadmasters pays off as the crew quickly offloads this huge C-124 Globemaster in Taiwan. In just five days of the joint exer- cise, over 3,800.000 pounds of combat cargo was airlifted from Okinawa to Taiwan. The Loading Phase

Combat cargo loading at Naha Air Base. USAF C-130 aircraft airdropped more than 600,000 pounds of assault cargo during the exercise.

Army members of the 173d Airborne Brigade (Sep) and Air Force loadmasters of the 315th Air Di- vision push a double pallet of Army 'mules’ into a C-130 Hercules during the assault phase. Using the 463L roller conveyer system for the first time in a Pacific area exercise, crews were able to on- load palletized cargo in minutes, offload in 10 minutes, and airdrop cargo in less than 10 seconds. An Army self-propelled antitank (SPAT) is loaded into a C-130 for aerial delivery. This weapon, along with thousands of pounds of other combat cargo, was airdropped in west central Taiwan.

‘Airborne All The Way"—Troops of the 173d Airborne Brigade (Sep) rtarch aboard a 1503d Air Transport Croup (MATS) C-124 Globemastcr of he 22d Troop Carrier Squadron at Kadena Air Base, Okinawa. These air- borne troopers were dropped in west central Taiwan during the exercise. The Aircraft Begin To Roll

The C-130’s. An 815th Troop Carrier Squadron crew is briefed prior to flight by the aircraft commander. Other crew members are the -■ * and. tWO loadmOStcrS. The C-124’s. Globe masters of the 1502d Air Transport Wing and 1503d Air Transport Croup (MATS) are readied for early morning take-off at Kadena Air Base. These aircraft flew over 2000 paratroopers of the 173d Airborne Brigade (Sep) in sup- port of Sky Soldier VI. The MATS airlift augmentation units were under the operational control of 315th Air Division.

This formation helped deliver over Sty-six C-130 Hercules of the 315th Air Di- 3,800,000 pounds of combat cargo :Sn move out for the runway at Naha Air to west central Taiwan in sup- • for a formation take-off. The 315th Air port of Sky Soldier/Tien Bing VI. won’s flying units include the 21st, 35th, lih, and 817th Troop Carrier Squadrons. Airborne—and Down

C-130 Hercules of the 315th Air Divi- sion move into a close tactical forma- tion on the way to the drop zone during Sky Soldier VI. C-130’s from the 21st, 35th, 815th, and 817th Troop Carrier Squadrons air-delivered over 600,000 pounds of combat cargo to the drop zone. 315th Air Division’s combat control team and the 173d Army assault team caught a few winks prior to jumping, after which they set up a drop zone for over 2000 1 73d Airborne Brigade troopers who jumped thirty minutes later.

Thousands of tons of combat cargo pour from the C-130's during the D-day assault ohase. All cargo hit the ground within the objective area. psing parachutes of the 173d Airborne Brigade (Sep) were seen almost during the joint United States-Republic of China Exercise Sky Soldier/ //. The regular paratroopers were preceded into the drop zone by the 115th Air Division combat control team and a 50-member Army assault team. nln’iibiUuilnminln H» Fla1» T sm w rsrT i

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THE COMPUTER USE OF HUMAN BEINGS

Major Robert L. Abl e

OST OF us in th e A ir F o rce do not h ave issue with the reasoning that supports this “too to look very far to see the im pact of impersonal” position and advance in its place the M computers on almost all aspects of our thesis that the com puterization of the officer pro- lives. Our national defense structure is integrated motion and assignment activities will provide the by a com puter com plex beyond the im agination of fairest and therefore most truly impersonal system the laym an. T he Strategic Air Com m and com bat we can attain. This thesis, with supporting argu- crewman depends upon computer systems not only ments, will be organized around the principal for the accomplishment of his job but in fact for objections cited for com puterizing personnel m an- his very life. A recent innovation has brought the agement. It is intended not as a conclusive contri- com puter hom e to us in a most critical area, the bution but rather as a thought stim ulant and should paycheck. Air Force finance offices are rapidly raise far m ore questions than it answ ers. consolidating their activities and autom ating the paycheck-producing activity. the “too impersonal'’ objection W ith all this shifting from m anual to com puter .operations, it is surprising to see one area remain T he “im personal” objection to com puteriza- so com pletely and consciously m anual. T hat area tion of officer promotions centers around the posi- is personnel management. W e manage our ma- tion that there is no substitute for human judgment chines, our strategies, and even our money by com - and that only another officer, with considerably puter; but when it comes to our careers, we insist more experience than the one being evaluated, that the process remain manual. The argument can properly and equitably weigh the many factors m ost often heard in defense of this position is that necessary for so im portant a decision. T he real the com puter is too im personal, that people would question here is: W hat is judgment? There are many' resent having their destiny placed in the hands of definitions, of course, but they all essentially d e- a machine.1 The purpose of this article is to take scribe judgment as a process of reasoning, of 60 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW comparing one alternative against another, con- lacks degrees, can he really believe formal educa- sidering and weighing the identified criteria, so as tion is vital? If he is nonrated, can he esteem com- to reach a conclusion. Isn’t this, in effect, a con- bat crew experience above all else? If he was ditioned choice based upon experience? commissioned from afrotc or the aviation cadet If judgment really is a process of comparing program, can he consider Academy graduation a and weighing relevant factors, can’t a computer criterion? The three-man review system is cer- weigh many more factors than a man? There is tainly an effort to reduce these biases, but few practically no limit for the computer, but the man would argue that is does a perfect job. The com- sitting on a promotion board certainly is limited puter is immune to bias. in his capacity. He can only consider those factors Even if one conceded a perfect job of elimi- he thinks of as he picks up each folder. As the nating biases and establishing a perfectly homo- number of folders mounts, it should be apparent geneous set of criteria, couldn’t the fatigue factor that a narrowing process takes place until he gives alone preclude equal consideration? For example, actual consideration to only a few factors. At the the 36-man board that recently completed the fy same time his colleagues are also narrowing the 64 temporary majors selections was reported to span of their consideration, but each settles on a have reviewed the folders of over 24,000 officers.2 different set of factors. Which is the fairer system: After the board was broken into twelve 3-man all contestants computer-compared according to groups, each man reviewed over 2000 folders. Is the same criteria, or the remote chance that this it physically possible for a reviewer to be the same process will be duplicated by a three-man group? man, with the same dedication to fairness, on folder The significant question to ask of the “too number 2000 as he was on folder number one? And impersonal" proponent is, What is so magic about if he isn’t exactly the same man, haven’t we intro- human consideration? Does it guarantee or even duced another factor into the considerations: In imply fairness? When compared with automated what order did one’s folder happen to fall? The consideration, just the reverse occurs. If unfairness Air Force makes every effort possible to reduce the could enter the evaluation, it could do so only impact of this factor, but can it be eliminated com- through human consideration. The computer has pletely? The answer is yes, by computerizing the no biases, personal or professional. It can consider process. only what it is told to consider and apply only the Perhaps an argument even more supportive relative weights it is told to apply. These criteria to the thesis here advanced is one centering about are the ones the Air Force would identify as most the intended role of the Officer Effectiveness Re- supportive to its requirements. If they seem to be port (oer).3 The current oer structure is obviously unfair to some group, e.g., those with too little intended to personalize the performance-evalua- formal education or without combat crew experi- tion process as much as possible. This is apparent ence, that group is aware of its deficiency and must from the policy of having an officer evaluated by make the choice of remaining or leaving the or- the two supervisors (rater and indorser) who work ganization. If their departure hurts the Air Force, most closely with him. They know him best and then the Air Force must reconsider its criteria. more personally than anyone else in the hierarchy, Fairness is thus properly oriented to the organiza- and so they complete the oer. But what happens tion rather than the individual. then? Someone else, who has never known the offi- Under the present system, what assurance cer, the rater, or the indorser, must attempt to in- does the candidate have that he was actually con- terpose his judgment of what the raters meant as sidered on the basis of criteria he believes the Air compared with what all other raters meant. Force esteems? Promotion board chairmen make Doesn’t this rather substantially shift the locus of every effort to achieve a common ground among responsibility for meaningful performance evalua- board members, but how successful can they be? tion away from “those who know him best to When each member retires to the privacy of his “those who don’t know him at all ? On the other own thoughts, lie cannot suddenly cleanse himself hand, if the process were automated the total per- of biases which have evolved from years of experi- formance-evaluation process would shift back to ence, no matter how conscientiously he tries. If he the rater and indorser. Their evaluation would h* THE COMPUTER USE OF HUMAN BEINGS 61

