University of Victoria Special Collections Roy, Reginald H., 1922- SC104

Title Reginald Herbert Roy fonds Dates 1850-2009

Extent 10.5 m of textual records 377 sound tape reels 1 audio cassette Biographical Sketch Reginald Herbert Roy was born in Nova Scotia. He has been professor at the University of Victoria Department of History since the 1960s and has published numerous books on military history and various aspects of Canadian history. Scope and Content The fonds consists of records relating to Roy's university administrative activities and his research in aspects of military history, including Canadian history and Canada's involvement in World War I and World War II (particularly the Normandy campaign). Fonds includes photocopies of war diaries, files on various Canadian Army regiments and battalions (including the 31st Infantry Battalion, the 1st Battalion Regina Rifle Regiment, Canadian Scottish Regiment (Princess Mary's), the Seaforth Highlanders, and the B.C. Dragoons), files on the Canadian Officers Training Corps UBC Contingent University of Victoria Detachment, files on Canadian defence and military policy, audio interviews with Canadian military officers, clippings and other material concerning South Africa and South-West Africa/Namibia, and material relating to the Fenians (1880-1881). Fonds also contains minutes, correspondence and reports relating to academic committees and associations (including the University of Victoria Alumni Association), records relating to the Canadian Confederation Centennial Committee of British Columbia Historic Commemorations Sub-Committee, and background material, notes and drafts for Roy's books. Fonds also consists of material collected by Roy including the papers (1943- 1979) of John Laurie (RCAF Provost Marshall), Rev. E.G. Parker, and the Red Chevron Association of Vancouver Island. The fonds also consists of an audio cassette of music from the war years. The fonds also includes 46 issues of South African Soldier. Finding Aids Inventory available with series and file level control.

Title Source Title based on the contents of the fonds.

ROY, REGINALD HERBERT

INVENTORY

Prepared by Anne Maclean and Anne MacLaurin

University of Victoria Archives

August 1990 - Winter 1991

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Biographical Sketch ...... 1 Scope and Content ...... 3 Series Descriptions ...... 4

File Listings: Accession 73-1 ...... 44 Accession 74-7 ...... 36 Accession 74-8 ...... 39 Accession 74-9 ...... 40 Accession 74-10 ...... 42 Accession 81-18 ...... 28 Accession 82-5 ...... 9 Accession 82-7 ...... 37 Accession 82-8 ...... 15 Accession 82-11 ...... 51 Accession 82-12 ...... 15 Accession 83-142 ...... 27 Accession 83-167 ...... 35 Accession 83-179 ...... 15 Accession 84-4 ...... 16 Accession 84-11 ...... 16 Accession 84-12 ...... 17 Accession 84-28 ...... 51 Accession 86-1 ...... 18 Accession 86-24 ...... 19 Accession 88-8 ...... 47 Accession 88-9 ...... 20 Accession 88-10 ...... 21 Accession 88-11 ...... 22 Accession 88-12 ...... 29 Accession 88-15 ...... 49 Accession 88-16 ...... 25 Accession 88-17 ...... 30 Accession 88-18 ...... 34 Accession 88-19 ...... 50 Accession 88-80 ...... 52 Accession 89-25 ...... 46 Accession 89-38 ...... 26 Accession 89-42 ...... 55 Accession 89-49 ...... 55 Accession 89-50 ...... 55 Accession 89-51 ...... 55 Accession 89-52 ...... 54 Accession 90-6 ...... 53 Accession 91-38 ...... 56

Biographical Sketch

Reginald Herbert Roy was born in New Glasgow, Nova Scotia, on 11 December 1922. He joined the ranks of the Cape Breton Highlanders in 1939 and served with the regiment in Britain, Italy, France, Belgium, Holland and Germany. He was commissioned as an officer in 1943 and returned to Canada in 1945. From 1946 to 1951 Roy attended the University of British Columbia, obtaining an Honours B.A. in History in 1950 and an M.A. in History in 1951. After receiving his M.A. he moved to Ottawa, spending two years as a call-out officer at the Historical Section (G.S.), Canadian Army Headquarters, researching and writing the history of the Canadian Army. He worked as an archivist at the Public Archives of Canada, military records section, from 1953 to 1954 and, returning to Victoria, at the Provincial Archives of British Columbia from 1954 to 1958. In 1958 he became an instructor at Royal Roads Military College, Dept. of History and Economics, in Victoria. He taught there for a year and was then appointed History Instructor at Victoria College (later the University of Victoria), becoming Assistant Professor in 1961. In 1965 Roy obtained his Ph.D. in History at the University of Washington; his thesis was entitled, "The British Columbia Dragoons and Its Predecessors". He was subsequently promoted to associate professor of History at U. Vic. and was made full professor in 1970, specializing in military history, defence studies and Canadian history.

In addition to his academic career, Prof. Roy continued his close association with the military. From 1954 to 1958 he served as a captain with the Canadian Scottish Regiment (Princess Mary's), and from 1958 to 1968 commanded the Canadian Officers Training Corps/Regular Officer Training Plan, UBC Contingent, U. Vic. Detachment. After serving in these capacities he was returned to the supplementary reserve of officers. He was promoted to major in October 1963 and awarded the Canada Decoration in December 1963.

Prof. Roy has served on many university committees and offices. He was Associate Dean of the Faculty of Graduate Studies from 1973-74 and Acting Dean from 1974-75. He served as Pro-Tem Chairman of the U. Vic. Social Sciences Research Centre in 1970, appointed Chairman in 1971, and helped oversee the compilation of the Bibliography of British Columbia (3 vols.) until the Centre closed in 1975. He was Faculty Representative to the U. Vic. Alumni Association from 1963 to 1969 and served as Faculty Advisor to the Alumni Association from 1969 to 1984. He has been equally busy outside the U. Vic. community, serving on the Historic Commemorations Sub-Committee of the Canadian Confederation Centennial Committee of British Columbia from 1964 to 1967. He has given numerous lectures and addresses on various aspects of military history at seminars, conferences and universities in

Canada, the United States, Australia and South Africa.

Prof. Roy's extensive published works include the books Ready for the Fray: A History of the Canadian Scottish Regiment (Princess Mary's), 1920-1955 (published 1958); Sinews of Steel: A History of the British Columbia Dragoons (1965); The Seaforth Highlanders of Canada (1969); Telegrams of the North-West Campaign, 1885, co-edited with Desmond Morton (1972); For Most Conspicuous Bravery: A Biography of Maj.-Gen. G.R. Pearkes, V.C., Through Two World Wars (1977); and 1944: The Canadians in Normandy (1984). He has written many articles for journals and contributed chapters to the books The Canadian Military: A Profile, New Dimensions in Military History, and War and Society.

Biographical Sketch cont'd.

Prof. Roy has been awarded numerous grants for his research projects, including Canada Council grants for the Bibliography of British Columbia and University of Victoria grants for his biography of Maj.-Gen. Pearkes. He was elected a Fellow of the Royal Historical Society in 1966, one of many honours he has received in the course of his career.

Scope and Content

The records of Prof. Reginald Roy document many aspects of his varied career. Most numerous is the background material to his research on Canadian military history, particularly his books on the Canadian involvement in the Normandy campaign and the histories of several Canadian regiments. Also included are records of his activities with the COTC/ROTP, the U. Vic. Alumni Association, and other committees and offices. In addition, Prof. Roy collected many articles, clippings, brochures and similar records dealing with NATO, NORAD, South Africa, South-West Africa and Namibia, which he used as background material for his numerous lectures on these subjects.

The series descriptions which follow outline the records and their various accessions in more detail. Prof. Roy began transferring his records to the University Archives in the early 1970's, although some of these records remained unprocessed for several years. Many of the same subjects and types of records are scattered throughout different accessions; therefore an index to names and subjects appears at the end of this inventory which will help to tie the material together. As Prof. Roy is still teaching and writing, he will likely continue to transfer his records to the Archives for some time to come, and this inventory will be updated as necessary.

Researchers may also wish to consult the military history interviews on audio tape, many of which were conducted by Prof. Roy and which complement information contained in his own records. Other related records include those of the University of Victoria Social Sciences Research Centre, which contains rough drafts, transcripts of interviews and background material for Prof. Roy's biography of Maj.- Gen. Pearkes. Prof. Roy's Ph.D. thesis, "The British Columbia Dragoons and its Predecessors" (University of Washington, 1965), is also available in the University Archives.

Series Descriptions

SERIES I MATERIAL RELATING TO THE NORMANDY CAMPAIGN Accession 82-5, Boxes 1-7 90 cm. 1940-1980. Original order. War Diaries, correspondence, reports, interviews with officers, intelligence summaries and situation reports concerning Operations Tractable, Totalize, Overlord, Tallulah and Spring. Includes files on the operations of the 4th Canadian Armoured Division, 2nd Canadian Corps, 2nd Canadian Armoured Brigade, and the 2nd and 3rd Canadian Infantry Divisions.

Accession 82-8, 1 Box, 8 cm. 1982. Original order. Holograph drafts of Prof. Roy's book, The Canadians in the Normandy Campaign, published in 1982.

Accession 82-12, 1 Box, 13 cm., 1944. Original order. Photocopies of statistical reports of Canadian casualties in North-western Europe and Canadian participation in the operations in North-West Europe. Used by Prof. Roy as research material for his book, 1944: The Canadians in Normandy.

Accession 83-179, 4 Boxes, 46 cm., 1943-1945, 1984. Original order. Photocopies of intelligence summaries and message logs of HQ 2nd Canadian Infantry Brigade, July 1943-May 1945, used by Prof. Roy as research material for 1944: The Canadians in Normandy. Photocopy of ts. of this book, with holograph revisions.

Accession 84-4, 1 Box, 8 cm. 1984. Original order. Typed drafts of 1944: The Canadians in Normandy, published in 1984.

Accession 84-11, 1 Box, 8 cm. 1984. Original order. Author's corrected copies of drafts of 1944: The Canadians in Normandy.

Accession 84-12, 1 Box, 8 cm. 1944, 1984. Original order. Newspapers relating to the Allied invasion of Normandy; used by Prof. Roy as background for 1944: The Canadians in Normandy.

Accession 86-1, 1 Box, 8 cm. 1952-1953. Original order. Canadian Army, HQ Historical Section (G.S.), Reports on Canadian participation in the invasion of Normandy.

Accession 86-24, 2 Boxes, 16 cm., 1979-1984. Original order. Correspondence, copies of newspaper clippings relating to Roy's Book, 1944: The Canadians In Normandy.

Accession 88-9, 2 Boxes, 21 cm. 1941-1945. Original order. Photocopies of official and personal correspondence of Lt.- General H.D.G. Crerar (originals in the National Archives of Canada) and correspondence of the Crerar family.

SERIES I MATERIAL RELATING TO THE NORMANDY CAMPAIGN cont'd. Accession 88-10, Box 1, 13 cm. 1942-1945. Original order. Lt.-General H.D.G. Crerar. Correspondence, reports, war diaries, directives, intelligence reports, re. Operation Totalize, Canadian POW's, and suggestions to help win the war.

Accession 88-11, Boxes 1-2 25 cm. 1944-1963. Original order. Operations in Normandy of Canadian troops, including the 2nd Canadian Infantry Division, 4th and 5th Brigades. War diaries, message logs, extracts from memoranda, correspondence, extracts from regimental histories, and magazine articles.

Accession 88-16, 1 Box, 13 cm. 1952-1953. Original Order. Photocopies of Reports on Canadian participation in the invasion of Normandy and civilian attitudes toward the army.

Accession 89-38, 1 Box, 6 cm., 1981-1987. Original Order. Photocopies of maps and photographs of illustrations for 1944: the Canadians in Normandy; correspondence with Macmillan of Canada re. publication of book.

SERIES II MATERIAL RELATING TO CANADIAN BATTALIONS, WORLD WAR, 1914- 1918

Accession 83-142, 2 Boxes, 52 cm. 1915-1918 War Diaries (photocopies) of the 31st Infantry Battalion; 6th Canadian Infantry Brigade Machine-Gun Company; 5th Canadian Mounted Rifle Battalion; and the 116th Canadian Battalion.

SERIES III MATERIAL RELATING TO THE 1st BATTALION REGINA RIFLE REGIMENT, WORLD WAR, 1939-1945

Accession 81-18, 1 Box, 13 cm. 1939-1944 War Diaries (photocopies).

SERIES IV MATERIAL RELATING TO NATO AND NORAD

Accession 88-12, Box 1, 13 cm. 1968-1985. Original order. Canadian defence policy statements, files on the origins and policies of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the North American Air Defence Command (NORAD), including press releases, newsletters, brochures, and information handbooks. Also includes

copies of articles on terrorism and disarmament.

SERIES V SOUTH AFRICA, SOUTH-WEST AFRICA/NAMIBIA

Accession 88-17, Boxes 1-3, 30 cm. 1978-1987. Arranged alphabetically by name or subject. Material collected by Professor Roy. Reports, addresses, newsletters, correspondence, brochures, clippings relating to apartheid, the African National Congress, economic and business issues relating to South Africa. South-West Africa/Namibia material includes manifestos, constitutions, guidelines and bills of rights of Aktur and the DTA in SWA/Namibia, policy manifesto of the SWA/Namibia Liberation Front and the Namibia National Front; newsletters, newspapers, magazines, brochures and booklets.

SERIES VI CANADIAN MILITARY POLICIES - MANPOWER AND CONSCRIPTION

Accession 88-18, Box 1, 13 cm. n.d. Photocopy of typescript of chapter VII from a book by the Canadian Army Historical Section, "Manpower and Conscription". Used by C.P. Stacey as the basis for his book, Arms, Men and Government.

SERIES VII UNIVERSITY OF VICTORIA. ALUMNI ASSOCIATION

Accession 83-167, Box 1, 13 cm, 1964-1983. Arranged chronologically. Alumni Association Constitution, correspondence, minutes of meetings, lists of Executive members, and lists of fund drive donors.

SERIES VIII CANADIAN CONFEDERATION CENTENNIAL COMMITTEE OF BRITISH COLUMBIA. HISTORIC COMMEMORATIONS SUB-COMMITTEE

Accession 74-7, 1964-1967. Arranged chronologically. Minutes of meetings, correspondence, Centennial Committee organizational chart, lists of proposed plaque sites, booklets, reports, newsletters.

SERIES IX CANADA. CANADIAN ARMY. CANADIAN OFFICERS TRAINING CORPS/REGULAR OFFICER TRAINING PLAN. UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA CONTINGENT. UNIVERSITY OF VICTORIA DETACHMENT

Accession 82-7, 3 Boxes, 30 cm. 1953-1968. Arranged chronologically. Correspondence, reports, newspaper clippings, operation orders, unit orders, model exercises, recruiting material (including brochures), summaries of training programmes, dinner invitations, menus, guest lists, notice board instructions, minutes of meetings of the Tri-Services Committee, officer assessments (restricted).

SERIES X READY FOR THE FRAY: A HISTORY OF THE CANADIAN SCOTTISH REGIMENT (PRINCESS MARY'S), 1920-1955 (Published 1958)

Accession 74-8, 1 Box, 26 cm., 1954-1958. Arranged chronologically. Correspondence, editorial comments by C.P. Stacey, typescripts, galley proofs. SERIES XI SINEWS OF STEEL: A HISTORY OF THE BRITISH COLUMBIA DRAGOONS (1965) Accession 74-9, 5 boxes, 66 cm., 1944-1964. Arranged chronologically. War diaries (photocopies), correspondence, typescripts, galley proofs.

SERIES XII THE SEAFORTH HIGHLANDERS OF CANADA (1969)

Accession 74-10, 7 boxes, 90 cm., 1966-1969. Arranged chronologically. Correspondence, notes, maps, newspaper clippings, transcripts of interviews with Seaforth veterans, critical comments on the manuscript by Seaforth veterans, variant drafts, galley proofs.

SERIES XIII TELEGRAMS OF THE NORTH-WEST CAMPAIGN, 1885, by Prof. Roy and Prof. Desmond Morton (1972)

Accession 73-1, 9 Boxes, 1.2 m., 1885-1972. Original order. Photocopies of correspondence of A.P. Caron re. the Riel Rebellion, 1885-1886; correspondence of Prof. Roy and Prof. Morton; notes, file cards, maps; variant drafts.

SERIES XIV PAPERS OF JOHN LAURIE, R.C.A.F PROVOST MARSHALL

Accession 89-25, 2 Boxes, 56 cm., 1943-1979. Arranged chronologically. Material relating to War Crimes trials and executions; correspondence of Provost Marshall Laurie; Air Force forms and identification cards; newspaper clippings; photographs of official and social activities of John Laurie and fellow officers in Germany, Paris and Holland.

SERIES XV DIRECTORATE OF HISTORY, OTTAWA

Accession 88-8, 5 Boxes, 58 cm., 1941-1945. Original order. Historical files, summaries of intelligence reports from military districts in Canada, war diaries of the Research and Information Section, Weekly Intelligence Summaries of the Pacific Command, Morale Reports.

SERIES XVI THE JOURNAL OF PRIVATE FRASER, CANADIAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE (1985), ed. by Prof. Roy

Accession 88-15, 2 Boxes, 21 cm., 1915-1916. Arranged chronologically. Photocopies of holograph diary of Private Donald Fraser; re-typed copies of diary; tss. and galley proofs of Prof. Roy's book.

SERIES XVII PAPERS OF REV. E.G PARKER

Accession 88-19, 1 Box, 13 cm., 1854-1856. Arranged in reverse chronological order. Photocopies of correspondence from Rev. Parker to his daughter and other people while in the Crimea. SERIES XVIII SCRAPBOOKS Accession 82-11, 1 Box, 1 m., 1968-1974. Arranged thematically. Scrapbooks of newspaper clippings re. military and strategic studies, international military news and weaponry.

Accession 84-28, 2 Boxes 2 m., 1969-1981. Scrapbooks of newspaper clippings concerning NATO, Canadian defence policies, and military and strategic studies.

SERIES XIX OTHER WORKS BY PROF. ROY Accession 88-80, 1 Box, 13 cm., n.d. "Rifleman Forin in the Riel Rebellion," paper by Prof. Roy.

SERIES XX FENIAN SUBMARINE Accession 90-6, 1 Box, 6 cm., 1880-1881. Original order. Original correspondence re. the Fenians; photocopies of correspondence; microfilm copies of correspondence and newspaper articles.

SERIES XXI RED CHEVRON ASSOCIATION OF VANCOUVER ISLAND Accession 89-52, 2 Files, 1963-1976. Original order. Correspondence with war veterans, including members of the Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry, and with the Royal Canadian Legion and other organizations; membership lists; newspaper clippings.

SERIES XXII OTHER MATERIAL RELATING TO THE WORLD WAR, 1939-1945 Accession 89-49, 1 File, n.d. Paper, "Three Bridges to Berlin", by S. Lloyd Swanton, ts., with 2 b & w photographs.

Accession 89-50, 1 File, n.d. 1 Temporary War Ration card and 2 ration books of Elizabeth Dawne Veinot, Nova Scotia.

Accession 89-51, 1 File, 1983-1986. Arranged chronologically. Department of National Defence newsletter, Press Roundup, November 1983 - October 1986.

Accession 82-5

Box 1 Normandy - 4th Canadian Armoured Division

1.1 4th Canadian Armd. Division. "Background to 'Operation Totalize'". Account written by Maj.-Gen. George Kitching, October 1980. Holograph, 7 leaves; annotated photocopy ts. re. Operation Totalize and Operation Tractable, 34 leaves. 1.2 4th Canadian Armd. Division. Intelligence Summary and Situation Reports, 7-9 August 1944. 1.3 4th Canadian Armd. Div. War Diary, June-July-August 1944. 1.4 Operation Tractable. Instructions. 13 August 1944. Carbon tss., 7 leaves. Hand-drawn map of France, 1 leaf. 1.5 4th Canadian Armd. Div. Operations Log, 8 August 1944. 1.6 4th Canadian Armd. Brigade. Operations Logs, Situation Reports, 9-14 August 1944. 1.7 Letter to Col. C.P. Stacey from A. Fortescue Duguid, re. a history of the Canadian Grenadier Guards, 14 Feb. 1952. Photocopy ts., 2 leaves. 1.8 29th Canadian Armd. Reconnaisance Regiment (South Alberta Regiment). War Diary, June-July-August, 1944. 1.9 4th Canadian Armd. Div. Statistics Charts: "Units When Under 85%"; Battle Casualties; Cumulative Officer Battle Casualties; Cumulative OR Battle Casualties; Cumulative Prisoners of War; PW - Provost Channels Only. Photocopies, 7 leaves. 1.10 4th Can. Armd. Div. RCA Field Regiments. War Diary, August 1944; Interview of Capt. C. Harold Clarkson by William Thackray, transcript, 7 leaves, 19 August 1980. 1.11 A Short History of the 29 Cdn. Armd. Recce Regt. (South Alberta Regiment), by Maj. G.L. MacDougall. Amsterdam, Spin's Publishing Co., n.d. Page proofs, photocopies, 45 sheets. 1.12 22nd Cdn. Armd. Regt., Cdn. Gren. Guards. Operations, 8 August 1944 - 5 May 1945. Carbons, 10 leaves. 1.13 21st Cdn. Armd. Regt. (Gov.-General's Foot Guards), 4th Cdn. Armd. Bde.). War Diary, June-July-Aug. 1944. 1.14 22nd Cdn. Armd. Regt. (Cdn. Gren. Guards). War Diary, July-August 1944. 1.15 The Green Centre Line, Newsletter, Vol. 1, Nos. 6-7, 12 Aug. 1944. 1.16 28th Cdn. Armd. Regt. (British Columbia Regiment). War diaries, July-Aug. 1944. "The Story of the British Columbia Regiment, 1939-1945", by D.E.H. Parker, Chapter V. Photocopied pages from book, [5 l.]. 1.17 Lincoln and Welland Regiment. War Diary, 15-31 July 1944 - August 1944. 1.18 10th Cdn. Inf. Bde. War Diaries, June-July-Aug. 1944. 1.19 The Algonquin Regiment. War Diary, 15-31 July 1944 - August 1944.

Photocopies of originals in the Public Archives of Canada. 1.20 The Algonquin Regiment. War Diary, August 1944; "Account of Battle Participation", 6-11 Aug. 1944, prepared by Maj. L.C. Monk, photocopy ts., 11 leaves; "Outline of Events", 8-10 Aug. 1944 by Lt. Robert Saville, photocopy ts., 1 leaf; "First Battle Innoculation", by Lt. Ken Gartley, photocopy ts., 3 l. 1.21 Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders of Canada. War Diaries, 15-31 July - August 1944. 1.22 Lake Superior Regiment. War Diaries, 15-31 July - August 1944.

Accession 82-5

Box 2 2nd Canadian Corps - H.Q. July-August 1944

2.1 HQ 2nd Cdn. Corps. War Diary, June-Aug. 1944. 2.2 Lt.-Gen. Simonds. Operation 'Totalize' and 'Tractable', Aug. 1944. Correspondence, reports. Carbons, 21 leaves. 2.3 2nd Corps. Operation Totalize. Reports, 7-16 Aug. 1944. Photocopies, 25 leaves. 2.4 Operational Directives by Lt.-Gen. Simonds, 29 July-19 Aug. 1944. Carbon, 9 leaves. 2.5 Lt.-Gen. Simonds. 2 Cdn. Corps. GOC's activities - personal diary. July-Dec. 1944. 2.6 2nd Corps. Operation Tractable. Reports, 14-16 Aug. 1944. 2.7 Operations Totalize and Tractable. Air Aspects. Extracts from R.A.F. Narrative (First Draft); Correspondence; other reports. Aug. 1944 - May 1945. 2.8 Operation Atlantic - 2nd Cdn. Inf. Div. Notes, map tracings, July 1944. 2.9 2nd. Cdn. Corps. Intelligence Summaries. August 1944. 2.10 2nd Cdn. Corps. Corps Troops. 12th Manitoba Dragoons. War Diaries, August 1944. 2.11 2nd Cdn. Corps. Situation Reports and Intelligence Summaries, 8-9 August 1944. 2.12 2nd Cdn. Corps. Intelligence Logs, August 1944. Photocopies, 20 leaves. Includes letter to Dr. Roy from the Canadian War Museum, Ottawa, 30 January 1981. 2.13 2nd Cdn. Corps Commanders - Lt.-Gen. Simonds. Policy letters, July - August 1944. Photocopies, 8 leaves. 2.14 Lt.-Gen. G.G. Simonds. Policy Statements, February - October 1944. Photocopies, 26 leaves. 2.15 Lt.-Gen. Simonds. Policy letters, February 1944. Photocopy, 15 leaves. "Lessons Learned" from operations, 1 July 1944, photocopy, 4 leaves. 2.16 2nd Cdn. Corps. Operations Logs, 8-9 August 1944. 2.17 Operation Goodwood. Meetings, orders, instructions, 15-17 July

1944. 2.18 RAF Bomber Attack: 4-12 July 1944. Report. Photocopy, 8 leaves. 2.19 Operation Spring. Orders and instructions, 23-24 July 1944. 2.20 1st Cdn. Army - Operation to Capture Falaise, France. Draft of report, photocopy, 12 leaves. 2.21 Operations Totalize and Tractable. Reports by Col. R. Massey- Westrop. Photocopies, 5 leaves. 2.22 Operations Totalize and Tractable. Armoured Personnel Carriers. Reports.

Box 3 2nd Cdn. Armd. Bde.

3.1 War diaries, June-July 1944. 3.2 War Diary, August 1944. 3.3 Tank losses statistics, August 1944. 3.4 "Operation Overlord: The Assault on the Beaches of Normandy, 6-11 June 1944. Sequence of Events and Lessons Arising Therefrom." 2 July 1944. Photocopy, ts, 34 leaves. 3.5 6 Cdn. Armd. Regt., 1st Hussars. War Diaries, June-August 1944; A History of the First Hussars Regiment, 1856-1945. London: Hunter Printing, 1951. Photocopies from book, p. 90-109, title page, Forword.

Accession 82-5

Box 3 2nd Cdn. Armd. Bde.

3.6 2nd Cdn. Armd. Bde. Extracts from memoranda, August - November 1944. Photocopy ts., 6 leaves. 3.7 2nd Cdn. Armd. Bde. Memorandum of Interview with Lt.-Col. R.J. Colwell and Maj. F.E. White, 6 Cdn. Armd. Regt. (1 H), 20 August 1944. Photocopy, ts., 3 leaves. 3.8 6th Cdn. Armd. Regt., "C" Squadron. Report of Action at Fontenay-Le-Marmion, 17 June 1946. Photocopy of carbon ts., 1 leaf (2 copies). 3.9 6th Cdn. Armd. Regt. War Diary, August 1944. 3.10 10th Cdn. Armd. Regt., Fort Garry House. War Diary, July 1944. 3.11 10th Cdn. Armd. Regt., Fort Garry House. War Diaries, July- August 1944. 3.12 10th Cdn. Armd. Regt. War Diary, June-August 1944. 3.13 27th Cdn. Armd. Regt., Sherbrooke Fusiliers. War Diaries, June- July 1944. 3.14 27th Cdn. Armd. Regt., Sherbrooke Fusiliers. List of actions and events from landing in BLA to 5 May 1945. Photocopy of carbon, 5 leaves. 3.15 27th Cdn. Armd. Regt., Sherbrooke Fusiliers. War Diaries, August

1944. 3.16 27th Cdn. Armd. Regt., Sherbrooke Fusiliers, CAC Operation Charnwood, "The Fall of Caen", 8-9 July 1944. Photocopy, ts., 25 leaves. 3.17 5th Cdn. Armd. Div. Radio Net Logs, April-May 1945.

Box 4 2nd and 4th Cdn. Inf. Bde.

