Ephemerides Theologicae Lovanienses 92/1 (2016) 109-125. doi: 10.2143/ETL.92.1.3144373 © 2016 by Ephemerides Theologicae Lovanienses. All rights reserved.

Reason and Revelation according to

Annemarie C. Mayer KU Leuven

How does the human being know about the divine? What is the relation between revelation and reason, between and ? Does one exclude the other, or do both have a function with a common con- cern? Throughout the history of both, philosophy as well as theology, the question of how reason and revelation are related as ways of leading to the recognition of truth has always been discussed. In this contribution, I will concentrate on a specific period in the history of this question, the Middle Ages, and on a specific thinker, Ramon Llull. When Ramon Llull was born in Palma de in 1232, the island had recently been re-conquered by the Christians after some 300 years under Muslim dominion. (1208-1276) had successfully besieged Majorca and brought Christian officials, tradesmen, and land- lords onto the island. Among them was Llull’s father. The majority of the population were still Muslim farmers and craftsmen. Besides, there lived a small, but influential, since wealthy, group of Jews, and the Christian conquerors. Llull formed part of the first Christian generation born there. He, so to speak, imbibed the climate of religious plurality and witnessed the interrelatedness of religion, politics, and economics. Llull himself first started a career at the court managing the royal household. He was married and had two children. His spare time he devoted to writing poetry1. In 1263, by the way, the same year as the famous Barcelona ­ between the spokesman of the Jews, Moses ben Nachman, called , and the convert Paulus Christianus, Llull experienced a conversion. It mainly consisted of the decision to devote his future life to God by furthering a peaceful relationship between the three monothe- istic religions and converting the so-called “infidels”2. To achieve this, he decided to employ reason and strove to write – as he called it – the

1. All this we know from himself, because in 1311 he dictated a sort of autobiography, the so called Vita coaetanea, to a Carthusian monk in Paris. 2. unlike , who addresses the Muslims in his Summa contra gentiles merely as “gentiles”, Llull calls Muslims and Jews “infideles” in order to distinguish them on the one hand from the “fideles”, the Christians (see Raimundi Lulli Opera Latina [henceforth ROL], 1, ed. F. Stegmüller, , Maioricensis Schola Lullis- tica, 1959, p. 489), and on the other hand from the “gentiles” who neither believe in God nor in the resurrection (as in his Book of the Gentile and the Three Wise Men).

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“best book of the world to confute their errors”3. He studied Christian as well as Muslim theology and philosophy. He learned with an Arab slave, and also seems to have known some Hebrew. Being himself a lay- man he nonetheless founded a monastery where future missionary monks could learn Arabic and Hebrew4. Moreover he brought the in 1311 to decreeing that lectureships for these Oriental languages should be installed at several European universities5. To him it was of pivotal importance that the Christian missionaries should be understood. Llull ventured himself on a couple of missionary journeys to North Africa and, when he died at the age of 86, he had written more than 250 books. In what follows I will have a look at the “state of the art” of the relation between revelation and reason during the Middle Ages, highlighting ­especially the position of Thomas Aquinas. In a second step, I will com- pare Llull’s position to this “standard view” and focus on the differences in Llull’s approach. In a third step, I will trace how Llull strives to confute the accusation of being a “rationalist” in his Disputatio Fidei et Intellec- tus. In a fourth and last point, I will investigate how Llull’s particular approach is related to his inter-religious scope.

I. The State of the Art since the Middle Ages

Between the two extreme positions of fideism, on the one hand, and , on the other, a whole range of different models of relating reason and revelation is possible: reason neither has to be so stunned by the experience of the divine that it completely surrenders to revelation nor does it necessarily only have to believe what it understands. One of the classic definitions of revelation that was coined during and influential throughout the Middle Ages (and even beyond) can be found in the opening pages of Thomas Aquinas’ Summa Theologiae6. There Aquinas

3. Ramon Llull, Vita coaetanea 6, ed. H. Harada (ROL, 8; CCCM, 34), Turnhout, Brepols, 1980, pp. 259-309, esp. 275: “unum librum, meliorem de mundo, contra errores infidelium”. 4. In 1276, King James II allowed the foundation of the Miramar Monastery where 13 Franciscan friars were to study. See also the Papal Bull of acknowledgement by John XXI in: J.N. Hillgarth, Diplomatari lul·lià: Documents relatius a Ramon Llull i a la seva família, transl. L. Cifuentes (Col·lecció Blanquerna, 1), Barcelona, Universitat de Barce- lona; Palma de Mallorca, Universitat de les Illes Balears, 2001, pp. 39f. 5. Cf. Istituto per le scienze religiose (ed.), Conciliorum Oecumenicorum Decreta, vol. 2,1, ed. F. Lauritzen (CC), Turnhout, Brepols, 2013, pp. 359-469, esp. 379f. The council names the universities of , Paris, Bologna and , as well as the Roman Curia. 6. Cf. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae Iª q. 1 a. 1 co, in R. Busa (ed.), Thomae Aquinatis opera omnia, cum hypertextibus in CD-ROM, Milan, Editoria Elettronica Editel, 21996: “Unde necessarium fuit homini ad salutem, quod ei nota fierent quaedam per ­revelationem divinam, quae rationem humanam excedunt. Ad ea etiam quae de Deo ratione