the sole input for this key portion of the overall each board or each time Air Force requirements promotion-selection process. Again, only through changed. There is serious question as to how fast computerization can we achieve a truly impersonal the manual system can change. It is one thing for system. personnel staffers to brief the board members con- cerning the desired weighting of criteria, but it is quite another thing for them to change a long the “criteria weighting” objection adopted sense of values. For example, in the 1950’s when the Air Force gave strong support to formal One of the objections against automating the education as a significant promotion criterion, did process stems from the fact that the Air Force tried all of the subsequent promotion board members and abandoned a system of assigning points for really accept this as a vital criterion? Can we expect correspondingly weighted criteria. A similar sys- senior officers who did not have the opportunity for tem would of course be necessary with a computer formal education to suddenly change their views? process. When the point system was rejected, the Could they stop reasoning that since they made it process was shifted to a “whole man” concept. to the top without education, so also could others? Under this system, the board member examines the In the final analysis, the “flexibility” issue is entire file and awards a single composite score. really a sterile argument. If changes in Air Force In the final analysis, however, this does not effect requirements dictate criterion changes, those [any real change. What process does the board changes must be communicated to the board. Such member actually go through when he makes this changes could just as easily, and far more effec- examination? Doesn’t he very quickly, though un- tively, be communicated to a computer. iconsciously, set up his own little informal weight- One of the experiments that usaf Personnel ing system by which he reaches his composite staffers have already conducted is the mechanical score? And if he does, which is the fairer system, simulation of a promotion board’s actions. To do one in which candidates are compared against as this, the computer men carefully observed each imany weighting systems as there are reviewers, step in the review process, noting the factors con- or one in which all candidates are compared against sidered and the weights assigned. This information ;:he same criteria with the same weights? And what was then fed to the computer, and it was asked to if some of the board members are influenced by perform the same process. The idea, of course, was criteria contrary to Air Force personnel require- that if a large enough sample could be studied, ments? Will this system elevate the kind of skills eventually the computer would be taught all the he organization needs? Why leave so vital a need relevant factors and therefore do the job. The proc- 0 chance? ess was apparently rejected because the machine This argument breaks down when one realizes did not produce exactly the same selections as did hat what we are now doing singly we could do the board, although they were very close. The •ollectively more effectively. We now brief board implication was that the computer could not be nembers on the kinds of factors the Air Force taught perfectly and any imperfection—or devia- leeds and hope that each will use these as the tion really—would be unfair to those not selected. >asis for his evaluation. Why couldn’t the function The real question is, Which list was the more cor- f future promotion boards be to evaluate all the rect? Isn’t it entirely possible that the human board possible criteria, compare them with Air Force was wrong, with wrongness defined as the degree jeeds, select the most significant, and assign the of deviation from the established criteria? Maybe ppropriate weights?—leaving the rest of the proc- the computer choices adhered more closely and ss to computers. In such a system the board’s task were to that extent fairer. Perhaps the experiment «'ould be just as vital as it is now. It would require serves as proof ol the “human frailty” arguments. ie same depth and breadth of experience on the This issue could be tested, of course, by select- art of board members. ing and carefully weighting a number of criteria, This automated process would be even more thoroughly briefing the board members, letting the exible than the current system because the board and the computer make the selections, and 1 eighted criteria could in fact be changed for then evaluating the deviations. Careful analysis of 62 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW the results should locate and measure the devia- search study conducted by the author.4 In that tions from the weighted criteria. study a statistically significant sample of officers representing every major command was asked to computer potential in officer assignments compare their career progress with that specified as desirable for their rank in Air Force Regulation Besides the promotion system, the other major 36-23. Some 60 per cent of the respondents, second personnel management function of greatest inter- lieutenant through lieutenant colonel, reported that est to most of us is the assignment process. The they had not received the desirable rotation. The thesis advanced here is that computerizing this reason would seem to be that there are simply too process is even more beneficial to the officer and many variables for the staffer to give proper con- the Air Force than conversion of the promotion sideration to them all. The solution would seem to system to computers. Many of the objections and be: automate the process and eliminate the human counterarguments would closely parallel those pre- limitation now apparent. viously advanced. For example, it is argued that computerizing the assignment process is too im- personal and human consideration is preferred. T he central thesis advanced here is that if the Again the real question is, What is actually taking officer promotion and assignment processes were place in this process? Obviously it is a matching automated, great benefits would accrue to both the process by which the myriad weighted details of individual and the Air Force. The principal objec- Air Force requirements are matched against the tion to such a proposal seems to center around the details of qualifications, preferences, equity, etc. “too impersonal” nature of such a procedure. The How can it be argued that a human being can ac- argument advanced here is that an automated sys- tually consider the relevant detail that the com- tem would provide a substantially fairer—yet truly puter can? And if he cannot, who is the loser? The and wisely impersonal—system than could ever be answer—both parties to the transaction. achieved with the manual human process. If the assignment system were automated, the There is some evidence that usaf Personnel key function of usaf Personnel staffers would be staffers would support the thesis advanced here but the selection and weighting of criteria. This func- are reluctant to install such a system out of concern tion is obviously the most important in the process for the impact upon officer morale.5 Certainly this and is also a continuous one if changing require- is indicated by the shift toward central control of ments are to be met. the two systems. Though I have no affiliation or Consider for a moment the kinds of factors experience with usaf Personnel activities, it is ap- which could be considered from the officer’s stand- parent that some degree of automation is already point. Obviously a more refined system of express- being incorporated into these systems, particularly ing the officer’s personal preference could be de- the assignment process. veloped, weighted as usaf felt appropriate, and The purpose of this article has been to stimu- incorporated into every selection. Such facts as late the thinking of all its readers regarding this last assignment, foreign service vulnerability, rota- question. Hopefully, it will encourage inputs from tion between isolated and desirable locations, pref- many people: from computer people regarding the erences as to location, progress made toward career technical feasibility of my proposal, rebutting ar- development (i.e., command-staff or rated-nonrated guments from dissenters, practical considerations rotation), and so on ad infinitum. Evidence that from those engaged in the two processes, and others consideration of career development through job who share an interest. If we can achieve such a rotation has not been incorporated into the majority debate, we will be doing our fellow officers at the of assignments was amply demonstrated in a re- Pentagon (or Randolph) a great service. United States Air Force Academy Notes 1. For a summary of the "impersonal” argument see Colo- this argument. . . .. , _ , , , nel Lonnie E. Martin, " ‘Instant’ Personnel Management,” Air 4. Robert L. Able, "An Analysis of the Use of Selected University Review, XIV, 4 (September-October 1963), 56-63. Methods of Executive Development in the U.S. Air Force 2. Air Force Times, 26 February 1964, p. 10. (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation. Graduate School, University at 3. The author is indebted to his colleague. Captain Orin C. Kentucky, 1962), Patton of the Air Force Academy faculty, for the key points of 5. Martin, op. cit., p. 58. THE CONSTITUTIONAL BASIS OF THE UNITED STATES AIR FORCE

D r . Maurer Maurer

N A desperate effort to prevent establishment of the United States Air Force in 1947, opponents of an I autonomous air service resorted to the Constitution of the United States. Arguments based on strategic, tactical, and administrative considerations had been exhausted in the organizational controversy that had been going on for more than three decades. Now Congress was considering legislation that would separate the Army Air Forces from the Army and create an independent United States Air Force equal to the Army and Navy in a unified military establish- ment.1 This bill not only pleased the airmen but also had the approval of the War and Navy Departments and the support of the President. But there were a few die-hard opponents who tried to prevent the passage of the National Security Act of 1947 by labeling the bill “unconstitutional.” The Preamble to the Constitution states that one of the reasons for establishing the Government of the United States was to “provide for the common defense.” Toward this end, Section 8 of Article I says: The Congress shall have power To lay and collect taxes ... to pay the debts and provide for the common defense and general welfare of the United States; . . . 64 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

To declare war . . . Admiral told a committee of the House of To raise and support armies . . . Representatives that the necessity or desir- To provide and maintain a navy. ability of establishing the United States Air To make rules for the government and Force was immaterial. The question, he said, regulation of the land and naval forces. . . . was “whether or not there is any basis in law And or any power of Congress to enact legislation To make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the fore- creating a separate military department.” Con- going powers . . . fessing a “limited knowledge of constitutional law,” Zaeharias asserted that the powers be- Elsewhere, in Article II, Section 2, the Presi- stowed upon Congress by the Constitution are dent is designated “Commander-in-Chief of “precise and specific.” He found “nothing in the Army and Navy.” the Constitution . . . which will permit the The Constitution thus speaks of an army creation of an entirely new military establish- and a navy, of land and naval forces, but ment outside the present constitutionally au- nowhere does it mention an air force. It does thorized Army and Navy.” Nor could he find not say that Congress shall have power to any “provision for a commander-in-chief of create one, or that the President shall command an air force as there is specifically provided any such force. Therefore, opponents of air for the Army and Navy.” This did not mean force autonomy maintained, there is no con- that air power could not be used, but to be stitutional sanction for an independent air constitutional, the Admiral maintained, the service. air forces of the Nation must be “integral Advocates of air force independence had parts of the Army and Navy.”3 to admit that the Constitution does not ex- When Representative W. Sterling Cole pressly provide for an air force. But they in- (R ., N .Y.) testified before the committee, he sisted that Congress has authority to create took the same line and borrowed some of the one and make it a separate branch of the mili- Admiral’s words. Advocating retention of the tary establishment. The power is there—not air force within the War Department, Cole specifically stated but implied from various said this was “the only method sanctioned by other powers. the Constitution.” He pointed out, however, The argument, then, was really over the that the Constitution could be amended to way in which the Constitution is to be inter- provide for an independent air force and to preted. Is it to be construed strictly or loosely? make the President its commander in chief. The question is as old as the Nation itself. Without such an amendment the bill before From the very beginning the people of the Congress was, in Cole’s opinion, clearly un- United States have lined up on one side or constitutional.' Cole may have realized that the other, invoking the supreme law of the he was fighting a lost battle. At any rate, when land to support or oppose policies and pro- he took the floor of the House to express his grams of the national Covernment. There has “conviction that the creation of a separate de- been no permanent alignment, however, for partment of air and a separate air force as a people have never hesitated to switch from part of the Military Establishment is without one position to the other as issues have authority under the Constitution,” he did not changed.- attempt to present any argument in support In the matter of air force independence, of his views/’ Rear Admiral Ellis M. Zaeharias, usn (Re- R ep resen tativ e M elvin P rice ( D ., 111.) re- tired), was one of the persons who gave the jected Cole’s narrow interpretation of the Con- Constitution a narrow interpretation. Reading stitution. The bill, Price said, “seeks to give us the proposed National Security Act of 1947, an Air Force worthy to employ the great air he found “many sections . . . which violate the power that we have developed. He would not spirit and letter of the Constitution and make blame the framers of the Constitution tor it inadvisable to pass this legislation.” The lack of prophetic vision, but he felt that later CONSTITUTIONAL BASIS OF THE USAF 65

generations should not be penalized because poses the ability to wage it successfully, and as the Founding Fathers did not have enough a consequence this requires the exercise by foresight to make specific provision for an air Congress of its war powers in time of peace force when they wrote the Constitution in to the extent that Congress deems it necessary 1787.° to provide for . . . the common defense.” To Representative J. Edgar Chenoweth (R., postpone preparations until after a declaration Colo.), who wanted it known that he favored of war “would lead to most grave conse- a powerful air force, was not sure that Con- quences.” Therefore, O’Keefe maintained, the gress was doing the right thing in setting up war power must be interpreted to cover what- an independent air service. W ithout specific- ever actions Congress may deem necessary in authorization by the Constitution, he said, ap- order for the Nation to be prepared." propriations for the United States Air Force True, the Constitution does not state that might not be legal. W hen Carl Spaatz, Com- Congress shall have authority to create an air manding General of the Army Air Forces, ap- force, but neither does it contain specific pro- peared before the House committee, Cheno- visions for establishing a national bank or weth asked him if his attorneys had looked constructing Wilson Dam. Yet, as O’Keefe into the constitutional question. The four-star pointed out, these and many other actions not General replied that in the opinion of his specifically provided tor by the Constitution Judge Advocate the bill was constitutional had been sustained by the Supreme Court and Congress could legally appropriate money through a broad interpretation of the Con- (for a separate air force/ stitution.1-' Justice Joseph Story had explained Spaatz's answer was based upon a lengthy that the Founding Fathers, being unable to memorandum prepared bv Colonel Desmond anticipate all the exigencies of the future, had O’Keefe, the Air Judge Advocate.' As might be left the legislature free “to adopt its own means expected, O Keefe had no doubts about the to effectuate legitimate objects and to mould significance of air power, which, he said, was and model the exercise of its power as its own ‘utilized by practically every country in the wisdom and the public interest should re- .vorld as a most potent offensive and defen- q u ire.",:; Urging a broad interpretation of the sive weapon, as formidable in itself as any powers relating to the creation ol military ground army.” He was sure that the power to forces, the Air Judge Advocate quoted a mem- ,-reate an air force to employ this w eapon must orable passage from Chief Justice John Mar- ;xist somewhere within the framework of gov- shall’s decision in McCulloch c. Maryland: ernment. It did not reside with the states be- "Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the -ause the Constitution says that without the scope of the Constitution, and all means which ■onsent of Congress no state may keep troops are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to >r warships in time of peace or engage in war that end, which are not prohibited, but consist inless the state has been invaded or is in im- with the letter and spirit of the Constitution, minent danger o f being invaded.1' O’Keefe are constitutional. 1 oncluded, therefore, that whatever authority One of the legitimate functions of the nay exist for the establishment of an air force national Government is the common defense, mist belong to the Federal Government. The as the Constitution says in its Preamble. Jgical place to seek such authority is, of O Keefe noted, however, that congressional ourse, in the so-called “war powers.” authority for the creation of an independent . It was not necessary to discuss the extent air force cannot be based on this common de- f these powers in time of war because, the fense clause because, as the Supreme Court iir Judge Advocate said, “No one disputes has held, the Preamble does not confer any lat during an emergency they are practically power on any department of the Government. nlimited. But the question at hand con- However, as Story said in commenting on the emed legislation in peacetime. The Colonel Preamble, “No one can doubt that this does nind that the power "to declare war presup- not enlarge the powers of Congress to pass any 66 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