4.1 2 Division. Operations Logs, 4-31 July 1944. Photocopies. 4.2 2nd Cdn. Inf. Div. Operations Logs, 14-18 August 1944. 4.3 2nd Cdn. Inf. Div. Operations Log, August 1944. 4.4 HQ 2nd Cdn. Inf. Div. War Diary, July - August 1944. 4.5 2nd Cdn. Inf. Div. Intelligence Summary, July 1944. 4.6 G Branch - HQ 2nd Cdn. Inf. Div. War Diary, June 1944. 4.7 2nd Cdn. Inf. Div. Operation Instructions, July - December 1944. Includes map tracings. 4.8 HQ, 2nd Cdn. Inf. Div. Operation Totalize. Reports, August 1944. 4.9 4th Cdn. Inf. Bde. Operations Logs, July - August 1944. 4.10 4th Cdn. Inf. Bde. War Diary, July - August 1944. 4.11 Essex Scottish Regiment (4th Bde.). War Diaries, July - August 1944; 1 Battalion: The Essex Scottish Regiment, 1939-1945: A Brief Narrative. Photocopies of Chapter V, p. 30-47. 4.12 Essex Scottish Regiment. Court of Enquiry. Proceedings, correspondence. August 1944. Includes letter to Dr. Roy from Lt.-Col. B.J.S. Macdonald, 2 June 1980, tls., 3 leaves, with enclosed re-typed copies of earlier letters from Macdonald to Gen. Foulkes, tss., 4 leaves.

Accession 82-5

Box 5 2nd Cdn. Inf. Div., 6th Brigade 5.1 Situation Reports, August 1944. 5.2 HQ 6 Cdn. Inf. Bde. War Diary, June 1944. 5.3 HQ 6 Cdn. Inf. Bde. War Diary, July 1944. 5.4 HQ 6 Cdn. Inf. Bde. War Diary, August 1944. 5.5 Iron Brigade News Sheet, Appendix 13, Vol. 1, Edition 25, 31 August 1944. 5.6 Operations Log, Appendix 4, August 1944. 5.7 Fusiliers Mont-Royal. "Report on Employment of Flame-Throwers in Attacks on May-sur-Orne and Secqueville La Campagne on 8 August 1944." 14 August 1944. Photocopy of carbon, 2 leaves.

5.8 Fusiliers Mont-Royal. "Account of the Capture of Monastery 144358 in Falaise 7-8 Aug. 1944". Photocopy, 5 leaves. Includes hand-drawn map. 5.9 Queen's Own Cameron Highlanders of Canada. War Diaries, July - August 1944. 5.10 SP Company, Camerons of Canada. Attack on St. Andre-Sur-Orne. Notes, report, 4 August 1944. Photocopy, 3 leaves. 5.11 "A" Company. Camerons of Canada. Attack on St. Andre-Sur-Orne. Notes, 4 August 1944. Photocopy, 1 leaf. 5.12 Camerons of Canada. Fontenay-le-Marmion Attack. Report, 11 August 1944. Photocopy, 6 leaves. 5.13 "A" Company. Camerons of Canada. Attack on Fontenay-le-Marmion. Report, 10 August 1944. Photocopy, 1 leaf. 5.14 "B" Company. Camerons of Canada. Battle of Fontaine-le-Marmion. Photocopy with hol. underlining, 7 leaves. Hand-drawn map. August 1944. 5.15 Camerons of Canada. "Account of the Attack on La Cressionniere and on Falaise, 14-17 Aug. 1944". Report, 18 Aug. 1944. Photocopy, 4 leaves; Operational Notes, clippings. 5.16 South Saskatchewan Regiment. War Diary, July - August 1944; correspondence, 1 August 1944; Iron Brigade News Sheet, 9 August 1944. 5.17 South Saskatchewan Regiment. Attack on High Ground, July 1944. Reports, photocopies, 24 leaves. 5.18 2nd Anti-Tank Regiment, R.C.A. War Diary Extract, July 1944. Photocopy, 2 leaves.

Box 6 3rd Cdn. Inf. Div. 6.1 War Diary Extracts re. D-Day and aftermath. August 1944. 6.2 Operation Tallulah. Report, August 1944. Photocopy, 2 leaves. 6.3 HQ. Ops. Logs, 14-18 August 1944. 6.4 War Diary, August 1944. 6.5 Operation Tractable. Report, 10-17 August 1944. Photocopy, 11 leaves. 6.6 7th Cdn. Inf. Bde. Memo of interview with Maj. H.W. Foster, 22 June 1944. Photocopy of carbon, 4 leaves. 6.7 R.C.E. War Diary, August 1944. 6.8 7th Cdn. Recce Regt. War Diary, June, August 1944. 6.9 12th Cdn. Rd. Regt., RCA. Memo of interview with Lt.-Col. R.H. Webb, 23 June 1944. Photocopies, 3 leaves. Accession 82-5

Box 6 3rd Cdn. Inf. Div.

6.10 Memo of interview with Lt.-Col. P.C. Klaehn, 28 July 1944. Photocopy, 2 leaves. 6.11 7th Cdn. Inf. Bde., 3rd Cdn. Div. War Diaries, August 1944.

6.12 Royal Winnipeg Rifles. War Diaries, July - August 1944. 6.13 Royal Winnipeg Rifles. "Memo of interview with CSM Belton, B Coy, R Wpg Rif, 14 June 1944". Photocopies, 3 leaves. 6.14 Regina Rifles. War Diaries, June - August 1944. 6.15 Regina Rifles. Correspondence re. Norrey-en Bessin, 1950. Photocopies, 4 leaves. 6.16 "Liberation of Bretteville-L'Orgueilleuse-Normandy". 7-8 June 1944. Regina Rifles. Photocopy, 1 leaf. 6.17 Memo of interview with Lt.-Col. Matheson, Regina Rifles, 24 June 1944. Photocopy, 4 leaves. 6.18 Canadian Scottish Regiment. War Diary, August 1944. "The Attack on Point 168 - Aug. 15". Report, August 1944. Photocopy, 9 leaves. 6.19 1 Canadian Scottish Regiment. War Diary Extracts, October 1944, January 1945. 6.20 Canadian Scottish Regiment. Battle Narrative of D-Day to D- Day+2. June 1944. 6.21 Canadian Scottish Regiment. Narrative of D-Day (Major J.J. Andrews) and Counter-Attack on Putot-en-Bessin. June 1944. Photocopy, 3 leaves. 6.22 Canadian Scottish Regiment. The Capture of Cussy. Memo of interview with Lt.-Col. F.N. Cabeldu, 13 July 1944. Photocopy, 2 leaves. 6.23 Queen's Own Rifles of Canada. War Diaries, list of appendices, July - August 1944. 6.24 8th Cdn. Inf. Bde. War Diary, August 1944. 6.25 Interview with Maj. J.N. Gordon, QOR of C., re. Operation Overlord, 15 July 1944. Photocopy of carbon, 4 leaves. 6.26 Le Regiment de la Chaudiere. War Diaries, July - August 1944. 6.27 North Shore (New Brunswick) Regiment. War Diary, July - August 1944. 6.28 HQ 9th Cdn. Inf. Bde. War Diary, August 1944. 6.29 Highland Light Infantry of Canada. War Diary, August 1944. 6.30 Stormont, Dundas and Glengarry Highlanders. War Diaries, July - August 1944. 6.31 Memo of interview with Lt.-Col. R. Rowley, OC, SD&G Highrs., 17 August 1944. Photocopies, 6 leaves. 6.32 Memo of interview with Lt.-Col. G.H. Christiansen, OC, SD&G Highrs., 1 August 1944. Photocopies, 4 leaves. 6.33 "Account by Lt.-Col. R. Rowley, SD&G Highrs., 22 August 1944". Photocopy, 2 leaves. 6.34 N.N.S. Highrs., 9th Bde. War Diary, August 1944.

Accession 82-5

Box 7 Normandy Campaign - Directorate of History. Photocopied files

7.1 1 Polish Armd. Div. Operation Totalize, 7-13 Aug. 1944, 11 leaves; "Falaise Gap Has Been Closed", photocopies from book (2 sets), 14 leaves each. 7.2 German sources. Special Interrogation Report, June - August 1944. Photocopy, 12 leaves; Operation Totalize, article, translated from the German photocopy, 11 leaves. 7.3 "Situation Reports by German Army Commanders in Normandy, May 15 - October 11, 1944". Photocopies, 76 leaves. (Translated into English) 7.4 1 Polish Armd. Div. Operational Reports, 7 Aug. - 9 Nov. 1944. Translated into English. Photocopies, 49 leaves. 7.5 Campaign in France, 1944. Interrogation of General Blumentritt by Chester Wilmot. Photocopies, 8 leaves. 7.6 Interview with Brig. K.G. Blockader, re. 8th Cdn. Inf. Bde. in Operation Overlord. Photocopies, 4 leaves. 24 June 1944. 7.7 "The Normandy Invasion - June 1944," prepared by the German Air Historical Branch (8th Abteilung), dated 6 August 1944. Translated into English. Photocopy, 12 leaves. 7.8 RCEME / LORE Corps History. Index, drafts, correspondence. 1963-1978. 7.9 RCEME history re. D-Day, Operation Totalize, prepared by Col. M.C. Johnston. Drafts of Chapters 10 and 11. Photocopies, 22 leaves. 7.10 1st Cdn. Parachute Battalion. June-July 1944. War Diary Extracts, interviews with Maj. D.J. Wilkins, 15 leaves. 7.11 6 Airborne Division. Report on Operations, 5 June to 3 Sept. 1944. Photocopy, 17 leaves. 7.12 6 Airborne Division. Immediate reports, 11-12 June 1944. Photocopies, 30 leaves. 7.13 6 Airborne Division. Report on operations in Normandy, 6 June - 27 August 1944. Photocopy, 85 leaves. Includes copies of maps. 7.14 "British Army of the Rhine Battlefield Tour, Operation Totalize, 2nd Cdn. Corps Operations Astride Road Caen-Fal." Germany, September 1947. Photocopy of book, 108 leaves.

Accession 82-8 The Canadians in the Normandy Campaign (1982)

Box 1

1.1 Holograph draft. Title page, Chapters I-III, ca. 100 leaves. 1.2 Holograph draft. Chapters IV-VI, ca. 110 leaves. 1.3 Holograph draft. Chapter VII (includes 3 types pages); Chapter VIII. ca. 120 leaves total. 1.4 Holograph draft. Chapter IX, 49 leaves. 1.5 Holograph draft. "Bibliographic Notes" [Appendix], 3 leaves.

Accession 82-12 The Canadians in the Normandy Campaign (1982)

Box 1

1.1 Normandy Campaign Book. Statistical records showing casualties suffered by the Canadian Army in Europe on D-Day. 1.2 Report No. 54, Historical Section (G.S.) Army Headquarters. "Canadian Participation in the Operations in North-West Europe, 1944". Ts., p. 1-162. 1.3 Report No. 54, "Canadian Participation in the Operations in North-West Europe, 1944". Ts., p. 163-265, and appendices.

Accession 83-179 1944: The Canadians in Normandy (1984)

Box 1

1.1 HQ 2nd Canadian Infantry Brigade. Intelligence summaries and message logs, June-August 1943. Photocopies of holographs and tss. 1.2 HQ 2nd Cdn. Inf. Bde. Intelligence and message logs, September 1943. Photocopies of tss. 1.3 HQ 2nd Cdn. Inf. Bde. Intelligence and message logs, October 1943. Photocopies of tss. 1.4 HQ 2nd Cdn. Inf. Bde. Intelligence and message logs, December 1943. Photocopies of tss. 1.5 HQ 2nd Cdn. Inf. Bde. Intelligence and message logs, January- February 1944. Photocopies of tss. 1.6 HQ Inf. Bde. Intelligence and message logs, March-May 1944. Photocopies of tss.

Box 2

2.1 HQ 2nd Cdn. Inf. Bde. Ops/Intelligence Logs, June-August 1944. Photocopies of tss. 2.2 HQ 2nd Cdn. Inf. Bde. Ops/Intelligence Log, September 1944.

Photocopies of tss. 2.3 HQ 2nd Cdn. Inf. Bde. Ops/Intelligence Logs, October-November 1944. Photocopies of tss. 2.4 HQ 2nd Cdn. Inf. Bde. Ops/Intelligence Log, December 1944. Photocopies of tss. 2.5 HQ 2nd Cdn. Inf. Bde. Ops/Intelligence Log, January 1945. Photocopies of tss.

Accession 83-179 1944: The Canadians in Normandy (1984)

Box 3

3.1 HQ 2nd Cdn. Inf. Bde. Ops/Intelligence Logs, February 1945. Photocopies of tss. 3.2 HQ 2nd Cdn. Inf. Bde. Ops/Intelligence Log, April 1945. Photocopies of tss. 3.3 HQ 2nd Cdn. Inf. Bde. Ops/Intelligence Log, May 1945. Photocopies of tss.

Box 4

4.1 1944: The Canadians in Normandy. Tss. with hol. rev., Chapters I-VI, p. 1-238. 4.2 Tss. with hol. rev., Chapters VII-IX, p. 239-402. 4.3 Variant draft. Tss. with hol. rev., Chapters I-IX, p. 1-402. 4.4 Variant draft. Photocopy of ts., Chapters IV-IX, p. 121-403. 4.5 Incomplete variant drafts. Tss. Dedication, Preface, Chapters I- VIII, p. i-235, 252-421. Chapter VII, p. 239-293.

Accession 84-4 1944: The Canadians in Normandy (1984)

Box 1

1.1 Final tss. Photocopy of ts. with hol. rev., preliminary pages, Chapters I-III, p. i-120. 1.2 Final tss. Photocopy of ts. with hol. rev., Chapters IV-VII, p. 121-238. 1.3 Final tss. Photocopy of ts. with hol. rev., Chapters VIII-IX, p. 239-353. 1.4 Final tss. Photocopy of ts. with hol. rev., Chapter X, p. 354- 402; Appendices B-F, p. 403-420. 1.5 Author's copy. Preface, p. i-v. Appendix A-E, p. 403-421.

Accession 84-11 1944: The Canadians in Normandy (1984)

Box 1

1.1 Author's corrected copy. Title page, Table of Contents, Chapter I. Tss., 44 leaves. 1.2 Author's corrected copy. Chapter II, p. 43-75. Carbon ts., p. 43-61; ts., p. 62-75. 1.3 Author's corrected copy. Chapter III, carbon ts., p. 76-120. 1.4 Author's corrected copy. Chapter IV, carbon ts., p. 121-165. 1.5 Author's corrected copy. Chapter V, carbon ts., p. 166-206. 1.6 Author's corrected copy. Chapter VI, carbon ts., p. 207-238. 1.7 Author's corrected copy. Chapter VII, carbon ts., p. 239-293. 1.8 Author's corrected copy. Chapter VIII, ts. and carbons, p. 294- 353. 1.9 Author's corrected copy. Chapter IX, ts. and carbons, p. 354- 402.

Accession 84-12 1944: The Canadians in Normandy (1984)

Box 1

1.1 The Times, London, 7 June 1944, re. D-Day. 1.2 The News, Portsmouth, 1984. "Operation Overlord: The Story of the Allied Invasion of Normandy, D-Day, June 6, 1944".

Accession 86-1

Box 1

1.1 Canada. Army. HQ Historical Section (G.S.), Report No. 50, 14 October 1952. "The Campaign in North-West Europe, Part II: Invasion and Battle of Normandy, 6 June-22 August 1944. Ts., 142 leaves. 1.2 Report No. 50, Invasion and Battle of Normandy. Indices, appendices. 1.3 Report No. 58, 15 February 1953. "Canadian Participation in the Operations in North-West Europe, 1944, Part II: Canadian Operations in July". Ts., ca. 175 leaves, plus 5 maps.

Accession 86-24 1944: The Canadians in Normandy

Box 1

1.1 Lists of correspondents, notes, comments on 1944: The Canadians in Normandy, 1984. 1.2 Correspondence - photocopies, A. 1980-1981. Includes photocopies of recollections of Normandy veterans. 1.3 Correspondence - photocopies, B. 1981-1984. 1.4 Correspondence - photocopies, C. 1980-1982. 1.5 Correspondence - photocopies, D - F. 1981-1982. 1.6 Correspondence - photocopies, G. 1980-1983. 1.7 Correspondence - photocopies. Mailing list of correspondents, L - W. 1.8 Correspondence - photocopies, L. 1979-1981. 1.9 Correspondence - photocopies, Mac - Mc. 1979-1982. 1.10 Correspondence - photocopies, M. 1980-1982. 1.11 Correspondence - photocopies, P - R. 1980-1981. 1.12 Correspondence - photocopies, S. 1980-1983.

Box 2

2.1 Correspondence - photocopies, Louis St.-Laurent, 1982. 2.2 Correspondence - photocopies, T. 1981. 2.3 Correspondence - photocopies, W. 1979-1982. Includes copy of the personal diary of C.M. Wightman. 2.4 Correspondence - photocopies, Y. 1979-1981. 2.5 Correspondence, copies of newspaper clippings, notes on chapters of book, notes on translation of book by Kurt Meyer.

Accession 88-9 General Crerar correspondence

Box 1 1.1 1941-1945. Photocopies from the Public Archives of Canada (PAC), MG 30 E157, Vol. 7, File D 137. 1.2 1942-1945. Photocopies, PAC, MG 30, E157, Vol. 7, D 138. 1.3 Personal correspondence, 1942-1943. Photocopies, PAC, MG 30, E157, Vol. 7, D 140. 1.4 Personal correspondence, 1943-1945. Photocopies, PAC, MG 30, E157, Vol. 7, D 143. 1.5 1941-1945. Photocopies, PAC, MG 30, E 157, Vol. 7, D 145.

Box 2 2.1 Crerar Family. Personal correspondence, 1942-1945. Photocopies, PAC, MG 30, E 157, Vol. 7, D 150. 2.2 Gen. Crerar. Personal correspondence, 1942-1945. Photocopies, PAC, MG 30, E 157, Vol. 7, D 152. 2.3 Gen. Crerar. Official correspondence, 1941-1945. Photocopies, PAC, MG 30, E 157, Vol. 7, D 156.

Accession 88-10

Box 1 Re. General H.D.G. Crerar

1.1 Gen. Crerar correspondence. Microfilm print-outs, 1944-1945. 1.2 Correspondence, "Suggestions to Help Win the War", 1940-1941. 1.3 Correspondence, reports, 1943-1945. 1.4 Correspondence, war diaries, 1942-1945. Includes copies of letters from Field Marshal Sir Bernard Montgomery. 1.5 Crerar - War Diaries, June 1944. 1.6 Crerar - Directives of the 21st Army. 1944. Photocopies. 1.7 G.S., Intelligence, 1st Cdn. Army. War Diaries, July - August 1944. 1.8 Report of visit to the 8th Army. Appendices B - J. n.d. 1.9 Crerar - Operation Totalize. Remarks to Senior Officers, Cdn. Army; correspondence. August 1944. Photocopies. 1.10 Crerar - GOC-in-C files, 1st Cdn. Army. Correspondence with Lt.- Gen. G.G. Simonds. 1944-1945. Photocopies. 1.11 GOC-in-C files. 1944. Photocopies. 1.12 2nd Canadian Corps. "Immediate Report on Operation Totalize". 7-9 August 1944. Photocopies, 14 leaves. 1.13 Crerar - Montgomery correspondence re. raids across the English Channel. February 1942. Photocopies. 1.14 Crerar - re. Canadian Prisoners Of War. Correspondence, telegrams. 3 June - 11 August 1944.

Accession 88-11

Box 1 2nd Cdn. Inf. Div., 4th-5th Brigades

1.1 4th Inf. Bde., 2nd Inf. Div. Royal Regiment of Canada. War Diaries, July - August 1944. 1.2 Royal Regiment of Canada. Accounts of the move to Tournebu, 11- 12 August 1944. Photocopies, 5 leaves. 1.3 "Account of the Attack on Louvigny Night 18-19 July 1944 ..." Royal Regiment of Canada. Photocopies, 12 leaves. Includes map and air photo of Louvigny, France. 1.4 Royal Regiment of Canada. Account of the attack on PT 122 and Glaumesnil, 7-8 August 1944. Photocopies, 4 leaves. Includes air photos. 1.5 "Account of the Actions of the Scout PL RHLI in the attack and holding of Verriers, 25 July 1944." Photocopies, 6 leaves. 1.6 "Account of the Attack on PT46 - (0655) 8 Aug. 1944 by RHLI". Photocopy, 2 leaves. 1.7 Royal Hamilton Light Infantry. War Diaries, July - August 1944. 1.8 Royal Hamilton Light Infantry. Letter to Col. C.P. Stacey from Brig. J.M. Rockingham, 27 October 1948. Photocopy (unsigned), 3 leaves. 1.9 RHLI. Account of the Battle of Verrieres, 25 July 1944. Photocopy, 7 leaves. Includes air photo. 1.10 HQ 5th Can. Inf. Brig. War Diaries, June - August 1944. 1.11 5th Can. Inf. Brig. Message Logs, 12 July - 31 August 1944. 1.12 5th Cdn. Inf. Brig. Account of attack on Bretteville-sur-Laize, 8 August 1944. Photocopies, 2 leaves.

Accession 88-11

Box 1 2nd Cdn. Inf. Div., 4th-5th Brigades

1.13 "Outline Report on Battle May-sur-Orne - Fontenay-Le-Marmion. 25 July 1944. Includes correspondence, map. Photocopies, 12 leaves. 1.14 Operation Spring. The Black Watch (Royal Highland Regiment) of Canada, 25 July 1944. Correspondence, report, February 1946. Photocopies, ca. 100 leaves. 1.15 Operation Spring. "Notes on the Movements of R.H.C. at May-sur- Orne, France, 25 July 1944". Photocopies, 38 leaves. 1.16 Scout Pl, RHC; Account of the Black Watch on May-sur-Orne, 25 July 1944. Photocopies, 3 leaves. 1.17 Memo of interview with Pte. Williams, re. Attack of the R.H.C. on Fontenay-le-Marmion, 25 July 1944. Photocopy, 2 leaves, and copy of map. 1.18 Account of Maj. Bennett re. the Black Watch on May-sur-Orne, 25 July 1944. Photocopies, 11 leaves. Includes maps. 1.19 Action by RHC, Fontenay-le-Marmion. Messages, letter, report. 25 July 1944. Photocopies, 7 leaves, including map. 1.20 "Operation Spring - 25 July 1944. Emphasis on Black Watch Attack". Report, n.d. Ts., 23 leaves. 1.21 2nd Cdn. Inf. Div., 5th Brig. Calgary Highlanders. War Diaries, July - August 1944. 1.22 Calgary Highlanders. Account of Attack on May-sur-Orne, 24-25 July 1944. Photocopies, 23 leaves. 1.23 Tilly-la-Campagne. Account by Capt. P.A. Mayer, 1 August 1944. Photocopy, 4 leaves. 1.24 Calgary Highlanders. Account of attack on May-sur-Orne as given by Lt.-Col. MacLaughlan, 25 July 1944. Photocopy, 8 leaves. Includes 2 maps. 1.25 Calgary Highlanders. Report of Action. 25 July 1944. Photocopy, 3 leaves. 1.26 Calgary Highlanders. Account of Attack on Tilly-la-Campagne, 31 July - 1 August 1944, as told to Capt. Engler by Lt. R. Porter, 2 August 1944. Photocopy, 2 leaves. 1.27 Calgary Highlanders. Account of seizure of Bretteville-sur- Laize, 8 August 1944. Photocopies, 4 leaves, including map. 1.28 Calgary Highlanders. Account of the seizure of the Bridgehead, 13 August 1944. Photocopies, 8 leaves, including maps. 1.29 Black Watch. Account of Operation Spring. Photocopies, 8 leaves. War Diaries, July -August 1944.

Accession 88-11

Box 2 Normandy Campaign

2.1 "Highlights of Fighting in France (6 June to 23 June 44)". Photocopy, 7 leaves. 2.2 Canadian Operations - North-West Europe. Series 1 - 6, 12 July - 11 September 1944. Photocopies, 83 leaves. Extracts from memoranda. 2.3 Canadian Operations - North-West Europe. Extracts from memoranda. Correspondence. Series 7-9, 15, August - November 1944. Photocopies, 77 leaves. 2.4 Extracts from Regimental Histories. 1954-1963. Photocopies, ca. 60 leaves. 2.5 "The Left Flank: Normandy Campaign, June 1944. Phase II: Assault and Consolidating the Bridgehead, 6-13 June". Photocopies, 23 leaves. 2.6 Extracts from war diaries of units landed in France on D-Day, June 1944. Photocopies, 56 leaves. 2.7 Victoria Times Weekend Magazine, Vol. 24, No. 45, November 9, 1974. Issue about Normandy. Signed, "S. Higgins". Includes newspaper clipping from the Victoria Daily Colonist, Thursday, 6 June 1974.

Accession 88-16 Historical Section (G.S.) Army Headquarters Reports, Ottawa

Box 1 1.1 Report No. 29, "Canadian Public Opinion on the Employment of the Canadian Army, 1939-1945". October 1949. Ts. 1.2 Report No. 39, "Operations of 1 Cdn. Corps in North-West Europe, 15 March - 5 May 1945". 17 October 1950, revised 31 January 1951. Ts. 1.3 Report No. 54, "Canadian Participation in the Operations in North-West Europe, 1944, Part I: The Assault and Subsequent Operations of 3 Cdn. Inf. Div. and 2 Cdn. Armd. Bde., 6-30 June 1944. 30 June 1952. Includes "Summary of Subject Headings". p. 1-159. 1.4 Report No. 54, p. 160-265, Appendices A-F, maps. 1.5 Report No. 58, "Canadian Participation in the Operations in North-West Europe, 1944, Part II: Canadian Operations in July". 15 February 1953. 1.6 Report No. 65, "Canadian Participation in the Operations in North-West Europe, 1944, Part III: Canadian Operations, 1-23 August". 23 December 1953.

Accession 89-38 1944: The Canadians in Normandy

Box 1

1.1 Maps and photographs of illustrations for book, with covering letter from Macmillan, 1984. 1.2 Correspondence with Macmillan re. publication of book, 1981-1987.

Accession 83-142

Box 1 31st Infantry Battalion

1.1 War Diaries, July - December 1915. 1.2 War Diaries, January - March 1916. 1.3 War Diaries, April - June 1916. 1.4 War Diaries, July - September 1916. 1.5 War Diaries, October - December 1916. 1.6 War Diaries, January - March 1917. 1.7 War Diary, April 1917. 1.8 War Diaries, May - June 1917. 1.9 War Diaries, July - September 1917.

Box 2 Other Battalions

2.1 6th Canadian Infantry Bde. Machine-gun Company. War Diary, July 1916 - August 1917. 2.2 5th Canadian Mounted Rifle Battalion. War Diaries, September - October 1916. 2.3 5th Canadian Mounted Rifle Battalion. War Diaries, November - December 1916. 2.4 5th Canadian Mounted Rifle Battalion. War Diaries, January - March 1917. 2.5 5th Canadian Mounted Rifle Battalion. War Diary, April 1917. 2.6 5th Canadian Mounted Rifle Battalion. War Diary, May 1917. 2.7 5th Canadian Mounted Rifle Battalion. War Diary, June 1917. 2.8 5th Canadian Mounted Rifle Battalion. War Diaries, July - August 1917. 2.9 116th Canadian Battalion. War Diaries, November - December 1917. 2.10 116th Canadian Battalion. War Diaries, January - April 1918. 2.11 116th Canadian Battalion. War Diaries, May - June 1918. 2.12 116th Canadian Battalion. War Diaries, July - November 1918.

Accession 81-18 1st Battalion Regina Rifle Regiment

Box 1 1.1 War Diaries, September 1939 - December 1940. 1.2 War Diaries, January - December 1941. 1.3 War Diaries, January - December 1942. 1.4 War Diaries, January 1943 - May 1944.

Accession 88-12

Box 1 Canadian Defence Policy Statements; NATO and NORAD files.

1.1 Department of National Defence. Statements, 1969-1986. Includes reports of the Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence, Consultative Group on Disarmament and Arms Control Affairs, etc. 1.2 Terrorism. Photocopy of article, "Terrorism: How the West Can Win", Time, April 14, 1986, p. 52-61; Canada. External Affairs. Statements and Speeches, 1986, 1 leaf. 1.3 NATO. File cards of articles from magazines, compiled by Dr. Roy; copies of magazine articles; newspaper clippings; correspondence. 1970-1985. 1.4 NATO. "Articles Favouring NATO or Governments' Action". Ts., 12 leaves. n.d. 1.5 NATO - Notes. Brochures, reports, course notes, articles, correspondence, agenda and program of the visit of Canadian Academics to NATO, February-March 1980. 1968-1980. 1.6 North American Air Defence Command (NORAD). Brochures, correspondence, fact sheets, notes on seminars. 1973-1985. 1.7 NORAD. Information Handbook, Minutes of House of Commons Proceedings, communiques. 1980-1981. 1.8 NORAD. Press releases, 1973-1975. SITREP, newsletter of the Royal Canadian Military Institute, Vol. 41, No. 5, June-July 1984. Presentation to the Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence, 21 October 1980.