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(†1274) states that, in addition to ordinary knowledge built upon human reason, having knowledge revealed by God is required for our salvation. Even though the human being is naturally directed to God, revelation is needed because God is beyond the grasp of reason. Although some truths about God can be discovered by reason alone, even here revelation serves a useful purpose. Only a few people have the time and skill to reach knowl- edge of God by reason. It would take them a very long time, and their conclusions might be mixed with human errors. Hence, sacred doctrine derives its principles not from any human knowledge but from divine truth. Aquinas’ definition of revelation is important because it concisely for- mulates the various elements in this concept. It comprises truths of reason and truths of faith. It shows the practical value of revelation as well as its logical necessity. It relates the realm of reason and faith by making one higher than the other without creating a conflict between the two. Finally, it assumes that sacred doctrine is to be found in the teachings of Scripture because the Bible, as the book revealed by God, is an authoritative source. This definition, however, by distinguishing so clearly between the two realms, the order of knowledge and that of faith, classifies revelation also as something that transcends the categories of ordinary thought. It takes into account that revelation might be transmitted by means of authoritative records the content of which cannot be verified by the believer. Thus philosophy can only prove certain principles while other principles can only be proven by revelation. The question therefore arises: can assent to an authoritative revelation be justified before the bar of reason? And the result is a tension between faith and reason that is particularly acute in Christianity, yet also exists to a certain extent in Judaism and Islam. In the First Vatican Council’s Constitution Dei Filius, this distinction made its way even into official Catholic teaching. This text of 1870 states in its second chapter that we can know certain things of God through the natural light of reason (i.e., that God exists, that he is all-powerful, that God is the cause of all things, that he is one, that he is simple, etc.)7. The great

humana investigari possunt, necessarium fuit hominem instrui revelatione divina. Quia veritas de Deo, per rationem investigata, a paucis, et per longum tempus, et cum admixtione multorum errorum, homini proveniret, a cuius tamen veritatis cognitione dependet tota hominis salus, quae in Deo est. Ut igitur salus hominibus et convenientius et certius prove- niat, necessarium fuit quod de divinis per divinam revelationem instruantur. Necessarium igitur fuit, praeter philosophicas disciplinas, quae per rationem investigantur, sacram ­doctrinam per revelationem haberi”. 7. Cf. Vaticanum I, Dei Filius, ch. 2, transl. N. Tanner, in N. Tanner – G. Alberigo (eds.), Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils, Washington, DC, Georgetown University Press, 1990, p. 806: “The same Holy mother Church holds and teaches that God, the source and end of all things, can be known with certainty from the consideration of created things, by the natural power of human reason: ever since the creation of the world, his invisible nature has been clearly perceived in the things that have been made. [13] 2. It was, however, pleas- ing to his wisdom and goodness to reveal himself and the eternal laws of his will to the human race by another, and that a supernatural, way”.

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that preceded the Judeo-Christian Revelation demonstrated many of the truths about God which are affirmed in Scripture, and are what Aquinas called praeambula fidei, the preambles of faith. Dei Filius continues, however, that there are truths about God and about ourselves that can only be known through God’s self-revelation, or rather, by God telling us (i.e., that God is a Trinity, that Christ is fully God and fully man, that we are destined to enjoy eternal life with him). Someone cannot intellectually construe these truths, which are the articles of faith, since they exceed human reason’s capacity and limitedness. The development of Catholic doctrine on revelation did not stop at this point (as is well known). Yet the result of this particular approach is: without revelation, nobody could conceive of God being a Trinity of persons that are fully distinct and yet completely one. Without revelation, nobody could con- ceive of Jesus Christ as being fully God and fully man.

II. ramon Llull’s “New” Old Ontology

With Ramon Llull, however, we need to forget all this. He simply refuses to establish any dichotomy between the order of reason and that of revelation. For him there is no competition between cognition reached by faith and cognition reached by reason. Rather than contradicting each other, reason and faith complement each other. Following the foot- steps of Augustine, and the Victorines, human ­reason constitutes for Llull the means by which God wants to support the faith of the human person. In this Llull may either be called anach- ronistic – and be accused of clinging to past theological concepts that reckon with the intelligibility of the traces of the divine attributes due to creation in a model of ascent and descent without paying any heed to Thomas Aquinas – or he may be called avant-garde – advancing to a posi- tion similar to that held by Hegel in regarding Christianity as the religion that by a dynamic and relational conception of being overcomes the oppo- sition between Infinite and finite, God and world, without nullifying this opposition8. Llull advocates the demonstrability of the major articles of faith, like the Trinity and the Incarnation. He is convinced that so called rationes necessariae, necessary reasons can be given for proving the existence of God. And together with God’s existence also his unity and infinity are

8. For Llull, this is possible thanks to the idea and reality of God made man. For him, therefore, the scope of creation is the incarnation rather than the scope of the incarnation salvation. The incarnation is not an emergency measure that God takes to save the created human being despite sin. The incarnation has always been part of the plan of the Creator in order to crown and perfect his creation by the incarnation of the Son. Cf. also Bonaventura and other Franciscan theologians like Rupert of Deutz and .

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demonstrable. Yet if God’s unity can be deduced by intellectual reasoning then God’s trinity has to be accessible to the human intellect too. In the Llibre de demostracions he writes:

If God had given to the understanding the possibility to understand God’s unity and hadn’t given to it also the possibility by which one could under- stand the Trinity […] it would follow that the unity of God matches the high quality of understanding whereas the trinity were against the quality of under- standing; and if this were the case, it would follow that the unity of God were contrary to the Trinity; and this is impossible9.

Since Llull openly proclaimed such an “intellectualist” position, he has been accused of rationalism – not least by the Dominican inquisitor Nicholas Eymeric (1320-1399) who influenced Pope Gregory XI to con- demn several of Llull’s works. Thus, in 1376 Llull’s Art was condemned by the pontifical court of Avignon and in 1390, by the University of Paris. Despite the sentence of absolution in 1416, the shadow of heterodoxy cast itself over Llull during the following centuries. Yet is Llull really advocating a heterodox approach? The ingredients, so to speak, of his concept consist of (1) the Anselmian concept of God as id quo maius cogitari nequit, that than which nothing greater can be conceived. This means that to God always the highest perfection has to be attributed, in the realm of being as well as in that of acting. Secondly, (2) it consists of the so called “dignities”, the divine attributes which serve as transcendental concepts of perfection that manifest themselves analogically in the Creator (in an absolute way) and in his creation (in a relative way). And thirdly, (3) it consists in the so called “correlatives” which stand for a more detailed understanding of the same divine attrib- utes with regard to principle, object and the connection of both that implies an intrinsic activity of each divine attribute. This will become clearer below. In Llull’s concept, a particular key role belongs to creation. It estab- lishes the world’s causal dependency from God. God is the sufficient ­reason for the world’s being the very way it is, because he has passed on to it his properties in a weaker form. This leads to an analogous rela- tion, which refers to a kind of ontological process of ascent and descent. Robert Pring-Mill illustratively asks: “Given this conception of the uni- verse as a Ladder of Being whose levels were wholly congruous with one another, if one but knew all that there was to be known about one level,