measure which they deem useful for the com- Security Act of 1947 might not have been mon defense.” Further, the Supreme Court raised because “armed forces” could easily be has held that the Constitution is not to be in- interpreted to include an air force. Instead terpreted in a manner that would defeat its they mentioned an army and a navy as the avowed objectives.15 only instruments they knew in an age when No specific grant of power is required to wars were fought on land and sea.lu As enable Congress to provide for the defense of O’Keefe pointed out, “at the time of the adop- the Nation because defense is an inherent re- tion of the Constitution, an ‘air force’ was un- sponsibility of the government of a sovereign known, and, therefore, could not have been nation.1'5 Instead Section 8 of Article I of the expressly included as such.” He was sure, Constitution makes provisions for declaring however, that the “clear intent and purpose” war and for raising, maintaining, and govern- of the Founding Fathers “was to vest complete ing the forces required for defense. The first power in Congress over the national armed clause of that section supplies the financial forces,” and that the names applied to these means for defense by authorizing Congress to forces are of no significance. In the Constitu- lay and collect taxes for that purpose. tion the Air Judge Advocate found “equally Clause 1 of Section 8 is often misread by as much authority for an Air Force as . . . for skipping over the words about taxes, thus an air component of the land forces converting the clause into a specific authoriza- Thus the Air Judge Advocate defended tion for Congress to provide for the common the National Security Act of 1947 against the defense.17 Admiral Zacharias evidently real- attack that had been launched by opponents of ized that, m isconstrued in this way and an autonomous air force. The House did not coupled with the later clause authorizing Con- rally to Cole’s cry of “unconstitutional”; the gress to make all laws necessary and proper Senate considered it unnecessary to argue the for carrying out the other powers, Clause 1 of constitutional question. Having cleared Con- Section 8 could be used to support the legality gress, the act was signed by President Harry of the National Security Act of 1947. Civing S Truman on 26 July 1947. That same day the Clause 1 its generally accepted interpretation, President prescribed the functions of the three the Admiral explained that this “related to the services in an executive order which contained raising and expenditures of money” for defense. an interesting reflection of the Constitution’s But he went on to assert that this clause does silence on the subject of an air force. In state not give Congress power “to provide physically papers of this kind the President had tradition- for the elements having the duty of defense of ally been styled “Commander in Chief of the United States.”1'" Colonel O’Keefe read the Army and Navy.” Now he became “Com- Clause 1 in the same way as the Admiral but mander in Chief of the Armed Forces.”20 arrived at a different conclusion, thereby sup- About six months later, on 19 January plying an answer to Representative Cheno- 1948, Representative Claude I. Bakewell (R-. weth’s question concerning the legality of ap- Mo.) introduced a joint resolution to amend propriations for the United States Air Force: the Constitution to give Congress specific “As a necessary attribute to the present day power to create and maintain an air force and common defense of this nation Congress, both make rules for its government, and to desig- in peace and war, has the undoubted power nate the President its commander in chief.- to authorize the expenditure of money for the Bakewell’s objective was to remove any doubt means of carrying on aerial warfare and may that might exist concerning the constitutional- create whatever ‘agency’ or ‘instrumentality’ it ity of the new United States Air Force. W. deems best suited and expedient to perform Stuart Symington, who had become the first this function.” Secretary of the Air Force, thought that Bake- If the Founding Fathers had spoken in well’s proposal might have the opposite efiect, terms of “armed forces,” the question con- that it might jeopardize procurement of ma- cerning the constitutionality of the National teriel by raising a question as to the legality a CONSTITUTIONAL BASIS OF THE USAF 67

ppropriations for Air Force operations. After had moved for dismissal because of lack of ymington made known his concern, Bakewell jurisdiction. The court could not agree with id not press for action. The resolution was counsel’s contention that, “since the Air Force ever reported out of the Committee on the is not an Army, is not a land or naval force, idiciary, and consequently Congress never therefore there is no provision in the United oted on it.22 States Constitution for the Air Force.” After The question of the constitutionality of the motion had been overruled, the prosecu- le Air Force came up again in 1950 during tion offered in evidence a paper authenticated le trial of an Air Force private by the name by the seal of the Department of the Air Force. F Ingle, who was accused of being absent Defense counsel objected: “it purports to be •ithout leave and of escaping from the guard- an official document of an unconstitutional Duse. When the court-martial was convened agency.” The objection was overruled. Other : MacDill Air Force Base, defense entered a papers bearing the seal were presented. Each ;otion for dismissal on the ground that the time defense objected and each time he was )urt lacked jurisdiction. Contending that overruled. The Board of Review quickly dis- ongress has power to make rules and regu- posed of the motion and the objections by cit- tions for the government of only land and ing its finding in the Ingle case.2'1 ival forces, defense argued that to try this The following year a lieutenant, Naar, ise in a court appointed by an Air Force com- asked the District Court for the District of ander would violate that part of the Fifth Columbia to prohibit the Air Force from mendment which says that “No person shall bringing him to trial at Bolling Air Force . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, Base.27 The lieutenant’s attorney maintained ithout due process of law.” The motion hav- that trial by court-martial for larceny would ';g been denied, the private was tried, found be a violation of the Fifth Amendment, which pilty, and sentenced. The record eventually states: “No person shall be held to answer for tent to the Air Force Board of Review, which a capital or other infamous crime unless on a refully considered the motion that had chal- presentment or indictment of a grand jury, ex- nged the jurisdiction of the court-martial.23 cept in cases arising in the land or naval forces Noting the Supreme Court’s decision that . . . ” Counsel for the accused argued that, since tilitary law is due process” so far as persons the United States Air Force is neither a land i the military or naval service” are con- nor a naval force, the exception to the Fifth med,24 the board reasoned that if Congress Amendment does not apply to members of the .s power to create the Air Force it must also Air Force. By using the approach taken by the five power to bring Air Force personnel under Board of Review in /ng/e, the District Court military law in order to maintain order and could have considered the broader question of (scipline in the service.23 Consequently the the constitutionality of the Air Force. With ap- tajor issue, the board believed, was “whether peals, the question might eventually have been te Congress had authority to create the Air answered by the Supreme Court. The District hrce within the military in the first place.” Court, however, found that the lieutenant had idying heavily on Colonel O’Keefe’s memo- failed to “state a cause of action upon which indum of 1947, the board held that the relief may be granted.” The judge therefore liited States Air Force is the legitimate sister denied the application for a restraining order c the Army and Navy. and dismissed the complaint. No appeal of t . Later the same year the board received a this decision was taken.29 cse in which the constitutionality of the Air The District Court had, in effect, upheld hrce had been challenged directly. In this the constitutionality of the United States Air tance a private named Bainbridge had been Force. The arguments that had been advanced (irged with desertion and had been convicted in 1947 by opponents of a separate air force, a court-martial at Lackland Air Force Base. and later by military personnel seeking a way i the outset of the trial, counsel for the defense to avoid punishment for offenses with which 68 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

they had been charged, had been countered so Air Force has not reappeared in Congress or effectively and decisively that since 1951 the before any court, civil or military.-9 question of the legality of the United States Aerospace Studies Institute