Accession 88-17

Box 1 Files on South Africa. Arranged alphabetically

1.1 "ANC: A Soviet Task Force?" by Keith Campbell. London: Institute for the Study of Terrorism, 1986. 58 p. 1.2 Africa Insight. Vol. 10, No. 2, 1980. 1.3 Map of the African continent. African Institute of South Africa, 1978. 1.4 Aida Parker Newsletter. Nos. 85, 87, 90, 93, 97. July 1, 1986; August 5-19, 1986; September 17, 1986; October 29, 1986; January 15, 1987. 1.5 "Address by His Excellency John J. Becker, Ambassador of the Republic of South Africa, at the Opening of the Conference on South Africa in Toronto on 15 November 1980. Ts., 37 leaves. 1.6 Address by State President P.W. Botha at the opening of the 3rd Session of the 8th Parliament, Republic of South Africa. 31 January 1986. Photocopy, 20 leaves. 1.7 R.F. Botha, Minister of Foreign Affairs, South Africa. Letter to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, 7 November 1979, ts., 2 leaves; press statement, 1 November 1979, ts., 1 leaf. 1.8 Briefing. North-South Institute (Ottawa) Newsletter, August 1983. Issue on South Africa. 1.9 Business Briefing. Newsletter of Prescon Business News Agency. No. 8, February 1981; No. 11, November 1981. 1.10 Conflict Studies. "Soviet Strategic Penetration of Africa", by David Rees. No. 77, November 1976. 21 p. 1.11 "Disinvestment in the R.S.A.: The Growing Threat", by J.C. Knoetze, Chairman, West Rand Development Board, 29.1.1986. 6 p. 1.12 "Facts About Soweto". Report, n.d. Ts., 13 leaves. 1.13 Foreign Affairs Research Institute, London. Papers on South Africa: Mining, Soviet Bloc activities, Namibia, "East Germany's Continuing Offensive in the Third World". March 1980 -June 1982. 1.14 South Africa. Human Sciences Research Council. Institute for Sociological and Demographic Research. Media Release, May 1986. Ts., 22 leaves. 1.15 Informa Newspaper. March 1979. 1.16 The Intellectual Activist. Newsletter. Vol. IV, No. 4, 20 January 1986. Re. South Africa. Photocopy, 4 leaves. 1.17 ISSUP: Bulletin. Newsletter of the Institute for Strategic Studies, University of Pretoria, South Africa. April 1979 - February 1987. 1.18 "Notes on Understanding and Motivating Black Workers" by E. Raymond Silberbauer, M.A. n.d. 45 p. 1.19 Republic of South Africa. Department of Defence. White Paper on Defence and Armaments Supply, 1986. Photocopy, 40 leaves. 1.20 Report on South Africa. Reprinted from The Taber Times. 1986.

20 p. 1.21 Skills Creation. Newsletter of the Bloemfontein Training Centre. n.d. 6 leaves. 1.22 South Africa - brochures. "South Africa on Film", n.d.; "RSA Statistics in Brief", 1986; History of 3 Squadron, n.d.; "The Enchantment of Gold", n.d.

Accession 88-17

Box 1 Files on South Africa

1.23 South Africa - correspondence of the South African Foundation; Frontline Magazine; articles; reports. 1986. 1.24 South Africa Foundation. Briefing Papers, Nos. 24, 25, 27, 28, June, July, August, September 1980. 1.25 "South Africa in Context", by Ernest P. Walker. Economic Education Bulletin, published by the American Institute for Economic Research, Great Barrington, MA. n.d. Photocopy, 18 p. 1.26 South Africa in World Strategy: Special Survey. Booklet. June 1969, 21 p. 1.27 South Africa: International Bone of Contention. Booklet. n.d., n.p. 1.28 South Africa - newspaper clippings. 1958-1986.

Box 2 South Africa 2.1 South Africa - magazine clippings. 1979-1982. 2.2 South Africa - photocopies of magazine articles. 1938-1986. 2.3 South Africa: Mainstay of Southern Africa. Promotional booklet. July 1985, 20 p. 2.4 South Africa Today. Magazine. Vol. 3, No. 2, March 1986; Vol. 4, No. 1, January 1987. 2.5 South Africa - travel and financial brochures. 2.6 "South Africa: What Everyone Should Know", brochure, June 1986; "Oliver Tambo: Obstacle to Peace?", advertising poster for the ANC, August 1987. 2.7 South African Backgrounder. No. 6, 1984. Nos. 3, 4, 5, 1986. 2.8 South African Broadcasting Corporation. Comment, "The ANC", 22.5.86. Photocopy ts., 2 leaves; "The ANC States Its Case", 4.6.86. Photocopy ts., 2 leaves. 2.9 South African Digest. May 4, 1979 - March 6, 1987. 2.10 South African Embassy, Ottawa. Backgrounder. News on developments in South Africa and South West Africa/Namibia. November 1979 - April 1983. 2.11 South African Facts Sheet. Published by Southern Africa Editorial Services (Pty) Ltd. No. 56, February 1984; No. 57, March 1984; No. 71, May 1985; No. 82, April 1986. No. 31,

January 1982. 2.12 The South African Institute of International Affairs. Jan Smuts House Newsletter, 1983; Background Briefing No. 13, ca. 1981. 2.13 The South African Institute of International Affairs. Occasional papers: "Palestinian Nationalism", August 1981; "South Africa in the American Mind", November 1981; "Whither the EEC?" November 1981; "Zaire: Continuing World Headache", October 1981. 2.14 The South African Institute of International Affairs. "North- South Relations and the Lome Conventions: Treating the Symptoms and Not the Causes", by Peter C.J. Vale. Occasional Paper, July 1981, 14 p. 2.15 The South African Institute of International Affairs. "The Soviet Union and Southern Africa", by John Barratt. Occasional Paper, May 1981, 19 p. 2.16 The South African Institute of International Affairs. "Southern Africa in Retrospect: The Views of Two Foreign Correspondents", by Robin Knight and Quentin Peel. Occasional Paper, June 1981, 14 p. Accession 88-17

Box 2 Files on South Africa

2.17 The South African Institute of International Affairs. "The South African Labour Scene in the 1980's: Discussions of the Study Group on Multinational Corporations". Study Group Series. ed. by Deon Geldenhuys. December 1980. 61 p. 2.18 South African News Complement. Vol. 1, No. 1, November 1986; Vol. 1, Nos. 2, 3, January, April 1987. 2.19 South African Newsletter. Nos. 67-68, March, April 1973; No. 70, June 1983; No. 76, December 1983; Nos. 77-78, January, February 1984; No. 80, April 1984. 2.20 Martin Spring's South African Newsletter. No. 24, August 1979; No. 34, July 1980; No. 41, January 1981; No. 42, February 1981; No. 51, November 1981; No. 57, May 1982; No. 58, June 1982; No. 60, August 1982; No. 62, October 1982. 2.21 South African Newspoint. No. 2 of 1986; No. 1 of 1987. 2.22 Strategic and Defence Studies Centre Newsletter. Canberra, Australia. October 1984; June 1986.

Box 3 South Africa

3.1 Strategic Review, Fall 1985, "Losing South Africa", by J. Joachim Maitre. U.S. Strategic Institute, Washington, D.C. Photocopy, 4 leaves. 3.2 Symposium on Building Societies and the South African Economic Scene. "Housing the Urban Black, A Talk by J.C. Knoetze", n.d., 9 p.

3.3 "Talking with the ANC ... ". Booklet published by the Bureau for Information, Pretoria, June 1986, 42 p. 3.4 "This is South Africa". Addendum. n.d., 12 p. 3.5 Towards a Constellation of States in Southern Africa. Report of the Meeting Between the Prime Minister [P.W. Botha] and Business Leaders, Johannesburg, 22 November 1979. 44 p.

South-West Africa/Namibia

3.6 Aktur (Action Front for the Retention of the Turnhalle Principles). "Principles for a Constitution", n.d.; "The Differences: Actur - DTA", August 1978. 3.7 Counter-Insurgency: A Way of Life. SWA/Namibia Information Service, February 1980. 3.8 Demokratiese Turnhalle Alliansie (DTA). Manifesto; Guidelines for a Socio-Economic Policy for SWA/Namibia; Bill of Rights; Constitution. n.d. 3.9 Namibia. Copies of articles dealing with the Namibia bill of rights; 1986-1987 budget; and the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO). By Sean Cleary, Sue Cullinan. The New Nation newspaper, English edition, Vol. 2, No. 6, June 1986. 3.10 Namibia Brief. Published by the Namibia Foundation. Nos. 1, 2, 3, 1985; No. 4, 1986. 3.11 Namibia Bulletin. Published by the United Nations. No. 4/79, December 1979; No. 1/80, March 1980. 3.12 Namibia National Front. "Policy Manifesto and Alternatives". April 1978. 16 p. Accession 88-17

Box 3 South-West Africa/Namibia

3.13 Namibia/SWA Prospectus. Africa Institute of South Africa, 1980, 66 p. 3.14 On Record. Newspaper published by the SWA/Namibia Information Services. Nos. 7-15, April-August 1986. 3.15 Rossing Uranium 1979. Booklet on uranium mining in Namibia, 1979, 12 p. 3.16 Sektor 70. "Background Study: Eastern Caprivi Zipfel". n.d. 11 p. 3.17 Spectrum. Newspaper, SWA/Namibia. Vol. 1, Nos. 2-3, January/February 1980. 3.18 SWA/Namibia. On the Economic Front. No. 1, April 1980; Nature Conservation in SWA/Namibia, n.d. 3.19 SWA/Namibia Liberation Front. Manifesto, n.d., 1 leaf; "United Nations Aid to Swapo", 70.02.14, 2 p. (1 leaf). 3.20 The South African Defence Force's Contribution to the Development of South West Africa, by J.A. Visser. ca. 1982, 35 p.

3.21 Southern Africa - brochures. "Africa's Gem, n.d.; "Study Trip to Southern Africa", October 1980. 3.22 Sub-Committee on Security and Terrorism Hearings on Soviet, East German and Cuban Involvement in Fomenting Terrorism in Southern Africa. March 31, 1982. Chairman Jeremiah Denton's Closing Remarks. n.p. 3.23 "What One Should Know About South-West Africa: Facts and Figures". Afrikaans-Deutsche-Kulturgemeinshaft Booklet No. 1. August 1978, 24 p.; A.D.K. Booklet No. 2, "The Population Groups of South-West Africa, Part I, November 1978.

Articles, Essays on South Africa, South-West Africa, Namibia

3.24 "The Constellation of States in Southern Africa: A Turning Point for South Africa", by Dr. Gordon E. Boreham, Professor of Economics, University of Ottawa. Unpublished papers. 15 November 1980. Ts., 34 leaves. 3.25 "Recent Developments in the South African Political Scene". Lecture given by John Bruce Lockhart, at the City University Business School, London, England, 29 February 1984. Ts., 8 leaves. 3.26 "The Roles of the South African Defense Force in the Maintenance of White Rule in Namibia and the Subsequent Decolonization of Namibia", by Richard Dale. Presented at the Annual Meeting of the African Studies Association, Los Angeles, CA, 31 October -3 November 1979.

Other files

3.27 People and Process in Transition: Report to the Solicitor-General by the Independent Advisory Team on the Canadian Security Intelligence Service. October 1987. In English and French. 90 p. total. 3.28 AstroLabe. Published for the Navy League of Canada Cadets, Wrenettes and Royal Canadian Sea Cadets, October 1984. Accession 88-18

Box 1

1.1 Army Historical Section. "Canadian Military Policies, Part VII: Manpower and Conscription". Ts. upon which C.P. Stacey based his book, Arms, Men and Government. Photocopy, p. 815 -1011; footnotes, photocopies, p. 100 - 121.

Accession 83-167

Box 1 U. Vic. Alumni Association records

1.1 Correspondence, minutes of meetings, 1965-1969. 1.2 Constitution, December 1964; correspondence, minutes and summaries of committee meetings, 1973-1976. 1.3 Minutes of meetings, lists of Executive members, correspondence, lists of Fund Drive donations. 1976-1979. 1.4 Correspondence re. Alumni Fund '76; minutes of meetings; other correspondence. 1977-1979. 1.5 Constitution, March 1980; notices and minutes of meetings; correspondence. 1980-1981. 1.6 Minutes of meetings, lists of Executive members, correspondence. 1981. 1.7 Lists of executive members, agenda of meetings, minutes, memos. 1982-1983.

Accession 74-7

Box 1 Canadian Confederation Centennial Committee of British Columbia. Historic Commemorations Sub-Committee

1.1 Correspondence re. sub-committee; Centennial Committee Organizational Chart; lists of proposed plaque sites and stops- of-interest. 1964-1967. 1.2 Minutes of meetings, September 1964 - December 1966. 1.3 "A Commemorative Historic Booklet", by T.R. Broadland, Parks Branch, January 12, 1965. 2 variant drafts, tss., 2 leaves each. 1.4 "Lists of Monuments and Tables Which Have Been Erected in the Province of British Columbia ... ". n.d., 13 leaves. 1.5 "Centennial Grants Structure for 1967". 2 p. 1.6 "So You Want to Write Your Community's History!" Booklet published in co-operation with the Provincial Archives of British Columbia, Victoria, 1965, 35 p. 1.7 B. C. Centennial Spokesman. Issues No. 1-3, January - May 1965; Issue No. 7, November 1965. 1.8 "Let's Stop, Look and Learn: 'Stops-of-Interest' Markers in British Columbia". Booklet, n.d., 13 p.

Accession 82-7

Box 1

1.1 "Outline History of the University of Victoria Detachment, UBC Contingent, Canadian Officers Training Corps", by Maj. R.H. Roy, 1968. Ts. with hol. rev., 5 leaves. 1.2 Correspondence, newspaper clippings, Final Unit Order. 1968. 1.3 Operation Orders, Background information and model exercise on operations. n.d. 1.4 COTC/RCSME - mimeographed material. Includes Rules of the Royal Canadian School of Military Engineering; RCSME Physical Training Games; History of the Royal Canadian Ordnance Corps; History of the RCOC; Organizational Charts for Ordnance Services; map of ORD depots in Canada. 1942-1956. 1.5 Unit Orders, Part 2. December 1955 - April 1957. 1.6 Unit Orders, Part 2. October 1957 - April 1959. 1.7 Unit Orders, Part 2. 31 May 1962 - 21 November 1962. 1.8 ROTP - Career Opportunities. Summaries of training programmes: RCAC; RCA; RCE; RCCS; RCIC; RCASC; RCOC; RCEME; RCAPC; C PRO C; C INT. C. Bulletins of the RCA, RCE, RC Sigs, Infantry, RCASC, RCAPC, and C PRO C. 1955-1956, n.d. 1.9 Operation Orders. Background information, model exercise, standard layout. COTC. 1953. 1.10 COTC - Social. Dinner invitations, menus, guest lists. 1965- 1968. 1.11 COTC - Social. Dinner invitations, lists of guests, programme, correspondence. 1968. 1.12 Royal Canadian Air Force Reserve Officers' School, Centralia, Ontario. Information Brochure, 1964, n.p. 1.13 COTC - ROTP. Notice Board Instructions. 1960-1962. 1.14 Tri-Services Committee. Minutes of meetings. 1961. 1.15 Tri-Services Committee. Itineraries of visits, notices of meetings and mess dinners, list of those attending mess dinner. 1963. 1.16 Tri-Services Committee. Minutes of meetings, notices of functions, correspondence, training reports. 1964-1966. 1.17 Tri-Service Mess Dinner, December 1966. Invitations, acceptances, regrets, guest lists.

Box 2

2.1 COTC/ROTP. Instructions and orders. 1958-1963. 2.2 Notice Board postings. September 1962 - March 1963. 2.3 COTC. Victoria College Detachment. Correspondence, 1962-1963. 2.4 COTC. Correspondence, 1966-1968. 2.5 COTC/ROTP. Current File. Nominal roll, officers' mess

membership cards, notes re. cadets' leave, 1962-1963, n.d. 2.6 COTC/ROTP. Sample service documents. n.d. 2.7 COTC/ROTP report of activities, October 1962 - May 1963. Prepared by Lt. A.D. Hopkins, Acting Officer Commanding. Holographs, 15 leaves. Nominal roll; training standards; COTC test. 2.8 COTC. Corrected tests, 1964; lists of subjects covered, 1963; Tri-Service Training Schedule, 1965. Accession 82-7

Box 2

2.9 "Military Training at Victoria College". Account presented at Mess Dinner of the Combined Services of U. Vic., January [no year]. 2.10 Holograph notes on index cards re. military history. ca. 100 cards. 2.11 COTC. UBC Contingent. Victoria College Detachment. Shoulder flashes and buttons. 2.12 Map. "Commands & Areas, Canadian Army, Dec. 1953", 66 cm. x 76 cm.

Box 3 Army Personnel files, assessments. RESTRICTED

3.1 "Reports on those Officers and Cadets Who May Return for 1963- 1964 Winter Session". Prepared by Lt. A.D. Hopkins for Capt. R.H. Roy. Holographs, 5 leaves. 3.2 COTC/ROTP Assessments, First and Second Phase, March 1962. 3.3 Army Personnel Selection Report. n.d.

Accession 74-8

Box 1

1.1 Col. C.P. Stacey - correspondence with Prof. Roy re. the Canadian Scottish Regiment, 1954-1958. Includes Stacey's comments on Roy's ms. of Ready for the Fray and extracts from war diaries. 1.2 Ready for the Fray: A History of the Canadian Scottish Regiment (Princess Mary's), 1920-1955 (1958). Chapters I - V, title page, preliminary pages. Tss. with hol. rev., 225 leaves. 1.3 Ready for the Fray. Chapters VI - IX, tss. with hol. rev., p. 219-384. 1.4 Ready for the Fray. Chapters X - Appendices. Tss. with hol. rev., p. 385-584. 1.5 Ready for the Fray. Galley proofs, marked, p. 1-156.

Accession 74-9 Sinews of Steel: A History of the British Columbia Dragoons (1965)

Box 1

1.1 H.H. Angle, Commanding Officer, British Columbia Dragoons. Personal diary, January -December 1945. Re-typed, 61 leaves. 1.2 9th Canadian Armoured Regiment (British Columbia Dragoons). Operations Reports, maps, clippings, correspondence. 1944-1962. 1.3 British Columbia Dragoons. Battle accounts, operations reports re. Gothic Line. 1944-1962. 1 of 2. 1.4 B.C. Dragoons. Battle accounts, operations reports re. Gothic Line. 1944-1964. 2 of 2. 1.5 B.C. Dragoons. Battle accounts - Coriano Ridge, September 1944. 1.6 B.C. Dragoons. Operations Report, August - September 1944. 1.7 B.C. Dragoons. Battle Narratives re. Capture of Ravenna, 1943- 1944. 1.8 B.C. Dragoons. Operations Reports, war diaries, correspondence. 1944-1963. 1.9 B.C. Dragoons. Battle Narratives, January 1945. 1.10 B.C. Dragoons. Battle Narratives, April 1945. 1.11 B.C. Dragoons, Armoured Division and Regiment. Notes on administration and supply in the field, 1942-1945.

Box 2 Correspondence re. Sinews of Steel

2.1 A - B, 1960-1964. 2.2 Canada. Dept. of National Defence, 1960-1964. 2.3 C, 1960-1964. 2.4 D - G, 1961-1964. 2.5 H, 1964-1965.

Box 3 Correspondence re. Sinews of Steel cont'd.

3.1 K - L, 1960-1964. 3.2 M, 1960-1964. 3.3 Lt.- Col. A. Moss, Commanding Officer, British Columbia Dragoons, 1960-1964. 3.4 O - R, 1960-1964. 3.5 Maj.-Gen. George R. Pearkes, 1961. 3.6 Royal Military College (Kingston, Ont.), 1960-1963. 3.7 C.P. Stacey, 1960. 3.8 S - T, 1961-1964. 3.9 V - W, 1960-1964.

Accession 74-9 Sinews of Steel: A History of the British Columbia Dragoons (1965)

Box 4 Sinews of Steel

4.1 Chapters I - II, plus title page and preliminary pages. Ts. with hol. rev., p. i - 101. 4.2 Chapters III - V, ts. with hol. rev., p. 102 - 216. 4.3 Chapters VI - VIII, ts. with hol. rev., p. 217 - 369. 4.4 Chapters IX - XI, ts. with hol. rev., p. 370 - 510. 4.5 Chapter XII. Rough drafts. Holographs, 34 leaves; tss., 24 leaves. 4.6 Chapters XII - XIV, ts. with hol. rev., p. 511 - 597. 4.7 Appendices A - I. Ts. with hol. rev., p. 598 - 640.

Box 5 Sinews of Steel

5.1 Galley proofs, marked, p. 1-186. 5.2 Galley proofs, marked, p. 187-344. 5.3 Galley proofs, marked, p. 345-466.

Accession 74-10 The Seaforth Highlanders of Canada (1969)

Box 1 Correspondence. Arranged alphabetically. 1.1 1967-1969. Includes minutes of the Seaforth Highlanders History Committee; Regimental Association Newsletter, December 1967; newspaper clippings; maps; copies of war diaries and intelligence summaries. 1.2 A 1966-1969. 1.3 B 1966-1968. 1.4 H.P. Bell-Irving, 1965-1966. 1.5 H.P. Bell-Irving, 1967. 1.6 H.P. Bell-Irving, 1968. 1.7 H.P. Bell-Irving, 1969. 1.8 C 1965-1967.

Box 2 2.1 J.A. Clark, 1965-1966. Includes carbon transcript of interview with Clark, 3 March 1966. 2.2 J.A. Clark, 1967-1969. 2.3 Directorate of History, Ottawa, 1966-1968. 1 of 2. 2.4 Directorate of History, Ottawa, 1967-1968. 2 of 2. 2.5 D - E 1966-1969 2.6 Fa - Fe 1966-1969 2.7 Fo - Fu 1966-1969 2.8 G 1967-1968

Box 3 3.1 H 1966-1968 3.2 I - L 1966-1968 3.3 Mc - Mac 1966-1968 3.4 M 1966-1968 3.5 O - P 1966-1969 3.6 R - S 1967-1969 3.7 T 1966-1968 3.8 General Correspondence, 1966-1971

Box 4 The Seaforth Highlanders of Canada

4.1 Chapter I. Holograph, 57 leaves. 4.2 Chapter I. Carbon ts., 61 leaves. Includes letter from W.G.H. Roaf, Deputy Chairman, War Veterans Allowance Board, 1967, and letter from J. Stewart Lough, 1966. 4.3 Chapter II. Holograph, 33 leaves; ts. with hol. rev., 8 leaves. 4.4 Chapter III. Holograph, 45 leaves. Ts., 43 leaves. Holograph notes, 8 leaves. 4.5 Chapter IV. Holograph, 33 leaves. Carbon ts., 30 leaves. 4.6 Chapter V. Holograph, 28 leaves. Carbon ts., 29 leaves.

Transcripts of recollections of Seaforth veterans, ts., 11 leaves.

Accession 74-10 The Seaforth Highlanders of Canada (1969)

Box 4

4.7 Chapter VI. 5 variant drafts. Holographs and tss., 256 leaves total. 4.8 Chapter VII. 6 variant drafts. Holographs and tss., ca. 150 leaves total. 4.9 Chapter VIII. Holograph, 47 leaves. Partial carbon ts., 21 leaves. Comments by Seaforth veterans, tss., 31 leaves total. 4.10 Chapter IX. Holographs, 42 leaves. Critical comments, ts., 2 leaves. 4.11 Chapter X. Holographs, 46 leaves. Critical comments, ts., 2 leaves. Transcript of interview with Seaforth veterans, 13 leaves.

Box 5

5.1 Chapter XI. Holographs, 30 leaves. Revised carbon ts., 31 leaves. Critical comments, ts., 2 leaves. 5.2 Chapter XII. 5 variant drafts. Holographs and tss., ca. 150 leaves total. 5.3 Chapter XIII. Holographs, 46 leaves. Carbon ts., 42 leaves. 5.4 Chapter XIV. 10 variant drafts; correspondence; notes. Holographs, tss., ca. 200 leaves. 5.5 Chapters I - VI, Index. Variant draft. Holographs, tss., 312 leaves.

Box 6

6.1 Chapters I - V. Variant drafts. Tss. with hol. rev., p. 1-218. 6.2 Chapters VI - IX. Variant drafts. Tss. with hol. rev., p. 219- 410. 6.3 Chapters X - XII. Variant drafts. Tss. with hol. rev., p. 411- 608. 6.4 Chapter IX. Copies of maps of the Netherlands campaign, April 1945, The Battle for the Rivers, December 1944-February 1945, The Savio River Crossing, October 1944, the Gothic Line, the Hitler Line, the Moro River and Sicily. 6.5 Galley proofs, 83 sheets. 6.6 Marked page proofs, Chapters V - VI, p. 133-202.

Box 7

7.1 1 Canadian Infantry Division. Summary of Operations, 1944. 7.2 1 Canadian Division, HQ. Summary of Operations, October - December 1944.

7.3 Seaforth Highlanders of Canada, "C" Company. Diary, Book II, 7 December 1944 - 28 February 1945. Holographs, photocopies. 7.4 Seaforth Highlanders of Canada, "C" Company. War Diary of Major Tom Turner, Book 2, 26 January 1945 - 9 July 1945. 7.5 Seaforth Highlanders of Canada, "C" Company. Photocopies of 2 photographs of unidentified Seaforth officer, n.d.

Accession 73-1 Telegrams of the North-West Campaign, 1885, by Prof. Reg Roy and Prof. Desmond Morton. Toronto: The Champlain Society, 1972.

Box 1

1.1 Correspondence of A.P. Caron, Minister of Militia and Defence during the Riel Rebellion, 1885. Section 1: p. 1-83. Photocopies of tss. March - April 1885. 1.2 Caron correspondence, April 1885, p. 84-120. Photocopies of tss. 1.3 Caron correspondence, April 1885, p. 121-218. Photocopies of tss.

Box 2

2.1 Caron correspondence, April 1885, p. 219-330. Photocopies of tss. 2.2 Caron correspondence, April-May 1885, p. 331-439. Photocopies of tss. 2.3 Caron correspondence, May-June 1885, p. 440-545. Photocopies of tss. 2.4 Caron correspondence, June 1885-February 1886, p. 546-640. Photocopies of tss.

Box 3

3.1 Telegrams of the North-West Campaign, 1885. Holograph notes on file cards, re. militia personnel, sources, etc. 3.2 Notes re. mss., lists of sources, photocopies of newspaper clippings and journal articles. 3.3 Notes, maps re. the Battle of Fish Creek, N.W.T., 20 April 1885. Holographs, photocopies of maps. 3.4 Notes re. Frenchman's Battle. Photocopies of map and journal article, holograph notes. 3.5 Troop movements. Holographs notes, copies of maps. 3.6 Cut Knife Hill. Holograph notes, photocopies of journal articles and maps. 3.7 Pursuit of Big Bear. Photocopied map and page from unidentified journal article.

3.8 Battle of Batoche, Sask., 12 May 1885. Photocopies of maps, journal article, holograph notes. 3.9 The Riel Rebellion, 1885: A Documentary History, by Prof. Desmond Morton. Correspondence with Prof. Roy, Morris Zaslow et al, 1969-1972. 3.10 The Militia in Canada. Gaps in the Canadian Pacific Railway. Photocopies of bibliography, holograph and typed notes, maps.

Box 4

4.1 North-West Rebellion - 4 maps of troop movements in Saskatchewan, Alberta and the North-West Territories, n.d. Box Holograph notes on file cards re. works on the history of Ontario, Quebec, Louis Riel, 5-6 the North-West Rebellion, the Royal North-West Mounted Police and related subjects.

Accession 73-1 Telegrams of the North-West Campaign, 1885, by Prof. Reg Roy and Prof. Desmond Morton. Toronto: The Champlain Society, 1972.