9. R. Llull, Llibre de demostracions I, 4 (Obra completa de Ramon Llull, 15), Palma de Mallorca, Comissió Editora Lulliana, 1930, p. 11: “E si Déus havia dada possibilitat a l’enteniment de entendre sa unitat e no li havia dada possibilitat per la qual pogués entendre trinitat […] seguir-s.ia que la unitat de Déu se convengués ab la nobilitat del enteniment e que la trinitat fos contrària a la nobilitat de l’enteniment; e si açò era enaixí, seguir-s.ia que la unitat de Déu fos contrària a la Trinitat; e açò és impossíbol”.

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could one not argue validly from that level to the other per analogiam?”10. Different levels of being correspond to different degrees of perfection. The divine characteristics manifest themselves at all levels of being to varying degrees. In his logical writings, Llull defines nine levels of existence (instrumental, elemental, vegetative, sensitive, imaginative, human being, heaven, angel, God)11. Therefore, for Llull all reality is relational and analogical. Llull can operate with a relation of similarity, since for him creation has a revelatory function. In it, in a mirrored form, the omnipresence of the divine perfection is reflected. This very point constitutes the peculiarity of Llull’s approach, for the Llullian relations investigate the (platonically understood) reality to fathom its ontological structures12. The divine attributes turn out to be at the same time principia essendi and cognoscendi. As a basic principle an analogy of all things applies; thus an ascent or descent to the different levels is possible. Depending on whether one focuses on the order of being or the order of knowing, the use of the metaphor “ascent” or “descent” is appropriate. If one emphasizes the alignment from top to bottom and advocates an ontolog- ical-metaphysical perspective which highlights the order of being13, this corresponds to the traditional position of Hugh of St. Victor (†1141) that the human mind descends to the visible by viewing the invisible14. The fact of creation undoubtedly refers to a causal relationship between God and the world which forms the basis for Llull’s so-called “exemplarism”15. Yet one can go even one step further, as Erhard-Wolfram Platzeck explains: “When good brings forth good, the generating good is not only causally connected with the good brought forth, but also united regarding its due to its goodness. In the concrete good the goodness appears,

10. R. Pring-Mill, The Analogical Structure of the Lullian Art, in S.M. Stern (ed.), and the Classical Tradition, Oxford – Columbia, SC, University of South Carolina Press, 1972, 315-326, p. 316. 11. Cf. R. Llull, , dist. I, ch. 1, n. 2, ed. C. Lohr, Darmstadt, Wissenschaft- liche Buchgesellschaft, 2002, p. 8. 12. Cf. A. Bonner, Ramon Llull: Relació, acció, combinatoria i lògica moderna, in Studia Lulliana 34 (1994) 51-74, p. 65. 13. Cf. E. Colomer, El ascenso a Dios en el pensamiento de Ramón Llull, in P. Wilpert (ed.), Die Metaphysik im Mittelalter: Ihr Ursprung und ihre Bedeutung: Vorträge des II. Internationalen Kongresses für Mittelalterliche Philosophie, Köln, 31. August – 6. Sept. 1961 (Miscellanea Mediaevalia, 2), Berlin, de Gruyter, 1963, pp. 582-588, p. 582: “El movimiento de este pensamiento va más bien de arriba a abajo, que no de abajo a arriba; es decir, va de Dios con sus razones y dignidades al universo creado por el mismo Dios a semejanza y participación de sus propias dignidades”. 14. Cf. Hugh of St. Victor, Exegetica II: Expositio in hierarchiam coelestem S. Dio- nysii Areopagitae, lib. IX, cap. XIII (PL 175, 1127BC), Paris, Migne, 1854: “et sic ‘a primis usque ad ultima descendens’ conducit illuminationem suam per singulas virtutes”. 15. J. Gayà, El conocimiento teológico, como precepto, segun Ramón Llull, in Estudios Lulianos 18 (1974) 47-51, p. 47.

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as it were, as a real binding force”16. On this basis, i.e. a regeneration of essence, rest both Llull’s proofs of the existence of God and his predica- tions of God. “Of God applies the praedicatio in quid. I can say that God is goodness. Of created things only the praedicatio in quale is valid, i.e. just the denominative statement: ʻThe human being has goodnessʼ or ʻThe human being is goodʼ. Llull’s teaching here is in all quite traditional”17. With regard to the question of what the human intellect can know about God Llull’s concept of divine attributes is also of pivotal impor- tance. Already in his first main theoretical tracts, the Book of the Con- templation of God and the Art of Finding Truth, Llull stresses that God is perfect goodness, perfect greatness, perfect mercy etc., even perfect per- fection. For in analogy to Anselm’s God for Llull is id quo perfectius cogitari nequit, that than which nothing more perfect can be thought. God has his attributes out of himself, out of his own power, not by way of other causes. They are in God in the most perfect way possible. The same attributes manifest themselves in less perfect ways in crea- tion. Yet they are independent from creation, for, firstly, in God they pertain to God’s essence and are thus essential, whereas in creation they only manifest themselves as accidental. This is the main difference between the Creator and the created, between God and man: “Just like your attributes are essential ones in you, the attributes of man are acciden- tal ones and different from the essence of man because of the defects that are in him”18, states Llull in the Book of Contemplation. And, secondly, God is not dependent on his creation in order to enact his attributes. Oth- erwise God would be dependent on the world, if creation were his first activity. In Llull’s view the divine attributes are God’s essence and are active from eternity. By their own intrinsic characteristic activities they become distinguishable. This means – as Llull points out in the definitions of the Art of Finding Truth – that God’s goodness makes good, God’s greatness great, God’s eternity eternal etc. God’s goodness, greatness,