Notes 18. Hearings, 491-92. 1. National Security Act of 1947, 61 Stat. 495. 19. It may be noted, however, that Benjamin Franklin, 2. If an example is required, one might mention Thomas who was a member of the Constitutional Convention, had wit- Jefferson, who was a strict constructionist when he was opposing nessed the balloon experiments that J.A.C. Charles and Joseph Hamilton’s plan for a national bank in 1791 but who shifted to Montgolfier had conducted in France in 1783 and had immedi- a broader interpretation when he was trying to justify his own ately seen the possibility of using such instruments in warfare. action in purchasing Louisiana in 1803. (Franklin to Ingenhousz, 16 Jan. 1784, in John Bigelow [ed.], 3. House of Representatives, Committee on Expenditures The Works of Beniamin Franklin [New York: Federal Edition, in the Executive Departments, Hearings ... on H.R. 2319, 1904], X, 266-69.) Before the Convention met in 1787, other 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (Washington: USGPO, 1947), 491-92, Americans, including Washington, Jefferson, and Francis Hop- hereafter cited as Hearings. At Headquarters Army Air Forces, kinson, had shown an interest in balloons. (Jeremiah Milbank, the Office of Legislative Services dismissed Zacharias’ testimony Jr., The First Century of Flight in America [Princeton: Princeton with the following comment: “As to the lack of constitutional University Press, 1943], 4-23.) The fact remains, however, that authority for an independent Air Force, an examination of the many years were to elapse before air power would acquire any enumerated powers of Congress will indicate that such power great significance in warfare. exists in the Congress to establish and provide for the armed 20. Executive Order 9877, 26 July 1947. forces and separation of Air and Ground is merely a compart- 21. H. J. Res. 298, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. (1948); 94 Cong. mentization.” Rec., 322; cf. Edward S. Corwin, The Constitution and What It 4. Hearings, 672-73. Means Today (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1958), 71. 5. 93 Cong. Rec., 9420 (1947). 22. Bakewell to Maurer, 19 Oct. 1959. As Professor Cor- 6. Ibid., 9422. win has suggested, Congress evidently believed that the Consti- 7. Hearings, 340-41. tution already provided sufficient authority for the creation of 8. Memorandum for Director, Plans and Operations Divi- the Air Force and that consequently no amendment was re- sion, War Department General Staff, by Col. Desmond O’Keefe, quired. (Corwin, The Constitution and W hat It Means Today, The Air Judge Advocate, 10 April 1947. All subsequent O’Keefe 71; Corwin, The Constitution . . . Analysis and Interpretation, quotations and references are from the Memorandum. 284.) 9. Art. 1, Sec. 10, Cl. 3. 23. ACM 2631, Ingle, 3 CMR (AF) 353 (1950). 10. O’Keefe quoted United States v. Stephens, 245 Fed. 24. Reaves v. Ainsworth, 219 U.S. 296, 304 (1911). 956, 960 ( 1917 ), affirmed in 247 U.S. 504 (1918), and United 25. The Board quoted John Paul Jones O’Brien, A Treatise States v. Tarble, 13 Wall. 297. 408 (1872 i. on American Military Law (1846), 25, and cited Kahn v. Ander- 11. O’Keefe quoted Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Au- son, 255 U.S. 1 (1921). thority, 297 U.S. 288, 326, 327 (1936). 26. ACM 3191, Bainbridge, 4 CMR (AF) 102 (1950); 12. O’Keefe quoted or cited a number of cases, including also see ACM 2771, Austfn, 4 CMR (AF) 978 (1950). the following: Legal Tender Cases. 12 Wall. 457 (1871), Mc- 27. The question whether military courts are acting within Culloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316 (1819); Ashwander v. their special and limited jurisdiction may be inquired into by Tennessee Valley Authority, supra. Federal courts. 13. Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 1 Wheat. 304, 326 (1816). 28. Naar v. Lee, Civil Action No. 2061-51 (D.D.C., 1951). 14. 4 Wheat. 316, 421 (1819). The word “consist” ap- When the lieutenant was brought to trial at Bolling Air Force pears in the original report; in O ’Keefe’s Memorandum, as in Base, his attorney asked for dismissal on essentially the same numerous secondary sources, this is changed to “consistent.” grounds that the case had been taken to the District Court. The 15. United States v. Boyer, 85 Fed. 425, 430 (1898), quot- motion was rejected and became a matter for consideration by ing Stors', Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States the Board of Review, which found that the principles of con- (1833), Sec. 462. struction set forth in Ingle were also applicable in this case. 16. Penhallosv v. Doane, 3 Dali. 54 (1795); United States (ACM 4215, Naar, 2 CMR 739 [1951].) v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 315 (1936); cf., 29. The writer has been unable to find any reference to Alexander Hamilton in The Federalist, No. 23 (1787). O’Keefe, this subject in published congressional documents or any case however, did not consider the origins of the war posver. mentioned in any of the court reports. This does not necessarily 17. See, for example, Cole’s testimony in Hearings, 672. mean, of course, that the question is dead and will never be For interpretation of this clause, see Edward S. Corwin (ed.). revived. In fact, the first draft of this article was written in 1959 The Constitution of the United States of America, Analysis and as the result of a querv from an Air University student who had Interpretation, Sen. Doc. 170, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (Washington: some doubts about the legality of the President s serving as USGPO, 1953), 112-13. commander in chief of the Air Force. FLEXIBLE RESPONSE vs. DETERMINED Ret a l iat ion

I^Iajor Gen er a l Dale 0. Smith , USAF, Ret.

T MAY SEEM that I am beating a dead horse counter moves with superior force at places of our I by even mentioning the term “massive retalia- own selection. Now suppose our ranch, the Bar E, ion.” It has been discredited, butchered, and has a serious grievance against a neighboring uried by its detractors, and the seemingly more spread, the Lazy C. The Lazy C has been using easonable new terms “graduated deterrence” and some of our pastureland and polluting our water flexible response” have been substituted in its supply. We have tried negotiations and threats, lace. But if one tries to avoid the bias and emo- but to no avail. It is time for us to act. ion associated with “massive retaliation,” it might In following a “determined retaliation” policy, ist possibly represent a philosophy of persuasion we move in and take over the Lazy C reservoir and rhich is the direct opposite from that of the “flexi- divert it to our own use, making it clear that we le esponse.” To purge ourselves of the bias will remain there in force until the Lazy C gets off >und in a discredited term, let us talk instead of our pastureland. determined retaliation.” It happened that the Lazy C reservoir was un- Next, let us begin with a homely example in protected and it was easy to take. Once there we der to examine and compare these two philoso- found ourselves in a strong defensive position; it hies of persuasion free from the emotion which would be hard to dislodge us by force. Besides, we light be generated by relating them to war and have moved in several full-time guards. Now we > nuclear weapons. Let us consider a Western can sit tight. No one has been killed, our action was inge conflict common to the last century and to swift, determined, and decisive. The next move is lodem fiction. up to the Lazy C. Determined retaliation means simply to make Suppose, however, we followed the other 70 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW policy of “flexible response.” The philosophy be- the feud, and we would probably fail economically, hind this style of persuasion is that when the time regardless of our superior strength. Our aim should comes to act we act very cautiously at the point of be to persuade the Lazy C owners as soon as pos- contact and that we gradually increase our pres- sible with as little conflict as possible. Which strat- sure until the other side gives in. In this way it is egy would most likely do this? hoped we shall never use more force than is neces- The first situation of “determined retaliation” sary to achieve our ends, while the chances of the puts us in a favorable tactical position at the Lazy Lazy C overreacting and increasing the intensity C reservoir and takes advantage of our superior of the conflict (escalating) are reduced. So we send strength. If the Lazy C accepts the challenge we an unarmed cowhand out to the disputed pasture- present, the range will burst into a rather large- land and instruct him to drive off the Lazy C cattle. scale war (not necessarily nuclear), which we wish The likely response of the Lazy C ranch is to to avoid. However, if the Lazy C people are well send a man with a gun and drive off our cowhand. aware of our superior strength and wealth, and if Our superior strength and wealth will avail us our demands do not threaten their existence or little in this event simply because we attempted a prestige, then only madness would lead the Lazy half-hearted measure. In fact, the Lazy C people C to pursue the fight. will no doubt figure we re scared to take adequate Three conditions can be met by following a action. Similarly, we ourselves lose some self- policy of “determined retaliation.” First, our move confidence by this rebuff. must be in force—nothing half-hearted—which So next time we, too, send a man with a gun. demonstrates our superior strength and our con- The Lazy C people respond with two men with fidence in that superiority. Second, we must not two guns. Stepping up our response in a graduated threaten the existence of our enemy, for then he manner, we retaliate with three men and order will fight to the end. Instead we must make it them this time to shoot. The Lazy C men fire back abundantly clear that we wish him simply to get with four guns. We have encouraged escalation to off our land. Third, we must not threaten his pres- limited war. tige. In fact, by moving back from the Lazy C Still our superior strength has not helped us reservoir, in exchange for his getting off our pas- resolve the conflict. We are playing the game by tureland, we have allowed him to save face. the rules established by the Lazy C, and in per- How are these three criteria for effective per- mitting them the initiative, we are letting them suasion met for the other situation in which we raise our ante on each exchange. employed a “flexible response”? First, our true Eventually, of course, the flexible response strength was not demonstrated. If the Lazy C had tactics could give us victory, hut in the meantime been aware of our superiority, our graduated ac- there will have been a long-drawn-out small war tions would have led them to believe that we didn t with a rising tide of hate on each side. Many people have the will to use our strength. Second, we did on both sides will have been killed. We might even not threaten their existence so this criterion was settle for a truce, considering the expense involved adequately met. But third, we did, by prolonging in this graduated range war. In which case the the conflict, threaten their prestige. The longer the weaker ranch would win the contest. shooting goes on, the greater the emotional com- Now the question is, which kind of strategy mitment. Prestige becomes a vital issue and there will better persuade the Lazy C to pull back from is no obvious quid pro quo to pave the way for an our pastureland? It can be assumed that either honorable retreat. strategy will work if pursued to its ultimate end From this analysis it would appear that two simply because we have the greater strength and of the criteria for successful persuasion, those of wealth. But there are other considerations. awareness of superior strength and preservation of First, we do not want this minor altercation the opponent’s prestige (the “golden bridge tew to escalate into a feud which would cause all Bar retreat” suggested by the ancient Romans), are not E and all Lazy C folk to be at each other’s throats served as well by the “flexible response strategy incessantly. Ranching would take second place to as by the “determined retaliation strategy.

*

Operations in Viet

AIRLIFT IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

Colonel Thomas B. Kennedy

N TH ESE days of highly sophisticated modem geared to data punch control of the flow of cargo I weapon systems operating in supersonic en- and personnel. In Viet Nam, however, the airlift vironment, computerized control of personnel and job rests on the strong wings and landing gear of equipment, and an expanding aerospace effort the somewhat ancient C-123, with backup support directed toward the use of the most complicated from the appropriately manned CV-2A Caribou of systems yet known to military man, there is a con- the U.S. Army. The airlift mission also depends on tradiction that exists in terms of the places where the willing, dedicated people using imagination, the U.S. Air Force today is actually engaged in or initiative, and physical effort to accomplish tasks supporting combat operations. that are vital to the conduct of all military opera- In Southeast Asia, particularly Viet Nam, the tions in Viet Nam. environment, the operating conditions, the nature Much has been written and said about thei of the conflict itself, the terrain, the weather, the environment of Viet Nam, its effect on military facilities—all dictate that the historical knowledge operations and hence on the requirements for par- of operations in less complicated environment be ticular types of equipment to solve problems pe-j brought to bear to cope with the situation. culiar to this environment. Environment here is Today man is talking in terms of mach 3 for usually spoken of in terms of jungle canopy 200j transport aircraft of the future, and our forces are to 300 feet high, the marshy delta lands covered geared to aircraft such as the C-135, C-141 (soon by rain during much of the year, the plateau area) to be operational), and the C-130 as the primary of central Viet Nam with its highlands, and thei airlift element of U.S. Air. Force commands rugged mountains in the northern part of \ iet throughout the world. Modern terminals are being Nam. All these make up the geographical environ- built with mechanized cargo-handling systems ment. AIR OPERATIONS IN VIET NAM 73