Box 7

7.1 Telegrams of the North-West Campaign. First draft, Book 1. Tss., p. 1-223. 7.2 First draft, Books 2. Tss., p. 224-485. 7.3 Corrected carbon tss., Book 1, p. 1-219. 7.4 Corrected carbon tss., Book 2, p. 220-530.

Box 8

8.1 2nd Draft, tss., p. 1-365. 8.2 2nd Draft, tss., p. 366-716.

Box 9

9.1 2nd Draft, 3rd copy, carbon tss., p. 1-716. 9.2 Notes. Tss. with hol. rev., ca. 100 leaves. 9.3 Marked galley proofs, p. i-412.

Accession 89-25

Box 1

1.1 Newspaper articles re. John Laurie, in the Daily Colonist, March 4, 1979. 1.2 R.C.A.F. memos, passenger air movement notification forms, movement permits, protection and identity certificate, identification cards. 1944-1946. 1.3 Newspaper clippings re. R.C.A.F. #203 Squadron. Victoria Daily Times, Feb. 17 and May 4, 1940; Police Chronicle and Constabulary World, April 20, 1945. 1.4 Notebooks and address book, 1941-1946. 1.5 Provost Marshall. Reports, and correspondence, 1941-1946. 1.6 3 maps of Aurich, Germany. 1.7 War Crimes Trials. Instructions for procedures for trials and executions, charge sheets, permanent pass for John Laurie to attend War Crimes Court, temporary telephone directory, certificate of execution, nominal roll of service police, diagram of court-room, Prisoners Record Book, Occurrence Book. 1946.

Box 2

2.1 9 b & w photographs of the R.C.A.F. in unidentified concentration camp and surrounding areas, 1945, including John Laurie. 26 duplicates; 7 enlargements. 2.2 5 copy negatives of R.C.A.F. activities in unidentified German concentration camp and surrounding areas, 1945. [prints in 2.1] 2.3 R.C.A.F. on parade, on motorcycles and on board ship; R.C.A.F. officers, including John Laurie. n.d. 10 b & w photographs. 2.4 Official and social activities of the R.A.F. and R.C.A.F. Police in Holland, n.d. 28 b & w photographs in album. 2.5 R.C.A.F. in Holland - views of city streets, off-duty officers, enemy aircraft, pilot and co-pilot in cockpit. 70 b & w photographs. 2.6 2 b & w mounted photographs of R.C.A.F. officers, including John Laurie. n.d. 2.7 R.C.A.F. officers. 16 b & w photographs. 2.8 R.C.A.F. - portraits of officers; views of German officers taken prisoner in Paris; award ceremony; Gen. Eisenhower with Field Marshall B.L. Montgomery. n.d. 19 b & w photographs. 2.9 John Laurie's command group, n.d. 3 b & w photographs. 2.10 John Laurie as Chief of Police, Trail, B.C., n.d. 1 b & w photograph. 2.11 Staff at Canadian Civil Defence College, Arnprior, Ont. n.d. but post-World War II. 1 b & w photograph. 2.12 Air Force Provosts, with inscription on verso, "Aug. 7/40 with

compliments of S/L M.M. Sisley P.M." 1 b & w photograph. 2.13 Motorcycles, n.d. 4 b & w photographs. 2.14 John Laurie reviewing parade, n.d. 3 b & w photographs. 2.15 Collage - Caricatures of staff at HQ of Provost Marshall, London, n.d. b & w photograph, 3 copies. 2.16 John Laurie and office staff, London [?], n.d. 3 b & w photographs. Accession 88-8

Box 1 1.1 Directorate of Special Services (DSS). Historical Outline of General Research, to November 1943. Photocopy, 5 leaves. 1.2 War Diary, Research and Information Section, November 1943; report, "R & I's Purpose and General Function"; list of personnel; Appendix G, Functions of R & I, outline of DSS activities during 1942. 1.3 "The Research and Information Section, AG Branch, NDHQ: A Preliminary Narrative by Donald Sage, Lt., Historical Section, General Staff, 22 March 1945". Ottawa. Photocopy of ts. with hol. rev., 8 leaves. 1.4 Memorandum from C.R. Hill, Director of Special Services, 16 January 1943. Photocopy of ts. with hol. rev., 2 leaves. 1.5 Summary of Intelligence Reports from military districts, June - November 1941. Hol. notes, 5 leaves; photocopies of tss., ca. 100 leaves. 1.6 Summary of Intelligence Reports from military districts, 22 March - 17 May 1942. Hol. notes, 1 leaf; photocopies of reports, ca. 30 leaves. 1.7 Summary of Intelligence Reports from military districts, 11 - 17 May 1942. Hol. notes, 2 leaves; photocopies of tss., ca. 50 leaves. 1.8 War Diaries, 1942-1943, DSS, Adjutant General's office, National Defence Headquarters, Ottawa. Hol. notes, 2 leaves; photocopies of tss., ca. 120 leaves. 1.9 War Diaries, R & I Section, 1944. Hol. notes, 1 leaf; photocopies of tss., ca. 30 leaves. 1.10 War Diary, R & I Section, December 1943 - June 1945. Photocopies of tss., ca. 30 leaves.

Box 2 2.1 Pacific Command: Weekly Intelligence Summary #33, 12 February 1943. Hol. notes, 2 leaves; photocopies of tss., ca. 50 leaves. 2.2 Pacific Command: Weekly General Intelligence Reports #131 and 132, July 1943. Hol. notes, 2 leaves; photocopies of tss., ca. 25 leaves. 2.3 Progress Report - Coast and AA Defences, Ottawa, 19 April 1943. Hol. notes, 1 leaf; photocopies of tss., ca. 50 leaves.

2.4 Pacific Command - Morale Reports. 1 of 3. July 1945 - February 1946. Photocopies. 2.5 Pacific Command - Morale Reports. 2 of 3. November 1944 - July 1945. Photocopies. 2.6 Pacific Command - Morale Reports. 3 of 3. December 1942 - October 1944. Photocopies. 2.7 Pacific Command - Composite Reports on Unit Morale: 14th Bde., Terrace, May 1943; Pacific Command, December 1943, October 1944, January 1945, April 1945. 2.8 Pacific Command - Morale Reports, 1943-1945. Photocopies; with hol. notes by Prof. Roy.

Accession 88-8

Box 3 3.1 Reports - Morale in the Canadian Army, January - October 1943 (with charts). Hol. notes; photocopies of tss. 3.2 Special Reports, #101 (January 1944) to #118 (April 1944). Re. depot recruits, extra-curricular facilities, the rotation system, etc. Photocopies. 3.3 Special Reports, #119 (April 1944) to #135 (July 1944). Re. views of CWAC on discharge; recreation facilities; civilian-army relations, etc. Photocopies. 3.4 Special Reports, #136 (August 1944) to #149 (September 1944). Re. quality of medical services, regrading of men, etc. Photocopies.

Box 4 4.1 Special Reports, #151 (October 1944) to #170 (January 1945). Re. attitudes to military hospitals; messing; security training, etc. Hol. notes, photocopies. 4.2 Special Reports, #173 (February 1945), #174 (February 1945). Re. wounded soldiers; attitudes of men toward infantry service. Hol. notes; photocopies. 4.3 Special Reports, #175 (January 1945) to #196 (July 1945). Re. housing congestion; clothing and equipment, etc. Hol. notes, photocopies.

Box 5 5.1 "Trends in the Thinking of Army Units", February - December 1944.

Hol. notes, photocopies of tss. 5.2 "Trends in the Thinking of Army Units", January 1945 - March 1945. Hol. notes, photocopies of tss. 5.3 Civilian Surveys, 1943. Hol. notes, photocopies of tss.

Accession 88-15

Box 1 1.1 Journal of Private Donald Fraser, 31st Battalion Canadians and 6th Canadian M. Gun Company. Photocopy of tss., April - September 1916, 128 leaves. 1.2 Journal of Private Fraser, April - September 1916. Photocopies of holographs, ca. 110 leaves. 1.3 The Journal of Private Fraser, Canadian Expeditionary Force, ed. by Prof. Roy. Tss. Title page, Table of Contents, Preface, Introduction, Chapters I - III, p. i-151. 1.4 The Journal of Private Fraser. Tss. Chapters IV - VI, p. 152- 288. 1.5 The Journal of Private Fraser. Tss. Chapters VII - X, Appendices A - C, p. 289-440. 1.6 The Journal of Private Fraser. 2nd ts. draft with hol. markings. Preliminary pages, Chapters I - III, p. i-151. 1.7 The Journal of Private Fraser. 2nd ts. draft with hol. markings. Chapters IV - VI, p. 152-288.

Box 2 2.1 The Journal of Private Fraser. 2nd ts. draft with hol. markings. Chapters VII - X, Appendices A - C, p. 289-440. 2.2 The Journal of Private Fraser. Marked galley proofs, complete set.

Accession 88-19

Box 1 1.1 Parker correspondence, Crimea, 1855-56. Photocopies of holographs. 1 of 3. 1.2 Parker correspondence, Crimea, 1855-56. Photocopies of holographs. 2 of 3. 1.3 Parker correspondence, Crimea, 1855-56. Photocopies of holographs. 3 of 3. 1.4 Parker correspondence, Crimea, 1855-56. Tss. (re-typed). 1 of 2. 1.5 Parker correspondence, Crimea, 1854-55. Tss. (re-typed). 2 of 2. 1.6 Parker correspondence to his daughter, 1855-56. Carbon tss. 1 of 2. 1.7 Parker correspondence to his daughter, 1855-56. Carbon tss. 2 of 2.

Accession 82-11

Box 1 1.1 Military and strategic studies, 1968-1969. 1.2 International military news, 1969-1974. 1.3 Weaponry, 1969-1974.

Accession 84-28

Box 1

1.1 NATO, 1969-1974. 1.2 Canadian defence policies, 1969-1974. 1.3 Military and strategic studies, 1974-1975.

Box 2

2.1 Military and strategic studies, 1976-1978. 2.2 Military and strategic studies, 1978-1981.

Accession 88-80

Box 1 1.1 "Rifleman Forin in the Riel Rebellion", paper by Prof. Roy. n.d. Ts., 21 leaves.

Accession 90-6

Box 1 1.1 Fenian submarine. Photocopies of hol. correspondence, 1880; original letters, 1880-1881, hol. and tss.; notes. 1.2 Fenian submarine. Microfilm copies of correspondence, newspaper articles, 1880-1881. 1 of 4. 1.3 Fenian submarine. Microfilm copies of correspondence, 1880-1881. 2 of 4. 1.4 Fenian submarine. Microfilm copies of correspondence, 1880-1881. 3 of 4. 1.5 Fenian submarine. Microfilm copies of correspondence, 1880-1881. 4 of 4.

Accession 89-52

Box 1

1.1 Red Chevron Association. Correspondence, membership lists, clippings. 1965-1976. 1.2 Red Chevron Association. Correspondence. 1963-1984.

Accession 89-42

Box 1

1.1 25 b & w photographs of World War I posters from the National Archives of Canada. Posters from Argentina, Belgium, England, Germany, France, Italy and Poland.

Accession 89-49

Box 1

1.1 "Three Bridges to Berlin", paper by S. Lloyd Swanton, n.d. Photocopy of ts., 17 leaves. 2 b & w photographs of an RAF Hastings aircraft and Swanton with Canadian RAF navigator Flt. W.A. Thurston.

Accession 89-50

Box 1

1.1 World War II ration card and ration books belonging to Elizabeth Dawne Veinot, New Germany, Nova Scotia. n.d.

Accession 89-51

Box 1

1.1 Department of National Defence Press Roundup [newsletter]. 1983- 1986.

UNIVERSITY OF VICTORIA ARCHIVES

Reginald Herbert Roy

Inventory prepared by Anne MacLaurin

Accession 91-38 Location:Archives Provenance: Reg H. Roy

SERIES DESCRIPTION

A copy of the Diaries of Regimental Num. 114840 Trooper F. Lacey 3rd. Troop "A" Squardron Royal Canadian Dragoons World War I Accession 91-38 Box 1 File 1 Arranged alphabetically

SPEAKERS Accession 91-38 Box 2 Files 2-4 Arranged alphabetically Correspondence with people who have a military background and would be willing to share their knowledge with UVIC's students of military history. Includes scheduling for the lectures and the speakers program.

PERSONAL CORRESPONDENCE-GENERAL HDG CRERAR (NAC PHOTOCOPIES) Accession 91-38 Box 1 Files 2-6 Arranged alphabetically General HDG Crerar-correspondence with Senior officers in Italy, 1943- 44; Correspondence between Lt. Gen. HDG Crear and Field Marshal Delan-Brooke, 1942-42; Crerar-Simonole correspondence, Dec. 1943-Jan.1944; correspondence of General HDG Crerar, 1944. NEWSLETTERS Accession 91-38 Box 1 Files 7-12 Box 2 File 1 Arranged alphabetically Defence newsletter vol. 1 to vol. 8; 1983 Year in Review; Index to Defence Newsletter, Vol.5,6,7

BOX LISTS

Box File Location 1.1 A Copy of the Diaries of Regimental Num. 114840 Trooper F. Lacey... 1.2 General HDG Crerar-Correspondence Photocopies-NAC M.G.30, E-157, Vol.7, file D-183 1.3 Correspondence between Lt. Gen. HDG Crerar Photocopies-NAC M.G. 30, E-157, Vol.7, file D-171 1.4 Crerar-Simonole Correspondence, Dec.1943-1944 Photocopies-NAC M.G. 30, E-157, Vol.7, file D-180 1.5 Correspondence of General HDG Crerar, 1944 Photocopies-NAC M.G. 30, E-157, Vol.7, file D-169 1.6 Correspondence of General HDG Crerar, 1944 Photocopies-NAC M.G. 30, E-157, Vol.7, file D-170 1.7 Defence Newsletter vol.1 no.1-12 1.8 Defence Newsletter vol.2 no.1-12 1.9 Defence Newsletter-Year in Review, 1983 1.10 Index Defence Newsletter-vol.5 no.1-12; vol.6.(1987); vol.7(1988) 1.11 Defence Newsletter vol.6 no.1-12 1.12 Defence Newsletter vol.7 no.1-12

Box File Location 2.1 Defence Newsletter vol.8 no.1-8 2.2 Speakers Program, 1982-83 2.3 Speakers 1983-89-90 2.4 Speakers 1985-88

INDEX - NAMES AND SUBJECTS

10th Canadian Armoured Regiment, Fort Garry House 82-5 ...... 11 10th Canadian Infantry Brigade 82-5 ...... 9 116th Canadian Battalion See Canada. Canadian Army. 116th Canadian Battalion ...... 27 12th Canadian Rd. Regiment 82-5 ...... 12 12th Manitoba Dragoons 82-5 ...... 10 1944: The Canadians in Normandy (1984) 83-179 ...... 16 84-11 ...... 16 84-12 ...... 17 84-4 ...... 16 1st Battalion Regina Rifle Regiment See Canada. Canadian Army. 1st Battalion Regina Rifle Regiment ...... 28 1st Canadian Army 82-5 ...... 10 88-10 ...... 21 1st Canadian Parachute Battalion 82-5 ...... 14 21st Army 88-10 ...... 21 21st Canadian Armoured Regiment see Governor-General's Foot Guards ...... 9 27th Canadian Armoured Regiment, Sherbrooke Fusiliers 82-5 ...... 11 28th Canadian Armoured Regiment (British Columbia Regiment) 82-5 ...... 9 29th Canadian Armoured Reconnaisance Regiment see South Alberta Regiment ...... 9 2nd Anti-Tank Regiment 82-5 ...... 12 2nd Canadian Armoured Brigade 82-5 ...... 10 2nd Canadian Corps 82-5 ...... 18 88-10 ...... 21 2nd Canadian Infantry Division 82-5 ...... 10

31st Infantry Battalion See Canada. Canadian Army. 31st Infantry Battalion ...... 27

5th Canadian Mounted Rifle Battalion See Canada. Canadian Army. 5th Canadian Mounted Rifle Battalion ...... 27 6 Airborne Division 82-5 ...... 14 6th Canadian Armoured Regiment, "C" Squadron 82-5 ...... 11 6th Canadian Armoured Regiment, 1st Hussars 82-5 ...... 10 6th Canadian Infantry Bde. Machine-gun Company See Canada. Canadian Army. 6th Canadian Infantry Bde...... Machine-gun Company 27 7th Canadian Infantry Brigade 82-5 ...... 12 7th Canadian Reconnaissance Regiment 82-5 ...... 12 8th Army 88-10 ...... 21 8th Canadian Infantry Brigade 82-5 ...... 13, 14 9th Canadian Armoured Regiment See Canada. Canadian Army. British Columbia Dragoons ...... 40 African National Congress 88-17 ...... 31, 32 Aktur (Action Front for the Retention of the Turnhalle Principles) 88-17 ...... 32 Algonquin Regiment 82-5 ...... 9 American Institute for Economic Research (Great Barrington, MA) 88-17 ...... 31 Angle, H.H. 74-9 ...... 40 Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders of Canada 82-5 ...... 9 Becker, John J. 88-17 ...... 30 Bell-Irving, H.P. 74-10 ...... 42 Black Watch (Royal Highland Regiment) of Canada 88-11 ...... 23 Bloemfontein Training Centre 88-17 ...... 30

Botha, P.W. 88-17 ...... 30, 32 Botha, R.F. 88-17 ...... 30

Bretteville-L'Orgueilleuse-Normandy 82-5 ...... 13 Bretteville-sur-Laize (France) 88-11 ...... 22 British Columbia Dragoons See Canada. Canadian Army. British Columbia Dragoons ...... 40 Calgary Highlanders 88-11 ...... 23 Canada - Defence Policies 84-28 ...... 51 Canada. Canadian Army. 1 Canadian Division, HQ 74-10 ...... 43 Canada. Canadian Army. 1 Canadian Infantry Division 74-10 ...... 43 Canada. Canadian Army. 116th Canadian Battalion 83-142 ...... 27 Canada. Canadian Army. 1st Battalion Regina Rifle Regiment 81-18 ...... 28 Canada. Canadian Army. 27th Canadian Armoured Regiment, Sherbrooke, Quebec 82-5 ...... 11 Canada. Canadian Army. 29th Canadian Armoured Reconnaisance Regiment 82-5 ...... 9 Canada. Canadian Army. 2nd Canadian Armoured Brigade 82-5 ...... 11 Canada. Canadian Army. 2nd Canadian Corps - HQ 82-5 ...... 10 Canada. Canadian Army. 2nd Canadian Infantry Brigade 82-5 ...... 11 Canada. Canadian Army. 2nd Canadian Infantry Division, 4th Brigade 88-11 ...... 23 Canada. Canadian Army. 2nd Canadian Infantry Division, 5th Brigade 88-11 ...... 23 Canada. Canadian Army. 2nd Canadian Infantry Division, 6th Brigade 82-5 ...... 12 Canada. Canadian Army. 31st Infantry Battalion 83-142 ...... 27 Canada. Canadian Army. 3rd Canadian Infantry Division 82-5 ...... 12, 13 Canada. Canadian Army. 4th Canadian Armoured Brigade 82-5 ...... 9

Canada. Canadian Army. 4th Canadian Armoured Division 82-5 ...... 9 Canada. Canadian Army. 4th Canadian Infantry Brigade 82-5 ...... 11 Canada. Canadian Army. 4th Infantry Brigade, 2nd Infantry Division

88-11 ...... 22 Canada. Canadian Army. 5th Canadian Armoured Division 82-5 ...... 11 Canada. Canadian Army. 5th Canadian Mounted Rifle Battalion 83-142 ...... 27 Canada. Canadian Army. 6th Canadian Infantry Bde. Machine-gun Company 83-142 ...... 27 Canada. Canadian Army. 7th Canadian Infantry Brigade 82-5 ...... 13 Canada. Canadian Army. British Columbia Dragoons 74-9 ...... 40 Canada. Canadian Army. Canadian Officers Training Corps/Regular Officers Training Plan 82-7 ...... 37, 38 Canada. Canadian Army. Canadian Scottish Regiment 82-5 ...... 13 Canada. Canadian Army. Essex Scottish Regiment 82-5 ...... 11 Canada. Canadian Army. Historical Section (G.S.) Army Headquarters 88-16 ...... 25 Canada. Canadian Army. HQ 2nd Canadian Infantry Brigade 83-179 ...... 15, 16 Canada. Canadian Army. HQ Historical Section (G.S.) 86-1 ...... 18 Canada. Canadian Army. Regina Rifles 82-5 ...... 13 Canada. Canadian Army. Royal Hamilton Light Infantry 88-11 ...... 22 Canada. Canadian Army. Royal Winnipeg Rifles 82-5 ...... 13 Canada. Canadian Army. Seaforth Highlanders of Canada 74-10 ...... 42 Canada. Canadian Army. Seaforth Highlanders of Canada. "C" Company 74-10 ...... 43 Canada. Department of National Defence 74-9 ...... 40 88-12 ...... 29 89-51 ...... 55 Canada. Directorate of History 74-10 ...... 42 82-5 ...... 14 Canada. Directorate of Special Services 88-8 ...... 47 Canada. Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence 88-12 ...... 29 Canadian Confederation Centennial Committee of British Columbia 74-7 ...... 36

Canadian Grenadier Guards 82-5 ...... 9 Canadian Scottish Regiment 82-5 ...... 13 Canadian War Museum, Ottawa 82-5 ...... 10 Canadians in the Normandy Campaign (1982) 82-8 ...... 15 82-12 ...... 15 Caron, A.P. 73-1 ...... 44 Clark, J.A. 74-10 ...... 42 Clarkson, C. Harold 82-5 ...... 9 Conscription 88-18 ...... 34 COTC/ROTP. UBC Contingent. U. Vic. Detachment See Canada. Canadian Army. Canadian Officers Training Corps/Regular Officers Training Plan ...... 37 COTC/ROTP. UBC Contingent. U. Vic. Detachment. Tri-Services Committee 82-7 ...... 37 Crerar Family 88-9 ...... 20 Crerar, Gen. H.D.G. 88-10 ...... 21 88-9 ...... 20 91-38 ...... 56, 57 Crimean War 88-19 ...... 50 D-Day 82-5 ...... 12-14 84-12 ...... 17 88-11 ...... 24 Defence Newsletter 91-38 ...... 56, 57 Demokratiese Turnhalle Alliansie (DTA) 88-17 ...... 32

Disarmament 88-12 ...... 29 Duguid, A. Fortescue 82-5 ...... 9 Eisenhower, Dwight D. 89-25 ...... 46 Essex Scottish Regiment 82-5 ...... 11

Falaise (France) 82-5 ...... 10, 12 Fenians 90-6 ...... 53 Fontenay-Le-Marmion (France) 82-5 ...... 11 88-11 ...... 23 Foreign Affairs Research Institute (London, England) 88-17 ...... 30 Foster, Maj. H.W. 82-5 ...... 12 Fraser, Donald 88-15 ...... 49 Fusiliers Mont-Royal 82-5 ...... 12 G Branch - HQ 2nd Canadian Infantry Division 82-5 ...... 11 German Air Historical Branch 82-5 ...... 14 Glaumesnil (France) 88-11 ...... 22 Governor-General's Foot Guards 82-5 ...... 9 Highland Light Infantry of Canada 82-5 ...... 13 HQ 9th Canadian Infantry Brigade 82-5 ...... 13 Institute for Strategic Studies, University of Pretoria, South Africa 88-17 ...... 30 Journal of Private Fraser 88-15 ...... 49 Klaehn, Lt.-Col. P.C. 82-5 ...... 13 La Cressionniere (France) 82-5 ...... 12 Lacey, F. 91-38 ...... 57 Lake Superior Regiment 82-5 ...... 9 Laurie, John 89-25 ...... 46 Lincoln and Welland Regiment 82-5 ...... 9 Louvigny (France) 88-11 ...... 22 Macdonald, Lt.-Col. B.J.S. 82-5 ...... 11

Matheson, Lt.-Col. 82-5 ...... 13 May-sur-Orne (France) 82-5 ...... 12 88-11 ...... 23 Meyer, Kurt 86-24 ...... 19 Military and Strategic Studies 82-11 ...... 51 84-28 ...... 51 Military History 91-38 ...... 56 Montgomery, Field Marshal Sir Bernard 88-10 ...... 21 89-25 ...... 46 Morale 88-8 ...... 7, 47-48 Morton, Desmond 73-1 ...... 44 Moss, Lt.-Col. A. 74-9 ...... 40 Namibia 88-17 ...... 33 Namibia National Front 88-17 ...... 33 Normandy Campaign 82-12 ...... 15 82-5 ...... 9, 14 88-11 ...... 24 Norrey-en-Bessin 82-5 ...... 13 North American Air Defence Command (NORAD) 88-12 ...... 29

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 84-28 ...... 8, 51 88-12 ...... 29 North Shore (New Brunswick) Regiment 82-5 ...... 13 North-South Institute (Ottawa, Ont.) 88-17 ...... 30 North-West Rebellion (1885) 73-1 ...... 44 Operation Atlantic 82-5 ...... 10 Operation Charnwood

82-5 ...... 11 Operation Goodwood 82-5 ...... 10 Operation Overlord 82-5 ...... 10, 13, 14 Operation Spring 82-5 ...... 10 88-11 ...... 23 Operation Tallulah 82-5 ...... 12 Operation Totalize 82-5 ...... 10, 11, 14 88-10 ...... 21 Operation Tractable 82-5 ...... 10, 12 Parker, E.G. 88-19 ...... 50 Pearkes, Maj.-Gen. George R. 74-9 ...... 40 Polish Armoured Division 82-5 ...... 14 Prisoners of War - Canada 88-10 ...... 21 Queen's Own Cameron Highlanders of Canada 82-5 ...... 12 Queen's Own Cameron Highlanders of Canada. "A" Company 82-5 ...... 12 Queen's Own Cameron Highlanders of Canada. "B" Company 82-5 ...... 12 Queen's Own Cameron Highlanders of Canada. SP Company 82-5 ...... 12 Queen's Own Rifles of Canada 82-5 ...... 13 Ready for the Fray! A History of the Canadian Scottish Regiment 74-8 ...... 39 Red Chevron Association of Vancouver Island ...... 8 89-52 ...... 54 Regiment de la Chaudiere 82-5 ...... 13 Regina Rifles 82-5 ...... 13 Republic of South Africa. Department of Defence 88-17 ...... 30 Riel Rebellion 73-1 ...... 44 88-80 ...... 52 Riel, Louis

73-1 ...... 44 Rockingham, Brig. J.M. 88-11 ...... 22 Royal Air Force (RAF) 89-49 ...... 55 Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) 89-25 ...... 46 Royal Canadian Military Institute 88-12 ...... 29 Royal Hamilton Light Infantry 88-11 ...... 22 Royal Military College (Kingston, Ont.) 74-8 ...... 40 Royal North-West Mounted Police 73-1 ...... 44 Seaforth Highlanders of Canada (1969) 74-10 ...... 42, 43 Secqueville La Campagne (France) 82-5 ...... 12 Simonds, Lt.-Gen. G.G. 82-5 ...... 10 88-10 ...... 21 Sinews of Steel: A History of the British Columbia Dragoons 74-9 ...... 40, 41 South Africa 88-17 ...... 30, 31, 33 South Africa - Black Workers 88-17 ...... 30 South Africa Foundation 88-17 ...... 31

South Africa. Human Sciences Research Council. Institute for Sociological and Demographic Research 88-17 ...... 30 South African Embassy (Ottawa) 88-17 ...... 31 South African Institute of International Affairs 88-17 ...... 31 South Alberta Regiment 82-4 ...... 9 South Saskatchewan Regiment 82-5 ...... 12 South-West Africa/Namibia 88-17 ...... 31, 32 Soweto (South Africa) 88-17 ...... 30 St. Andre-Sur-Orne (France)

82-5 ...... 12 St.-Laurent, Louis 86-24 ...... 19 Stacey, C.P. 74-8 ...... 39 74-9 ...... 40 88-11 ...... 22 88-18 ...... 34 Stormont, Dundas and Glengarry Highlanders 82-5 ...... 13 SWA/Namibia Liberation Front 88-17 ...... 33 Tambo, Oliver 88-17 ...... 31 Telegrams of the North-West Campaign, 1885 (1972) 73-1 ...... 44 Terrorism 88-12 ...... 29 Thackray, William 82-5 ...... 9 Tilly-la-Campagne (France) 88-11 ...... 23 Tournebu (France) 88-11 ...... 22 U.S. Strategic Institute (Washington, D.C.) 88-17 ...... 32 United Kingdom. Royal Air Force 82-5 ...... 10

