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The Meno Has Long Been Considered a Transitional Platonic Dialogue

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The Meno Has Long Been Considered a Transitional Platonic Dialogue COLLOQUIUM 4 THE METHOD OF HYPOTHESIS IN THE MENO HUGH H. BENSON The Meno has long been considered a transitional Platonic dialogue. In­ deed, Gregory Vlastos once maintained that he could identify the precise point in the dialogues where the historical Socrates (interpreted by Plato) gave off and Plato (on his own) began-Meno SOd-e. I am less sanguine than I once was about this historical and developmental claim. But that the Meno marks a break with the so-called elenctic dialogues appears secure.' At Meno SOd-e, Plato has first Meno and then Socrates pose a challenge that the readers of the elenctic dialogues have been wanting to pose for some time. For Socrates' immediate goal in those dialogues is eliminating the interlocutor's false conceit of knowledge.2 And yet, it is clear that Soc­ rates' purpose in eliminating the interlocutor's false conceit is to encour­ age the interlocutor to seek the knowledge he has been shown to lack. 3 But how is such a search to take place given Socrates' repeated claims to be ignorant as well? Socrates' only explicit recommendation is that one should seek out someone who knows and learn from him. But if no one with the requisite knowledge is to be found, how is one to proceed? In­ deed, is progress even possible? This is the problem Meno raises in re- 1 The historical and developmental claims have been the subject of substantial debate, especially since Y1astos' bold and extreme expressions of them in Vlastos ( 1991 ). Accord­ ing to Vlastos, the philosophical views found in the elenctic dialogues and those found in the middle dialogues could not have simultaneously inhabited the brain of anyone other than a schizophrenic. Indeed, bold and extreme expressions, for which Vlastos is justly famous, while perhaps less likely to be true are productive of lively, healthy, and productive debates. I confess here to a more moderate version of these claims of the sort expressed by the likes of Brickhouse and Smith (1994), Irwin (1995), and Nehamas (1999), to name a few. (Cf. Benson 2000:7-10). For the purposes of this essay, however, it makes no difference whether Plato's introduction of Meno's paradox, the theory of recollection, and the method of hy­ pothesis in the Meno is a consequence of his philosophical development, his desire to dis­ tance himself from the philosophical views of the historical Socrates, or his piecemeal dis­ play of a fully worked-out philosophical theory. What is important is that these three fea­ tures occur in the Meno together, and one wants to know how-if at all-they are related. By the elcnctic dialogues I mean those dialogues which have also been described as "early" or "aporetic": Apology, Charmides, Crito, Euthydemus, Ewhyphro, Gorgias, Hippias Ma­ jor, Hippias Minor, !on, Laches, Lyvis, and Protagoras. 2 For a defense of this way of reading th'e elenctic dialogues see, for example, Benson (2000). 3 See Meno 84a-c. 96 HUGH BENSON sponse to Socrates' encouragement to join him in the search for knowl­ edge of the nature of virtue tliat both he and Meno have professed to lack.4 The problem has come to be known as Meno's paradox. (Tl)MENO: In what way, Socrates, will you search for that thing which you do not know at all what it is? What sort of thing, of those things you do not know will you set up as the object of your search? Or even if you should hap­ pen upon it, how will you know that this is what you didn't know? (Kat Tiva Tp6rcov sTJTTJGEl~, ro LWKpaT£~, TOUTO 0 llll otcr8a 10 rcaparcav on EG<iv; rcoiov yap OUK olcrea rcpo8EIJ£VO~ sTJTTJG£1~; ~ £i Kat on IJUAtGTa EV'tUXOl~ auT<\), rcro~ dcrn on TOU10 ecrnv 0 GU OUK i\OTJG8a;) [80d5-8], Followed by Socrates' version (T2)SOC: I know what you mean, Meno. Do you know how contentious an argument you are introducing, that it is possible for a person to search for neither what he knows nor what he does not know? For, he could not search for what he knows - for he knows it and there is no need to search for it-nor could he search for what he does not know-for he does not know what to search for. (Maveavm olov ~OUA£l A.£ynv, ro M£vwv. opq~ TOUTOV ro~ £pta11KOV A6yov Ka<ayct~, ro~ OUK apa EG11V sTJT£tV avepwmp OllT£ 0 Olli£ oih£ 0 llTl ollie; OUT£ yap av 0 Y£ Olli£V STJTOt Ot0£V yap, Kat ouliEv li£1. T(\) Y£ TOtOUT((l sTJTi]G£ ro~ OUT£ 0 llll Ol0£V ouo£ yap Ol0£V on STJ1TJG£t.) [80el- 5]5 In the pages that follow the paradox two fundamental features of what has come to be thought of as classical Platonism are broached: the theory of recollection and the method of hypothesis.6 The first-the theory of recollection-has rightly been regarded as Plato's direct response to Meno's paradox. The conversation with the slave boy, which immediately follows upon the statement of the theory of recollection, is offered to "teach" or illustrate (£m<i£t~ffi!-lat) this theory. 7 It is not until the conversation with the slave boy has come to an end, followed by an 4 The sincerity of Meno' s profession of ignorance is, I believe, indicated by his claim to be numbed not simply in his tongue, but also in his mind. See Benson (1990: 138 n. 28) and Benson ( 1989). 5 For the claim that Socrates' version of the paradox is not significantly different ti·om Meno's see Nehamas (1985) and White (1976). All translations are my own unless other­ wise noted. 6 Neither of these features can be easily discerned in the elenctic dialogues. There may be a hint of the method of hypothesis at Charmides l69a-l75d (see Kahn 1996:184 and Weiss 2001:131), and perhaps Euthyphro's reference to the statues of Daedalus at llb6-e2 foreshadows the theory of recollection as described at Meno 97d6-98a5, but otherwise I can find no hint of these two features in the elenctic dialogues. By conu·ast, they play important roles in the Phaedo, Republic, and Phaedrus, dialogues that are associated with classical Platonism. 7 Even Jenks ( 1992:328-329) who thinks that Plato does not take the theory of recollec­ tion seriously would agree that the substance of Socrates' solution to Meno's paradox is contained in the conversation with the slave boy that is proffered as an illustration of the theory. Pace Weiss (2001). .
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