However, the environment that makes airlift came into its own and did the job for which it was so vital to the conduct of operations is the under- designed. Capable of operating into 1500-foot un- developed state of transportation in this area. With improved strips at gross weights of approximately the very limited road and railroad network that 54,000 pounds and hauling up to 12,000 pounds, exists in this part of the world, any significant depending upon fuel requirements, it became the movement of equipment and supplies is basically backbone of all future airlift operations in South- a job for the airplane. The French had long recog- east Asia. Rugged, relatively easy to maintain, and nized this, and over the years they built numerous possessing a high degree of reliability, it proved small airstrips throughout Viet Nam to support itself capable of living up to its name, “The Pro- their plantation type of economy. These airstrips, vider.” designed for light aircraft to move small cargo But airlift is more than just aircraft and crews. loads and small groups of people basic to a planta- Airlift is a system. It consists of the trained aircrew, tion economy, are serving a vital purpose today an appropriate aircraft, the people who maintain and form the basis of the network of airports used that aircraft, the organization that controls load- in moving equipment and troops throughout Viet ing and unloading of aircraft throughout the sys- Nam. tem, and a control mechanism that ties all these It was recognition of the necessity for logistics elements together and makes the system responsive and tactical airlift support that established the Air to the requirement of the user. Force approach to building an airlift capability in As it became ev ident that this airlift effort Southeast Asia. This capability had to be respon- would increase, the resources available to the air sive to and appropriate for the environment that force component commander were increased. An exists. As the U.S. national policy evolved, which aerial port function was established. A centralized indicated an obvious buildup in U.S. support to control system, including the necessary communi- the government of the Republic of Viet Nam, one cations, was devised. This control system was )f the first things that military planners recognized linked as an inherent part of the Air Operations is a requirement was the need for improving both Center ( aoc) to the rest of the tactical air the capacity and the quality of airlift support for operations being conducted in Viet Nam, to pro- Southeast Asia. This led to the early introduction, vide an integrated air effort under the control of in January' of 1962, of the first squadron of C-123’s the air force component commander. As time lesignated as “Mule Train.” This squadron, de- progressed it became evident that this was a long- coyed on toy from Pope afb. North Carolina, haul job. The war would not be won in a relatively farmed the nucleus of the buildup that was to short period of time, so units that had been put in fallow. Southeast Asia to perform these airlift functions on The unit was injected into a truly rustic situa- a tdy basis were gradually phased into a pcs-type ion. Parking and maintenance facilities did not unit. By July 1963 the prime Air Force airlift ele- ?xist. No control organization for either the ship- ment was put on a firm footing which permitted per or the operator was available, little or no com- orderly inputs of trained personnel on a pc s basis nunications were functioning, and airfield informa- and the establishment of necessary support chan- ion was at a premium. Aircraft and other parts nels for logistics basic to any sustained operation. ,vere limited in numbers. Equipment, facilities, and The evolution of this unit followed classic Overall vehicle transportation were unbelievably pattern: cincpacaf has assigned to him the 315th critical. Air Division with headquarters at Tachikawa, Here, perhaps, a little ought to be said about Japan. This unit is responsible for providing intra- he C-123 and its capabilities to perform the kinds theater airlift to the theater commander, cincpac, >f missions that need to be performed in Viet Nam. charged with operations throughout all of the Far iVhile old and relatively obsolete in terms of mod- East, has available to him through the air force >m aircraft, it was designed specifically for assault component commander this centralized-control air- lirlift. Operating in an environment where many lift system. >f the airports are unimproved dirt strips 2000 feet This pattern was followed in setting up the >r less in length, the C-123 for the first time really airlift system in Southeast Asia. Here the elements 74 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW were assigned to the 315th Air Division but were the airlift sorties flown in any month are considered assigned under the operational control of the air tactical, and because of the fluid nature of the con- force component commander in Viet Nam. This flict in Viet Nam almost all sorties are exposed to component commander is responsible for providing potential enemy fire whether they be of a logistics, to the Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Com- training, or tactical nature. mand, Vietnam ( comusmacv) airlift responsive to The operational environment in whi£h the the needs of the users in Viet Nam. The U,S. Air airlift elements function is probably the reason for Force airlift organization in Viet Nam is the 315th describing airlift activity in Viet Nam as different Troop Carrier Group comprised of three squadrons from any previous airlift operations which U.S. of C-123’s and the 8th Aerial Port Squadron. These forces have conducted. In Viet Nam today there elements are tied together through the communica- are approximately 176 airfields, fewer than 15 of tions system basic to an air operations center and which have control tower facilities. The rest are, in a tactical air control system. The airlift control ele- essence, uncontrolled airfields where the final de- ment known as Transport Movement Control termination as to wind direction and velocity and (tmc) is located in the Air Operations Center and the condition and security of the runway must be uses the communications of the Tactical Air Con- made by the aircrew, by correlating the best intelli- trol System (tacs) to perform its central control gence information that can be provided and actual function. visual observations over the airfield. In addition to As in any joint operation, the air force alone, the airfields that must be serviced, there are numer- of course, does not make the determination as to ous drop zones where outlying elements are resup- what or who moves on its aircraft. Instead it is plied by air. But numbers alone do not describe necessary to control the use of airlift through some the whole story. It is the nature and condition in central board or mechanism which determines rela- which these airfields exist and in which these drop tive priority of the requirements for airlift to pre- zones are found that make the airlift task difficult. vent its abuse and to ensure that the airlift effort Many of the runways arc less than 2000 feet long, is applied to the highest relative priority, depend- and only a very few have hard surface. They are ing upon the tactical situation. In South Viet Nam located in jungle terrain, in mountains, and in the this priority control function is monitored by flat delta country where approaches from any direc- comusmacv and is exercised on a combined basis tion expose the aircraft to a sustained period of with the Vietnamese forces through a Combined vulnerability to ground fire. j Movement Allocations Board (cmab). The cmab The pace of the operation also is unusual and is responsible for determining allocations of airlift has a definite bearing on the functioning of the on a bulk basis to the various users based on the system. On an average day approximately 100 air- capability of the airlift system and the relative lift sorties of various kinds are flown. Around urgency of each user’s requirements. 10,000 tons of cargo and personnel are airlifted In general, the airlift system must be re- every month. The 8th Aerial Port Squadron, han- sponsible for satisfying requirements in four main dling not only the in-country terminal function but categories and in four relative priorities. The first also the intertheater terminal function, processes category, of course, is emergency tactical airlift. and handles some 13,000 tons of cargo and people The second category is preplanned tactical airlift. per month. These terminal functions are not per- The third is on-call or emergency logistics airlift, formed under conditions which equate to terminals and the fourth is routine logistics. The categories at Travis or McGuire or any modern Air Force in- and priorities are easily understood, but the rela- stallation. They are performed from hangars or tive amount of effort devoted to these categories is open storage on difficult surfaces, including pierced unusual when compared to classic airlift operations steel planking ( psp), dirt, laterite, and in a few in the past. During Korea, for example, the number cases hard surface. This all compounds the problem of tactical airlift operations conducted was relative- of expeditious loading and safety in loading. ly small as compared to the total airlift effort, the Historically also in large-scale operations, vari- bulk of the Korean airlift being logistical in nature. ous types of transport aircraft have been used to In Viet Nam, by contrast, as high as 30 per cent of perform specialized functions. Here in ^ iet Nairn AIR OPERATIONS IN VIET NAM 75

the C-123 is called upon to perform all these func- life—Strategic Air Command B-47 anti ii-52 crews, tions and several others that have not been per- Air Defense Command C-121 crews, Air Training formed by transport aircraft in the past. In addition Command T-29 crews, and Military Air Transport to providing normal logistic support throughout Service C-124, C-133, and C-135 crews. Crews [the country on a routine basis, the airlift system is were trained at Pope afb and sent to Viet Nam responsible for providing in-country medical air with a sound background in the aircraft but rela- evacuation, airdrop resupply to Special Forces ele- tively little actual experience in the type of opera- ments throughout the country, and airdrop of tions basic to the environment. Consequently, it troops. Many of these missions take on hazardous was necessary to establish extensive time-phased ispects and require the highest degree of profes- orientation and training programs to build the ex- sional pilot skills to counter the hazards not only perience level of the aircrews in the environment ;rom enemy ground fire but also from the terrain in which they were flying. The crews responded ind weather or a combination of all three. remarkably, and rapidly assumed the highest de- As the unit evolved from tdy status of highly gree of professional ability, individual resourceful- rained troop-carrier assault-oriented aircrews to ness, and a dedication to getting the job done that >cs units, it was obviously necessary to train crews was basic to the successful accomplishment of the hat had not previously been trained in troop- mission. carrier operations to perform the missions required In the aerial port area also people were taken n Southeast Asia. The crews selected to perform from all walks of life because the Air Force did he operation on a pc s basis came from all walks of not have a base of resources large enough to pro-

Tan Son Nhut Air Base near Saigon, Viet Nam. has progressed since its tent days of 1962. A C-123 is loaded by forklift under truck lights at Eighth Aerial Port Squadron, Tan Son Nhut AB, to permit take-off at first light. vide a rotation of highly qualified and skilled Perhaps a discussion of one day’s operation, people in this particular job skill. Supply personnel which may or may not be typical, would clearly were given the job of becoming experts in the air illustrate the operation of the system and the vari- freight business in a relatively short period of time. ous kinds of missions that might be flown on a Here, again, by comprehensive training programs given day. it was possible, because of the ability and dedica- First let us look at the overall posture of the tion of the individuals, to form a highly professional forces on any given day. The hub of the activity organization with a remarkable esprit de corps and is at Tan Son Nhut Air Base. Here two squadrons a degree of imagination and ingenuity unusual any of C-123’s are based. Another squadron is located place in the world. The locally developed traffic- at Da Nang. Elements of these squadrons are de- handling systems are an outstanding tribute to ployed to Nha Trang in support of Special Force) American “can do” spirit. For example, by use of and to Bangkok, Thailand, for the intra-Thailand simple skate-type rollers and homemade pallets, 78 airlift mission in support of the U.S. forces de- aircraft landed, offloaded, and were airborne with ployed in that part of Southeast Asia. Aerial ports an average touchdown-to-takeoff time of 11 min- are operating in Can Tho, \ ung Taw Tan So™ utes—on a dirt runway in mountainous terrain. Nhut, Bien Hoa, Nha Trang, Qui Nhon. Pleiku, and ARVN troops unload hags of rice from a C-123 at Cam-Due for resupply of a strategic hamlet.