United Nations. Secretary General 88-17 ...... 30 University of Victoria (B.C.) - Speakers Programme 91-38 ...... 56, 57 University of Victoria (B.C.). Alumni Association 83-167 ...... 35 Verriers (France) 88-11 ...... 22 Victoria Daily Colonist 88-11 ...... 24 Victoria Times Weekend Magazine 88-11 ...... 24 War Crimes - Trials and Executions 89-25 ...... 46 Weaponry 82-11 ...... 8, 51 Webb, Lt.-Col. R.H. 82-5 ...... 12

Wightman, C.M. 86-24 ...... 19 World War, 1914-1918 89-42 ...... 55 91-38 ...... 56 World War, 1939-1945 ...... 8 89-50 ...... 55 Zaslow, Morris 73-1 ...... 44

73 Roy Lecture Series

This is a series of tapes currently only available as reel to reel made by speakers to Dr. Reginald Roy Lectures

378 Agnew, J. Lecture: Coalition Warfare: The U.S. Involvment in Vietnam. Interviewer: none original sound tape reel (ca. 33 min.): 1 7/8 ips., 2 track Provenance: Reg Roy guest lectures series no date , UVIC. Restriction: none Scope & Content: Reel: 1, Side: 1Also called "alliance/warfare"; associated problems. Early times, U.S. largely alone. Boxer Rebellion in China first real U.S. joint action. World Wars I & II and Korea were true alliances. Question: Are coalitions good or bad? Problem of supreme command, logistics, communications, etc. No combined command in Vietnam - SEATO involvment -Unity of effort is hard to achieve. Mutual support took much time to make effective. This was not always a good way to fight a war. U.S. wanted to forget a "Non-Win" an unfortunate involvment. For the future, none forseeably as effective as that' in W.W. II. Answer to question: Best when cohesion of effort exists for both sides. Subjects: Alliance. 378 Coalition Warfare. 378 Vietnam. 378

379 Auty, Phyllis Lecture: Tito and Yugoslavia Interviewer: none original sound tape reel (ca. 46 min.): 1 7/8 ips., 2 track Provenance: Reg Roy guest lectures series no date, UVIC. Restriction:none Note that Dr. Auty has written two books (at least) about this phase of the war. Scope & Content: Reel: 1, Side: 1Background to Tito, a popular leader. Ethnic groups (e.g. Croats vs. Serbs) a major problem. Tito, a long-time communist, established the only Yugoslav National Party although it remained very small for years. Hitler invaded in April, 1941 - a ten day campaign. The Communist party was the only surviving political party. On June 22, 1941, Hitler invaded Russia thus releasing Tito to go to war against the Germans with a well organized guerrilla war. Tito had gained military experience as a member of the Austro-Hungarian army in the Great War. Captured by the Russians, he saw, as a P.O.W., the Russian Revolution and gained much as an observer. He created an army, not just a guerrilla organization, which was then considered a novel idea. Formed "brigades" of about 1,000 men. Short-term objective to defeat the enemy and, long-term, to govern the country. Established "liberated areas" from which he could operate. Set up civil governments with very strictly enforced laws - and in the military. Explains about Mihajlovic, leader of the Royalist Serbian army. By 1943 Tito had an army of 200,000 men and women. Describes the major battle in 1944. British sent agents. Tito's problems mainly political toward the end of the war. Subjects: Communism. 379 Guerrilla Operations. 379 Mihajlovic. 379 Political objectives. 379 Tito. 379 Yugoslavia, W.W. II. 379

380.1 Avakrmcovic, Ivan, Prof. U.B.C. (formerly U of Manitoba?)Lecture: Communist Subversion in Europe Interviewer: none original sound tape reel (ca. 45 min.): 1 7/8 ips., 2 track Provenance: Reg Roy guest lectures series Possibly 1978, UVIC. Restriction:none Dr. R.H. Roy commented that these lectures were some of the best offered by a guest lecturer. Scope & Content: Reel: 1, Side: 1Explains subversion as espionage, terrorism, and seizing power by violent means. Many other means and directed by many. Women played a larger part than in the West. Much effort in gathering intelligence. Russian revolutionary tradition. Agents were usually recruited by payment or blackmail. Ideological conviction not as common except in parts of Russia. Personal family anecdote. After the Russian revolution three kinds of intelligence services were established and many training schools, including political Schools. Universities for young Communist sympathizers, even possibly sympathetic, especially from Africa and the Near and Far East. Intelligence Officers often took menial jobs as a cover. Military and economic intelligence gathered. Attacks on anti-communists were promoted. Russian agents in British Service and other Intelligence Services. Listening devices used. Some Soviet Agents defected but the Russians had many successes. Communists claimed not to be in favor of violence unless absolutely necessary. They prefer a peaceful approach to power. Left of centre governments a useful starting place but in practice were only present in a small number of democratic countries. Failure of the "peaceful' method could cause guerrilla operations to arise. Export of revolution through military means is also useful and has been practiced many times. Subjects: Avakrmcovic, Ivan. 380.1 Agents. 380.1 Espionage. 380.1 Intelligence services. 380.1 Revolution, export of. 380.1 Russian agents. 380.1 Subversion, in Europe. 380.1

380.2 Avakrmcovic, Ivan, Prof. U.B.C. (formerly U of Manitoba?) Lecture: Communist Subversion in Canada. Interviewer: none original sound tape reel (ca. 50 min.): 1 7/8 ips., 2 track Provenance: Reg Roy guest lectures series Possibly 1978, UVIC. Restriction:none Dr. R.H. Roy commented that these lectures were some of the best offered by a guest lecturer. Scope & Content: Reel: 1, Side: 2Some methods of Russian direction of Communist agents not well known but often directed to agitation in trade unions and ethnic groups. Not a lot of attention paid to communism in Canada. There are no autobiographies of former communists and the R.C.M.P. files are closed as a source of information. Basically the Canadian party was built on the Russian model. Full-time revolutionaries were required to lead. Both legal and illegal methods of operation were fostered. Part of the CommunistInternational. Problems of establishing a party. Some old Marxists, some 1917 Marxists, and some who fought in the I.W.W. (anarchists) originally many Finns, fewer Ukrainians, Jews and a few Anglos. Slowly won a few seats in parliament and provincial legislatures but not a popular party. In the l920's some were imprisoned. Some were also imprisoned in 1940 for opposing the war effort. (The Russian-German treaty of that time.) Police harassment could be a problem. Instructions from Moscow could also cause problems, e.g. changes in attitude, practically over-night the "party- line" could change. Some opposition by Canadians who usually had to be forced out of the party. Communism did not have much application to the Canadian scene. The American Communist Party had some influence in Canada. An intelligence centre was established in the 1920's and, in war-time, run from the Soviet embassy. Interested in pipelines, atomic research,infiltrating government organizations, ethnic groups (particularly Central European). Canada was sometimes used by American and German communists "on the run". After the war communist defector provided a great deal of information. Some important communists fled the country. Mackenzie King told Americans and British but unfortunately held a naive opinion of Stalin & Co. The Canadian Communist Party was discredited. Increased Canadian security. Eastern European immigrants were a source of communist agents. Also the R.C.M.P. had staffing and financial problems. What can be done in an "Open Society"? Very difficult to obtain information, etc. Subjects: Canadian Communist Party. 380.2 Canadian Parliament. 380.2 Canadian Security. 380.2 Communist Party. 380.2 Communist Subversion in Canada. 380.2 Eastern European Immigrants. 380.2 Intelligence centre. 380.2 Maxists. 380.2 Methods. 380.2 Moscow, directions from. 380.2 Police. 380.2 Soviet Embassy. 380.2

381 Baines, J.A., Mr., Victoria, Former R.C.A.F. Navigator Lecture: Dirigibles Interviewer: none original sound tape reel (ca. 48 min.): 3 3/4 ips., 2 track Provenance: Reg Roy guest lectures series 12 Oct. 1971, UVIC. Restriction:none Balance of lecture unrecorded.Side 2, blank Scope & Content: Reel: 1, Side: 1Something of the beginning of lighter-than-aircraft and of hydrogen gas used later in them. In l670 balloons were damned as diabolical machines. By the early 1900's passenger flights were fairly common. Early military use by the Germans (dirigibles). Used with some success against England but at heavy cost. Describes the fate of some Zeppelins, early ones lacked height potential but later were able to reach 20,000 feet. The British eventually built some large machines (the R-l00 series) which tended to be somewhat unreliable! Describes some of the factors influencing flight - rain, snow, wind, amount of gas carried, etc. Gas bags could burst if not volume delicately controlled. U.S. dirigibles, the Los Angeles, etc. where helium was used (not flammable). Graf Zeppelin circled the world in 12 days. British R-l0l started in 1924. Details of construction, also the R-l00. Gas bags made from bullocks diaphragms. Very difficult to maintain, protection against mold, moisture, abrasion was necessary. Great trouble with engine weight causing some instability. The R-l0l crashed on her maiden voyage. In 1925 the non-rigid blimps came into service. Subjects: Baines, J.A. 381 Civilian use. 381 Destruction of dirigibles. 381 Dirigibles, British, German, U.S. 381 Gas bags. 381 Gasses used to provide "lift". 381 Lighter than air craft. 381 Military use. 381 Zepplins. 381

382 Bond, Brian, Prof. Kings College, London Lecture: Liddell Hart (Capt. B.H.) Interviewer: none original sound tape reel (ca. 44 min.): 3 3/4 ips., 2 track Provenance: Reg Roy guest lectures series no date , UVIC. Restriction:none Note that the first few minutes of this tape are blank, followed by garbage for the introductory remarksTape ends a few minutes before lecture does. Side 2 blank. Scope & Content: Reel: 1, Side: 1Liddell Hart, early career. Military correspondent for the Daily Telegraph, 1925-35, and for the Times of London, 1935-40. Very modern ideas of warfare and during the mid-thirties was an important adviser to the war Ministry. The "indirect approach" taken up by the Germans and used on a large scale 1939-40. Not accepted on anything like that scale by the British. Hart was able to confirm German interest in his theories by interviewing German generals after the war. One of the earliest to see the deterrent effect of nuclear weapons. Post-war he became well recognized as a major proponent of the rank. Besides the Germans, the Russians had shown interest as had the Israeli forces later. Between the Wars L.H. had been an advocate of British abstention from land warfare on continental Europe. Britain had made too many illogical efforts in the Great War. Liddell Hart had an important influence on British military thinking (but slowly). In 1937 he influenced the appointment of some senior army officers. This did not make him popular in certain circles. He was not sympathetic toward guerrilla warfare, felt it was too disturbing to civilized behavior. Some additional thoughts on the British resistance to blitzkrieg warfare. Subjects: Bond, Brian. 382 German interest in Liddell Hart. 382 Influence at British War Office, 1930's. 382 Military corses poundent. 382 Modern ideas of warfare. 382 Opponent of guerrilla warfare. 382 Strategist. 382 Tanks, proponent of. 382

383 Burke, David, Lt. Col. Lecture: American Strategic Bombing (and Nuclear Weapons) Interviewer: none original sound tape reel (ca. 47 min.): 1 7/8 ips., 2 track Provenance: Reg Roy guest lectures series 29 Nov. 1977, UVIC. Restriction:none David Burke, Assist. Professor of Political Science and Coordinator of Western European and Cdn. Studies at the Naval Post-Graduate School, Monterey, Calif.NOTE: That Col. Burke misjudged his time. As a result the lecture was not completed. Scope & Content: Reel: 1, Side: 1Strategic bombing, theory and practice. Hardware, as it was introduced, caused changes in practice. Begun in the Great War by the Royal Naval Air Service against the German Zepplin service. After Zepplins, the German air force used large heavy bombers against London. (Book, "Sky on Fire") discuses some including the Gotha. Despite the Kaiser's hesitation the German bombers were effective, flying from bases in Belgium. Night bombing began, but was "area bombing". The Germans developed an effective incendiary bomb but for Political reasons did not use it. The British established their own heavy bomber force. Between the wars, theory had it that command of the air was vital, especially at the beginning of a war. A "mix" of bombs (including gas) was touted. Thus the British fear of a gas attack at the start of W.W.II. American thought prewar, was slow in gathering stern but eventually American technology produced the DC-l, 2, & 3, the B-9 and B-lO, which flew faster than fighter aircraft currently in service, finally an early version of the B-17. The Sperry bomb-sight was followed by the Norden. By choice, Americans preferred bombing specific targets, not area bombing. Subjects: Burke, David. 383 Aircraft, Bomber types. 383 Poison gas. 383 Royal Naval Air Service. 383 Strategic Bombing, early German. 383 Strategic Bombing, post W.W. I. 383 Zepplins, German. 383

384 Burns, E.L.M., Lt. General, Canadian Army Lecture: Arms Control Interviewer: none original sound tape reel 15/16th ips., 2 track Provenance: Reg Roy guest lectures series 19 Feb. 1972, UVIC. Restriction:none Side 2 blankNOTE: "Unable to access due to slow recording speed" no summary Subjects: Burns, E.L.M. 384

385 Campbell, Ross, Mr., Canadian Ambassador to NATO Lecture: NATO Interviewer: none original sound tape reel (ca. 45-50 min.): 1 7/8 ips., 2 track Provenance: Reg Roy guest lectures series 7 Feb. 1972, UVIC. Restriction:none Side 2 blank. Scope & Content: Reel: 1, Side: 1Reasons for an org. like NATO: standing together very necessary. Compares the Russian attitude toward Eastern Europe to that of Hitler. The U.N. had been reduced to near impotence due to Soviet veto. The twelve original nations in NATO were there for flexibility, territorial integrity, detante, social and economic well-being. Collective security, integrated military force. Brief description of chain-of-comand in NATO, from the North Atlantic Council (money and resources), two supreme military commands (one. "Atlantic") and sub-commands. Of necessity largely a military organization. The Cuban Crisis brought about nuclear restraint - the realization how close war was at that time. Czech affair, comments on Soviet Russia, the Warsaw pact and the unchanging Political situation. This was, however, somewhat of a live and let-live period. The Russian promoted a European pact with economic and technical benefits without Western political ideas. On the other hand the West promoted strategic arms limitation talks, levels of conventional forces, Stabilization of national borders, negotiations and a treaty regarding Berlin.Questions:Soviets kept up pressure on German militarism, which did not really exist. Spread of Russian influence in the Mediterranean, a de-stabilizing force. Greece a problem country. NATO not involved in the internal affairs of other member countries. NATO viewed Yugoslavia favorably. Russia-U.S.-NATO relative strengths, not good regarding land forces, but mutually effective nuclear deterrence. Noted that the "first step" causing war was not worth it. Subjects: Campbell, Ross. 385 Collective Security. 385 NATO, Establishment and Growth. 385 NATO: Military organization. 385 Nuclear Balance. 385 Nuclear Deterrence. 385 Russian threat. 385

386.1 Charles, J.A., Rear Admiral., Dep. Chief of Plans, N.D.H.Q. Lecture: Naval Operations and Strategy in the Mediterranean, 1941-43 Interviewer: none original sound tape reel (ca. 45 min.): 1 7/8 ips., 2 track Provenance: Reg Roy guest lectures series 25 Jan. 1972 , UVIC. Restriction:none Rear Admiral. Charles continues, same reel and side. 1972? Canada/U.S. Defense Relations. Scope & Content: Reel: 1, Side 1Allied strategy shifting from the defensive to the offensive. Summer of 1942, the Axis Owned" most of Europe. Pressure was being exerted to start a second front, but supply system was still inadequate. Of several options considered, North Africa was picked. Problems in French North Africa. Finally the Germans were pushed back from both West and East. Conference at Casablanca picked Sicily as next invasion site. Then to Italy. Landing at Salerno. Locations picked were subject to the availability of landing craft and the range of fighter air-craft. Support for the Yugoslavian partisans. Anzio landing a complete surprise but not fully exploited. Flexibility is vital in any grand strategy. Command of the sea is vital, today as then.Questions: Subjects: Charles, J.A. 386.1 Allied Strategy, defensive to offensive. 386.1 Anzio landings. 386.1 Italy. 386.1 North Africa. 386.1 Sicily. 386.1 Salerno. 386.1

386.2 Charles, J.A., Rear Admiral., Dep. Chief of Plans, N.D.H.Q. Lecture: Canada/U.S. Defence Relations. Interviewer: none original sound tape reel (ca. 45 min.): 1 7/8 ips., 2 track Provenance: Reg Roy guest lectures series 1972?, UVIC. Restriction:none

Scope & Content: Reel: 1, Side 1Started in a small way in 1936/7. Ogdensburg Agreement. Permanent joint board on defence established including war production and transport. Emphasis on war-time planning. Connections between NATO and North American defence establishments. Russian threats. Setting up radar stations across Canada. Unified air defence system (NORAD) initially of ten years duration (1958-68). Use and control of U.S. nuclear weapons in Canada. Major threat to North America, Political problems, Air control units, Maritime threats. ICBM's. Cdn. East coast also involved with NATO. Many channels of communication with the U.S., including political, Diplomatic, Dept. of Defence, Military channels.Close monitoring of technical changes and the forces available. Policy objectives exchange of ideas. Long-term planning more difficult since governments think in short terms. Financing a stumbling block; usually new equipment costs far more than originally thought - priorities are vital. World wide problems. Internal finances, including relations with other Government Dept. are very time- consuming. Scope & Content: Reel: 1, Side: 2ca. 40 min.Questions: How difficult is an Independent Foreign Policy? Defense policy is the only large area. Canadian Sovereignty over land mass in the Arctic. Canada claims ice-covered sea is ours, the U.S. disagrees. Civilian maintenance of the radar stations is economically viable. Development of high tech military equipment. Defence production sharing. Canada cannot afford to develop major defence items but we are expert in many smaller components. American bases in Canada. Effectiveness of Canadian anti-submarine capability. Canada is a valuable member of NATO and can bring some influence to bear on U.S. Foreign Policy. Subjects: Charles, J.A. 386.2 Canadian sovereignty. 386.2 Defence of North America. 386.2 Defence production. 386.2 Nuclear Weapons - Canada. 386.2 Ogdensburg Agreement. 386.2 Permanent Joint Board on Defence. 386.2 Radar stations. 386.2

387 Clark, S.F., Lt. Gen., Cdn. Army, formerly C.G.S. Lecture: NATO Interviewer: none original sound tape reel (ca. 60 min.): 1 7/8 ips., 2 track Provenance: Reg Roy guest lectures series 24 March 1971, UVIC. Restriction:none

Scope & Content: Reel: 1, Side: 1In general terms the need for NATO. Some felt that the UN charter had caused doubts, including those of Great Britain. After the war, the Western Allies turned from a military stance to a civilian one; Russia did not and, as well, held on to much occupied territory. American interest was in a free Europe. Trueman doctrine. Marshall Plan. An early collective start was made with the Brussels Treaty. Canada sent military observers to the early organization. Remarks on the early structure of NATO. Canadian forces needed, ours were professional but financial problems existed. Americans held supreme command as they were the largest component, although there were some other nationalistic problems. Canada has made a critical contribution but suspects that our efforts have fallen off somewhat in the past few years. Some serious reductions.Question period: Scope and expansion of NATO. Works better with a modest number of members. Practical effect of foreign commanders created some problems, particularly with the French. Points out that serving officers in the Cdn. Forces must obey orders or resign - then disillusioned officers, if any, can climb on their soap boxes! Subjects: Clark, S.F. 387 Canadian Forces, somewhat deminished. 387 NATO: Early collective agreements. 387 NATO: Origins and Scope. 387

388 Collins, J., Brig. Gen., U.S. Army Lecture: Eisenhower's Strategy in Europe after D-Day Interviewer: none original sound tape reel (ca. 60 min.): 3 3/4 ips., 2 track Provenance: Reg Roy guest lectures series no date, UVIC. Restriction:none

Scope & Content: Reel: 1, Side: 1The army to move to the "heart of Germany": the Ruhr in the North, then Bradley to push into the Saar. On the right, the push was to be frown the south of France. The Combined Chiefs of Staff wanted to destroy the economic strength of Germany. Berlin, the political centre, not the first priority. Allied forces ran into supply difficulties. Insufficient transport to supply the armies. Two main thrusts toward Germany was decided although Montgomery wanted just One. Problems arose in the Northern sector. Supply caused the delay. It was planned that the Americans were to cross the Rhine, somewhat over-ambitious. Surprise battle in the Ardennes. Later, the British still worried that continuing two offensives would be dangerous. Eisenhower abandoned any idea of taking Berlin and much land that would, in the future, fall into the Russian sector of Germany, partly because of the casualties that might result. Question period: Discusses early days of American offensive in Normandy. Lack of logistical support troops caused a problem. Aircraft in the Ardennes battle. German oil supply which was synthetic (from coal) and failure to hit the transportation facilities had been a weak spot in the bomber offensive. Opposing German forces in the invasion area, especially in the American sector. Personal involvment in field artillery (155 mm). Ammunition shortage, rations not balanced. Subjects: Collins, J. 388 Bombing, U.S., W.W. II. 388 Strategic compromises. 388 Supply Difficulties, U.S. Army, Europe, W.W. II. 388 Supply Difficulties, German. 388 Transportation facilities, German. 388 United States Army, Europe, W.W. II. 388

389 Coox, A.D., Ph.D. Univ. of San Diego Lecture: Japan and the China - Incident Interviewer: none original sound tape reel (ca. 50 min.): 1 7/8 ips., 2 track Provenance: Reg Roy guest lectures series 2 March 1971, UVIC. Restriction:none Better audio without earphones!Side: 2, Blank. Scope & Content: Reel: 1, Side: 1War in China l937-45, rarely written about. At the start only a small Japanese force in China. Main enemy always considered Russia. As a result of the large Chinese army the Japanese had to send reinforcements. Japan mobilized, as did China. The situation escalated largely due to misunderstandings and traditional hard feelings. Japanese strategy, capture cities and rail centres. First Shanghai then Nanking. This would be a major factor in winning the war. By 1939 they had more than 30 divisions in China, and in 1945 they had a million men there, the largest Japanese army in the field. Heavy casualties on both sides. Japanese feelings and command decisions. Chinese fought a war of attrition. Japanese felt very superior and expected to win the war quickly. Initially both the Russians and the Germans assisted the Chinese. In Japan a lack of production off military supplies and civilian goods caused problems. Not a good supply system. The Japanese knew how to start a war but not how to end one.Questions:Attempt to renew the martial spirit in post-war Japan. Little chance. Start of the war with the Americans. Subjects: Coox, A.D. 389 Japanese strategy, China. 389 Japanese early supply system. 389 Sino/Japanese War, 1937-1945. 389

390 Critchley, W. Harriet, Ph.D. Lecture: Ottoman Empire, The Rise and Fall Interviewer: none original sound tape reel (ca. 47 min.): 3 3/4 ips., 2 track Provenance: Reg Roy guest lectures series 1977/8?, UVIC. Restriction:none The recording ends apparently just short at the end of the lecture.Reel 1, Side 2 of Burke, g.v.Chritchley, W. Harriet, Ph.D. (Cdn. Institute of International Affairs, later U. of Calgary) Scope & Content: Reel: 1, Side: 2Extent of Empire in Europe, Middle East, and North Africa although this lecture concerned with European Turkish Empire. Mercenary troops. Western coalition to fight the Turks, particularly in the Balkans (1300's). Organization of armed forces, grand strategy, tactics. Firstly a cavalry force - a feudal organization responsible only to the Sultan. This was largely recruited from Christian children, males of about 10 years who, after training and conversion as Moslems, became cavalrymen. Sultan in complete control. Most administrators were also foreign-born, also converts. Civilian control entrusted to various religious leaders throughout the Empire, thus exhibiting considerable tolerance. Tactics in war included the famous half-moon formation for enveloping the enemy; cavalry on the wings, infantry in the centre. The Turks were considered a savage enemy (not without cause) and this was psychologically very effective. In due course (c.1699) much of the European Ottoman Empire was lost. The armed forces declined - recruitment of the Janissarys (the elite infantry formed, like the cavalry, from former Christian male children) became less rigorous, and more corrupt and somewhat obsolete. Added to that, the European states became stronger. Finally presents a brief comment on Republican Turkey. Critchley, W. Harriet. 390 European Empire. 390 Janissarys, Turkish. 390 Ottoman Empire. 390 Turkey, Feudal Organization. 390 Turks, Strategy. 390 Warfare, Turkish method. 390

391 Douglas, W.A.B., Ph.D., D.N.D. - Directorate of History Lecture: History of Military Aircraft Interviewer: none original sound tape reel (ca. 55 min.): 3 3/4 ips., 2 track Provenance: Reg Roy guest lectures series no date, UVIC. Restriction:none

Scope & Content: Reel: 1, Side: 1Balloons used in the U.S. civil war. In 1909 it was said that aircraft would never be used in war. Designers and Governments soon changed that. Now there is a very close relationship between the two and with war. Gives some historic details of flight. Problems encountered by aircraft Designers and Governments. Inter-service rivalry may be beneficial, or not, re: aircraft production.Aircraft played an important part in the Great War, the majority of aircraft in Europe. In 1914 there was only a few aircraft but by l9l8 the R.F.C. had some 22,000 aircraft. Performance tremendously improved. Roles: scouting, air warfare (tactics were developed), ground support. The British and the Germans were both innovative. British naval air fell behind due to opposing schools off thought and inter-service rivalry. The naval air service had set up a bombing wing and also established fighter Squadrons on the Western Front. Later purely naval use languished although some anti-submarine work was done. Much theory was expounded between the wars, including the theory that air power would win the next war. Conclusion: air power was a sort of religion, revolutionary but not effective in isolation. Subjects: Douglas, W.A.B. 391 Aircraft, Military. 391 Aircraft, early military use. 391 Royal Flying Corps. 391 Royal Naval Air Service. 391 Warfare, Air theory. 391

392 Epstein, Wm., Ph.D., U.N. Institute for Training and Research Lecture: Outlook for Arms Control and Disarmament. Interviewer: none original sound tape reel (ca. 50 min.): 3 3/4 ips., 2 track Provenance: Reg Roy guest lectures series 1976, UVIC. Restriction:none Reel: 2, Side: 1, Speed 1 7/8 ips. ca. 50 min.Very nearly a repeat of Scope & Content: Reel: 1 Side 2. A rather poor copy of Side: 2, Scope & Content: Reel: 1. Scope & Content: Reel: 1 Side: 1Discusses treaties between major Nations, particularly the U.S. and Russia. Costs. Number of ICBM's, both land and on sea. Armour and naval arms races. SALT, politically important. Effect of clashes as between treaties. Balance of power politics. There ought to be a phasing out of nuclear weapons and testing. Not a fan of submarine warfare; somewhat ineffective against nuclear submarines. Disarmament can be promoted by reducing finances spent on arms. Non-Prolification Treaty. Attitudes of certain U.S. members. Small powers vs. large powers. Proposed disarmament conferences. Super-powers playing a game regarding disarmament. Despite that, believes that nuclear disarmament is possible.Questions: Scope & Content: Reel: 1 Side: 2A number of partial recordings taking up the whole of the side. Firstly, an account of Hitler's Germany, perhaps from a radio/T.V. program. Toward the end, the interviewer apparently speaks to Wm. L. Shirer. Secondly, there is a period (fairly short) of comment recorded at 15/16ths ips. and thus unavailable. Third: an unknown speaker, apparently in a class of Dr. Roy's, no date. Canada, Political - Economic - Military Complex, almost non- existing. Early Imperial defence included Canada. There was no long-term planning by Canada. However there was worry vis-a-vis the United States. Canada eventually began to think about foreign affairs, defence policies, etc. Canada's military and the reason for home defence during W.W. II. Subjects: Epstein, Wm. 392