16. E.-W. Platzeck, Raimund Lull: Sein Leben – Seine Werke (Bibliotheca Franciscana, 5), Düsseldorf, Schwann, 1962, vol. 1, p. 152: “Wenn Gutes Gutes hervorbringt, so ist das hervorbringende Gute mit dem hervorgebrachten Guten nicht nur kausal, sondern auch washeitlich auf Grund der Gutheit geeint und verbunden. Im konkret-Guten erscheint die Gutheit gleichsam wie eine real bindende Kraft”. 17. Ibid.: “Von Gott gilt die ‘praedicatio in quid’. Ich kann sagen: Gott ist die Gutheit. Von den geschaffenen Dingen gilt nur die ‘praedicatio in quale’, d.i. eben die denominative Aussage: ‘Der Mensch hat Gutheit’ oder ‘Der Mensch ist gut’. Lulls Lehre ist hier in allem recht traditionell”. 18. R. Llull, Liber contemplationis in Deum, ed. I. Salzinger (Moguntina editio [henceforth MOG], 9), Mainz, Häffner, 1740 (repr. F. Stegmüller, Frankfurt/M., Minerva, 1965), ch. 178, 27, p. 426: “sicut tuae qualitates sunt in te essentiales, et omnes sunt una et eadem res cum tua substantia ratione tuae magnae perfectionis, ita qualitates, quae sunt in homine, sunt accidentales et distinctae a substantia ipsius hominis ratione defectuum, qui in eo sunt”.

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power call for a corresponding activity as their enacting. This activity of the divine attributes is essential19. It does not need the created world and it does not cause any gap between God’s being and acting. In God there is something which is “good making”, which is “good makeable” and the “act of good making”. For Llull, this points towards the existence of the Trinity. It is the consequence of the inner-divine Trinitarian dynamics of the divine Being and completes itself outwardly in the incarnation of God. Since these correlatives belong to every divine attribute, different predica- tions like “God is good” or “God is powerful” still make sense, although in God all attributes are essentially one. Llull claims: “All that is called attributes in you, is one and the same thing, for your justice is your mercy and your mercy your justice, and the same is true of all your virtues, because whatever is in you is your divine essence”20. Although the attrib- utes are many, they are convertible among themselves and ultimately they even coincide in God’s essence21. There can be neither composition nor accidens, neither createdness nor corporeality in God, for Llull combines the convertibility and co-possibility of the divine attributes with their essential identity and intrinsic activity. One of the major Llull scholars of the 1960ies, Eusebi Colomer, explains this further:

According to their context of discovery the dignities are transcendental terms which can be predicated of all that is, be it created, be it uncreated. Accord- ing to their context of existence they are attributes of God, identical with his essence, in which the created can only partly partake. Thus the dignities are terms of relation which can be predicated of both, God and the world, since they mean God in his relation to the world22.

For Llull, the divine attributes form the binding force that keeps the realm of faith and the realm of reason together, since God chose to reveal them in creation.

19. Cf. E. Colomer, El problema de la relació fe-raó en Ramon Llull: Proposta de solució, in Actes del Simposi International de Filosofia de l’Edat Mitjana, Vic-Girona 11-16 d’abril 1993, Actes núm. 1, Vic, Patronat d’Estudis Osonencs, 1996, 11-20, p. 16. 20. Llull, Liber contemplationis (n. 18), ch. 178, 28, p. 426: “Omnes res, quae dicun- tur in te qualitates, sunt una et eadem res, quia tua iustitia est tua misericordia, et tua mis- ericordia est tua iustitia, et hoc idem est de omnibus aliis tuis virtutibus; quia, quidquid est in te, est tua substantia divina”. 21. Cf. ibid., ch. 180, 1, p. 431: “omnes tuas qualitates sint una res in te, licet quoad nos demonstrentur multae”. 22. E. Colomer, Nikolaus von Kues († 1464) und Ramon Llull († 1316): Ihre Begeg- nung mit den nichtchristlichen Religionen, Trier, Paulinus Verlag, 1995, pp. 86f.: “Dem Erkenntnisursprung nach sind die Grundwürden (= dignitates) Transzendentalbegriffe, die auf allgemeingültige Weise von jedem Seienden, sei es geschaffen, sei es ungeschaffen, ausgesagt werden können. Dem Seinsursprung nach sind sie Eigenschaften Gottes, die mit dessen Natur identisch sind, vom geschaffenen Sein aber nur geschieden partizipiert wer- den. Demnach sind die Grundwürden Relationsbegriffe, die, da sie Gott in bezug auf die Welt meinen, von Gott und von der Welt ausgesprochen werden können”.

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III. The “Disputatio Fidei et Intellectus”