At the jungle airstrip of Aloui, Vietnamese troops prepare to utdoad pierced steel planking. 78 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

Da Nang in Viet Nam and at Bangkok. Each morn- by fighter aircraft, and fighter rendezvous point ing at 1030 there is a meeting of the Transport must be established. After picking up its fighter Movement Control, Maintenance, and Aerial Port escort, the C-123 flies to the target area and clearly personnel to determine the next day’s activities. identifies the drop zone by smoke signals from the The maintenance status is weighed against the Special Forces on the ground before beginning the operational commitments and workload, the ter- airdrop. Multiple passes at the drop zones are minal backlog is measured, special airlift requests made necessary by the size of the drop zones, the are evaluated, and of course any tactical operations kinds of loads, and the volume limits on delivery are considered in the planning session. At this time capability of the C-123. agreement is reached on the number of airplanes The drop zones, frequently located in moun- that will be furnished and the various categories or tainous terrain and sometimes almost like a box priorities of airlift in response to the requirements. canyon, require that the pilot do a little of the Flight orders are then published, fighter escort and old-fashioned seat-of-the-pants type of flying. In rendezvous are called for, and helicopter support some extreme cases, the pilot has approximately for any operations that may require air rescue cov- three seconds to start his turn after delivering a erage is arranged for with the Vietnamese Air load before he finds himself boxed into a position Force. As the day progresses and changes to re- from which he would not be able to maneuver quirements are received, based upon priority of himself. After completing his series of airdrops, he effort, the morning’s planning session is the basis returns to his home station, gets reloaded, and per- for decisions made as to commitment of forces for haps for his afternoon mission delivers a load of the next day’s operation. Special Forces supplies, airlanding them on a re- Since most operations are conducted during mote jungle strip. daylight hours because of the environment, take- Many of these strips have to be seen to be off times and routings of aircraft are established believed—1500 to 2000 feet in length, in mountain- so that they can depart and return to their home ous terrain surrounded by jungle with trees as high station during daylight hours or at least leave the as 200 feet. These dirt and laterite strips tax a last remote air base toward home station prior to pilot’s ability and the performance limitations of darkness. the aircraft to an unusual degree. These departures and arrivals have to be inte- Back at Tan Son Nhut an emergency require- grated with weather, the ability of airfields to ment has come in to deliver ammunition to troops absorb a particular flow of aircraft, and the timing engaged in conflict down in the delta. Alert air- of other tactical air operations that affect the avail- craft are maintained in constant readiness with ability of escort fighters. Terminal cargo loads are crews to perform emergency missions. Whether it preplanned, and loading starts at midnight. Air- be the delivery of elements of the airborne brigade, crews arrive from 0430 on, depending upon their referred to as the fire brigade, air evacuation, or planned departure time. They are briefed on the the airdrop or airlanding of supplies, the alert air- weather and the intelligence situation, draw craft are geared to be responsive to the wide variety weapons, and flight-plan their mission for the day. of airlift tasks that can be imposed. Logistics flights take off early in the morning Meanwhile throughout all of Viet Nam other from Tan Son Nhut and Da Nang for the day’s C-123’s are being loaded and dispatched on the delivery of rations and munitions. At Nha Trang, many preplanned and on-call missions that are Special Forces personnel have loaded the airdrop basic to this continually changing situation. resupplies for Special Forces units in the mountain- Throughout the day it is necessary to divert and ous and jungle terrain. These supplies consist of reroute aircraft through the centrally controlled ammunition, rations, barbed wire, and in general system to satisfy requirements that have generated all kinds of essentials that make living in the jungle since the previous morning’s planning conference. possible. These aircraft normally fly two sorties a This is done almost routinely bv the controllers on day, turning around as soon, as the first sortie is duty in the transport movement control section, j completed to deliver another load at a different If an aircraft breaks down anywhere in the drop zone. Here again these missions are escorted system, maintenance teams must be dispatched. An airstrip that formerly served an old French plantation near Minh Thang is surrounded by rubber trees 200 feet high. Only 35 feet of the width of the strip can bear the load.

On approach for landing at a remote airstrip, logistics plane has dropped a smoke bomb to indicate by color the type of load it carries and to help indicate wind direction. securing an airfield for a specific period of time periodof time aspecific for airfield an securing involve assuch problems but frequently ported and should the logistics aircraft to fail onarrive aircraft and should the logistics while the aircraft is on the ground. The ground is The ground. on the aircraft the while in not onlydelivery Delays affect as planned. ered deliv- be can the sosupplies and equipment that difficulties of mechanical care to take provided be must aircraft Substitute nightfall. out before craft such as Bien Hoa, Tan Son Nhut, Nha Trang, Da Da Son Nha such Nhut, as Hoa, Tan Trang, Bien the logistics posturethe unit of iswhatever sup- being air- the toget to attempt area, to aremote perhaps load and unload the in-country airlift elements and elements airlift in-country the unload and load the perimeter of the airfield for a limited period, period, alimited for airfield the of perimeter the sionaircraft performing intertheater airlift at bases are also handling all the forces must go out and secure the approaches and approaches the gomust out secure and forces time, this time, work would have for been nought. rr Nang, or Bangkok. Meanwhile the aerial ports are continuing to continuing portsare aerial the Meanwhile What I have just described may be considered be may described just have I What Vietnamese paratroopers drop from C-123's into small clearing in Viet Cong-infested area. in Cong-infested Viet clearing C-123's into small from drop paratroopers Vietnamese ats t ma and 315th Air Divi- 315th and craft are quickly recalled, and the alert aircraft aircraft alert andthe recalled, quickly are craft must respond, all force resources airlift are the mission. tactical aninemergency of support gade of an bri- airborne battalion selected the airdrop to maynecessary daysit be typical these of one pilot passengersbriefs aC-123 who of inVietnam- constantly changing The nature of the situation in Since this is the highest-priority mission tois which this highest-priority the Since all this,besides in midstBut the day. of atypical standing by ongroundthe immediatelyare recon- to this applied Air-type of activity. immediately hours after first notification that the the mission firstthat may notification hours after bear to solve the varying problems. varying the solve to bear aircraft and those that are recalled tothe perform recalled are that those and aircraft achieved by the centralized control resources and the by centralized achieved is And environment responsiveness. this responsive- for and briefing time the little leaves This occur. missionistwo within formation a such for time Language difficulties must he surmounted by the co- the by surmounted he must difficulties Language operators, and the controllers will be brought controllers tothe and operators, the personnel, aerial port the maintenance aircrews, of the professionalism the and ingenuity the which in operation pressure-packed phased, arapidly be problems and the the weather, mechanical levied, requirements emergency the performed, must be indifferent terms of the kinds of missions that figured for airdrop mission, as are the day’s asthe mission,are sparefigured airdrop for adequate communications systems and the dedica- the andsystems communications adequate is location It can mostonly geographical critical. be operations. airborne ese take-off before for Cam-Due fromBien Hoa tunity for preplanning. Frequently the take-off Frequently for preplanning. tunity mission. tion and professionalism of all the people involved. task and whatever to whatever geared nessmust be of normally expected coordination fine, detailed faced. But it can be guaranteed that each day day will each that guaranteed be it can But faced. These missions run are oppor- with very little These The key to effective airlift operations airlift in key to this effective The It can be anticipated that that day each anticipated It can be will be A/J

\

Vietnamese Rangers and Army personnel waiting to board C-123 on diii strip in Mekong Delta area for transfer to another camp site

Viet Nam requires that new techniques, improved integrated into the system and an additional C-123 , methods, be continually introduced. There is no squadron and Army Caribou company are being resting on our laurels. Although the laurels re- deployed to cope with the increasing requirements. ceived have been well deserved in the past and But regardless of forces committed or the extent' will be in the future, they will come from the of the operation, it is axiomatic that airlift forces ability to adapt and respond to whatever variety must operate in the framework of a system estab- of tasks can be imposed. lished-even if under the most difficult environment To illustrate this point: With the increasing —to control the total effort constantly so as to apply, tempo of activity, an Australian airlift unit has been it to priority tasks. Hq Pacific Air Forcei PARATROOP TRAINING, ARVN

Ever?' month the Republic of Viet Nani Army (ARVN) conducts the final practice drop of its airborne troop training. These troops are trained in the vicinity of Vung Tav, about JO miles south of Saigon. The training division for the paratroopers is part of the LOOth Airborne Division, ARVN. The drop zone is about 10 miles from Vung Tav. The troops are dropped fully combat loaded. When they hit the ground they are deployed nto their field problem, which takes two weeks to complete. They are then redeployed :o a different airborne division, and from there they go into combat. C-123’s of the J15th Troop Carrier Group, 2d Air Division, Tan Son Nhut AB, furnish the airlift.

Three C-123’s of the 315th Troop Carrier Group flying over the coastal city of Vung Tav, Republic of Viet Nam, en route to the Vung Tav drop area. Vung Tav is located on the South China Sea in the Mekong Delta area of Viet Nam. Combat-loaded paratroopers in C-123

Approaching the Vung Tav drop zone. Vung Tav Bay, a part of the China Sea, is in the background behind delta marshland. Ready for the jump The C-123’s unload over the delta area drop zone.

Postgraduate combat operational troops jump into Viet Cong-infested jungle clearing or over wide-open rice country of the Mekong Delta with its water-drenched paddies. • •

Air Force Review

GROUND ELECTRONICS ENGINEERING AND INSTALLATION

Colonel Charles U. B rombach

N THE summer of 1958, almost six years prior until in 1963 it reached a dramatic 5800—still with I to Project ic e (Increased Combat Effective- the same basic resources as existed in 1959. ness), the Ground Electronics Engineering-Instal- Although significant savings in men, money, lation Agency (ceela) was bom and assigned to the and materiel have been realized, economy was not Air Force Logistics Command (aflc), at that time the prime factor behind the usaf decision to form the Air Materiel Command (amc). One of the cri- ceeia. Actually, top usaf officials were faced with teria laid down by the Pentagon framers of the the obvious need to “shore up” the installation- ceeia constitution ( afr 20-17) was that ceeia engineering of ground electronics. During the would be mission oriented. It would not be self- formative years of the new Air Force—late Forties sufficient and thereby duplicate services already and early Fifties—this work, which had formerly available. It would rely on support such as Civil been accomplished by the Army Signal Corps, was Service processing, fiscal accounting, and data delegated to many low-level activities in almost jrocessing from the “host” of any base it occupied, all of the major air commands. All in all, there were rhis early frugal environment influenced the de- some 24 activities engaged in the business of en- velopment of ceeia into a “lean,” fast-on-its-feet gineering and installing ground electronics equip- organization. For example, ceeia has approxi- ment. As a consequence there were technical and mately 1300 vehicles—cable plows, ditchers, trucks schedule incompatibilities and inefficient communi- —but not one sedan or station wagon. When geeia cations-electronics (c -e ) facilities. Coordination was founded there were approximately 5700 per- channels were lengthy and cumbersome. It was sons assigned. Its budget (P437 funds) was $50 only natural that each activity looked out for its million, and 2400 jobs were accomplished. During own interests and attempted to “corner” the lim- :he next few years the personnel strength remained ited available resources—trained personnel and c-E roughly the same, as did the allotted funds, while equipment—without regard to the relative priorities the number of job completions steadily increased involved. This competition for resources resulted, 88 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW many times, in their being applied to low-priority the bmew s and other Air Defense sensors was use- use at the expense of high-priority needs in an- less unless it could be flashed rearward for evalua- other command. tion and decision-making. The resulting action Probably the most severe effect was that by commands again had to be sent instantaneously to 1958, although we were in the jet age and fast combat elements. For, as General Power once said, approaching the space age, we could not provide, in effect, “Without communications I don’t com- in a timely fashion, the modem c -e facilities needed mand or control anything except my desk.” for our global and fast-changing operations. Mod- During the late Fifties the United States Air em strategic bombing, nuclear weapon, and mis- Force faced up to the difficulties it was encounter- sile concepts dictated centralized decision-making ing in its attempt to provide these critical com- and control of our dispersed forces. Strategic and munications-electronics facilities. It realized also tactical intelligence had to be communicated to the greatly expanding quantity and complexity of command and control centers in Washington, c -e requirements. It therefore decided it needed Omaha, and Colorado Springs. Data were continu- a worldwide organization that would be a reposi- ous and voluminous and had to be relayed quickly tory of organic technical know-how and installa- and accurately. After being analyzed, resultant de- tion engineering capability. Thus ceeia was born cisions had to be transmitted, in some cases to indi- and, along with it, afr 20-17, which delineates vidual bombers flying over the arctic or desert near the mission and responsibilities of geeia . Simply the perimeter of the free world. Intelligence from stated, the mission is to “manage the implementa-