393 Glover, (Richard?), Ph.D., University of Manitoba (ret'd) Lecture: Bonaparte Interviewer: none original sound tape reel (ca. 50 min.): 1 7/8 ips., 2 track Provenance: Reg Roy guest lectures series no date, UVIC. Restriction:none Side 2: Blank. Scope & Content: Reel: 1, Side: 1Resume. An early gangster - an Al Capone of Europe. Studied by Lord Wellington. Rode roughshod over Spain and, treacherously, many other countries. Russian campaign. Always the French army was supposed to eat off the country. Side-lights on Waterloo. Wellington admired Bonaparte's military skills and quick mind. When young, Wellington was not exactly brilliant at his studies; no high intellectual attainments, some said. However he was a man of many accomplishments, a keen reader and a good administrator. Comments on some battles against the French. Subjects: Glover, (Richard?)393 Bonaparte, strategy. 393 Waterloo, Battle of. 393 Wellington. 393

394 Glubb, John, Sir, Lt. Gen. , Formerly Royal Jordanian Army. Lecture: The Near East. Interviewer: none original sound tape reel (ca. 50 min.): 1 7/8 ips., 2 track Provenance: Reg Roy guest lectures series no date, UVIC. Restriction:none Side 2: Blank. Scope & Content: Reel: 1, Side: 1Brief history of the "owners" of the Near East, over some 5,000 years. The importance of this area. Egypt a "crossroad". This was recognized by Napoleon who attempted to take and hold Egypt. British eventually became the sole "owner" of Egypt.The Jewish influx to Palestine caused a division of that country. He blames Britain for leaving that county too early. They should have stayed until more peaceful conditions prevailed. Russian influence in the Near East; an old enemy of Turkey. The British navy began to withdraw from the Mediterranean thus allowing the Russian fleet to partially fill the vacuum. In 1967 Egypt attacked Israel. Glubb feels that the Russians wanted Egypt to be defeated so that, as rescuers, they could extend their influence. This was especially important as the U.S. supported Israel. The Russians thus obtained an important naval base. Partition of Palestine - an unfair situation for the Palestinians Russian propaganda attacked British imperialism in the Near East. The Russians are newcomers at the same game. Many in that part of the world favored the Western European style of civilization, not the Russian version. The Jewish influence is strong in the West but not in the Middle East, bar Israel. Other countries lean toward their "friend", Russia. Russian influence in the Indian Ocean. As long as Russia and the United States do not agree on a solution to Middle East problems, there will not be one. Subjects: Glubb, John. 394 Israel, Wars. 394 Jewish Influx and Influence - Palestine. 394 Near East, U.S./Russian Influence. 394 Palestine. 394 Soviet Expansion, Near East. 394

395 Goodspeed, D.J., Prof. Military Historian (Col.) Lecture: Ludendorf Interviewer: none original sound tape reel (ca. 55 min.): 1 7/8 ips., 2 track Provenance: Reg Roy guest lectures series no date, UVIC. Restriction:none

Scope & Content: Reel: 1, Side: 2 of Mason Scope & Content: Reel: 1, Side: 2Some early aspects of Ludendorfs life. From 1916 to 1918 Ludendorf was effectively the leader of Germany. Comments on the high status of the German army and as an essential part of German life. A very professional army. German General Staff - almost a separate entity in mobilization section, although he was subsequently transferred. In German military doctrine offense is preferred. Railways emphasized with complete military control. Staff officers were men of intellect and maximum results were expected. Sometimes the political aspect of military operations was ignored, the whole being better than the part. Ludendorf may not have fully recognized and adjusted to a changing, modern world. In the Great War he fought at Liege then in East Prussia where he was chief of staff. Russians defeated by smaller but more efficient German forces. Superior railways, administration and in better physical condition of the troops. When in the West again Ludendorf found that many political considerations were not in his field of expertise. The German war effort required much change. Ludendorf changed the defensive configuration of the army. Terrible losses encouraged defensive zones, thinly held. Quick counter attacks. Enormous retraining needed. The offensive in 1918 - a torrent of troops, by passing strong points, many light machine guns gave increased fire-power and produced great results. In the event the politicians erred in giving the army more than its' capabilities could handle and the army erred in aggressively believing that it could do what was asked. Subjects: Goodspeed, D.J. 395 German Army, W.W. I. 395 German General Staff. 395 Ludenforf - Influence and Importance, W.W. I. 395 Military Operations, German. 395

396 Heald, J.F., Capt. U.S. Navy (ret'd) Lecture: Submarines. Interviewer: none original sound tape reel (ca. 45 min.): 3 3/4 ips., 2 track Provenance: Reg Roy guest lectures series 10 Feb. 1977, UVIC. Restriction:none Side 2: Blank. Scope & Content: Reel: 1, Side: 1Historic background of submarines. Development in the Great War and W.W. II. In the later, U.S. submarines were very effective but few new designs cf. German U-Boats. Asdic/sonar had devastating effect on submarines. Snorkel invented. Gradual removal of upper deck equipment improved speed considerably. U.S. began working on nuclear propulsion. Not requiring air for propulsion, nuclear submarines were very efficient. Russians moved ahead with missiles. The U.S. Navy quickly developed the Polaris missile to catch up with the Russians. Much of the world in range of submarine launched missiles. U.S. submarines on constant 9-day patrols. Discusses Russian submarines. Very Low-Frequency under-water wireless communication became common. This was very useful in directing training exercises from the U.S. to any patrol area. The Trident submarine larger and quieter with longer range. Much training in anti-submarine warfare was carried out.Questions. Subjects: Heald, J.F. 396 History and Development. 396 Missiles, Submarine. 396 Polaris Submarine. 396 Wireless, submarine. 396 397 Hilliker, John, Mr., Dept. of External Affairs. Lecture: External Affairs during W.W. II. Interviewer: none original sound tape reel (ca. 55 min.): 3 3/4 ips., 2 track Provenance: Reg Roy guest lectures series 4 March 1980, UVIC. Restriction:none Side 2: Blank Scope & Content: Reel: 1, Side: 1Canada well established and remained nominally independent until W.W. II. The Depression occupied much of our time. The war was a turning point - looking beyond our borders. We became a major contributor to the war. Heightened interest in foreign affairs; we became more important and were recognized as a "middle power". Expansion of our overseas diplomatic positions. In the 1930's Skelton and Mackenzie King were somewhat isolationist, particularly the former, but gradually younger, more activist members joined External Affairs. Relationships between Great Britain, U.S. and Canada expanded to other countries during the war. The Canadian Government very strongly in favor of independent action within the Commonwealth. Especially impressed this on the U.S.A. Declaration of war in 1939, a politically important move. We developed from a Depression nation to an employed, industrial nation. More closely involved with the U.S., particularly in defence matters. (Ogdensburg Agreement, defence of North America) Economic status improved. Canada made great efforts to convince the Americans of our independence. We insisted on making our own decisions. Not too close a relationship to the Commonwealth. Canada felt that, during the war, that it had a right to sit on some committees under the Joint Chiefs of Staff (U.S. and Britain). Discusses the Combined Food Board where we had some influence. Also various "technical" discussions which were quite specific in nature, (air traffic, for instance) Subjects: Hilliker, John. 397 Commonwealth. 397 External Affairs, Canada - Britain - U.S. 397 External Affairs - Prewar. 397 Joint Chiefs of Staff. 397 United States of America. 397

398 Hinsley, F.H., Ph.D. Cambridge. Lecture: Intelligence in the Second World War Interviewer: none original sound tape reel (ca. 50 min.): 1 7/8 ips., 2 track Provenance: Reg Roy guest lectures series 18 Sept. 1976, UVIC. Restriction:none Dr. Hinsley at preset (1976) writing the official British history of the Intelligence Services but warned that he cannot divulge certain secret information at this date. Scope & Content: Reel: 1, Side: 1ENIGMA codes broken, officially secret until 1974. Early books hinted at this including Wing Commander Winterbottom and Bertrain (?) Fr. Both Polish and French claim to deciphering differed from the British. The Poles passed their info to the British, who went on to break the latest German efforts. Winterbottoms book largely inaccurate but caused much controversy since he claimed that breaking the code was the cause of Allied victory. Too simplistic an answer. Winter bottom occupied a peripheral position in the distribution of ENIGMA data, not in the deciphering or strategic use of the information. Did the P.M. suppress the intelligence regarding the bombing of Coventry? Information from a captured German pilot true or not? In an aside, Hinsley claims that Wm. Stevenson's book is inaccurate. ENIGMA particularly useful in revealing a method of accessing operational orders of the German air force, especially when and where attacks were to take place. Until an authentic record is produced many myths and errors will continue in the public domain.Questions (answers):Constant monitoring was necessary as the German forces changed their ciphers on a regular and/or operational basis. Germans had no reason to suspect that anything was wrong.The quality of codes: low, medium and high grades all used. The enemy never broke the highest grade Allied codes. Subjects: Hinsley, F.H. 398 Enigma, Development. 398 German Military/Naval Codes, W.W. II. 398

399 Kamoff-Nicolski, George, Mr., Dept. of National Defence, Foreign Affairs Analyst. Lecture: Soviet Aid to Third World Countries. Interviewer: none original sound tape reel (ca. 50 min.): 3 3/4 ips., 2 track Provenance: Reg Roy guest lectures series February 1981, UVIC. Restriction:none Side 2: Blank. Scope & Content: Reel: 1, Side: 1Canada criticized for a general lack of clout - too dependent on the U.S. nuclear deterrent. Treaties made to contain Russia and its sphere of influence. This resulted in many large U.S. and British bases. This circle was broken by arms aid provided by Russia to smaller countries. Very effective in the Near East. When the Western World rejected the supply of arms to Cuba, Russia filled the gap. Thus Russian influence spread. Market-driven arms supply and rejection of old colonial powers open the door to Russia. Libya is a major arms supply base for use by Russian foreign policy moves. The Russians are a significant military presence in North Africa. Nationalism is a considerable factor to be utilized. Canada did not actively oppose the spread of communist influence in former colonies. Russians efficient in supplying training personnel fluent in almost any foreign tongue. Thus it was easier to train Third World military. In his opinion Canada has a "head-in-sand" attitude toward much of foreign affairs. Criticizes NATO for a general lack of common purpose except maintaining the status quo. Much rationalization over our friendly "dictator-run" nations. Some aspects of successful U.S. interventions.Questions:Interesting Russian/Indian trade agreements includes licensing India to produce sophisticated Russian arms. India misused some Canadian aid to build a fishing port that was made available to Russian naval units. Canadians ignore what they do not want to hear regarding foreign affairs. American efforts often not very effective. Discusses armed forces pay also the Chinese army. Subjects: Kamoff-Nicolski, George. 399 Canada, reaction to Russian foreign aid. 399 Canadam criticized for each of interest. 399 Russia - Aid to Thirt World. 399 Russia - Influence in Africa, India, etc. 399 Third World - Military. 399

400 Kinnear, Prof. Lecture: 1967 Arab/Israeli War Interviewer: none original sound tape reel (ca. 45 min.): 1 7/8 ips., 2 track Provenance: Reg Roy guest lectures series no date, UVIC. Restriction:none Side 2: Blank. Scope & Content: Reel: 1, Side: 1The area of the war and the political conflict Pres. Nasser of Egypt originally had much influence. Some civil war in the Near East. Nasser losing influence. Considers ways to recover it. The Palestinian problem provided it. Israel retaliated against Syria and Jordan. The Russians promoted, for their own reasons, discord amongst the Arabs, particularly Syria and Egypt. Domestic unrest was another reason for Egyptian aggression. A Holy War became a popular cry. Egypt moved seven divisions into the Sinai. Arab hysteria mounted giving rise to a political dilemma for the Arabs. The U.S. faced a difficult choice; trouble whomever they supported. Israel had a shaky economy but was strategically strong and in a good position for a short war. Arab propaganda, available in Israel, helped strengthen Israeli morale. The Israeli gov't felt that a preemptive strike offered the best (and only) chance of a favorable outcome. Reasons for Arab strengths and the reasons for their loss. Israel controlled the air and their gamble in staking everything in a quick attack was effective. Mobility and flexibility were two keys. Several frontier changes favorable to Israel were gained. Points out that both the U.S. and Russia could have nipped the war in the bud had either had strong mobile forces in the Mediterranean.Questions: Subjects: Kinnear. 400 Egypt, unrest. 400 Egypt, military. 400 Politics, Near East. 400 Russia, Palestinian problem. 400 Strategy, Israeli, 1967. 400 United States, a dilemma. 400

401.1 Lane, R.J., Lt. Gen., D.S.O., D.F.C., Cdn. Forces (Ret'd) Lecture: "Bombing Strategy, World War II" Interviewer: none original sound tape reel (ca. 50 min.): 3 3/4 ips., 2 track Provenance: Reg Roy guest lectures series 25 March 1981, UVIC. Restriction:none

Scope & Content: Reel: 1, Side: 1First use of strategic bombing was during the Great War. Significance of bombing first realized by the Germans and continued by them. This caused the British to bring fighters back from France. Two factors in defence was the establishment of the Air Ministry and thus the R.A.F. Britain establish their own bomber force but the war ended before it could see action against Germany proper. R.A.F. Bomber Command est. in 1936. Air Marshal Trenchard great advocate. Some British aircraft not very effective but British Prime Minister held firm to idea of bomber attack. The Halifax, Lancaster and Mosquito were fine, effective aircraft. German anti-aircraft defences very good. British improved air navigation systems. U.S.A.F.'s daylight precision bombing. Heavy losses until fighter protection available. Pathfinder aircraft introduced. With heavy losses in Bomber Command serious "creeping" began, bombs short of target. In July 1943 the R.A.F. and the U.S.A.F. destroyed Hamburg. "Window" reduced aircraft losses. Fire-bombing very effective. 1943/44, the Battle of Berlin. Bomber Command paid attention to the transportation system. Many losses. Aviation life of an air crew, 14 trips (a "tour" was 30 trips). This amounted to heavy casualties. Despite the bombing civilian populations retained their morale.Questions: Control of bomber groups in the air, German industrial losses. Subjects: Lane, R.J. 401.1 Aircraft, bombers. 401.1 Bomber Command, British. 401.1 Bombing Strategy, W.W. II. 401.1 Development, prewar. 401.1 Losses. 401.1 NORAD. 401.1 Strategy & Tactics, Bomber Command. 401.1

401.2 Lane, R.J., Lt. Gen., D.S.O., D.F.C., Cdn. Forces (Ret'd) Lecture: "Bombing Strategy after World War II. Interviewer: none original sound tape reel (ca. 50 min.): 3 3/4 ips., 2 track Provenance: Reg Roy guest lectures series 28 March 1981, UVIC. Restriction:none

Scope & Content: Reel: 1, Side: 2Mentions air war against Japan, gradual use of incendiaries, area bombing. Surveys carried out on effectiveness of bombing campaign. Somewhat inconclusive results. Speer, of Germany, recounted the serious effects. The U.S., Russia, and Britain began work on intercontinental bombers. The Russians began to build a large air defence system, then nuclear weapons concentrating on rocketry. The U.S. Policy was one of containment, then deterrence. The large U.S. bombers were not truly intercontinental as they need forward bases in order to refuel, thus the bilateral treaties with foreign countries, esp. in the Mediterranean. The U.S. produced aircraft of extremely high technology, but very expensive. Emphasis changed to rocketry. Atomic weapons proliferated. U.S. established idea of flexible response with assured destruction. Conventional forces build-up advocated. U.S.S.R. produced an enormous missile development, both on land and in submarines. Need for control became evident. Russian "Backfire" bomber introduced followed by the U.S. B-1, state of the art. Emphasis switched to submarines. NORAD attack-warning system established. Salt I and II. Now Salt II is dead and Salt I is ineffective since it did not control R.&D. NATO is leaning toward "equivalent defence". U.S. reviving the B-1 bomber with up-dated electronics.Questions. Subjects: Lane, R.J. 401.2 Aircraft, bombers. 401.2 Intercontinental Bombers. 401.2 NORAD. 401.2 Nuclear Weapons. 401.2 Rocketry/Missiles. 401.2 Strategy & Tactics after W.W. II. 401.2 United States/Russian arms. 401.2

402 Leach, Barry, Ph.D., Douglas College Lecture: "Blitzkrieg" Interviewer: none original sound tape reel (ca. 50 min.): 1 7/8 ips., 2 track Provenance: Reg Roy guest lectures series March 1978, UVIC. Restriction:none

Scope & Content: Reel: 1, Side: 1Blitzkrieg was both a strategic and tactical innovation in order to bring about Hitler's dream of German living space. It was a method of reducing the horrors of trench warfare. Hitler believed strongly in mechanization. Recognized that Germany had over- stretched its ability at home and in war and was determined not to slip into that situation again. See "Mein Kampf". Politically he needed the support of the army, especially the senior Officer Corps. The General Staff was of extremely high quality but conservative. Guderian was an early enthusiast for mechanization who had a powerful ally in Hitler. Goering formed the new German air force basically on his Great War experiences, thus the emphasis on fighter aircraft. Some effort to produce four-engined aircraft (bombers) but this petered out in time. The result was a bomber force largely of two-engined fast medium bombers. The Spanish civil war provided useful training. A favorite Blitzkrieg principle of war was "concentration of force". Emphasis was on the moral fibre of the German people. Much propaganda - that of a military nature effective domestically as well as on prospective enemies. German generals were concerned that Hitler was moving too fast and exceeding the capability of the Germans to equip the army adequately. The 1939 treaty with Russia gave the Germans time and isolated Poland. Hitler wanted to attack the West immediately, but the Generals managed to get a postponement on the grounds that the army could not be effective in a winter campaign. When the invasion came through the Ardennes by won Manstein's plans, it was a masterful effort beautifully and vigorously executed. Mobility in warfare finally triumphed with massive force. For the British, Dunkirk was the result; for the French, attack and final defeat. (The original goal!) Subjects: Leach, Barry. 402 Development & use. 402 France - German invasion, 1940. 402 German air force. 402 German General Staff. 402 German Strategy, land & air. 402

403.1 Lindsey, George, Ph.D. Lecture: Strategic Weapons Deterrence. Interviewer: none original sound tape reel (ca. 50 min.): 3 3/4 ips., 2 track Provenance: Reg Roy guest lectures series no date (1970's) UVIC. Restriction:none Lindsey, George, Ph.D., Defence Research Analysis Establishment. Scope & Content: Reel: 1, Side: 1Critical point is the psychological factor, "what the other fellow thinks". Effectiveness (technical) and probability (psychological and political factors) not so readily calculated. Older examples of deterrence: Romans if you want peace, prepare for war. Psychological threats of death, for instance, can be very effective. e.g. Knowledge that entire populations could be put to the sword. Later economic as well as military considerations were major items. Nuclear fission changed all this, especially as more effective means of delivery were developed. Deterrence, originally unilateral (U.S.) is now bilateral as exists between the U.S. and Russia. There were some problems with a bomber-delivery system. A "fail-safe" system was invented. Rocket use was improved (solid fuel) to allow faster use. Submarine ballistic missiles provide almost invulnerable launch sites. The blanche of deterrence must be stable, no great desire for first strike, no hair triggers - no worry about precise numbers of weapons. Satellite observations very helpful. There is dancer in great increase in numbers or technical expertise, one country over another. Parity efforts are worthwhile. Subjects: Lindsey, George. 403.1 Missiles, Inter-continental. 403.1 Nuclear weapons. 403.1 Psychological factors, historic and modern. 403.1 United States/Russian parity. 403.1

403.2 Lindsey, George, Ph.D. Lecture: "Nuclear Arms" Interviewer: none original sound tape reel (ca. 55 min.): 1 7/8 ips., 2 track Provenance: Reg Roy guest lectures series 19 January 1977, UVIC. Restriction:none Lindsey, George, Ph.D., Defence Research Analysis Establishment. Reel: 2, Side: 1Historical background of nuclear balance. "Nucs" provided an increditable factor of increase in war-making potential. Once a country reaches a level of "many" nuclear weapons there is little difference in war capability, no matter that there might be a substantial multiplier, one country vis-a-vis another. Little defence available. The U.S. might have used nuclear weapons after W.W. II but chose not to. But not any more as nucs are so widely held. Inter-continental aircraft vulnerable to surface air missiles. Rocketry has expanded from relatively ineffective weapons to very reliable ones, particularly solid fuel ones. The Russians have many intermediate range missiles and much civil defence training. There is now a very stable balance of nuclear weapons. Strategic weapons systems, three offensive and four defensive. The later includes both land and sea launched missiles. Comments on various components of offensive/defensive systems. Note that looking at numbers alone can end in a sort of dead-end argument. The SALT agreements are now suspect.Questions:MIRVS. U.S. guidance system is of high quality. Lack of civil defence effort is psychological, not financial. Neither side has an effective first strike capability. i.e. disarm your opponent. Subjects: Lindsey, George. 403.2 Capability for War. 403.2 Defence. 403.2 Missiles. 403.2 Nuclear balance. 403.2 Strategic weapons systems. 403.2 404 Lund, Wilf, Cmdr., Cdn. Armed Forces (Navy) Lecture: Anti-Submarine Warfare Interviewer: none original sound tape reel (ca. 50 min.): 1 7/8 ips., 2 track Provenance: Reg Roy guest lectures series 25 March 1980, UVIC. Restriction:none

Scope & Content: Reel: 1, Side: 1Anti-submarine warfare: The destruction of the enemy in order to achieve command of the sea. Comment on early German efforts in W.W. II. Small submarines but a huge number of escorts required to combat them. Long range air cover, wide-spread warfare. Convoy system forced the submarines to concentrate - a war of attrition. Eventually the anti-submarine groups went on the offensive with great effect. Radar possibly the major technical innovation and the most effective. Many weapons, new submarines. Presently there are large numbers of submarines in the world, particularly Russian with many modern boats. Nuclear submarines are revolutionary and many cannot be caught by surface ships. Wireless communications through satellites. Comments on helicopters, passive towed arrays, torpedoes, integrated command and control systems, intelligence, evolving strategy. Sonar - weather and water conditions. More difficult in the North Atlantic. American aircraft carriers require large ASW assets. Perhaps not sufficient A/S ships at present. Training is expensive, important and difficult to do. This has an adverse effect on training. Complacency is a real danger, as evidenced by the Royal Navy between the wars. This can also be a public attitude as well. Comments on budget restraints and effect on defence, the greatest flexible budgetary item. At present the ASW situation is quite critical.Questions:Personnel for manning ships is a problem. Feels that too many assets going into carrier forces (U.S.) Subjects: Lund, Wilf. 404 Equipment & weapons. 404 Nuclear Submarines. 404 Public support required. 404 Strategy W.W. II (anti-submarine) 404 Warfare, Submarine weapons, etc. 404

405 McGill, Allan, Mr., Dept. of External Affairs Lecture: Canadian Foreign Policy Interviewer: none original sound tape reel (ca. 50 min.): 1 7/8 ips., 2 track Provenance: Reg Roy guest lectures series no date, (1970's), UVIC. Restriction:none

Scope & Content: Reel: 1, Side: 1Restoration and construction of a world order, peace, stability, etc. Monetary and economic factors. NATO started. Canadian efforts multiplied, in part by the establishment of new countries. Peace-keeping began a new era with Canada, then a fairly significant military power among the medium sized nations. A useful job. We first became involved in Africa and the West Indies. Also a certain frustration began with the United Nations. Changes in politics in Eastern Europe. Our involvement in Latin America has been small. Under Trudeau some shifting in emphasis began. Internal and external environments are challenging policy objectives. These include sovereignty, trade, monetary situations, freedom, social justice, democracy, etc., all affect foreign policy. External affairs can enhance our sense of country. Our French language is helpful in Africa. Sovereignty in the Arctic, and how much can we afford? Policy fields must be integrated to a larger degree. Many more government services have shown an interest in overseas factors that influence our domestic affairs.Questions:Canadian interests vs. American policy. Where are our differences and how to treat them? Subjects: McGill, Allan. 405 Canadian priorities. 405 External Affairs, Canada. 405 Peace-keeping, Canadian development. 405 Policy factors, very broadly applied. 405

406 McPherson, James, Mr., (ret'd) Gen. Mgr. C.P.R. Foreign Freight Dept. Lecture: Transportation in Canada, 1918-1968 Interviewer: none original sound tape reel (ca. 60 min.): 1 7/8 ips., 2 track Provenance: Reg Roy guest lectures series 1 April 1970, UVIC. Restriction:none Reel: 5, Side: 2Transportation facilities vital to the growth of the country, both internally and externally. Railway equipment has been vastly improved, often for special purposes. A highly regulated industry. Many standards set by various transportation associations. C.N.R. est. in 1922 from a number of rail companies (Grand Trunk Pacific and others). The P.G.E. was build to connect with the Grand Trunk and to open Northern B.C. A large expense to the shipping industry was the building and maintaining of docks, some being purpose-built for bulk freight. At present passenger ships are far fewer than freighters which have vastly increased in number. B.C. Coast Service. Some shipping traffic on interior lakes, to connect with the railroad. C.P.R. ships were registered in Britain and subject to British control, especially in war-time. The development of container ships and special loading/unloading equipment. Some problems in the trucking industry often due to provincial regulations. Railways used trucking to supplement their activities. 1897 regulations still affect freight charges, especially in grain shipping. The pleasure of traveling by rail in earlier periods could be very comfortable. Today, air travel does not provide the same level of "creature comfort". Subjects: McPherson, James. 406 Railways, Canada. 406 Shipping. 406 Standards & Regulations. 406 Trucking. 406

407 Manor, Frederick S. Mr., Foreign Correspondent (Prague) Times of London Lecture: "NATO To-day" Interviewer: none original sound tape reel (ca. 45 min.): 1 7/8 ips., 2 track Provenance: Reg Roy guest lectures series 4 December 1970, UVIC. Restriction:none

Scope & Content: Reel: 1, Side: 1NATO as defined by the free world. Note that international affairs can result in a mental weariness in those who are committed to it. Human behavior is slow to change. Patience is vital. NATO is only a military organization not held in high esteem by the public - they are weary of militarism. NATO is, however, a necessary military alliance. It must protect against the threat of Russian expansion which has been active in Europe and the Mediterranean. Canada and others must involve themselves in international affairs, but wisely. The moral charge obtained as a result of peace-keeping is not enough, in practical terms only a short term solution. Bilateral agreements are necessary for Russia, which is, in fact, spending vast sums on armaments. Russia will still go on pushing political expansion. Soviet policy regarding China and some others is a mass of contradictions. Believes that politicians are perhaps too conscious of public or media opinions. This hampers negotiations. NATO is crucial to our survival. Questions:It is necessary for Canada to be part of NATO. It is possible that war might be fought over Canada (air). Subjects: Manor, Frederick S. 407 International Affairs, effect on personel. 407 NATO - Moral & Political. 407 NATO - Crucial to survival. 407 NATO - Military origin. 407 Peace-keeping. 407 Russia. 407

408 Mason, R.A., Wing Commander, R.A.F. Lecture: The Battle of Britain. Interviewer: none original sound tape reel (ca. 50 min.): 1 7/8 ips., 2 track Provenance: Reg Roy guest lectures series 12 March 1971, UVIC. Restriction:none

Scope & Content: Reel: 1, Side: 1The military state of Britain in 1940. The principles of war that were or were not effectively used. Air groups. Radar. German deliberations. Overseas economic dependence seen as a British weakness. Hitler was receptive to peace feelers in mid-1940. German military thought regarding the invasion of Britain. Command of the air considered vital. Main effort: attack the enemy air force. Thus a clear priority of targets beginning August 5, 1940. Britain had to use many novice pilots. Heavy losses and signs of strain became obvious. In September the Germans attacked London instead of air force targets. The German estimate of R.A.F. strength was incorrect. Partly due to a change in the weather the Germans were unable to keep up the pressure. Also the distance and time required to reach London had increased thus allowing more British response time. Hitler finally decided that control of the air was not probable. Many factors contributed to this stand-off condition. Mason feels that Hitler had wrong strategic and tactical ideas. There were many staff errors that contributed to this.Questions: Subjects: Mason, R.A. 408 British reaction to air attach. 408 German Strategy & Tactics. 408 Royal Air Force. 408

409 Mazari, Prof. Univ. of B.C. Lecture: "Strategy in the nuclear age" Interviewer: none original sound tape reel (ca. 50 min.): 1 7/8 ips., 2 track Provenance: Reg Roy guest lectures series 9 April 1969, UVIC. Restriction:none