To show that this does not equate with a rationalist position is Llull’s aim in a short text entitled The Dispute between Faith and Understand- ing, Disputatio Fidei et Intellectus, written in 1303. Faith (fides) and her brother Understanding (intellectus) are travelling together and get into an argument about whether the knowledge of faith is rationally provable by using necessary reasons. Faith vehemently opposes such a suggestion, whereas Understanding holds that the articles of faith can be rationally demonstrated. To justify his view, Understanding tells the story of a ­Muslim king whom a Christian convinces of the falsity of Mohammed’s teachings. On the king’s invitation, to prove to him the truth of the ­Christian doctrine, the Christian simply replies that one can only believe the Christian faith, but not prove it. The king replies, “You have rendered me a bad service, because before I was at least a Muslim, and now I am neither Muslim nor Christian”23. Faith does not want to give in so easily and counters that such a faith based on evidence does not bring the believer any merit before God24. Intellectus is a pretty obstinate brother, the kind one does not necessarily want to have, and treats Faith haughtily. “You’re welcome to stay with the people who are uneducated and do not have high intelligence”, he says25. However he admits to her that, although it might be more meritorious to simply believe, times have changed since the Old Testament prophets in whose days the peoples had still believed; and that during the time of the apostles there had at least been miracles. Yet today miracles would not be happening anymore and there would be a lack of willingness to believe. All the more, Understand- ing argues, the understanding of faith is needed to help faith survive. Faith stubbornly refuses to accept her brother’s help arguing that with regard to God there can be no demonstrable knowledge, since God does not have any cause by which he could be defined or known. Understand- ing counters by explaining Llull’s concept of divine attributes: “It is true, that God does not have any cause beyond him but rather is the cause of all that is, was, and ever will be. Nevertheless, God is knowable by his most holy properties. For if one asks what God is, the answer has to be that God is that being in whom its goodness, greatness, eternity, power, wisdom, will, etc. coincide and are the same in number”26. Especially

23. R. Llull, Disputatio Fidei et Intellectus I, l, ed. W. Euler (ROL, 23; CCCM, 115), Turnhout, Brepols, 1998, pp. 213-279, esp. 226: “Tu fecisti multum male, quoniam eram sarracenus, nunc neque sarracenus neque christianus”. 24. Cf. ibid., p. 227: “Fides non habet meritum, ubi humana ratio praebet experimentum”. 25. Ibid., p. 232: “imo placet, quod remaneas in hominibus litteras non scientibus aut altum non habentibus intellectum”. 26. Ibid.: “Ait intellectus: Veritas est, quod Deus non habet causam supra se, sed est causa omnium entium, quae fuerunt, sunt et erunt. Tamen cognoscibilis est per suas sanctis- simas rationes siue proprietates. Quoniam si quaeratur, quid est Deus, respondendum est,

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the attribute of goodness serves Understanding as a means to prove the Trinity, since God’s goodness constitutes “the reason why God naturally produces something infinitely and eternally good. Yet we call the produc- ing Father, the produced Son and the Holy Spirit the one breathed by both”27. Theoretically, the ternary structure could refer to something rather than someone. Yet for Llull the attribute of goodness already com- prises an interpersonal matrix, for goodness is mainly predicated of a person as well as addressed towards a person. For Llull God could not really be good, “if he lacked the liberty by which the one who is good can give himself to another one who is also good”28. Faith and Understanding go on quarrelling, in a similar manner like about the demonstrability of the Trinity, when they treat the Incarnation, the creation of the world (while Fides strangely enough advocates that the world is eternal) and the resurrection of the human being. In the end their dispute needs to be settled by a hermit who promises to send copies of their disputation to the Pope and the theologians. Yet if one reads the prologue attentively, for Llull already at the very beginning, when he gives the definitions of his respective characters, the question is settled of what the human intellect can reach on its own: “The understanding is the facility by which the human being in a natural way understands the intelligible objects; this facility cannot understand anything against the natural way of understanding, just as the facility of seeing cannot see anything against the natural way of seeing. Faith, how- ever, is the light given by God by which the understanding reaches further than its natural way, by believing that that which belongs to God is true; this is something which the understanding cannot reach by simple understanding”29. Ultimately the human being can come to know God only through God, “by way of reason illuminated by divine wisdom”30. Understanding, therefore, does not cease to point out to his sister that she holds the higher rank and that he needs her for his very task. He keeps quoting Isaiah 7,9 in the Vetus Latina version: “nisi credideritis, non intel- ligetis” – “if you don’t believe you will not understand”. Faith is the precondition for understanding. “Thus it is apparent that you, Fides, are

quod Deus est illud ens, in quo sua bonitas et magnitudo, aeternitas, potestas, sapientia, uoluntas etc. conuertuntur et sunt idem numero”. 27. Ibid. II, l, p. 244: “Ergo est ratio Deo, quod producat naturaliter bonum infinitum et aeternum. Vocamus autem producentem patrem, productum Filium et sanctum Spiritum ab utroque spiratum”. 28. R. Llull, Liber de quinque sapientibus IV, d. 1, ch. 1, ed. I Salzinger (MOG, 2), Mainz, Häffner, 1722, pp. 125-174, esp. 161. 29. Llull, Disputatio I (n. 23), p. 225: “Intellectus est potentia, cum qua homo intelligit naturaliter entia intelligibilia, quae contra suam naturam intelligendi intelligere non potest. Sicut potentia uisiua, quae contra suam naturam uidendi uidere non potest. Fides uero est lumen a Deo datum, cum quo intellectus extra suam naturam intelligendi atttingit credendo de Deo hoc uerum quod non attingit intelligendo”. 30. Llull, Llibre de demostracions I, 1 (n. 9).

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the disposition and preparation, by which I am disposed by God toward high things. For in this which I suppose through you, believing that I can ascend, I make use of you. And thus you are in me and I am in you. And when I ascend by understanding to the level where you are, you by believ- ing ascend to an even higher level above me. Therefore, you always are staying above me like oil on top of water”31. Understanding even admits that in matters of faith he does not function as “comprehensor”, thus fully comprehending his object, but only as “apprehensor”, trying to grasp in a rational way as much as possible32. Nevertheless, for Llull faith remains something that can be right or wrong while reason always is located in the realm of truth. Also members of other religions, the so called “infidels” have faith, yet their faith is on a wrong path and needs to be put right by pertinent reasonable explanations. Along these lines, Understanding points out to Faith that before the days of Mohammed, Africa and Asia were Christian continents and that it is Faith’s fault that they were lost, because she is “so high and difficult to believe […]”33 while the faith of Muslims about God is much easier to grasp. This brings us to the last point, the inter-religious scope of Llull’s concept.