GEEIA personnel dismantle and re- move Texas Tower radar equipment. H-19 simplifies installation of tactical air navigation antenna.

tion of the usaf Ground Communications-Elec- States Air Force. There are fourteen squadrons, tronies Program as it pertains to engineering and five region headquarters, and a command head- installation.” This one sentence involves so many quarters located as shown on the accompanying things that it would be almost impossible to name chart from T. O. 31-1-8. Flexibility is a keynote an Air Force operation or activity with which of this organization, which routinely sends engi- ceeia does not in some way become involved. neers and installation teams across region borders Some of the major responsibilities of ceeia are to to meet the peak workloads of a Berlin crisis, an —develop and publish technical standards Alaskan earthquake, a Cuban “buildup,” a Guam —provide technical assistance to Air Force com- typhoon, or a Viet Nam operation. nands to develop c -e requirements and state these A sampling of the communications-eleetronics •equirements in what are known as c -e Implemen- jobs that ceeia is involved with discloses such proj- ation Plans (ceip’s ) ects as: —engineer and install ground c -e facilities (1) Installation of radars and associated com- —control and manage c -e materiel resources munications in the vast Air Defense Command leeded to accomplish installation of c -e facilities complex. —accomplish systems implementation testing, (2) Multimillion-dollar “hook-up” of the ic bm nd test and acceptance of facilities and systems sites as part of the Site Activation Task Forces ostalled (sa t a f). Just one ic bm wing includes up to 150 —prepare base telephone development plans and sites and as much as 2100 miles of missile control :eep them current and communications cable, which has a reliability —train a reserve force of seventeen Air National requirement of 99.9 per cent. >uard squadrons for use during national emergen- (3) Communications for the Atlantic Missile ies or wartime Range, the John F. Kennedy Space Center, and • —participate, as required, in the Military Assist- nasa’s Merritt Island Launch Area. nce Program. (4) Administrative communications, long-haul ceeia does all these things with approximately and on-base, including Autovon and Autodin. 100 military and civilian personnel (including geeia also contracts and negotiates with commer- fobile Depot Activity) deployed around the free cial telephone companies for many stateside com- r'orld, responsive to all the needs of the United munications facilities. Worldwide regional boundaries of Ground Electronics Engineering-Installation Agency

(5) Navigational aids such as ground-controlled pated by this reorganization. Overhead will be re- approach ( cca), tactical air navigation ( tacan), duced and productivity increased by this consoli- control towers, and instrument landing systems. dation of similar specialists and their test and tool (6) Meteorological facilities such as weather equipment. radars and ceilometers. (7) Closed-circuit color tv for Pentagon and T he rapid operational deployment of interconti- other command centers and educational tv systems. nental ballistic missiles demanded a fast-reacting, (8) Strategic and tactical communications such flexible, professional c -e organization such as as tropo and microwave systems, from Thule, geeia . What the next technological breakthrough Greenland, to Turkey and southeast Asia. will be is difficult to forecast, but whatever it is (9) Under radio-interference and hazards- there will certainly be an even greater requirement reduetion responsibility, lectures and workshops for communications-electronics—that is to say, com- whereby geel a indoctrinates local radio and tv mand and control. As costs continue to rise with repairmen in the methods of correcting interference each succeeding weapon system, the need for cost from new high-power radars. consciousness becomes more acute, geeia , with it; (10) Tropospheric path-loss measuring, using hard core of engineering and technical know-how highly specialized equipment and teams. and its mission-oriented, quick-reacting organiza Effective 1 July 1964 the function of on-site tion, provides the United States Air Force with t depot-level repair of ground electronics equipment professional force that is capable of fulfilling, a t : was incorporated in ceeia’s mission, and the associ- minimum cost, the emergency war and postww ated Mobile Depot Activity personnel and other needs of the United States Air Force. resources were transferred concurrently. This is another ic e move, since sizable savings are antici- Eastern GEEIA Region, Brooklet/ AFB, A l TECHNCIAL DATA MANAGEMENT

L ieu t en a n t Colonel Willlam O. R ennhack

CHRONIC problem plaguing the Air Force drastic inroads into the peripheries of the data A . for many years has been the generation of spectrum. Specifically, the group had two basic staggering amounts of data by contractors to as- objectives: to challenge the existing structure for suage our insatiable appetite. The lack of control acquiring data and to develop a standard author- over contractor-furnished data and reports has ized data list for uniform application to contracts. been a major concern to the Government. In the past, requirements for data were inter- While there is considerable evidence daily in spersed throughout the contract and referenced the newspapers and other media of the billions of documents. The first basic concept was to establish dollars expended to procure missiles, aerospace a data requirement form (dd 1423) to list all data vehicles, electronic components, and similar end- items. A clause in the contract states that the only item hardware, it is less obvious that the cost of data to be paid for will be listed on the 1423 not- data makes up 10 to 20 per cent of the average withstanding other statements to the contrary. This lardware contract. It has been estimated that close imposes a discipline upon the Air Force to analyze to $2.6 billion was spent in fy 64 by the Depart- the data and distinguish the essential from the nice- ment of Defense for data.® It is no wonder, then, to-have. Jiat a major emphasis has been placed by the Air The second basic concept was to consolidate Force on the management of this costly acquisition. all requirements for contractor data into one loose- For the past two years the Air Force Systems leaf binder. Specific discrete data items were of a Command, the organization charged with the re- standardized format. Only items contained in this sponsibility for procurement of all new system/ Authorized Data List (Vol. II of afsc/aflc Manual rrogram acquisitions, has spearheaded an exhaus- 310-1) can be listed on the dd Form 1423. These :ive effort to “get a handle” on the data problem. ironclad procedures forged the cornerstone of the This Herculean undertaking involved the restruc- new approach to data management. :uring of the entire process of buying data from The two basic objectives have been described contractors. In a concerted effort to ensure the as the min /ma x theory. The minimum essential eady availability of timely and accurate data at data would be listed on a dd Form 1423. These minimum cost, the Data Management Working would be selected from the maximum allowable Uroup was created within afsc. The group was data list. The policies and procedures for acquiring lirected to take a fresh new approach to data the minimum essential are published in Volume I management—to push back the horizons and make and the maximum allowable is published in Volume II of joint Systems/Logistics Command Manual m "Defense industries have an abhorrence for unnecessary 310-1. New Air Force Regulation 310-1 makes baper work. At the Monterey conference in May 1962 the Aero- fpace Industries recommended strong action to reduce the order- these policies mandatory for all users of contractor jins of data by the Air Force. The House Appropriations Cnm- data. •pittee annually has reminded the Department of Defense to buy hardware and not paper. It has been estimated that the number These new concepts of data management did mt hours expended annually to prepare reports has risen 400 per pent since the Korean War. not come easily. Their formulation required almost 92 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW two years of concentrated effort, about 75,000 man- The cost of unnecessary data is not our only hours and dogged determination to accomplish the concern. We are even more concerned about pro- following: viding our system program directors and their • Vested interests and parochial vision had teams with the proper information to make deci- to be sacrificed. sions. In order to control his program the director must plan ahead to get the necessary status reports, • Approximately 9000 documents had to financial progress reports, per t networks, and so be intensively reviewed. forth. If he encounters design deficiencies, over- • A logic flow chart showing milestones in expenditures, or schedule slippages, it is probable the life cycle of a new system had to be prepared. that his data are inadequate for management • Coordination between commands, divi- control. sions, staff, and industry had to be continuing and Steps taken to improve data management in- aggressive. clude the following: Positive direction from the Air Staff has been • All system program offices have data the key to successful implementation. The Data managers who are responsible to the director. Management and Advisory Committee of the Air Every data item requirement must be approved by Staff focuses attention on problems which affect the director. Data items must be justified by cost the major commands. The Air Force Logistics and estimates when available. These are the day-to-

Data Management Structure

Systems Commands have a Joint Data Manage- day procedures which force timely decisions for ment Review Board which makes revisions to the data management. Authorized Data List (Vol. II, 310-1). In addition, • Instead of buying engineeering drawings* data reviews are made by the data management to support all missions, we now order drawings officers of the Air Materiel Areas and the afsc Di- only when they are required to support a mission., visions. Each new contract is thoroughly screened • If we need a reprocurement package foi to ensure minimum essential data requirements. competitive purposes, we order it only on the items The establishment of data requirements should which have a reasonable chance of being procured be a joint Air Force/industry effort. Contractors competitively. The contractor must identify which are encouraged to establish data management items on the od Form 1423 are proprietary. Thi; control points. Whenever possible, contractors’ enhances the Air Force’s bargaining position earl) recommendations for substitution, consolidation, in the acquisition process. or elimination of data are requested when planning for or reviewing data requirements. General Schriever has stated that manage AIR FORCE REVIEW 93