Scope & Content: Reel: 1, Side: 1Comments on the 1957 balance of power, security as between the U.S. and Russia. NATO security rests on the U.S. and Britain with the smaller powers being consumers of security. After 1958, when the U.S. became vulnerable to Russian attack, Europe became more important to the U.S. This resulted in a decline of cohesiveness in NATO. Great missile expansion, Polaris, Minute Man, etc. Both Russia and the U.S. felt that they had "assured destruction capability" (1962/3). A crucial point since there was no winning solution. The second strike capability keeps both fairly safe. War is a suicidal scenario for a rational leader. How to deal with this problem is difficult, banning the bomb is impossible unilaterally. Nuclear weapons are very difficult to use politically. Numerous examples exist. Thus only limited conventional wars are really possible. Korea was the first example of this in the Nuclear age. Similarly the threat of nuclear war is not viable - psychological limitations. The threat is only of use in neutralizing all-out war. The threat to use nuclear weapons lacks creditability unless the stakes are extremely high. Survival of the state for example. The status quo has been maintained by the existence of nuclear weapons. Military action is more than ever an instrument of diplomacy and therefore completely under the control of politicians.Questions: Subjects: Mazari 409 Balance of Power, 1957. 409 Deterrance, Strategic. 409 Military action, a diplomatic instrument. 409 Missiles, Nuclear. 409 NATO 409 Nuclear Balance. 409 Nuclear Weapons. 409 Nuclear Warfare, psychological limitation. 409

410 Munro, J.A., Prof. Lecture: Harry Stevens, R.B. Bennett, Cdn. Election of 1935. Interviewer: none original sound tape reel (ca. 45 min.): 1 7/8 ips., 2 track Provenance: Reg Roy guest lectures series March 1968, UVIC. Restriction:none Note that this is Side 2 (red tape leader). Side 1 has been used for a musical recording. Scope & Content: Reel: 1, Side: 2Stevens and Bennett were both back-benchers in parliament. Bennett arrogant, ambitious, dogmatic, competent, self-sufficient. Stevens was a great supporter of Bennett and eventually appointed to the Cabinet. They had serious disagreements and eventually parted ways. Stevens fought big business and was constantly under attack. Pressure applied to the Cabinet and Stevens finally resigned, but still held his seat. Finally he established the Reconstruction Party but was only able to elect one M.P., Stevens. The C.C.F. and the Social Credit Parties were able to elect a few opposition members. The Conservative Party would have supported Stevens against Bennett but Stevens would not consider opposing Bennett from within. Secondly, a National Party was proposed, well funded, but Stevens felt that he would be a mouth-piece for his corporate supporters. This lack of trust may have been a mistake. Thirdly, Stevens might have waited for Bennett to retired but Bennett fought Stevens and in the end brought both himself and Stevens down. The Reconstruction Party was the unfortunate result and for the times made some sense. Didn't like big business or big government. Stevens ran an almost evangelic campaign. The self-destruction of Stevens and Bennett left Mackenzie King to pick up the pieces. Stevens was held responsible for the disaster to the Conservative Party. The Reconstruction Party disappeared and at the age of 61 Stevens lost his seat in Parliament. Subjects: Munro, J.A. 410 Bennett, R.B., Prime Minister. 410 Conservative Party, Canada. 410 Election, Canadian, 1935. 410 Reconstruction Party. 410 Stevens, Harry. 410

411 Napier, John, Lt. Col. U.S.A.F. Lecture: "Special Operations" Interviewer: none original sound tape reel (ca. 50 min.): 1 7/8 ips., 2 track Provenance: Reg Roy guest lectures series December 1976, UVIC. Restriction:none Restricted: This is a non-attributable lecture. Scope & Content: Reel: 1, Side: 1Special operations, historically, in Canada and the U.S. began about 1755. A Canadian/U.S. unit in W.W. II gradually evolved into the Green Berets (U.S.). Rescue, special missions, clandestine operations, subversion, counter insurgency, psychological activities, etc. One of the oldest tools of war. (Aside: "destructive impotence", a good phrase for nuclear stand-off). Trans-national terrorism. The PLO is a good example and many others, extending to pre-biblical times. Napoleon actually caused guerrilla warfare by mistreating conquered populations. Conventional forces tended to ignore special operations troops. Example in the American Civil War. Lessons learned soon forgotten. In W.W.II Britain found that it could support resistance movements. Founded the S.O.E. Special U.S. units were formed in Europe and the South Pacific. The U.S. Special Forces were used in Europe before 1950. The U.S. Air Force had three units devoted to this work in Europe. Operated also in South-east Asia. Several instances of use in Vietnam. Israeli operations; a classic operation at Entebbe in Africa. The U.S. finally fully recognized the usefulness of special units - army, navy and air force - as national instruments of policy, and a relatively low cost one at that.Questions: Subjects: Napier, John. 411 Clandestine Operations. 411 Special Forces (U.S.) 411 Special Operations, history. 411 Subversion and Resistance. 411 Terrorism. 411

412 Pollard, M.E., Lt. Gen. R.A.F./R.C.A.F. Lecture: Air Warfare in Western Europe. Interviewer: none original sound tape reel (ca. 47 min.): 1 7/8 ips., 2 track Provenance: Reg Roy guest lectures series no date, UVIC. Restriction:none This lecture is No. 2 on Scope & Content: Reel: 1, Side: 1 of Auty, g.v. Scope & Content: Reel: 1, Side: 2, unknown material, thought to be recorded at 15/16 ips. Scope & Content: Reel: 1, Side: 1Luftwaffe part of German Military, not independent as R.A.F. was. Considers German air-crew first class, generalship somewhat lacking. Discusses this point. Americans outstanding. Size of German/British/French air forces. Campaign against Poland. German tactical doctrine. Troop carriers used in Norway, France and Low Countries. Paratroops and close coop with army. R.A.F. support for British and Canadian armies. Dunkirk. Defence of England, Battle of Britain, command and control system. German attacks on London, a German mistake; should have continued attacks on airfields. Points out early lack of R.A.F. navigating equipment for night use. Much improved by 1943. Compares R.A.F. and U.S. bombing strategies. Both had caused tremendous losses to German economy by late 1944, early 1945. In the end strategic bomber forces had become very effective. (Lecture end due to a shortage of time) Subjects: Pollard, M.E. 412 Luftwaffe. 412 German tactics & doctrine. 412 Royal Air Force. 412 Strategic bombing, German, British, U.S., W.W. II. 412 Warfare, Air. 412

413 Porter, Henry A., Rear Admiral, Canadian Forces Lecture: Integration and Unification Interviewer: none original sound tape reel (ca. 50 min.): 1 7/8 ips., 2 track Provenance: Reg Roy guest lectures series 2 April 1970, UVIC. Restriction:none

Scope & Content: Reel: 1, Side: 1The move toward Integration began with the appointment of a single Minister of National Defence (Broke Claxton). In 1950 a legal code was passed by parliament, the National Defence Act, followed by basic Queen's Regulations. In 1959 Maritime Headquarters was established and co-ordination of the services was carried out by the Chief of Staffs Committee. When Paul Hellyer became Minister of National Defence the process accelerated. In March 1964 the Government introduced a White Paper on Defence. It proposed integration, the melding of the organizational structure of the three services and unification, one common system of training, administration, and conditions of service. A Chief of Defence Staff was appointed. An emotional period of reorganization began in August, 1964. Various commands were established: Mobile. Maritime, Air Defence, Training, Transport, and Material (by Jan. 1966). The Minister then ordered a quickening of the process. Two schools of thought were current - evolutionary and revolutionary. That is, organize as you go or do it, then organize later. During July and August 1966 submissions and remarks before a Parliamentary Committee produced many emotional problems for the armed forces and produced nearly a complete new slate of senior officers. Under the Canadian Forces Reorganization Act the three services ceased to exist. Much work was required to make the Canadian Forces a meaningful organization. The effects of Integration and Unification: a single planning staff, budget, and programs, etc. Flexibility required to make it work. Trades and officer classifications changed. Integration has now become evolutionary but time is required to stabilize the process. Another factor is the Government holding down defence costs and inflation is a unknown factor, should allow 20-25% of the budget for new equipment. Government policy difficult. NATO? U.S. - Canada defence?Questions: Subjects: Porter, Henry A. 413 Canadian Forces. 413 Canadian Forces Reorganization Act. 413 Commands established (by Jan. 1967) 413 Parliamentary Committee. 413 Unification, Canadian Forces. 413 White Paper on Defence. 413

414 Prentice, J.D., Captain, R.C.N. (ret'd) Lecture: Personal experiences, Battle of the Atlantic. Interviewer: none original sound tape reel (ca. 30 min.): 1 7/8 ips., 2 track Provenance: Reg Roy guest lectures series 10 February 1971, UVIC. Restriction:none Incomplete. Scope & Content: Reel: 1, Side: 2 of F.S. ManorWar is an art as well as being scientific. When young failed naval staff course. Aircraft carrier experience. Advice: Don't disagree with senior officers - you might be right and cause great disapproval. Considers war at sea a "Filthy business". Survivors, ships sinking, etc. Convoy system. Based at Sydney N.S. early in the war. They were forced to make home-made depth charges out of milk cans. Eventually became "Senior Officer, Canadian Corvettes". An early staff officer. Many alterations to corvettes were required. Much time spent training new crews in ship-handling. Some tactics were learned from R.N. submarines; what they did not like! Prentice, Subjects: J.D. 414 Corvettes. 414 W.W. II. 414

415 Ranger, Robin, Prof. U.B.C. Lecture: "Post-war arms and strategy" Interviewer: none original sound tape reel (ca. 55 min.): 1 7/8 ips., 2 track Provenance: Reg Roy guest lectures series 20 March 1972, UVIC. Restriction:none Remainder of Side: 1 and also Side: 2 have been used to record interviews not connected to this series. Scope & Content: Reel: 1, Side: 1Nature of the changes. Conventional warfare becoming very expensive e.g. Israeli military spending. The cost/benefit angle. Guerrilla warfare is cost effective, especially of one is satisfied with human loss. Different forms of action - regular and degrees of clandestine operations. The latter is fairly easy to do. Third world countries do this internally, often with the use of their militias, few have an external capability. Political control is vital. Note that cost was high in the bombing campaign against Germany. At present nuclear deterrence is expensive and requires much human effort. Some wrong conclusions drawn as a result of the bombing of Hiroshima. Korea pointed out the difficulty of conventional warfare in mountainous country. Soviet capabilities vs. U.S. vulnerability. Some think it is possible to win a nuclear war, many more do not, regardless of technical advances. Special circumstances can foster conventional warfare with nuclear weapons acting as a stabilizer. Nuclear weapons can be, in retrospect, a cheap defence for those who can manufacture them. Notes that "The man with a rifle" is still very important.Questions. Subjects: Ranger, Robin. 415 Clandestine Operations. 415 Conventional Warfare. 415 Guerrilla warfare. 415 Nuclear weapons. 415 Third World Countries. 415

416 Rodney, William, Ph.D., Royal Roads Military College Lecture: "Canada and the Siberian Intervention, 1918-1919" Interviewer: none original sound tape reel (ca. 60 min.): 3 3/4 ips., 2 track Provenance: Reg Roy guest lectures series no date (c.1970), UVIC. Restriction:none A C.B.C. documentary compiled by Dr. Rodney and narrated by Leigh Taylor.Background history to intervention and comment by James Bannerman of the program CBC Tuesday Night.Reel: 2, Side: 2, blank. Scope & Content: Reel: 1, Side: 1Reasons for Canadian involvement. Some reserve expressed by the Canadian military. A potentially rich commercial market was seen. Some cabinet members of Borden's government had serious doubts. Expedition authorized in August 1918. The Canadians landed in Vladivostok to face very poor accommodation. Critical of other nation's troops. Many refugees. Impressions of Vladivostok. Desolate countryside, dirty city, picturesque population. Canadian troops had a rough voyage to Siberia, much sea-sickness, including the horses. The troops not happy with service after November, 1918. Some in Victoria before embarking (Dec. 21st) attempted to mutiny. For a short time the 239th Bn. refused to board the ship. Some public opposition to the expedition, opposed the interference in the internal affairs of another country. Some newspapers also opposed, including The Globe of Toronto. The Prime Minister was in favor of continuing. Government was concerned by the influence of left-wing radicals who opposed the intervention. Russian-speaking Canadian soldiers were discharged due to Bolshevik tendencies among some. Active recruiting continued at the Willows in Victoria. The R.C.M.P. contingent had adequate barracks outside Victoria. Much drill and caring for horses, and rigorous training in the country-side. Afternoons were quiet, close to boredom, so "busy work and play" was organized.Reel: 2, Side: 1Speed 3 3/4 ips, c. 40 minLecture: Siberian Intervention - continuation.The Canadians were proud of themselves but somewhat bored in Vladivostok. Hockey teams were organized. Troops told to avoid "certain pleasures" in town. Especially the large "red-light" district, seemingly under the control of the Japanese. Inflation was growing resulting in a strictly cash economy as far as the Canadians were concerned. Chinese collies hired to carry the food supplies. Shops and distribution well handled by the Chinese. Good military roads. Quoted letter from an English lady, tea for the sergeants. Church parade on Sunday afternoon - not popular. Impact of foreign troops. The Japanese were the most efficient; joined in Canadian sports. Surplus food given to refugee children. One Russian boy became the "mascot" and returned to Canada with the troops to live with a Canadian family. The Canadians were an independent body, not subject to foreign orders or committed to military action. More protests by the Canadian public re: the involvement. Decision taken to withdraw as early as December, 1918, to take effect in the Spring. Labor tension in Canada was a factor in with drawing and releasing troops slated for Siberia. The reason for retaining troops in Siberia was a fear of the Bolsheviks. Not considered valid by the Canadian public. First Canadians withdrawn April 19, 1919. Churchill listed Russian successes, pressed for continued intervention and finally asked for Canadian volunteers. Last Canadians left June 5, 1919. Subjects: Comments on the Siberian experience. Rodney, William. 416 Canada, Public Opinion. 416 Canadian Gov't. Policy - Siberia. 416 Japanese contingent. 416 Morale, Canadian troops. 416 Siberia, Canadian Intervention. 416 Vladivostok, 1918/19. 416

417 Ross, University Professor Lecture: The Franco-Prussian War, 1870. Interviewer: none original sound tape reel (ca. 50 min.): 1 7/8 ips., 2 track Provenance: Reg Roy guest lectures series no date, UVIC. Restriction:none Professor Ross speaks quickly and the sound is muffled in places. Scope & Content: Reel: 1, Side 2German General Staff, early history. Moltke the guiding force. All major units had a chief of staff who ensured that the army commanders wishes were activated. German railways were organizes largely for the benefit of the army. Total conscription instigated in the 1860's. Officers were promoted on merit. The French army on the other hand was poorly organized and less politically reliable than the German army. Comments on the Prussian-Austrian war with examples of weaponry and command. German army moves.... What the war was about... Neither side wanted much of what the other had... Diplomatic maneuvers. Muffled comments on the German invasion of France, Etc. etc. Subjects: Ross. 417 German Army, 1870. 417 German General Staff. 417 German invasion of France. 417 France, Army. 417

418 Ross, Stephen, Ph.D., U.S. Naval War College Lecture: "Technology and Strategy in W.W. II". Interviewer: none original sound tape reel (ca. 60 min.): 1 7/8 ips., 2 track Provenance: Reg Roy guest lectures series October 1983, UVIC. Restriction:none Side: 2, blank. Scope & Content: Reel: 1, Side: 1Comparison of German and French tanks in 1940 (roughly even quality). The Germans won because of superior strategy; the French lost because of strategic errors. Battle of Britain, strengths and weaknesses of German and British aircraft. Germans did not attack British radar installations. During 1940/1943 war in the desert. Best German weapon, the 88mm gun. The British did not use their 3.7 in A.A. gun in the anti-tank role. Prewar Russian/German collaboration in tank warfare. Stalin's cleansing the Russian officer corps did great damage, especially in tank officers. When war came Russia had many tanks but lacked armored doctrine. Prewar aircraft carriers were not considered offensive weapons. Japanese were the first to use offensively and had all six at Pearl Harbour. Japanese had best torpedo Submarines not used by Japanese against convoys, activity restricted to naval vessels. The U.S. very active in submarine warfare against commerce. U.S. torpedoes in the beginning were of low quality. Nuclear weapons. Start of the Manhattan project. Only two nuclear weapons built and then used. Technology by itself was rarely decisive; proper doctrine and leadership are the keys.Questions:Submarines. German nuclear research. Japanese naval doctrine. U.S. naval doctrine vs. the Japanese. Artillery, Missiles. French army effective but badly used, largely by Gamelin. Battle of Britain; air control. Eisenhowers' strategy in Germany. Subjects: Ross, Stephen. 418 Artillery, British and German. 418 Battle of Britain. 418 Japanese strategy. 418 Nuclear weapons. 418 Strategic consideration. 418 Tanks, French. 418 Tanks, German. 418 Torpedoes, U.S. and Japanese. 418

419 Stacey, C.P., Col. Directorate of History, D.N.D. Lecture: Mackenzie King and the Grand Alliance. Interviewer: none original sound tape reel (ca. 55 min.): 3 3/4 ips., 2 track Provenance: Reg Roy guest lectures series 27 January 1981, UVIC. Restriction:none

Scope & Content: Reel: 1, Side: 2The Prime Minister directed our affairs. King's attitude, etc. His diary threw much light on the man and his actions. "The North Atlantic Triangle" strictly a Canadian phrase. Knew many influential people, including Americans. By inclination, basically a Victorian. A spiritualist, especially in the period 1932-1939. Called up many British Liberal politicians, especially on his 60th birthday. Liberal support in Quebec was always a factor in King's politics. Mackenzie King was somewhat of a quiet but dedicated supporter of the British. The official external relations of Canada, with Churchill and Roosevelt, were King's. Points out that the friendship of Roosevelt and Churchill was lukewarm. Combined Chiefs of Staff set up in Washington. Canadians not represented nor advised of its' establishment. This was deemed not to be very polite and Canada continued to be ignored (Quebec Conference). King became a little worried about U.S. incursions into N.W. Canada although the Americans were not very interested in Canada except for war-time convenience.Questions:Canada (King) not very interested in the Pacific war, especially the recovery of British colonies. Subjects: Stacey, C.P. 419 Canada - Britain Relations. 419 Canada - U.S. Relations. 419 External Affairs, Canada. 419 External Affairs, King's direction. 419 420.1 Soward, F.H., Dean, U.B.C. Lecture: "Administration of Canadian Policy and External Affairs". Interviewer: none original sound tape reel (ca. 60 min.): 1 7/8 ips., 2 track Provenance: Reg Roy guest lectures series 11 April 1969, UVIC. Restriction:none

Scope & Content: Reel: 1, Side: 2, blank. Scope & Content: Reel: 1, Side: 1Refers to the annual report of the Department of External Affairs as well as their monthly magazine. Hints for those interested in joining the foreign service. The make-up of the DEA and its growth. Documents submitted to the cabinet. Duties and work of the Minister of External Affairs. The Under-Secretary of State is very important. He runs the service and is sometimes chief advisor. Inter-departmental committees. Departmental divisions include political, U.S., European, U.S., Far East, Commonwealth, and so on. NATO requires two divisions. Functional divisions: Economic, Legal, Finances, Personnel, Property, Organization. Slow growth until W.W. II. Great expansion since, both in foreign service and support staff. Follows a newly joined foreign service officer partly through his training period; memorandums, letters, committees, conferences, etc. Contacts are very important. The duties of Foreign Service Officers. Indicates the documents required in order to authenticate an ambassador's appointment and recall - both approved by the Sovereign. Also the overall instructions to the ambassador. Subjects: Soward, F.H. 420.1 External Affairs, Canada. 420.1 Foreign Service Officers. 420.1 Organization - Dept. of External Affairs. 420.1

420.2 Soward, F.H., Dean, U.B.C. Lecture: "Canada and Imperial Organization, 1887-1911" Interviewer: none original sound tape reel (ca. 75 min.): 1 7/8 ips., 2 track Provenance: Reg Roy guest lectures series 4 December 1969, UVIC. Restriction:none Sede: 2, blank. Reel: 2, Side: 1Excellent book: N. Mansergh, "Commonwealth Experiences" also "The Cambridge History of the British Empire", and many books by Canadian historians.Note: There may be problems with the recording at this point.Recounts many 19th century publications and organizations. The 1887 Imperial conference, an unwieldy group. Discussed naval matters, the C.P.R., a cable across the Pacific, a form of free trade, etc. Other conferences in 1894, 1897, and in 1907. Recommendations were made but could not issue orders. Anglo-German naval rivalry. In 1909 there was pressure for on increased navy with some colonial responsibility, but controlled by the Admiralty. Thus the Canadian Naval Act of 1910. Halifax and Esquimalt were to provide unimpeded access to Royal Navy vessels. The last imperial conference in 1911, all the Dominions (including Newfoundland). Canada and South Africa of joint opinion. See "The Round Table", an excellent quarterly on Commonwealth affairs. Canada not keen on being drawn into military situations, the incident at Agadir for instance, being strictly Britain's affair. Therefore Canada should not be too active in foreign affair. Canada was a member of Imperial defence committees and took a co-operative stance. Laurier's stance - Canada to be more independent as to its' contribution to a war.Questions:South Africa. When Borden came to power he reversed much of Laurier's Foreign Policy Stance. Personal comment re: End of Great War. Subjects: Soward, F.H. 420.2 Commonwealth. 420.2 Imperial Defence Committees. 420.2 Imperial Organization, Canada. 420.2 Laurier verses Borden. 420.2 Naval responsibilities. 420.2

420.3 Soward, F.H., Dean, U.B.C. Lecture: "Robert Borden, 1911-1919". Interviewer: none original sound tape reel (ca. 67 min.): 1 7/8 ips., 2 track Provenance: Reg Roy guest lectures series 4 December 1969, UVIC. Restriction:none Reel: 3, Side: 1Promoted Canadian nationalism but had the opposite foreign policy to that of Laurier. Indicates sources of information including Documents on Canadian External Relations, 1919. Borden Memoirs, 1938 and additional books and articles. Background of Borden. First elected in 1896, becoming Prime Minister in 1911. Devoted to the Empire but a very strong nationalist. Naval matters. Requests that Canada should be given influence in British Foreign Policy but no changes resulted before the Great War in 1914. Borden visited Britain in 1915 and made strong representations for Canada to acquire influence. Made further efforts in 1916. Finally he obtained access to the British War Cabinet. Canadians become more vigorous in foreign policy. Comments on the Imperial War Cabinet - Canada - General Smuts, South Africa. Imperial War Conference, 1917, Section 9. Borden fought for the Dominions as autominous members of the Commonwealth (and included India) with adequate involvement in Foreign Policy - and a Common Policy - which was a precursor to the Statute of Westminster.Side: 2, a continuation - ca. 44 min.During the 1918 conference Borden wanted direct communication established between Prime Ministers. He fought for revision of a centralized navy except for control in war-time. Borden attacked the British mishandling of the British army in France and the Canadian Corps in particular. He was well briefed and was particularly critical of the Passchendaele battle. Borden was requested to return to England in 1918 as the end of the war approached and immediately advised that Canada wanted full participation in the peace negotiations. This caused a stir. Solution found by General Smuts who suggested a British Empire delegation. French opposed to this, but finally agreed. Position of Canada re: League of Nations. Subjects: Soward, F.H. 420.3 Borden, Robert, 1911-1919 420.3 Canadian Foreign Policy, 1911-1919. 420.3 Canadian pressure for full recognition by Britain. 420.3 External Affairs, Canada, Borden W.W. I. 420.3 Imperial War Cabinet. 420.3 Imperial War Conference, 1917. 420.3 Naval affairs. 420.3

420.4 Soward, F.H., Dean, U.B.C. Lecture: "Borden, Meighen, King, and British Foreign Policy". Interviewer: none original sound tape reel (ca. 57 min.): 1 7/8 ips., 2 track Provenance: Reg Roy guest lectures series 22 January 1970, UVIC. Restriction:none Reel: 4, Side: 1Assorted bibliographic information Canada and the Commonwealth came of age internationally in the 1920's, beginning with the Peace Conference in 1919. International Labor Organization. Borden pushing for "full power" to sign treaties. Some opposition to this in the Canadian parliament, possibly due to a lack of understanding of the situation. Canada/U.S. relations and their much needed improvement advocated by Borden. Meighen often seen to be a little aloof, clever but not able to excite popular support. Very hard worker, great drive. Succeeded Borden but not very interested in foreign affairs. Anglo-American friendship deemed very important by Christie of External Affairs. Meighen very firm at Imperial Conference. Americans influenced. Once again the Dominions signed as individuals.Side: 2, a continuation.Mackenzie King - in the 1920's. Some references given, of critical importance. Educational attainments. Good labor negotiator. Elected to parliament in 1908. Much interested in immigration. Became a Laurier Liberal. Walked the tight-rope of Quebec/English aspirations. Much understanding and suspicions of British motives in foreign affairs, not a separatist, but a "family" supporter. In 1922 Canada did not become involved with Britain against the Turks. King gained from this decision, Meighen did not. Separate Dominion policies gained credence. British misunderstanding of Canadian position. Canada asserted herself with the signing of the Halibut treaty with the U.S. in 1923. Canada signed alone, without Britain, a precedent. King emphasized a separate Canadian policy, but after consultation, would follow Britain on major aspects of British policy.Questions. Subjects: Soward, F.H. 420.4 Borden, Robert, 1920's. 420.4 British Foreign Policy, 1920's. 420.4 Canada/U.S. Relations. 420.4 External Affairs, Canada, 1920's. 420.4 Halibut treaty, 1923. 420.4 Mackenzie King, 1920's. 420.4 Meighen, 1930's. 420.4

420.5 Soward, F.H., Dean, U.B.C. Lecture: 1923 to 1939. Interviewer: none original sound tape reel (ca. 50 min.): 1 7/8 ips., 2 track Provenance: Reg Roy guest lectures series 12 February 1970, UVIC. Restriction:none Reel: 5, Side: 1Review. Mackenzie King's position, Imperial Conference of 1923. First appearance of Irish Free State. King, Skelton, Lapoint. Skelton very able. King and foreign policy. New Labor Government in England combined with King's inexperience in foreign affairs caused problems to arise. Geneva Protocol. Locarno Treaty with which Commonwealth had a choice re: acceptance. Breakdown of centralized policy. Offers a list of reference books, 1926- 1939: the best in Soward's opinion. Constitutional troubles (Byng as Governor General) which leads up to the Statute of Westminster. King independently minded. Balfour Declaration. Defined Dominion status and appointment of the Governor General. Canada and the other Dominions had many rights conferred. Hume Wrong entered External Affairs. Embassies opened in U.S., Paris, Tokyo. Canada - League of Nations. R.B. Bennett and his rise to power. British parliament passes Statute of Westminster retaining Br. N. America Act features, especially in regard to amendments. Note: Some sound distortion at this point. Trade and tariffs. Dominion involved in Abdication crisis, orders in council required. Japan - China troubles. Canada established some trade restrictions. Italy invaded Ethiopia. Canada originally not very interested but followed the lead of Britain. Economic sanctions applied, including that for oil (advocated by Canada).Complete voice distortion follows. Subjects: Soward, F.H. 420.5 Bennett, R.B., Prime Minister. 420.5 Constitutional Problems. 420.5 Dominion Status. 420.5 Economic Sanctions. 420.5 Statute of Westminster. 420.5 Treaties. 420.5