IV. The Inter-religious Scope of Llull’s Thought

Christianity was not the only religion wrestling with the relationship of reason and revelation in those days. In medieval Judaism, for instance, Moses (†1204) advocated an intellectualistic approach in his definition of prophecy and revelation, which is spelled out especially in his Guide of the Perplexed part I, chapters 32–48. Contrary to the opinion that revelation does not depend on the intellectual faculty of the human being, but has to be understood as a divine act of grace, Maimonides holds the intellectual preparation of the human being as a conditio sine qua non for reaching the truth. This highest level of human perfection can only be reached after intensive studying: “Consequently he who wishes to attain to human perfection must therefore first study , next the various branches of in their proper order, then Physics, and lastly

31. Id., Disputatio I, 1 (n. 23), p. 228: “Et sic patet, quod tu fides es dispositio et praeparatio, per quam ego de Deo sum dispositus ad res altas. Quia in hoc, quod ego per te suppono credendo, quod possum ascendere, habituo me de te. Et sic tu es in me et ego in te. Et quando ascendo ad gradum in quo tu es, intelligendo, tu credendo, ascendis in altiorem gradum super me. Quoniam sicut oleum super acquam, ita tu semper super me moraris”. 32. Ibid., pp. 229f.: “Sed dico, quod si de diuina trinitate habeo aliquas rationes neces- sarias, non sequitur, quod sim comprehensor, sed tantum modo apprehensor”. 33. Ibid., p. 228: “Sed post aduentum Mahometi saraceni destruxerunt christianos quasi per omnes illas terras, eo quod tu es multum alta et difficilis ad credendum”.

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Metaphysics”34. So it depends on the human being to transform his or her potential intellectual faculty into real action. Then – and here Maimonides speaks the language of Aristotelian philosophy – the active intellectual faculty of the human being can reach the lowest level of the mundus intel- ligibilis. Thus divine emanation will reach the human being after intensive study of all disciplines and thus the human being can reach the level of a prophet. The model of a prophet or “father” of all prophets, Moses, is distinguished from all other levels of prophecy as a prophet- sui generis. Due to his extraordinary intellectual faculties, Moses func- tioned as the instructor of the divine commandments on Mount Sinai. The (ordinary) human being will be able, as a result of the process of prophetic transformation, to understand the divine attributes, which are expressed in the mundus sensibilis as the laws of nature, without – and this must be emphasized – knowing anything positively about the essence of the Divine. This is because all biblical divine attributes have to be under- stood in the sense of a negative theology. For the only way of predicating attributes of God, which Maimonides can accept, is the way of negation. If we said, for example, “God is good”, we would have to say at the same time with equal necessity that he is not good. This would be even more adequate, because there is no similarity, no analogy, no link between God and his creation. He is the absolutely Transcendent and Perfect. Therefore, naming God by negative attributes excludes any possibility of similarity and defect in him. Even if we use a positive term, we have to understand it in a negative way: “He is powerful, wise, and willing. By these terms we only want to say that he is not weak, not unknowing, not imprudent, and not negligent”35. That does not mean that we can negate of God any- thing that comes to our mind, “for sometimes we deny something in a thing which cannot be attributed to it according to its nature, as, for example, if one says of a wall that it cannot see”36. Llull’s verdict on this kind of approach reads: “Modern Jews do not say anything, neither about the essence of God nor about the intrinsic activity he has, and the same is true of the Saracens. Therefore, whatever they think about the divine goodness, greatness, etc., they consider by way of extrinsic activities, i.e. as an effect of God”37.

34. Moses Maimonides, Guide of the Perplexed I, ch. 34, transl. M. Friedländer, ­London, Routledge & Kegan, 1904, p. 46. 35. Moses Maimonides, Dux neutrorum / Führer der Unschlüssigen I, 58, transl. A. Weiss, Hamburg, Meiner, 31995, vol. 1, p. 199. 36. Ibid., p. 200. 37. R. Llull, Declaratio Raymundi per modum dialogi edita, ch. 174 (ROL, 17; CCCM, 79), Turnhout, Brepols, 1989, pp. 219-402, p. 380: “Iudaei moderni non dicunt aliquid de essentia Dei nec de operatione intrinseca, quam habet, et sic de saracenis. Unde quidquid considerant de divina bonitate, magnitudine etc., considerant per actus extrinsecos, scilicet, in effectu Dei”.

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Yet at least in terms of divine attributes Llull could point to Al-Ghazali (1059-1111) as a kindred spirit who, for instance, wrote on the basis of the Quran an entire book on the Ninety Nine Beautiful Names of God38. Al-Ghazali continued the position of the Asharites. The latter are named after their first well known representative al-Ashari (873-935) and form the later mainstream of orthodox Islam. They advocate the existence of real, eternal attributes in God which are inseparable from his essence. The Middle Path in Theology, one of the major works of Medieval Muslim theology, written by al-Ghazali, contains a whole section on divine predi- cates and their properties. Al-Ghazali presupposes the traditional seven properties of God given in the Quran: power, wisdom, life, will, seeing, hearing and speaking. Yet he also shows how to arrive at them without having recourse to revelation by authoritative Scripture – simply by rational deduction. In the case of power, the syllogism for instance reads: “Any masterly work proceeds from a powerful agent. The world is a masterly work. Therefore, it proceeds from a powerful agent”39. Concerning God’s wisdom, he claims that God must know also himself, if it can be affirmed that he knows other than himself40; at least there is much reason to suppose this, just as there is reason with a scribe who is capable of producing even lines to suppose that he knows the art of writing. The most important and decisive attribute of God is God’s will, for his power or his wisdom could equally be directed towards opposite possibilities. Yet his will decides which option he chooses. Al-Ghazali thus explains the special qualities of each attribute and deduces some common characteristics of them. He insists that different attributes can be distinguished in God and that God’s essence and attributes are neither identical nor different; this is, in fact, the shortest way of summing up the position of the Asharites. As I already mentioned earlier, Llull takes his departure from a point which his Islamic dialogue partners admitted, the dynamism of the process of knowledge (the knowing intellect, the known object, and the act of knowledge) and love (the lover, the beloved, and love itself). He maintains that we must admit the intrinsic activity of all the divine attributes. True goodness must produce something essentially good41, true greatness some- thing essentially great, etc. For Llull the Islamic concept of the divine