Inent and not technology is the pacing factor of (2) It will save Government resources by elimi- |)ur progress. The reason we are insistent in our nating unnecessary storage and retrieval of data. Demands for better data management is that data (3) It will force timely decisions. landling is a common denominator for all our (4) It will free the decision-making process ither management techniques. We are on the from excess detail and masses of unwanted hreshold of entirely new disciplines in eonfigura- information. ion management, engineering management, and (5) It will eliminate burdensome reporting re- vstem program management. A long needed criti- quirements imposed on contractors. al evaluation is being made of our existing tech We are just beginning to reap measurable rder system. User needs are being analyzed, and benefits, but already the amounts of data have been le best method of presenting this information is greatly reduced. A savings of $36 million was re- eing determined. New manuals are being pre- ported in fv 1964. Our data managers report that ared in these areas as well as in the 310-1 data reviews and concentration on buying only the jries. minimum essential are now a way of life. In summary, the new approach to data man- Data constitute the nervous system of a pro- gement has attempted to take a fresh look at all gram. The most significant benefit of data man- le old data problems. The five main advantages of agement is our ability to have better data for lis approach can be stated as follows: decision-making by the system program director. (1) It will save system acquisition dollars. Hq Air Force Systems Command The Contributors

M ajor Gen er a l , H orace A. H anes (R.E., Illinois State Normal University) is Commander, 9th Aerospace Defense Division, ADC, Ent AFB, Colorado. After completing flying training in 1939 and receiving his regular commission in 1940, he served with the 18th Pursuit Group in Hawaii, with the Air Training Com- mand, and with the 312th Pursuit Squadron before being transferred to the First Fighter Group, Mediterranean Theater of Operations, in 1943. He com- manded the 71st Squadron and later served as group operations officer and deputy commanding officer. Other assignments have been as Commanding Officer, Fighter Station, Punta Gorda, Florida, 1944-46; Commander, 31st Fighter Group, Germany, to November 1947; Commanding Officer, 67th Tacti- cal Reconnaissance Group, March AFB, California, to 1949; Chief, Air Defense Division, Directorate of Requirements, Headquarters USAF, 1950-52; Directoi of Flight Test, Air Force Flight Test Center, Edwards AFB, California, 1953- 57; Commander, 58th Fighter Bomber Wing, Korea, 1957-58; Deputy Chief of Staff'Operations, Fifth Air Force, Japan, 1958-61; Deputy Chief of Staff/PlansJ Headquarters Air Defense Command, from 1961 until his present assignment in July 1964. General Hanes is a graduate of the Armed Forces Staff College and Air W ar College. He set the world’s first official supersonic speed record over the Mojave Desert on 20 August 1955, flying an F-100C Super Sabre at an| average speed of 822.135 mph. He was awarded the Thompson Trophy for his record runs at 40,000 feet and in 1956 received the Mackay Trophy.

L ie u t e n a n t Colonel Frederick R. R it z in c e r , J r ., USAF, C aptain Ellis G. Abo u d , USAF, MSC, (B.S.. Wake Fore^ MC, is Chief, Aeromedical Indoctrination Department, USAF College) is an instructor in Aviation Physiology, Aeromedicjj School of Aerospace Medicine, Aerospace Medical Division, Indoctrination Department, USAF School of Aerospace Medicine, ASFC, Brooks AFB, Texas. After graduation from the University Aerospace Medical Division, AFSC, Brooks AFB, Texas. During] of Illinois College of Medicine in 1948 and two years’ general World W ar II he served in the U.S. Army, South West Pacific practice, he entered the Air Force in 1952 and was assigned to Theater, 1943-45. He was recalled to active duty during the the 62d Tactical Hospital, Larson AFB, Washington. He com- Korean War, 1951-53. He attended the University of North pleted the Aviation Medical Examiners’ Course at Randolph AFB Carolina School of Medicine for two years and the University of’ in 1953, the Harvard School of Public Health in 1955, and the Michigan until he again entered on active duty in 1957. 19 Advanced Course in Aviation Medicine at Randolph in 1956. served as Physiological Training Officer at Carswell AFB unti He was Commander, Wiesbaden Air Base Dispensary, Hq his current assignment in 1959. USAFE, 1958-60, and Chief of Professional Division, Hq MATS, from 1960 until his present assignment in 1963.

D r . M aurer Maurf. r (Ph.D., Ohio State University) is Chief, Historical Studies Branch, USAF Historical Division, Aerospace Studies Institute. He was formerly a historian at Air Force Logistics Command and a member of the faculty of Wittenberg College. He edited Air Force Combat Units of World M nr II (196D and is the author of numerous monographs on Air Force history. He also has contributed articles to various journals, including Air University Review, Military Affairs, and the U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings. M ajor David I. C leland (M .S., University of Pittsburgh; Ph.D., Ohio State Univer- sity i is assistant head of the Systems Management Department and Assistant Professor Df Management. School of Engineering. Air Force Institute of Technology. He teaches nurses in Systems Management. Management Thought and Theory, and Corporation Finance. His several years of systems management experience in the Air Force Systems Command included duty as Program Manager for the KC-135B command post aircraft.

} r . R obebt F. Fvtrell (Ph.D.. Vanderbilt University) is Pro- essor of Military History. USAF Historical Division. Aerospace itudies Institute, Air University. He is also Professorial Lecturer h International .Affairs at the George Washington University >nter. Maxwell AFB. He is author of The United States Air •orce in Korea, 1950-1953 and was a contributor to The Army Ur Forces in World War II. Dr. Futrell has been a frequent con- ributor to the Air University Review and other military and listorical journals.

M ajor Gen er a l Dale O. S mith , USAF Retired. (USM.A; Ed.D., Stanford University) was last assigned as Air Force Member, Joint Strategic Survey Council, Joint Chiefs of Staff. During World War 11 he commanded the 384th Bombardment I ajoh Robert L. A bl e < Ph.D., University of Kentucky) is Group (B-17 i in the European Theater. After graduating from issociate Professor of Economics, Air Force Academy. He served the Air War College in 194S and receiving his doctorate in rith the Fifteenth .Air Force in Italy during World War II, flying 1931, he served on the Air War College faculty and in 1932 1-24’s, and in the Korean War. flying B -26’s. He has also served became Director of Education, Hq Air University. In 1954 he s a B-47 pilot in the Strategic Air Command. Most of the rest f his career has heen in education, including an AFROTC tour was assigned to the staff of the Operations Coordinating Board. During 1956 he was Chief, Policy Division, Plans Directorate, t the University of Kentucky. He has published several articles DCS O, Hq USAF, and in 1957 he was sent to Saudi Arabia as n management development and related topics, including one Chief. U.S. Military Training Mission, and Commander, 2d Air i the November-December 1964 issue of the Air University Division (USAFE). In 1958 he was assigned as Commander, lecicw. 313th Air Division, Okinawa, and in 1960 as Commander, 64th Air Division (ADC), Stewart AFB, N.Y. He was Special Assistant to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for Arms Control from 1961 until 1963. General Smith is the author of U.S. Military Doctrine 11955), and his articles have been published in numerous maga- zines and in Impact of Air Power edited by Eugene Ennne and The Wild Blue edited by John F. Loosbrock and Richard M. Skinner. General Smith retired 1 August 1964 and has since devoted his time to writing and consultant work.

C olonel Charles U. B homhai h (USMA; M.B.A., University of Chicago) is Com- mandrr. Eastern Region, Ground Electronics Engineering-Installation Agency (GEEIA), Brookley AFB. Alabama. Before World War II he served in the Signal Corps and was Signal Officer of the Hawaiian Air Depot at llickam Field on 7 December 1941. He later served as Communications Officer, 7th Air Force Service Command, and subse- quently as Signal Officer of Headquarters Army Air Forces, Pacific Ocean Area ' AAFPOAi, Postwar assignments have been as Chief of Communications Maintenance, Headquarters AFLC; Chief of Communications Maintenance Engineering, Head- quarters USAF; Chief of the Communications and Navigation Laboratory, Wright Field, and communications staff officer in Headquarters USAFE. Germany. In the summer of 1958 he was named the first commander of GEEIA. Prior to his present assignment he served for three and a half years ns Deputy Commander, GEEIA. Colonel Brombach is a graduate of the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, C olonel Thomas B. K ennedy (B.S., University of Mary- land) is Assistant for Requirements and Systems Programs, Headquarters PACAF. After completing flying training in 1943, he flew B-26 and B-24 missions in World War II. Shot down over France, he worked with the French Under- ground, ultimately returning to Italy with the help of British “A” Force personnel. Postwar assignments have been in the Air Training Command, 1945-46; with MATS (including the Berlin Airlift), 1947-51; as Director of Operations, 374th Troop Carrier Wing, FEAF, 1951-53; in the Directorate of Requirements, Hq USAF, 1954-58; as Chief of Programs and Policy, Hq MATS, 1959-61; and as Commander, 315th Troop Carrier Croup, Republic of Viet Nam, until his present assignment. Colonel Kennedy is a graduate of the Air Tac- tical School, Air Command and Staff College, and Air War College.

L ie u t e n a n t Colonel Wil l ia m O. R ennhack (B.S., Northwestern University; M.B.A., Air Force Institute of Technology) is Data Management Officer, Head- quarters Air Force Systems Command. He served overseas during both World War II and the Korean War. He was Director of Management Analysis, Headquarters Flying Training Air Force, 1955-58, and Division Chief, Guidance and Control Procurement Division, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, from 1959 until his present assignment in 1963. EDITORIAL STAFF

L ieu t en a n t Colonel Kenneth F. Gantz, USAF, Pli.D., Editor J ack H. Mooney, M.A., Managing Editor L ieu t en a n t Colonel Harmon H. Harper, U SA F, Chief, Acquisition Branch E dmund O. B arker, Financial and Administrative Manager J ohn A. W est c ot t , J r ., Art Director and Production Manager E nrique Gaston, Ph.D., Associate Editor, Spanish Language Edition W il l ia m J. De P aola, Illustrator Major Robert G. Spa r k ma n , USAF, M.A., Editorial Project Officer

ADVISERS

Colonel Glen W. Clark, Hq Air Defense Command Colonel Wil l ia m J. Mc Gin t y, Hq Air Force Systems Command Colonel Geor c e Schenkein, Hq Tactical Air Command Colonel Joseph A. S tuart, J r ., Hq Military Air Transport Service Lieu t en a n t Colonel Jack Rose, Hq United States Strike Command Lieu t en a n t Colonel James F. Sunderman, Hq Pacific Air Forces Harry A. Ha berer , Hq Air Force Logistics Command La V er ne E. Woods, Hq Air Force Cambridge Research Laboratories

ATTENTION

Air University Review is published to stimulate professional thought concerning aerospace doctrines, strategy, tactics, and related techniques. Its contents re­ flect the opinions of its authors or the investigations and conclusions of its edi­ tors and are not to be construed as carrying any official sanction of the Depart­ ment of the Air Force or of Air University. Informed contributions are welcomed.