420.6 Soward, F.H., Dean, U.B.C. Lecture: The Suez Crisis. Interviewer: none original sound tape reel (ca. 60 min.): 1 7/8 ips., 2 track Provenance: Reg Roy guest lectures series 19 March 1970, UVIC. Restriction:none Reel: 6, Side: 2References offered. Much hatred between Arab and Jew. Declining British influence a disturbing factor.French were against Nasser (Egypt) for his support of Algerian rebels. Joined Israel in opposing the Arabs. Russia providing arms to Egypt. American opposing the Arabs. Russia providing arms to Egypt. American opposed to Nasser and canceled financial aid, allowing Russia to step in. Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal. Britain prepared to use force to restore the Canal to previous control.American vigorously opposed to the use of force. British and French took the matter to the U.N. but to no avail. Finally the Britain and France invaded (Oct. 1956), not advising the Americans - Eisenhower furious - Israel invaded - Nasser blocked Canal. Prime Minister Anthony Eden should have been more open. Canada tried diplomatic solutions. Felt that Commonwealth might be upset and that Canada should not be too involved. Pearson pushed for some sort of international police force and after an important speech, eventually sparking the international force, for use with the consent of the parties concerned. Much negotiation required to implement a U.N. resolution with the proviso that no "great power" should participate in the force. Canada provided 1,000 men for the support services. Britain felt that she had to stop the war and the French reluctantly had to join her. Eden resign as prime minister early in the New Year. Efforts were made to obtain Israeli withdrawal, which they eventually did under cover of the U.S. force. British influence in the commonwealth was seriously compromised. The French were very annoyed at their "loss of face". Nasser gained prestige despite losing to Israel. Canada gained in diplomatic prestige (Nobel Peace Prize - Pearson). Note that our present influence not as strong as it was in 1957.Questions. Subjects: Soward, F.H. 420.6 British/French Alliance, Suez. 420.6 Eden, Anthony - British Prime Minister. 420.6 Israel, War, 1956. 420.6 Nasser, President of Egypt. 420.6 Peacekeeping, Canadian. 420.6 Pearson, Suez Crisis. 420.6 United Nations, Pearson. 420.6 United States Objections. 420.6

420.7 Soward, F.H., Dean, U.B.C. Lecture: External Affairs, 1867-1909. Interviewer: none original sound tape reel (ca. 65 min.): 1 7/8 ips., 2 track Provenance: Reg Roy guest lectures series Fall, 1970, UVIC. Restriction:none Reel: 7, Side 1Recommended books, published as late as 1968. The British government controlled Canadian foreign policy - a British Empire policy until the end of the Great War although administered by a Canadian department. Refers to the B.N.A. Act affecting treaties that might be of interest to Canada. The methods by which ambassadors are appointed and received. The Governal General originally represented the British Government as well as the Crown. Colonial governors. The Canadian government was closely tied to British policy, at least until 1926, through the Governal General. This was a complex and laborious system insofar as foreign consultation (and results) were to be obtained. The Canadian government could not negotiate directly with foreign governments. The Canadian Prime Minister could be, and was, appointed to British treaty negotiation committees where he was more a British negotiator than a Canadian one. After 1879-80 Macdonald pushed for a more independent foreign policy and included a seat in the British cabinet. Rejected since it was felt that such a member might disturb the governance of the British Empires. Instead the term High Commissioner was advocated and would be a person v. familiar with Canadian politics. Very capable men were appointed - Gault, Sir Charles Tupper. Lord Strathcona (1896-1918) of great personal prestige. The High Commissioner originally reported directly to the prime minister. Commissioner General appointed to Paris. External Affairs became important through foreign trade although originally required to operate through the British Government. In 1893 Sir Charles Tupper negotiated a treaty (with British assistance) with France, signed in 1895. This was a first. The British Government then instructed that the colonies could instigate treaty negotiations with the British Government leading.Reel: 7, Side: 2, continuation.ca. 50 min.The Boer War and the Alaska Boundary discussions were the cause of Canadian dissatisfaction, especially the latter and caused Laurier to virtually demand more influence in treaty making (1902). Grey, the Government General felt that the system of negotiating was very slow and awkward, especially with the U.S. A Royal Commission received requests for an external affairs capability. Some of these requests became fact in due course. A small External Affairs Department was finally initiated by Laurier (1908), placed before Parliament in 1909 and approved in June. A Secretary of State for External Affairs if required. This strengthened the position of the P.M. who could then have more influence over many departments. For example, Department of Transport which subsequently controlled the radio and telegraph systems. (Tape sound fades at ca. 35 min. and gradually returns.) First External Affairs Office in Ottawa was over a barber shop eventually moving to the East Block (1914). With that, the Foreign Consuls eventually began to appear in Ottawa.Questions. Subjects: Soward, F.H. 420.7 Alaska Boundary. 420.7 British Control of Canadian Foreign Affairs. 420.7 Imperial Conference, 1887-1911. 420.7 External Affairs, Dept. of, 1909. 420.7 Governor General, Canada. 420.7 High Commissioners, Canadian. 420.7 Macdonald, Sir John A. 420.7

420.8 Soward, F.H., Dean, U.B.C. Lecture: Canada and the Imperial Conferences, 1887-1911 Interviewer: none original sound tape reel (ca. 95 min.): 1 7/8 ips., 2 track Provenance: Reg Roy guest lectures series 25 November 1970, UVIC. Restriction:none Reel: 8, Side: 1Evolution of the Imperial Conferences: recommended books. After 1874 there was new enthusiasm for trade and pride in the expansion of the Empire. First Imperial Conference, 1887 - Queen Victoria's Jubilee. Main topics were defence and communications. Australia was nervous about German and U.S. expansion in the Pacific. The Canadian government was concerned about the "All Red Route" to the Far East and Australia. Cable to Australia and New Zealand first suggested. Later the self-governing colonies were considered. In 1897 all the colonies appeared for the Diamond Jubilee of Queen Victoria. The emphasis was on the advancement of the colonial status, particularly in trade matters. Laurier's attitude: opposed to tight trade ties with Britain. Canada needed to spend its' money internally not on Empire projects. In 1902 there was more discussion of increased colonial input. Canada did not contribute financially to Imperial Defence. In 1905 and 1907 Canada was more friendly and co- operative. Officially the word "Dominion" came into use. Conference decided to strengthen local autonomy. Some suggested that India should be included. Defence conference held in 1909 with better co-operation by Canada. Britain approved of "local" Dominion navies but Canada wanted authority to use navy primarily in the defence of Canada. Naval bill of 1910 and Conference of 1911 was Laurier's last. Many questions of uniformity of laws and regulations were decided. Canada and South Africa co-operated closely. Some pressure for a Commonwealth body. A Committee of Commonwealth Defence was brought into being with flexible membership, some permanent. Canada should be consulted, i.e. have a share in "High policy" prior to any military matters including war. Imperial Defence policy. After 1911 Borden had different ideas and offers sources re: Borden. Comment on "early" Borden who was Conservative leader and M.P. as early as 1900, was a loyalist and nationalist. He supported the navy and took on Foreign Affairs contribution to the Royal Navy. Borden also demanded a voice in Foreign Policy decisions.Reel: 8 Side: 2, continuationca. 10 min.Borden unable to obtain sufficient support for his Canadian naval ambitions. Again Canada demanded from Britain consultation rights in Foreign Policy (signing treaties, membership in the League of Nations, etc.), because of Canada's contribution in the Great War.Questions: Subjects: Soward, F.H. 420.8 Borden, Robert - Imperial Defence. 420.8 Foreign Policy Consultation. 420.8 Imperial Conferences. 420.8 Imperial Defence Policy. 420.8 Laurier, Wilfred, P.M. 420.8 Naval Affairs. 420.8 South Africa/Canada co-operation. 420.8

420.9 Soward, F.H., Dean, U.B.C. Lecture: Meighen, King, and the Breakdown of Commonwealth Foreign Policy. Interviewer: none original sound tape reel (ca. 60 min.): 1 7/8 ips., 2 track Provenance: Reg Roy guest lectures series 6 January 1971, UVIC. Restriction:none Reel: 9, Side: 1Borden believed in a single foreign policy for the Commonwealth. Comments from Prime Minister Meighen. Recommended books, 1920-25. Meighen, a first class mind, first elected to parliament in 1908, age 34. Solicitor General in Borden government, 1913. Essentially he was in the "Domestic sphere". Became P.M. when Borden retired. Believed in the British ethos but pressed for more independence although considered domestic questions of more importance. By 1921 External Policies were attaining status particularly with Britain, the U.S. and Japan. Britain was somewhat cool to Canadian involvement particularly with Japan. At a conference in 1921 Borden still thought it should be considering Commonwealth policy. Meighen thought it should be on naval policy and constitutional arguments. Many thought a constitution was unnecessary as the unwritten one had served well, and this prevailed. The British wanted to speak for everybody at the Washington Conference and this created a furore. Conservatives were defeated in an election. King became P.M. Suggested ref. books re: Mackenzie King. Early education of King and career moves. King had been isolated to some extent in Labor disputes, particularly in the U.S. He was keen on autonomous communities rather than independence in the Commonwealth.Reel: 9, Side: 2, continuesca. 45 min.King had a deep affection for the British people but this changed somewhat during the 1920's. Canada objected to British involvement in Turkey, 1922 and would not support Britain. King insisted on consulting Parliament and had general support in Canada for consultation not unwarned pressure. Halibut treaty with the U.S. in which Britain insisted on participation but down-played in the end to the extent that it was a Canadian treaty. Imperial Conference of 1923. Ireland appeared as a Dominion for the first time. Christie became prominent in Canadian external affairs for the first time, as did Skelton who was a tower of strength. King a strong nationalist. Lord Curzon attempted to insist that British policy should be for all. King maintained his independent attitudes. Subjects: Soward, F.H. 420.9 Borden, Robert - Commonwealth. 420.9 Commonwealth Status - Canada. 420.9 Dept. of External Affairs - Canada. 420.9 Foreign Affairs - Canada. 420.9 Mackenzie King, 1920's. 420.9 Meighen, 1930's (P.M.) 420.9

421 Stevenson, Leigh F., Air Vice Marshall, R.C.A.F. (ret'd) Lecture: Early Canadian Military Flying. Interviewer: none original sound tape reel (ca. 60 min.): 1 7/8 ips., 2 track Provenance: Reg Roy guest lectures series 8 January 1970, UVIC. Restriction:none Despite a reference to one, a second lecture was apparently not recorded. Scope & Content: Reel: 1, Side: 1In the introductory remarks Ait Vice Marshall Stevenson relates some of the famous early flyers and senior Air Force officers known to him. In about 1910 the Canadian Government began to take an interest in flying. The Great War gave real impetus to pilots and to aircraft. New facilities included the Curtis Flying School in Toronto and other schools established by the Royal Flying Corps. After the war Britain gave Canada about 100 aircraft and much related equipment. As a result the Canadian Government established an Air Board which organized the Air Force and other establishments. These included a government air service, aeronautical engineering branch, controller of civil aviation, etc. In these efforts they received much support from other departments which needed transportation, map production, customs work, Indian Affairs, etc. The Air Force flying boats. Hudson's Bay expedition. Anecdotes of Western and Northern flying. Mapping and photography were very important. Describes a forestry station. Fire patrols. In 1930 the air station serviced some 500 fires, often flying dawn to dusk. The photo detachment took about 100,000 photos and transferring the information to maps. In many cases gasoline caches had to be established in the bush by human carriers, a lengthy process. Questions:Primitive instrument flying. - Parachutes provided in 1925. - The work produced excellent pilots, some whom became expert commercial bush pilots. Subjects: Stevenson, Leigh F. 421 Photo-mapping - Canada. 421 Royal Canadian Air Force, Established. 421 Royal Flying Corps. 421

422 Teller, Edward A., Ph.D. Lecture: Can Western Europe be Defended? Interviewer: none original sound tape reel (ca. min.): 1 7/8 ips., 2 track Provenance: Reg Roy guest lectures series 18 September 1976, UVIC. Restriction:none Unfortunately this lecture is not available since the recording speed is too slow to be played on our equipment. Subjects: Teller, Edward. 422

423 Thorneycroft, Major Gen. Canadian Forces (Air) Deputy C. in C. NORAD Lecture: A Brief Overview of NORAD. Interviewer: none original sound tape reel (ca. 50 min.): 3 3/5 ips., 2 track Provenance: Reg Roy guest lectures series 10 March 1981, UVIC. Restriction:none Side: 2, blank. Scope & Content: Reel: 1, Side: 1Posted to NORAD in 1980. Canadian and American forces. Mission: To provide warning of ballistic missile attack on North America providing 30 min. warning time from Russia, sea launching, 12-15 min. This allows time to make rational decisions. Secondly, monitors space activity. Includes a world-wide system of observation stations. Thirdly, to protect North American air space, including defence against manned bombers. Surveillance, defence, command and control are the three areas of responsibility. Eight air space defence regions report to command centre in Cheyenne Mountain, Colorado. The facility is designed to be self-sustaining for 30 days. Interior buildings are mounted on shock absorbing springs. Reaction to manned bomber threat - as bombers improve so must fighter aircraft. Space shuttle an important part of the defence system. Satellites will be serviced by the space shuttle. Space observation increasingly important. Over 4,000 space objects are tracked. Laser a good candidate for defence use. NORAD continues to evolve to changing threats.Questions (answers)Established that as few as 30 to 60 Russian bombers might gain access to NORAD bases. Much funding required to track in-coming missiles, the earlier the better. Cruise missiles. Retaliation. Massive re-equipment of computers. Satellite interception. Russians about 60% successful. Radar gaps in the Dew Line, well known to Russians and is penetrable. Errors can occur in land-line communications. Replacement needed. Subjects: Thorneycroft. 423 Air Defence network. 423 Communications, satellite, radar, etc. 423 NORAD, Establishment and Role. 423 Space observation. 423

424.1 Tovell, Freeman M., Mr., Dept. of External Affairs (ret'd) Lecture: Canadian Dept. of External Affairs, 1920-1970. Interviewer: none original sound tape reel (ca. 50 min.): 1 7/8 ips., 2 track Provenance: Reg Roy guest lectures series 1981?, UVIC. Restriction:none Tovell, Freeman M., Mr., Visiting Distinguished Scholar (Formerly Dept. of Ext. Affairs).Study question: Pearson: Isolation can never be a principle of policy. Scope & Content: Reel: 1, Side: 1Canada gradually and radically changes its' foreign affairs - began by differing from that of Great Britain. International recognition of Canada as an independent country started. Turkish crisis in 1922 was first real break with British Policy. The Canadian Parliament was to decide, not to be an automatic follower. First treaty signed by Canada was the Halibut Treaty with the U.S. Next, the Locarno Treaty 1925, that specified that the Dominions were not necessarily involved with all terms. The Balfour Declaration 1926, produced equality of the Dominions within the British Empire. In 1927 the Governor General ceased to be the representative of the British Government. Replaced by a high Commissioner. Treaties with the U.S. In 1939 Sept. 10, Canada declared war on Germany, a week after Britain. This was recognized by the U.S. by including Canada in their Neutrality Act. Mackenzie King the real author of our Foreign Policy, governed somewhat an isolationist tendency of the Canadian public. King was probably pro-British but certainly not a blind follower. He distrusted European countries. Support of the League of Nations in the 1930's not particularly strong. The areas not well-covered included Ethiopia and Adolf Hitler whom King badly misjudged. King worried about rearmament by "Doubtful nations" and began a modest rearmament plan. In the post-war period we were a "Middle power". In 1946-1957 "The Golden Age of Canadian Diplomacy", Canada was an active participant in world affairs. Priorities were: No. 1. Active involvment in a safe and peaceful world, No. 2. Full support for the U.S., No. 3. Major contribution to Economic Recovery in Europe, No. 4. Support of Commonwealth, No. 5. Program of technical assistance to less developed countries. Beginning of NATO, 1949. Policy carried on by St. Laurent. NATO was not just a military alliance it was a concept of an Atlantic community. Canada supported the U.S. through the Korean war. The Suez crisis brought about an Emergency Peace-keeping Force, originally proposed by Pearson. Canada played a middle- man role in this crisis, between U.S. and Britain. Also involved when many former British colonies wished to become republics but also members of the Commonwealth. Canadians generally in support of Canadian Foreign Policy. Our country had a high reputation abroad.Questions. Subjects: Tovell, Freeman M. 424.1 External Affairs - History. 424.1 Foreign Aid, Canadian. 424.1 Foreign Policy, Priorities. 424.1 Mackenzie King, Foreign Policy. 424.1 Peacekeeping (Suez) 424.1 Rearmament. 424.1 United Nations/Canada. 424.1 424.2 Tovell, Freeman M., Mr., Dept. of External Affairs (ret'd) Lecture: Canadian Department of External Affairs. Interviewer: none original sound tape reel (ca. 50 min.): 1 7/8 ips., 2 track Provenance: Reg Roy guest lectures series 1981?, UVIC. Restriction:none Tovell, Freeman M., Mr., Visiting Distinguished Scholar (Formerly Dept. of Ext. Affairs) Scope & Content: Reel: 1, Side: 2Lists recommended reading. Covers ground after 1957. Canada played a role far beyond its stature on the world scene. NATO, Peace-keeping, United Nations, Commonwealth, and capital development programs. Public opinion driven. Conservatives came to power in 1957. Fundamental agreement on the basics of foreign affairs with several conservative aspects. Disarmament was a favorite with Howard Green (the Minister). Consultation in NATO was of great importance - several examples. The Commonwealth, considerable changes undertaken - Defence - NORAD was a difficult undertaking politically. Acquisition of weaponry - Bomarc, the Arrow which was suitable for North American defence but not widely adaptable. Nuclear weapons, for Bomarc - for aircraft - the army and caused emotional problems as well as political ones - a growing split in the Cabinet for one. Problem climaxed with the Cuban missile Crisis in the early 1960's. Diefenbaker was annoyed that he was not fully informed regarding NORAD. Pearson period not covered here to any extent. Trudeau had an academic interest in Foreign Affairs amid much dissension. A full review was required. Trudeau thought that foreign policy did not come to terms with domestic needs. Too slow in coming to terms with changes in the world. It lacked a proper national foundation to reconcile our competing internal ideas. What about new world countries. Also growing aspirations of Canadian provinces? Foreign policy booklets were produced to educate the Canadian public. Priorities: No. 1. Fostering economic growth, develop our international trade, No. 2. Safeguard Canadian sovereignty, territorial integrity and vital interests, No. 3. Working for peace and security, peace-keeping, arms control, peace-keeping, No. 4. Promoting social justice, No. 5. Enhancing the quality of life, social reforms, etc., No. 6. Harmonious natural environment, pollution, etc. Pearson had different priorities. Did not hold economic growth as "Number One". Trudeau forced a reduction of forces in NATO. Defence Department wanted to increase European involvement but this was not done. Foreign aid increased. European Common Market could cause Canada trouble in trade. Relations with the U.S.A. only touched upon. Subjects: Tovell, Freeman M. 424.2 Avio Arrow, Bomarc, etc. 424.2 Conservative Government - Canada, 1957. 424.2 External Affairs, Dept. of. 424.2 Foreign Policy, Canadian Priorities. 424.2 NATO. 424.2 NORAD. 424.2 Nuclear Weapons, Canadian. 424.2

424.3 Tovell, Freeman M., Mr., Dept. of External Affairs (ret'd) Lecture: 1945-1960 St. Laurant and Pearson. Interviewer: none original sound tape reel (ca. 50 min.): 3 3/4 ips., 2 track Provenance: Reg Roy guest lectures series 25 March 1981, UVIC. Restriction:none Tovell, Freeman M., Mr., Visiting Distinguished Scholar (Formerly Dept. of Ext. Affairs)An over-view to An over-view to History 230 in three parts: Scope & Content: Reel: 1, Side: 11920's Treaty of Versailles and an Independent Foreign Policy.1930's Non-involvement in Foreign Affairs. Scope & Content: Reel: 1, Side: 2ca. 50 min. Speed 3 3/4 ips., 27 March 1981Covers Canada's influence, beyond our size and resources and it required some dedication to maintain our newly won stature. This was willingly given. St. Laurant and Pearson in complete accord. Sketch of their early lives. National unity must be reflected in foreign policy. Political liberty. Respect for the rule of law, externally. Policy must acknowledge "human rights" Willingness to accept international responsibilities. Collective security. Support the Commonwealth and offer technical assistance - Columbo Plan the first. NATO, military commitment Canada and the U.N. with Pearson. Emphasizes the personal element between diplomats and leaders as extremely positive.Questions. Subjects: Tovell, Freeman M. 424.3 Collective security. 424.3 Foreign contacts expanded. 424.3 Non-involvement in Foreign Affairs, 1930's. 424.3 St. Laurant & Pearson, 1945-60. 424.3 Treaty of Versailles and an Independend Foreign Policy, 1920's. 424.3

425 Tugwell, Maurice, Brig. Lecture: Terrorism. Interviewer: none original sound tape reel (ca. 45 min.): 3 3/4 ips., 2 track Provenance: Reg Roy guest lectures series 26 November 1980, UVIC. Restriction:none Scope & Content: Reel: 1, Side: 1Political terrorism is a violent process: premeditated criminal technics for political ends. Mentions several causes, most likely where alienation of persons occur and where the culture is violent - minimal social controls, existence of "no go" zones, etc. The attitudes of people must be changed. Propaganda used to raise support and to decrease support for the government. Methods: political, psychological, tactics. Carefully organized attacks. Create uneasiness. Terrorists: no moral restrictions. Organization usually in the form of 3-5 person cells. They may have a legal support group of some sort. Governments may support terrorist groups for their own ends. Leadership: both military and political leaders. Infrastructure to infiltrate and socially spread downward. Properly organized (poses the most important factor) it can be very effective. Others: supplies, safe housing, recruiting, intelligence, plans, etc. Plans approved by a central committee. Internal security carefully screens recruits. Possible support of local politicians. Immigrants useful. Tactical efficiency may be of a high order, perhaps even better than counter terrorism efforts. Economic influence can be large, airlines blackmailed, etc. Highly technical civilization makes things easy for terrorism efforts. Economic influence can be large, airlines blackmailed, etc. Highly technical civilization makes things easy for terrorist organizations, travel, communication, wide-open television, newspapers, etc. Sophisticated arms. The future holds more of the same. Regrets that no time for discussion of government responses: short of time.Questions:Urban guerrillas, not guerrillas really but terrorists. Some of the New Left - the process is the thing, winning is not important in some cases. e.g. the Bader? Meinhof gang in Germany. Subjects: Tugwell, Maurice. 425 Culture (favourable) 425 Government support. 425 Leadership. 425 Organization, Methods, Influence. 425 Political Terrorism, defined. 425 Urban guerrillas. 425 426 Weeks, Berry, Ph.D., Vancouver City College Lecture: Reforms in the British Army after the Crimean War. Interviewer: none original sound tape reel (ca. 50 min.): 1 7/8 ips., 2 track Provenance: Reg Roy guest lectures series no date, UVIC. Restriction:none Sound somewhat muffled. Scope & Content: Reel: 1 Side: 1Reforms came from failure not success and many reforms were small. British superiority and conservatism hindered the recognition of the need for reform. Crimea was a failure of supply and organization. The command system was very cumbersome with several semi independent bureaucracies. On top of that the purchase of commissions was common which often resulted in rank without experience or skill. Reorganization of the Royal Military College and other institutions resulted in the first staff college 1860. The study of military matters was encouraged, a novelty in the British army. The War Office was established in the 1870's bringing the army under a more unified command. General Wolesely promoted many reforms, often against considerable opposition. Terms of active service were reduced and an additional period of reserve service was established. Standards of enlistment were raised. Discipline was made more practical. The army regimental system was modified. Home and overseas units were reorganized, largely by connecting overseas with home units. Local brigade recruiting was established and pay was increased. Uniforms improved. Weaponry improved despite opposition, mostly due to misplaced satisfaction with existing equipment. Light Infantry problems were addressed. The British Square remained popular until the end of the 19th century. Slow to change were medical and hygiene problems. Opposition still flourished but there was an intellectual awakening. In the Great War the Canadian Corps was a sterling example of a large formation excellently organized (compared to some British organizations with vestiges of regimental organization still haunting their commanders). Subjects: Weeks, Berry. 426 British Army, 19th century. 426 Canadian Corps (W.W. I), comparison. 426 Equipment. 426 Service, terms of. 426 War office established. 426

ROY, REGINALD

Accession 92-065

Location: 02/05/39-40

Box 1

W.W.II Intelligence - Study -published papers -Security Intelligence Review Committee -papers

SHERWOOD LETT: His Life and Times -ts, uncorr. -mss, holo corr.

THE VANCOUVER CLUB -(history) -mss, holo corr.

Box 2

Strategic Studies -Speakers' files 1968-81

Accession 93-049 Roy, Reginald Herbert

Canada. National Defence. Historical Section (G.S.) 36 Reports. Box 1 Unnumbered Report by Major Sesia. Pp. 12-95 "Sicilian Landing and Campaign [26 June -1 Sept. 1943]" 14 Sicilian Campaign July-August 1943. 18 Campaign in Southern Italy September-December 1943. 25 1 Cdn Corps, 22 Sept 44 to 28 Oct 44: From the Marecchia to the Ronco. 31 1 Cdn Corps, 28 Oct 44 to 27 Feb 45: The Capture of Ravenna, the Advance to the Senio and the Winter Line. [39] Operations of 1 Cdn Corps in North-West Europe, 15 Mar - 5 May 45. TS with holograph corr. [54] Canadian Participation in the Operations in North-West Europe, 1944. Part I: The Assault and Subsequent Operations of 3 Cdn Inf Div and 2 Cdn Armd Bde, 6-30 Jun 44. CTS in two binders. 64 The Reorganization of the Canadian Militia, 1936. 74 Offensive Air Support of 1 Cdn Army during Operations in North-West Europe. 121 Canadian Operations in the Liri Valley (Italy) May-June 1944. 126 Canadian Operations in Sicily, July-August 1943. Part I: The Preliminaries of Operation "Husky" (The Assault on Sicily.) [Lacks maps 1 + 2.] 127 Part II: The Execution of the Operation by 1 Cdn Inf Div. Section 1: The Assault and Initial Penetration Inland. 129 Canadian Operations in Italy, September-December 1943: Preliminary Report. [Lacks 2 maps.] 135 Canadian Operations in Sicily, July-August 1943. Part II: The Execution of the Operation by 1 Cdn Inf Div. Section 2: The Pursuit of the Germans from Vizzini to Aderno 15 Jul-6 Aug. 143 Canadian Operations in Italy 4 Jun 44 - 23 Feb 45. 146 Operations of 1 Cdn Army in North-West Europe, 31 Jul - 1 Oct 44. (Preliminary Report.) 152 The Concluding Phase: The Advance into North-West Germany and the Final Liberation of the Netherlands, 23 Mar - 5 May 45. 154 Clearing the Scheldt Estuary and Opening the Port of Antwerp: Operations of 1 Cdn Army in North-West Europe, 1 Oct - 8 Nov 44. (Preliminary Report.) 155 Operation "Veritable": The Winter Offensive between the Maas and the Rhine, 8-25 Feb 45. (Preliminary Report.) 158 Operations of the 1st Canadian Armoured Brigade in Italy, May 1944 to February 1945. Part I, the Gustav and Hitler Lines. 160 --"-- Part II, the Advance to Florence, 3 Jun - 1 Sep 44. 161 Canadian Operations in Italy, October-November, 1943. 165 Operations of 1 Cdn Inf Div and 1 Cdn Armd Bde in Italy, 25 Nov 43 - 4 Jan 44. 169 Canadian Participation in the Operations in North-West Europe, 1944. Part III: Canadian Operations, 1-23 August.

93-49 page 2 Box 2 (Doc Case)

170 Operation "Timberwolf": The Movement of 1 Cdn Corps to the Mediterranean, 1943. 171 Operation "Blockbuster": The Canadian Offensive West of the Rhine, 26 Feb - 23 Mar 45. (Preliminary Report.) 173 The Watch on the Maas, 9Nov 44 - 8 Feb 45. 175 Operations of the 1st Cdn Armoured Bde in Italy, May 1944 to February 1945: Part III: The Gothic Line. 178 Canadian Operations in Italy, 5 Jan - 21 Apr 44. 179 Canadian Operations in the Liri Valley, May-June 1944. [cf. 121] 181 Operation "Goldflake", the Move of 1 Cdn Corps from Italy to North-West Europe, February-March 1945. 183 Canadian Participation in the Operations in North-West Europe, 1944. Part IV: First Canadian Army in the Pursuit (23 Aug - 30 Sep). 184 Part V: Clearing the Channel Ports, 3 Sep 44 - 6 Feb 45. 185 Operation "Veritable": The Winter Offensive between the Maas and the Rhine, 8-25 Feb 45. 187 Operations of 1 Cdn Corps, 4 Jun 44 - 24 Sep 44: The Breaking of the Gothic Line and the Capture of Rimini. 188 Canadian Participation in the Operations in North-West Europe, 1944. Part VI: Canadian Operations, 1 Oct - 8 Nov. The Clearing of the Scheldt Estuary. [cf. 154]