38. Cf. Al-Ghazali, The Ninety-nine Beautiful Names of God, transl. D.B. Burrell – N. Daher, Cambridge, Islamic Texts Society, 1995. 39. Al-Ghazālī, Al-Iqtisād fī l-ictiqād / The Middle Path in Theology, ed. I.A. Çubukçu – H. Atay, Ankara, Nur Matbaasi, 1962; transl. A. Zayd, Al-Ghazali on Divine Predicates and Their Properties, Lahore, Sh. Muhammad Ashraf, 1970, p. 1. 40. Cf. Al-Ghazali on Divine Predicates (n. 39), p. 25: “that He knows His own essence and attributes if it be affirmed that He knows other than Himself”. 41. Cf. e.g. Disputatio Raimundi Christiani et Hamar Saraceni, pars II, 1, ed. A. Madre (ROL, 22; CCCM, 114), Turnhout, Brepols, 1998, pp. 159-264, p. 196: “Quoniam Deus est infinitus et aeternus, ideo bonitas est ei ratio infinita et aeterna, quod producat bonum infinitum et aeternum”.

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qualities is deficient because Muslims do not assume that God’s nature is already active in itself. Regarding the doctrine of God in Islam, Llull therefore concludes: “The Saracens are people who are really well edu- cated in philosophy and pretty reasonable, but of the nature of God and his dignities they understand too little”42. Therefore, Llull broadens the area of discussion by no longer confining it to the realm of the praeambula fidei but including the articles of faith in it as well. The way in which he conceives of creation offers him the possibility of doing this. Consequently, Llull holds above all three firm convictions with regard to the inter-religious end of his theological endeavours. The first one has to do with our relation to the religious other: “Infideles sunt homines sicut et nos”43 – non-Christians are human beings like we are. Only thus is it possible to conduct a dialogue on an equal footing. Only thus does one realise, and be it even on second thought, that there are also substantial commonalities. Only thus do we reach the insight that not everything others do, think, or believe is bad only because they do, think or believe it in a different way. For the search of members of other religions also serves the same end, to love, laude and honour God44. Nevertheless, and this is Llull’s second conviction, “Infideles non stant ad auctoritates fidelium”45 – non-Christians do not pay heed to Christian authorities like Councils, , or Holy Scripture. Even if they share a common authority, as the Old Testament in the case of the Jews, they interpret it in a different way. This point had already been acknowledged by Thomas Aquinas, but somewhat reluctantly and only when dealing with Muslims where there was no other common

42. R. Llull, Liber de acquisitione Terrae Sanctae II, 1, ed. E. Kamar, Projet de ­Raymond Lull De acquisitione Terrae Sanctae. Introduction et édition critique du texte. Studia Orientalia Cristiana “Collectanea” 6 (Cairo, 1961), pp. 3-131, esp. 117: “Sarraceni sunt aliqui in philosophia bene litterati et sunt homines bene rationales, sed de Essentia Dei et dignitatibus suis parum sciunt. Idcirco Catholicus in disputationibus disponet ipsos ad intel- ligendum Deum et actus suarum dignitatum intrinsecos et ex dictis quod Deus sit perfectus et quod suae rationes habeant actus intrinsecos, videlicet, sua bonitas bonificare, sua magnitudo magnificare et coeterae consequentiae, concludunt quod Deus sit trinus et sic de actibus exten- sis, quos habent in creatis, ex quibus sequuntur consequentiae quod Deus est incarnatus”. 43. R. Llull, Lectura super artem inventivam et tabulam generalem, Prologue, ed. I. Salzinger (MOG, 5), Mainz, Häffner, 1729, pp. 359-716, p. 360: “Ipsi infideles sunt homines, sicut et nos, et sunt de nostra natura”. 44. Cf. R. Llull, Llibre del gentil e dels tres savis, ed. A. Bonner (Nova edició de les obres de Ramon Llull, 2), Palma de Mallorca, Patronat Ramon Llull, 22001, p. 11: “E la ffi es amar e conexer e tembre e sservir Deu”. R. Llull, Book of the Gentile and the Three Wise Men, in A. Bonner (ed.), Selected Works of Ramon Llull, vol. 1, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1984, pp. 91-304, esp. 115. 45. Id., Liber de demonstratione per aequiparantiam, ed. A. Madre (ROL, 9; CCCM, 35), Turnhout, Brepols, 1981, pp. 201-231, esp. 221: “Infideles non stant ad auctoritates fidelium, et tamen stant ad rationes”. He explains this further in the Disputatio Raimundi Christiani et Hamar Saraceni (n. 41), pars III, p. 261: “quod christianus et Saracenus per rationes, et non per auctoritates, ad inuicem disputarent. Nam auctoritates calumniantur, ratione diuersarum expositionum”.

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authority. Otherwise, Aquinas thought it much safer to abide with revela- tion and the authorities which bore witness to it: to use arguments from authority is most adequate to this doctrine, i.e. to theology, so he says in the Summa Theologiae46. Moreover, the so called infidels do not want to exchange just one uncer- tain faith for another equally unproven belief but to exchange believing for understanding: “nolunt dimittere credere pro credere, sed credere pro intelligere”47. That Llull is right in this is shown by the spokesman of the Jewish community in Girona, Mose ben Nachman, called Nachmanides (1194-1270) during the already mentioned Barcelona Disputation in 1263. When his opponent, the Dominican and ex-Jew Paulus Christianus († around 1269) claims that even the angels do not understand the Trinity, Nachmanides astutely draws the conclusion that in that case even the angels do not believe in the Trinity. For, “it is clear that nobody believes what he does not know”48. Thus non-Christians do follow reason and rational arguments. This is the third important conviction Lull holds. And this is where the formal side of inter-religious dialogue is merging with the content-related one. “If they were to understand what we believe […]”49, declares Llull’s Christian in The Book of the Gentile and the Three Wise Men. According to Lull inter-religious dialogue ought to focus primarily on explaining the most difficult doctrines of the Christian faith, i.e. the doc- trines of the Trinity and the Incarnation. Starting from common ground, Llull underlines: “there is only one God, Father, Creator, and Lord of everything that exists”50. For him the doctrine of God and the notion of

46. Cf. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae (n. 6), I q. 1 a. 9, ad 2: “argumentari ex auctoritate est maxime proprium huius doctrinae [scil. Theologiae]”. 47. R. Llull, Liber de convenientia fidei et intellectus in obiecto, ed. F.P. Wolff – J.M. Kurhummel (MOG, 4), Mainz, Häffner, 1729, pp. 571-575, p. 572: “Beatus Augusti- nus fecit librum ad probandum divinam Trinitatem supposito merito fidei, contra quam fidem ipse non fuit, quia erat sanctus. Iterum (beatus) Thomas de Aquino fecit unum librum contra gentiles, qui requirunt rationes, quia nolunt dimittere credere pro credere, sed credere pro intelligere”. 48. Nachmanides, Vikuah § 107, in C.B. Chavel (ed.), Ramban (Nachmanides) (Writings­ and Discourses, 2), New York, Shilo Publishing House, 1978, pp. 656-696, p. 696. 49. Llull, Llibre del gentil (n. 44), pp. 114f.: “Mas, si ells entenien la trinitat que nos creem esser en Deu, fforssa de rahó e concordanssa de les fflors del primer arbre e les condicions d’aquell los enclinaria a concebre veritat de la santa trinitat de nostre seyer Deus”; Id., Book of the Gentile, p. 217: “But if they understood the Trinity as we believe it to exist in God, the force of reason, and the concordance of the flowers of the first tree along with its conditions, would make them see the truth of the Holy Trinity of our Lord God”. This sounds almost like the religious version of the Socratic error: “Knowing good is doing good”, thought Socrates; “Knowing and understanding Christianity means becom- ing a Christian”, thinks Llull. 50. Llull, Llibre del gentil (n. 44), p. 11: “E que enaxí con es .i. Deu tan solament, pare e creador e seynor de quant es”; Id., Book of the Gentile, p. 116.

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divine attributes constitute this common ground. In all three monotheistic religions, God is the creator and judge of the world. This is why certain fundamental attributes or dignities are characteristic of God51. They are those characteristics without which God would cease to be God. In Chris- tian theology we achieve knowledge of these attributes through both rational deduction and divine revelation. God, for instance, reveals his name (Ex 3,14) or his mercy (Ex 34,6). Llull reduces his Christian position with regard to this point, rejects the arguments of authority derived from revelation and only accepts those attributes which can be derived from reasoning. Thus for Lull human reason (intellectus) can become the referee in the self-assertive contest of the three monotheistic religions, because it is neutral and independent of religion as well as universal and it also has such an authority that it can be recognized by all religions. All people alike dispose of this decision-making facility in as far as they make use of language. As Markus Enders contends:

Whatever this general means of human cognition […] accepts as true, needs therefore to be valid and binding for all human beings capable of using their mind and reason. Only the judgment of mind and intellect as well as the reason determining them are therefore the appropriate judge in the dispute among world religions about the truth of their relevant beliefs52.

This is Lull’s firm conviction. However, it does not lead into religious militancy, precisely because, as a decision-making authority between the revealed, content-wise competing truth-claims of the three monotheistic religions, Lull relies on – to put it bluntly – “common sense” or – in an even more colloquial way – on the motto: think in believing and believe in thinking. Thus revelation and reason are reconciled.

Faculty of Theology and Annemarie C. Mayer Religious Studies KU Leuven St.-Michielsstraat 4/3101 BE-3000 Leuven Belgium [email protected]

51. Cf. also John of Salisbury, Polycraticus, Book VII, c. 7 (PL 199, 650C), Paris, Migne, 1855. 52. M. Enders, Die Bedeutung der christlichen Philosophie der monotheistischen ­Weltreligionen im frühen Mittelalter für das interreligiöse Gespräch der Gegenwart, in Archa Verbi 7 (2010) 143-165, p. 145: “Was diese allgemein menschlichen Erkenntnis- vermögen […] als wahr anerkennen, muß daher für alle ihres Verstandes- und Vernunftge- brauchs fähigen menschlichen Wesen gültig und verbindlich sein. Nur das Verstandes- und Vernunfturteil und die sie bestimmenden Gründe sind daher der einzig geeignete Richter im Streit der Weltreligionen um die Wahrheit ihrer jeweiligen Glaubensauffassungen”.

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Abstract. — The way how the relation between reason and revelation has been seen throughout the Middle Ages (and beyond) has been influenced to a great extent by Thomas Aquinas. Nevertheless, already during the lifetime of Aquinas, there have also been alternative suggestions. One of them has been made by the Catalan thinker Ramon Llull. He refuses to establish any dichotomy between the order of reason and that of revelation, and instead advocates the ‘demonstrability’ of the major articles of the Christian faith, not least for inter-religious reasons. In his Disputatio Fidei et Intellectus, Llull seeks to defend himself against the charge of being a ‘rationalist’, pointing out that a certain understanding of faith is needed to help faith survive. The tension between reason and revelation is a topic which also kept Jewish and Muslim thinkers busy at that time. This contribution investigates how Llull uses both certain commonly held convictions as well as obvious differences to enter into an inter-religious exchange with intellectuals of the other two monotheistic religions. According to Llull such clarifications on the relation of reason and revelation serve the common aim to come to know and worship God.

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